Preparing for Emergencies

1
 Pendahuluan
• Dalam situasi yang tidak normal atau keadaan darurat,
perlu tindakan untuk menjadi normal kembali dan
kerugian ditekan seminimal mungkin
• Manajemen pengendalian kerugian
• Sikap tanggap terhadap kemungkinan timbulnya keadaan
darurat yang menyebabkan kerugian perlu diantisipasi
• Perencanaan untuk menghadapi keadaan darurat
(emergency planning)
• Menumbuhkan sikap tanggap dari seluruh individu dalam
perusahaan/industri terhadap gejala-gejala yang diduga
akan menimbulkan keadaan darurat serta upaya
penanggulangan keadaan darurat dan pertolongan
pertama (emergency response and first aid)

2
2
 definisi
• Tanggap darurat: suatu sikap untuk mengantisipasi
kemungkinan terjadinya hal-hal yang tidak diinginkan,
yang akan menimbulkan kerugian
• Penanggulangan keadaan darurat: upaya atau tindakan
yang dilakukan untuk mengatasi keadaan yang tidak
dikehendaki supaya dapat dinormalisir dan kerugian
ditekan seminimal mungkin
• Keadaan darurat: berubahnya suatu kegiatan/keadaan
atau situasi yang semula normal menjadi tidak normal
sebagai suatu akibat dari suatu peristiwa yang tidak
diduga atau tidak dikehendaki

3
3
 Jenis penyebab keadaan darurat
• Penggunaan/pengoperasian alat (operational
emergencies): kecelakaan, kebakaran, ledakan,
tumpahan bahan kimia, dll
• Bencana alam (natural disasters): banjir, angin,
gempa bumi, petir, dll
• Gangguan dari pihak luar (public disturbances):
ledakan bom, sabotase, pemogokan kerja,
kerusuhan, kecelakaan pesawat terbang, dll

4
4
 Prosedur tanggap darurat
• Rencana/rancangan dalam menghadapi keadaan
darurat
• Pendidikan dan latihan
• Penanggulangan keadaan darurat
• Pemindahan dan penutupan

5
5
 Rancangan menghadapi keadaan darurat
• Penyusunan dapat mengacu pada informasi sbb.:
1. kemungkinan akan bahaya: bahaya apa yang akan
menimpa?
2. Sistem peringatan bahaya: siapa yang akan
diperingatkan dan bagaimana caranya?
3. Prosedur pengaturan tugas dan tindakan: siapa yang
akan mengkoordinasikan dan mengatur suatu
tindakan?
4. Manajemen dan kontrol: siapa yang bertanggung
jawab?
5. Komunikasi di lapangan: bagaimana dan untuk apa
berkomunikasi?
6. Urutan kuasa: siapa yang memiliki kekuasaan? Peran
pemimpin saat keadaan darurat.
6
6
 Rancangan menghadapi keadaan darurat

7. Tindakan/kegiatan anggota: siapa yang dilatih

untuk masing-masing tugas?
8. Pusat organisasi keadaan darurat: dimana
letaknya?
9. Prosedur pemindahan (evakuasi): kapan dan
siapa yang akan membantu?
10. Kelompok penolong: kelompok luar manakah
yang dapat dipanggil untuk diminta
bantuannya?
11. Modal: modal apa yang dimiliki?

7
7
 Sistem tanda dan
peringatan akan bahaya
• Deteksi kebakaran
• Alarm kebakaran
• Sistem peralatan deteksi
• Peringatan dari luar
• Teriakan pekerja

8
8
 • Suatu keuntungan bagi pekerja untuk mengetahui
benar-benar lokasi dan no telp darurat, pintu
darurat, alarm, dan cara-cara evakuasi
• Peralatan pemadam kebakaran dan peralatan
pertolongan pertama harus diperiksa secara
teratur, untuk meyakinkan bahwa peralatan
tersebut bisa digunakan sesuai waktu dan sesuai
dengan masa berlakunya

9
9
 Pendidikan dan latihan
• Para pekerja mengerti dan memahami kegunaan
prosedur tanggap darurat dan rancangan dalam
menghadapi tanggap darurat serta
penanggulangannya
• Latihan menghadapi keadaan darurat: prosedur
evakuasi, pencegahan dan penanggulangan
kebakaran, pertolongan pertama, prosedur
pengamanan.

10
10
 Penanggulangan keadaan darurat
• Kelompok yang bisa dibentuk: pusat koordinator
selaku pos komando, tim penyelamat yang
berpengalaman di bidang pertolongan pertama,
tim/regu pemadam kebakaran, keamanan, dll.

