People v. Pagal, G.R. No.

241257, September 29, 2020

Facts The Brendo P. Pagal (accused-appellant) on or about December 15, 2008, in Brgy.
Esperanza, Matalom, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully, feloniously, with treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, without any justifiable reason whatsoever, slabbed
Selma Pagal, with a sharp bladed weapon, wounding her at the back penetrating the chest,
thereby causing [her] direct and immediate death.

During his arraignment on August 20, 2009, accused appellant pleaded "guilty" to the crime
charged. 

The RTC stated that "the prosecution after having exerted its effort to present any
prosecution witness in determining the degree of culpability of the accused who pleaded
guilty to the crime charged, has no one to be presented. On this matter, the prosecution now
submitted the case for decision and as joined by the defense who has also no witness to be
presented." none of the prosecution witnesses appeared and testified on the scheduled
hearing dates of November 17, 2010; February 22, 2011; May 11, 2011; and July 20, 2011,
for the presentation of the prosecution's evidence despite repeat subpoenas duly issued and
received by them. 

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt based solely on his plea of
guilty. Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Order to the CA and raised this singular error
committed by the lower court, of convicting him of the crime charged solely based on his
plea of guilt.

The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC and remanded the case for further
proceedings. The CA held that the RTC failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 3,
Rule 116 regarding the treatment of a plea of guilty to a capital offense, particularly the
conduct of a searching inquiry into accused- appellant's voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Also, the CA observed that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independent of the plea of
guilty. In fact, the CA noted that the prosecution did not present any evidence; thus, it
remanded the case to the RTC with a directive that it follow the mandate of Sec. 3, Rule 116.
Issue WON RTC erred in convicting him on the sole basis of his guilty plea despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling Accused-appellant's arguments are meritorious. This Court sets aside the CA's order of
remand. Dictates of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights mandate this course of
action. Accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy. Procedurally, it must be noted that
accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the May 8, 2018, CA Decision
before this Court.
People v. Agbot, G.R. No. L-3764, July 31, 1981.
Facts Appellant Antonio Agbot of the Mandayan tribe was charged with murder for the death of
his sister, Leona Agbot. According to the prosecution, the victim’s husband and stepson were
relaxing at the porch when they heard a gunshot after which the victim came rushing from
the kitchen wounded and bleeding on the right breast. She died seconds later. It was shown
that before the shooting, appellant Agbot had threatened the deceased when she refused to
return his 12-year-old daughter, who had been under her custody since the child was 2 years
old. The accused admitted his guilt before the barrio captain during the investigation at the
house of Leona Agbot, and in an extrajudicial confession executed later before the police
authorities and sworn before the municipal judge. The gunshot used by appellant was
recovered from his house. Based on this evidence, appellant was convicted and sentenced to
 death. On automatic review, appellant disputed the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, there having been no post-mortem examination made nor a ballistic examination
conducted and denied having made any admission. He claimed that his confession was
extracted by force and maltreatment.
Issue Whether or not the evidence gathered against appellant were sufficient to convict him of
murder.
Ruling The Supreme Court held that appellant’s confession which fulfilled all elements of
admissibility, supported by evidence of corpus delicti and the finding in appellant’s house of
the weapon that undisputedly inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the deceased,
sufficiently proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Judgment affirmed, but the death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Sec.
106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu which entitles him as a member of the
Cultural Minority to life imprisonment instead of death, and also taking into account the
length of time he had already been in the death row.

