Paderanga vs. CA – 247 SCRA 741 (1995) Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24,
1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner
Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition
which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to
be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an
amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple
murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of
the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information,
filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog
City,  had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused
1
suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit,
Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard
the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later
escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the
present.  2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was
implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated October
6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein
petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well,
Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case.
Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein,
said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but
which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner
as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag
family.
3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de
Oro City from the case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the
Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was
finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a
second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this
Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs.
Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick
F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en
banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained
the filing of the second amended information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with
the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension
but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel,
filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the
trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and
the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5,
1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail.
Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant
 Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's
Office appeared for the prosecution. 5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel
manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that
in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office,
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was
neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that
they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail
judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo
announced that he was waiving any further presentation of
evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5,
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed
to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and
posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned
and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and
attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty
(20) days later on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who
allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day
after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated
March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals
through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and
the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on
November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that
they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of
petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of
the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that
petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which
reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident.
Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not
afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail
contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court
in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,  his filing of the aforesaid
9
application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the
latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and
purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words,
the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a
pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody
of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record
negates the existence of such strong evidence as would bar his
provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by
reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further
presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and
whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound
the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural
due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil
action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an
unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the
equities involved in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished
by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before
any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule.
Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance
at the trial.  As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's
10
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody
over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by
his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.  As this Court has put it in
11
a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused
could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.  Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,  where the
13 14
petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder
went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the
bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court
categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for
admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have
either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their
freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional
release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to
"all persons"  where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course,
15
subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the
custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of
the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112
of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.  in this light, the ruling, vis-
17
a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,  should be
18
explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said
petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from
serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular
mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for
her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in
view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order
against her, she question the jurisdiction of that court over her
person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside
from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never
personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her
arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own
representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had
earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively
submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had
indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at
that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as
being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof
he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to
the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the
trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an
arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.  The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
19
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined
to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel,
emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail
court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not
then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The
 prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly,
it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in
the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a
kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court
and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers,
he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his
person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court;
secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual
whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally
recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent
to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts
from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to
the submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement
at the hospital on account of an acute ailment, which facts were
not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a
manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the
authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis
Oriental Chapter.  In other words, the motion for admission to bail
20
was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former
practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the
authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened
in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to
obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should
the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before
conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended,
now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal
nature  and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the
21
custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded
every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the
outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court
of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where
the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment  and the evidence of guilt is
23
strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to
bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of
course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically
determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions
to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court,  is required with the
24
participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.  Of course, the burden
25
of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the
prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may
resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.  If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
27
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's
order in respect of the motion or petition is void.  At the hearing, the
28
petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.  When,
29
eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong.  The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of
30
their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was
that the law requires. 31
that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was
waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the
of procedural due process when the court below allowed Assistant real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office to readily answered in the affirmative.
appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick
P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor The following exchanges bear this out:
expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the
motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no
authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in I was informed to appear in this case just
opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound now Your Honor.
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution
was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
COURT:
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office
Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor
received a copy of the motion as early as
Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an
October 28. There is an element of
authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was
urgency here.
sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This
authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on
July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was
done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional only informed just now. The one assigned
State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo here is State Prosecutor Perseverando
to enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in Arena, Jr. who unfortunately is in the
said criminal case.  It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the
32 hospital attending to his sick son. I do not
same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana know about this but before I came I
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous received an instruction from our Chief to
hearing in said case.  Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its
33 relay to this court the stand of the office
receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State regarding the motion to admit bail. That
Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the office is neither supporting nor opposing it
prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992. and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was
allegedly not familiar with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly COURT:
instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office Place that manifestation on record. For
received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, the record, Fiscal Abejo, would you like to
that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to formally enter your appearance in this
manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting matter?
nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting
 PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office
represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo
Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the
Court to understand that in effect, at least,
the prosecution is dispensing with the
presentation of evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . .
. justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to
submit the incident covered by this
particular motion for resolution by this
court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. 34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the
instructions of Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no
intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this should be so
notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting
nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to
the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not
be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper
forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory
hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that
such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,  it was stressed
35
that where the trial court has reasons to believe that the
prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must
inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very
recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21,
1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor,
Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison,   the Court, citing Tucay
36
vs. Domagas, etc.,   held that where the prosecutor interposes
37
no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is
really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could
therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards its order
granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5,
1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly
reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the
waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence
of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting
through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be
provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing
that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever
committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
 As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable period of
time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional  
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application
for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial Footnotes
court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day
of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more
1 Venue was later transferred to the Regional Trial Court
than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have
of Cagayan de Oro City, per Administrative Matter No. 87-
wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion.
2-244; Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5.
Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy
of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point 2 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5-6.
for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People. 3 Ibid., id., 6.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the 4 Ibid., id., 7.
indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it
questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the 5 Ibid., id., 22.
omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more 6 Ibid., id., 23.
than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be
exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which 7 Ibid., id., 23-25; Rollo. 9-11.
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against
petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before 8 Ibid., id., 26-30; Rollo, 7-8, 56-58.
the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had
ensued in the court below with the active participation of
prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, 9 G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633.
the definitive rule now in that the special civil action
for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three 10 Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et al., L-31665, August 6,
months,  the same to be reckoned by taking into account the
38 1975, 66 SCRA 38.
duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same. 39 11 Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., supra, Fn. 9.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- 12 Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, etc., et
G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the al., L-35612-14, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA
resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 369, citing Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., L-14657,
29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 888.
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion
for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET 13 Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-
ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail 1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778.
Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby
REINSTATED. 14 Supra, Fn- 12.

