(Chin-Shing Huang) Philosophy, Philology, and Politics

This book explains the general intellectual climate of the early Ch'ing
period, and the political and cultural characteristics of the Ch'ing re-
gime at the time. Professor Huang brings to life the book's central
characters, Li Fu and the three great emperors - K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng,
and Chien-lung - whom he served. Li Fu rose from poverty to become
top graduate in the examinations, a distinguished scholar-official, and
author of several important philosophical works; he was also involved in
such practical affairs as the troubled relations between the state and non-
Han minority peoples in Kwangsi. Li Fu's turbulent relationship with
three of China's most active emperors led to repeated banishments, loss
of office, and in one case to a death sentence and a last-minute reprieve.
Although the author's main concern is to explain the contributions of
Li Fu to the Lu-Wang school of Confucianism, he also gives a clearly
written account of the Lu-Wang and Ch'eng-Chu schools from the
twelfth century to the eighteenth. In a clear, succinct style, Huang
explains the historical differences between the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-
Wang schools without sacrificing the subtleties of either.
The book culminates in a discussion of the hero-emperor K'ang-hsi's
appropriation of the "tradition of the Way" from his intellectual officials,
which denied them their traditional role as moral censors and critics
of the emperor's exercise of authority. This depiction of the Ch'ing
period's activist management of the world of ideas will broaden our
understanding of the historical relationship between intellectuals and
the state in China.
PHILOSOPHY, PHILOLOGY,
AND POLITICS
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA
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Nineteenth Century
J. D. Schmidt Within the Human Realm: The Poetry of Huang Zunxian,
1848-1905
Eva Shan Chou Reconsidering Tu Fu: Literary Greatness and
Cultural Context
Philosophy, philology,
and politics
in eighteenth-century China
Li Fu and the Lu-Wang school
under the Ch'ing
Chin-shing Huang
Academia Sinica
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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© Cambridge University Press 1995

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1995

First paperback edition 2002
A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Huang, Chin-shing.
Philosophy, philology, and politics in eighteenth-century China: Li Fu and
Lu-Wang school under the Ch'ing / Chin-shing Huang,
p. cm. - (Cambridge studies in Chinese history, literature, and institutions)
Originally presented as the author's thesis.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 52148225 9
1. Li, Fu, 1673-1750. 2. Philosophy, Chinese- 1644-1912.
3. Neo-Confucianism. 4. Political science - China - Philosophy.
I. Title. II. Series.
B5234.L485H83 1996
181M12-dc20 95-13358 CIP
ISBN 0 52148225 9 hardback

ISBN 0 521 52946 8 paperback
For my parents
Contents
Foreword by Professor Ying-shih Yii page ix

Acknowledgments xvi
Abbreviations xviii
Introduction 1
1 The original argument (1): "Chu Hsi versus Lu

Hsiang-shan" (Chu-Lu i-t'ung): A philosophical
interpretation 4
2 The original argument (2): Wang Yang-ming and

the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu
Hsiang-shan" 25
3 The critical dimension in the Confucian mode of

thinking: The conception of the Way as the basis
for criticism of the political establishment 47
4 Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in

the Ch'ing dynasty (1): His life 63
5 Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in

the Ch'ing dynasty (2): His thought 77
His conception of destiny (ming) 77
The character of the Way (tao) 84
The relationship between mind (hsiri), nature
(hsing), and principle (It) 90
His theory of ko-wu 101
6 Ii Fu and the philological turn 107

The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final
Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life: An evidential
vii
Contents
approach to the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus

Lu Hsiang-shan" 107
The intellectual transmission of Lu Hsiang-shan's
doctrine: the establishment of an intellectual 117
lineage
Li Fu and the study of classics 130
The price of having a sage-emperor: the
assimilation of the tradition of the Way by
the political establishment in the light of
the K'ang-hsi emperor's governance 143
Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime 144
A sage-emperor emerges: K'ang-hsi's appropriation
of the tradition of the Way 148
The implications of the unity of the tradition of
the Way and that of governance 157
Conclusion 169
Chinese glossary 173
Bibliography 185
Index 195
vni
Foreword
by Ying-shih Yii
Li Fu (1675-1750) is practically unknown in the West. Neither is he

adequately studied by scholars of his own land in the twentieth century.
To the best of my knowledge, it was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929) who,
in a series of lectures on Ch'ing intellectual history delivered at Tsing
Hua University in 1923, first referred to Li Fu as "the last Neo-Confucian
of the Lu-Wang persuasion." Perhaps inspired by Liang's lecture, my late
mentor Ch'ien Mu (1895-1990) devoted a whole chapter to the life and
thought of Li Fu in his History of Chinese Scholarship during the Last Three
Hundred Years (1937), which remains to this day the most detailed and
penetrating account in Chinese.
Li Fu's oblivion in twentieth-century Chinese historiography says a
great deal more about the mentality of the historian than the historical
reality in which Li Fu found himself. Riding on the tide of nationalism
and positivism Chinese historians in modern times are generally biased
against Confucian scholars closely associated with the Manchu court and
Neo-Confucianism as a philosophical system. As a result, modern re-
search on Ch'ing intellectual history has been heavily focused on the
philological turn of the Han Learning at the expense of Neo-Confucian-
ism of both the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang varieties. The double
identities of Li Fu as a high-ranking official and spokesman for Lu-Wang
Confucianism have thus made him low on the historian's list of
priorities.
However, once we manage to step outside this modern frame of
reference and directly and closely examine the historical record, we
would immediately see that neither Li Fu nor Lu-Wang Confucianism
can be ignored in the study of Ch'ing intellectual history, particularly if
we aim to understand it in its own terms. To begin with, it may be
emphatically pointed out, Li Fu's intellectual influence was consider-
able. First, his elaborate attempt, ably assisted by the well-known histo-
rian Ch'uan Tsu-wang (1705-55), to reconstruct ancient texts from the
IX
Foreword
Ming encyclopedia Yung-lo ta-tien in the early 1730s set the example for
the imperial project known as Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu (The Comprehensive Collec-
tions of the Four Categories) initiated some forty years later. It was this
project that brought the Han Learning to its peak. Second, Li Fu was the
first Confucian scholar in the Ch'ing period to openly attack the histori-
cal prejudice against Wang An-shih (1021-86) and his reform move-
ment. His writings on Wang directly inspired Ts'ai Shang-hsiang
(1717-1810), who devoted two decades of his life to a detailed bio-
graphical study of Wang An-shih. For the first time most, if not all, of the
false charges against this great Sung reformer were cleared. Based on
Ts'ai's research, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was able to write a modern biography
of Wang in 1908, which greatly facilitated the spread of reformist ideas.
Thus, indirectly, Li Fu also contributed to the political development in
late Ch'ing China. Third, from his death in 1750 to the end of the
dynasty, Li Fu's name was never forgotten. Many nineteenth-century
writers wrote of him either in connection with his political career or
scholarly achievement or both. As a matter of fact his reputation as a
scholar of encyclopedic knowledge and photographic memory contin-
ued to grow, at times even to legendary proportions. The republication
of his complete works in 1831 also testifies to his enduring influence in
the world of learning.
Li Fu may well have been, as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao says, the last scholar of
the Ch'ing period who openly identified himself as a Lu-Wang follower.
But this must not be taken to mean that the Lu-Wang tradition as a whole
came to an abrupt end with his death in 1750. On the contrary, it
continued its existence without a spokesman and without a publicly
recognizable identity. Put in a different way, we may say that the spectre
of Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism never ceased to haunt the intellectual
world even in the heyday of the Han Learning. From time to time some
scholars, notably Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738-1801), would advocate
the methodological holism of the Lu-Wang school while others like
Chiao Hsun (1763-1820) would seek to redefine Wang Yang-ming's
theory of liang-chih ("innate knowledge of the good") for their own age.
By the 1820s the spectre of Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism must have
appeared very threatening to a Ch'eng-Chu disciple like Fang Tung-shu
(1772-1851) who alerted his contemporaries, in a tone of utmost ur-
gency, to the imminent second coming of the Lu-Wang school in the
wake of the moral bankruptcy of the Han Learning. His warning proved
to be prophetic, though not immediately. Some six decades later when
K'ang Yu-wei founded his private academy in Canton to promote educa-
tional reform, the Learning of the Mind of the Lu-Wang variety figured
centrally in his revised Confucian curriculum.
Foreword
There can be no question that a book-length study on Li Fu and the

Lu-Wang school under the Ch'ing is long overdue. Now, with the publi-
cation of Dr. Chin-shing Huang's study presented below, this lacuna in
Chinese intellectual history isfilledat long last. As I have closely followed
the progress of Dr. Huang's project over the years since its conception,
I would like to share with the reader my appreciation of this book by
pointing out a few of its most distinctive contributions.
To begin with, I think the author deserves commendation for his
ingenuity in contextualization. The book is so broadly conceived that Li
Fu is located in the largest possible context of historical significance.
Within the realm of intellectual history the contextualization operates in
two different ways, one may be called genealogical and the other con-
temporaneous. Having first placed Lu Fu in the context of what the
author calls the problematik of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan," he
then traces the genealogy of the problematik upwardly all the way to its
beginning and downwardly to Chang Hsueh-ch'eng at the end of the
eighteenth century. As a result, the book goes far beyond the scope of
intellectual biography in the ordinary sense, and therefore can be better
appreciated as a highly condensed history of Neo-Confucianism skillfully
narrated from a particular vantage point. By the way, the first two chap-
ters on "The Original Argument" present what seems to me a most clear
exposition of the profound philosophical differences between Ch'eng-
Chu on the one hand and Lu-Wang on the other. The author analyses
their arguments entirely in their own terms and resists every temptation
to apply Western philosophical categories to Neo-Confucianism as has
been so fashionable nowadays.
Contemporaneously, the author places Li Fu and the problematik of
"Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" in the context of mid-Ch'ing intellec-
tual mainstream. Chapter 6, "Li Fu and the Philological Turn," strikes
me as the best case study of how Neo-Confucian philosophical debates,
in this case from the Lu-Wang point of view, interacted and interwined
with the rising evidential scholarship known as k'ao-cheng. Ch'ing eviden-
tial scholarship was built largely on the basis of philological explication
of texts. Writing in the West today we often render the term k'ao-cheng as
"philology" in the interest of simplicity. Therefore the reader may well
be reminded that when the author discusses the relationship between
"philosophy" and "philology" in this book, he is primarily talking about
Neo-Confucianism as a philosophical tradition and evidential scholar-
ship as evolved since the late sixteenth century. I shall follow the same
usages.
The "philological turn" as a learned movement arose and developed
from very complex historical situations. A comprehensive account of the
xi
Foreword
movement, needless to say, would require a thorough examination, on

the part of the historian, of every aspect of Chinese history during the
Ming-Ch'ing transition. Intellectual history alone is far from adequate to
the task. Interestingly, however, within the Neo-Confucian philosophical
tradition the evolution of the problematik of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-
shan" itself can be shown to be responsible for initially setting the
"philological turn" in motion. Early in the sixteenth century, Wang Yang-
ming, in one of his important philosophical battles against Chu Hsi,
made a great effort to restore the so-called "old text of the Great Learn-
ing." In so doing, perhaps unwittingly, Wang got himself involved in
textual and philological studies. Thus he set the example for many
philosophically minded scholars in the seventeenth century to devote
themselves to philological exercises on this Confucian text. On the other
hand, Lo Ch'in-shun (1465-1547), Wang Yang-ming's most celebrated
rival in the Chu versus Lu problematik, also advocated "return to the
sources" as an important way to settle philosophical disputes. Defending
Chu Hsi's "the nature is principle" against Lu Hsiang-shan's "the mind is
principle," he quoted several passages from the classics to make his
point. In concluding he argued that "If one carries on his studies without
seeking evidence in the classics and is utterly arbitrary and opinionated,
it is inevitable that he will go astray." Here we see the beginning of how
philosophy pushed itself into philology.
Through his detailed and careful analysis of Li Fu's writings, Dr.
Huang has given us a concrete illustration of the "philological turn" of
Lu-Wang Confucianism on the eve of the full flowering of Ch'ing eviden-
tial scholarship. In the case of Li Fu, the problematik of "Chu versus Lu"
had now to be coped with by way of philology rather than philosophy. To
a considerable extent, Dr. Huang's admirable success in this regard
results from the important fact that he is the first intellectual historian in
modern times to make a full and fruitful use of Li Fu's Comprehensive
Compilation of Chu Hsi s Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life. This text
has long been a rare book, generally inaccessible to researchers, my late
mentor Ch'ien Mu included. As Dr. Huang has convincingly shown, Li
Fu's thesis is built on a rather flimsy basis. But this is beside the point.
What really matters is, in the author's words, "Li's transformation of the
problematik of Chu versus Lu from a philosophical to a textual one." In
this connection I wish to support Dr. Huang's firmly established case
from the other, that is, Chu Hsi's, side. Wang Mao-hung (1668-1741), a
leading Chu Hsi scholar of the period, dedicated his life to the compila-
tion of a detailed Chronological Biography of Chu Hsi from a point of view
diametrically opposite to Li's. He came to the conclusion that through-
out his intellectual life, early and late, Chu Hsi never showed a slightest
xii
Foreword
inclination to reconcile his philosophical differences with Lu Hsiang-

shan. Later critics are in general agreement that, though somewhat
flawed due to Wang's deep-seated prejudice, the biography must never-
theless be regarded as a tour deforce of evidential research. Thus we see
that in the Ch'eng-Chu camp the problematik also underwent exactly
the same transformation in exactly the same time.
Finally, in Chapter 7, Dr. Huang places Li Fu and Neo-Confucian
philosophy in the context of early Ch'ing political history. His account of
Emperor K'ang-hsi's appropriation of the Tao-Vung ("Tradition of the
Way") is truly fascinating. Apparently of their own accord Neo-Confu-
cian philosophers of both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools in the
imperial court, represented respectively by Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718)
and Li Fu, ceded the Tao-VungXo the emperor. In order to do this they
made the clever ideological move by suggesting that, after the separation
of Tao-Vungand chih-Vung ("tradition of governance") over three millen-
nia, now for the first time the two traditions are reunited in the person
of a sage-emperor. Now the interesting question is how are we to account
for this sudden change of heart on the part of these Neo-Confucian
scholars? Dr. Huang has offered many keen observations based on
research in a variety of historical and literary texts. In what follows I
would like to highlight some of his most significant findings by supple-
menting a few pertinent facts which happen to be at my disposal.
First, Dr. Huang is quite right to suggest that Li Fu was genuinely
convinced that his emperor was indeed in possession of certain "sagely"
qualities. Li Fu's unbounded admiration for K'ang-hsi can be justified by
the latter's impressive public record as well as his many-sided accom-
plishments in Confucian cultivation. It is very significant that even
Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95), leading Lu-Wang philosopher and Ming
loyalist, appears to have also shared Li Fu's enthusiasm to a certain
degree. Dr. Huang quotes his praise of K'ang-hsi from his letter to a
friend, datable to early 1686.1 wish to add that in the same letter he also
referred to K'ang-hsi as "sage-emperor."
Second, according to the author's learned judgment, K'ang-hsi was
"particularly conscious of the significance of Confucian ritual practice."
He cites as evidence K'ang-hsi's visit to the Confucian temple in the
sage's home-town in 1684. There, the emperor did an unprecedented
honor to the sage by performing the rite of "three kneelings and nine
bows." From the point of view of cultural history, this is an event of
singular importance which merits a little amplification.
K'ang-hsi's visit to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu took place near
the end of 1684 when he was on his way back from the first Southern
Tour. Earlier he stayed in Soochow and Nanking, each for a few days.
Foreword
While in Nanking he made a sacrifice in person at the tomb of the

founding emperor of the Ming dynasty. Moreover, a vivid eye-witness
account of K'ang-hsi's activities in Soochow in early December 1684 has
recently seen the light of day. In the diary of a local Shanghai literatus
{Li-nien chi, "Record of Past Years"), the diarist gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the emperor's meeting with the local people in front of a Bud-
dhist temple. K'ang-hsi himself joined the monks playing a musical
instrument to entertain the crowd. Much excited, the crowd shouted
"Long Live the Emperor!" In response the emperor turned toward the
crowd saying loudly "Greetings to the people!"
The three ritual performances of K'ang-hsi in 1684, mentioned above,
seem to have been remarkably well orchestrated to deliver an important
political message, namely, the arrival of universal peace in the Chinese
world under the benevolent rule of a sage-emperor. With kneeling in
the Confucian temple and sacrificing at the tomb of Ming T'ai-tsu he
appeared to be saying to the Chinese elite that he was now the legitimate
heir of both the Tao-Vung and chih-t'ung, whereas with music-playing he
was probably showing the masses that he exemplified the ideal Confu-
cian ruler who, as defined by Mencius, "shared his enjoyments with the
people." Rites and music have always been central to Confucian symbol-
ism. It is truly amazing that a young Manchu emperor at age thirty was
able to reach such an extraordinarily high degree of sophistication in his
manipulation of Confucian symbols. I use the word "manipulation"
advisedly because, despite his well-publicized but initially self-promoted
image as an assiduous Confucian scholar, K'ang-hsi never really aban-
doned his Manchu identity. That he did all of this out of the need of
political manipulation rather than true belief becomes immediately
clear once the significance of the year - 1684 - of hisfirstSouthern Tour
is grasped. The previous year Taiwan was annexed and three years
earlier the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was pacified. There were
no power groups left in China to challenge the legitimacy and authority
of the new dynasty. K'ang-hsi knew his Chinese history only too well: The
time had finally arrived for Confucian symbolism to be evoked to ad-
vance the cause of universal peace. In the cases of Huang Tsung-hsi and
the local diarist, as shown above, K'ang-hsi's manipulation must be
considered a success. After his first Southern Tour, both men's anti-
Manchu feelings noticeably subsided.
Dr. Huang's study of the relationship between Confucianism and
imperial power under the Ch'ing ends, quite understandably, on a
melancholy note. It is indeed depressing to find that the price of having
a sage-emperor was paid with the critical dimension of Confucianism.
This was very true as far as Confucians in the center of imperial power
xiv
Foreword
were concerned. As Chang Ping-lin (1867-1936) points out, the "speak-

ing officials" known as chi-shih-chung ("Supervising Censors"), whose
function had been by definition critical under the Ming, were com-
pletely silenced since 1723, one year after K'ang-hsi's death. Institution-
ally speaking, therefore, Dr. Huang's point is irrefutable. However, in
the case of Confucian scholars who were only peripherally or remotely
connected with imperial power, it proved to be quite difficult to strip
them of their critical functions completely. The reason is not far to seek.
The Confucian critic has always been what Michael Walzer calls in
Interpretation and Social Critism, the "connected" critic whose critical dis-
tance is measured in inches. "Connected" critics, Walzer assures us, can
establish critical distance by way of interpretation. "So long as they do
intellectual work, they open the way for the adversary proceeding of social
criticism" (p. 40). In Ch'ing China, Tai Chen (1724-1777) maybe taken
as a classic example of the "connected" Confucian critic. Through a new
interpretation of the Confucian concept of li ("moral principle"), he was
bold enough to question the validity of the state-sponsored Ch'eng-Chu
philosophy to its core. "Sympathy," said he, "is sometimes expressed for
a person who is executed in the name of law. But who will sympathize
with a person who is condemned to death in the name of moral princi-
ple?" Viewed in this way, the unity of Tao-t'ungand chih-t'ung, no matter
how solidly forged, can never be complete.
Princeton, New Jersey

July 1995
xv
Acknowledgments
When Professor Ying-shih Yu first suggested that I select Li Fu as a

dissertation topic, I did not even know who Li Fu was. With some
curiosity, I took his advice. My interests in Li Fu and related problems
grew rapidly in the course of my research and writing. In the end, it
proved a very rewarding intellectual exercise. Along the way Professor Yu
has given me his valuable guidance.
It is not difficult to find Professor Benjamin Schwartz's influence in
the treatment of this subject. My discussions with him often produced
many insights into my analysis, and his critical comments on the manu-
script were very beneficial. In addition, both Professor Schwartz and
Professor Yu have taught, by example, what a good scholar ought to be.
They have been very kind and patient in helping me overcome the
difficulties of my study at Harvard. It is a great pleasure to thank Pro-
fessor Schwartz and Professor Yu, to whom I am indebted in many
ways. This book is essentially based upon the dissertation that I wrote
under their guidance.
In retrospect, my years at Harvard were most exciting intellectually, a
period in which I was exposed to various trends in Western thought, a
critical assessment of which, in turn, aided my understanding of Chinese
culture. I believe that my experience at Harvard can be seen as a kind of
spiritual resource upon which I can draw again and again.
I am grateful to my teachers, Professor Yu-sheng Lin of the University
of Wisconsin at Madison, Professor Cho-yun Hsu of the University of
Pittsburgh, Professors Chia-lin Pao andjing-sheng Tao of the University
of Arizona, and Professor Wei-yun Tu of National Cheng-chih University
in Taiwan. Their continuing support and encouragement gave me the
strength I needed to complete my work. My thanks also extend to
Professor Wei-ming Tu, who read the manuscript of my thesis and
provided many good suggestions. Professor Wing-tsit Chan and Pro-
fessor Frederick Mote read the manuscript and offered their generous
xvi
A cknowledgments
encouragement. In the process of revising my thesis into a book, Pro-

fessors Prasenjit Duara, Hoyt Tillman, and Benjamin Elman kindly
offered their constructive ideas. Professor Duara and Professor Tillman,
in addition, have improved my English.
Chien Ho, Deborah White, and Sidney Tai have been very helpful in
my use of the Harvard-Yenching library, and they have always provided
delightful company. In 1985, when I made a visit to Japan, my friends
Professor Hiroshi Watanabe and Mi-cha Wu helped me explore the
library of the Institute of Oriental Cultures of Tokyo University and
Tokyo Bunko.
The Institute of East Asian Philosophies in Singapore was very gen-
erous in providing both the grant and the place for completing my book
in 1986. Needless to say, thanks are due to my home institution, the
Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, in which a tradition
of pure research and discussion has blossomed. I have benefited deeply
from this intellectual spirit.
This book is dedicated to my parents, who have made many sacrifices
so that I could continue my quest for an intellectually meaningful life.
xvn
Abbreviations
CCTC Chi-ch'i t'ing-chi

CHL Ch'uan-hsi lu
CTNP Chu-tzu nien-fl'u
CTWC Chu-tzt wen-chi
CTYL Chu-tzu yu'-lei
ECCS Erh-Ch 'eng ch yuan-shu
HPTP Hsueh-pu t'ungpien
KHCY Kang-hsi cheng-yao
LCA Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts yun-kao
LHCC Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch 'uan-chi
LTHP Lu-tzu hsueh-p'u
MJHA Ming-ju hsueh-an
MTCK Mu-t 'ang ch 'u-kao
MTPK Mu-t 'ang pieh-kao
SCTT Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu tsung-mu Vi-yao
SKCS Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu
SPPY Ssu-pu pei-yao
SSCC Ssu-shu chi-chu
SYHA Sung-Yuan hsueh-an
TSCC Tsung-shu chi-ch'eng
WMSK Wen-miao ssu-tien k 'ao
WSC Wen^yuan-ke ssu-k 'u ch 'ixan-shu
WYCC Wang Yang-ming ch 'uan-chi
YCWC Yu-chih Kang-hsi wen-chi
XVlll
Introduction
This study will explain the general intellectual climate of the early
Ch'ing period and explore the political and cultural characteristics of
the Ch'ing regime at the time. To achieve these ends I have focused
on the Lu-Wang school, but will pay special attention to Li Fu (1675—
1750), the most outstanding representative of this school in the early
Ch'ing. By the early Ch'ing, the Lu-Wang doctrines had undergone
several transformations. Li Fu's thought can be seen as the final Lu-
Wang response to the Ch'eng-Chu school. Early Ch'ing rulers and schol-
ars generally blamed the left wing of the Wang Yang-ming school for the
fall of the Ming dynasty. Yet Li Fu demonstrated successfully that a Lu-
Wang scholar could still lead a viable intellectual life even after the
Ming. In other words, the Lu-Wang school did not end with the fall of
the Ming.
Stressing the transformative power that the mind has upon moral
cultivation, the Lu-Wang scholar takes a critical stance toward book
learning (tu-shu), even if he does not necessarily exclude it from the
process of moral perfection. One among many distinctions between the
Lu-Wang school and its rival, the Ch'eng-Chu school, resides in their
differing attitudes toward the role book learning plays in their moral
programs. For the Ch'eng-Chu school, book learning has an inherent
positive value in the course of moral cultivation.
Notwithstanding these differences, by the Ch'ing period neither Lu-
Wang scholars nor those of the Ch'eng-chu school hesitated to employ
an evidential approach (k'ao-cheng) as an efficient way to argue for their
own doctrines. Prior to this, the battles between them were conducted
primarily in the sphere of philosophical speculation. What compelled
the Lu-Wang scholars to assume this new weapon - (that is) the eviden-
tial approach - may have resided in the shift in intellectual climate from
"honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing) to "the pursuits of inquiry
Introduction
and study" (tao wen-hsueh). Briefly, the philological turn did occur
during the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods.
In reconstructing the philosophical argument between Lu Hsiang-
shan (1139-92) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200), it becomes apparent that
the vital issue separating them is the different approach each takes to the
ontological presupposition of "mind" (hsiri). From this perspective, the
other differences, such as whether book learning benefits moral cultiva-
tion, merely stem from their ontological presupposition of mind.
Various political and intellectual factors contributed to the rise of the
Chu Hsi school and the decline of the Lu Hsiang-shan school. The
pressures that the Chu Hsi school exercised upon the Lu Hsiang-shan
school were manifold. First of all, intellectually, during his lifetime the
doctrines set forth by Chu Hsi and the commentaries on the classics
made by him attracted an enormous following; the degree to which
these beliefs found acceptance and support is reflected by the ease with
which they survived the political purges aimed at their obliteration. In
contrast, the philosophy of Lu Hsiang-shan lost influence shortly after
his death. The intellectual reasons for the rise and fall of these two
schools are discernible if we penetrate their doctrines.
Furthermore, since the end of the Southern Sung period, Chu Hsi's
scholarship had gained government patronage and become the official
learning. In the Yuan dynasty, Chu Hsi's annotations to the classics were
further employed to test the civil service candidates. The line between a
student sincere in his devotion to Chu Hsi's philosophy and examination
candidates keen on government position blurred, because knowledge of
Chu Hsi's doctrine became a conditio sine qua non for passing the civil
service examinations. Because of this, K'ung Shang-jen (1648-1718)
lamented that most of the students favored Chu Hsi and attacked Lu
Hsiang-shan simply because the former wrote commentaries that could
be used for the civil service examinations.1
This trend certainly could not satisfy scholars committed to learning
for the sake of intellectual and moral enlightenment. Wang Yang-ming
(1472—1529) is perhaps the best example of such philosophers. He
reacted against the current of Chu Hsi's learning in two ways. First,
through a process of intellectual struggle with Chu Hsi's doctrines, he
eventually arrived at a theory of moral action that drew directly upon the
inner mind as the source of morality, in opposition to Chu Hsi's philos-
ophy. Second, in order to reduce his own psychological anxieties caused
both by his felt intellectual indebtedness to Chu Hsi's doctrine and by
the hostility of the Chu Hsi scholars toward his newly proposed theory,
1. K'ung Shang-jen, Hu-hai chi, Shanghai, 1957, 9/203-204.