Mobil Oil v. Diocares, G.R. No. L-26371, September 30, 1969

Facts Ruth Diocares and Lope Diocares entered into a contract of loan and real estate mortgage
amounting to P45,000.00. and agreed to buy from the plaintiff their petroleum requirements
amounting to not less than P50,000.00 liters per month.
To secure the performance of the foregoing obligation they executed a first mortgage on two
parcels of land issued by the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.  The agreement further
provided that in case of failure of the defendants to pay any of the installments due and pur-
chase their petroleum requirements in the minimum amount of 50,000 liters per month from
the plaintiff, the latter has the right to foreclose the mortgage or recover the payment of the
entire obligation or its remaining unpaid balance; that in case of foreclosure the plaintiff shall
be entitled to 12% of the indebtedness as damages and attorney's fees.
Defendants, admitted their indebtedness as set forth above, denying merely the alleged
refusal to pay, the truth, according to them, being that they sought for an extension of time to
do so, inasmuch as they were not in a position to comply with their obligation.
The defendant paid only the amount of P1,901.76 to the plaintiff, thus leaving a balance of
P43,098.24, excluding interest, on their indebtedness. The said defendants also failed to buy
on cash basis the minimum amount of petroleum which they agreed to purchase from the
plaintiff.  The plaintiff, therefore, prayed that the defendants be... ordered to pay the amount
of P43,098.24, with interest at 9-1/2% per annum from the date it fell due, and in default of
such payment that the mortgaged properties be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment
of defendants' obligation."[
Then came a motion from the plaintiff for a judgment on the pleadings, which motion was
favorably acted on by the lower court.  As was stated in the order appealed from:  "The
answer of the defendants dated October 21, 1965 did not raise... any issue.  On the contrary,
said answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint. The plaintiff is entitled to a
judgment on the pleadings."[7]
As to why the foreclosure sought by plaintiff was denied, the lower court order on appeal
reads thus:  "The Court cannot, however, order the foreclosure of the mortgage of properties,
as prayed for, because there is no allegation in the complaint nor does it appear from the
copy of the loan and real estate mortgage contract attached to the complaint that the
mortgage had been registered.  The said loan agreement although binding among the parties
merely created a personal obligation but did not establish a real... estate mortgage.   The
document should have been registered.  (Art. 2125, Civil Code of the Phil.)
Issue WON there is a need that the mortgage be recorded in the Registry of property.
Ruling The lower court should not have held that no real estate mortgage was established and should
have ordered its foreclosure.
The lower court predicated its inability to order the foreclosure in view of the categorical
nature of the opening sentence of the governing article 10 that it is indispensable, "in order
that a mortgage may be validly... constituted, that the document in which it appears be
recorded in the Registry of Property." Not that it ignored the succeeding sentence:  "If the
instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties." Its
conclusion, however, is... that what was thus created was merely "a personal obligation but
did not establish a real estate mortgage."
Such a conclusion does not commend itself for approval.  The codal provision is clear and
explicit.  Even if the instrument were not recorded, "the mortgage is nevertheless binding
between the parties."
Effect must be given to it as written.  The mortgage subsists; the parties are bound.  As
between them, the mere fact that there is yet no compliance with the requirement that it be
recorded cannot be a bar to... foreclosure.
A contrary conclusion would manifest less than full respect to what the codal provision
ordains.  The liability of the mortgagor is therein explicitly recognized.  To hold, as the lower
court did, that no foreclosure would lie... under the circumstances would be to render the
provision in question nugatory.
Moreover, to rule as the lower court did would be to show less than fealty to the purpose that
animated the legislators in giving expression to their will that the failure of the instrument to
be recorded does not result in the mortgage being any the less "binding between the...
parties."
"In article [2125] an additional provision is made that if the instrument of mortgage is not
recorded, the mortgage, is nevertheless binding between the parties."
Manila Memorial Park v. CA, G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000
Facts Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land
against petitioner. After a protracted litigation, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The
court ruled that the claims had been barred by the statute of limitations and laches. Private
respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, which was denied by the trial
court. On appeal to the CA, the
records were not transmitted to the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic
notes. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion for new trial since reconstitution of the
missing stenographic notes was no longer possible which was granted by the trial court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, invoking that the trial court erred in holding that
the petitioner was barred from assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting the
motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioner was stopped by laches in assailing the notice of appeal which had been given due
course by the trial court.
Issue WON CA erred in not holding that the perfection of an appeal within the time prescribed is
jurisdictional and as such it can be assailed at anytime.
Ruling No, the Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for
the dismissal of the appeal at an earlier time acting upon the assumption that the appeal was
filed on time relying on the order of the trial court that the notice of appeal had been filed
within the reglementary period. The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition
on the ground of its having then filed out of time. The respondents did not attempt to explain
the reason for the delay and instead blamed the petitioner for its failure to assail the
 timeliness of the appeal.
Yu Con v. Ipil, G.R. No. L-10195 December 29, 1916
Facts The purpose of the action brought in these proceedings is to enable the plaintiff to recover
from the defendants jointly and severally the sum of P450, which had been delivered by the
plaintiff to the defendants, master and supercargo, of a banca named Maria belonging to the
second defendant, to be carried, together with various merchandise belonging to the plaintiff,
from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon of the Province of Cebu.

By virtue of the contract executed between the said second defendant and the plaintiff, the
money and merchandise were to be transported by the said craft between the points above-
named in consideration of the payment of a certain sum for each voyage. The money
disappeared from said craft during the night of October
18, 1911, while it was anchored in the port of Cebu and ready to sail for its destination,
Catmon, and was not afterwards found. The plaintiff based his action on the charge that the
disappearance of said sum.
 
The defendants, besides denying the allegations of the complaint, pleaded in special defense
that the plaintiff, at his own expense and under his exclusive responsibility, chartered the said
banca, the property of the defendant Lauron, for the fixed period of three days, at the price of
P10 per diem, and that, through the misfortune, negligence, or abandonment of the plaintiff
himself, the loss complained of occurred, while said banca was at anchor in the port of Cebu,
and was caused by theft committed by unknown thieves. They further alleged that said
defendant Lauron, the owner of the banca merely placed this craft at the disposal of the
plaintiff for the price and period agreed upon, and did not go with the banca on its voyage
from Catmon to Cebu.