SO ORDERED.
15 De la Camara vs. Enage, etc., L-32951-2; September
17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
16 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, et al., 75 Phil. 634
(1945); Manigbas, et al. vs. Luna, etc., et al., 98 Phil. 466
(1956) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., supra.
17 Dinapol vs. Baldado, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-92-898,
August 5, 1993, 225 SCRA 110.
18 Supra, Fn. 9.
19 Section 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
20 Rollo, 101-102.
21 People vs. Donato, etc., et al., G.R. No. 79269, June
5, 1991, 198 SCRA 130.
22 De la Camera vs. Enage, etc., supra, Fn. 15.
23 Sec. 7, Rule 114, as amended; see also Borinaga vs.
Tamin, etc., A.M. Mo. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993,
226 SCRA 206.
24 Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106087, April
7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397; Aurilio, Jr. vs. Francisco, etc., et
al., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA
283.
25 Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., supra, Fn. 23.
26 Section 8, Rule 114, as Amended.
27 People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al., G.R. No. 81389,
February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 489; Lardizabal vs. Reyes,
A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA
640.
28 People vs. San Diego, etc., et al., L-29676, December
24, 1968, SCRA 523; Carpio, etc., et al. vs. Malalang,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 78162, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 41.
29 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); Beltran vs.
Diaz, et al., 77 Phil 484 (1946).
30 People vs. Casingal, et al., G. R. No. 87173, March
29, 1995.
31 Baylon, etc. vs. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6,
1995.
32 Rollo, 69, 106, 115-116; Annex "A," Petitioners Reply.
33 Ibid., 105.
34 Ibid., 75-77.
35 Supra, Fn. 16.
36 Supra, Fn. 31.
37 A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.
38 Caramol vs. National Labor Relation Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 102973, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA
582, citing Philec Worker's Union vs. Young, G.R. No.
101734, January 22, 1992, Minute Resolution, First
Division; Catalina Bermejo vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102713, January 20, 1992,
Minute Resolution, First Division.
39 Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
et al., G.R. No. 106090, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA
460.
 Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Judge Montesa – August 7, 1995
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-93-983 August 7, 1995
GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes
charges the respondent judge with gross ignorance of law and evident
dishonesty in the performance of his work in that he granted bail to the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91, 488-M-91, and 488-M-91
without the required petition for bail and without conducting any hearing
to accord the prosecution an opportunity to establish that the evidence of
guilt of the accused was strong.
In compliance with the resolution of 24 May 1993, the respondent judge
filed his comment wherein he disclosed that the issue raised was the
subject of G.R. Nos. 108478-79  pending before the Second Division of
1
this Court.
On 22 September 1993, this Court, upon the recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), dismissed this case, "the issues
raised . . . being sub-judice but without prejudice to its revival should the
Court in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 find the orders to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion."
In the decision promulgated on 21 February 1994,  this Court dismissed
2
G.R. Nos. 108478-79. The complainant then filed on 23 November 1994
a motion to revive this complaint.
On 23 February 1995, the respondent judge filed an Additional Comment
and Observation to stress that what he did was to quash the warrant of
arrest, determine probable cause on the basis of the record and
documents available, order the arrest of the accused, and grant bail to
those against whom the evidence of guilt was weak.
Issues having been joined and the revival of this complaint being in order,
this Court required the parties to manifest whether they agree to submit
this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have submitted.
In their separate manifestations, the parties responded in the affirmative.
The antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant complaint (as well as
to G.R. Nos. 108478-79) are summarized in the decision in G.R. Nos.
108478-79 as follows:
On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain
Pedro Panganiban and Armando Vitug were ambushed along
Ipo-road, Kay-Pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan, resulting in the
untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an inquisition of the incident and after
which charged petitioners Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico,
together with Romeo Adviento, Romeo Permejo, Rolando Gozum
and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder before the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte,
then presided over by Judge Virginia Pagarogon.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the
witnesses and on November 14, 1990 issued an order admitting
the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused after
finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused are probably guilty
thereof. No bail was recommended.
Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Bulacan for appropriate action.
The Investigating Prosecutor, without conducting a thorough
investigation of the cases, concluded that there was no probable
cause and ordered motu proprio the release of the accused from
custody. So, the widow of Patrolman Reyes petitioned the
Department of Justice to disqualify the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office from conducting the preliminary investigation and
prosecution of the cases.
In due course, the DOJ acted favorably on the petition and
designated State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan to take over and
handle the cases. The State Prosecutor found probable cause for
murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and
consequently, they were formally charged with said crimes on
March 13, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 487-M-91, 488-M-91
and 489-M-91. No bail was recommended and the corresponding
warrants of arrest were issued.
The accused were quick to learn of the filing of the informations.
On the same day (March 13, 1991), they filed a "Manifestation
and Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest," praying
for the suspension of court proceedings on the ground that they
are filing a petition for review of the resolution of the State
Prosecutor.
On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or
placed under the jurisdiction of the trial court (after their
precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to Grant Bail" in C.C.
Nos. 487-M-91 and 488-M-91 and a "Petition to Reduce Bail in
C.C. No. 489-M-91.
On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the
petitions since the accused had not yet surrendered and/or
apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons.
On the same day (March 25, 1991), the accused filed another
petition entitled "Reinstatement of the Petition to Grant Bail in the
above entitled cases and Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and Motion
to Set Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender the
Accused on the Hearing of this Petition."
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of
heart, issued an order consolidating the petitions for bail, set
them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the DOJ and/or
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records
of the preliminary investigation of the cases within ten (10) days
from notice.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash the
warrants of arrest alleging want of probable cause.
On April 22, 1991, the accused withdrew their motion for
reinstatement of their petition for bail bond and opted to pursue
their motion to quash the warrants of arrest.
On May 2, 1991, the trial court quashed the warrants of arrest
and set the hearing on May 15, 1991 for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause.
On May 17, 1991, after examining the records of the cases as
forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial court found the
existence of probable cause but instead of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused upon their
apprehension or voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted
bail to them despite the absence of (because it was previously
withdrawn) a petition for bail and, worse, the lack of a hearing
wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to
present evidence showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On August 23, 1991, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion
praying for the cancellation of the bail bonds as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest on the fundamental ground that the
trial court could not legally grant bail in a capital offense without
the prosecution being accorded the right to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong.
On October 28, 1991, the trial court denied the prosecution's
motion on the principal ground that its questioned orders had
become final and executory. On December 2, 1991, the motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On March 3, 1992, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary
restraining order before respondent Court of Appeals, CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 27430, assailing the following orders of the trial court:
the May 17, 1991 order which granted bail to the accused; the
October 28, 1991 order which denied the prosecution's omnibus
 motion praying for the issuance of warrants of arrest's as well as
the cancellation of what it perceived to be irregularly posted bail
bonds; and the December 2, 1991 order which denied the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration. Upon the filing of said
petition, respondent court issued the temporary restraining order.
On the other hand, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the same court,
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27472, seeking: (a) to annul the orders of the
trial court resetting the hearings on different dates for being
dilatory and violative of their constitutional right to a speedy trial;
(b) to command the trial court to dismiss with prejudice all the
criminal cases; and (c) to perpetually prohibit the prosecution of
the criminal cases.
On July 31, 1992, respondent [Court of Appeals] ruled in favor of
the prosecution. The dispositive portion of its consolidated
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition (SP No.
27430) is hereby granted and the questioned
orders of respondent Court dated May 17, 1991,
October 28, 1991, and December 2, 1991 are
annulled and set aside. Accordingly, the accused
herein (private respondents) are ordered
arrested/committed pending the trial of their
cases, without prejudice on their part to file in the
proper court a petition for bail after the arrest,
detention or deprivation of their liberty, wherein
the prosecution is accorded the right to present
evidence to prove that evidence of guilt is strong.
SP No. 27472, on the other hand, is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, considering that the
delays incurred herein were due to unavoidable
circumstances and were therefore reasonable in
nature.
No costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
Hipolito, et al. filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 108478-79, which, as earlier stated, was dismissed on 21 February
1994.
Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what
he did because he was merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix,  to 3
the effect that the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest should be personally determined by the judge. Since in
these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on
the certification of the state prosecutor, he granted the motion to quash
the warrants of arrest and, considering that on the date of the hearing to
determine probable cause the witnesses for the prosecution did not
appear and the private prosecutor submitted the issue on the basis of the
proceedings had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits of
witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis. He further alleges that
since he found the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against
Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the gunman, he
believed that the evidence of guilt as against the others was not strong
and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the amount of P80,000.00
each.
The explanation of the respondent judge is wholly unacceptable for,
contrary to his belief that he has shown perfect knowledge of the rules on
the issuance of warrants of arrest and grant of bail, he has demonstrated
either gross ignorance of the constitutional and statutory principles and
settled jurisprudence thereon or gross incompetence which no claim of
good faith can exculpate or even mitigate.
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the
criminal cases before the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed
their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail, motion to reinstate petition
to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of arrests before the
court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective
service and enforcement of the warrants of arrest or their voluntary
surrender, i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of their liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially,
denied correctly the petition for grant of bail but subsequently
disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion
to reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on
6 April 1991, directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the
preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.  While it may
4
be true that the disregard of this precept was not consummated, it was
not because the respondent judge corrected himself, but because the
accused withdrew their petition for the grant of bail and opted to pursue
their urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest grounded on want of
probable cause. Instead of retracing his steps back to the proper judicial
path, the respondent judge, still forgetting that the accused remained
scot-free, not only quashed the warrants of arrest, but, thereafter motu
proprio converted, in effect, the "hearing" for the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, which he set on
15 May 1991, to a hearing on the matter of admission to bail, as his order
of 17 May 1991 indisputably shows. In so doing, the respondent judge
had either utterly confused the proceeding to determine probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the proceeding on a petition
for admission to bail, order deliberately ignored the basic requisites for
the grant of bail.
The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is mandated by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.  Probable
5
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested.  A hearing is not necessary therefor. In satisfying himself of
6
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge, following the established doctrine and procedure, shall either
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of
the information he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. 7
This procedure is dictated by sound public policy; otherwise judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.  At this stage of a criminal proceeding, the
8
judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in
determining probable cause. 9
This judicial function does not carry with it a motu proprio review of the
recommendation of the prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall
be granted. Such a recommendation is the exclusive prerogative of the
prosecutor in the exercise of his quasi-judicial function during the
preliminary investigation, which is executive in nature.  In such cases,
10
once the court determines that probable cause exists for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall forthwith be issued and it is
only after the accused is taken into the custody of the law and deprived of
his liberty that, upon proper application for bail, the court on the basis of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing called for the
purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit
the accused to bail.11
Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was
then nothing to be heard or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they
did not withdraw their petition, they have no right to invoke the processes
of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the
filing of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority
to act on the petition. 12
Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for
bail was regularly filed, the respondent judge wantonly ignored the due
process requirement of hearing to afford the prosecution reasonable
opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the applicants is strong.  To
13
grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without such
hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether the evidence
of guilt is strong constitutes ignorance or incompetence whose grossness
cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence  or 14
constitutes inexcusable conduct which reflects either gross ignorance of
the law or cavalier disregard of its requirements. 15
At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence.
Gross ignorance of law and incompetence are characteristics and quirks
impermissible in a judge. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative
that he be conversant with basic legal principles.  He should he studious
16
of the principles of the law,   and he must be faithful to the law and must
17
maintain professional competence. 18
The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living
personification of justice and the rule of law. 19
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-753,  for abuse of discretion, this
20
Court censured the respondent judge for issuing an order granting bail to
an accused without affording the prosecution the opportunity to present
evidence to show that the evidence of guilt was strong.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-742,  for gross ignorance of law and
21
serious misconduct, the respondent judge was admonished to be more
circumspect in the resolution of the cases before him and given a last
warning that any form of infraction cases hereafter would be dealt with
severely.
The respondent judge has indisputably failed to comply with the strict and
exacting demands of the public-trust character of his office.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, respondent Judge CAMILO
O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. His dismissal shall take effect immediately upon
his receipt of a copy of this decision which must be personally served by
the Office of the Court Administrator.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of the respondent
with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.,
concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Entitled, "Estelita Hipolito, et al. vs. Court of Appeals."
2 Reported in 230 SCRA 191.
3 194 SCRA 292 [1991].
4 Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court; Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 [1945]; Manigbas vs. Luna, 98 Phil. 466
[1956]; Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 [1961]; Pico vs.
Combong, 215 SCRA 421 [1992]; Medina vs. De Guia, 219
SCRA 153 [1993]; Dinapol vs. Baldedo, 225 SCRA 110 [1993].
5 It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of a person to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
6 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, A commentary, vol. I, 1st ed., [1987], 86-87.
7 Supreme Court Circular No. 12, dated 30 June 1987; Soliven
vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Cruz vs. People, 233 SCRA
439 [1994].
8 Soliven vs. Makasiar, supra note 7.
9 Cruz vs. People, supra note 7 at 455.
10 Id. at 453.
11 Section 13, Article III, Constitution, Sections 3-5, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, as amended.
12 Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4.
13 People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968]; People vs. Bocar,
27 SCRA 512 [1969]; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369
[1973]; People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 [1981]; People vs.
Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 [1989]; People vs. Calo, 186 SCRA 620
[1990]; Cerpio vs. Maglalang, 196 SCRA 41 [1991]; Libarios vs.
Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]. See also, People vs. Nano, 205
SCRA 155 [1992]; Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4; Aurillo, Jr.
vs. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283 [1994]; Re: Report on the Judicial
Audit and Physical Inventory of Records of Cases in RTC, Branch
43, Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, 236 SCRA 631 [1994]; Estoya vs.
Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994].

14 Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, supra note 13.

15 Pico vs. Combong, supra note 4.

16 Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, supra note 13, citing Garganera

vs. Jocson, 213 SCRA 149 [1992]; Aducayen vs. Flores, 51
SCRA 78 [1973]; Libarios vs. Dabalos, supra note 13; Ajeno vs.
Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30
[1980]; Lim vs. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993].

17 Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics.

18 Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

19 Supreme Court Circular No. 13, dated 1 July 1987; Cuaresma

vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].

20 Entitled, "Captain Jose Huevos vs. Judge Camilo Montesa,

Jr.," promulgated 3 March 1992.