11
11
 Pemindahan dan penutupan
• Pada saat darurat, pastikan untuk
menutup/menghentikan kegiatan dan melakukan
evakuasi kepada seluruh pekerja dari tempat
kejadian

12
12
 Medical evacuation
• Korban kecelakaan dapat diberi pertolongan dalam
berbagai suasana:
1. Ideal
2. darurat
3. Musibah (disaster)
4. Bencana (catastrophe)
• Faktor kritis yang sangat mempengaruhi hasil
pertolongan korban dalam setiap suasana tsb.:
1. Waktu
2. Tempat kejadian
3. Tenaga penolong
4. Sarana/material

13
13
 Penggolongan korban sesuai urgensi
• Gawat I (ancaman maut): gangguan pernafasan
karena trauma otak, kehilangan kesadaran, luka
bakar di wajah atau di jalan pernafasan atas,
penyumbatan jalan nafas, luka berat di kepala,
patah tulang hebat, trauma torax, trauma perut,
kehilangan darah, dll
• Gawat II (maut mengancam, tetapi tidak segera):
trauma otak, perut, muka yg tidak terlalu berat,
luka bakar 9-18%, korban dengan luka sendi
terbuka, patah tulang
• Gawat III (tidak ada ancaman maut): yang tidak
terancam cacat tetap

14
14
15
15
 Manajemen keadaan darurat
• Prosedur untuk mengidentifikasi potensi dan
kesiagaan terhadap insiden dan keadaan darurat,
untuk mencegah dan menguranginya
• Mengkaji ulang rencana dan prosedur, terutama
setelah keadaan darurat atau terjadi insiden
• Prosedur dikaji secara berkala
Peta evakuasi, penanganan korban, monitoring
alat-alat safety, P3K, safety warning, penanganan
pengendalian

16
16
17
17
 8.2 Emergency preparedness and response

• a) establishing a planned response to emergency situations, including the

provision of first aid;
• b) providing training for the planned response;
• c) periodically testing and exercising the planned response capability;
• d) evaluating performance and, as necessary revising the planned response,
including after testing and, in particular, after the occurrence of emergency
situations;
• e) communicating and providing relevant information to all workers on their
duties and responsibilities;
• f) communicating relevant information to contractors, visitors, emergency
response services, government authorities and, as appropriate, the local
community;
• g) taking into account the needs and capabilities of all relevant interested parties
and ensuring their involvement, as appropriate, in the development of the
planned response.
• The organization shall maintain and retain documented information on the
process[es) and on the plans for responding to potential emergency situations.

18
18
19
20
21
Local emergency planning committees
(LEPCs)

22
Evacuation Planning
• To ensure that routes of egress and all related evacuation
response items are clearly marked, safety professionals should
answer the following questions about the facilities for which
they are responsible:
1. Are all exit, emergency exit, and nonexit doors clearly
identified and marked?
2. Are there up-to-date evacuation route maps mounted at
strategic locations throughout the facility?
3. Are all egress route aisles, hallways, and stairs marked clearly
and can the markings be seen in the event of darkness?
4. Are there low-level markings posted strategically throughout
the facility that can be viewed in the event that smoke fills the
facility?
5. Are all items of firefighting equipment clearly marked with
directional signs so they can be easily located in the event of
an emergency?

23
6. Is all emergency first-aid equipment clearly marked
with directional signs so that it can be easily located
in the event of an emergency?
7. Are all electrical, chemical, and physical hazards
identified and clearly marked?
8. Are all physical obstructions clearly outlined?
9. Are all critical shutdown procedures and equipment
identified and clearly marked?
10. Are the handrails, treads, and risers on all stairs
clearly marked?
11. In the case of multicultural workforce settings, are
all signs and markings provided in a bilingual or
pictogram format?

24
Machine safeguard

25
Each of these aspects should cover every
stage of the life of the equipment
1. design
2. manufacture
3. transport
4. installation
5. testing
6. commissioning and preparation for production
7. operation from start-up to shut-down
8. setting, adjusting and process change
9. cleaning
10. maintenance, repair and overhaul
11. removing from service and dismantling
12. disposal of parts especially if contaminated by hazardous materials.

