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Habermas and post‐national identity: Theoretical

perspectives on the conflict in Northern Ireland
a
Gerard Delant y
a
Depart ment of Sociology , The Universit y of Liverpool ,
Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Gerard Delant y (1996) Habermas and post ‐nat ional ident it y: Theoret ical perspect ives on t he conflict in
Nort hern Ireland , Irish Polit ical St udies, 11:1, 20-32, DOI: 10.1080/ 07907189608406555
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 HABERMAS AND POST-NATIONAL IDENTITY:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND*
Gerard Delanty
Department of Sociology
The University of Liverpool

Abstract: Habermas's theory of post-national identity has mostly been developed in the
context of debates on German political culture. The basic ideas underlying it have
emerged from his broader theory of society, in particular his notion of discursive
democracy. His critique of nationalism and his discursive model of democracy can be
used to form a theory of post-national identity which can be applied to deeply divided
political cultures. The case of Northern Ireland is an example of such a situation in
which conflict resolution can be solved only by the discursive transformation of national
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identities along post-national lines.

INTRODUCTION

In this article I would like to present schematically and largely defend

Habermas's concept of post-national identity as well as to apply it to the
concrete case of Northern Ireland. It is helpful to begin with a provisional
definition of post-national identity, before looking at Habermas's use of the
term. Frequently referred to in recent theoretical literature there is little clarity
on what it is supposed to be (Delanty, 1995d; Laclau, 1994; Matustik, 1993;
Cerutti, 1992). Underlying the various accounts is a concern with a non-
essentialist identity: national identity is seen as essentialistic while post-national
identity is interpreted as an identity that has been radically deconstructed and is
open ended.
I wish to suggest that post-national identity is best defined as an identity that
is based on multiple identities, and can therefore be contrasted to national
identity which is based on an exclusive reference to a single identity. A second
characteristic is that it is not focused.on the territorial nation-state but on more
reflexive reference points. A third characteristic is that post-national identity is

*
Originally a paper given at the Political Studies Association annual conference, Glasgow, April
1996. I am grateful to the editors and referees for comments on an earlier version.

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES, 11, 1996, pp. 20-32

 Delanty / HABERMAS 21

post-historical: unlike national identity it is not defined by reference to the past

or a myth of origins but by the present. A fourth characteristic is that it is not
focused on cultural traditions: rather than presupposing cultural consensus, post-
national identity is based on the acceptance of dissent and cultural difference. A
fifth characteristic is that if we conceive identity in terms of a continuum
ranging from positive to negative, post-national identity involves an emphasis
more on positive identification than on negative: the 'we' is defined less by
negative reference than by what the 'we' have in common and in broadening the
"universe of obligation' (Gamson, 1995; Wendt, 1994).
With this provisional definition of post-national identity in mind, I shall now
present and defend some of the key tenets of Habermas's social and political
theory. Finally I shall apply it to the case of Northern Ireland in order to see
whether it can help to clarify the normative terms of political debate on the
peace process. Northern Ireland is an interesting example of a situation of
conflict which challenges some of the presuppositions of conventional political
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theory. Both the communitarian and liberal traditions in political theory

presuppose the existence of a relatively stable political culture which coincides
with the boundaries of the state (Mulhall and Swift, 1996). In the case of
Northern Ireland this clearly cannot be taken for granted for it is precisely the
fact that political culture is deeply divided and the state does not coincide with a
unitary political community that is the source of the problem (O'Neill, 1994).
My thesis is that the social and political theory of Habermas offers a useful
corrective to both communitarian and liberal views on society and the state. The
principal advantage of Habermas's approach is that it can be adapted to cases
where conflict is deeply rooted in political culture. Liberals and
communitarians, in contrast, tend to assume too easily that political culture is
not fundamentally divisive and an obstacle to conflict resolution. Moreover,
Habermas's approach, with its emphasis on post-national identity, challenges the
nation-state as a normative reference point for collective identity. Since
Northern Ireland is, in my view, an example of a society where the nation-state
has utterly failed to provide a means of social and political integration, a
theoretical perspective challenging the nation-state seems a matter of crucial
importance.