21 Entitled, "Antonio C. Ramos vs. Judge Camilo Montesa, Jr.,"

promulgated 24 March 1994.
 B. Section 2 – Condition of the bail; requirements
1. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan – 247 SCRA 127 (1995)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. Nos. 115132-34 August 9, 1995
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse
of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying
petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment.
Petitioner, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) now pending in the
Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, i.e.,
Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, petitioner was found guilty by the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating § 3(g) of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and was sentenced to suffer in
each case imprisonment for an indeterminate period of 9 years and 1 day
as minimum to 12 years and 10 days as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which is pending resolution in the Sandiganbayan.
After her conviction in the two cases petitioner filed on December 24,
1993 a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and
treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in the People's Republic of
China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical
condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines. Petitioner's
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan for failure of petitioner to give
notice to the prosecution and because the time asked (December 29,
1993) was too close for the court to inform itself of the basis of the
motion.
On December 29, 1993, petitioner filed in another case (Criminal Case
No. 18742)  an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad"
1
to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. The motion was supported
by Ambulatory BP Reports, Nuclear Medicine Reports and Computed
Tomography Scan Results prepared by her physician and cardiologist,
Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, and other doctors at the Makati Medical
Center.
On January 4, 1994, petitioner filed In Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and
17453 another "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad," to places including
the United States and Europe, "if necessary," for treatment of
"hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior
myocardial infarction." It was alleged that the tests needed were not
available in the Philippines.
The Chairman of respondent court's First Division, Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-
Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a
letter,  asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine," particularly on
2
the following questions:
1. Is [petitioner's] condition life-threatening?
2. What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary (not
merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to ascertain and
remedy her condition?
3. Are these tests available here?
4. Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines adequate to
respond to her condition?
The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation
interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian
grounds provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions
for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor,  on the other hand, opposed the motions, contending
3
that:
1. the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated;
2. no statement was made by the accused that medical
equipment and facilities here were "sorrily" inadequate for the
needs of the movant;
3. the conviction of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 17450 and
No. 17453 might motivate her not to return if she were to be
authorized to leave the country.
On January 7, 1994 hearing was held on petitioner's motion, during which
petitioner presented Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio. After the hearing, the
Sandiganbayan informed the parties that a copy of petitioner's first
motion and its supporting documents had been sent to Dr. Patacsil for
study and comment by a committee of cardiologists.
After consulting Dr. Anastacio, petitioner's counsel asked the court to
include among the questions to the committee the following: "Without the
Biochemical test, may proper treatment be administered to Mrs.
Marcos?" Petitioner's counsel also asked the court to include the list of
medicine being taken by petitioner as part of the study. These requests
were granted by the court.
Thereafter, a "Supplement to the Motion for Leave Abroad" was filed on
January 17, 1994 together with additional documents, consisting of the
following:
(a) a faxed letter from Dr. Denton A. Cooley of the Texas Heart
Institute dated January 11, 1994;
(b) a letter dated May 9, 1990 from David B. Case, M.D.
addressed to lawyer Gerry Spence;
(c) a letter dated May 23, 1990 from Dr. Vincent De Quattro of the
University of Southern California Hypertension Diagnostic
Laboratory;
(d) two letters, both dated January 3, 1994 from China, one from
the Tranjin Medical College, and another without letterhead from
one F.S. Tsui, both letters offering their facilities for diagnosis and
treatment of hypertension and related illness through the "Classic
Art of Chinese Medical Technology."
On January 20, 1994, the Sandiganbayan received by FAX machine the
report of the committee,  containing findings which were contrary to the
4
conclusions of petitioner's physicians. The Presiding Justice immediately
informed by phone petitioner's counsel, Attorneys Vicente D. Millora and
Manuel M. Lazaro, of the committee's report. Atty. Lazaro requested that
a copy of the report be sent to him by FAX machine, while Atty. Millora
got his copy personally from the court.
On January 26, 1994, Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr. was heard by the court
on his committee's report. Present at the hearing were the two lawyers of
petitioner and Dr. Anastacio.
On February 11, 1994, the court accepted petitioner's "Supplemental
Motion to Travel Abroad" and heard the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Roberto
V. Anastacio, as well as the testimony of Dr. Jorge Garcia, heart surgeon
from Washington, D.C., in support of petitioner's motion to travel abroad.
On February 18, 1994 the court denied petitioner's motions. The
dispositive portion of its resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the judgment of this Court
that the imperative necessity of the accused to undertake a trip
abroad for diagnosis and treatment has not been established and
for this reason DENIES the various motions of accused Imelda R.
Marcos to leave for abroad.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit
Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." The
Clinical Summary was a recent medical report on petitioner's condition
after she had undergone another medical examination at the Philippine
Heart Center  Petitioner also filed a "Motion to Admit Recognizance in
5
Support of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for Reconsideration to
Travel Abroad." Attached to the motion were letters of Vice President
Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and
those of twenty four members of the House of
Representatives  requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.
6
In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, respondent court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit even as it expressed
disapproval of the intervention of the Vice President and the twenty four
congressmen and warned them and petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo U.
Jimenez, that "repetition of any attempt to influence the resolutions,
decisions or orders or any judicial action of [respondent court] will be
responded to appropriately."
Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutions dated
February 18, 1994 and April 19, 1994 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner claims
that
1. [The Sandiganbayan] arbitrarily disregarded or misinterpreted
the testimonies, medical findings and recommendations of
petitioner's attending physicians and relied on or substituted them
with the academic views of Dr. Abarquez and the Committee,
who never examined or treated personally the petitioner, and
erroneously concluded "that the necessity for trip abroad by the
accused for diagnosis and treatment has not been established";
2. It adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct of trial as
demonstrated by the following: (a) it motu propio contacted a
third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's
motion and medical findings; (b) it unusually participated in the
examination of petitioner's witnesses; (c) thru its PJ, it presented
as own witness; (d) it requested the formation of a committee to
study the evidence presented; (e) it did not decide the case on
the basis of the evidence presented; (f) it decided on the basis of
evidence (academic) it sought;
3. It failed to resolve that, in the clash between basic
constitutional rights of the petitioner and the authority of the court
over the petitioner, the basic constitutional rights must prevail;
4(a). It considered the conviction of petitioner in two (2) criminal
cases which are pending reconsideration as factors in denying
the rights of petitioner to life, health and liberty and depriving
the penumbras of such right to give life and substance;
4(b). Respondent court violated the cluster of rights of
"personhood", "privacy" or "personal liberty".
5. It perceived that there is no "imperative necessity" for petitioner
to avail of medical examination and treatment abroad not
withstanding that such perception/conclusion cannot constitute a
cause to deny or deprive petitioner of her constitutional rights, nor
can it refute the medical findings of petitioner's attending
physicians.
Called upon to comment, the Solicitor General, in representation of the
prosecution in the criminal cases, contends that respondent court acted
properly in seeking the advice of medical experts in regard to petitioner's
motion to travel; that in any event petitioner is estopped from questioning
the referral of her medical condition to other experts by agreeing to
submit additional questions for their consideration; and that the right to
life is not absolute but must be balanced by the State's right to prosecute
and enforce the judgments of its courts, and that petitioner's conviction in
two cases is relevant along with "humanitarian and equity"
considerations.
The question for decision is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in denying petitioner's request to travel abroad for medical
treatment. After due consideration of the parties' arguments, we find that
it did not.
Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion
was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be
expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving
her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond its
competence and since the grant of the request depended on the
verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical
condition that was alleged to be serious and life threatening, the
respondent court, we think, followed the only prudent course available of
seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field.
Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed
to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there is no
reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. Presiding Justice
Garchitorena's letter to Dr. Patacsil is notable in this regard for its
sedulous concern for "greater need for information and expert advise" to
the end that respondent court may be able to determine "whether or not it
is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad."
What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained
information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them. Then the parties could justifiably complain
that their right to due process has been violated. But, in this case,
everything was on the level, with the parties taking part in the
proceedings of the court.
At all events if petitioner did not agree to the procedure adopted by the
court, her counsel should have objected when informed by the court on
January 7, 1994 that it had referred Dr. Anastacio's report to the
Philippine Heart Center for advice and opinion. Counsel did not object.
Instead, after consulting Dr. Anastacio, he requested the court to submit
additional questions for referral to the Philippine Heart Center and later
took part in cross examining Dr. Abarquez, Jr. when the latter testified.
Petitioner is thus estopped from questioning what she now calls the
"unusual and unorthodox" manner of resolving her request for permission
to travel abroad.
Now, if the respondent court disregarded the findings and
recommendations of petitioner's physician, it was because in light of the
report of the panel of experts which reviewed the findings and
recommendations of petitioner's physicians, petitioner failed to prove the
necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the
fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two
of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the
country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to
health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in
foreign countries.7
Nor is there warrant for the claim that respondent court acted arbitrarily in
disregarding the findings of petitioner's physicians and relying on the
opinion of specialists from the Philippine Heart Center because the latter
did not personally examine her and for that reason their opinion is
allegedly "academic." The question raised by petitioner's motion was not
whether petitioner was suffering from a serious and life threatening
medical condition. Rather the question before the Sandiganbayan was
whether on the basis of reports attached to the motions for travel there
was evidence to show that she was suffering from such ailments (i.e.,
coronary artery disease and labile hypertension) and there was need for
diagnostic tests which could only be performed abroad. Consequently, it
was unnecessary for the Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine
the petitioner personally. Given the findings of petitioner's own
physicians, they found that petitioner had not been shown to be suffering
from coronary artery disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure (labile
hypertension).
The claim that petitioner is suffering from a life threatening medical
condition is based on a letter dated November 4, 1993 of Dr. Roberto V.
Anastacio, cardiologist at the Makati Medical Center, to Dr. Jorge M.
Garcia, heart surgeon of the Washington Heart Institute at Washington
D.C., recommending diagnostic tests abroad for petitioner. In his letter
(marked Annex B of petitioner's first "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad")
Dr. Anastacio claimed that petitioner complained of chest pains; that she