2
Introduction
Wang Yang-ming restored The Great Learning of the Ancient Text as a

justification of his theory of ko-wu (rectification of the mind). Further-
more, he compiled Chu Hsi s Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life to try
to show that no basic difference existed between his own doctrines and
those articulated by Chu Hsi. Both of Yang-ming's works triggered a
series of debates that continued well into the Ch'ing period.
The content of these debates no doubt had bearing upon the philo-
sophical stands of both the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang schools; the
form of these debates witnessed the rise of the evidential approach
itself.2 Li Fu, as a Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing period, not only argued
with the Chu Hsi scholars on philosophical issues, but also assumed the
new weapon of evidential research to fight against the Chu Hsi school.
Although we can detect an underlying intellectual continuity between
the thought of the Sung Confucians and the early Ch'ing Confucians,
their political ideology underwent a subtle but fundamental change.
Before the reign of the K'ang-hsi emperor, in spite of their intellectual
differences, both the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school
shared the assumption that the Way {tao) or the tradition of the Way
(tao-tfung) could be employed to criticize the political authorities,
the rulers. This critical dimension of the Way, however, eventually was
eliminated in the thought of Ch'ing scholars (except among the Ming
loyalists).
Li Fu, who was the major champion of the Lu-Wang school during the
early Ch'ing, is a good example of a scholar who reflected the intellec-
tual and political changes that occurred in that period. An in-depth
analysis of his life and thought will help to illuminate how the political
establishment successfully usurped the formerly independent tradition
of the Way. Moreover, Li Fu illustrates how a man who claimed to be an
adherent of the Lu-Wang school could still serve as a scholar-official
under an alien dynasty. Finally, his thought illustrates the process
whereby the debates between the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang
school resulted in the evidential research movement. I also will discuss
the Ch'eng-Chu school, the rival of the Lu-Wang school, at some length
when clarity warrants a broader perspective for the Lu-Wang school.
2. This thesis was first proposed by Professor Ying-shih Yu; see his Li-shih yii ssu-hsiang
(History and thought), Taipei, 1977, pp. 87-156.
1
The original argument (1):
"Chu Hsi versus
Lu Hsiang-shan"
(Chu-Lu i-t'ung):
A philosophical interpretation
In 1175, Chu Hsi (1130—1200) and the Lu brothers, Chiu-ling (1132—

80) and Chiu-yuan (Hsiang-shan, 1139—92) were invited by Lii Tsu-
ch'ien (1137—81) to the Goose Lake temple to seek a reconciliation of
their long-held divergent views. The theme of this debate constituted
one of the major discourses in the history of Neo-Confucianism. The
debate itself was significant not only for those philosophers who partici-
pated in it, but also for those who developed Neo-Confucianism in later
days. Hence, it deserves our detailed scrutiny in order to appreciate its
far-reaching implications.
Before their departure for Goose Lake, the Lu brothers had an intel-
lectual exchange so as to reach a common ground between themselves.
In the end the elder brother, Chiu-ling, agreed with Hsiang-shan and
wrote a poem to express his own view:
Children know love, but in growing up learn respect.
The ancient sages pass on this mind.
Only after the foundation has been laid can a house be built.
No hill will rise without a base.
Fondness for commentaries brings thorns and thistles.
If you are attached to details, you may lose yourself in them.
Value friendship and counsel each other.
Realize that great joy lies in this moment.1
1. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi (Complete works of Lu Hsiang-
4
The original argument (i)
However, Hsiang-shan felt somewhat dissatisfied with the second line of

his brother's poem, "The ancient sages pass on this mind." On the way
to Goose Lake he wrote a poem in response:
Graveyards evoke sorrow, ancestral shrines, respect.
This man's unpolished Mind through all ages.
Tiny drops make up a mighty ocean,
Small rocks pile up as mounts T'ai and Hua.
Easy [i] and simple [chien] effort [kung-fu] brings lasting greatness.
Fragmented work stays drifting and aimless.
To know how to mount, from the lower to the higher,
Find out truth and falsehood this very day.2
In their meeting with Chu Hsi the Lu brothers in turn preceded the
debate with presentation of each's poem. It was said that on hearing
these poems, Chu Hsi turned pale. Still, Chu Hsi discussed his own view
with the Lu brothers.
Today, there are few materials left that record in detail the arguments
adduced in that debate. From the fact that Chu Hsi and the Lu brothers
(especially Hsiang-shan) continued to criticize each other long after the
debate, one might assume that the debate itself was a failure of intellec-
tual communication for both sides. Chu Hsi quite often attacked Lu
Hsiang-shan's philosophy as Zen Buddhism or Confucianized Zen. 3 Lu
Hsiang-shan in response called Chu's philosophy heterodoxy (i-tuari)
that was unconsciously influenced by Taoism. 4 The primary task for a
proper Confucian of the Sung dynasty was to distinguish true Confucian-
ism from Buddhism as well as from Taoism. All the criticisms employed
by Chu and Lu were intended as insults to each other's self-image as
champions of true Confucianism.
Chu Heng-tao, a witness to this debate, recalled the situation as fol-
shan), hereafter abbreviated as LHCC, 1823. Punctuated by Li Fu. 34749a. Professor

Wing-tsit Chan's and Julia Ching's English translations provided a great help to my
rendering of this poem. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "Neo-Confucian Philosophical Poems,"
Rendition, no. 4 (Spring 1975), 14; and Julia Ching, "The Goose Lake Monastery
Debate," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1 (1974), 165.
2. Ibid., 34/49b. Ching, "Goose Lake," 165. The second line of this poem reads: "Ssu-jen-
ch'ien-ku^ru-mo-hsin"; the other version of it reads "Ssu-jen-ch'ien-tsai-tsui-ling-hsin," which
is literally rendered as 'This man possesses the most subtle and sensitive mind through
thousands of years." See Sheng Ju-tzu, Shu-chai-lao-hsueh-ts'ung-t'an, Shanghai, 1941,
p. 26.
3. Chu-tzu yu'-lei (Classified conversations of Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTYL,
Taipei, 1962. 114/4460-4461; and Chu-tzu wen-chi (Collection of literary works by
Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTWC, in Ssu-ftu pei^yao, entitled Chu-tzu ta-ch 'u'an,
35/22a.
4. LHCC, i5/3b-5a.
Philosophy, philology, and politics
lows: "During the meeting at the Goose Lake, in a discussion of educat-

ing people, Chu Hsi held that one should be widely read, and then seek
the essential (yileh). But according to the Lu brothers, one should dis-
cover the fundamental mind (pen-hsin)first,then read widely. For Chu,
the Lu brothers' teaching method is oversimplified; for the Lu brothers,
Chu's method is fragmented."5 This account has long been accepted as
a standard paradigm for comprehending the discrepancy between Chu's
and Lu's philosophy. Despite the oversimplified character of this ac-
count of their differences, during the past eight hundred years many
scholars have adopted this model in grasping Chu's scholarship as deal-
ing primarily with "intellectual pursuits" (tao wen-hsueh) and Lu's as
solely concerned with "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing). For
example, although the present-day scholar Hsu Fu-kuan shows a more
sophisticated comprehension of Chu and Lu than previous scholars, he
merely presents a modern version of that traditional paradigm. He
employs the dichotomy between knowledge and morality and criticizes
Chu Hsi's confusion of a moral problem with an intellectual problem.6
But even Lu Hsiang-shan himself had already perceived that this way of
arguing could not convince Chu Hsi,7 not to mention those who cau-
tiously keep in mind the distinction between an "ought" category and an
"is" category, a distinction actually made in post-Kantian philosophy.
After reconstructing the original arguments of Chu and Lu, I will come
back to these criticisms.
Here, I will show that the fundamental difference between Chu Hsi
and Lu Hsiang-shan lies in their respective ontological presupposition of
"mind"; all other differences are derived from their different perspec-
tives on this issue.
In fact, Chu Hsi's understanding of human mind is intimately shaped
by, or interconnected with, his cosmology, especially with the concept of
ch% which can be rendered as "vital force," "physical-psychic energy," or
"substance."8 It is fruitful for us first to investigate Chu's cosmology
in order to form a comprehensive picture of his "mind-based" philo-
sophical anthropology.
5. LHCC, 36/18a.
6. Hsu Fu-kuan, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang-shih lun-chi (Essays on Chinese intellectual history),
Taipei, 1975, p. 37. In his later days, Professor Hsu reflected upon his early view of Chu
Hsi and confessed it was too superficial. This is one example to show that Professor Hsu
is a highly reflective scholar. See Hsu Fu-kuan tsui-hou jih-chi (The last diary of Professor
Hsu Fu-kuan), Taipei, 1987, p. 184.
7. LHCQ 3 4 /37a.
8. Ch'i is usually rendered as material force, vital force, ether, or substance. In fact, none
of these is equal to its meaning in Chinese philosophy. A stone is made of ch \ and
the spirits are a form of ch'i too. Hence, ch'i has both spiritual and physical nature in
one.
In discussing the origin of the earth, Chu Hsi said:

In the beginning of the universe there was only vital force [ch'i] consisting of yin
and yang. This force moved and circulated, turning this way and that. As this
movement gained speed, a mass of sediment was pushed together and, since
there was no outlet for this, it consolidated to form the earth in the center of
universe. The clear part of vital force formed the sky, the sun and moon, and the
stars and zodiacal spaces. It is only on the outside that the encircling movement
perpetually goes on. The earth exists motionless in the center of the system, not
at the bottom.9
He also said:
Within the universe there are principle [li] and vital force [ch'i]. Principle
constitutes the Way [tao] that is "above form"; it is the source from which things
are produced. Vital force constitutes the "instruments" [ch'ib] that are "within
form"; it is the [material] means whereby things are produced. Hence, men or
things, at the moment of their production, must receive this principle [li] in
order that they have a nature [hsing] of their own; they must receive this vital
force in order that they may have form.10
Four points can be made from these quotations: first, that the vital force
is the basic material for making everything in the universe; second, that
although the earth as well as other celestial bodies are made of the vital
force, the composition of the earth is not so pure as those of heaven, the
sun, the moon, and the stars. If we admit that purity is a normative
criterion in Neo-Confucianism, then we must agree that heaven and
other celestial bodies should be evaluated as being higher than the
earth. Third, people and things on the earth are also made from the vital
force. Finally, principle regulates the way in which vital force operates.
But principle is not a separate entity. It exists inside vital force. Without
vital force, principle would have nothing to adhere to. So Chu Hsi stated,
"In the universe there has never been any vital force without principle or
principle without vital force."11
To correspond to the vital force as a whole, Chu Hsi gives a general
name to the principle of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things, that
is, the Great Ultimate (t'ai-chi). "With" the Great Ultimate there is the
shapeless Great Void (wu-chi), which preserves the infinite possibility of
transformation and creation. It is this very concept, the Great Void, that
aroused fierce criticism from Lu Hsiang-shan. Lu not only casts doubt on
9. CTYL, 1/72. The English quotation is slightly modified from Wing-tsit Chan's A Source
Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, N.J., 1973, pp. 641-642.
10. CTWC, 5874b. The English translation is based on Fung Yu-lan's A History of Chinese
Philosophy, trans, by Derk Bodde, Princeton, N.J., 1953, vol. 11, p. 542.
11. CTYL, 4 / i o a .
the necessity of this concept, but argues that yin and yang are "above
form" (hsing-erh-shang), just as the Great Ultimate is. In his view, the
Great Void, with a strong flavor of Taoism, cannot be legitimately ac-
cepted in a proper Confucian cosmology.12 Despite Lu's objection, Chu
Hsi insists that the Great Void is cosmologically a theoretical necessity,
and that yin and yang are "within form" (hsing-erh-hsia), not above form
as the Great Ultimate is. These assertions receive their support from a
textual interpretation of the writings of Chou Tun-i (1017—73), from
whose books Chu Hsi draws these ideas. 13
Moreover, Chu Hsi is deeply influenced by Hua-yen Buddhism with
respect to the nature of principle (&'). He thinks that everything in
the universe possesses a Great Ultimate (principle in general term)
and that the Great Ultimate in everything is identical, as the Buddhist
metaphor "the moon reflected in ten thousand rivers" implies. 14 Here
in "principle" more than in "vital force" one can more clearly recognize
the homogeneity of Heaven and Earth, creatures, and all things. It
is the endowment of the vital force in each case that creates differences
between one thing and another. In other words, while in terms of
"principle," everything has no difference at all, in terms of "vital
force," owing to the endowment of each one, all things differ from
one another. However, among the myriad things, human beings stand
out as the best because their better endowment of the "vital force"
enables them to manifest the principle more completely than other
creatures. For instance, in the case of birds and other animals, since
they are endowed with the "vital force" to a lesser degree of purity
than mankind, they suffer from the incompleteness of principle
manifested in their physical structure and behavior. The crow can know
no more than filial piety, the otter no more than to offer sacrifices;
the dog can only keep guard, the ox, plow. Chu Hsi explains this very
well:
From the point of view of principle, all things have one source, and of course
man and things cannot be distinguished as higher and lower creatures. From the
point of view of vital force, that which receives it in its perfection and is
unimpeded becomes man, while those that receive it partially and are obstructed
become things. Because of this, they cannot be equal, but some are higher and
others are lower.15
12. LHCC, 2 / i o b - i 4 a . 13. CTWC, 3 6 / 7 b - i o b .

14. CTYL, 18/700. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih (A history of Chinese philos-
ophy), n.d., Taipei, pp. 902—903; Bodde, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11. pp. 541—
542; Hou Wai-lu et al., Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang Vung-shih (A general history of Chinese
thought), vol. 4b, p. 601.
15 CTYL, 4/152—153. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 622.
This implies that although all things share the same principle, only man
can understand the principle on a conscious level because he is better
endowed with the vital force.16
Viewed in this light, man is no doubt the most intelligent creature in
the universe. But as far as individual endowment is concerned, men are
also different among themselves according to opaqueness or clarity of
their vital force. Sages embody the purest "vital force," idiots the most
sullied. The majority of men are between these two extreme categories.
In order to penetrate into the real source that distinguishes man from
other creatures, we need to take account of Chu Hsi's understanding of
mind (hsiri).
Human mind, which distinguishes man from other things, is the
master of the whole body. It is a crystallization of the most delicate vital
force.17 The substance of mind is emptiness and sensitivity (hsu-ling).18
These qualities allow it to contain all principle (s) and respond to things.
The mind so conceived is the convergence of principle and vital force.
The very fact that the mind is an embodiment of vital force makes it
vulnerable to obstruction from the coarser part of its endowment. Sages
are the perfect embodiment of the "pure" vital force; consequently, the
mind of a sage because of his gifted endowment is completely identical
to "principle."19 But this is not the case for average people. Although
both sages and common men possess "principle" in their minds, they are
different because men usually are unaware of the existence of "princi-
ple" in their own minds. Effort (kung-fu) and cultivation (han-yang) are
needed to arouse the immanent principle onto consciousness of one's
mind. To precisely grasp this point would involve the most complicated
intellectual growth in Chu's life, which has to do with his restructuring
of the relationship among three concepts - nature (hsing), feeling
(ch'ing), and mind (hsin).
Chu Hsi experienced a great change in his apprehension of these
three conceptual units. At the age of twenty-four, he went to see Li T'ung
(1088-1163), who continued the teaching of Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng
I. Before that he was under the spell of Zen Buddhism. Chu Hsi was quite
discouraged by his first visit to Li because Li did not appreciate his
understanding of Zen. On the contrary, Li persuaded him to read the
Confucian classics, a plain and common suggestion that caused Chu Hsi
to be skeptical of the depth of Li's appreciation of "profound truth."20
16. Li T'ung, Li Yen-f'ing chi (The writings of Li T'ung), Shanghai, n.d., Ts'ung-shu chi-
ck 'eng ch 'u-pien, 2 /30.
17. CTYL, 5/198. 18. Ibid., 27/200. 19. Ibid., 27/1158.
20. Li T'ung, Li Yenning chi, 3/49.
Later, his study of the classics gradually came to inspire him, and he was
able to come to terms with Li's teaching. But Chu Hsi never felt at ease
with Li's method of cultivation, "sitting in silence and clarifying one's
mind" (mo-tso ch'eng-hsiri), which, in a sense, showed some similarity to
the approach of Zen Buddhism.21 As a result Chu Hsi did not formally
receive Li's teaching until the age of thirty-one. When Chu Hsi was
thirty-four, Li passed away.
According to Ch'ien Mu, as Chu Hsi's intellectual mentor, Li influ-
enced Chu in three respects: First, he directed Chu's attention to prac-
tical human affairs; second, Li pointed out the importance of classical
learning for Chu Hsi; and last, Li presented the idea that "principle is
one but its manifestations are many" (li-i fen-shu),22 Chu Hsi confessed
that before he met Li Tung, he was inclined to engage in grand and
superficial talk. Later, having been influenced by Li, he gradually real-
ized that it was much more difficult to recognize principle manifested in
various forms than to grasp principle in one. This realization, in Chu's
view, is crucial in distinguishing Confucian teaching from heterodoxy.23
It might also account for Chu Hsi's intellectual reorientation as ex-
pressed in his interest in studying the details of any subject. As Chu Hsi
recalled,
Master Li usually taught the people how to experience the fundamental and
that which is not yet manifested (ta-pen wei-fa) in a state of quietude. When
this state is clearly achieved, one can deal with human affairs spontaneously
and adequately. This pedagogic art has been transmitted through a line of
Yang Shih's (Kuei-shan, 1053—1135) disciples. At the time when I was
studying with him, I was distracted from the practice of this by my fondness for
intellectual discussions and textual analysis - Each time I think of this, I feel
ashamed.24
In fact, Chu Hsi had long been obsessed with identifying a definite
relation between the substance of mind and the operation of mind; or in
Thomas Metzger's terminology, the "linkage" between the metaphysical
world and the experiential world.25 At the time of Li T'ung's death, Chu
Hsi had still not figured out a conceptual scheme incorporating these
two states of mind on a firm and secure basis.
With the realization of such a scheme as his goal, at the age of thirty-
eight, Chu paid a visit to Chang Shih (Chang Nan-hsiian, 1133—80), who
21. Li T'ung, Li Yen-p'ing chi, 3/39.

22. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsueh-an (A new record of Chu Hsi's learning), Taipei, 1971,
vol. 3, pp. 34—35; and Wang Mao-hung, Chu-tzu nien-p'u (Chronological biography of
Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTNP, Taipei, 1971, pp. 7-22.
23. CTYL, 117/4556-4557. 24. CTWQ 4o/8a.
25. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament, New York, 1977, pp. 70-79.
1O
was at that time the leader of the Hsiang school. 26 Through their intellec-
tual exchanges, Chang convinced Chu that the "not yet actualized" (wei-
fa) is nature (hsing) and the "actualized" (i-fa) is mind. Chu Hsi further
developed this idea in a series of philosophical letters called "The Old
Theory of Equilibrium and Harmony." In this theory, he implies that
with regard to the method of cultivation, one ought to examine one's
mind (the actualized) before preserving and nourishing it.
A decisive change took place when Chu Hsi was forty years old, one
year after he had finished the compilation of the Ch'eng brothers' works
(Ch'eng Hao, 1032—85; C h ' e n g I, 1033—1107). According to Chu's
own account, his rereading of the Ch'eng brothers' writings brought
about this dramatic change. In a letter to his friend in H u n a n , he
wrote:
Right along, in my discussions and thinking, I have simply considered the mind
to be the state after feelings are aroused, and in my daily efforts I have also
merely considered examining and recognizing the clues [of activities of feelings]
as the starting points. Consequently I have neglected the effort of daily self-
cultivation, so that the mind is disturbed in many ways and lacks the quality of
depth or purity. Also, when it is expressed in speech or action it is always
characterized by a sense of urgency and an absence of reserve, and there is no
longer any disposition of ease or profoundness - When Master Ch'eng said that
"whenever we talk about the mind, we refer to the state after the feelings are
aroused," he referred [only] to the mind of an infant [whose feelings have
already been aroused]. When he said, "Whenever we talk about the mind," he
was mistaken in the way he expressed it and therefore admitted the incorrectness
and corrected himself.27
Chu Hsi subsequently adopted the view of Chang Tsai (1020—77).

According to this view, nature is the state of mind before it is aroused,
whereas feelings are the state of mind after it is aroused, as expressed in
Chang Tsai's idea: that the mind commands nature and feelings (hsin
t'ung hsing-ch'ing) ,28 From there he can consistently claim that "nature is
the principle." Nature is what man is given from the heavenly principle
(Vien-li), and resides in h u m a n mind. 29 Feelings are the concrete mani-
festations of the mind. It appears to be unstable and precarious because
of impurity on the part of each person's endowment. The mind cannot
be equal to the principle, as Lu Hsiang-shan thinks. Only nature, which
belongs to the "not yet actualized" (in Chu's new theory), is identical
to the principle and totally good. Chu Hsi had arrived at this new
26. The Hsiang school was founded by Hu Wu-feng (1100—1155), who was Chang Nan-
hsuan's teacher.
27. CTWC, 64/2O,a-2O,b. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 601-602.
28. CTYL, 60/2318. 29. Ibid., 60/2318, 2324.
11
perspective when he met Lu Hsiang-shan at the Goose Lake temple at

the age of forty-six.
Thus, from Chu Hsi's standpoint, Lu Hsiang-shan's claim that "the
mind is the principle" implies that Lu is blind to the fact that man is
constituted by the vital force, which displays the physical nature (ch'i-chih
chih hsing) in him.30 According to Chu Hsi, the idea of the physical
nature, first proposed by Chang Tsai and the Ch'eng brothers, makes a
tremendous contribution in compensating for the defect in Mencius's
and Hsiin tzu's theory of human nature. The physical nature formed by
vital force is supposed to differ from the heaven-conferred nature (t'ien-
ming chih hsing or i-li chih hsing), that is, principle. When Mencius (ca.
371-289 B.C.) says that human nature is originally good, he merely has
the "heaven-conferred nature" in mind; when Hsun tzu (fl. 298-238
B.C.) says that human nature is originally evil, he is concerned only with
the physical nature. So only if one takes both nature and vital force into
account, can one come up with a comprehensive understanding of
human nature.31 Implicitly Chu Hsi criticized Lu Hsiang-shan on this
point. The substance of nature is without doubt the supreme good. But
if one fails to see the vital force at work, one is unable to realize why
various things (especially the bad) occur; vice versa, if one is solely
absorbed by these diversified phenomena without knowing the existence
of nature, one cannot understand that in another respect these diversi-
fied phenomena participate in the common source of goodness, nature.
Therefore, we know that Chu Hsi's phrase "nature is the principle"
actually refers to heaven-conferred nature but not physical nature. Here
more than anywhere else, Chu Hsi reveals the dualistic elements of his
thought. To put it another way, Chu Hsi reveals this dualism more clearly
in his philosophical anthropology than in his cosmology.
Chu Hsi believes that "man, being at the center of Heaven and Earth,
is the most intelligent creature among the ten thousand things.
The reason for this is his mind."32 It is reasonable to say that Chu's
philosophical anthropology centers around his theory of human mind.
"Nature is principle. The mind is its embracement and reservoir, and
issues it forth into operation," Chu Hsi says.33 In theory, this saying is
correct. But in fact, only the sages, because of their special endowment,
are born with the knowledge of principle; hence their minds are entirely
compatible with the principle. Average men are obstructed by the im-
pure vital force in their psychophysical endowment so that they are
unable to immediately realize the principle in their minds. Nevertheless,
30. CTYL, 124/4826. 31. Ibid., 59/2262-2263. 32. CTWC, 77/6b.

33. CTYL, 5/203; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 631.
12
the mind (of an average person), as the purest part of the psychophysical
endowment, has a capacity to be perceptive and conscious of the
principle(s) from within and without. In other words, the principle,
which one's mind has not been aware of, needs to be aroused by the
investigation of external affairs (affairs in a general sense, including
book learning). This does not mean that the principle so obtained is
external to one's mind. On the contrary, all principles are inherent in
one's mind and are the same as those in external things and events.34 In
fact Chu Hsi never doubts that all principle (s) appearing in the universe
are the same, since he believes that "the principle of the mind is the
Great Ultimate,"35 and that "each and every person has in him the Great
Ultimate and each and every thing has in it the Great Ultimate."36
For Chu Hsi, the best way to acquire the principle is by studying the
classics, which are based upon the sages' writings and sayings over the
ages. The sage's mind contains the principle in the universe. The reason
for us to study and learn is simply that our minds are not the same as
those of sages.37
During the debate at the Goose Lake temple, Lu Hsiang-shan bluntly
put the question to Chu, "What did the ancients read before the writing
system was invented?"38 Years after that occasion, Chu Hsi replied, "Be-
fore the written language had been created, students certainly had
nothing to read; people above average were expected to achieve human
perfection by themselves without sudying texts. But after cultural crea-
tions (including the written language) by the sages and wise men, the
Way [tao] has been preserved in detail in the classics; even a man as
sagacious as Confucius could not avoid learning these classics."39 A
strong historical and cultural overtone can be perceived in Chu's views
here. He considers Confucius to have made the cultural legacy of the
earlier sages significant to the world through his enormous efforts. Since
Confucius, learning, especially the study of the classics, constituted the
primary path for quest of the Way. But Chu Hsi is not an antiquarian in
any sense. In a reply to his student about whether one should study texts
to become enlightened, he answered, "Surely one should study texts. If
the principle is in the books, one apprehends it by book learning; if not,
one should look for it in contemporary affairs. If the principle does not
exist in the ancient period, seek it in modern times."40 He is also known
for his skeptical spirit in his treatment of ancient texts. But he feared that
if he took his skeptical approach to an extreme, the validity of all the
important classics would be shaken.41
34. CTYL, 17/673. 35. Ibid., 5/197. 36. Ibid., 94/3823. 37. CTWC, 42/21*.
38. LHCC, 34/49b. 39. CTWC, 43/7^ 40. CTYL, 14/384.
41. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsiieh-an, vol. 1, pp. 181-182.
13
Lu Hsiang-shan's approach to principle is considerably different from

that of Chu Hsi. Although the study of classics is not superficial in his
strategy of grasping the principle, personal experience and practice
seem even more important. Lu once made a very daring dictum: "If in
our study we know the fundamentals, then all the six classics are my
footnotes." 42 This symbolized a protest against the heavy weight of classi-
cal learning. Overemphasis by scholars upon the fragmented and de-
tailed study of the classics made them prisoners of the classics. Lu often
proudly said, "I reduce the b u r d e n for students, but other scholars tend
to increase it for students." 4 3
It is interesting to note that both Lu Hsiang-shan and Chu Hsi were
determined to become sages in their youth. A precocious curiosity was
also characteristic of both scholars. They were preoccupied with
cosmological questions from an early age. Chu Hsi said that from the
age of five or six, he had been continuously preoccupied with the
cosmological question of what is above heaven. 44 This same pattern
repeats itself in Lu's early life. When Lu Hsiang-shan was merely three or
four years old he was so absent-minded in his speculation on the scope
of Heaven and Earth that he even stopped eating; this resulted in a
scolding by his father. 45 Their outlook on cosmology and philosophical
anthropology, however, diverged sharply in their later intellectual and
personal development.
As already indicated, influenced by Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung ( 1 0 1 1 -
77) and Chang Tsai, Chu Hsi synthesized their theories and constructed
a grand cosmology with an "intellectual-analytic" style that characterizes
Chu Hsi's scholarship methodologically. It can be best seen in his con-
cern with cognitive clarity, especially of verbal expression. 46 T h e last four
lines of the poem he wrote in response to Lu Chiu-ling displays this
concern very well:
We exchanged views about the study with which we were occupied, and went to
the depths to discover how new knowledge could be improved. I am just afraid
that we might talk about what is beyond words; I doubt that there is a difference
of opinion between ancient and modern days.47
Chu Hsi believed that from the course of discussion would inevitably
emerge the various opinions from which a valid conclusion could be
derived.
42. LHCC, 34/ib. 43. Ibid., 35/143. 44. CTNP, p. 2. 45. LHCC, 3675b.
46. Cf. Metzger, Escape, pp. 63-68.
47. CTWC, 4/1 oa. Unlike the former two poems, this English translation is based upon
Carsun Chang's Development ofNeo-Confucian Thought, New York, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 298—
299-
l
4
Lu Hsiang-shan, however, followed another path to resolve his con-

cerns. In contrast to that of Chu Hsi, Lu's approach appeared to be an
"experiential-holistic" style. One day when he was reading an old text, he
happened to encounter two characters, yii-chou, in it. He was so inspired
by the annotation defining yii (spacial continuum) as "the four direc-
tions plus upward and downward," and chou (temporal continuum) as
"what has gone by in the past and what is to come in the future" that he
wrote, "The affairs in the universe {yii-chou) are my own affairs. My own
affairs are affairs of the universe." He suddenly grasped the point that
people, Heaven and Earth, and the ten thousand things are all in the
infinitude.48
Unlike Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan does not employ a lot of concepts
such as vital force, Great Ultimate, principle, and so forth to cope with
the origins of the universe. He becomes one with the universe not by
intellectual understanding of the homogeneity of men and the ten
thousand things, but by an intuitive awareness and experience of the
total truth. In reply to a student's question about the differences among
mind, capacity (ts'ai), nature, and feeling, he said:
What you say is also a matter of details. However, this is not your fault, my friend;
it is the defect of the entire world. When scholars read today, they try to
understand only words and do not go further to find out what is vital. As to
feeling, the nature, mind, and capacity, they are all one thing in general and
simply happen to be expressed differently - You do not have to talk about them.
If you do, you will be wrong; and in the future you will depend on only words,
and study not for your own sake but to impress others. If you pay attention to
what is concrete to yourself, you will eventually understand.49
Here, Lu's experiential-holistic approach is at work. Basically, Lu does
not trust language very much. Rather, he puts an exclusive emphasis on
the experiential dimension of knowledge. A disciple was scolded by him
when the former asked him to "teach" moral knowledge.50 Discussing
moral problems meant futile talk to Lu. He had a deep suspicion of
those who engaged in grandiose discourse. In that fashion, language
may be perverted to the extent that its corresponding reality and prac-
tice are entirely missing. "Empty talk" (hsii-shuo) and "opinions ex-
pressed in examination essays" (shih-wen chih chien) are two terms
constantly employed by him to criticize these persons.51 For him, those
who pursue material interests find it easier to understand his teaching
than those who immerse themselves in grand ideas.52 His very emphasis
on the experiential dimension of language and knowledge leads him to
48. LHCC, 36/5b-6a. 49. Ibid., 35/2oa-2ob. 50. Ibid., 34/22b.