HABERMAS'S THEORY OF DISCOURSE

In order to appreciate the significance of Habermas's theory of post-national

identity, it is important to begin with a brief overview of the principal
theoretical ideas underlying his writings. I shall concentrate on his recent
discourse theory, which is of course based on his theory of communicative
 22 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 1996

action (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1990) and his earlier work on the public sphere
(1989a). Habermas is centrally concerned with the problem of providing
normative justification for identity claims and 'the legitimate ordering of
coexisting forms of life' (1993a, p. 60). The problem for Habermas is: 'How
can we appropriate naive, everyday ethical knowledge in a critical fashion
without at the same time destroying it through theoretical objectification? How
can ethical knowledge become reflective from the perspective of the
participants themselves?' (1993a, pp. 22-23). Habermas's aim is to provide a
normative grounding for conflicting claims to legitimation by seeking a point of
ethical reflection that is both outside the immediacy of the life-world and at the
same time part of it. It is not an attempt to offer an ultimate justification of
ethics, which he says is neither possible nor necessary (1993a, p. 84). Indeed, it
is precisely the attempt to claim an Archimedian point of ultimate justification
that is part of the problem, since it is very often the case that such identity
claims are exclusivist in nature.
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In the most general terms Habermas's argument is that:

Modern worldviews must accept the conditions of postmetaphysical thought to the

extent that they recognize that they are competing with other interpretations of the
world within the same universe of validity claims. This reflective knowledge
concerning the competition between equally valid warring "gods and demons"
creates an awareness of their fallibility and shatters the naivete of dogmatic modes of
belief founded on absolute truth claims. Recognizing the "burdens of reason" entails
knowing that proponents and opponents in the contest between substantive
worldviews may (for the time being) have equally good grounds for the inability to
reach a consensus and for leaving contentious validity claims undecided. This
fallibilism is grounded in the indeterminism of discursive procedures, in local
limitations on available information and reasons, and, in general, in the provinciality
of finite minds regarding the future. Under these conditions there is no guarantee that
a motivated consensus could always be attained (1993 a, p. 94).

The theoretical alternative Habermas proposes to metaphysical thinking, as

well as to conventional liberal and communitarian models, is the model of the
discourse ethic. Discourse theory breaks from a purely moral view of the world
as is reflected in national identity and in the taken-for-granted assumptions of
everyday life. While drawing from the everyday experiences of the life-world,
the procedural universalism of the discourse ethic offers a moment of reflection
that is otherwise not to be found in everyday discourse. It operates at a
heightened level of awareness and one which is argumentative in nature.
'Polities', Habermas argues forcibly against communitarian theories, 'may not
be assimilated to a hermeneutical process of self-explication of a shared form of
 Delanty / HABERMAS 23

life or collective identity. Political questions may not be reduced to the type of
ethical questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves who we
are and who we would like to be' (1994a, p. 4). This is a point of great
importance to recognizing the limits of a national identity. Against the attempt
to draw principles of legitimation out of a convergence of settled ethical
convictions or out of cultural consensus, Habermas insists on the importance of
communicative presuppositions that allow better arguments to come into play in
various forms of deliberation, and from procedures that secure fair bargaining
process (1994a, p. 4).
The model Habermas is proposing is one that is cautious about its empirical
reference points, which cannot be taken to be self-evident. The democratic
process of the genesis of law cannot be at the mercy of unreflected ethical
presuppositions. What is required is a deliberative process of political discourse
which reflects on its own presuppositions. Thus in place of a holistic concept of
society, we have a 'de-centred society' (1994a, p. 7). Habermas argues that this
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discursive 'concept of democracy no longer needs to operate with the notion of

a social whole centred in the state and imagined as a goal-briented subject writ
large' (1994a, p. 8). This is in contrast to the liberal and republican or
communitarian models of democracy. Both of these presuppose a view of
society as centred in the state: the state as the guardian of a market society or
the state as the self-conscious institutionalization of an ethical community
(1994a, p. 6). Discourse theory in contrast breaks from these traditions which
presuppose some kind of macro-subject and addresses itself to the higher level
of the inter-subjectivity that is constitutive in the self-reflective processes of
communication. To be rejected, then, is the notion that civic self-determination
rests on a single encompassing macro-subject, a position which is as
unacceptable as the liberal argument which invests sovereignty in many isolated
subjects (1994a, p. 8). This, Habermas argues, is not a denial of popular
sovereignty but the recognition that it is not at the disposal of the will of the
citizens in an arbitrary manner. Yet, discursive politics, unlike liberal theory, is
still capable of mediating with concrete life practices. This is because Habermas
understands discourse to be the means by which communicative action becomes
reflective and self-critical. I should now like to discuss Habermas's proposal for
a post-national identity.

HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM

It should now be possible to see more clearly the direction of Habermas's

discourse theory in terms of a notion of post-national identity. Though often
seen as an abstract theory of society, Habermas in fact offers one of the most
 24 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 1996

devastating critiques of nationalism we have. First, let us clarity the theoretical

critique of nationalism that discourse theory offers. The objections against
national identity as a basis for democracy are suggested by his critique of
communitarianism as outlined above: normative legitimation cannot be derived
from unmediated cultural processes. Consensus can only be discursively arrived
at; it cannot be derived from cultural traditions. In jettisoning the philosophy of
consciousness, Habermas is explicitly rejecting the possibility that there is a
macro-subject capable of offering normative foundations. The notion of a 'de-
centred' society strikes at the heart of the world-view of nationalism which
presupposes by definition a national centre and a myth of origins.
On nationalism Habermas in quite unambivalent:

In Germany nationalism took on an excessive, social-darwinistic form and

culminated in racial delusions which served as a justification for the mass
annihilation of the Jews. Consequently nationalism as the basis for a collective
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identity became drastically devalued in our case. And for this reason the overcoming
of fascism constitutes the specific historical perspective in terms of which an identity
based on the universalistic principles of the constitutional state and democracy is
understood. But since the Second World War all European countries, and not only
the Federal Republic, have developed in such a way that integration at the level of
the nation-state has lost significance and relevance (1992a, p. 241).

This is quite a remarkable statement. Habermas unequivocally rejects

nationalism as a world-view that has discredited itself and has been undermined
by social, political and economic developments which make it no longer
sustainable. In this context he mentions European integration, supra-national
military alliances, processes of globalization, immigration and increased ethnic
diversity in what had once been more homogeneous populations. These
developments, along with new forms of communication, have heightened our
sensitivity to issues relating to human rights and the concerns of minorities as
well as global catastrophes, resulting in a double-edged response. On the one
side, there is the rise of a new wave of defensive ethnic-nationalism in the
periphery and in the core an anxiety-ridden nationalism of prosperity. On the
other side, there is the simultaneous development of a consciousness struggling
to articulate universalistic norms. Notwithstanding the contemporary revival of
nationalism, Habermas argues against its ability to provide an enduring
normative standpoint capable of articulating real human aspirations for
universal norms. Nationalism operates below the level of normative reflection
since it is based on an essentialist concept of the self. This position led
Habermas (1994b) into criticizing German unification, which in his view was
 Delanty/HABERMAS 25