had an uncontrolled high blood pressure with "a spread of 200/100-
100/70;" that the ambulatory blood pressure monitoring device showed
her highest systolic BP to be from 184 to 204 mmHg at 6 P.M., 1:35 A.M.
and 3 A.M., and her highest diastolic pressure to be 120 mmHg; that an
Electrocardiogram indicated a myocardial infarction; that an Exercise-
HexaMibi Tc-99m myocardial perfusion imaging showed an "abnormal
myorcardial injury in the anterior region." Dr. Anastacio concluded:
Definitely, we have established that Mrs. Marcos is suffering
from a dangerous level of rises in blood pressure provoked by
high level of emotional stress and now complicated with a strong
evidence of myocardial injury.
Her significant family history of hypertension in her father and
siblings (eldest sister and brother) and that indeed two of them
have experienced sudden cardiac death as complicating
manifestations of uncontrolled high blood pressure of this
type place this patient in the high risk category of sudden cardiac
death. (Emphasis added)
He recommended:
Definitely, Mrs. Marcos should undergo immediate studies
[abroad] to define the following:
1. To investigate invasively (Coronary Arteriogram) to correlate
the severity of coronary obstruction and the recent development
of myocardial infarction in relation to sudden cardiac death.
2. To do biochemical studies at the same time e.g. Continuous-
Serial Vasopressine-Arginine and Catecholamine level
determination in relation with her uncontrolled high, dangerous
level of high blood pressure not only in the stratification of her
 "Sudden Death" risk staging but likewise, equally important is the
control of her uncontrolled high blood pressure.
3. The observed sensitiveness to the drugs administered, makes
drug therapy risky without a concomittant close monitoring of the
hemodynamic and biochemical parameters which will help avert a
possible iatrogenic, fatal cardiovascular event.
Based on these findings, Dr. Roman F. Abarquez, Jr., Dr. Homobono B.
Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia, however, found the diagnosis of
"definite coronary artery disease" to be "questionable" for the following
reasons:
1) The location and character of the chest pain (sharp pain lasting
for a few seconds left mid axillary and not related to effort) is not
the common presentation of pain due to coronary artery
disease (angina pectoris).
2) The Stress Test done during the Thallium Scan was
adequate (maximum predicted heart rate of 106%) and yet was
negative for ischemia.
3) The Thallium Myocardial imaging (Nuclear scan) showed only
a small questionable perfusion defect on the anterior wall. It can
also be considered as a false positive finding due to soft tissue
artifacts as mentioned in the report. (Emphasis added)
In fact the finding that petitioner did not have ischemia  and that there
8 With respect to Dr. Anastacio's claim that petitioner is in the high risk
was only a small perfusion defect on the anterior wall which could be
considered a "false positive finding" is based on petitioner's own nuclear
medical report.  prepared by the Makati Medical Center, which contains
9
the following conclusions:
CONCLUSIONS: ABNORMAL MYOCARDIAL PERFUSION
IMAGING. EVIDENCE FOR PRIOR MYOCARDIAL INJURY IN
THE ANTERIOR REGION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FOR
STRESS INDUCED MYOCARDIAL ISCHEMIA.
ALTHOUGH THESE FINDINGS ARE SUGGESTIVE OF
CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE, PHOTON ATTENUATION
SECONDARY TO SOFT TISSUE ARTIFACTS CAN BE
EXCLUDED.
As to the ambulatory blood pressure monitor reports, the Abarquez panel
noted:
The diagnosis of hypertensive heart disease is questionable. Mrs.
Marcos has transient (labile) hypertension. In the ambulatory BP
monitoring records — there were only 2 transient rises of
elevated systolic pressure and 3 episodes of elevated diastolic
pressure. 5 episodes of transient systolic BP elevation and 5
episodes of transient elevated diastolic pressure occurred in the
2nd ambulatory recording. The patient did not submit a diary
during both occasions when her ambulatory BP recording was
performed.
A patient is considered to have sustained hypertension if 30% or
more of the recorded blood pressures on ambulatory monitoring
are hypertensive levels. The term hypertensive heart disease is
used to denote heart involvement due to effects of long standing
(chronic) hypertension. There is no evidence in the medical brief
to show that there is left ventricular hypertrophy or left ventricular
dysfunction. In fact, the previous echocardiogram was reported to
be normal.
For this reason the committee questioned the need for petitioner to have
biochemical tests abroad. Even without these tests, it noted, Dr.
Anastacio had "already been treating her with medicines that are used for
hypertension and coronary heart disease."
group of sudden cardiac death, the committee stated that a history of
sudden death in the family alone will not support such a conclusion:
The known direct determinants for sudden cardiac death are: (1)
ventricular electrical instability (ventricular arrhytmias), (2)
extensive coronary artery narrowing, (3) abnormal left ventricular
function, (4) electrocardiographic conduction and repolarization
abnormalities.
In the absence of the above factors for sudden cardiac death, the
presence of a family history of sudden cardiac
death alone cannot stand as a strong argument for a high risk of
sudden cardiac death. Even the family history of sudden cardiac
death in this case is still questionable since we are not furnished
 with definite evidence that the said members of the family actually
died of sudden death.
In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation
that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac
death. (Emphases added)
The group made the following conclusions and recommendations:
RECOMMENDED TESTS:
1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence
or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
disease.
2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardlography — to demonstrate the
presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.
3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious
arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.
CONCLUSIONS:
1) The diagnosis or significant coronary heart disease
is not confirmed from the brief presented.
2) Marcos has transient elevation of blood pressure" which be
reactive to situations but there is no evidence to indicate the
presence of hypertensive heart disease.
3) The tests we have recommended are available in the
Philippines. Proper treatment can be given to Mrs. Marcos even
in the absence of the suggested biochemical tests. (Emphasis
added)
4) The present facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more
than adequate to diagnose and treat patients with hypertension
and/or coronary heart disease. (Emphasis added)
Dr. Abarquez, Jr. testified on January 26, 1994 on the report of his
committee. Dr. Anastacio was present at that hearing, but he did not
refute Dr. Abarquez, Jr.'s conclusions. Instead it appears that he
performed the tests recommended by the committee, namely:
1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence
or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
disease.
2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardiography — to demonstrate the
presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.
3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious
arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.
The results, as the Sandiganbayan said in its resolution, were:
Dr. Roberto Anastacio, accused Marcos' attending physician,
appears to have subsequently subjected accused Marcos to
another set of tests during her latest confinement at the Makati
Medical Center, principally the Echo Doppler Test and the Holter
24-hour monitoring test.
The 2-D Echo Doppler test, which the Committee of Cardiologists
recommended was administered on February 1, 1994 (Exhibit "D-
Supplemental") and all findings read normal.
Dr. Anastacio said that the handwritten notes of Drs. Dy and
Lapitan who had read the results of the Ambulatory Hotter
Monitor, i.e., an ambulant electrocardiogram, and the readings
did not show that there was anything wrong with accused Marcos.
In fact, the readings themselves said that the average pulse rate
was at 68 beats per minute (from 50 to 134) no blockages, no
PVCs, no PACs, no indication of arrythmia.
It would appear that earlier on January 31, 1994, petitioner had also
undergone electrocardiogram tests at the Makati Medical Center in which
cardiologists are rotated to do the readings. Dr. Esperanza Cabral found
the electrocardiogram results to be "Normal." The results of the
echocardiogram were read by another cardiologist, Dr. Adoracion
Nambuyan-Abad, and her finding was approved by Dr. Benjamin N.
Alimurong. The results were also "Normal."
Although Dr. Anastacio subsequently conducted another
electrocardiogram test on petitioner and found the existence of
myocardial infarction, as the Sandiganbayan noted, Dr. Anastacio's
finding was not read or concurred in by another cardiologist, contrary to
the procedure followed at the Makati Medical Center.  It is, therefore,
10
also questionable.
The evidence submitted to it, according to the Abarquez committee, "[did]
not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group of
sudden cardiac death." Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the
group is the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat in the House of
Representative and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous
political campaign but apparently is none the worse for it.
Considering the foregoing we cannot say that respondent court trifled
with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and liberty.
What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of
the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it would seem, from
the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill
motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner, the latter's counsel or
her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions,
petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad. But her later conviction in
two cases dictated the need for greater caution. To be sure, conviction is
not yet final view of a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. But a
person's right to travel is subject to the usual contraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion.
The active intervention of respondent Presiding Justice in the trial the
case was justified by the fact that the subject with which the court was
dealing was a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a
number of medical question. That a judge has the power — if not indeed
a duty — to do this teaching of People v. Obngayan;  11
There are obviously certain rights to the trier of facts due to the
nature of (a judge's) function. Among these is the right to
question a witness with a view to satisfying his mind upon a
material point which present itself during the trial as to the
credibility of such witness.
This Court quoted the following from Justice Labrador's opinion Ventura
v. Judge Yatco:  12
While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing
partiality to one party and hostility to another, it does not mean
that a trial judge should keep mum throughout the trial and allow
parties to ask the questions that they desire, on issues which they
think are the important issues, when the former are improper and
the latter, immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must
take a leading part therein, by directing counsel to submit the
evidence on the facts in the dispute by asking clarifying
questions, and by showing an interest in a fast and fair trial.
Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to
watch and decide the result of a game; they should have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence, calling attention of counsel to point at issue that are
overlooked, directing them to ask the question that would elicit
the fact on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in trials in the
above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions
whether pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the
speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the
Government and of the people cannot be attained. Counsel
should, therefore, not resent any interest that the judge takes in
the conduct of the trial, they should be glad that a trial judge takes
such interest and help in the determination of truth.
The active participation of respondent court in examining petitioner's
witnesses in the case merely indicated the court's deep concern with the
truth of petitioner's medical condition.
What perhaps should have been done was for petitioner to request an
examination of her medical condition by a joint team of cardiologist and
other medical experts instead of having the findings of her physician
reviewed by the other specialists. A joint investigation will have the
advantage of not being unduly adversarial since the purpose is the
common objective of arriving at a consensus among the experts.
It is not late for the petitioner to ask for this. She can file another motion
before the Sandiganbayan. This observation is made because after the
petitioner in the case had been filed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to
travel, this time on the ground that she is suffering from a difficult type of
glaucoma which threatens to make her blind. Her motion is supported by
a medical certificate of Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, opthalmologist and
glaucoma expert, who recommends that petitioner see Dr. Richard J.
Simmons of Boston, Massachusetts, and avail herself of his
"internationally renowned expertise and recognized authority in this
particularly difficult glaucoma type."   Dr. Agulto's certificate states:
13
This certifies that above patient has been treated by the
undersigned by since 1980 for Low Tension Glaucoma which was
initially diagnosed by Richard J. Simmons, M.D. of Harvad
Medical School and New England Glaucoma Research
Foundation of Boston, Massachussetts.
Since then the patient has been monitored closely to prevent
irreversible visual field and acuity loss. Lately we have noted a
progression of her visual field changes.
Latest pertinent clinical findings (as of April 19, 1994) include the
following:
condition is question of fact to be made in the first instance by the
Sandiganbayan. The court should order a joint examination of petitioner's
eye condition and resolve her motion accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still
desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination
of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
Petitioner's motion for leave to travel for medical treatment of her alleged
failing eyesight is hereby referred to the Sandiganbayan with directive to
the latter to appoint a joint panel of eye specialists as outlined above.
SO ORDERED.