26
27
28
29
30
 Guidance on
permit-to-work systems

3131
Introduction
• Dalam industri apa saja, kecelakaan sangat
mungkin terjadi. Terlebih di industri minyak
dimana bahaya kebakaran dan bahan beracun
merupakan sumber bencana terbesar.
• Terjadinya kecelakaan / bencana umumnya
diakibatkan oleh faktor kelalaian (human error)
• Salah satu kelalaian tersebut adalah faktor
management system.
• PTW (Permit To Work) system merupakan bagian
management system yang penting dalam
mengantisipasi / mencegah terjadinya accident.

3232
Introduction
• Kecelakaan/kejadian fatal → tidak dipahaminya
tujuan /aplikasi praktis dari permit to work
systems.
• Untuk mencegah kejadian yang fatal, diperlukan
management yang effective berhubungan
dengan management of hazard, termasuk
penggunaan “safe systems of work”
• PTW system merupakan bagian yang terintegral
dengan “safe system of work” yang dipadukan
dengan pengaturan berbagai kegiatan yang
akan dilakukan.

3333
Introduction
• PTW: bukan hanya ijin untuk melakukan pekerjaan
yang berbahaya saja, namun merupakan bagian
penting dari suatu sistem yang menentukan
bagaimana sebuah pekerjaan dilakukan dengan
aman, dan membantu mengkomunikasikan ke orang
yang melakukan pekerjaan tersebut sesuai dengan
prosedur dan persyaratan, sehingga dipastikan bahwa
pekerjaan siap dilaksanakan dan aman.
• Dengan demikian PTW tidak hanya tentang
keselamatan kerja, tapi juga prosedur operasional
atau aktivitas lainnya sesuai dengan lingkup jobnya
atau pekerjaan pada perusahaanya.
• Penerapan PTW tidak terbatas pada pekerjaan yang
besar saja, namun juga untuk ruang lingkup yang
kecil seperti bengkel kerja, gudang atau proses
produksi

3434
Introduction
• Dengan permit tersebut, a job safe, dapat dicapai,
oleh orang yang mempersiapkan PTW, supervisor
yang mengawasi, orang yang melakukan pekerjaan
tersebut dan orang-orang yang berhubungan
dengan pekerjaan tersebut.
• Penanggung jawab dan orang-orang yang
berkompeten telah berpikir tentang resiko, dan
kondisi berbahaya dapat dihindari.
• Dengan sendirinya PTW bukan jaminan mutlak tidak
akan terjadinya kecelakaan. Semua tergantung pada
executornya (pelaksananya), apakah dilakukan
dengan sungguh-sungguh atau sekedar formalitas
diatas kertas.

3535
What is a PTW system?
• Formal assessment process untuk mengontrol
pekerjaan yang telah diidentifikasi sebagai hazard.
• Sebagai komunikasi antara site/installation
management, plant supervisor, operator dan
orang yang menjalankan pekerjaan tersebut.

3636
Hal Pokok dari PTW systems:
• Identifikasi yang jelas, siapa yang bertanggung
jawab pada pekerjaan tersebut
• Training dan instruksi tentang permit to work
systems, penggunaan dan closure of permits.
• Monitoring dan auditing
• Identifikasi yang jelas tentang jenis pekerjaan yang
berbahaya
• Identifikasi tugas, risk assessment, durasi dari
permit

3737
Kapan dibutuhkan PTW systems?
• Non-production work (e.g. maintenance, repair,
inspection, testing, construction, dismanthling,
modification, cleaning, etc)
• Non-routine operations
• Jobs where two or more individuals or groups
need to co-ordinate activities to complete the job
safety
• Jobs where there is a transfer of work and
responsibilities from one group to another

3838
Contoh jenis pekerjaan dengan permit
• Work of any type where heat is used or
generated (e.g. welding, flame cutting, grinding,
etc)
• Work which may generate sparks or other
sources of ignition
• Work which may involve breading containment
of a flammable, toxic or other dangerous
substance and/or pressure systems
• Work on high voltage electrical equipment of
other work on electrical equipment which may
give rise to danger

3939
Contoh jenis pekerjaan dengan permit
• Entry and work within tanks and other confined
spaces
• Work involving the use of radioactive materials
and explosives
• Well intervention
• Diving, including on shore operations near water
• Pressure testing
• Work affecting evacuation, escape or rescue
systems

4040
Contoh jenis pekerjaan dengan permit
• Work involving temporary equipment, e.g.
generator, welding equipment, etc
• Work at height
• Any operation which requires additional
precautions or personal protective equipment
(PPE) to be in place
• Any other potentially high-risk operations.