At the termination of the trial, the court, in view of the evidence adduced, held that there was
no room to doubt that the sole cause of the disappearance of the money from the said banca
was the negligence of the master and the supercargo, the defendants Ipil and Solamo,
respectively, and that the defendant Narciso
Lauron was responsible for that negligence, as owner of the banca, pursuant to articles 586,
587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce, the plaintiff therefore being entitled to recover the
amount lost.
Issue WON the defendants are liable for the loss?
Ruling It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in
force, which are applicable to the instant case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as the
proprietor and owner of the craft of which Glicerio Ipil was the master and in which, through
the fault and negligence of the latter and of the supercargo Justo Solamo, there occurred the
loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the plaintiff and were delivered to said
master and supercargo, a theft which, on the other hand, as shown by the evidence, does not
appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft, should, for said loss or
theft, be heldcivilly liable to the plaintiff, who executed with said defendant Lauron the
contract for the transportation of the merchandise and money aforementioned between the
port of Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of the said craft.
ADMU v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993
Facts Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. respondent students
were present at the hazing as auxiliaries. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo
"Lennie" H. Villa, a first-year student at petitioner university, died of serious physical
injuries. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee found the
respondents guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then
president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students.
 The respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
Issue WON Ateneo de Manila University has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.
Ruling In favor of the petitioner. The RTC’s decision to allow respondent students was overturned.
ADMU practices academic freedom. RTC’s decision will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present
1987 Constitutions.
In re Column of Amado Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008
Facts Respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet, a newspaper columnist of Malaya, for authoring
publications imputing bribery to a member of this Court. The same issue was also reported in
Newsbreak via Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo.

Justice Santiago issued a statement denying the "accusations and insinuations

Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo uniformly testified that they obtained the information on the
alleged bribery from their respective confidential sources. Delis, Justice Santiago’s staff,
denied having received or opened any box containing cash intended for Justice Santiago.
While admitting that she was a staff of Justice Santiago, Delis denied having been fired from
service and claimed that she resigned effective 15 March 2007. Danilo Pablo of the Court’s
Security Division testified that while visitors to the Court are listed in the logbook at the
Court’s gate, the security personnel, as a matter of policy, do not open gifts or boxes
intended for members of the Court.

It was determined during the hearings conducted by the Committee that the case referred to
in Macasaet and Newsbreak’s publications is G.R. No. 172602 (Henry T. Go v. The Fifth
Division, Sandiganbayan). 

Issue WON Macasaet is guilty of criminal contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Ruling In its Report and Recommendation dated 10 March 2008 (Report), the Committee found that
"there exist valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet for indirect contempt x x x." The
Report found that (1) Macasaet’s publications were false, baseless, unbelievable, and
malicious and (2) Macasaet was negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his story. The
Committee concluded that Macasaet’s publications generated public distrust in the
administration of justice and thus, contumacious. The majority finds the Report’s findings
and conclusion well-taken and accordingly imposes a punitive fine on Macasaet.

Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

I agree with the majority that Macasaet failed to substantiate his story. However, I disagree
with the majority’s conclusion that this suffices to hold Macasaet guilty of contempt of court.

The Committee read this Resolution as having granted it mere "fact-finding" powers.
Accordingly, when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee
monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such
right.

This procedure is fatally defective for patent denial of due process, rendering the testimonies
in question inadmissible.

This matter comes on the heels of a small but growing line of jurisprudence on contempt-by-
publication; however, this is only the second incident to involve this Court on reports of
corruption. These cases implicate two competing but equally vital State interests: on the one
hand, the right of journalists to be protected from contempt of court under the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and of the press and, on the other hand, the right of the courts to
maintain order, impartiality and dignity in the administration of justice. In resolving the
matter, we are called upon to perform a task more commonly done in constitutional
adjudication – the balancing of constitutional values using applicable standards. As ever, the
result of this delicate task hinges on the liberality or stringency of the test used against which
the two interests are weighed.

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of
similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of
expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the [1] "clear and present danger"
rule and the [2] "dangerous tendency" rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases,
means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger
to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is
primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under
this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and
present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

The Constitution did not conceive the press to act as the cheer leader of government,
including the judiciary. Rather, the press is the agent of the people when it gathers news,
especially news derogatory to those who hold the reins of government. The agency is
necessary because the people must have all available information before they exercise their
sovereign judgment. As well observed: "The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of
the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and
business affairs of the nation than any other instrument of publicity; and since informed
public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with
grave concern." As agent of the people, the most important function of the press in a free
society is to inform and it cannot inform if it is uninformed. We should be wary when the
independent sources of information of the press dry up, for then the press will end up
printing "praise" releases and that is no way for the people to know the truth.