based on a 'normative deficit' since it did not involve active democratic

legitimation along deliberative lines.
Universalism, however, does not mean abandoning concrete identities or
transcending history and tradition, but expresses the ability to be able to view
one's determinate identity in a critical light. Habermas is quite clear that
universal principles can take root only in determinate identities. In his view
universalistic principles must be appropriated out of the particular life context
and be anchored in real cultural contexts: 'a commitment to the principles of the
constitutional state and democracy', he argues, 'can only become a reality in the
different states (which are on the way towards becoming post-national
societies), when these principles strike root in the various political cultures in
different ways' (1992a, p. 241). This includes a post-national identity, which
Habermas insists is also a concrete identity, and, indeed, is much more concrete
than the ensemble of basic moral, legal and political principles around which it
crystallizes. What then does universalism mean?: it means that a culture is
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prepared to relativise its own way of life and does not insist on universalising its
values, and that difference is accepted as a positive attribute rather than being
something to overcome. It is Habermas's conviction that under modern
conditions competing traditions cannot claim general validity. The ideas of the
Enlightenment or modernity are "hot just abstract notions, but are deeply rooted
in the normative structure of modem societies, including its political
institutions, and are also built into the communicative practices of everyday life:
modernity cannot then be avoided by appeal to cultural particularism. Habermas
thus insists that modernity - however ambivalent and fragmentary it may be - is
not something we have chosen and cannot therefore be shaken off by a decision
or an act of will (1992c, pp. 226-27).
It should now be apparent that Habermas is not so far from Derrida's (1992)
critique of western logocentricism and his plea for a politics of memory
(Matustik, 1995). Habermas, too, argues that memory is political for the very
reason that our responsibility also extends to the past. He argues that the
catastrophes of the twentieth century have altered our time consciousness
compelling us to take up a critical attitude towards the past. In the wake of the
holocaust - which was a European as much as a German atrocity - tradition is
not something that can be merely seen as a 'source of the self, to use Taylor's
phrase; or as Gadamer would have it, something which we cannot transcend
since we are too much a part of it, but a burden to be relieved by critical
reflection. Habermas agrees with Gadamer that we 'cannot pick and choose our
own identities but, we can be aware that it is up to us how we continue them'
while disagreeing that this does not mean that we can't transcend these
traditions, for 'every continuation of tradition is selective, and precisely this
 26 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 1996

selectivity must pass today through the filter of critique, of a self-conscious

appropriation of history' (1992a, p. 243).
The only room for national identity in Habermas's model is a recovery of the
cosmopolitan nationalism of the French revolution which must be developed in
the form of multi-culturalism. In particular for Germany - whose historical
national identity anyway was never exclusively focused on the state - the only
possible' form of patriotism is what he calls 'constitutional patriotism', which
consists of taking pride in having succeeded in establishing a constitutional state
anchored in a liberal political culture, however unsatisfactory it may be (see also
Kluxen-Pyta, 1990). In his view the first signs of constitutional patriotism - an
identification with the norms of the constitutional democracy as opposed to the
Nazi state - were apparent in certain aspects of the mature political culture of
the Federal Republic (Habermas, 1989b, 1991, 1993b). In the German case
Habermas acknowledges that constitutional patriotism was able to take root by
virtue of the shock of the Holocaust. But as I have argued above, it is also
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evident that this is also a European inheritance and is not confined to Germany.
Constitutional patriotism, as the normative content of post-national identity,
refers then to an identification with democratic or constitutional norms and not
with the state, nation or cultural traditions. He speaks of two levels of
integration, which are underpinned by post-national identity. Since a modern
society is characterised by both complexity and multiculturalism, there can be
no simple form of consensus as a basis for integration, which must instead,
therefore, be conceived in terms of the legal system's neutrality vis-a-vis
cultural communities while at the same time recognizing the diversity of the
different forms of life: "The neutrality of the law vis-a-vis internal ethical
differentiations stems from the fact that in complex societies the citizenry as a
whole can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values but
only by a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and
the legitimate exercise of power' (1994c, pp. 134-5). This is Habermas's central
insight. One of its concrete implications is that post-national identity is
compatible with multi-identities, since constitutional patriotism only requires
identification with normative principles of argumentation. It is in fact
Habermas's conviction that as a result of the accelerated rate of change in
modern societies, cultures will survive only if they adapt themselves to the
principles of discursivity and critique (1994c, pp. 130-3).
Habermas's critique of national identity is centrally concerned with rescuing
the notion of citizenship from the model of nationality. He argues that in the
broader vision of history citizenship was not always tied to a concept of national
identity. The original concept of popular sovereignty, as developed by
Rousseau, 'does not refer to some substantive will which could owe its identity
 Delanty / HABERMAS 27

to a prior homogeneity of descent or form of life' (Habermas, 1992b, p. 4).