Corrected Vision: 20/20, Jaeger 1 Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Automated Visual field: positive paracentral depression, both
eyes (April 11, 1994, copies of result appended)  
Tensions: (Diurnal Range) 13-15mm Hg, right eye
13-16mm Hg, left eye Footnotes
Disc: Cupping of 0.6-0.7, both eyes
1 For violation of §3(h) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Remarks: Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

We suggest that the patient see her primary eye physician in 2 The letter, dated January 4, 1994, reads in full:
Boston so as to avail herself of his internationally renowned
expertise and recognized authority in this particularly difficult
This is further to my conversation with you over the
glaucoma type.
telephone this afternoon with respect to the need of the
Sandiganbayan for expert opinion on coronary medicine.
Considering the irreversible nature of glaucoma blindness and the
documented progression of her field changes plus additional and
At this time Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos is requesting
strong clinical evidence of the unrelenting course of visual loss as
permission from this court to travel abroad for medical
was recently documented in a younger brother and patient,
reasons, through a motion dated December 24, 1993,
Alfredo T. Romualdez, who was recently declared legally blind
copy of which is enclosed herewith together with
from the same familial glaucoma, we urge Mrs. Marcos who is
correspondence and technical data in support thereof.
much older and therefore at greater risk, to consult immediate Dr.
Normally, requests for travel such as this would be
Simmons so as to delay if not prevent the onset of very real and
granted as a matter of course. Considering, however, that
absolute blindness.
Mrs. Marcos has been convicted in two cases (Although
the decision thereon is not yet final), the Court must
This motion should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan not only respond with greater caution, and, therefore, with a
because whether petitioner should be allowed to leave the country is its greater need for information and expert advise.
primary concern but also because the determination of petitioner's eye
Mrs. Marcos will present her evidence in justification of
her request on January 7, 1994 at 2:00. p.m. The Court
would certainly want independent verification of the facts
and professional opinion presented at that time.
Our primary concern on the basis of the motion filed with
us together with its annexes are the following general
areas of inquiry:
Is her present condition life threatening? if so, to what
extent?
What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary
(not merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to
ascertain and remedy her condition?
Are these test available here?
N. Villespin, pulmonologists, Dr. Avenilo P. Aventura,
cardiovascular surgeon, and Dr. Santos-Jose G. Abad,
cardiologist.
6 Speaker Jose de Venecia Speaker Protempore Raul
Daza, and Majority Floor Leader Ronaldo Zamora and
Congressmen Antonio Abaya, Jose Aspiras, Luz
Bakunawa, Benjamin Bautista, Elias Balut, Samuel
Dangwa, Renato Diaz, Ali Dimaporo, Salvador Escudero
III, Arnulfo Fuentebella, Nur Jafaar, Edgar Lara, Simeon
Maguindanao, Roger Mercado, Victor Ortega, Pedro
Pancho, Amadeo Perez, Mariano Tajon, Asani Tammang,
Alberto Veloso, and Dominador Venegas.
7 See Manotoc v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142
SCRA 149 (1986); Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195
SCRA 260 (1991).

Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines 8 Lack of blood supply in a tissue or organ.
adequate respond to her condition?
9 Petition, Annex J.
The answer to the above question will lead us to
determine whether or not it is necessary (not merely 10 Resolution, p. 17.
desirable) and urgent for her to travel abroad, whether to
the People's Republic of China, the United States and/or 11 55 SCRA 465, 471 (1974).
to Europe.
12 105 Phil. 287, 294 (1959).
Your comment either personally or through a referral to
competent specialists in the Heart Center will be 13 Annex B-1, Petition.
appreciated.

Should you feel need for it, may call me at the following
telephone numbers: 481-333; 475-387.

3 Through Prosecutor Erdulfo O. Querubin.

4 Composed of Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr., chairman,

Dr. Homobono B. Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia,
members.

5 The examination was conducted by a new team of

doctors composed of Dr. Teresita S. de Guia and Dr. Ivan

C. Section 3 – Release only upon court order or bail
1. Obre vs. Digandang – September 3, 2009
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196390               September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No.
9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to
the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court
may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph
(Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of
Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade,
deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets
with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent
plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging only
Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a
net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as
"Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235
grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper,
with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
dried leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a
dangerous drug.3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett
filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that during his
arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several
personal non-drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car
with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed
that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to
himupon verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its
Comment and Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC
of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout
the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the
Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City
Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the
instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or
custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the abovementioned
Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S.
Brodett and the return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the
personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S.
Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as
needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was
denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated November
4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals
(CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were
issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the
petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more
particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore
see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and
should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction,
especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
the required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord
with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda
Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett),
had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal
operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the
Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the
car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged
to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize
its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC
that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any
question of law that warranted a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R.
A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in
favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds
or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person
must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the
commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies
before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor
the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an
accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including
documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to
commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of
which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or
the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As
justification for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom
thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper,
because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the
contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense
has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime,
such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the
accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the
offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government.15 But it
is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in
such manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in
connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant
or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is
by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seized
may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat
which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be
made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or
may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be
no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is
used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to
the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may
order the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made
only when the case is finally terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the
matter of disposing of property claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion
extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused
claims the property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial
court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful
owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the
criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then
subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms.
Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal
possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any
other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and
forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to,
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools
with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property
that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more
particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore
see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
only when such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of
law peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and
should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction,
especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or
proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and
precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which
pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the
Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation
or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources
of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in
favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby,
and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this
Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal
case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the
assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however,
That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off
not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in
custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or
forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses
incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and
maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for
publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against
illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text
of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that
ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal
Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the
car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction
with rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and
forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if
such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar
the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person
either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not
suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient
ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment
and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the
delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be
held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value.
The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car
because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale
of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission
of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with
applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the
custody of the law because it had been seized from accused Brodett
during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that
she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the
car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-
Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings
were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
release of the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all
that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the
penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or
any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be
subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in
custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure
its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to
deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was
not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary
need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or
reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the
RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208
and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and
further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except
the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the
chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in
view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these
cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused
BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD
BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and
09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non-
drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are
ordered returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated in
favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National
Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition
for review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court
seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the
matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the
extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of
repetition in the future.35 
1âwphi1
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly
with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not
release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial
and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person
who is not liable for the unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this
decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in 7
 Id., p. 110.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.  Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso,
8

with Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson 9
 Id., pp. 44-46.

CERTIFICATION 10
 Id., pp. 2-32.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting 11
 Id., pp. 158-177.
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had beenreached in consultation 12
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1733.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division. 13
 Villaruz v. Court of First Instance,71 Phil. 72 (1940).
RENATO C. CORONA 14
 United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
Chief Justice
15
 United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).

16
 United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).
Footnotes 17
 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
* Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order 18
 Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27,
19
** Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special order No.
2006, 505 SCRA 704, 711.
1093 dated September 21, 2011.
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing United States v.
20
1
 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
2
 Rollo, p. 51.
21
 Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351
3
 Id., pp. 54-55.
 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66 N.W.
22
4
 Id., pp. 58-61. 2d 830, 159 Neb. 314.
5
 Id., pp. 63-64.  Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24 Misc. 2d
23

949.
6
 Id., p. 107.
24
 Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d 1060.

 Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave.,

25

Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d

1297.

26
 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

27
 Emphasis supplied.

28
 No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.

29
 Id., p. 482.

30
 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638-639.

31
 Rollo, pp. 63-64.

32
 Id., pp. 2-32.

 Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal Case

33

No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209.

 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134

34

SCRA 438, 463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,

May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.

 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,

35

489 SCRA 160, 215;Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona,
Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577;Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421
SCRA 656.

. Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan – July 6, 2011
 
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175457               July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado
Sr.2 assailing the Decision3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and
Resolution4 dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste,
President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of
Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP,
Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no
longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners.8
Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners
Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano.
Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the
complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to
include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining
accused. The Amended Information12 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior
[or] subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of
Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then
the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado,
being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been
public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of
detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case
No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by
Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, and thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor
Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody,
by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil’s residence for a
period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without
any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had
given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco
Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information.
They reason, however, that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering
the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his
detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same
jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence
and rested its case after the admission of its documentary exhibits.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was
denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr.,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar
from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s
lawyers that he directed the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home.
He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for
taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in
the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards
identified with his political opponents.15
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of
Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how
Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat,
Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she
sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden
and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s
safety.16
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft,
Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in
connection with a murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s
account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who
are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also
noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised
clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim
admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost three months before
he posted bail after the charge against him was downgraded to
homicide.17
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of
Eastern Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe
Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim.
Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest
and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the
provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him
that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a provincial
jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the
governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail
to be dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards
were incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail,
each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was
unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the
perimeter for use during conjugal visits.19
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated
the assailed Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private
residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits
in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and
other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under
the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released
or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail.21
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s
transfer was made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil,
Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied
simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also
pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-
meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to
separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil,
Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary
Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor
of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to
imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and
eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I Sandiganbayan:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,
AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS
PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF
SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE
INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR
GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
SAID SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733,
ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975
HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION
PRISONER.
V 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY
OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID
NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.22
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL
OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER
SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6,
ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING
GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.23
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article
11(5)24 of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be
condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to
the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only
transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public
officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner
avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim,
a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the
mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under
the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes
himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of
conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr.
defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when he
transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from
criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the
absence of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains
that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners
have accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the
provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private
party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the
unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his
person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further
that petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal
to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The
OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that
petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions
bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public
officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay
with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public
officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No.
8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is
beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As
to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head
of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified
as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused
are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall
exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had
exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross
negligence" as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined
as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never
fail to take on their own property." x x x31
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power
of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police
within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the
Philippine National Police.—The extent of operational supervision and
control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit,
and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions
shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The
Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise
supervision and control over all city and municipal jails. The provincial
jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized
by the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the
effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.34
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform
their duties."35 If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their
duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of supervision
means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully
executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.36 The supervisor
or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or
replace them.37
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone
which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial
jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts
beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must
be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the
subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how
the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner
Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of
1917 on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the
province shall be charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and
it shall be his duty to administer the same in accordance with law
and the regulations prescribed for the government of provincial
prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be
committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial
governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the
unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which
classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be
entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except
that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing
governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and
qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall,
under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the
province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though
the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding
of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987.
But again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor
as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to
take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision
is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the
administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the
prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which
are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes
already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon
it38 by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative
powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is
found in Section 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the
jail of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or
insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this
provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule
114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except
upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under
detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial
government, much less the governor. This was amply clarified by Asst.
Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated October 6, 1998 addressed
to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports
earlier received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in
taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that
province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of
arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the
provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates
that an arrested person be delivered to the nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking
custody of the accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section
merely speaks of the power of supervision vested unto the provincial
governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to
take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself
within the bounds of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the
provincial jail in order to avoid legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a
"provincial jailer." Said petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not
to mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in order to
accommodate a former political party mate,41 betray his unmistakable
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element
of the crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for
violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act
constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the
accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of
giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public
officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and
detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this
case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly
because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not
such government officer or employee. Second, the purported
unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public
officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil,
Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling
in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a prosecution for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of
whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions." Following is an excerpt of what
we said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt
practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to
"any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies
the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers
(sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of
"public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public
officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a
prosecution for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether
the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section
2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor
Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a
private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such
benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party"
rather than "private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term "party" is a
technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46 as
distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human
being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to
protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the
provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they
accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor,
but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying
the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices
that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the
exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word
"unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage"
means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit
or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference"
signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation
above another.49
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in
a place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more
comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move
about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these
benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the
mayor’s life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the
latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet,
even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a
threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and
compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention outside the provincial
jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail
which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the
prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such
repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have
proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a
court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying
circumstances claimed by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5,
Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal
liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites
must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office.50 Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his
authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his
house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did
not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of
his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance
of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under
paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any
criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following
requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior;
(2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used
by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first
requisite is present in this case.
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr.,
who was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by
petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched
Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order,
transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him
liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the
RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts
aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another
performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of
the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in
fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.53
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is,
likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine
(9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four
(4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Associate Justice
Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado,
Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. WE CONCUR:
The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by
legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who
RENATO C. CORONA
is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his
Chief Justice
power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil,
Chairperson
Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them
equally responsible as conspirators.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO* LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A.
No. 3019 punishes a public officer or a private person who violates
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less than six (6) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and Associate Justice
perpetual disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act CERTIFICATION
No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
same. 1avvphi1
Division.

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, RENATO C. CORONA
Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to Chief Justice
twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-
principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to
his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.

Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated July 4, 2011 in
lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who
recused herself due to prior action in the Sandiganbayan.
1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 8-34.
2
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175482) pp. 8-15.
3
 Id. at 16-24; rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 35-43. Penned by
Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado with Presiding Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (now a member of this Court)
and Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (also now a member
of this Court) concurring.
10
 Id. at 102-104.
11
 Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jail. - The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall
remove from any jail or penal establishment any person confined
therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of
violence, intimidation or bribery. If other means are used, the
penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed.
xxxx
12
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 100-101.

4
 Id. at 26-44; id. at 44-62. 13
 Id. at 100.

5
 Exhibit "D". Dated September 11, 1998. 14
 Id. at 314-316.

6
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 10-18. 15
 TSN, October 8, 2001, pp. 7, 23-30, 33.

7
 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts 16
 TSN, October 9, 2001, pp. 5-7, 22-24.
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer 17
 TSN, March 11, 2002, pp. 4-6, 16, 21.
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
18
 TSN, March 12, 2002, pp. 11-17, 32.
xxxx
19
 Id. at 21, 60-61.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted 20
 Supra note 3.
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through 21
 Sec. 3, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175457), pp. 16-17.
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175482), pp. 11-12.
xxxx
 Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur
24

8
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 64-65. any criminal liability:

9
 Id. at 1-2. xxxx
 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the 36
 Id.
lawful exercise of a right or office.
37
 Drilon v. Lim, supra at 142.
xxxx
38
 H.C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979 Ed., 42.
 Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur
25

any criminal liability: 39

xxxx
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose.
 Ong v. People, G.R. No. 176546, September 25, 2009, 601
26
SCRA 47, 53-54.
 Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special
27
Court to be known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes.
 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
28
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
29
 Records, Vol. I, p. 43.
 G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA
30
 SEC. 1737. Transfer of prisoners to jail of neighboring
province.-In case there should be no jail in any province, or in
case a provincial jail of any province be insecure or insufficient for
the accommodation of all provincial prisoners, it shall be the duty
of the provincial board to make arrangements for the safe-
keeping of the prisoners of the province with the provincial board
of some neighboring province in the jail of such neighboring
province, and when such arrangement has been made it shall be
the duty of the officer having custody of the prisoner to commit
him to the jail of such neighboring province, and he shall be there
detained with the same legal effect as though confined in the jail
of the province where the offense for which he was arrested was
committed.
40
 Exhibit "Q."
41
 TSN, October 8, 2001, p. 55.
42
 Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 399.

670.
43
 Id. at 405.

31
 Id. at 680.
44
 G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 52.

 An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a

32
45
 Id. at 60.
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and for Other Purposes.
46
 H.C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979 Ed., 1010.

 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA

33 47
 Id. at 1028.
135, 140-141.
48
 Sison v. People, supra at 682.
34
 Id. at 142.
49
 Id. at 681-682.
 Joson v. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998, 290 SCRA
35

279, 301.  Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 149718, September 29, 2003,
50

412 SCRA 257, 261.

 51
 L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, p. 213. of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused
Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926
52
 Art. 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: for Rebellion,  and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting
1

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
xxxx
the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental
motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow
petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.

D. Section 4 – Bail as a matter of right The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may,
under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with
1. People vs. Donato – 198 SCRA 130 an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT In the original Information  filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No.
2