4141
Essentials of permit to work systems
• DISPLAY
a) At the work site, or in a recognised location
near to the work site
b) In the central or main control or permit
coordination room, with additional copies at
any local control rooms
c) In addition, a copy of the permit should be kept
with the issuing authority, or with the area
authority, if that person is not located at the
worksite or control room

4242
Essentials of permit to work systems
• SUSPENSION
a) If there is a general alarm
b) For operational reasons, e.g. when the permit is
for hot work and process fluid or gas sampling
must be carried out at the same time, with the
possibility of a release of a dangerous
substance
c) While waiting for spares
d) Where there is conflict with another scope of
work.
It is important: a suspended permit remains live
until it is cancelled.

4343
Essentials of permit to work systems
• PERMIT INTERACTION
To make sure that one activity under a permit to
work does not create danger for another, even
it the other work does not require a permit to
work.

4444
Essentials of permit to work systems
• HAND OVER

WORK IN PROGRESS SHOULD BE LEFT IN A

CONDITION THAT CAN BE RELIABLY
COMMUNICATED TO AND UNDERSTOOD BY,
THE ONCOMING SHIFT
A permit log, permit file or display boards are ways
of recording ongoing permits.

4545
Essentials of permit to work systems
• HAND BACK
a) Has the work been completed? This should be
confirmed by the performing authority, i.e. the
person to whom the permit was issued
b) Had the plant or equipment been returned to a
safe condition, in particular by removing isolations?
Has this been verified by the person responsible
for signing off the permit (ie. Issuing or area
authority)
c) Has the person in control of operational activities
acknowledged on the permit that the plant or
equipment has been returned to the control of the
production staff?

4646
Essentials of permit to work systems
• PERMIT AUTHORISATION AND SUPERVISION
A permit to work system will be fully effective only
if the permits are coordinated and controlled
by an issuing or other responsible authority,
and there is adequate supervision and
monitoring of the system to make sure that the
specified procedures are being followed.

4747
What does a permit to work look like?
• Keep sentences short and simple
• Clearly state who does what and when
• Use colour coding (e.g. to illustrate individual
roles)
• Use the present tense and the active voice
• Do not use text fonts smaller than 8 points
• Place items on the permit in the order they are
performed
• Make cross-referencing easy – keep related
information together

4848
What does a permit to work look like?
• Use UPPER CASE sparingly for emphasis
• Leave enough room for descriptions (e.g. to list
area involved, hazards and precautions),
specifying the level of detail required
• Provide actual quantitative values and limits (e.g.
don’t just say “must not exceed a critical level”)

4949
Permit Types
• HOT WORK PERMIT
• COLD WORK PERMIT
• ELECTRICAL WORK PERMIT
• EQUIPMENT DISJOINTING
CERTIFICATE/BREAKING CONTAINMENT PERMIT
• CONFINED SPACES ENTRY CERTIFICATE
• MACHINERY CERTIFICATE
• ISOLATION CERTIFICATE

5050
Permit Types
• EXCAVATION CERTIFICATE/HEAVY EQUIPMENT
MOVEMENT CERTIFICATE
• RADIATION CERTIFICATE
• DIVING CERTIFICATE
• CONTROL OF LESS HAZARDOUS WORK

5151
Suggested colours for different types of permits

5252
Essentials elements of a permit to work form

5353
Preventive Strategies
• Hazard controls and risk reduction
• Concept-driven strategies
• Case-driven strategies: A reactive approach
• Comprehensive strategies: A proactive approach
• Safety Management Systems

54
55
56
57
58
Cost-benefit Factors in Hazard Analysis
Example of the CNC machining center, assume that
the analysis team identified the following potential
hazards:
• Lubricants sprayed on the machine operator or
floor
• Flying metal chips hitting the operator or other
workers
• Jammed metal stock kicking back into the
operator

59
60
Hazard Analysis
• In cases where the potential exists for serious injury,
multiple injuries, or catastrophic illness, a detailed
hazard analysis is conducted.
• A number of different methods can be used for
conducting detailed analyses.
• The most widely used of these are as follows:
1. Failure mode and effects of analysis (FMEA)
2. Hazard and operability review (HAZOP)
3. Human error analysis (HEA)
4. Technique of operations review (TOR)
5. Fault tree analysis (FTA)
6. Risk analysis

61
Hazard and operability review (HAZOP)
• HAZOP is an analysis method that was developed
for use with new processes in the chemical
industry.
• Its strength is that it allows problems to be
identified even before a body of experience has
been developed for a given process or system.
• Although originally intended for use with new
processes, it need not be limited to new
operations.
• HAZOP works equally well with old processes and
systems.