Popular sovereignty was intended to show how the social contract could provide
an abstract model for a mode of political legitimation that was no longer tied to
the authoritarianism of the Ancien Regime. The original revolutionary-
Enlightenment notion of nationality was the very opposite to late-nineteenth
century ideas. The original meaning of the concept 'nation' was not that of a
prepolitical entity based on descent, a shared community, a common language
or hereditary authority, but was a constitutive agency within a democratic
polity: "The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common
ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who
actively exercise their civil rights' (Habermas, 1992b, p. 3). Habermas believes
something valuable has been lost in the subsequent transformation of the
revolutionary notion of the nation into modem nationalism. What has been lost
is the concept of democratic sovereignty which has been sacrificed to the idea
of a pre-political historical community, a substantive collective will. For this
reason Habermas is opposed to communitarian ideas of nationality, such as
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those of Charles Taylor, since these claim that the universalistic principles of
democratic states need anchoring in the historical-political culture of each
country before they can be accepted (Habermas, 1992b, p. 7). Habermas cites
the examples of the United States and Switzerland to provide evidence of
societies where constitutional principles were institutionalized and have reached
common acceptance without being rooted in citizens sharing the same language
or ethnic background. In the context of a future Federal Republic of European
States the concept of democratic sovereignty would have to be recovered and
particularistic traditions would not have to be given up but be made flexible to
supranational integration. This presupposes an ability to relativize one's
historical traditions. Habermas does not in fact see that as the insurmountable
problem since there are adequate historical and contemporary examples of self-
critical political identities.
It is not my aim to examine in detail Habermas's proposal for an alternative
to the nation-state. I should merely like in conclusion to remark that Habermas
argues that Europe needs to create, what to an extent exists in Switzerland, a
common political-cultural identity which would stand out against the cultural
orientations of the different nationalities (Habermas, 1992b, p. 12). But unlike
Switzerland, this will involve creating a liberal immigration policy. In this
context, he argues, 'our task is less to reassure ourselves of our common origins
in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence
commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century'
(Habermas, 1992b, p. 12). I have argued elsewhere (Delanty, 1995a, 1995c,
1995d, 1996a, 1996c, 1996d) that the model of a post-national identity -
 28 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 1996

focused less on territory, culture, geography or history than on democratic

norms and citizenship - is the only acceptable means of defining European
identity as a non-essentialistic identity. All other forms of identitfication run the
risk of promoting a negative dichotomy of Self and Other. Habermas's theory
allows us to conceive ways in which this could be overcome: its central idea is
that citizenship must be divorced from nationality.

ASSESSING HABERMAS

Against other theoretical positions, Habermas's social theory has a number of

advantages when it comes to the question of national identity. Against
communitarianism and neo-republicanism, he has demonstrated how cultural
traditions including national identity cannot be a normative basis for conflict
resolution in advanced societies: consensus can only be discursively achieved.
Cultures in western Europe are not so restrictive that they prevent their
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members from transcending them and rationally deliberating problems that arise
as a result of cultural differences. Moreover, few cultures are homogeneous so
we cannot attach universality to any one tradition: universality is a highly
restrictive characteristic of constitutional principles which can become a
reference point for identification. Against liberalism, he has demonstrated that
the asocial model of the individual is inadequate and that conflict resolution is
more than a matter of mere compromises between competing interests which
take place on the level of the state, but must penetrate civil society itself
challenging cultural traditions. So his democratic theory places politics in the
social and cultural dimensions, but does not concede the communitarian thesis
of relativity. Against postmodernism or radical deconstructivist approaches,
Habermas's model suggests that there are limits to deconstruction and that post-
national identity and the discourse ethic must be rooted in real life-world
contexts. Habermas's model of discourse, which refers to communication,
breaks radically from the postmodernist conception which is based on the model
of the text and the rule of metaphor. In this way Habermas has not precluded the
important question of how we conceive of solidarity and collective identity
(which are dismissed by postmodernism as metaphysical illusions).
The principal shortcoming of Habermas's social theory is the way he links
his theory of collective identity (post-national identity) to his theory of
discourse (his theory of conflict resolution). In his systematic social theory of
communicative action, identity is too much reduced to the private realm or the
pre-discursive level and does not feature centrally in the idea of discourse: in
discourse people leave their identities behind them and engage in discursive
communication. As a result dualism pervades his theory, for he is unable to
 Delanty / HABERMAS 29

show how identity is actually linked into the very process of discursivity. It is, I
wish to argue following Melucci (1989), important to show that identity is itself
generated in the actual process through which conflict is resolved and must be
more firmly integrated into the notion of discourse. In this way the discursive
democracy is itself the social basis of post-national identity. At it stands, the
notion of constitutional patriotism suggests something too formalistic to be a
basis of real collective identity.
Notwithstanding this criticism, which can be accommodated in his broader
theory, Habermas has provided a convincing theoretical defence of the
possibility that ideology and cultural traditions can be transcended and made
transparent. In order to take this further, I shall take the case of Northern
Ireland, where a precarious peace process has been in operation for almost two
years.