Manila 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an

Amended Information  which was filed on 24 October 1986, private
3

respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused

EN BANC
were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to
Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
G.R. No. 79269             June 5, 1991
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila
vs. and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other
SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents. subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the
The Solicitor General for petitioner. aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation or support of
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of members and followers whose whereabouts and identities are still
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country
Rodolfo Salas. against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the
purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance
to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate
General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their
capacities as leaders of the aforenamed organizations, in
conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of
the government, destroying property or committing serious
 violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose,
such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before
and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-
accused were in military custody following their arrest on 29 September
1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier
escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a
petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was
filed with this Court  which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was
5 circulation on June 26, 1987.
dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will
remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody
over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are
deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a
Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,  to which petitioner filed an Opposition  citing, among other
6 7
grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically
conceded that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987,  respondent Judge denied the motion to
8 As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to
quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent
filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail,  which herein petitioner opposed in
9
an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987  on the ground that since rebellion
10
became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled
to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June
15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially released for
In his Order of 7 July 1987  respondent Judge, taking into consideration
11
Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail,
fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent
the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two
(2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In
granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion, for which accused
Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00,
which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III,
1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of
right in non-capital offenses before final judgment. This is very
evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in
relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the
present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now
entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of
rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.
grant bail to private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges
of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his
release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed
struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's
constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which right is
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the
right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state that the
Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of
the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic,
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by
any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the
dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of
certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the
government is prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court,
in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the
same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the
eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the
Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is
that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and
the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic) and
destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political
institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded
that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades
in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason
to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to
bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to
bail. Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider  the above order filed on 16 July 1987,
12
petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No.
10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused
should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of
imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense
and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private
respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody of the military
authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government
through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration  indirectly asking the court to deny bail to the private
13
respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply
with this main condition of his bail –– to appear in court for trial," a
conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are
widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable
Court may have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and
was an escapee from detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known
address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the
time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate
his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to
be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a
declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be
false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a
reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest
intention to appear in court for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues
that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his
followers, are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this
government and threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the
original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that
of the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is
paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the
United States of America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending
deportation proceedings,  and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until
14
trial as he presents a risk of flight;  and sustaining a detention prior to trial
15
of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are found after an
adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the
community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order  adverted to
17
in the introductory portion of this decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the "supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be
without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of
bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987
only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the
court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of
every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665,
August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent
Judge took into account the "sudden turn-about" on the part of the
petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration wherein
it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of
arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987;
asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the cases
involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal
Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail
in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail; and
quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the
cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-
4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition
submitting therein the following issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE
DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL
TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped
from invoking his right to bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No.
76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of
the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not
absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution
must be allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not
allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its
prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has
forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail
was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed,
respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private
respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and
the likelihood of flight.
18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987  We required the respondents to
19
comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order
ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing his
order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,  private respondent asks for the
20
outright dismissal of the petition and immediate lifting of the temporary
restraining order on the following grounds:
 I In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November  and24
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL;
NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT.
ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED
FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT
ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL
OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE
RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS
NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN
THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS'
RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private
respondent.  The reply was filed on 18 September 1987.
21 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987  We gave due course to the petition
23
and required the parties to file simultaneously their memoranda within
twenty days from notice.
23 November 1987  petitioner and private respondents asked to be
25
excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply be
considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolution
of 19 November 1987  and 1 December 1987,  respectively.
26 27
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor
General to express his stand on the issues raised in this petitions,  which
28
he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990  wherein he
29
manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of
respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be
annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the
light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break;
in determining bail, the primary consideration is to insure the attendance
of the accused at the trial of the case against him which would be
frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of
whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in
Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the
amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on
the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied by
respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations
for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below
the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent
was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of
the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the
President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally
provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The
restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court
resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the
private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.  It is, therefore,
30
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.  To that extent the right is
31
absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99
Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused was already convicted,
although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life
imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the
pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security
of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction
appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong,
We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration
of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section
(1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15),
(16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of
several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly
providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling
in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those
arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.  But once it is determined that
33
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar
provisions contained in the Constitution of the United States and
that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution
of the many states provide that all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right
which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases
not embraced in the exceptions. Under such
provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital
offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a
matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail.
35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at
P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for
the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the
discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
whether or not the accused is under bond in other
case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations
which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be heard for the
purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not
authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the
law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine
not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on
24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least
two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others,
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty
for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup
d'etat. ––– Any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
x x x           x x x          x x x
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for
acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable
to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however,
waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original
information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a
petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his
co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with
this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz
Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno
praying, among others, that the petition be given due course and
a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to
produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
accused before the Court and explain by what authority they
arrested and detained them. The following proceedings took
place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas
corpus, required respondents to make a return of the writ on or
before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition
for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ of Habeas
Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the
military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine
General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders
or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New
People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent
means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their
arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch
XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their
arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them
because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the
criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that,
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent
was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace
negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct
pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the
Court of certain agreements reached between them. We issued a
resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning,
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon
Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners with
Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E.
Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor
General Ordoñez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested
in open Court that in conformity with the agreement
reached with the government, the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to
remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released
immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court,
confirmed the foregoing statement made by petitioners'
counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be
interposed to the immediate release of detainees Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be
required of them, but they will continue to face trial with
their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not
be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the
trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their
willingness to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Court and to appear in court when their presence is
required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with
petitioners' counsel today relative to the compromise
agreement that they have previously undertaken to
submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, that on his oath as member of the Bar, the
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have
agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing
manifestations and statements and required both parties
to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by
4:00 o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official
leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties
submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty.
Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la
Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for
respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by
their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal
respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong,
petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations may be called into
play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the
following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately
released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo
Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be
86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region) filed against them under their
personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is
hereby deemed recalled in view of formal
manifestation before the Supreme Court that they
will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to
obtain the conformity of the Government to the foregoing
terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic)
and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation
during the hearing on October 14 and the present
manifestation in compliance with the resolution
announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for
petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents
which states that they have entered into an agreement
whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall
appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion
[People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for
the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is
hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal
manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person and in view of the said agreement, the petition
for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but subject to the
condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong,
upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his
commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case
for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on
official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to
remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial of his
criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail."  Upon the other
37
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual
and legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely
questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention of
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not
resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but
left open for further determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the
matter of the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved
by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on
7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear
and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be
granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally,
private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the
Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent
agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual
imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a person by
virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing
or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-
742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa.
306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court and settled jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject
to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in
actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or
detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-
petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants
of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of
the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
between legal custody and court having custody over the person in
respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of
his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this
been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have
insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at
the time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October
1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and
signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his
co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall
be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall
remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other
meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that as
above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial.  It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the
39
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal
custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered
and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."
41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable
right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of
which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit,
do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage
of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred
by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver
in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or
would be against public policy or morals and the public interest
may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights
conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions
intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of
the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver. 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,  it was held:
43
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into
two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused,
is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused,
which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first
class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the
Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken
against his will."
44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for
example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures;  the 45
right to counsel and to remain silent;  and the right to be heard.
46 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights
guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.  Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the
1âwphi1
right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in
some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6
of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights
which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
in granting bail to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July
30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene
Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Footnotes
E. Section 5 – Bail as a matter of discretion
1. Omosa vs. Court of Appeals – January 16, 1997 FOROSUELO
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114350. January 16, 1997]
JOSE T. OBOSA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa,
who was charged with two (2) counts of murder (a capital
offense)1 for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D.
Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2) counts of
homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such
conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court
of Appeals ruled otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this
petition under Rule 65 assailing the two Resolutions2 of
respondent Court3 promulgated on November 19, 1993 and
March 9, 1994, respectively. The first Resolution4 of November
19, 1993 disposed as follows:5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor General's motion
to cancel accused-appellant Jose T. Obosa's bailbond. The Court
NULLIFIES the lower court's order dated May 31, 1990, granting
bail to accused Obosa.
Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accused-appellant Jose T.
Obosa."
On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of Arrest
against petitioner was issued under signature of then Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. 6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and Reconsider Resolution of
November 19, 1993.7 The second assailed
Resolution8 promulgated on March 9, 1994 denied the motion as
follows:
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES accused Obosa's
'Motion to quash warrant of arrest and to set aside and
reconsider the resolution of November 19, 1993' dated
December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this resolution be given to the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, Manila, so that he may issue the
appropriate directive to the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for the rectification of the prison
record of accused Jose T. Obosa."
 The Facts
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice of
appeal was actually filed with the trial court,9 the facts
precedent to this petition are undisputed as set out in the first
assailed Resolution, thus: 10
"On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe charged the accused Jose T. Obosa and three others
with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the
ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N.
Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on
August 2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta,
Para()aque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his
car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La
Huerta, to hear Sunday mass.
Each information alleged that the killing was with the
attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of
the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as
to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor
recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and
tried jointly, the accused Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused
Obosa was a virtual 'escapee' from the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita
Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for
robbery as a maximum security prisoner.
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa
was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the
pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge
could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused therein.
While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
participate in the commission of the double murder now
charged against him as principal for the ambush-slaying of
Secretary Ferrer and his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA
546, 553).
Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T. Obosa as one of
three assassins firing at a car near the canteen at the corner of
Victor Medina Street and Quirino Avenue, Para()aque, Metro
Manila. It was the car of Secretary Ferrer. He sustained eight
entrance gunshot wounds on the right side of his head, neck
and body, while his driver sustained three entrance wounds on
the left temple, right side of the neck, right arm, chest and right
hip. They died on the spot.
In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court found the
accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on
two counts.11 In ruling that the crime committed was homicide,
not murder as charged in the informations, the lower court
declared that there was no qualifying circumstance attendant.
In fact, however, the lower court itself found that the accused
shot the victims while the latter were inside the car, unwary of
any danger to their lives, for unknown to them, were the
assassins lurking in the dark, firing their guns from behind, a
circumstance indubitably showing treachery (People vs.
Tachado, 170 SCRA 611; People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA 226).
There is treachery when the victims were attacked without
warning and their backs turned to the assailants, as in this case
(People vs. Tachado, supra). There is treachery when the
unarmed and unsuspecting victim was ambushed in the dark,
without any risk to his assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163 SCRA
692). Moreover, the crimes could be qualified by taking
advantage of superior strength and aid of armed men
(People v. Baluyot, 170 SCRA 569). Where the attackers
cooperated in such a way to secure advantage of their
combined strength, there is present the qualifying circumstance
of taking advantage of superior strength
(People v. Baluyot, supra; People v. Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).
On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and
on the same occasion, accused Obosa manifested his intention
to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted
accused Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each
case.
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of
appeal, dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the
decision (Alama v. Abbas, 124 Phil. 1465). By the perfection of
the appeal, the lower court thereby lost jurisdiction over the
case and this means both the record and the person of the
accused-appellant. The sentencing court lost jurisdiction or
power to do anything or any matter in relation to the person of
the accused-appellant (Director of Prisons v. Teodoro, 97 Phil.
391, 395-396), except to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal (People v. Aranda, 106 Phil.
1008).
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount
of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance
Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day,
June 4, 1990, the lower court issued an order of release. The
prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused
Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, as
hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double
murder, accused Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery."
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service of
sentence made by the accused. Thus, it extensively discussed
the following computation on the penalties imposed upon the
petitioner for his previous offenses, which all the more
convinced respondent Court that petitioner was not entitled to
bail on the date he applied therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed
his bailbond on June 4, 1990, as follows: 12
"At the time the accused committed the crimes charged, he was
an inmate at the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was in jail, but was able to
commit the Ferrer assassination. He was serving imprisonment
by final judgment in each of three (3) cases, namely, (a) theft,
for which he was sentenced to eleven (11) months and fifteen
(15) days of prision correccional; (b) robbery in band, for
which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision  correccional, as minimum,
to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and (c) evasion of service of
sentence, for which he was sentenced to six (6) months
of arresto mayor. These sentences are to be served
successively not simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal
Code; People v. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538; Gordon v. Wolfe, 6 Phil.
76; People v. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United States v. Claravall,
31 Phil. 652; People v. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1; People v. Tan, 50
Phil. 660). In successive service of sentences, the time of the
second sentence did not commence to run until the expiration
of the first (Gordon v. Wolfe, supra).
He commenced service of sentence on October 11,
1979 (with credit for preventive imprisonment) and was
admitted to the New Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980 (See
prison record attached to Supplement, dated January 31, 1994
of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison record [incomplete] attached
to Manifestation dated February 2, 1994 of the Accused
Appellant).
On December 25, 1980, he escaped from detention at Fort
Del Pilar, Baguio City, where he was temporarily working on a
prison project (See decision, Crim. Case No. 4159-R, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City, People v. Jose Obosa y Tutaa). While a
fugitive from justice, he committed other crimes, in Quezon
City, Makati, and Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The cases are
pending (See prison record, supra).
He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under prison
regulations, he forfeited his allowance for good conduct
prescribed by law (Article 97, Revised Penal Code; Act 2489 of
the Philippine Legislature). In addition, he must serve the time
spent at large (TSAL) of five (5) years, eight (8) months and
two (2) days, and the unserved portion of his successive
sentences for robbery in band, theft and evasion of service of
sentence aforementioned. In sum, he has to serve the balance
of his sentence for robbery in band of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional; the sentence
for theft of eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days of prision
correccional; and the sentence  for evasion of service of

sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor, reaching a total
of five (5) years, seven (7) months and sixteen (16) days.
Since his commitment to jail on October 11, 1979, to the time
he escaped on December 25, 1980, he had served one (1) year,
two (2) months, and fourteen (14) days, which, deducted from
the totality of his prison term, would leave a balance of four (4)
years, five (5) months and two (2) days. Thus, he must still
serve this unserved portion of his sentences in addition to the
time spent at large. Counting the time from his re-arrest on
August 27, 1986, and adding thereto five (5) years, eight (8)
months and two (2) days (time spent at large), the result is
that he must serve up to April 29, 1992. To this shall be added
the remaining balance of his successive sentences of four (4)
years, five (5) months and two (2) day(s). Consequently, he
has to serve sentence and remain in confinement up to
October 1, 1996. Of course, he may be given allowance for
good conduct. But good conduct time allowance can not be
computed in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil. 466). This is
counted only during the time an accused actually served with
good conduct and diligence (Frank v. Wolfe, supra; See Aquino,
The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp. 803-804).
However, accused Obosa can not avail himself of this beneficent
provision of the law because, while he was at large, he
committed infraction of prison rules (escaping) and other
crimes, including the Ferrer assassination, and for which he was
placed under preventive imprisonment commencing on
December 4, 1987, the date the informations at bar were filed
against him. Because he was then under custody, no warrant of
arrest or commitment order need be issued
(Asuncion v. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June 22, 1988, minute
resolution; Cf. People v. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381; Umil v. Ramos,
187 SCRA 311). Allowance for good conduct does not apply to
detention prisoners (Baking v. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA
851). Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa could not
be released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he was
admitted to bail. His release was illegal. He still has to serve the
balance of his unserved sentences until October 1, 1996."
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with respondent Court an
urgent motion,13 praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail
bond.
Petitioner promptly filed an opposition,14 to which respondent
People submitted a reply.15 Thereupon, respondent Court issued
its first questioned Resolution dated November 19, 1993:16 a)
canceling petitioner's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's
order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to petitioner, and c)
issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest.
Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration17 and quashal of
warrant of arrest proved futile as respondent Court, on March 9,
1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and
after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second
questioned Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit.
The Issues
The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows: 18
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The principal constitutional and legal issues involved in this
petition is (sic) whether petitioner as accused-appellant before
the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals is entitled to bail as
a matter of right and to enjoy the bail granted by the Regional
Trial Court, in Makati, Metro Manila, pending appeal from the
judgment convicting him of Homicide on two (2) counts though
charged with Murder; and assuming that bail is a matter of
discretion, the trial court had already exercised sound discretion
in granting bail to accused-appellant, now petitioner in this
case, and respondent Court of Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction
in cancelling said bailbond."
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly, thus: 19
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"I
Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction over
the case when it approved petitioner's bail bond on June 4,
1990.
II
Considering that the murder charge against petitioner still
stands pending his appeal and strong evidence of guilt actually
exists based on respondent Court of Appeals' own preliminary
determination and the lower court's initial finding as well, is
petitioner entitled to bail as a matter of right pending review of
his conviction for homicide?
III
How does petitioner's prison record affect his alleged right to
bail?"
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail bond by
the respondent Court was correct, we deem it necessary to
determine first whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant
bail under the circumstances of this case.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in allowing
him to post bail for his provisional liberty on the same day, May
31, 1990 when the judgment of conviction of (sic) homicide was
promulgated and the accused-appellant (petitioner) manifested
his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction. At the time,
the lower court still had jurisdiction over the case as to
empower it to issue the order granting bail pending appeal.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal only on June 4, 1990, on
which date his appeal was deemed perfected and the lower
court lost jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the grant of bail on
May 31, 1990 cannot be validly attacked on jurisdictional
grounds." 20
Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent People
admits that petitioner manifested his intention to appeal on May
31, 1990 and filed his written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990.
But the Solicitor General nevertheless contends that "x x x it
was only on June 4, 1990, or three (3) days after perfecting his
appeal that petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of
P40,000.00 through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company.
Clearly, when the lower court approved the bail bond on the
same day (June 4, 1990), it no longer had jurisdiction over the
case." 21
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990, accused
Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990,
thereby perfecting appeal from the decision x x x."22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We reviewed the page23 cited by respondent Court, and found
that indeed, the written notice of appeal, although dated June
4, 1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on
June 1, 1990. Such being the case, did the trial court correctly
approve the bail bond on June 4, 1990? To answer this, there is
a need to revisit Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
"Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial
Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or order appealed from, and by serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx."
Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1,
1990, petitioner's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need
of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably,
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the
record and over the subject of the case.24 As has been ruled: 25
"The question presented for our resolution is: Did the Court of
First Instance that convicted respondent Lacson have the power
and authority to issue the writ of preliminary injunction,
prohibiting the transfer of said Lacson from the provincial
hospital of Occidental Negros to the Insular Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Rizal? While there is no express provision on this
point, it is contrary to the generally accepted principles of
procedure for said court to be invested with said power or
authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure demands
that once a case, whether civil or criminal, has been appealed
from a trial court to an appellate (sic) court and the appeal
therefrom perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the
case, both over the record and over the subject of the case.
Thus in civil cases the rule is that after the appeal has been
perfected from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the
trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction over the case, except to issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal
(Rule 41, Sec. 9). The jurisdiction of the court over the matters
involved in the case is lost by the perfected appeal, save in
those cases which the rules expressly except therefrom."
(Underscoring supplied).
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31,
1990 by the trial court.26 The validity and effectivity of the
subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June
4, 1990 is therefore the matter at issue. We agree with
respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was
granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval
of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then,
the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had
lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been
different had bail been granted and approval thereof
given before the notice of appeal was filed.
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of
jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On
this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues,
it is indisputable that the instant petition should be dismissed.
Second Issue: Is Petitioner Entitled To Bail
As A Matter of Right?
The second issue, while no longer critical to the disposition of
this case, will nevertheless be tackled, in view of its importance.
The Solicitor General argues that "(f)or while petitioner was
convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, the fact that he has
appealed resultantly throws the whole case open for review and
reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged
with the capital offense of murder on two (2) counts against
whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the
trial court during the bail proceedings a quo." 27
Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused who is
charged with a capital offense is convicted not of the offense for
which he is charged but for a lesser one which is not capital or
punished with reclusion perpetua, he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right because the fact that the evidence of his guilt of
a capital offense is not strong is necessarily to be inferred from
his conviction of the lesser offense." 28
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated: 29 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"In this case, although the accused is charged with murder on
two counts, and evidence of guilt is strong, the lower court
found him guilty of homicide also on two (2) counts. He has
appealed. An appeal by the accused throws the whole case open
for review and this includes the penalty, the indemnity and the
damages awarded by the trial court which may be increased
(Quemuel v. Court of Appeals, 130 Phil. 33). The appellate
court may find the accused guilty of the original crime charged
and impose on him the proper penalty therefor
(Linatoc v. People, 74 Phil. 586). By virtue of the appeal, the
conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is stayed in the
meantime. Hence, the accused is back to the original situation
as he was before judgment (Cf. Peo. v. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398),
that is, one charged with capital offenses where evidence of
guilt is strong. Bail must be denied."
To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage,30 we analyzed the
purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one charged with
a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
"x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the
breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that
a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense
is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a 'mode short of confinement which would,
with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused'
for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in
denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong. as the likelihood is, rather than await
the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death
sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted." (Underscoring
supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an
appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was
nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such
appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his
conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on
appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely
more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the
capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the
appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental
law, set the standard to be observed in applications for bail.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure,31 as amended, provides:
"Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or
an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
(Underscoring supplied).
In Borinaga vs. Tamin,32 which was promulgated in 1993, this
Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail:
"The 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. Corollarily, the Rules of Court, under Section
3, Rule 114 thereof, provides that all persons in custody shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on availability of bail to
an accused may be restated as follows:
1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge is not for a capital offense or is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua; [Sec. 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules
on Crim. Procedure]
2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail
shall be allowed if the accused is charged with a capital offense
or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of guilt is strong; [Idem].
3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt
is strong, the accused may still be admitted to bail in the
discretion of the court if there are strong grounds to apprehend
that his continued confinement will endanger his life or result in
permanent impairment of health, [De la Rama v. People's
Court, 43 O.G. No. 10, 4107 (1947)] but only before judgment
in the regional trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the
accused has applied for probation and has not commenced to
serve sentence, [Section 21, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Court] the
penalty and offense being within the purview of the probation
law."
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have
since been modified by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, which
was issued by this Court and which came into effect on October
1, 1994. Verily, had herein petitioner made application for
bail after the effectivity of said circular, this case would have
been readily and promptly resolved against petitioner. For,
quite recently, in Robin Carino Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,33 we held, making reference to said administrative circular:
"Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if
the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter
of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment, and evidence of
guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong
bail becomes a matter of right." (Citations omitted;
underscoring supplied).
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure the presence of any of which could
preclude the grant of bail are as follows:
"(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime."
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing
amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner for two
counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as
a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound
discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances
enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are
present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and
warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive
application of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it
would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of
petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm.
Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause either.
In Quemuel vs. CA, et al.,34 this Court held that the appeal in a
criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the
entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may
once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation,
the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever
present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as
it had done so in this case, such determination subsists even on
appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such
determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant
or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether
petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the
charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after
conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of
the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending
the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding
the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. 35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides
that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital
offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed
on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) years and
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to
have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded
sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may
commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to
a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released
on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted should be cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old rules on bail
(i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm. Circular 12-94).
Senator Vicente J. Francisco's36 eloquent explanation on why
bail should be denied as a matter of wise discretion after
judgment of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains
valid up to now:
"The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying
principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another
point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction. x x x"
Third Issue:  Petitioner's Record
Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
concluding "that at the time the bail was granted and approved
by His Honor of the trial Court, he has still to serve sentence
and remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996" and hence
was not entitled to bail.37 Petitioner, citing Luis B.
Reyes,38 maintains that the Bureau of Corrections properly
released him from prison on July 18, 1990.
We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the resolution of
the instant petition. Having already determined that the bail
bond was approved without jurisdiction and that the Court of
Appeals was correct in issuing the two questioned Resolutions,
we thus hold that, petitioner cannot be released from
confinement. The determination of whether or not petitioner
should still be imprisoned up to October 1, 1996, and only
thereafter may possibly be released on bail is no longer material
for the disposition of this case. Thus, we shall longer burden
ourselves with the resolution of this academic issue.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right
even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense,
appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail
considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of
the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts
would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after
conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the
degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated
by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous
escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.
Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be
commended for its vigilance, discretion and steadfastness. In
ruling against bail, it even scoured the records and found that
treachery attended the killing thereby justifying its action. The
trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully
debunked by the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the
rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law must be understood
not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but
always in context of pulsating social realities and specific
environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role
of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice." 39

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is

hereby  DENIED and the two assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.