51. Ibid., 35/6a, 8a-iob; CTYL, 124/4817-4818. 52. LHCC, 34/6a.
say that although he has uttered tens of thousands of words, they are all
expressions of what is within him, and nothing more has been added.
Spontaneity is characteristic of his learning, which is rarely found in that
of others.53 No wonder Chu Hsi's great interest in intellectual discussion,
book editing, and annotative tasks convinces Lu Hsiang-shan that Chu
starts his learning from an improper point. By immersing himself in the
details, he fails to apprehend the fundamental mind first. Lu is so
concerned with the starting point {tuan-hsu) for pursuing the Way that,
in his view, if one begins with the wrong starting point, one will end up
far away from the right path of the scared learning and get lost in the
jungle of heterodoxies.
From this point of view, Chu Hsi's doctrine qualifies as a heterodoxy.54
On one occasion, when Lu walked by moonlight with his disciple, he
sighed, saying, "Chu Yuan-hui's (Chu Hsi's) scholarship is like the great
mountain T'ai, yet he does not arrive at the Way by his learning. This is
equal to wasting his energy without making any progress in himself."55 In
contrast, Lu has a great confidence in his own understanding of the Way.
"The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe," claims Lu.56 In
this sense, the mind (or his mind) becomes the focus of the unity of
people and the universe. It is worth our while to examine Lu's concep-
tion of mind to understand the difference between Lu and Chu in their
understanding of it.
As Lu's student once pointed out, Lu Hsiang-shan did not like to talk
about the concept of nature (hsing). But on at least one occasion when
he was requested to discuss it, Lu simply equated "the nature in heaven"
with "the mind in man."57 This demonstrates Lu's profound commit-
ment to the doctrine that mind is the principle that warrants the concep-
tual possibility of the equation between "nature in heaven" and "mind in
man." The reason Lu puts mind and the principle directly together is
because the human mind is the most intelligent and the principle is
clearly latent in the mind itself. Naturally, every man has this mind and
contains the principle in full.58 If he does not, it is simply because his
mind is distracted by human desires. With regard to this point Chu Hsi
did an injustice to Lu Hsiang-shan in accusing him of ignoring the
operation of the vital force in human beings. In fact, Lu is not unaware
of the bad effect of impure vital force. However, for him it constitutes no
great obstacle to moral cultivation.59 As Lu puts it, "Moral principles
inherent in the human mind are endowed by Heaven and cannot be
wiped out. Those who are beclouded by material desires so as to pervert
53. LHCC, 34/ga. 54. Ibid., 34/11a. 55. Ibid., 34/28^ 56. Ibid., 22/9a-o.b.
57. CTYL, 124/4820; LHCC, 35/206. 58. LHCC, 22/ioa. 59. Ibid., i3/ia-2b.
16
principles and violate righteousness, do so because they do not think,

that is all."60 But Lu Hsiang-shan never gives a clear account of the origin
of human desires. For him, in order to recover the original state of the
mind {pen-hsin), one needs simply to think and examine oneself.
For Chu Hsi, this would be just the first step to moral perfection. The
investigation of things serves as the necessary second step. At this point,
Chu Hsi attacks Lu Hsiang-shan for being overly subjective in his method
of grasping principle. In addition, Lu also underestimates the bad effect
of the impure vital force in each person's endowment. The impure vital
force, like built-in sin in oneself, takes a lifelong struggle to get rid of, or
to purify. To set one's mind right needs both tremendous determination
(li-chih) and strenuous effort. The way to achieve sagehood is a precari-
ous one. Chu Hsi remembered that based on his reading of Mencius he
had believed that to become a sage was easy. But later he felt it was very
difficult to achieve sagehood.61 He believed that an enormous intellec-
tual understanding was necessary in order to arouse the principle im-
plicit in one's mind (yiing-chih fang fa-ti ch'u-lai).62 Here we see the
concept of vital force go through Chu's cosmology and philosophy of
mind, playing a crucial role in the whole system.
By contrast, vital force does not receive the same weight in Lu's
thought. For Lu, the mind, as the unique source of moral development,
is in accord with principle; hence, it is self-sufficient for moral cultiva-
tion. He ascribes to the mind an unimpeded transformative power that
Chu Hsi would not allow. For Lu, it is incorrect to believe that the mind
is only a place for locating the principle, as Chu Hsi holds. It is also the
principle itself. If one becomes corrupted and evil, it is merely because
one loses the original knowledge of the innate good in the mind. The
only task for that person is to make up his mind to "recover" (hui-fu) his
initial moral consciousness. (In Chu's case, we can expect he would use
the word discover (fa-chiieh) here instead of hui-fu.) Based on this, one
can also achieve sagehood. For Lu Hsiang-shan, mind is universal and
identical in all cases. He asserts, "There is only one mind. My mind,
my friend's mind, the minds of the sages thousand of years ago, and
the minds of sages thousands of years to come are all the same."63
This reveals why he felt uneasy about the second line of his brother's
poem - "Ancient sages pass on this mind." In this line, sages become the
mediating agents of the mind.
Chu Hsi, as might be expected, took issue with Lu on this point. In
Chu's view, Lu transmits his own mind rather than the mind of the sages;
60. Ibid., 32/7a; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 580.

61. CTNP, p. 2. 62. CTYL, 17/673. 63. LHCC, 3 5 / i g b - 2 o a .
he transmits his private ideas rather than the sages' ideas.64 In order
to grasp the principle, people ought to trace the works of the sages to
the latter's intentions, and from those intentions to the principle in
the universe. Viewed in this light, the classics, being the records of
sages' doings and sayings, form the most important source for Chu's
"investigation of things."
While book learning is not totally excluded from Lu's search for
principle,65 personal experience with the real world occupies a more
important position. One day, when he was asked why he was unwilling to
put his doctrine into written form, he replied that The Six Classics anno-
tated his experience and his experience annotated The Six Classics.66 In
his view, the study of classics merely served as a witness to one's own
experience. In this respect, Lu appears to have been a more independ-
ent thinker than Chu. He boldly challenged the Tzu-kung and Tzu-hsia
wing of the Confucian literary tradition, the branch that distracted
scholars from appreciating the essence of Confucius's teaching: "One
thread goes through all."67 Moreover, he questioned the classics, the
words of the sages, whenever he felt they were contradictory to his own
experience. Lu said, "Establish yourself in life and respect yourself.
Don't follow other people's footsteps nor repeat their words."68 The
possibility of achieving moral perfection depends on one's determina-
tion to become a sage and one's authentic confrontation with the prac-
tical world. A man without even the slightest knowledge of literature can
still claim to be a dignified and imposing person.69
But the concern with "objectivity" or "validity" of the principle haunts
Chu Hsi's thought constantly. As Chu Hsi conceded, he would not feel
secure if the principle reached by his mind were not compatible with the
sages' classics.70 The task of looking for a systematic procedure that both
guides the discovery of the principle in one's mind and at the same time
guarantees the validity of the principle is pressing in Chu Hsi's intellec-
tual endeavor. The validity of the principle must be tested either by the
study of the classics, by the investigation of the external world, or by
both.
Of course, Lu Hsiang-shan also talks about these matters. In answer
to a question about the investigation of things, Lu quotes Mencius:
"All things are already complete in oneself."71 His understanding of
64. CTWC, 70/22a—22b. Here Chu Hsi criticizes Wang Hsin-po's sayings. This criticism
can be applied to Lu Hsiang-shan as well. Cf. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsiieh-an, vol. 3,
pp. 300-301.
65. LHCC, 34/7b. 66. Ibid., 34/7b. 67. Ibid., 34/ioa-iob, 20b.
68. Ibid., 35/43a; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 586.
69. LHCC, 35/243. 70. CTWC, 42/2ob-2oa. 71. LHCC, 35/14^
18
"things" here deserves a closer look. Lacking an unambiguous context,

one cannot be certain whether he means that the ontological basis of
things is rooted in our mind, or whether, espistemologically, that our
mind is acute enough to know "the principle of things" in itself. The
ambiguity of that utterance will become apparent when compared with
Chu Hsi's vision of "things." In Chu's case, the mind has the same
principle in itself as is in external things; the external things have
their own ontological reality simply because of their embodiment of the
vital force. But one is tempted to say that in order to support more
forcefully the self-sufficiency of mind, Lu Hsiang-shan finds it possible to
move from an espistemological ground to an ontological one. This,
however, is inconsistent with his other concerns. Despite the fact that he
disagrees with Chu Hsi on the problems of the ontological status of yin
and yang, their philosophical anthropology shares the same cosmic base.
Both Chu and Lu presuppose a continuity of beings from heaven to
human beings that are all made of the vital force of yin and yang. They
take for granted Mencius's saying, "He who exerts his mind to the
utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven."72
Heaven means to them a supreme entity outside one's mind that one
seeks to understand and thus to model oneself after. Therefore, the
mind in question is not just an individual mind. For Lu Hsiang-shan,
whatever ontological reality a thing possesses vis-a-vis universal mind, still
vis-a-vis the individual mind it has a certain external reality. Then,
Lu's realization of the objective existence of external things is beyond
question.
Actually, Lu believes simply that the principle resides in our mind. We
initiate learning from the very place of our inner mind because from the
mind we can extend the principle to all things. As he describes it, "What
permeates the mind, emanates from it, and what extends to fill the
universe is nothing but principle."73
A conversation between him and his disciple, Li Po-mien, also cor-
roborates this observation, although indirectly. Li asked, "There are so
many things in the world. How can one study all of them?" The teacher
said, "'All things are already complete in oneself.' It is necessary to
understand only principle."74 This reveals either that one can find "prin-
ciple" of the ten thousand things in one's mind, or that one has the
cognitive power to grasp the principle often thousand things. If we take
into account Lu's inner-directed approach, the first interpretation seems
more plausible. To him Chu Hsi's mistake simply lies in his searching for
the principle in things, not in mind.
72. Mencius, SSCC, p. 187. 73. LHCQ 34/43^ 74. Ibid., 35/14^
Thus, we can see that Chu Hsi and Lu's disagreements on

cosmological problems extend to philosophical anthropology as well. Lu
insists that yin and yang are "above form," as is the Great Ultimate. This,
in a way, brings an ontological strength to his claim that "mind is
principle." Since mind is made of yin and yang and principle is the Great
Ultimate, mind and principle are above form and identical to each
other. It is superfluous to use the concept hsing (nature) as Chu Hsi does
to bridge the gap between mind (in Chu's case, "within form") and
principle (in Chu's case, "above form"). Hence, it is understandable that
Lu's former student, Fu Shun-kung, said that Lu did not like to talk
about nature (hsing).75 In contrast to Lu, Chu Hsi has to insist that yin
and yang belong to "within form" in support of his tenet, "Nature is
principle." Mind and principle, according to Chu, belong respectively to
two different categories, "above form" and "within form"; therefore they
cannot be identical to each other, as Lu asserts.
In sum, while I stress that Chu Hsi's philosophical anthropology is
much influenced by his cosmology, particularly the concept of the vital
force, I do not mean to say that Lu Hsiang-shan has no interest in
cosmology at all. What I am trying to argue is that the differences in their
cosmologies may be regarded as expressive of their distinct philosophi-
cal styles. One emphasizes an intellectual-analytical style; the other, an
experiential-holistic style.
Besides, Lu Hsiang-shan would endow the mind with more power and
content than Chu Hsi would allow. Therefore, their conceptions of mind
differ in an ontological sense. In this respect, Fung Yu-lan is wrong
in saying that the mind in both Chu and Lu is the same.76 Lu's under-
standing of the mind is atemporal and universal both in endowment
and potentiality. He openly proclaims, "Sages appeared tens of thou-
sands of generations ago. They shared this mind; they shared this prin-
ciple. Sages will appear tens of thousands of generations to come. They
will share this mind, they will share this principle. Over the four seas
sages appear. They share this mind; they share this principle."77 The
mind so apprehended by him lacks a historical and cultural dimension
that is immanent in Chu Hsi's understanding of mind. Chu Hsi has long
been known as a great synthesizer of the doctrines of the five masters of
the Northern Sung dynasty; this makes his intellectual burden much
75. CTYL, 124/4820. Also see Huang Tsung-hsi, Sung-Yuan hsueh-an, Taipei, 1975,
76. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih, p. 940; Bodde, History of Chinese Philosophy,
p. 588.
77. LHCC, 36/5b-6a.
2O
heavier than Lu's.78 Chu Hsi had to go over all the fields touched by his
intellectual predecessors, to cover all the subjects in a consistent and
interconnected manner. By and large, he succeeded in accomplishing
this. We have seen how the concept of vital force goes through his
cosmology and philosophical anthropology without any contradiction.
On the contrary, Lu Hsiang-shan relied on his own learning. He confi-
dently asserted that after Mencius, only his learning shed light on the
Way.79 His knowledge had been obtained through his own reading of
Mencius. Chu Hsi also once remarked that he did not know who Lu's
teachers were.80
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to make some brief
comments on those scholars who deal with the "Chu-Lu problematic"
somewhat differently than I do. It is misleading to accuse Chu Hsi of
confusing a moral discourse with an intellectual one, a charge made by
Hsu Fu-kuan. The natural world, Heaven and Earth, or the cosmos is
constituted by the better part of the vital force. Normatively, it provides
a model for human beings to imitate or emulate. The principle is one, its
manifestations are many. Even a thing as small as a blade of grass is
expected to contain the principle. Basically, one is entitled to study
anything in the universe in order to approach the principle. Chu Hsi
believes that as a human being, one ought to understand the principles
in Heaven and Earth, including the names of plants and animals.81 His
conception of principle is normative in nature, but not descriptive in a
modern empirical sense. In other words, principle, if true, penetrates
both the natural and the human world. There is no distinction between
"is" and "ought" in these two zones.
Besides, after the first step is taken - that is, after a decision is made to
achieve moral perfection - the relationship between the consciousness
of the moral nature and the investigation of things becomes dialectical.
Each effort reinforces the other and raises the relationship to a new
level. Hence, the investigation of things is always morally oriented ana!
enhances moral understanding, not only quantitatively but qualitatively'
This idea is well expressed in Chu Hsi's postscript to the fifth chapter or
The Great Learning:
78. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism" in Francois Aubin,
ed., Sung Studies, 2d series, 1 (1973), 59-90. I have some reservations about Chan's
assertion that Chu Hsi set the direction of Neo-Confucian movement to philosophy of
principle.
79. LHCC, io/7a. 80. CTYL, 124/4812.
81. CTYL, 119/4641. Although Heaven and Earth contain the principle in themselves, it
is the sages who read the riddle of them and speak for them. CTYL, 65/2621.
21
[ The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard
to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their
principle, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme
point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find
himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. There, the qualities of
all things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all be
apprehended, and the mind in its entire substance and its relations to things will
be perfectly intelligent.82
Chu Hsi once admonished the emperor, saying that the way of learn-
ing consists in the investigation of things, and that the essence of the
investigation of things lies in studying the classics.83 In theory, everything
in the universe contains the principle in itself, but the essence of the
principle has been embodied perfectly in the classics of the sages. The
step from the investigation of things to the study of the classics is signifi-
cant if one can sympathize with Chu Hsi's view that the study of the
classics, owing to its particular constitution, paves the quickest way in
the quest for sagehood. Chu Hsi is quite clear that "the commentaries of
the classics enable us to understand the classics; after grasping the
classics, the commentaries become useless. In the same way, though one
understands the principle by means of the classics, after obtaining the
principle, the classics become useless."84 Viewed in this light, the classics
serve as the necessary means to the end of acquiring the principle in Chu
Hsi's whole project. Hence, study of the classics is not off the point or
peripheral to moral cultivation.
The dichotomy between "is" and "ought," or between "transcenden-
tal" and "natural" often employed by modern scholars in analyzing the
distinction between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan is actually drawn,
consciously or unconsciously, from Western post-Kantian philosophy.85
82. Ta-hsiieh, SSCC, p. 6. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Hong Kong, 1960, vol. 1, pp.
365-366.
83. CTWQ 14/11a. 84. CTYL, 11/365.
85. For example, Carsun Chang employs concepts such as "transcendental" and "natural"
to apprehend the difference between Chu and Lu. See Development of Neo-Confucian
Thought, pp. 270-275. Apart from that, I can only partially agree at his observation
that Lu Hsiang-shan was merely influenced by Zen Buddhism in methodological
respect. As he says: "In my opinion, Lu may be called a believer in Ch'an thought only
in the methodological sense. He lived at a time while the Ch'an school flourished, and
this school did regard book reading, intellectual pursuits and erudition, as being
unessential, concerning on inner realization and sudden awakening for the attain-
ment of truth. Lu could not help but be attracted and influenced by these ideas. He
forsook the negative attitude towards life of the Ch'an school but kept their method,
seeking the original mind. Methodologically he applied their technique by calling the
mind directly to attention in the interest of moral perfection, and also for the sake of
the cause of Confucianism. In this sense I am inclined to agree with Chu Hsi's verdict
that Lu Chiu-yuan was a Ch'an follower. But I must enter the proviso that the applica-
22
We should keep this in mind when we enthusiastically seek to apply

Western philosophical categories where they do not necessarily belong.
Mou Tsung-san, a self-proclaimed proponent of the Lu-Wang school in
contemporary China who is inspired by Kant's moral philosophy, applies
Kant's conceptual scheme in an idiosyncratic fashion in order to make
a distinction between Chu's and Lu's philosophy. The result is quite
disappointing. His appreciation of Kant's moral philosophy is not only
arbitrary, but also immature. It is arbitrary in the sense that he extracts
Kant's concepts out of context and imposes them inappropriately on
Chu's and Lu's concerns; it is immature in the sense that Mou does not
carry his analysis to a logically consistent point. Can we really say that
Chu Hsi's conception of morality is a posteriori, and Lu's a priori? Are
we really justified in concluding that for Chu Hsi the relation of prin-
ciple (li) to mind (hsiri) is horizontally oriented (heng-she) and static, but
that for Lu Hsiang-shan is vertically oriented (tsung-kuan) and dynamic?
Does Lu Hsiang-shan's moral philosophy have the character of moral
autonomy, whereas Chu's does not?86 In short, Mou neither apprehends
the Chu-versus-Lu problematic from an appropriate perspective nor
directs our attention to the proper place in which to seek the real basis
of their conflict.
tion of this method of mental hygiene has nothing to do with Buddhism in general,
nor with Ch'an thought as such" (p. 303).
But inasmuch as the mind constitutes the major discourse for both Chu Hsi and Lu
Hsiang-shan, it cannot be relegated to a technical status or minor point. Arguing with
Buddhists and Taoists on the nature of mind, they based their philosophical anthro-
pology on a redefined ground, mind. As in his reading of Yiieh-ai-lou k'e-hua, Shen
Tseng-chih (1851—1922) indicates, unlike Buddhists and Taoists, who employ more
than one conceptual unit in analyzing mind, Confucianists cover the same subject with
a single concept, mind. See Shen Tseng-chih, Hai-jih-Um cha-ts'ung, Shanghai, 1962,
p. 151.
86. Mou Tsung-san, Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i (Mind and human nature), Taipei, 1968, vol. 1,
introduction, and idem, Ts'ungLu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan (From Lu Hsiang-shan
to Liu Chi-shan), Taipei, 1979, chs. 1 and 2. A passage of Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason suffices to show how misleading Mou's understanding of Kant is: ".. . the
reasons which occasion all the confusion of philosophers concerning the supreme
principle of morals. For they sought an object of the will in order to make it into
material and the foundation of a law;... instead, they should have looked for a law
which directly determined the will a priori and only then sought the object suitable to
it. Whether they placed this object of pleasure, which was to deliver the supreme
concept of the good, in happiness, or in perfection, in moral feeling, or in the will of
God . . . their fundamental principle was always heteronomy, and they came inevitably
to empirical conditions for a moral law." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason,
trans, by Lewis White Beck, New York, 1956, pp. 66-67. For a general critique of the
use of the concept of moral autonomy in the interpretation of Chinese thought see my
article, "Rethinking the Concept of Moral Autonomy in the Study of Chinese
Thought" (So-wei tao-te tzu-chu-hsing), Shih-huo, 14, nos. 7-8 (November 1984), 77-
88. Also see my "Mencius' Theory of Four Germs and Theory of Moral Sense,"
Continent (Ta-lu tsa-chih), 88, no. 5 (May 1994), 1—3.
23
T'ang Chun-i, a well-known Neo-Confucianist in modern times, ap-

proaches the Chu-versus-Lu problematic {Chu-Lu i-t'ung) from another
perspective and tends to minimize the differences between the two men.
In his understanding, Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan share the same ideas
on fundamental questions such as moral concerns, but diverge on the
method of moral cultivation {te-hsing kung-fu).87
But the distinction between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan has been
commonly perceived as real and sharp by many Confucian scholars.
Chang Hsueh-ch'eng's statement bears witness to this:
[In terms of intellectual style and temperament] Sung Confucians such as Chu
Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan were in opposition to each other. Over the ages the
difference between them could never be reconciled, nor could their differences
be eradicated [because they are two fundamental, but distinct, doctrines about
the Way].88
In this, I am totally in agreement with Chang.
87. T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yiian-lun (A fundamental exposition of Chinese

philosophy), Hong Kong, 1968, p. 531.
88. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Wenshih t'ung-i, Taipei, 1980, p. 54.
2
The original argument (2):
Wang Yang-ming and the
problematic of "Chu Hsi
versus Lu Hsiang-shan"
Despite their real intellectual differences, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and

their followers shared something in common. Their uncompromising
attitude toward each other's philosophical views reflected their lack of a
pluralistic conception of truth. Lu Hsiang-shan was typical of this atti-
tude, as he proclaimed that "there can exist only one most adequate
truth; never can two profound meanings hold at the same time" (chih-
tangkuei-i ching-i wu-erh).1 Chu Hsi welcomed various intellectual discus-
sions (chiang-lun) as methods to achieve final truth.2 Nevertheless, Chu's
pluralistic view is confined to a technical sense and does not extend to
the nature of truth. For Chu believed that if Lu went through a process
of fruitful discussions, Lu would eventually recognize his mistaken
ideas.3 Hence, there is no significant difference between Chu and Lu in
their comprehension of the nature of truth. After Chu Hsi and Lu
Hsiang-shan passed away, the difference between their views was re-
inforced because their disciples formed cliques in support of their own
master's doctrines. These groups not only continued to develop the
criticisms inherited from their masters, but they also intensified the
debate in a factious and divisive spirit.
Huang Kan (1152-1221), the major disciple of Chu Hsi, succeeded in
restraining Chu's students from conflict with Lu's students. But, after his
death, conflict seemed inevitable. The label "Zen" was typically applied
1. LHCC, 35/16b. 2. C7WC, 34/343-34^ 3. Ibid., 34/17a-17b.
25
by Chu's students to attack Lu's teaching; in turn, the term chih-li (frag-
mented), was adopted by Lu's students to criticize Chu's scholarship.
After Huang's death, and partly because of his absence, various versions
of Chu's recorded conversations surfaced, all of which reinforced the
discrepancies between Chu and Lu.4 On the other hand, Lu's students
also established their clique seeking a distinct and outstanding reputa-
tion. Even when they read the classics, they intentionally avoided read-
ing Chu Hsi's later annotations, thereby focusing on the earlier works
and selecting among them for their own purposes. Out of partisan
interest, they concentrated on the complete works of the Ch'eng
brothers, and on Chou Tuni's Penetrating the Book of Changes {T'ung-shu),
but avoided Reflections on Things at Hand (Ching-ssu-lu) and Chou's
An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate {T'ai-chi-t'u shuo).5
Although all of these works had been edited primarily by Chu Hsi,6 the
latter two were the sources with which Chu Hsi's philosophy was closely
related.
After the controversy had continued for some time, the Chu Hsi
school became the dominant one. One of the major intellectual reasons
for its ascendancy over the Lu school was that Lu Hsiang-shan himself
was averse to putting his ideas into print. Moreover, because his thought
was oriented toward moral teaching through personal demonstration,
his school declined rapidly after the first generation of his disciples
passed away. For this reason, Chu's school could take advantage of Chu
Hsi's great achievement of commenting on and editing the classics in
order to gain the attention of the literati and political leaders. In 1212,
the Directorate of Education adopted Chu Hsi's commentaries on both
the Analects and Mencius as the official doctrine.
Court politics and the international crises of the day also played a role
in the rise of the Chu school. In his lifetime, Chu Hsi enjoyed a reputa-
tion as a great scholar and political critic. He and his followers under-
went several political purges on account of their political and intellectual
stance. The term "false learning" {wei-hsueh) was intentionally employed
to designate Chu's scholarship. Despite that, the Sung councillor Shih
Mi-yuan (1164-1233), in order to clear his own sullied image (acquired
through his struggle in court politics), turned to the school of Chu Hsi
for intellectual justification of his position. He thereby confirmed the
4. Huang Tsung-hsi and Ch'uan Tsu-wang, Sung Yuan hsueh-an (Philosophical records of
the Sung and Yuan Confucians), hereafter abbreviated as SYHA, Taipei, 1975, 63/21.
5. SYHA, 74/68-69. The Lu scholars read the original text of T'ung-shu, but not the
version annotated by Chu Hsi.
6. Ching-ssu-lu is coedited by Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien.
The original argument (2)
school's leading intellectual position and restored political and social