62
• A variety of approaches can be used with HAZOP. The
one recommended by the American
• American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AICHE) is
probably the most widely used.
• AICHE recommends the following guidewords:
1. no,
2. less,
3. more,
4. part of,
5. as well as,
6. reverse,
7. And other than.

63
• These guidewords relate to the operation of a specific component in
the system or a specific part of an overall operation.
• They describe ways in which the component may deviate from its
design or its intended mode of operation.
• For example:
a. If a component that should rotate 38° in a cycle fails to rotate at all,
the no guideword applies.
b. If it rotates less than 38°, the less guideword applies.
c. More would apply if the component’s rotation exceeded 38°.
d. Reverse would be used if the component rotated 38° in a direction
opposite of the one intended.
e. As well as is similar to more in that it indicates an increase in an
intended amount.
f. Other than is used when what actually occurs is something
completely different from what was intended.
g. For example, if the component fell off rather than rotating 38°,
other than would be used.

64
A HAZOP proceeds in a step-by-step
manner.
1. Select the process or system to be analyzed.
2. Form the team of experts.
3. Explain the HAZOP process to all team
members.
4. Establish goals and timeframes.
5. Conduct brainstorming sessions.
6. Summarize all input.

65
66
Human Error Analysis (HEA)
• HEA is used to predict human error, not to review
what has occurred.
• HEA should be used to identify hazards before they
cause accidents.
• Two approaches to HEA can be effective:
1. observing employees at work and noting hazards
(the task analysis approach) and
2. actually performing job tasks to get a firsthand
feel for hazards.
• Regardless of how the HEA is conducted, it is a good
idea to perform it in conjunction with FMEAs and
HAZOPs.
• This will enhance the effectiveness of all three
processes

67
Technique of operations review (TOR)
• TOR is an analysis method that allows supervisors
and employees to work together to analyze
workplace accidents, failures, and incidents.
• It answers the question “Why did the system allow
this Incident to occur?”
• A weakness of TOR is that it is designed as an
after-the-fact process.
• It is triggered by an accident or incident.
• The strength of TOR is its involvement of line
personnel in the analysis.

68
The process proceeds as follows:
1. Establish the TOR team.
• It should consist of workers who were present when the accident or
incident occurred, the supervisor, and the safety and health
professional.
• The safety and health professional should chair the team and serve as
a facilitator.
2. Conduct a roundtable discussion to establish a common knowledge
base among team members.
• At the beginning of the discussion, five team members may have five
different versions of the accident or incident. At the end, there should
be a consensus.
3. Identify one major systematic factor that led to, or played a significant
role in, causing the accident or incident.
• This one TOR statement, about which there must be consensus,
serves as the starting point for further analysis.

69
The process proceeds as follows:
4. Use the group consensus to respond to a sequence of yes/no
options.
• Through this process, the team identifies a number of factors that
contributed to the accident or incident.
5. Evaluate identified factors carefully to make sure that there is a
team consensus about each.
Then, prioritize the contributing factors beginning with the most
serious one.
6. Develop corrective or preventive strategies for each factor.
• Include them in a final report that is forwarded through normal
channels for appropriate action.

70
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
• FTA can be used to predict and prevent accidents
or as an investigative tool after the fact.
• FTA is an analytical methodology that uses a
graphic model to display the analysis process
visually.
• A fault tree is built using special symbols, some
derived from Boolean algebra.
• The resultant model resembles a logic diagram or
a flowchart
• Fault trees can be made quantitative by assigning
probability figures to the various events below the
top box.

71
A fault tree is developed using the following
steps:
1. Decide on the accident or incident to be placed
at the top of the tree.
2. Identify the broadest level of failure or fault
event that could contribute to the top event.
Assign the appropriate symbols.
3. Move downward through successively more
specific levels until basic events are identified.

72
73
74
The following hazard control methods are
recommended:
1. Eliminate the source of the hazards.
2. Substitute a less hazardous equivalent.
3. Reduce the hazards at the source.
4. Remove the employee from the hazard (for example,
substitute a robot or other automated system).
5. Isolate the hazards (for example, enclose them in
barriers).
6. Dilute the hazard (for example, ventilate the hazardous
substance).
7. Apply appropriate management strategies.
8. Use appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).
9. Provide employee training.
10. Practice good housekeeping.

75