NORTHERN IRELAND
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Without simplifying the complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland, in light

of Habermas's critique of essentialism it can now be seen that a major
dimension to the problem is not merely in finding a point of mediation between
cultural identities but of transforming them in the sense of rendering them
reflective or transparent. The concept of peace, for instance, can serve as a
regulative idea which can point to an interest in generating discursive norms of
conflict resolution. A post-national identity can then emerge in circumstances
that have their origin not in existing collective identities but in the very process
of over-coming them. Seen from the standpoint of Habermas's theory,
nationalism and unionism along with the respective models of Irish and British
national identity, cannot in themselves provide normative reference points for
conflict resolution. What is required is a higher level of identity than what can
be allowed for by these identities which are not sufficiently reflective to provide
self-critical norms. Much more broadly, what is needed is a model of civil
society in which autonomous public spheres can emerge and provide a forum
for conflict mediation. But at the moment the peace process has not broken from
the immediacy of socio-cultural identities and the conviction that consensus is a
matter of mediating world-views. Yet, the basis is already there for national
identity to be transcended. Habermas's idea of the discursive resolution of
conflict and constitutions as discursively mediated is highly pertinent to the case
of Northern Ireland. It is apparent that the simple model of the constitutional
referendum cannot succeed in resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland where
Yes/No forms of decision-making serve only to exacerbate the problem.
 30 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 1996

Habermas's discursive democracy suggests that the process of enacting

constitutional charters must be mediated by discursive deliberation.
Habermas's critique of conventional liberal and communitarian views can be
applied to both republican nationalism and unionism which are based on
essentialist definitions of identity and view society as being centred in the
nation-state. Republican nationalism can be seen as an extreme kind of
communitarianism while unionism can be seen as an extreme version of
liberalism (Delanty, 1996b; Delanty and O'Mahony forthcoming). From the
perspective of Habermas's theory, then, the concrete conclusion to be drawn is
that national identity, both that of republican nationalism and unionism, must be
transformed rather than merely accommodated.
The conflict in Northern Ireland has demonstrated the absence of a point of
convergence in the extremes of the two traditions and very little in the
mainstream currents. This is because their collective identities are not only
primary identities but are also exclusive of other identities. Moreover, the
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element of counterfactualism is particularly pronounced: both nationalism and

unionism are very much defined in opposition to each other. Up until now the
dominant tendency in the debate about peace has been to seek common ground
in the extremes of the two traditions upon which a peaceful and democratic
society can be built (Delanty, 1995b). While on one level that is indeed
commonsensical, on another level it cannot be the basis for an enduring
democratic political culture. From a Habermasian point of view nationalism and
unionism are themselves incapable of wielding democratic norms upon which a
post-national identity could be built. This is because they are based on
essentialist identities and the reality is that people have multiple identities, even
if these remain largely repressed or unarticulated. What then could a discourse
ethic offer?
A discursive model to conflict resolution offers the possibility that in zero-
sum situations where there can be no winners or where any gain is at the cost of
an other, a new identity can emerge out of the very process of conflict
resolution. It implies that conflict resolution cannot proceed by reference to
cultural traditions and that culturally rooted identities cannot find their
expression in the state. Generalized interests can be articulated only in a context
of equal citizenship and democratic participation. Moreover, it does not
guarantee outcomes or privilege one group's identity over the other and requires
that participants take up a critical attitude to their cultural tradition and to
reinterpret certain aspects of their identity. Essential to the task of creating a
new collective identity is the need to find less common ground in the extremes
of the two traditions than in achieving common-ground between the moderate
sides.
 Delanty/HABERMAS 31

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