prestige to both the school and himself.7
At that time, the Mongols sought to compete with the Sung regime
militarily and culturally as the Confucian empire. Because it needed an
ideology for national consolidation in the face of the Mongolian inva-
sion into Inner Mongolia, the Sung regime adopted Chu Hsi's commen-
taries on The Four Books in their entirety in 1227 as the official version.
Before that, in 1223, the Mongols had taken the advice of Yeh-lu Ch'u-
ts'ai (1190-1244) to honor Confucius and erect a temple for this pur-
pose. Having conquered the Jurchen empire in 1234, the Mongols
directly threatened the Southern Sung regime, which tried desperately
to boost its political prestige through cultural propaganda. Chu Hsi,
together with thefivemasters of the Northern Sung, was to be worshiped
in the Confucian temple in 1241.8 This meant that the Southern Sung
could meet the Mongol challenge on an ideological level only through
their claim to represent the sole legitimate line of transmission of the
true Way of Confucianism. The Sung's attempt to survive proved futile,
as the regime was destroyed in 1297.9
It is worth noting that it was not the Sung emperor, but the Mongol
emperor Jen-tsung of the new Yuan dynasty, who, in an edict issued in
1313, formally decreed that Chu Hsi's commentaries on The Four Books
and other classics be incorporated into the syllabus of the civil service
examination. The content of this syllabus was largely followed by the two
successive dynasties, the Ming and Ch'ing, until 1904.10
As the "officially" approved doctrine, the Chu Hsi school enjoyed an
unprecedented prestige compared with any previous school, both intel-
lectually and politically. In some sense, this may have been a Pyrrhic
victory for Chu Hsi. Most students or examination candidates read Chu's
commentaries, yet this was done usually out of practical interest rather
than with an aim to moral cultivation. For them, the classics and their
commentaries served merely as a stepping-stone to fame and a career,
which were expected from success in the examinations. Wu Yuan-ying
7. Concerning the rise of Chu Hsi's school and the political purges connected with it see
James T. C. Liu, "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?"
Philosophy East and West, 23, no. 4 (October 1973), 485-505; Conrad Schirokauer,
"Neo-Confucians under Attack: The Condemnation of Wei-hsiieh," in John Winthrop
Haeger, ed., Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China, Tucson, 1975, pp. 163—198; and Hoyt
Tillman, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy, Honolulu, 1992, ch. 10.
8. T'uo T'uo, Sung-shih, Peking, 1977, 105/2554.
9. J. Liu, "Neo-Confucian School," 501—503.
10. Teng Ssu-yu, Chung-kuo k'ao-shih chih-tu shih (History of the Chinese examination
system), Taipei, 1967, pp. 214-215, 245.
(1297—1340), a Chu scholar of the Yuan period who had criticized Lu,
criticized this trend as follows:
In recent years, the civil service examinations have been carried out. It causes the
flourishing of Chu's learning and the decay of Lu's learning. Scholars today tend
to routinize their study without aspiring to moral benefit, and to analyze the texts
without grasping the essential point for reflection. This further exposes the flaws
in their study. I hope that they may rediscover the forgotten books of Chin-
hsi [Lu Hsiang-shan], thereby cleansing their spirit of the process of study to
prepare for the process of moral learning.11
As a matter of fact, no matter how sharply the schools of Chu and Lu
differed, during this period they still shared one thing; namely, their
advocates were so disposed to abstract discourse that they neglected the
practice of their learning. As expected, early Ming Neo-Confucianism,
which was represented by the Chu school, reacted against this spirit by
reemphasizing the critical need for the integration of practice and study.
This is also the background of the emergence of Wang Yang-ming's
theory of knowledge and action later in the Ming.
The political climate from the end of the Sung period generally
favored the development of the Chu Hsi school. This was particularly
true in the Ming period. The founder of the Ming empire, T'ai-tsu,
promoted the Chu Hsi school both because of his admiration for Chu's
teaching (probably through the influence of one of his subjects, Sung
Lien [1310—81]) and because the royal house shared the same family
name with Chu Hsi. He decreed Chu Hsi's commentaries to be the
criterion for the official tests. His son, the emperor Ch'eng-tsu, further
ordered Hu Kuang (1370—1418) to compile A General Collection of
Commentaries of the Five Classics (Wu-ching-ta-ch yuan), A General Collection
of Commentaries of the Four Books (Ssu-shu-ta-ch'uari), and A General Collec-
tion of Hsing-li Learning (Hsing-li-ta-ch'uari) based on the works of the
Sung and Yuan Neo-Confucians.12 Wang Wei (1322-73), a follower of
the Chu school in the very beginning of the Ming period, expressed the
current attitude very well: "On the whole, the achievement of Confu-
cians is no more than the study of classics that embody the Way. To
contribute to the study of classics is equal to the performance of the
Way."13
11. SYHA, 65/87.

12. Chang Ting-yu, Ming Shih, 70/725. The former two collections were for the purpose
of the civil office examination. Hsieh Chih-shih points out that Ming T'ai-tsu's enthu-
siasm to promote Chu Hsi's learning is due to their sharing the same family name. See
Ch'en Teng-yuan, Kuo-shih chiu-wen, Peking, 1980, vol. 3, pp. 174—175.
13. Quoted from Jung Chao-tsu's Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih (The history of Ming thought),
Taipei, 1962, p. 9.
28
The great historical thinker Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738-1801) wrote

these astute observations on the intellectual climate of this day:
The doctrine of nature and fate [hsing-ming chih shuo] easily passes over to the
idea of emptiness. Chu-tzu [Chu Hsi] seeks "one thread" [i-kuan] in erudition,
and draws the essential rites from the variety of cultural expressions. The task is
complex but sophisticated; its achievement is solid but difficult. It is hard even
for Chu-tzu to accomplish this, not to mention others - through the fourth
intellectual generation to Ch'ien-hsi [Sung Lien] and I-wu [Wang Wei], the fifth
generation to Ning-jen [Ku Yen-wu] and Pai-ssu [Yen Jo-ch'u], all revere the
ancients and are good at studying the classics. Their learning aims at substantial
scholarship. They are definitely distinguished from those who engage in empty
talk about nature and fate and behave in a dogmatic and obstinate manner.14
Ironically, regardless of the fact that the rulers enthusiastically advo-
cated the Chu school, there was no great and intellectually innovative
Chu scholar in the Ming period. We can find only certain Chu scholars
known for their practice of Chu's learning. Among them, Hsiieh Hsiian
(1389—1464) was probably most noted for living in accordance with
Master Chu's teaching. He confidently proclaimed that "since Master
Chu the Way has been manifested in brightness and there is no need for
further writing. What one ought to do is simply to act on it, that is all." 15
Another Chu scholar, Wu Yii-pi (1392—1469), who committed himself
to sacred learning so earnestly that he constantly dreamed of Confucius,
King Wen, and Chu Hsi, paid most of his attention to the concrete
details of daily activities, such as dressing, behaving, learning, and so on,
with little interest in exploring their theoretical implication. 16
Professor Wing-Tsit Chan notes that the Ch'eng-Chu school in the
early Ming period had already anticipated the general tendency toward
the cultivation of the mind through its sole emphasis on the preservation
of "seriousness" (ching), which refers to a state of mind guided by moral
effort. This emphasis resulted from the inner logic of the Ch'eng-Chu
school as well as other historical factors and was not influenced by the Lu
Hsiang-shan school. Furthermore, there was no necessary connection
between this first stage of the Ch'eng-Chu school and the later moral
philosophy of Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500) and Wang Yang-ming
(1472—1529). 17 However, it was not the Ch'eng-Chu but rather the Lu-
Wang strain that redirected the development of Neo-Confucianism at
this time. Ch'en Hsien-chang in his youth studied with the Ch'eng-Chu
14. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Wen-shih-t'ung-i (General meaning of historiography), Taipei,

1980, p. 56.
15. Chang Ting-yii, Ming Shih, 282/3100. 16. Jung Chao-tsu, pp. 18—23.
17. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Ch'eng-Chu School of Early Ming," in William Theodore de
Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought, New York, 1970, p. 46.
29
scholar Wu Yii-pi. Ch'en was unsympathetic since Wu's teaching did not
appear to show Ch'en the path to the true Way. Through a long-term
spiritual struggle and solitary study, Ch'en came to realize that one's own
inner resource, the mind, is rich enough to experience heaven's princi-
ple (t'ien-li) and that spontaneousness is characteristic of the dynamic
transformation of the universe of which human activities constitute
one part.18 Ch'en's thought reveals a need for the reorientation of
Neo-Confucianism. In him, we see the fundamental position of mind
as the ground of being once again confirmed as the source of moral
enlightenment.
Later on, his favorite disciple, Chan Jo-shui (1466—1560), adopted
this view to advocate "experiencing heaven's principle everywhere" (sui-
cWu t'i-jen t'ien-li). Although Ch'en Hsien-chang himself had no immedi-
ate influence on Wang Yang-ming, his student, Chan Jo-shui, had a great
deal of intellectual exchange with Wang. Wang, of course, represented
the turning point of the development of Neo-Confucianism in general
and the great achievement of the Neo-Confucianism of the Ming period
in particular. As Huang Tsung-hsi put it:
The learning of the Ming dynasty started with Ch'en Hsien-chang but did not
achieve great glory until Wang Yang-ming. The reason was that scholars before
them learned well the established doctrines of earlier Neo-Confucians but never
returned to themselves to realize their meaning or extend them to discover their
profound subtlety. As we say, this scholar merely transmitted Chu Hsi's ideas,
and that scholar also merely transmitted Chu Hsi's ideas.19
In short, since the end of the Sung dynasty, the "problematic of Chu
Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" gradually developed from being purely intel-
lectual to being complexly intertwined with social and political factors.
This was the problematic that Wang Yang-ming faced. Therefore, if we
set aside for the moment the existential meaning of his deeply felt quest
for the true Way, Wang Yang-ming's philosophical activities might be
looked upon as a response to the various aspects of the Chu Hsi school
as it had developed until then. Yet in saying this we do not reduce the
creativity of Wang Yang-ming's philosophical endeavor. His lifelong
struggle with Chu Hsi's learning and its consequences vividly prove this
point.
18. To my knowledge, the best English writing on Ch'en Hsien-chang is Jen Yu-wen's
"Ch'en Hsien-chang's Philosophy of Mind," in de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming
Thought, pp. 53-92.
19. Huang Tsung-hsi, ed., Ming-ju hsueh-an (Critical anthology of Ming Confucians), 10/
53. The English translation is taken from Wing-tsit Chan's article in de Bary: Self and
Society in Ming Thought, p. 30.
Wang Yang-ming's experience with Chu Hsi's learning is supposed to

have started in his childhood, as part of his elementary education.
According to his chronology (nien-p'u), it was only at the age of eighteen
that Chu Hsi's teaching became a significant question for Wang. It tells
us that one day on his way home, Wang Yang-ming met Lou Liang, a
disciple of Wu Yii-pi, in Kuang-hsin. Lou discussed the Sung Confucians'
theory of investigation of things with Wang and assured the latter that
sagehood could be achieved by study.20 Although Wang's chronology
does not specify whose theory of investigation of things was discussed by
the two, in view of subsequent events we can be almost sure that this
theory was directly related to Chu Hsi's doctrine, or that Chu's theory
was one among many being posed in Lou's discussion. Three years later,
Wang Yang-ming accompanied his father to the capital. While he was
there he sought to read all of Chu Hsi's writings. He was impressed and
inspired by Chu Hsi's idea that everything, even a blade of grass or piece
of wood, contains principle. It so happened that his home was sur-
rounded by bamboo groves, and he made up his mind to engage himself
in an investigation of principle within the bamboo. After seven days, all
principle seemed to evade him and he fell ill.21 His frustration led him to
believe that sagehood could not be realized by cultivating merely human
qualities, but was predetermined by heaven.22
Two years after that, he recognized his mistake, through his reading of
Chu Hsi's memorial to the Sung emperor, Kuang-tsung. In it a statement
read, "The basis of study consists in keeping a serious state of mind and
in firmly persisting in the determination of the will; the method of study
lies in successive steps to achieve refinement." This pointed him to the
defect in his former study. Nevertheless, he could not feel that his mind
and principle converged anywhere, and he once again fell ill.23
Wang Yang-ming led an eventful life in his quest for the true Way. A
great misfortune befell him at the age of thirty-five. A censor, Tai Hsien,
was imprisoned after leading a group in a joint memorial to the young
emperor, Wu-tsung, attacking the corruption of the powerful eunuch,
Liu Chin. Wang Yang-ming at once submitted a memorial attempting to
defend and rescue Tai. As a result, he was sent to prison as well. Having
stayed in prison for two months and suffered forty strokes of the cane in
the palace, he was banished to the border area, Lung-ch'ang, in
20. Nien-p'u, in Wang Yang-ming cWuan-chi (The Complete works of Wang Yang-ming,
hereafter abbreviated as WYCC), Taipei, 1978, 32/610.
21. Wang Yang-ming, Ch'uan-hsi lu (Instructions for practical living, hereafter abbreviated
as CHL), annotated by Yeh Shao-chun, Taipei, 1967, p. 263.
22. Nien-p'uin WYCC, 32/611. 23. Ibid., 32/612.
Kweichow, to become the head of a postal station. This misfortune in

the end turned out to provide a spark for a series of intellectual trans-
formations Wang underwent throughout the rest of his life.
Lung-ch'ang was full of all kinds of hardship. The natives of Kweichow
were hostile to outsiders and spoke a language incomprehensible to the
Han people. The living conditions were felt to be very harsh by outsiders.
The jungle, disease, and wild animals all presented formidable obstacles
to living in comfort. Wang's servants were sick and he had to serve them
and cheer them up by singing and joking. Moreover, Wang Yang-ming's
personal obsession with his own long-term failure in finding access to the
true Way inevitably exacerbated his anxieties. He made a stone coffin in
which he slept at night, awaiting his fate and thereby transcending
worries about life and death. He constantly imagined what a sage would
do in his situation.
One night he was struck by a mystical experience that can be de-
scribed as an enlightenment because it transformed him entirely. He
suddenly realized that the Way of the sage lay in one's mind, and that it
was emphatically wrong to search for principle in things external to
one's mind, as Chu Hsi recommended. He confirmed his recent enlight-
enment by his memorization of the words in The Five Classics and wrote
Speculation on "The Five Classics" (Wu-ching i-shuo). The next year, he
began his examination of the unity of knowledge and action (chih-hsing
ho-i).24
In his later conversation with his disciple, Hsu Ai, we can see the
impact of this enlightenment. In their conversations, Wang Yang-ming
called into question The Great Learning, edited by Chu Hsi. Wang thought
that Chu Hsi was wrong in changing the term ch'in-min (loving the
people) of the old text into hsin-min (renovating the people) in the new
text.25 More important, he offered a new interpretation of the term ko-
wu, which, as we shall see, marked the turning point in Wang Yang-
ming's intellectual development; indeed, the interpretation itself
becomes an alternative to Chu Hsi's view of the phrase.
For Chu Hsi, komeant "to reach" (chihb); wumeant "everything" (shih
b). Combined, ko-wu meant to reach things to obtain principle (s) from
them.26 The concept of ko-wu holds a crucial position in the architecture
of Chu Hsi's thought. This can be seen in his commentary on the
relationship of the extension of knowledge (chih-chih) to the investiga-
24. Nieni>'uin WYCC, 32/614-615.

25. CHL, pp. 3-4. Following Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi changed ch 'ing-ming into hsin-ming, SSCC,
Ta-hsiieh, p. 1, annotation of Chu Hsi.
26. Ssu-shu-chi-chu (hereafter, SSCC), annotated by Chu Hsi, Shanghai, 1947, Ta-hsiieh,
p. 2.
32
tion of things (ko-wu) in The Great Learning. T h e extension of knowledge

d e p e n d s o n the investigation of things. C h u Hsi said:
If we wish to carry out knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the princi-
ples of all things we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is
certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which its principles
do not inhere. But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's knowledge
is incomplete. On this account, The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons,
instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what
knowledge he has of their principles, and pursue his investigation of them, till he
reaches the extreme point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he
will suddenly find himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration.
Then, the qualities of all things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the
coarse, will all be apprehended, and the mind, in its entire substance and its
relations to things, will be perfectly intelligent. 27
T o b e sure, in C h u Hsi's view, principle is i m m a n e n t in m i n d , b u t it

requires intellectual effort for its manifestation. Before that, m i n d a n d
principle are separate "in o u r feeling"; after that m i n d a n d principle are
u n i t e d into one. 2 8 T h e ontological status of external things is recognized
in C h u Hsi's t h o u g h t because of his c o m m i t m e n t to the c o n c e p t of ch'i.
T o achieve the unity of m i n d a n d principle is a long a n d precarious
process that c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e d all at o n c e , in a flash of moral enlight-
e n m e n t , as W a n g Yang-ming asserted. In fact, the a b r u p t transformation
of o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of principle in its entirety is also anticipated by
C h u Hsi. This qualitative c h a n g e is b r o u g h t only by m e a n s of, a n d
subsequent to, the quantitative accumulation of knowledge. But C h u Hsi
does n o t clearly specify how or w h e n this stage can b e attained.
In response to these questions W a n g Yang-ming p r o p o s e d a new
a p p r o a c h , having b e e n disappointed with C h u Hsi's project. For W a n g
Yang-ming after his e n l i g h t e n m e n t , ko m e a n t to "rectify" in accordance
with Mencius's use of ko, w h e r e the great m a n rectified (ko) the ruler's
mind; 2 9 wu m e a n t "affairs in o n e ' s mind"; ko-wu m e a n t "to rectify affairs
in o n e ' s own m i n d " accordingly. T h e p r o c e d u r e of ko-wu, in Wang's
a p p r o a c h , is to eliminate what is incorrect in the m i n d so as to preserve
the correctness of its original substance. 3 0
T h e investigation of things of this kind, according to Wang, b e c o m e s
inner-directed a n d appears to b e m o r e explicitly moralistic in n a t u r e . In
this, h e is in a g r e e m e n t with Lu Hsiang-shan in thinking that "mind is
principle." 3 1 In addition, h e h e l d that n e i t h e r principle n o r affairs are
outside o n e ' s m i n d . As h e described it, "The master of the body is the
27. Ibid., p. 6. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Hong Kong, i960, vol. 1, pp. 365-366.
28. CTWQ 10/12a-b. 29. CHL, p. 15; SSCC, Mentius, p. 107. 30. CHL, p. 15.
31. Ibid., p. 6.
33
mind. What emanates from the mind is the will [i]. The original sub-
stance of the will is knowledge [chih], and wherever the will is directed is
a thing."32 Through such a redefinition of what counts as a "thing,"
the intentionality of the human mind becomes the leading factor in
deciding the meaningfulness of a thing for human practice. For in-
stance, when the will is directed toward serving one's parents, then
serving one's parents constitutes a thing, and when the will is directed
toward seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then each of these
constitutes a thing.
Fundamentally, Wang Yang-ming relates this conception of a thing to
his program of moral cultivation, not intending to negate the existence
of external things. The following saying of his confirms this:
The eye has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the colors of all
things. The ear has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the sounds
of all things. The nose has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the
smell of all things. The mouth has no substance of its own. Its substance consists
of the tastes of all things. The mind has no substance of its own. Its substance
consists of the right or wrong of the influence and responses of Heaven, Earth,
and all things.33
Wang is least concerned with whether we can know the existence of
things objectively; rather, he is interested in locating the relatedness
of the mind to things in a philosophy of value, and thereby, in the
possibility of enhancing moral action.
Wang Yang-ming no doubt shares the common consciousness of Neo-
Confucians in accepting the idea of "forming one body with all things."34
Men are supposed to recognize this given "fact" through the function of
the mind as pure intelligence. For Wang Yang-ming, the epistemological
possibility of knowing "the unity of all things" is warranted by their
ontological homogeneity - all things come from the same source, ch'L55
But the concrete and distinct shape of each thing forms an "epistemo-
logical break" among things. Therefore, it needs the clear intelligence of
the human mind to recover the union of all things in their original
participation of the same ch 'i. The following statement firmly supports
this analysis:
32. CHL, p. 15. English translation is taken from Wing-tsit Chan's Instructions for Practical
Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming (New York, 1964), p. 14.
33. CHL, pp. 235—236; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 223.
34. The common theme in Neo-Confucianism is to "form one body with all things." See
Ch'ein Mu, Yang-ming-hsueh shu-yao (The essential analysis of Yang-ming learning),
Taipei, 1955. As for Wang Yang-ming himself, see CHL, pp. 272—273, and WYCC, 2 6 /
469-474.
35. CHL, p. 273.
34
All that fills Heaven and Earth is but this clear intelligence (ling-ming). It is only
because of their physical forms and bodies that men are separated. My clear
intelligence is the master of Heaven and Earth and spiritual things. - Separated
from my clear intelligence, there will be no Heaven, Earth, spiritual beings
or myriad things, and separated from these, there will not be my clear
intelligence.36
The major point Wang wants to make here is that the "unity of all things"
is manifested in its most refined and excellent form in the clear intelli-
gence of the human mind, though the human mind and the external
world are meaningless in themselves.
In other words, only in relation to the mind do things obtain their
meaning in the network of human practice. Wang Yang-ming extends
this doctrine into a more explicit moral zone. He claims that the innate
knowledge of the good (liang-chih) is the same as that of plants, trees,
stones, Heaven, and Earth. Without this innate knowledge inherent in
man, nothing can exist.37 This reveals that Wang's epistemology is inti-
mately related to moral concerns. Or more abstractly speaking, Wang's
espitemological approach is morally relevant to an ontology that is also
moral in character.
The next step in his response to Chu Hsi is the doctrine of the unity
of knowledge and action. The relationship between knowledge (chih)
and action (hsing) had been a perennial subject of inquiry since the time
of Confucius. In support of this, a couple of examples may suffice. A
gentleman, Confucius said, is ashamed that his words exceed his deeds;38
in another place he said that the man of perfect virtue is cautious and
slow in his words lest he should be unable to keep them.39 Both utter-
ances reveal the Master's deep concern with the correspondence of
words and action as a norm for a gentleman. If we take "words" (yen)
here as meaning a kind of moral knowledge in an explicit oral expres-
sion, then the relation of knowledge to action is pressing in Confucius's
moral project. Moreover, as shown in his discussion of "six words and six
becloudings,"40 Confucius also discerned that learning (hsiieh) as a form
of acquiring knowledge is an indispensable element for adequate moral
36. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 257. 37. CHL, p. 234.
38. SSCC, Lun-yii, p. 101. 39. Ibid., p. 24.
40. Ibid., p. 121. Confucius said, "There is the love of being benevolent without the love
of learning; the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of
knowing without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to dissipation of
mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning; the beclouding
here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightfor-
wardness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is
the love of boldness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to
insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning; the
beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct." Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 322.
35
action in a concrete situation. In such a way, the importance of learning

or knowledge is well recognized in the process of moral action. Chu Hsi
further put knowledge prior to action. He believed that knowledge
and action are complementary. In terms of chronological priority,
knowledge comes first; but action is more important.41 Even his intellec-
tual adversary, Lu Hsiang-shan, shared this point with Chu Hsi, admit-
ting that knowledge serves as an intellectual guide for and is prior to
action; otherwise, action will become blind action that goes nowhere.42
Both Chu and Lu placed a heavy emphasis on the necessity of acting
following knowing. They deeply believed that the true knowledge should
be a kind of knowledge rilled with personal practice in one's lived
experience.
Wang Yang-ming, through his new conceptualization of knowledge
and action, caused a revolutionary change in perception of their inter-
relationship. Wang held that "knowledge is the direction for action and
action the effort of knowledge," and that "knowledge is the beginning
of action and action the completion of knowledge."43 Knowledge and
action so conceived form an inseparable continuum and are identical to
each other. Although he made such a strong assertion about the unity of
knowledge and action, Wang left room for the legitimacy of theoretical
practice. Wang Yang-ming was dissatisfied with earlier scholars who re-
garded study and reflection as merely belonging to the realm of knowl-
edge, while earnest action was assigned to the realm of action. Contrary
to this view, Wang held that if one devotes oneself to substantial study
and speculation, these sorts of activities count as action as well. "In its
intelligent, conscious, and discerning aspects, action is knowledge. In its
genuine, concrete, and practical aspect, knowledge is action," Wang
said.44 To be clearly aware of what is, and to do concretely what is, share
equal weight in his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. These
two items are not two sequential steps, but take place simultaneously in
the practice of moral cultivation.
Wang's conception of the unity of knowledge and action was by no
means self-evident to his disciples. To take one example: having heard
Wang's theory, Hsu Ai was puzzled that someone could indeed under-
stand the concept of filial piety but not observe it. Wang Yang-ming
responded by pointing out that the discrepancy of knowledge and action
41. CTYL, 9/1 a.

42. Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi (Complete works of Lu Hsiang-shan), 1823,
punctuated by Li Fu. i2/6a-6b, 34/1 ob, 39b.
43. CHL, p. 11. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 11.
44. WYCC, 6/38. Julia Ching, trans., The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming Columbia,
1973, p. 106.
36
in such a case was mediated by selfish desires; they were no longer

knowledge and action in their original sense. In order to show the true
nature of his conception of knowledge and action, Wang Yang-ming
gave the example of sensory behavior, such as loving beautiful colors and
hating bad odors, in which knowledge and action are performed simul-
taneously.45 But the distinction between sensory and moral knowledge
was well perceived long ago even by Confucius, who once sighed that he
had not seen one who loved virtue as much as he loved beauty.46 Still, the
Master urged that a gentleman ought to bring (moral) knowledge and
action into strict correspondence. "Ought," however, is not equal to a
fact. Some element has to be introduced between them to bridge the
gap. To put in another way, if Wang Yang-ming's unity of knowledge and
action can hold, there must exist some interlocking chain to connect
them tightly. Wang's solution to this is the introduction of the concept
i, which if read in a motivational sense meant the will or intention, and
if read in reference to an individual act meant simply an intent toward an
event or an object. This missing link was generally overlooked by Wang's
later disciples, especially the left-wing Wang school, in comprehending
the unity of knowledge and action, but was taken up and emphasized by
Liu Tsung-chou in his own philosophy of action.47
It is no accident that Wang Yang-ming insisted that the procedure of
the Great Learning begins with "making the will sincere" (ch'eng-i)
rather than with "investigating things" {ko-wu)y as Chu Hsi had done. For
Wang, the essence of the Great Learning consists in the sincerity of the
will alone (chih-shih-ch'eng-i).48 Even political and social matters funda-
mentally rely upon personal cultivation (hsiu-sheri), whose realization in
turn depends on the sincerity of the will.49 The distinction between a real
gentleman and a mean person is that the former can make his will
sincere, whereas the latter cannot.50
The parallel between "the will" and "knowledge" and "sincerity of the
will" and "action" can be seen in Wang Yang-ming's observation,
When the will desires to care for the comfort of parents in both winter and
summer, and to serve and support them, the will exists but not yet the sincerity
of the will. Before the will can be said to be sincere, there must be the actual
45. CHL, pp. 9-10. 46. SSCC, Lun-Yii, p. 59.
47. As for Liu Tsung-chou, see Tang Chiin-i's "Liu Tsung-chou's Doctrine of Moral Mind
and Practice and His Critique of Wang Yang-ming," in William Theodore de Bary, ed.,
The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, New York, 1975, pp. 305—332.
48. WYCC, 7/58.
49. Wang Yang-ming, Ta-hsiieh ku-pen p'ang-shih (The annotations of the Old Text of The
Great Learning), in Pai-ling-hsueh-shan anthology, Shanghai, n.d., pp. lb, 2b. See Wang's
annotations.
50. Ibid., p. 2. See Wang's annotation.
37
practice of caring for their comfort and of serving and supporting them until
one is satisfied and has not self-deception.51
It is reasonable to argue that only with such an emphasis on the sincerity
of the will can Wang Yang-ming legitimately claim that "knowledge in its
genuine and earnest aspect is action, and action in its intelligent and
discriminating aspect is knowledge."52 In a letter written in his later days
(1525?) in reply to Ku Tung-ch'iao (1476-1545), Wang Yang-ming
confirmed his belief in the doctrine of the sincerity of the will as the first
principle of Confucianism in teaching people to exert moral effort,
which was inadequately understood and relegated to secondary impor-
tance by later scholars. His goal of advocating the importance of the
sincerity of the will was to cure the defects of his time, in which scholars
searched for the external and neglected the internal, thus emphasizing
breadth over essentials.53
But Wang Yang-ming was well aware that the will or an intent is not
necessarily good. He said, "What arises from the will may be good or evil,
and unless there is a way to make clear the distinction between good and
evil, there will be a confusion of truth and untruth. In that case, even if
one clearly wants to make his will sincere he cannot do so."54 Therefore,
the way of making the will sincere consists in extending knowledge. But
knowledge is not necessarily good, either. As Wang noted:
The original substance of the mind is correct. How is it that any effort is required
to rectify the mind? The reason is that, while the original substance is originally
correct, incorrectness enters when one's thoughts and will are in operation.
Therefore he who wishes to rectify his mind must rectify it in connection with the
operation of his thoughts and will.55
For example, whenever one has a good idea, one really loves it as he
loves beautiful colors, and whenever one has an evil idea, one hates it as
he hates bad odors. But what causes one to love the good and hate the
evil? Is it not the differentiating feeling of the mind to tell the correct
from the incorrect? This brings to light why Wang Yang-ming was par-
ticularly drawn to the differentiating function of the mind, and put an
unusual emphasis on it. His final doctrine couched in the famous Four
Statements confirms this very well. It reads:
In the substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and evil. When the
will becomes active, however, such distinction exists. The faculty of innate knowl-
51. CHL, pp. 118—119; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 106.
52. CHL, p. 108; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 93. 53. CHL, p. 105.
54. WYCC, 26/472; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 278.
55. WYCC, 26/472; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 277.
edge is to know good and evil. The investigation of things is to do good and
remove evil.56
The differentiating feeling, together with the other three feelings,
constitutes the four moral germs inherent in the mind. This doctrine was
initially elaborated by Mencius.57 But in Wang Yang-ming's moral phi-
losophy, this feeling stands out as a unique intellectual and moral power
to begin moral cultivation so as to meet the need that derives from his
whole moral program as already discussed. Hence, we can understand
why he said that innate knowledge of the good is the feeling of differen-
tiating the correct from the incorrect (shih-fei chih-hsin) .58 This, in a
sense, provides an ontological basis for his former theory of ko-wu, which
means "to rectify the affairs in the mind."
This knowledge is given to man by Heaven. Man knows it without
thinking and without learning. Although the innate knowledge does not
come from hearing and seeing, it constitutes the substance of the mind
in a state of sensitivity and perceptiveness. To extend knowledge, accord-
ing to Wang Yang-ming, does not mean to enrich knowledge of the
principle of individual things, as Chu Hsi held, but to extend the innate
knowledge of the good.59 By this approach alone, the innate knowledge
can be extended to reach and endow everything with principle. The
mind and principle so conceived are from their very beginning identical.
This can cancel Chu Hsi's approach of investigating things, an approach
that divides mind and principle.
Wang Yang-ming's belief that "innate knowledge does not come from
hearing and seeing"60 is in the same vein as Ch'eng I's comprehension of
moral knowledge. Cheng I also held that the knowledge obtained from
moral nature does not depend on seeing and hearing.61 This idea can be
traced back to Mencius.62 The priority of moral knowledge is recognized
by all of them, but Wang Yang-ming has a clear conception of the
relationship between innate knowledge and perceptive knowledge.
In his view, perceptive knowledge is a function of innate knowledge
and is subsumed by innate knowledge when in operation. The extension
of innate knowledge must be seen in one's interactions with other
things and people. Innate knowledge is neither impeded by perceptive
56. CHL, p. 243; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 258.

57. SSCC, Mencius, pp. 46-47, 161. 58. CHL, pp. 124, 241-242.
59. WYCC, 226/472. 60. CHL, p. 158.
61. Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu (Complete works of the two Ch'engs), hereafter abbreviated as
ECCS), 1908. 25/26; translation from Wing-tsit Chan's Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
Princeton, NJ., 1973, p. 570; and CTWC, 64/29a.
62. SSCC, Mencius, p. 192.
39
knowledge nor separated from it. The key point is whether one's basic
idea is to engage in the extension of innate knowledge. If so, then
however much one may hear or see, it all belongs to the task of the
extension of innate knowledge.63 Even participation in the civil service
examination is included if one really feels it relevant to the task of the
extension of the innate knowledge.64 "For in one's daily life," Wang said,
"although there is an infinite variety of experience and dealings with
others, there is nothing that is not functioning and operation of innate
knowledge."65 In other words, without actual interactions with others in
reality, there will be no innate knowledge to be extended at all. His
famous practical instruction for moral effort, that "one must be trained
and polished in the actual affairs of life" (shih-shang-mo-lien), can be
adequately grasped in this context.66
Therefore, the innate knowledge of the good, when in operation,
must have its "object" to act on, otherwise it will become void and
aimless. This is why the extension of the innate knowledge of the good
must consist of the rectification of things. A thing is an event to which
the will is directed. An event is what the will issues from the mind. What
Chu Hsi calls "to investigate" is to rectify. To rectify what is incorrect in
the mind is to return to the original substance of the mind. So through
his creative interpretation, Wang reverses Chu Hsi's statement, "The
extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things (ko-wu)"
into "The rectification of things (ko-wu) lies in the extension of
knowledge."
Looked at from this perspective, the extension of innate knowledge of
the good appearing in the thought of the later Wang Yang-ming is just a
logical conclusion to his previous theories concerning ko-wu and the
unity of knowledge and action. All of these three theories draw upon the
great potential of the mind as their source. In the logical structure of
these three theories, innate knowledge as moral instinct serves as the
ontological basis and starting point for Wang's proposed moral cultiva-
tion. When it is sincere, this innate knowledge gets rid of human desires
and follows Heaven's principle. This is equal to the will to be good and
the courage to see good practiced. Hence, the initial condition of the
unity of "knowledge" and "action" is a decision to be sincere to our
moral knowledge, especially by its dictates in the primordial state of
moral instinct. In sum, the will (to be good) as a link enables Wang Yang-
ming to unite knowledge and action. But only after Wang Yang-ming
came out with the idea of the extension of the innate knowledge did this
63. CHL, pp. 158-159. 64. Ibid., p. 215.

65. Ibid., p. 159; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 151. 66. CHL, pp. 31, 196.
40
unity obtain its c o m p l e t e a n d powerful justification. In e x t e n d i n g the

innate knowledge o n e realizes the unity of knowledge a n d action.
By a n d large, o n e can safely j u d g e that the t h o u g h t of W a n g Yang-
m i n g in its m a t u r e form is in a g r e e m e n t with that of Lu Hsiang-shan. But
the closeness of their t h o u g h t does n o t imply a causal relation. Rather,
this similarity is unexpectedly achieved by each o n e ' s lived experience.
W a n g Yang-ming asserted that his learning sprang from "a h u n d r e d
deaths a n d a t h o u s a n d sufferings" (ch'ien-ssu pai-nan). This echoes Lu
Hsiang-shan's claim that his words were all s p o n t a n e o u s a n d his learning
based o n his own r e a d i n g of Mencius.67 T h e message h e r e is clear: true
knowledge is p e n e t r a t e d by personal subjectivity.
But W a n g Yang-ming was well aware of his differences with Lu Hsiang-
shan. After having praised Lu's views as second to n o n e after C h o u
Tun-i a n d C h ' e n g H a o in answer to a student's question a b o u t Lu's
scholarship, W a n g c o n c l u d e d that Lu's doctrine was somewhat rough. 6 8
T h e defects of Lu's learning were later (in 1521) m o r e concretely
expressed by W a n g in a letter to Hsi Yuan-shan, an a d m i r e r of Lu:
The teaching of [Lu] Hsiang-shan is simple and direct. In this he ranks only after
Mencius. While his theories about study, inquiry, reflection and discernment,
about the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things, are not free
from [conformity to] convention, his basic insights are definitely far beyond
what the other philosophers can hope to have.69
Elsewhere W a n g also criticized Lu for h o l d i n g mistaken views r e g a r d i n g
the relation between knowledge a n d action. 7 0 H e was clearly conscious of
the g a p between knowledge a n d action a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars.
H e criticized t h e m by saying that "the Way is n o t manifested because we
only speak it with o u r m o u t h s b u t d o n o t m a k e it seen in o u r behavior.
People enjoy the rhetoric of morality b u t are u n a b l e to act. T h e only
r e m e d y is the resolve to b e sincere (li-ch'eng) ."71 T h e separation of knowl-
e d g e from action a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars was Wang's central
p r e o c c u p a t i o n . In sharp contrast to others, W a n g Yang-ming h a d deter-
m i n e d to achieve sagehood at a very early age. H e acted o n what h e knew
a n d what h e believed. Several examples should suffice to prove this. His
early c o m m i t m e n t to the quest for sagehood was revealed at the age of
eleven, w h e n h e asked his teacher what the most i m p o r t a n t thing in
the world was. "Only to study a n d pass t h e civil service examination,"
answered the teacher. W a n g was skeptical a n d replied, "I a m afraid that
to pass the civil service examinations is n o t the most i m p o r t a n t thing, b u t
67. LHCC, 34/ga, 35/57^ 68. CHL, p. 196.

69. WYCC, 5/21; Ching, trans., Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming, p. 56.
70. WYCC, 6/38. 71. Ibid., 5/21.
41
rather to study and become a sage."72 Later influenced by Chu Hsi's

writings, he investigated the bamboo until he became ill; he made a bold
protest against a powerful eunuch; his intellectual preoccupations were
so consuming that he even forgot his wedding date. He was well qualified
to proclaim that his learning sprang from "a hundred deaths and a
thousand sufferings."73 Indeed, his life displays an existential dimension
by which we can apprehend the unity of knowledge and action.74
Hence, although Wang Yang-ming shares the first premise, "Mind is
principle," with Lu Hsiang-shan, their doctrine concerning the exten-
sion of innate knowledge is very different. For Lu Hsiang-shan, the
extension of innate knowledge is precisely the process that initiates
moral cultivation. He criticized Chu Hsi for heresy because in his opin-
ion Chu Hsi deviated from this right path to moral perfection. Beyond
this, Wang Yang-ming was extremely concerned with the imperative
need of immediate moral action. He did not agree with Lu Hsiang-shan
that moral perfection was achieved by incessant accumulation of moral
effort. Instead, he believed that each moral action was qualitatively and
therefore ontologically equal to moral perfection.75 However, his real
conflicts were with Chu Hsi. After all, Lu and Wang shared the first
principle, "Mind is principle."
Chu Hsi's and Wang Yang-ming's different ultimate commitment can
be briefly shown in their comments on the term chih-shan (the highest
excellence) - the final goal of the Great Learning. For Chu Hsi, chih-shan
meant "the ultimacy of principle of affairs" (shih-li tang-jen chih chih) ;76 for
Wang Yang-ming, it meant "the substance of the mind" (hsin chih pen-
t'i).77 In other words, the final concern for Chu is the attainment of
principle in its fullness; for Wang, it is the fulfillment of the substance of
the mind. Both express their philosophical views through interpreting
The Great Learning. What concerns us here is their own doctrine rather
than whether their interpretations are faithful to the original meaning
of The Great Learning.
In annotating The Great Learning Wang Yang-ming accomplishes two
things at once. First, he shows that "making the will sincere" is the
touchstone of the Great Learning and constitutes the core of moral
effort. Second, he attacks Chu Hsi's doctrine through his commentaries.
As Wang held, the essence of the Great Learning is simply "the sincerity
of the will," and the effect of the sincerity of the will is nothing more than
72. Nien-p'u in WYCC, 32/610. 73. Ibid., 33/648.

74. Cf. Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confudan Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming's Youth (1472-
1509), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 172-176.
75. MJHA, 12/4. 76. SSCC, Ta-hsiieh, p. 1.
77. Wang Yang-ming, Ta-hsiieh ku-fen p'ang-shih, pp. 1, 78. WYCC, 7/58.
42
"the rectification of mind" (ko-mu).78 Chu Hsi, following Ch'eng I, held

that the two maxims, "Self-cultivation requires seriousness," and ' T h e
pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge," combine
the inner and external approaches of moral effort. 79 Now, through Wang
Yang-ming's particular interpretation of ko-wu as "rectification of affairs
in the mind," the first maxim is assimilated into the second. The concept
of seriousness (ching) entertained by Chu Hsi as the inward process of
moral cultivation turns out to be superfluous. 80
T h e strain of a holistic-experiential approach is characteristic of
Wang Yang-ming's thought. His conception of the innate knowledge of
the good illustrates this perfectly. "The equilibrium of the not-yet-
actualized" Wang said, "is innate knowledge. It is neither before nor
after any state of the mind and is neither internal nor external, but is
one substance without differentiation." 81 Wang continued to describe
its nature as follows:
Activity and tranquillity may refer to the mind's engaging in something or

nothing, but innate knowledge makes no distinction between doing something
and doing nothing. Activity or tranquillity may also refer to the state of being
absolutely quiet and that of being acted upon and penetrating things, but innate
knowledge does not make any distinction between such states.82
Here, Wang Yang-ming actually applied his description of heaven's prin-
ciple to that of innate knowledge. In doing so, his thinking employed
syllogistic reasoning. First, he believed that innate knowledge is the
substance of the mind, 83 second, that the substance of the mind is
Heaven's principle. 84 Following there two premises, it can be concluded
that the innate knowledge in our mind is the so-called Heaven's princi-
ple, which is single and indivisible and cannot be brought about by
thinking or deliberation. 85
In this way, Wang Yang-ming blurred Chu Hsi's proposed demar-
cation between the two states of the mind: the actualized and the
not yet actualized (i-fa and wei-fa). In Wang's view, the state of not yet
actualized is in the state of the actualized. But in this state (of the
actualized) there is n o other state as the not yet actualized. Likewise,
the state of the actualized is in the state of the not yet actualized.
But in this state (of the not yet actualized), there is not a separate
state as the actualized. Both are not without activity or tranquillity
and cannot be separately characterized as active or tranquil. They are
identical. 86
79. ECCS, 18/76. 80. WYCC, 7/58. 81. CHL, p. 146.

82. Ibid., p. 146; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 136.
83. CHL, p. 142. 84. Ibid., p. 137. 85. Ibid., p. 113. 86. Ibid., p. 147.
43
Moreover, Wang Yang-ming's attitude toward the classics differs from

Chu Hsi's, and resembles that of Lu Hsiang-shan. The Six Classics, Wang
said, are the records of our mind. The substance of The Six Classics
resides in our mind. But the vulgar scholars do not search for the
substance of The Six Classics in our inner mind; instead, they seek it
superficially in their literal meaning. The defect is like the members of
a once-rich family who hear the figures of their former property, yet have
lost it.87
Wang's independent spirit was explicitly expressed in the letter to Lo
Ch'in-shun (1465-1547) in which he said, "The important thing in
learning is to acquire learning through the exercise of the mind. If
words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, although they
have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as
correct. How much less those from people inferior to Confucius." 88
Wang Yang-ming attempted in this letter to justify his restoring the old
text of The Great Learning, which had been rearranged by Chu Hsi and
for a long time had become a standard text.
The other point made by Wang in the letter already mentioned was to
meet Lo Ch'in-shun's criticisms of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at
Late in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun). Wang's motive for compiling this
anthology was to soften the psychological tension between his commit-
ment to his own doctrine and his early intellectual indebtedness to Chu
Hsi. Wang wrote,
All my life Chu Hsi's doctrine has been to me a revelation as from the gods. In
my heart I cannot bear suddenly to oppose him. Therefore it was because I could
not help it that I did it. Those who know me say that my heart is grieved but those
who do not know me say that I am after something. The fact is that in my own
heart I cannot bear to contradict Master Chu, but I cannot help contradicting
him because the Way is what it is and the Way will not be fully evident if I do not
correct him.89
Here Wang Yang-ming reveals two conflicting commitments: One is
the Way and the other is to Chu Hsi's doctrine as his early intellectual
inspiration. For Wang, the Way is public and belongs to the whole world.
No one is allowed to monopolize it privately, even Chu Hsi and Con-
fucius. To learn is to acquire the Way. We learn and respect the sages
because they transmit the true Way. If they did not fulfill this mission, we
should seek direct access to the Way rather than blindly observe their
doctrines. It is the Way that demands our devotion, not the sages or
authorities. Two lines in his poem, On Immortality (ch 'ang-sheri), convey
87. WYCC, 7/66. 88. CHL, p. 167; Chan, Instructions far Practical Living, p. 159.
89. CHL, p. 171; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 164.
44
this spirit perfectly. They read, "The thousand sages pass as shadows/the
innate knowledge alone is my master."90
Wang Yang-ming thought that although he deviated from Chu Hsi's
teaching, Chu Hsi as an authentic scholar would rejoice in his finding of
the true Way because only the Way was worth dedicating one's life to.91
But as a matter of fact, the image of Chu Hsi looms large in Wang's
mind. The psychological pressures on Wang are real and enduring and
spring from two sources. The first and major one is personal - a tension
between his doctrine and his former intellectual relation with Chu Hsi's
teaching. The second is social and political. Wang was living in a world
overwhelmed by the influence of Chu Hsi's scholarship among the
ruling circles. Therefore, Wang's underlying intention can be seen in his
effort to show that his doctrine in the last analysis is compatible with the
thought of the aging Chu Hsi. But the anachronism Wang committed in
dating Chu Hsi's letters invited immediate criticism from Lo Chin-shun,
the greatest Ch'eng-Chu scholar in the Ming period.
Wang Yang-ming himself was not interested in carrying forward the
debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan (at least not in a factional
spirit). Rather, he had much more interest in developing his own doc-
trine. When he was asked by Hsi Yuan-shan in 1509 about the debate
concerning the similarities and differences between Chu and Lu, he
replied by stating his newly obtained doctrine of the unity of knowledge
and action.92 Indeed, Wang Yang-ming wrote a preface for the republica-
tion of Lu Hsiang-shan's work;93 he also ordered the local official in Lu's
native place to take special care of Lu's descendants by exempting them
from labor service and awarding them scholarships.94 But he was no less
critical of Lu Hsiang-shan than he was of Chu Hsi on the problem of the
investigation of things and the relation of knowledge and action. In
Wang's view, both held mistaken ideas on these questions.
In addition, Wang, unlike the previous scholars, disagreed in the use
of tao-wen-hsueh (intellectual pursuit) and tsun-te-hsing (honoring the
moral nature) to divide Chu Hsi's and Lu Hsiang-shan's learning. To
make this division signified an inadequate understanding of their
scholarship and concerns.95 Compared to other scholars, Wang's under-
standing and evaluation of Chu and Lu did more justice to both of them.
Hence in order to have a comprehensive picture of the complicated
reaction of Wang Yang-ming to Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan, we need to
take account of Wang's sympathy with Lu's learning, which had fallen
into oblivion in Wang's day. Apart from a relatively intellectual closeness
90. WYCQ 20/387. 91. CHL, p. 171. 92. Nien-p'uin WYCC, 33/615.
93. WYCQ 7/59. 94. Ibid., 17/274. 95. Ibid., 21/394-395.
45
between him and Lu, Wang Yang-ming's justification for Lu's teaching
represented a mixture of moral and psychological factors. As Wang said:
I dare to risk the attacks of the whole world to highlight Hsiang-shan's teaching.
For this, I would have no regret even if I offend others. Chu Hsi's teaching has
brought me a great deal of benefit. Is it possible for us to rebel against him
without regard to his favors? The fact is that the doctrine of Chu Hsi has been
manifested to the world like the sun and the stars, while the doctrine of Lu
Hsiang-shan still receives the fabricated slanders which it has for four hundred
years, and no one ever says a word for him. Chu Hsi would not be comfortable
in the Confucian temple for a single day if he knew this.96
Conveyed here is a sense of righteous defense of Lu in a climate of
hostility toward him brought about by the domination of the Chu school
as a result of long years of scholarly and official support. From a his-
torical point of view, Wang Yang-ming's compilation of Chu Hsi's cor-
respondence unintentionally triggered a long debate and thereby
enriched the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan." This
debate found its culmination in the thought of Li Fu, to whom we shall
turn following an analysis of the critical tradition of Confucianism that
was shared by both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools.
96. WYCC, 21/395.
46
3
The critical dimension in the
Confucian mode of thinking
The conception of the Way as the basis
for criticism of the political
establishment
In his publications, Professor Ying-shih Yii explores the significance of

the "philosophical breakthrough" of Chinese intellectual development
since the time of Confucius. One crucial point elucidated by Professor
Yu is that a tension between the tradition of the Way and the political
establishment had emerged because of the breakdown of feudalism
during the Eastern Chou. In the Western Chou, ritual and music in
themselves were thought to embody the Way. But as feudalism declined,
the practice of ritual and music began to decline along with the political
system that fostered them. Knowledge needed to implement ritual and
musical practices, which was previously in the hands of central political
authorities (then, supposedly the Chou family) shifted to newly rising
private scholars. It was Confucius (551—479 B.C.) who associated the
newly emerging intellectual group with the great mission to inherit and
defend the Way (tao). Devoted and committed to preserving and reviv-
ing the cultural tradition, Confucius redefined the term "intellectual"
{shih). Confucius divested shih of its former social and political designa-
tion within a feudalistic structure as the lowest class of noblemen. At the
same time, he gave the term shih in its relation to the Way a new
meaning: the bearer of the Way.1
1. Yu Ying-shih, "Ku-tai chih-shih chieh-tseng ti hsing-ch'i yu fa-chan" (The rise and

development of the class of the intellectuals in ancient China) in his Chung-kuo chih-shih
chieh-tseng shih-lun, ku-tai p 'ien (A historical survey of the Chinese intellectual class, the
ancient period), Taipei, 1980, pp. 1-108. Also see his "Tao-t'ung yii cheng-t'ung chih
chien" (Between tao-t'ung and cheng-t'ung), in his Shih-hsueh yu ch'uan-t'ung (History
and tradition), Taipei, 1982, pp. 30-70.
47
From then on, the ideal intellectual (shih) or gentleman (chiin-tzu) was
expected to embody the Way - to speak for it and act on it. Thus, for the
intellectuals, there appeared a new criterion of political and moral
conduct. According to Confucius, "A gentleman, in his plans, thinks of
the Way; he does not think how he is going to make a living. Even
farming sometimes entails a time of shortage; and even learning may
incidentally lead to high pay. But a gentleman's anxieties concern the
progress of the Way; he has no anxiety concerning poverty." 2
Clearly, Confucius thought the primary duty of an intellectual to be
the quest for the Way. This meant that if one was solely concerned with
material reward, he would not be able to justify his role in any true sense
as an intellectual. Confucius despised those who set their mind on truth
but were ashamed of bad clothes and bad food. Exemplifying this mode
of being, Confucius expected himself to be "a man hearing the Way
in the morning, dying in the evening without regret." 3 His authentic
commitment to the Way provided a paradigm for the intellectuals
who followed him. His disciple, Tseng-tzu, took this idea to its logical
conclusion:
An intellectual [shih] may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endur-
ance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden
which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does his
course stop; is it not long?4
Similarly, Mencius envisioned an intellectual to be one who even
in dire economic straits could maintain a fixed heart; nonetheless,
Mencius was well aware that for the people, moral cultivation was possi-
ble only if they were provided with the means of subsistence. 5 The
concept of individual as intellectual became idealized to such an extent
that he was expected to be a perfectly moral and versatile man. Confu-
cius created this standard for an intellectual: "Let the will be set on the
Way. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. Let perfect
virtue be accorded with. Let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the
arts."6
If the feudalistic states were no longer believed to combine political
power and the Way, then the relationship between the political establish-
2. SSCC, Lun-yii, Shanghai, 1947. p. 111. Arthur Waley, trans., Analects of Confucius,
London, 1949, p. 199.
3. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 22.
4. Ibid., p. 51. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 1, pp. 210—
211.
5. Ibid., Mencius, p. 14.
6. Ibid., Lun-yu, p. 42. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 1,
p. 196.
48
The critical dimension in the Confucian mode
ment and the Way-bearers demanded redefinition. Confucius pre-

scribed the new relationship:
With sincere faith he [the intellectual] unites the love of learning; hold firm to
death, he is perfecting the excellence of the Way. Such a one will not enter a
tottering state, nor dwell in a disorganized one. When the Way prevails in the
kingdom, he will show himself; when it is suppressed, he will keep concealed.
When the Way prevails in your land, count it a disgrace to be needy and obscure;
when the Way does not prevail in your land, then count it a disgrace to be rich
and honored.7
Reflecting upon this, two ideas immediately come to the fore. The Way
is an ontological entity that can be realized in the human world by the
effort of a person acting as a medium between the Way and its manifes-
tation. This inspires Confucius to conclude that it is man who makes the
Way great. 8 Accordingly, the duty of an intellectual is to develop and
preserve the Way.
Confucius's conception of the relationship of the Way and the intel-
lectual is shared by Mencius. This is witnessed by the latter's belief that
"when the Way [tao] prevails in the empire, it goes where one's person
goes; when the Way is eclipsed, one's person goes where the Way has
gone. I have never heard of making the Way go where other people are
going."9 Viewed in this light, the Way has an independent and transcen-
dental character in spite of the fact that its realization in the human
world hinges upon human mediation. It means the Way exists neither
for sage-king Yao nor for tyrant Chieh.
Moreover, an intellectual is supposed to be involved with political
authorities only if they are willing to receive the guidance of the Way. An
intellectual should concern himself with the fulfillment of the Way for
the country he serves. It is shameful for him to serve a government
merely for the sake of fame and fortune. Mencius set the political norm
for the intellectual in an uncompromising manner:
[Therefore], an intellectual, though poor, does not let go of his righteousness;
though prosperous, he does not leave the Way; it is thus that the expectations of
the people from him are not disappointed. When the men of antiquity realized
their wishes, benefits were conferred by them on the people. If they did not
realize their wishes, they cultivated their personal character, and became illustri-
ous in the world. If poor, they attended to their own virtue in solitude; if
advanced to dignity, they made the whole kingdom virtuous as well.10
7. Ibid., Lun-yu, pp. 52-53. The English translation is based on James Legge and Arthur
Waley.
8. Ibid., p. 110.
9. Ibid., Mencius, pp. 202-203; D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius, New York, 1976, p. 192.
10. Ibid., p. 190. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 2, p. 453.
49
Mencius also proclaimed that reciprocity is the guideline for the inter-
action between a ruler and his subject (engaged intellectuals). He put it
as follows:
If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their
belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as
a mere fellow countryman. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat
him as an enemy.11
Obviously, the emphasis is placed on the ruler's duty to pay due respect
to his subjects so that their service can be obtained.
In addition, Mencius argued for the right of "revolution". He de-
fended it in terms of rectification of names when he was asked by King
Hsuan of Ch'i whether regicide is permissible. Mencius replied, "He who
mutilates benevolence [jeri] is a mutilator; he who cripples Tightness [i]
is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an
'outcast.' I have indeed heard of the punishment of the 'outcast' Chou,
but I have not heard of any regicide."12
With regard to political affairs, the word tao (Way) is frequently used
to correlate with terms indicating individual virtue, such asjen (human-
ity) or i (righteousness), and tends to describe a universal political-
cultural norm that is characteristically moral. The ethical considerations
implicit in the concept of the Way are evidenced by the following two
conversations. The first is about Confucius and his disciples. One day the
Master said, "Shen [Tseng-tzu]! My Way has one thread that runs right
through it." The other disciples were puzzled by the saying. After the
Master went out, Tseng-tzu expounded upon it, saying, "Our Master's
Way is simply this: faithfulness [chung], and consideration [shu].ls
The other conversation concerns Mencius's reply to Prince Tien's
question about the business of being an intellectual. According to
Mencius, the duty of an intellectual is to set his mind on high principles;
namely, to cultivating humaneness (jeri) and righteousness (i).u Thus,
Lu Hsiang-shan illuminates this point by citing Mencius's "setting one's
mind on high principles [shang-chih]" as meaning "setting one's mind on
the Way" [chihyu tao].15
Hence, aside from the moral autonomy expressed by the individual's
process of moral decision making,16 the bearer of the Way brings to his
11. SSCC, Lun-yii, pp. 111-112; D. C. Lau, Mencius, p. 128.

12. Ibid., p. 26. D. C. Lau, Mencius, p. 68. 13. Ibid., Lun-yii, p. 23.
14. Ibid., Mencius, pp. 97—98.
15. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Hsiang-shan ch'iian-chi (hereafter abbreviated as LHCC), 21/10 a.
16. The Confucian concept of moral autonomy has been discussed in detail by Professor
Lin Yu-sheng in his "Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning oijen and the Confucian
Concept of Moral Autonomy," Monumenta Serica, 31 (1974-75), 172-204. A typical
50
encounter with politics a critical approach that is made possible only

after the separation of the Way from its former embodiment, the politi-
cal establishment of the golden age. This critical standard as conceived
by Confucius and Mencius is identical to the Way, but was realized fully
by three ancient dynasties, the Hsia, Shang, and Chou. 17 This conviction
was accepted by later Confucians as the most cherished value for them in
their response to politics.
By actively allowing the Way to become a presence in their lives,
subsequent generations of Confucians were able to expand their vision
of the world and to give insight into the use of the Way as a critical
transcendental standard for political activities. Intellectuals held that the
highest moral conduct of an individual consisted of the preservation and
the actualization of the Way in the world. This provides us with the
perspective to understand why Confucius firmly defended Kuan Chung.
Upon the death of his master, Kuan Chung had not only refused to
sacrifice himself but later chose, instead, to act as prime minister for
the enemy. In response to his students' criticisms, however, Confucius
defended Kuan Chung's behavior:
Kuan Chung acted as prime minister to the duke Huan, made him leader of all
the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present
day, the people enjoy the gifts that he conferred. But for Kuan Chung, we should
now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the
left side. Will you require from him the small fidelity of common men and
statement among others can be drawn from Analects to represent this idea: "The
determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of
injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue com-
plete." SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 107; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 297. Mencius elaborates
by saying that "I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two
together, I will let life go and choose righteousness. I like life indeed, but there is that
which I like more than life, and therefore, I will not seek to possess it by improper ways.
I dislike death indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore
there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If among the things man likes there
were nothing he liked more than life, why should he not use every means by which he
could preserve it? If among the things man dislikes there were nothing he disliked
more than death, why should he not do anything by which he could avoid danger?
There are cases when men by a certain course might preserve life, and they do not
employ it. When by certain things they might avoid danger, and they will not do them.
Therefore, men have that which they like more than life, and which they dislike more
than death. They are not men of distinguished talents and virtue only who have this
mental nature. All men have it; what belongs to such men is simply that they do not
lose it." SSCC, Mencius, pp. 166-167; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 2, pp. 411-412. The
last two sentences of this quotation indicate Mencius's intention to universalize the
concept of moral autonomy, which is organically connected with his theory of human
nature: "Human nature is originally good."
17. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 110.
51
common women, who would commit suicide in a stream or ditch, no one

knowing anything about them?18
Literally, Confucius may appear to be employing a utilitarian argument
to defend Kuan Chung's act. Yet, Confucius's eager concern with the
fulfillment of the Way in the world is of importance to our understand-
ing of this issue.
In a broad sense, the Way not only encompasses political order, but
also includes the preservation of cultural institutions to which Confucius
himself was deeply committed. What Kuan Chung had done, in Confu-
cius's eyes, was precisely to preserve all of these values, an act with
priority over anything, even the giving and receiving of one's life. Within
this concept, moral choice begins with preservation of the Way.19 By
proceeding in this fashion, the Way becomes established as a universal
societal norm of moral behavior to be sought after and acted upon
continuously. If the Way demands a high degree of commitment, each
individual is nonetheless allowed moral autonomy in the pursuits of the
Way. But both ideal and individual action become consistently inter-
related in a manner that provides an all-encompassing but ideal environ-
ment within which political, cultural, and moral issues are expected to
develop in tandem.
Because Confucianism is a "this-worldly" ethic, its consideration tends
to cover the political order even though the combination of the Way and
political power was believed to be in a perfect state only in the "golden
age" of the Three Dynasties at early antiquity. Therefore, the belief that
the Way and political power became separate and distinct after the
golden age increasingly began to be subscribed to by later Confucians in
spite of the fact that the concept of the Way then became the critical
standard for judging the legitimacy and success of any political
endeavor. When the question arose as to whether the Way took primacy
over political power, the answer for most Confucians was obvious. They
cited Confucius's statement, "When the Way prevails in the world, the
common people will not criticize."20
18. SSCC, Lun-yii, pp. 97-98; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 282.
19. But one will observe that Mencius later said, "The followers of Confucius are shameful
in talking about the history of Duke Huan of Ch'i and Duke Wen of Chin." Ibid.,
Mencius, p. 8. In contrast to Confucius, Mencius seems not to commit to the cultural
institutions of the Chou dynasty. This makes his conception of moral autonomy more
inner-determined and more self-based. Cf. Hoyt Tillman, "The Development of Ten-
sion between Virtue and Achievement in Early Confucianism: Attitudes toward Kuan
Chung and Hegemon (pa) as Conceptual Symbols," Philosophy East and West 31, no. 1
(January 1981), 17—28. In view of different assessments of Kuan Chung by Confucius,
Mencius, and Hsun-tzu, Professor Tillman has keenly observed the implicit tension
between personal virtue and social result in early Confucianism.
20. SSCC, Lun-yii, p. 115.
52
It is a cliche that Confucius advocated moral leadership of the political

elite. But what concerns us is on what condition a political elite is
allowed to assume moral leadership of the people. Is it not because a
member of the political elite happens to be a person of moral excellence
in the Confucian definition? A story about Duke Mu and Tzu-ssu relates
this very clearly. Duke Mu frequently went to see Tzu-ssu. "How did kings
of states with a thousand chariots in antiquity make friends with an
intellectual?" he asked. Tzu-ssu was displeased. "What the ancients talked
about," said Tzu-ssu, "was serving them, not making friends with them."21
Mencius explained Tzu-ssu's displeasure: In terms of position, Duke Mu
was a prince and Tzu-ssu was a subject. How dare Tzu-ssu be friends with
Duke Mu? In terms of virtue, it was Duke Mu who ought to serve Tzu-ssu.
How can he presume to be friends with Tzu-ssu?22 Thus an intellectual
should associate with political authorities only if they are willing to
accept his moral guidance. Keeping well within this Confucian convic-
tion, Tseng Tzu elevated the value of virtue to "a supreme degree": "The
wealth of Chin and Ch'u cannot be rivaled. They may have their wealth,
but I have my benevolence; they may have their exalted rank, but I have
my integrity. In what way do I suffer in the comparison?"23 Even though
he lived on the eve of unification of the Chinese empire, Hsiin Tzu
echoed Tseng Tsu's idea. He quoted Tzu Hsia saying, "I do not serve
those arrogant lords who treat me improperly; I do not see twice these
arrogant officials who treat me not with respect."24 Hsiin Tsu also af-
firmed the dignity of an intellectual. He put words in Duke Chou's
mouth as follows: "One may disdain those who rely upon official pay, but
one must not disdain those who pursue moral cultivation. Men of integ-
rity sacrifice the eminent for the humble, sacrifice wealth for poverty,
and sacrifice comfort for toil. Even if their complexion becomes dark,
they remain steadfast to their principle."25
In sum, the notion that the Way holds primacy over whatever political
establishment happens to be in power, and that the Way is expected to
put political leaders on the "correct" moral track, is rooted in ancient
Confucianism. A Confucian state is one in which the Way is carried out.
Conceived of in these terms, the Way provides the affirmative sanction
needed to legitimize a political regime, and the very success of Confu-
cian scholars has often been judged by their ability to get ruler and ruled
to believe in this conviction.
Certainly, history reveals that some rulers employed intellectuals or
the concept of the Way to serve their own opportunistic ends, and that
21. Ibid., Mencius, p. 152. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 52; Lau, Mencius, p. 87.
24. Annotated by Liang Ch'i-hsiung, Hsun-Tzu chien-shih, Peking, 1983, p. 382.
25. Ibid., pp. 408-409.
53
they relied heavily upon some intellectuals' knowledge of political and

cultural affairs. As the king of Ch'i once said, "I wish to give Mencius a
house in the most central part of my capital and a pension of ten
thousand measures of rice for the support of his disciples, so that my
officials and my people will have an example to look up to."26
The interaction between the tradition of the Way and the tradition of
political establishment has a long, complicated history that is not our
major concern here. There is, however, one event that deserves atten-
tion. In 136 B.C., the emperor Wu of the Han dynasty adopted Tung
Chung-shu's (ca. 179-ca. 104 B.C.) proposal to establish Confucianism
as the state doctrine. From that time, save for a few occasions, Confucian-
ism predominated as the official state ideology. No matter what form of
political regime ruled thereafter, whether native or foreign, all leaders
tried to approximate the image of a Confucian dynasty, whether from
practical calculation or sincere choice.
The relationship between the concept of the Way and political power
became more and more intricate as history unfolded. Nevertheless,
Wang Fu-chih's (1619—92) insightful definitions of these terms can
facilitate our grasp of these problems. According to Wang, "the tradition
of the Way" (tao~t'ung) concerned the transmission of the teachings of
sages in contrast to "the tradition of governance" (chih-t'ung) which dealt
with legitimate emperorship or rulership from the ancient period on-
ward.27 But the concept of the Way was intrinsically involved with the
legitimacy problem of rulership. Thus, politically, the Way was built into
a tradition that remained critical of political authorities. Intellectually, it
ushered in the problem of transmission of the "true" Way.
In the T'ang dynasty, Buddhism and Taoism flourished. Han Yii
(768-824) and Li Ao (fl. 798) had each established a line of transmis-
sion of the Confucian Way, a move against the Buddhists' and Taoists'
conceptualization of the transmission of the Way. During the Sung
dynasty, when Confucianism was being revived, the idea of "the tradition
of the Way" (tao-t'ung) became enriched with a historical perspective.
This approach was not novel and can be traced far back to Mencius, who
proclaimed that the doctrine of the sage was transmitted from Yao and
Shun through the sage-kings Yu, T'ang, and Wen to Confucius.28 In an
environment where different schools competed for the right Way,
Mencius had to construct a tradition of the Way in order to justify the
teachings he received. The appeal to ancient sages was a common
26. Annotated by Liang Ch'i-hsiung, Mencius, pp. 59-60; Lau, Mencius, p. 92.
27. Wang Ch'uan-shan, Tu T'ung-ch'ien lun (Comments on T'ung-ch'ien), Peking, 1975,
13/408.
28. SSCC, Mencius, pp. 218-219.
54
p h e n o m e n o n a m o n g the c o m p e t i n g schools of the Warring States

p e r i o d at the e n d of the Chou. 2 9
Neo-Confucians in the Sung dynasty invented a line of the transmis-
sion of the Way to claim their legitimacy within the Confucian circle.
This suggests that at that time B u d d h i s m a n d Taoism probably did n o t
p r e s e n t the same sort of threat to Confucianism as previously. 30 This new
a p p r o a c h to t h e transmission of the Way is evident in the eulogy C h u Hsi
wrote at the d e a t h of his friend (t'ung-chih), C h a n g Shih:
After Confucius and Mencius, the sacred learning discontinued. It was Chou
Tun-i and the Ch'eng brothers who sustained the Way from falling. Their subtle
words have not been heard for not more than one hundred years, but the
intellectuals diverged tremendously in their interpretation of the sacred
doctrine. Among all, only you and I shared the same heart and mind. 31
Before this, in the N o r t h e r n Sung period, C h ' e n g I h a d praised his

b r o t h e r , C h ' e n g H a o , for rediscovering t h e Way for the world after its
i n t e r r u p t i o n for fourteen h u n d r e d years: "After the d e a t h of Duke
C h o u , the Way of sages was n o t carried out; after the d e a t h of Mencius
t h e learning of sages was n o t transmitted. Since t h e Way was n o t mani-
fested, t h e r e has b e e n n o g o o d governance for centuries; since the Way
was n o t transmitted, t h e r e has b e e n n o real scholar for thousands of
years." 32 In C h ' e n g Fs view, having n o real scholar was worse t h a n having
n o real governance, for scholars could at least b r i n g the Way of govern-
ance to the world, a l t h o u g h g o o d g o v e r n m e n t does n o t necessarily
p r o d u c e a new c r o p of scholars. T h u s , in r e t u r n i n g to the surviving
classics, C h ' e n g H a o revived the belief in the true Way by r e i n t e r p r e t i n g
its message a n d r e n d e r i n g it explicable to the world.
Evidencing the same spirit, C h u Hsi traced the line of transmission of
the Way back to the legendary E m p e r o r Fu Hsi a n d the Yellow E m p e r o r .
A m o n g all the sages, however, C h u Hsi cited Confucius as the greatest
because h e readily acknowledged this inheritance of wisdom a n d stead-
fastly sought to r e g e n e r a t e these contributions, despite that h e h a d n o
political position (wei) with which to see t h e m i m p l e m e n t e d . But after
Mencius, the transmission of the Way was discontinued. It was n o t until
C h o u Tun-i a n d the C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s that the Confucian Way was
29. Yang K'uan, "Chung-kuo shang-ku-shih tao-lurf (An introduction to ancient Chinese
history), in Lu Ssu-mien and T'ung Shu-yeh, eds., Ku-shihpien (The investigations of
ancient history), Taipei, 1970, vol. 7, pp. 65-401.
30. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," in Francois Aubin, ed.,
Sung Studies, 2d series, 1 (1973), p. 80.
31. CTWC, 87/9D.
32. Ch'eng I, I-ch 'uan wen-chi, in Erh-Ch 'eng ch 'uan-shu (Complete works of the two Ch'engs;
hereafter abbreviated as ECCS), Tan-ya-chu, 1908, 7/iob-i la.
55
rediscovered. There is no doubt that Chu Hsi attempted to establish an

intellectual connection between the doctrine of the Northern Sung Con-
fucians and his own, and thereby regarded himself as the real successor
of this orthodox tradition. He was the first Neo-Confucian to make
explicit use of the term tao-t'ung (the tradition of the Way or the line of
the transmission of the Way) in a philosophical sense that found its
mature expression in the preface he wrote in 1189 to The Commentaries
on the Doctrine of the Mean.33 In his arrangement of the line of transmis-
sion, Chu Hsi entirely excluded the Confucians of the Han and T'ang
periods because of their partial and impure comprehension of the Way.
Lu Hsiang-shan took a far more radical position. Unconcerned with
the intellectual origins of his doctrine, he professed that through his
reading of Mencius he grasped the Way,34 and that it was his scholarship
that shed the necessary light on the long-concealed Way.35 Although Lu
did not use the term tao-fung, he did not abandon the concept of
transmission of the Way. Instead, he preferred to use the term tao-mai,
which means the lineage of the Way. It was the Han Confucians whom
Lu blamed for confusing the transmission of the true Way with heresy, a
mistake that he thought worse than that made by Emperor Ch'in-shih-
huang. The emperor tried to cut off the real transmission with a blunt
measure, but did not succeed.36 Lu Hsiang-shan was, however, willing to
credit the Northern Sung Confucians with rediscovering the long-lost
Way; nonetheless, Lu believed that it was his historical mission to create
an environment in which the dim light of their discovery would shine
forth.37
By exploring the various lineages proffered by Chu, Lu, and others as
transmitting the Way, it becomes apparent that these philosophers were
more interested in constructing a philosophical base for their thought
than in providing a history of Confucian thought. By restructuring and
stressing certain elements in previous scholars' thoughts, they were able
to lend credence to their doctrines.38
We will recall that Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had been determined
to become sages since childhood. Their authentic desire to achieve
sagehood made them irrevocably committed to the Way. It was said that
as a child, when Chu Hsi was given The Classic of Filial Piety, he read it
through in one sitting and immediately grasping the point, wrote, "If
not so [I] am not a human being."39 Equally committed, Lu believed that
33. CTWC, 76/2oa-23a. 34. LHCQ 3 4 / 9 ^ 35/57^ 35. Ibid., 35/7*).

36. Ibid., 34/14^ 37. Ibid., 35/7b.
38. For Chu Hsi's case, see Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," pp. 5 9 -
90.
39. CTNP, p. 2.
56
"the Way in the universe cannot be augmented or diminished. Neither

can it be taken or be given away. Man must find this out for himself."40
Thus, years after the Goose Lake debate, when Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-
shan were again engaged in heated arguments, Lu's student, Pao Min-
tao, advised Lu not to argue with Chu Hsi because it seemed to Pao
that Chu Hsi could not come to terms with his master's doctrine at
all. Hearing that, Lu became angry and said that the Way did not
exist for him or for Chu Hsi alone.41 Rather, Lu envisioned the Way as
bright as the sun at noon.42 Chu Hsi shared this view, saying, "The Way
[or here, "principle"] is quite responsive. Its substance as a whole is
both splendid and magnificent. It is clear and evident through the
thousands of years. The sages in the past transmitted it without doubt."43
Thus, the Way came to be regarded as a universal and transcendental
factor with which to measure the legitimacy of both intellectual view-
points and political authorities.44 Because of their personal commitment
to the Way, Confucians believed that they were entitled to champion its
cause.
The social implication of this attitude comes to the fore in the strong
consciousness evidenced by both Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan of Way-
bearers as fellowship. Thus the deaths of Chang shih (in 1180) and Lii
Tsu-ch'ien (in 1181) were considered by Chu Hsi to be symbolic of a
decline of the Way that resulted in a great loss to the world.45
Chu Hsi even extended the idea that the Way-bearers were a commu-
nity based upon a common intellectual religious faith and a commit-
ment to political activities. Unlike conventional scholars, who were
sensitive to the problems of party struggle (tang-cheng) in Chinese poli-
tics, Chu Hsi encouraged the chancellor not to be afraid of forming a
party (tang) among upright officials.46 Although the position taken by
Chu could be thought of as contradicting Confucius's view that "a gen-
tleman grave in self-maintenance, but not quarrelsome, allies himself
with individuals, but not with parties,"47 Chu Hsi also advised the em-
peror to give free rein to good officials, allowing them to form a
group and endowing them with more powers to carry out state policy
efficiently.48
Though Lu Hsiang-shan had an independent mind in relation to the
classics, he was very concerned with the relationships established
40. Lu Hsiang-shan, LHCC, $5/$b; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 584.
41. LHCQ 34/28D, 7a. 42. Ibid., 34/8b. 43. CTYL, ii7/2a.
44. As for the transcendental character of Confucianism in ancient China, see Benjamin
I. Schwartz, "Transcendence in Ancient China," Daedalus, 104, no. 2 (Spring 1975),
57-68.
45. CTWC, 34/258,87/12a. 46. Ibid., 28/1 gb-2ob.
47. SSCC, Lun-yii, 109. 48. CTWC, 11/23b.
57
between individuals and the group as a whole. According to him, after

one makes up his mind to engage in moral cultivation, one needs to
select his mentor and friends carefully; otherwise he will become corrupt
and wild.49 The value of "sharing the same Way" (t'ung-tao) and "sharing
the same goal" (t'ung-chih) is essential to the identity of the Confucian
community.
Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan were both well aware that, after the
ancient period (the Three Dynasties), a chasm developed between the
Way and political power (shih b). Lu claimed that
in ancient times, the political establishments and the Way were combined in one;
after that, they were split. What does "the identity of the political power and the
Way" (shihyii tao ho) mean? In terms of virtue, those who are entitled to be lords
are lords; to be high officials, high officials; to be intellectuals, intellectuals. This
is called "the identity of the political power and the Way." Their identity is a time
of good order; the split between them is a time of turmoil.50
The split between the Way and political power had been taken for
granted by all Confucians. Accordingly, as the bearers of the Way, they
had an accepted responsibility to lead the rulers onto the correct path.
Theoretically, the emperor, as the "son of Heaven" occupying the key
post as the model for all subjects, is expected to assume moral leader-
ship. Did not Confucius say, "He who exercises government by means of
his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place
and all the stars turned toward it"?51
To Confucians, the character of politics is held to be normative in
nature, and the populace is supposed to look to the rulers for moral
inspiration. The relation between superiors and inferiors is thought of as
"that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the
wind blows across it."52 Society expects the political elite to be able to
maintain political order and moral well-being. The moral cultivation
that inspires this system lies in the initiative of the political elite. Once
Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, "To
govern means to rectify. If you lead the people with correctness, who will
dare not to be correct?"53
49. LHCC, i/i8a-iga, 15/53, 34/11a. Lu Hsiang-shan insists that after making up one's
mind to achieve moral perfection, one must choose one's mentors and friends care-
fully because they are supposed to show the right path. This assertion seems inconsist-
ent with his self-portrait: "Self-assured, self-made, and self-directed; independent of
teachers, friends, and books." Ibid., 35/3ib.
50. LHCC, 34/25I). 51. SSCC, Lunyii, p. 6; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 145.
52. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 6; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 259.
53. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 83; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 258.
But after the split of the Way and the political establishment a division
of labor appeared. The author of The Doctrine of the Mean was perceptive
enough to see: "One may occupy the throne, but if he have not the
proper virtue, he should not presume to make ceremonies or music.
One may have the virtue, but if he have not the throne, he in the same
way should not presume to make ceremonies or music." 54 In principle,
only the "son of Heaven" can establish cultural institutions, but after the
breakdown of the identity of the Way with the political institution he
loses this specific knowledge and moral excellence. The sage-king is a
nostalgic projection of the Confucians' ideal in which everything, moral
and social, political and cultural, is drawn to this monolithic pivotal
agent. But the sage-king is gone. The Confucianists now have to take the
responsibility to inculcate the rulers with the Way.
The numerous memorials of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan bear wit-
ness to this point. In his famous Wu-shen memorial (1188), Chu Hsi
said:
The mind of Your Majesty is the great foundation of the world since everything
on earth, though varied and changing unlimitedly, actually relies upon the mind
of Your Majesty. That is a natural principle. Therefore, if the mind of an emperor
is on the right path, everything on earth follows the right path; if the mind of an
emperor is not on the right path, everything on earth will go astray.55
Subsequently, Chu Hsi severely criticized the affairs of court and the
personal selection of civil and military officers. Focusing on the educa-
tion of the heir apparent, Chu Hsi leveled his criticisms against the
mediocre opportunists who surrounded and demoralized the prince.
Chu Hsi held that all of these Disarrangements actually pointed to the
moral failure of the emperor himself. Nonetheless, the emperor was
assured by Chu Hsi that if he studied the message in the memorial, he
would discern that this saying was not a private opinion, but rather an
idea strongly supported by the sages of ancient times. And if the em-
peror pursued the idea further, he would find that the idea was not
simply an opinion of the sages, but rather the sincere belief that verbally
captured the natural principle of Heaven and Earth, which not even
sages and wise men dared violate. 56
In reading the memorials written by Chu Hsi, one is constantly im-
pressed by his self-assured role as the proponent of the Way. Given Chu
Hsi's deep commitment to the Way, it becomes understandable why he
54. SSCC, Chung-yung, p. 25. English translation by James Legge, Li Chi, New York, 1967,
vol. 2, p. 324.
55. CTWQ n/i8b-io.a, 24a-24b. 56. CTWC, 11/36b.
59
so often chose to resign from office. His actions lose their ambiguity as
we realize the extent to which he believed in the ideal relationship to be
achieved between the Way-bearer and the political leader.57
Similarly, the memorial Lu Hsiang-shan presented to the emperor
also created quite a stir in scholarly circles because of Lu's frank criti-
cisms of the emperor. Nonetheless, it drew criticism from Chu Hsi
because, according to Chu Hsi, Lu did not focus attention on the need
to rectify the mind of the emperor.58 Four years later, however, in a letter
to Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan did state that the duty of the emperor is to
govern the people by accomplishing the Way of Heaven and Earth, and
that the duty of an intellectual is to use his knowledge to rectify the mind
of the emperor and to lead him to the right path. Only then can the Way
be manifested.59
In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yang-ming echoed the view expressed by
Chu and Lu. Wang stated that the good order of the world rested in part
on the ability of the emperor's ministers to assist him in trying to
cultivate morality. For Wang, this was an urgent task to be performed by
Confucian officials.60 He was well aware of the rift that had arisen be-
tween the Way and political power since the golden age and viewed
those in authority as "having political status but not virtue" (yu-wei wu-te).
Precisely because they lacked the knowledge necessary to make musical
and ritual creations, rulers had no option but to depend upon Confu-
cians at cultural events.61 Besides, a ruler needed to rely upon the virtue
of Confucian officials for rectification of his mind after he had cultivated
it with an initiative to be morally good and a capability of discriminating
between good and evil subjects.62
On the surface, Wang's notion of how a ruler should achieve moral
cultivation and this theory's reliance upon Confucians' guidance ap-
pears to be inconsistent with another of his doctrines in which he asserts
57. Chu Hsi's major disciple, Huang Kan, described this point very well: "The master led
a sincere life. He was always concerned about the state. When he heard the errors of
the current affairs, one could learn from his concerned complexion he was depressed.
Whenever referring to the weak power of the state in contrast to that of the northern
enemy, he was moved and his eyes filled with tears. He scrupulously observed the
propriety of taking and resigning office. He definitely would not accept an office to
which he was not entitled. He would resign office without hesitation if his words were
not respected by the emperor. As a subject to the emperor, he never depreciated the
value of the Way in order to sell it to the emperor -fiftyyears from the day he took the
first office to the day of his death - he served at imperial court for only forty days. How
difficult to put the Way into practice like this," CTNP, p. 230. A different description
of Chu Hsi's political behavior is given by Conrad M. Schirokauer. See his "Chu Hsi's
Political Career: A Study in Ambivalence," in Arthur F. Wright, ed., Confucian Person-
alities (Stanford, Calif.: 1962), pp. 162-188.
58. LHCC, 36/26a. 59. Ibid., 2/i6a-b. 60. WYCC, 21/406.
61. Ibid., 31/600. 62. Ibid., 31/598-599.
60
the self-sufficiency of man's innate knowledge for achieving moral per-

fection.63 But if we take into account Wang's preoccupation with the
"norm" governing how a ruler and a Way-bearer should interact, this
apparent contradiction dissolves. Wang Yang-ming held that an official
who could serve his ruler by helping him obtain the Way never brought
shame on himself. It was particularly the duty of a great minister (ta-
ch 'en) to rectify the mind of the ruler and to lead him to the correct path
of the Way.64 Thus, the role of Confucians was affirmed by Wang Yang-
ming in relation to the function of the rectification of the mind for the
ruler. This, again confirmed that the idea of the Way-bearer was very
alive among truthful Confucians.
In short, the split that took place between the concept of the Way and
various political regimes presented the possibility of allowing Confucian
intellectuals to consider themselves as champions of the Way. From then
on, they spoke not only for themselves as a community, but also for the
Way. Confucius once said, "It is man that can make the Way manifest by
actualizing it, and not the Way that can manifest itself."65 Inspired by this
dictum, Confucian intellectuals were prepared to make the Way great.
Once, after quoting this dictum, Lu stated that the Way is not added to
or diminished by human effort. Rather, the Way is the fundamental
principle of the universe and has governed it for ten thousand genera-
tions. No one stands outside this principle, not even a ruler. If the
general populace needs to learn the Way from the teachings of their
leaders, the intellectuals can learn it by "their own study."66
Because of their initiative and their ability to monopolize access to the
Way, it began to be believed that only intellectuals could bear and teach
the Way. Viewed from the vantage of the intellectuals, the Way repre-
sented a solid ground upon which their role and function in the state
and society was defined. For the rulers, however, the Way became a
sacred doctrine and ideology legitimizing their position.
In the last analysis, the Way offered a critical standard to judge rulers
and regimes. Its essence was moral in nature and was, furthermore,
compatible with the concept of moral autonomy based upon individual
ethical self-decision. In addition, it brought a universal and impersonal
dimension to the concept of moral autonomy that was employed by the
intellectuals in the political arena. In other words, an intellectual as
bearer of the Way had the backing of this grand tradition of the Way
when he confronted the political rulers. This entitled Wang Fu-chih
(1619-92) in the early Ch'ing to claim: "Two things in this World are
63. See Chapter 2. 64. WYCQ 31/598-590.

65. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 110. 66. LHCQ 2i/9b-ioa.
61
supreme and cannot be usurped, that is, the position of ruler in the
tradition of governance and the teaching of the sages in the tradition of
the Way."67 In ideology, Confucian intellectuals were able to preserve
this spirit until the reign of the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi.68
67. Wang Fu-chih, Tu T'ung-chien-lun, p. 408.

68. Based on this analysis of the concept of the Way, I would like to make a brief remark
on Mou Tsung-san's discussion of the difference between Chu Hsi's and Lu Hsiang-
shan's ethical views. I cannot bring myself to accept his assertion that Lu's idea has the
character of moral autonomy, but not Chu's. If the concept of moral autonomy is
denned as morality (Way) for the sake of morality (Way), Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan
have no difference in their ethical thinking on either the individual or the collective
level. But if the concept is taken strictly as what Kant really means in the Critique of
Practical Reason, neither Chu Hsi nor Lu Hsiang-shan can be qualified as having the
idea of moral autonomy because the ethics of Chu and Lu, like that of most Confu-
cians, is not based upon an a priori rational universalizable principle. See my article,
"Rethinking the Concept of 'Moral Autonomy' in the Study of Chinese Thought" (So-
wei tao-te tzu-chu-hsing), Shih-huo, 14, nos. 7-8 (November 1984), 77-88.
4
Li Fu: an exemplary
Lu-Wang scholar in the
Ch'ing dynasty (1):
His life
Li Fu had one courtesy name, Chu-lai, and two pen names, Mu-t'ang and
Hsiao-shan. He was known to his contemporaries as Master Mu-t'ang and
has been commonly regarded as the major proponent of the Lu-Wang
school in the Ch'ing dynasty.1 He was born on April 5, 1675, m Lin-
ch'uan, Kiangsi. His father was a native of She-hsien of Anhwei. His
grandfather died when his father was still young. This probably caused
his father to wander about central and southern China in search of a
living. His father finally settled in Lin-ch'uan after marrying into a family
named Wu.2
He married the only child of the Wu family, and so the parents asked
him to stay in their family. From Li Fu's later description, it seems that
the marriage did not cause his father to stay home very long; Li Fu's
1. Hsu Shih-ch'ang, ed., Ch'ing-ju hsueh-an (Philosophical records of the Ch'ing scholars),
n.p., 1938, 55/1 a; and Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih (Chinese
intellectual history of the last three hundred years), Taipei, 1968, p. 284. For a brief
English biography of Li Fu, see Fang Chao-ying's "Li Fu" in Arthur W. Hummel, ed.,
Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Taipei, 1964, pp. 455-457.
2. Li Fu, Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao (The initial collection of Li Fu's writings, hereafter abbreviated
as MTCK), Fu-ch'i-t'ang, 1831, 25/1 a. In addition to the 1831 edition, MTCK was
initially printed in 1740 (hereafter abbreviated as MTCK [1740]). Another collection of
Mu-t'ang's writings, Mu-t'ang pieh-kao (abbreviated as MTPK), was published about
1747. Li Fu's writings were banned in 1768 because in them there were two poems
dedicated to a gathering at which Tai Ming-shih was present. In 1831, both collections
were revised and printed. I rely primarily on the 1831 edition for my analysis. As for the
problems of the texts see Fang Chao-ying's article on Li Fu in Hummel, ed., Eminent
Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 456. Also see "The Case of Li Fu's Poems" in Ch'ing-tai wen-
tzu-yu tang.
63
father was by nature fond of traveling and left home often. Li Fu and his
four brothers were brought up and educated mainly by their mother,
who embodied the traditional virtues of Chinese women - frugality,
diligence, and perseverance.3 All of these virtues were especially
cherished in a poor family like Li Fu's.
Since his childhood, Li Fu was known for his gift in writing poetry. He
began composing poems at the age of ten, writing prose at the age of
twelve, and practicing "current essays" (the "eight-legged essays") to
prepare for the civil service examinations at fourteen. He showed par-
ticular interest and talent in the writing of poetry and prose.4 He was
noted for being able to compose "one hundred poems and dozens of
essays" within a day. Li Fu proudly called this practice "a battle of art."5
His talent in literature was immediately recognized by a group of his
literary friends, among whom Li Fu was the youngest. He was only twelve
years old when he was admitted to this group; the other members were
already middle-aged.6 Later, when Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718) who was a
major advocate of the Ch'eng-Chu school and an important Ch'ing
official, read Li Fu's writings, he praised the latter's literary style as
comparable to that of the established writers of the Sung dynasty, such as
Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-72) and Tseng Kung (1019-83). 7
In the preface to his book of poetry Surviving Fires {Huo-yii ts'ao), Li Fu
tells us that he was advised to concentrate on the examinations rather
than unimportant matters such as writing poetry, so he burned his
poems on several occasions. Nevertheless, he did not entirely abandon
his continuing interest in composing poetry.8
When Li Fu went to take the civil service examination, he was accused
of pretending to be a native of Lin-ch'uan by some people who were
jealous of his talent; he was then disqualified from taking the test.9 These
unhappy events ironically sharpened his strong identity with Lin-ch'uan.
Li Fu was deeply convinced of his father's idea that the trend of the age
(shih-yun) from the Eastern Chin dynasty onward had shifted from the
North to the South and would prosper on the southern side of the
Yangtze River. This was why his father chose Lin-ch'uan as the place to
call home.10 Li Fu was extremely proud of being a man of Lin-ch'uan,
where a great cultural heritage had taken shape over the centuries, and
which had produced many distinctive scholars. Li Fu's unceasing justifi-
cations of Wang An-shih (1021-86), his attempts to prove that the great
calligrapher Wang Hsi-chih (321—76 or 303—61) was a native of Lin-
3. MTCK, 36/4^-41*). 4. Ibid., Preface, p. la. 5. Ibid., i7b/i6b.

6. Ibid., preface, pp. ib~3b, 2/7a~7b. 7. Ibid., preface, p. 6a.
8. Ibid., 3/1 a. 9. Ibid., 2/3a, 5a, 9a. 10. Ibid., 25/1 b-2a.
64
Li Fu: his life
ch'uan, and his emulation of the literary style of Ou-yang Hsiu and
Tseng Kung were only a few examples of the various manifestations of an
unusual local patriotism.11
This patriotism constituted an important ingredient in Li Fu's thought
and life because it displayed an emotional strain in his orientation and
provided him with the strength to struggle against the current ortho-
doxy, the Ch'eng-Chu school. His local patriotism also extended to his
defense of Lu Hsiang-shan, to whom he paid his greatest respect and
from whose learning he drew his main intellectual inspiration. Apart
from the fact that he received some elementary education from his
mother and learned the rules of poetic composition from Wu Yu-chai,12
Li Fu was intellectually a self-taught man. He had a remarkable memory,
which aided him in acquiring vast knowledge from books. It is said that
he could recite whatever he had casually read only once. Normally he
could read twenty chiian (Chinese volumes) per day; on a busy day he
would still read a chiian or two. In a letter to Ch'en Yen-yii in which
he discussed the difficulties of studying, Li Fu expressed remorse, saying,
"Within seven months I have read 'only' the histories of the Three
Kingdoms, Chin, and the Southern and Northern dynasties; the poetry
of Li Po, Tu Fu, Li Shang-yin, Wen T'ing-yun, Su Tung-p'o, and Lu Yu
twice; and the various commentaries on the Erh-ya, The Book ofFilial Piety
(Hsiao-ching), I-li, Analects, Mendus once; Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Historian's
Record, the histories of former Han, later Han, Sui, T'ang, and Five
Dynasties once; and part of the histories of Sung, Ch'i, Liang, Ch'eng,
later Wei, Northern Ch'i, later Chou, and Sung-Liao-Chin-Yuan
periods." It was clear that in Li Fu's view the advancement of one's
learning was proportional to how broadly and how profoundly one had
read.13
In his youth, Li Fu had been very poor. In 1692, the financial situation
of his family became worse than ever before. Because they had to sell
their property, Li's family was forced to move to Hsia-lu, seven li
(Chinese miles) north of Lin-ch'uan, where Li Fu married a girl from a
family named Hsii.14 In 1695, Li Fu received the status of a student in the
prefectural school, but it was not until 1697 that he received a stipend
from the school. However, the stipend did not significantly improve his
family's financial situation. Li Fu often felt sorry that he was unable to
provide a good living for his family, especially for his aged parents.15
For a time he had to walk hundreds of miles to cities like Hui-chou or
Soochow in search of work. In the winter of 1697, Li Fu braved a major
11. Ibid., preface, p. 8a, g/i2a-i3b, 19/393-4lb. 12. Ibid., 2/73, 36/4ia-4ib.
13. Ibid., 41/1 a-lb. 14. Ibid., 2/5b-6a, 17a, 27/1 a. 15. Ibid., 4b/nb-i2a.
65
snowstorm, traveling three thousand li by foot while carrying 300 wen (a

Chinese unit of currency) to look for his elder brother, who had used up
his travel funds and was trapped in a remote place.16 Sometimes his
family was so poverty-stricken that they did not have enough food. In Li
Fu's later writings on the death of his wife, he recollects that his wife was
kind and capable, and that she exerted her utmost in trying to cope with
their financial difficulties even after he assumed an official post.17
Poverty did not break Li Fu; on the contrary, the more distressing his
financial situation became, the more determined he was to carry on his
study. Later he was fortunate enough to be appreciated by Liang T'ing-
chi (1663—1715), the governor of Kiangsi, through whose financial
assistance Li Fu was able to pass the provincial examination in 1708 with
the first rank after having previously failed it four times. The following
year, he passed the metropolitan examination and became a chin-shih,
and subsequently he was selected as a bachelor of the Hanlin Academy.18
After receiving the rotation training there, he was appointed a compiler
(pien-hsiu).
Meanwhile, his scholarship was recognized by two important scholar-
officials, Li Kuang-ti and Wang Shih-chen (1643—1711). Both regarded
Li Fu as "a leading scholar of national importance" (kuo-shih). His out-
standing talent impressed Li Kuang-ti so much that through the latter's
recommendation to the K'ang-hsi emperor he was promoted in an
unprecedented manner, four grades to shu-tzu, in 1715.19 The next
summer, he was transferred to the post of study-attendant (shih-tu-hsueh-
shih), and in autumn he served as the vice-supervisor of the military
examination. In 1717 he rose to the post of attendant whose job was to
record the emperor's daily life. In this assignment, he had the opportu-
nity to directly wait on the K'ang-hsi emperor. This experience rein-
forced his admiration for the emperor, intellectually and personally.20
He was sent to take charge of the provincial examination in the same
year. Three years later he held the same post in Chekiang. Early in 1719,
he went to Canton on behalf of the emperor to offer sacrifices to the
gods of the South Sea. He was promoted to the vice-presidency of the
censorate in 1721. It was in that year that bad luck struck him.
Li Fu was assigned to the post of vice-examiner for the metropolitan
examination of 1721. When the day came to release the list of successful
16. MTCK, 3/gb. 17. Ibid., 27/ia-ib.

18. Ibid., 25/2a; Ch'uan Tsu-wang, Chi-ch'i t'ing chi (hereafter abbreviated as CCTC),
Taipei, 1977, 17/210.
19. Win-cheng hung nien^p'u in Li Kuang-ti, Jung-ts'un ch'iian-shu, B/596; MTCK, 11/1 a;
CCTC, 17/207.
20. MTCK 46/32a-35b.
66
Li Fu: his life
graduates, a yellow fog and dark wind occurred in the capital and were
conventionally interpreted as evil omens. Awed by this strange phenom-
enon, the K'ang-hsi emperor said that this must be caused by evil forces,
which implied that the list either contained usurpers or failed to include
good scholars. He ordered a review of examination papers and conse-
quently made some changes.21
This readjustment caused the failed candidates to gather in front of Li
Fu's house in protest. They eventually stoned the house. Li Fu did not
report this unhappy event to the government. The censor Shu Ku im-
peached him for concealing the facts and for being unfair in his exam-
ination of these candidates. Li Fu was deprived of his ranks and offices,
but was allowed to atone for his mistakes by assisting in conservancy work
at the Yung-ting River at his own expense. The emperor pardoned him
after realizing that Li Fu had been forced to sell everything for the sake
of the conservancy project, including his collection of books.22
Even before ascending the throne, the future Yung-cheng emperor
had a deep appreciation of Li's personality and capacity. Soon after his
ascension the emperor asked him to come back to the capital. The
emperor restored all his ranks and frequently held private discussions
with him, an indication of his favor. In July 1723 he was sent to tackle the
shipment of grain from the South to the capital. This had posed a serious
problem since the end of the K'ang-hsi period because of the lack of
water and defects in the administration. The grain revenue was supposed
to be transported annually from the South to Tungchow (east of
Peking), where the grain was stored. But owing to inefficiencies during
shipment, as well as to water shortages, the grain boats often were
blocked en route and arrived late at their destination. This created
further delays for the next shipment because during the winter months
the canal was frozen and the grain boats could not go back to the South;
this, in turn, was compounded by the fact that the fleet would block the
river on its way home, when it met the next fleet of grain boats heading
north.
Li Fu's ingenuity and industry were able to overcome all of these
difficulties. He arranged for the grain to be stored in Tientsin instead of
Tungchow, and thus shortened the necessary distance for transport. He
also adopted a method of using straw to preserve the grain through the
cold winter, and reorganized the shipping administration to make it
more efficient. In the beginning, many officials considered his plan
impractical, but to their surprise he succeeded in carrying it out. His very
21. Ch'ing-shih (The history of the Ch'ing), Taipei, n.d., 294/4068.

22. MTCK, i5b/8a, 4o/5a-5b.
67
success in this mission won much appreciation from the Yung-cheng

emperor, who wrote that he had been "honorably entrusted by the state
to make an exhaustive effort" (feng-kuo ch'ing-hsiri) in praise of Li's
merit.23 The boatmen also felt the benefits of Li Fu's accomplishment,
since he abolished many corrupt practices such as the taking of illegal
fees from them. In spite of the enthusiasm of the boatmen, he resolutely
declined their offer to erect a shrine in his honor as an expression of
their gratitude.24
In April of 1724, Li Fu was appointed governor of Kwangsi, where
conflicts often arose between the aboriginal and Han people. He put
down a local uprising there and pacified a border quarrel between
Vietnam and China. On the cultural side, he restored the academy of
Hsiian-cheng in order to sinicize the aboriginal people and educate
students. This academy, which used to offer sacrifices to the two Neo-
Confucians, Lu Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih, had sunk into oblivion for
years.25 In addition, Li Fu initiated the compilation of the General History
of Kwangsi {Kwangsi t'ung-chih), which was completed by Kan Ju-lai, the
successor to his post, in 1726.
In 1725, Li Fu was promoted to the post of governor-general of Chihli
due to his outstanding performance. On his way back to the capital,
he had a bitter confrontation with T'ien Wen-ching (1662-1732), a
favorite of the emperor, who was currently the governor of Honan. At
that time, T'ien, claiming to set the bureaucracy in order, was behaving
harshly toward his subordinates. It is said that his dislike of the degree
holders caused him to impeach in a memorial a dozen local officials,
most of whom held their posts by formally passing the civil service
examinations. When he met T'ien, Li Fu became angry and said bitterly,
"Being as you are, a high official entrusted by the court to govern this
vast area, why do you deliberately trample the scholars underfoot?" T'ien
could not stand Li Fu's criticism, so he secretly sent a memorial to the
emperor accusing Li Fu of protecting local officials.26
On his return to the capital, Li verbally attacked T'ien during an
audience with the emperor that lasted until midnight. At first, the em-
peror trusted the words of Li Fu and was about to denounce T'ien.
Coincidentally, a memorial from the censor Hsieh Chi-shih (1689—
1756) had also made the allegations that T'ien Wen-ching was cruel and
23. MTCK, 19/19b.

24. For a detailed description of Li Fu's shipment of the grain see MTCK, 17—20, 20/
na-i2b.
25. MTCK, 39a/3a-4a.
26. Yuan Mei, Sui-yiian ch'uan-chi (The Complete works of Yuan Mei), Shanghai, 1981,
27/ia.
68
Li Fu: his life
unjust to local officials. The similarity in the content of these criticisms

aroused the emperor's suspicions. He felt that Li Fu and Hsieh Chi-shih
were conspiring to attack T'ien, so he changed his mind and denounced
Li and Hsieh instead. The Yung-cheng emperor had come to the throne
only after surviving fierce factional struggles among his brothers, and
had a special hatred for such conflict. In 1724, he issued an edict that on
no account would leniency be shown toward high officials involved in
factions.27
In spite of the emperor's support of T'ien, Hsieh Chi-shih pressed his
accusation until he himself was sent to trial. When interrogated by the
judge as to who instigated him to fabricate charges against T'ien, Hsieh
replied, "Confucius and Mencius." When the judge asked him why he
made such a reply, Hsieh answered: "The learning of Confucius and
Mencius teaches us that a subject should admonish the emperor when
he thinks it necessary to do so. If a subject knows of a corrupt official's
wrongdoings and does not report them to the emperor, he cannot count
as a loyal subject."28
Hsieh was exiled to Mongolia, where he devoted himself to writing
and teaching. His troubles continued; in 1729 he was impeached by the
commander of the military settlement, Hsi-pao, for his arrogance in
attacking the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. The commander sent Hsieh's
Annotations on the Great Learning of the Old Text (Ta-hsueh ku-pen-chu) to
Peking for investigation. The emperor found an implicit criticism of
himself in Hsieh's annotations. On this basis, Hsieh was sentenced to
capital punishment. However, he was later pardoned by the emperor.29
Li Fu underwent a similar experience. He was hot tempered by nature,
and any type of injustice aroused his indignation. He was well aware of
his own temper and in fact would give the name "nonanger studio" (wu-
nu-hsuari) to any place he resided as a constant reminder to control his
temper.30 In spite of this he often had difficulty getting along with his
colleagues due to his temper. Some of them took advantage of Li Fu's
offense against T'ien Wen-ching to slander him for concealing the crime
of another official, Ts'ai T'ien, through whose recommendation the
Yiing-ch'eng emperor before his ascension had originally come to know
Li Fu.31 Even worse, Li Fu was said to have been involved in a political
conspiracy. When he was the governor-general of Chihli, he had been
ordered to keep the emperor's brother and enemy, Yin-t'ang, in custody
at his headquarters, P'ao-ting. Li Fu had Yin-t'ang placed in special
confinement in a building surrounded by high walls, where he died
27. MTCK, 4o/i5a-i6b. 28. Ch'ing-shih, 294/4071. 29. Ibid., 294/4071.

30. MTCK, 30/ioa-iob. 31. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, Taipei, n.d.,
69
within three months. A rumor circulated widely that Li Fu had murdered

Ying-t'ang at the emperor's behest. The emperor, who was understand-
ably sensitive to this charge, blamed Li Fu for mishandling the case.32 Li
was demoted to vice-president of the Board of Works in early 1727.
Subsequently, various reports from his successors in Kwangsi and
Chihli accused Li Fu of mishandling local affairs and of recommending
incompetent personnel during his terms. Li Fu was ordered to go back
to Kwangsi to personally arrest an aborigine who had escaped from
prison. His friends were concerned for his safety since he had to com-
plete this job without any aid from the government. When Li Fu arrived
in Kwangsi, the aborigine returned to jail voluntarily, saying that he
could not show ingratitude to Li.
In spite of this, Li Fu was arrested upon returning from Kwangsi.
According to the sentence of the Ministry of Justice, Li Fu had commit-
ted crimes among which seventeen deserved strangulation and six de-
served beheading.33 The administration confiscated his property and
incidentally discovered that Li Fu was so poor that in spite of his high
official status, his wife's hairpins and earrings were made of bronze. In
jail, he read daily, ate with a hearty appetite, and slept soundly as if
nothing had happened to him. The former governor of Kansu, Hu Ch'i-
heng, who was also in prison, saw this and sighed that Li was really a man
of firm principle.34
Li Fu was twice brought to the market to face execution. The first time,
an official put to him questions concerning the classics and histories,
which Li Fu answered fluently. When the knife was put on his neck, the
official sent by the emperor asked him, "Now, do you understand the
merits of T'ien Wen-ching?" Li said "Even though I am to die, I do not
know the good of T'ien Wen-ching."35 In fact, the Yung-cheng emperor
had no intention of killing Li Fu at all. He simply wanted to frustrate Li
Fu's stubbornness. At the last moment the emperor commuted Li Fu's
death sentence on account of his outstanding learning and sent him
back to jail.36
32. For Li Fu's involvement with this case see Wen-hsien t'sung-pien, Peiping: Palace Mu-
seum, I3a-i8b. Chang T'ai-yen, a nationalistic scholar, says that the Yung-cheng
emperor attempted to kill Li Fu on the pretext of T'ien Wen-ching's case to cover his
murdering his own brother, Yin-t'ang. This seems quite implausible to me. See Chang
T'ai-yen, "Comments on Two Historical Events," Hua-kuoyiieh Wan, 1, no. 10, (1531-
4), Taipei, reprint.
33. CCTC, 17/208. In Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, there were only twenty-one crimes committed
by Li Fu. See Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, 15/6a-6b. According to Ch'uan Tsu-wang, the total
crimes amount to twenty-four. Yuan Mei also followed Ch'Cian's account without cor-
recting the items from twenty-four to twenty-three; see Sui-yuan ch'iian-chi 27/ia-ib.
34. CCTC, 17/208. 35. Yuan Mei, Sui-yiian ch'iian-chi, 27/2a, 1a.
36. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, i5/6b.
70
Li Fu: his life
One year later the emperor put Li on trial. During the course of the
trial, the emperor's expression was grave and his voice broke with anger.
All the attending officials were trembling, but Li Fu's response was as
calm as usual. Not only did he not beg for mercy; he also said, "I
committed a crime for which I deserve to be executed so as to warn those
who are disloyal to your Majesty."37 Hearing this, the emperor's anger
abated somewhat. Li Fu was finally pardoned and ordered to serve in
the Editorial Bureau, where he was to work on the General History of
the Eight-Banner System. Released from jail, Li Fu rode directly to the
bureau in a broken cart drawn by a skinny horse. He stayed away from
all social activities and concentrated on studying for eight years. In
1728, it is said that his wife died of grief over the course of Li Fu's
life.38
During this troubled period, Li Fu was intellectually very productive.
Apart from the job with the General History of the Eight Banners, he devoted
himself to editing his previous writings and to the compilation of three
philosophical works. The Ch'eng-Chu school had since the end of the
Sung period been elevated to the status of official learning; later owing
to the K'ang-hsi emperor's patronage, the status of this school reached
a peak. Most of the scholars read the Ch'eng-Chu annotations in order
to be successful in the civil service examinations and thereby become
famous.39 The Lu-Wang school thus became comparatively obscure in
contrast to the Ch'eng-Chu school of the day. Li Fu had been born near
Lu Hsiang-shan's birthplace, and his commitment to Lu's teaching
could be traced back to his youth. His local patriotism naturally drew his
attention to Lu's teaching, which provided him a way of living and a
philosophy of action. He once wrote a poem in which he lamented that
the people were ignorant that Lu's teaching was the access to the true
Way.40 Li Fu was determined to defend the Lu-Wang school against the
popular Ch'eng-Chu school. He pursued this goal via two methods: One
was to elaborate the Lu-Wang doctrines; the other was to construct the
intellectual genealogy of the Lu-Wang school to show its intellectual
continuity, as opposed to that of the Ch'eng-Chu school. He expanded
Lu Hsiang-shan's chronological biography (Lu-tzu nien-p'u) from two to
three chu'an and compiled the intellectual lineages of Lu Hsiang-shan
(Lu-tzu hsueh-j)'u) and Wang Yang-ming (Yang-ming hsueh-lu). He also
revised Yang-ming's work called Chu HsVs Final Conclusion Arrived at Late
in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-luri), adding materials and developing it
into a more sophisticated and comprehensive form. In doing so, he
37. CCTC, 17/208. 38. MTCK 27/1 b-2a.

39. Ch'ing-ju hsiieh-an, 55/1 a. 40. MTCK, 2
71
reinforced Yang-ming's argument that in his later days Chu Hsi came to
the same conclusion reached earlier by Lu.41
Meanwhile, Li Fu had many exchanges with two distinguished Lu-
Wang scholars, Wan Ju-lu and Ch'iian Tsu-wang (1705—55), both of
whom were invited to live in his house. They often gathered in his
garden, called Wisteria Studio, where they enjoyed fruitful discussions.42
Wan and Ch'iian were important in assisting Li Fu in accomplishing the
tasks already mentioned. Working together in the Editorial Bureau, both
Li Fu and Ch'iian Tsu-wang sensed the importance of the Yiing-lo Ency-
clopedia (Yiing-lo ta-tien) as a rich reservoir for rare and lost books. They
initiated an ambitious plan to recover all the valued books from the
quotations in this encyclopedia. They set a rule for themselves to edit
twenty chiian each day, and hired four copiers to write them down. But
due to the lack of money and helpers, they were unable to complete the
project, which aimed to recover all the lost annotations of the Sung-
Yiian scholars on the Three Rites (San-li). Nevertheless, they set an exam-
ple for later scholars, who compiled The Comprehensive Collections of the
Four Categories {Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu). This undertaking incorporated their
original project - the reconstruction of lost books from the Yiing-lo
Encyclopedia.^ Ch'iian Tsu-wang stayed with Li Fu from 1733 to 1736. In
Ch'iian's estimation, Li Fu was a very assertive man, always confident of
his own views. On the other hand, Li Fu did not impose his ideas on
others and was open to hearing different opinions. Li Fu often encour-
aged Ch'iian to express his views even though the two men sometimes
disagreed. Although Wan, Ch'iian, and Li shared an interest in Lu's
learning, there were shades of difference in their views. Owing to his
personal association with Lu's learning, Li Fu tended to attack Chu Hsi
vehemently. The other two could not entirely approve of his criticisms of
Chu Hsi and were somewhat successful in lessening his dislike of Chu
Hsi's thought.44
Li Fu held that one's acts should match one's beliefs. A common
utterance of his accurately reflects this spirit. He said, "After self-
examination, if I feel right in my inner mind, the worries of life or death
cannot move my mind; if fortune or misfortune cannot move my mind,
neither does success or failure. I find it is easy to live in this way."45 Upon
meeting Li Fu, a high official who claimed to be a champion of the Chu
Hsi school said: "Lu's teaching is not unworthy. However, I cannot feel
41. MTCK, 32/7a~7b, 32/ia-2a, 32/3a-4b. 42. CCTC, wai-pien, 20/931-932.

43. MTCK, 43/2oa-2ib. CCTC, wai-pien, 17/889-891. On the relation between the revis-
ing of the Yung-Lo Encyclopedia and the Comprehensive Collections of the Four Categories, see
Kuo Po-kung, Ssu-k'u-ch'uan-shu tsuan-hsiu-k'ao, 1937, p. 8.
44. CCTC, 17/209. 45. Ibid., 17/210.
72
Li Fu: his life
at ease in my mind with it. This means that Lu's teaching does not follow
the correct way of the sages." Li Fu responded: "When you took charge
of the official granaries, you attempted to submit the surplus (hsien-yu)
to curry favor. Did you feel right for having done that? Among those who
favor Lu's teaching, even a child would spit [be contemptuous] at this
behavior." The official became pale and never saw Li Fu again.46
Indeed, the hypocrisy and superficiality of the contemporary Ch'eng-
Chu scholars played a great role in reinforcing his commitment to
Lu-Wang doctrines. A description provided by K'ung Shang-jen (1648—
1718) pointedly described the general mentality of students of the day.
Asked why they honored Chu Hsi while attacking Lu Hsiang-shan and
Wang Yang-ming, students often replied that it was because Chu Hsi had
made commentaries, whereas Lu and Wang had not.47 This answer
exposed the real motive of the students in associating themselves with
the learning of Chu Hsi - their practical interest in the use of Chu Hsi's
commentaries for the civil service examination.
For Li Fu, the Ch'eng-Chu scholars simply used their learning as a
stepping-stone to fame and profit without regard to its role in real life.
This also showed a defect inherent in Chu Hsi's teaching: its exclusive
emphasis on the study of the classics.48 By contrast, Li Fu believed that
the Lu-Wang doctrine could provide a theory of moral cultivation to
bridge the gap between words and actions.49
Li Fu was known for enthusiastically helping scholars in difficulty and
recommended them to the court when possible. He had two lines of Lu
Yu's (1125-1210, the famous poet in the Sung period) poem written on
pillars. They read: "Although remote from those who have special talent,
my mind goes with them/In spite of my old age, my eyes become
refreshed whenever an excellent book comes across my way."50 It is a
precise description of Li Fu himself. When the Ch'ien-lung emperor
succeeded to the throne, he reinstated Li Fu and told him that the Yiing-
cheng emperor originally intended to employ him. The new emperor
ordered Li Fu to work for the Board of Revenue and then promoted him
to senior vice-president of the board.
In 1736, the court held the "erudite scholars" examination (po-hsiieh
hung-ts'u k'e). The high-ranking officials were expected to recommend
eligible students. After having used up his own quota, Li Fu asked his
student Sun Fu-hsien to recommend the poet Wang Tsao, who had not
yet been recommended by others. Sun appeared somewhat reluctant.
Seeing this, Li Fu burst into anger and cursed Sun to the extent that Sun
46. Ibid., 17/209. 47. K'ung Shang-jen, Hu-hai chi, Shanghai, 1957, 9/203-204.
48. MTCK, i 8 / i i a - n b , 4 5 / 4 b . 49. Ibid., 2 6/ 4 a. 50. CCTQ 17/210.
73
had to kneel down to apologize to appease Li's anger. The emperor

learned about this event the next day. Chastising Li for transgressing the
propriety of a high official, the emperor demoted him by two ranks.51 He
was ordered to work in the Bureau of the Three Rites, where he joined his
old friend Fang Pao (1668—1749), who had been purged by a literary
inquisition for his involvement with the Tai Ming-shih case.52 Li Fu later
suffered from the Tai case as well. In 1768, eighteen years after his
death, Li Fu's writings were banned on the charge that Li wrote two
poems for a gathering at which Tai was present.53
When Li Fu served in the Bureau of the Three Rites, his mother passed
away and he returned to his hometown to observe the mourning period.
When he returned from the observance, he first served as vice-president
of the Bureau of the Ming History in 1741.
Li Fu had a deep interest in history. He had written broadly on various
historical subjects, including comments on historical figures (shih-lun)
and a book devoted to the exposition of the Annual of Spring and Autumn
(Ch'un-ch'iu i-shih). Once he initiated a project to rewrite Sung history,
but failed to carry it through.54 During his term in the Bureau of the
Ming History, he was known for his erudition because he often contested
his colleagues' evaluations of historical figures. His apology for the
notorious Yen Sung (1480—1565) stands out the most distinctly. It is said
that in that debate none of his colleagues could win him over to their
view.55
After his service in the Bureau of the Ming History, he assumed
the vice-chancellorship of the secretariat in charge of the Chiang-
nan examination. During the examination period he suddenly fell ill,
becoming absent-minded and murmuring all day long. Having returned
to Peking, he was asked by the emperor to remain in the capital to
recover.
Many years earlier, when Wang Shih-chen first read Li Fu's
exmaination essays, he could not help but praise Li Fu as "having the
talent often thousand men."56 Indeed, Li Fu had combined the distinct
qualities of scholar, literatus, official, and general. But after he had led
51. Yuan Mei, Suiyiian ch'iian-chi, 27/1 a.

52. Fang Pao, Fang Wang-hsi hsien-sheng wen-chi, in Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts'ung-shu, Shanghai,
4/83.
53. Ibid., 4/83-84.
54. Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming Ch'ingpi-chi t'an-ts'ung, Shanghai, 1981, p. 323.
55. Juan Kuei-sheng, Ch'a-yii k'e-hua, Shanghai, 1959, chuan 3. Viewed from the perspec-
tive provided by Lee Cheuk Yin in his article on Yen Sung. Li Fu cannot be totally
wrong. See Lee Cheuk Yin, 'The Ming-feng chi and the Problem of the Appraisal of Yen
Sung," Journal of Ming Studies, no. 6 (1983), 37—76.
56. CCTC, 17/209; MTCK (1740), 6/15b-i6b.
74
Li Fu: his life
an eventful life, his health gradually began to decline. He never com-

pletely recovered from his illness, and in 1743 he resigned his office
because of failing health.57
Asked by the emperor if he had anything to say before taking his leave,
Li Fu merely replied, "To act with the same care in the end as in the
beginning" (shen chung ju shih),58 an epigram that also commented
ironically on the decline of the Ch'ing regime, which began shortly after
the Ch'ien-lung emperor reached the peak of a glorious reign in his
middle age. This concise maxim made by Li Fu for the Ch'ien-lung
emperor did not escape the historians' attention and was recorded in
the History of the Ch'ing Dynasty.59
To glorify Li Fu's return to his home, the Ch'ien-lung emperor com-
posed a poem in praise of Li's contributions to the state over three reigns
and his personal integrity as a Lu scholar. During his life, Li Fu pro-
moted the ideas that the learning of Chu Hsi consisted primarily of
"following the path of inquiry and study" (tao wen-hsiieh) and that the
superiority of Lu Hsiang-shan resided in "honoring the moral nature"
(tsun te-hsing), a theme first struck by Wu Ch'eng in the early Yuan and
inherited by Li Fu. The Ch'ien-lung emperor acknowledged Li's re-
marks.60 After his retirement, Li-Fu led a relatively tranquil life until his
death in Lin-ch'uan in 1750.
In sum, Li Fu's life furnishes us with the existential dimension to
enable us to appreciate why he was attracted to the thought of Lu
Hsiang-shan in his early days and subsequently took up the championing
of the Lu-Wang doctrines as his lifelong commitment. Apart from the
common stress on the need for practice in concrete situations, both Lu's
belief in "the fundamental mind" and Wang's in "the innate knowledge
of the good" provided Li Fu with the dynamism to respond to the ever-
changing situation he encountered.
Although Li Fu was a Lu-Wang scholar, he was well versed in evidential
study (k'ao-cheng) as well. He had no difficulty in grasping the merits of
the evidential approach and established good relations with the Hui
family that had been famous for doing evidential research over three
generations.61
57. Mu-t'angpieh-kao (The additional collection of Mu-t'ang's writings, hereafter abbrevi-

ated as MTPK), Fu-ch'i-t'ang, 1831, 33/2ib-23b.
58. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, i5/8a.
59. Ibid., i5/8b. Besides the Ch'ien-lung emperor's mishandling of personnel affairs in
his later years, other social and economic factors also contributed to the decline of the
Ch'ing regime.
60. Wang Ping-hsieh, Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'eng yen-hsing-lu (The deeds and words of the
famous officials of the Ch'ing), 1885 edition, i2/25a.
61. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsiieh shih-ch'eng-chih, Peking, 1983, p. 23.
75
Li Fu was also noted as an outstanding writer in his day. He was very

critical of Fang Pao's writings, although the latter had already enjoyed
great literary fame and was considered the leader of the T'ung-ch'eng
school.62 In writing an epigraph in memory of Fang Pao, Ch'uan Tsu-
wang singled out Li Fu and praised him and Fang as the two most
learned scholars south of the Yangtze River.63 The first collection of Li
Fu's writings was printed in 1740, entitled Mu-Vang ch'u-kao. His self-
confidence in his talent for literary composition can be seen in a letter
to a student seeking the latter's help to publish his book. In the letter he
asserts that his writings could compete with those of the established
writers of the Sung and the Yuan periods.64 Fang Pao also contributed a
preface to this collection in praise of Li Fu's literary merits.65 The second
collection of his writings, called Mu-t'angpieh-kao, appeared about 1747.
Both were banned in 1768 due to his involvement with the Tai Ming-
shih case.66 In 1831, a combined and revised edition of his writings was
reprinted with alteration and the omission of some passages that might
have invited censorship. The popularity of Li Fu's writings is evidenced
by the fact that certain illegal book merchants even put Li Fu's younger
brother's book in Li Fu's name in order to reap greater profits.67 Li Fu's
writings on current social and economic measures also attracted Ho
Ch'ang-ling's attention. Ho included some of them in his famous an-
thology, Writings from Our Dynasty on Statecraft (Huang-ch'ao ching-shih
wen-pien) ,68
62. Ch'en K'ang-ch'i, Lang-ch'ien chi-wen san-pi, Peking, 1984, pp. 842-843.
63. CCTC, 17/204. 64. MTCK, $5/5a. 65. Fang Pao, Fang Wang-hsi, 4/83-84.
66. 'The Case of Li Fu's Literary Compositions," in Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yu tang, 2nd series,
Taipei, 1969, pp. ia-2b.
67. A certain merchant changed Nan-yuan shih-wen-ch'ao, a collection of essays actually
composed by Li Fu's brother, Li Hung, to the title, Mu-fang shih-wen ch'ao to cheat
those who liked to read Li Fu's writings. The so-called Mu-t'angshih-wen-ch'ao, available
in the Harvard Yenching Library, is in fact Nan-yuan shih-wen-ch 'ao.
68. Ho Ch'ang-ling, Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien, 1896.
76
Li Fu: an exemplary
Lu-Wang scholar in the
Ch'ing dynasty (2)
His thought
His conception of destiny (ming)

In discussing Li Fu's thought, it may be useful to start with what he
believes can and cannot be accomplished during a person's lifetime. His
notion of destiny reveals his perception of the limits of human effort in
general and of moral practice in particular. In his view, people who lack
a correct understanding of the meaning of destiny cannot become sages
or wise men. Some of these people neither believe nor trust in the
operation of destiny. They think that a person can pursue the good and
avoid disasters at one's will. On the other hand, others assign too great
a role to destiny. Believing that everything is predetermined, they simply
submit themselves to the hands of destiny. Both ideas are incorrect,
according to Li Fu.1
A clear discussion of the nature of destiny seems superfluous to those
who already reside in the zone of virtue; but it is absolutely necessary for
those who are immersed in material desires, but willing to learn. The
strategy used to enlighten the latter is to teach them an appropriate
belief in destiny. This is not to suggest that one should simply become
obsessed with fortune and misfortune. Instead, one should engage one-
self in the sages' Way. A second task is to show that the good are
remunerated with blessing and the evil with calamity. Only after realiz-
ing these truths can one be virtuous.2 At first glance these two tasks
appear to be contradictory, but they are not.
1. MTCK, i8/6a. 2. Ibid., i8/6a-6b.
77
Li Fu's idea of destiny had two components. One concerns the deter-
minate destiny (yu-ting chih ming), which man is made to follow. The
other is the indeterminate destiny (wu-ting chih ming) which awaits its
realization by the will of man. Therefore, for the gentleman there are
two modes of learning that correspond to these two destinies. For the
determinate destiny, there is the learning of waiting for fate (ssu-ming
chih hsu'eh); for the indeterminate destiny, there is the learning of estab-
lishing one's own destiny (li-ming chih hsu'eh). Both are important to a
gentleman in leading a moral life.3
According to Li Fu, in the universe there are vital forces (ch 'i) such as
yin and yang, through which the ten thousand things are created.
Among all creatures, man is the most intelligent. So it is plausible to see
these two destinies in him.4 Man has a life cycle just as ch 'i has its pattern
of rise and fall. When ch 'i is ascending, no one can force it down; when
ch'i is down, no one can make it go up. Thus man's life cycle cannot be
reversed or changed. However, Li Fu does not care to illustrate this point
with examples from physical life, but instead applies the pattern of ch 'i to
human destiny as a whole. The ups and downs of destiny are decided by
Heaven and therefore called the determinate destiny. The determinate
destiny is further categorized under four items. From the microscopic to
the macroscopic, they are the determinate destiny of an individual, of a
family, of a state, and of the world.5
When the world leaned to prosperity, the sagely emperors Yu, T'ang,
Wen, and Wu could bring about a grand age through their rule. When
it declined, even sages such as Confucius and Mencius could not put it
in order. When a state was on the rise, dukes such as Huan of Ch'i and
Wen of Chin could assume hegemonies. When a state like Lu was on the
decline, a great minister such as Kung-i-tzu and wise men such as Tzu-liu
and Tzu-ssu could do nothing to stop its downfall. The same is true of the
fate of an individual and a family. If a family moves toward prosperity,
the father will initiate a great undertaking and his son will inherit it. But
if a family declines, things will go the other way. For an individual, when
he is in a prosperous trend, the Way will be manifested in him; when not,
the Way will perish. These are the four determinate destinies against
which a gentleman can voice no complaints and has to accept.6 In other
words, even men of sagely endowment may appear in history, but
whether they can bring their wisdom and virtue to bear upon society is
to a large extent dependent on the times.
However, there are also four indeterminate destinies relating to the
world, state, family, and individual. One can see the indeterminate
3. MTCK, i8/6b. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., 18/73. 6. Ibid., i8/7a~7b.

78
Li Fu: his thought
destiny manifested in the general trend. For example, although the

Ch'in merged six other states and unified the world as parts of a general
trend, the Ch'in empire lasted for only two generations because its rulers
disregarded benevolent politics. The Eastern Chou regime, although
weak, lasted very long, for it benefited from the accumulated achieve-
ment of its previous virtuous rulers. The examples of the manifestations
of the indeterminate destiny on the level of state can be seen in the
various lands of the Warring States period. Solely dependent on their
might, the states of Wu and Yueh acquired hegemony quickly, but lost it
after a very short while. Lu and Wei, despite their weaknesses, endured
for a long period because they had accommodated many gentlemen and
rites. Family and individual are no exceptions to this rule. They rise
when they behave morally; they decline when they do not.7
This description of the indeterminate destiny seems to contradict the
concept of the determinate destiny mentioned by Li Fu previously. To
resolve this apparent contradiction, Li Fu introduces the concept of chi
(accumulation). People are constantly puzzled by the phenomenon that
good deeds do not always pay rich dividends to the doer. Or sometimes
they are mistaken in holding that only emperors or ministers with great
powers can establish their destiny, as opposed to those scholars and
commoners who are incapable of doing so because their power is too
feeble to dominate ch'i (vital force). All of these mistaken views result
from their ignorance of the concept of chi (accumulation).8 Ten thou-
sand things are formed by ch'i and are always located in a trend. The
trend so defined is the embodiment of overwhelming ch'i or the disposi-
tion of ch'i moving in a dynamic process. The ch'i as a trend is not
influenced by the small, individual acts of good or evil made by separate
acts of human behavior. In order to transform ch'i substantially, one
needs to accumulate enough acts, whether good or evil, over a period of
time. Only then can ch'i (the determinate destiny, here) be changed or
a trend be reoriented.9
Indeed, Li Fu leaves room for moral practice to play a role in human
destiny. But how much influence can it exert on human affairs? It seems
that its effects are quite limited. Li Fu well recognized that ch 'i as a trend,
an environmental force, sets a priori the track that human effort must
follow and thereby constrains it. Determinate destiny as a given ch'i (or
trend, here) means to him much more than historical or social factors
understood in today's scientific context. The notion of a determined fate
came from the pattern of ch % a mysterious, impersonal, and encompass-
ing cosmic force and material. Pervading the universe, the pattern of ch'i
7. Ibid., i8/7a. 8. Ibid., i8/7b. 9. Ibid., i8/8a.
79
regulates human affairs as well. It is too powerful for any human being
to modify. Moral practice, defined by Li Fu as the indeterminate destiny,
seems to be a restraining force to check - rather than to change entirely
- the pattern of ch'i. Historical examples provided by Li Fu bear witness
to this. Even a man as sage as Confucius could not restore the ideal
feudalistic order to the Chou regime. The longevity of certain types of
benevolent politics can be attributed to the character of the trend at the
time when power was assumed, as in the cases of kings Wen and Wu.
When Li Fu adopts the idea of the accumulation of moral behavior in
opposition to the determining power of the pattern of ch % he considers
moral practice in a quantitative sense and counts the consequence of
moral behavior rather than its existential meaning. He believes that in
the long run, through the accumulation of individual moral acts, the
pattern of ch'i can be altered to a certain extent. This throws light on
why, in spite of his severe criticisms of Buddhism, Li Fu thinks that it is
worth retaining the ledgers of merit and demerit (kung-kuo-ko) as a
form of recording daily concrete moral behavior without adopting
such Buddhist doctrines as the rebirth of the soul or the theory of
emptiness.10
The ledgers of merit and demerit, which had come into being in the
Sung but became widely popular in the late Ming, were initially devel-
oped by the Buddhists, Taoists, or even Confucians to evaluate daily
deeds with a credit system in which a balance is achieved by adding a
point for each merit and deducting a point for each demerit. The
greater the balance of the credit, the better a person is in moral terms,
and the more he or she will be rewarded by gods. A believer is expected
to carry on this method each day, and at the end of each month and each
year must also calculate how he or she stands. Mechanical though the
system is, it implies that one can evaluate oneself by doing virtue and
eschewing vice, and thereby take charge of one's own fate.11
It was interesting to note that in contrast to Li Fu, such Ch'eng-Chu
scholars as Lu Liu-liang and Chang Lii-hsiang attacked the ledgers of
merit and demerit and their advocate, Yuan Huang, vehemently, be-
cause the ledgers contradicted the Confucian "learning of establishing
destiny."12 But such Lu-Wang scholars as Li Fu and Chang Hsueh-ch'eng
10. MTCK,
11. As for the ledgers of merit and demerit see Tadao Sakai, "Confucianism and Popular
Education Works," in William Theodore de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought
(New York, 1970), pp. 341-345. Also see Cynthia Brokaw's study on the same subject,
The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit (Princeton, N.J., 1991).
12. MTCK, 43/10a. See Lu Liu-liang, Ssu-shu chiang-i, prefaced in 1686, i7/3a~3b; Chang
Lii-hsiang, Chang Yang-yuan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi, 1871, 28723a.
80
Li Fu: his thought
favored the adoption of the ledgers as a tool of moral cultivation.13 The

difference in their attitudes toward ledgers, I speculate, might lie in the
fact that the Wang Yang-ming school during the late Ming period was
associated with the movement of the unity of three teachings (san-chiao
ho-i), and the ledgers were a synthetic phenomenon. Therefore, the Lu-
Wang scholars were not so hostile to ledgers as the Ch'eng-Chu school
often was.
At the age of twenty-four, Li Fu once used the ledgers to examine his
daily life.14 His approval of the ledgers of merit and demerit shows that
although he does not expect that good or bad deeds will induce rewards
or punishments on either an immediate or a short-term basis, he does
believe that human destiny can be altered through incessant moral
effort over a long period. More revealing, moral behavior denned by Li
Fu as countable, discrete units lacks the character of intrinsic connec-
tion, as the pattern of ch 'i always does. According to such an understand-
ing, Li Fu unwittingly relegates moral practice to secondary importance
in contrast to the enormous collective force of the pattern of ch'i (the
determinate destiny) in its domination over the human world. His belief
in geomancy is a good indication of this. Once he complained to his
brother that because the latter did not manage their father's tomb
properly, they let out the good ch 'i and caused quite a few misfortunes to
befall the family, including the death of Li Fu's two children, the illness
of their eldest brother, and his own trouble in official service.15 Besides
being a duty of a local official, Li Fu's performance of sacrificial rites to
a god of the city wall (Ch 'eng-huang) or to the god of the river, as well as
his praying for rain and good harvest, can also be understood in this
context.16 In this regard, Li Fu stood in contrast to his "master," Lu
Hsiang-shan. When Lu served as a magistrate, he substituted moral
teachings for religious ceremonies.17
If, quantitatively speaking, moral practice can never be as efficacious
as ch'i as a whole, an interpretation of moral behavior in a qualitative
sense might. In the essay "On Destiny," Li Fu not only offers the quanti-
tative argument already described, but also reveals another conviction
he held concerning moral effort. The second argument is often entan-
gled with the first, for Li Fu is eager to persuade the layman to convert
to the sagely Way through the accumulation of moral acts. The second
argument recovers its original form only through a roundabout
13. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Chang-shih i-shu, Taipei, n.d. 2g/i2b-i4a.
14. MTCK 43/ioa. 15. MTPK 35/gb-ioa.
16. Ibid., 48/3a~3b, 4a~4b, 5a~5b, 6a-6b.
17. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Chiu-yuan chi, Peking, 1980, 36/510.
analysis further attested to by Li Fu's personal demonstration of moral

courage.
When Li Fu tries to define the indeterminate destiny, he says:
Heaven endows man with ch yi. There must be principle in correspondence to this
ch'i Ch'i has increase and decrease; but not principle. Ch'i has up and down but
not principle. The state of prosperity cannot abruptly fall, but a gentleman is to
worry about its prosperity. The state of decline cannot abruptly be recovered, but
a gentleman is to help raise it from its state of decline. Thus [Mencius] says,
"This is the fate, but therein lies human nature. That is why the gentleman does
not regard it as fate."18 This is the so-called indeterminate destiny.19
That Li Fu quotes Mencius in this statement reminds us that his concep-
tion of the indeterminate destiny is in effect a variation on the theme of
human nature first proposed by Mencius. As Mencius had said:
The way the mouth is disposed toward tastes, the eye toward colors, the ear
toward sounds, the nose toward smells, and the four limbs toward ease is human
nature, yet therein also lies fate. That is why the gentleman does not describe it
as nature. The way benevolence pertains to the relation between prince and
subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good and
wise man, and the sage to the Way of Heaven, is fate, but therein also lies human
nature. That is why the gentleman does not describe it as fate.20
Li Fu's definition of indeterminate destiny corresponds well to
Mencius's stress on the moral character of human nature. In addition,
he enriches the discussion of it with the concepts of principle and ch'i.
Unlike ch'i, principle is not subject to change. Li Fu believed that a
gentleman should stand on principle rather than submit totally to ch 'I21
In other words, a gentleman does not shift his ground to accord with the
vicissitudes of destiny. Moral behavior concerns itself with principle, not
the external operation of ch'i Li Fu's conviction that moral practice is a
kind of existential decision based on intrinsic human values displays his
conception of principle as being located in moral discourse.
But when Li Fu turns to the concept of the accumulation of indeter-
minate destiny in contrast to the pattern of ch % he is shifting from a
deontological argument to a utilitarian one in which the meaning of
moral commitment is blurred by an objective calculation of efficiency.
However, at least three points are clear to us. First, Li Fu holds that it is
necessary to take the result of long-term moral practices into account in
order to influence the determinate destiny.
18. SSCC, Mencius, p. 210. 19. MTCK, i8/6b~7a.

20. English translation is taken from D.C. Lau with a slight modification. D.C. Lau, trans.,
Mencius, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp. 198-199.
21. MTCK, i8/7b.
82
Li Fu: his thought
Second, a sense of moral autonomy also finds expression in his

thought, but more vividly in his action. In an essay written for one of his
students, he states a maxim rooted in his mind from reading Mencius and
The Doctrine of the Mean in his youth. He writes: "In situating oneself, one
should reside in changes and await his destiny; in charge of business, one
should act only according to the norm and await his destiny."22 So a full
understanding of Li Fu's ethical view needs to cover two dimensions. As
for external things or conditions like fame and wealth, one should not
attempt to pursue them because they are beyond oneself, and thus their
gain or loss are decided by uncontrollable fate. As for moral perfection,
man can totally rely upon his own inner decision and effort. Since moral
perfection belongs to the realm of the autonomous to oneself, one can
achieve it by oneself.23
Finally, seeing that Li Fu regards principle as the source of moral
discourse, he has to admit the discrepancy between principle and ch'i as
well as that between moral practice (indeterminate destiny) and trend
(determinate destiny).24 This distinction between principle and ch'i is
not an insignificant aspect of a Lu-Wang scholar's construction of a
theory of morality. To him ch'i is the cosmic force or substance that
goes through Heaven and Earth as well as the ten thousand things. But
unlike Chu Hsi, in discussing the concept of destiny Li Fu emphasizes
the aspect of ch'i as a huge, hardly resistible trend rather than as an
individual's endowment such as wisdom, folly, or longevity. The disposi-
tion in a major Lu-Wang scholar to understand ch'i as a general trend
with deterministic overtones deserves our attention.
In fact, Li Fu's appreciation of the concept of destiny should not be
taken as a sheer intellectual exercise, but as a personal reflection on his
existential predicament. The separability of principle from ch 'i reveals
the tensions deeply rooted in his life as a Lu-Wang scholar-official under
an alien regime, and as a minority Lu-Wang thinker overwhelmed by the
majority Ch'eng-Chu school. Politically, Li Fu's acceptance of the Ch'ing
regime is understandable because the rise or fall of a political power was
associated in his thought with the pattern of encompassing ch% and thus
22. MTPK, g/i2a-i2b.

23. MTCK, 43/22a-23b. Mencius anticipated the same idea long before Li Fu. Mencius
said: "Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it. If this is the case then seeking
is of use to getting and what is sought is within yourself. But if there is a proper way to
seek it and whether you get it or not depends on destiny, then seeking is of no use to
getting and what is sought lies outside yourself." SSCC, Mencius, p. 188. The English
translation is taken from Lau, Mencius, p. 182.
24. For a general discussion of the development of the concept of fate (ming) over Chinese
history see Tang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun (On Chinese philosophy),
Hong Kong, 1966, chs. 16—18.
83
the Ch'ing regime represented the rise of ch'l However, Li Fu cannot

come to terms with the dominant Ch'eng-Chu school because intellec-
tual commitment means an individual moral decision and thus a matter
of "principle." In this regard, his life can be regarded as a confirmation
of his theoretical articulation of the concept of destiny: Although an
individual is too finite to resist predetermined destiny or the movement
of ch'i, he is entitled to stand on principle to magnify the meaning of his
commitment to the Way and thereby to assert his existence.
The character of the Way (too)

What is the Way? And where is the Way manifested? According to Li
Fu, the Way is found in the relationship between lord and subject,
father and son, husband and wife, brothers, and friends. These five
fundamental human relationships (wu-luri) are regarded as eternal
and ethical in character. If the Way is so defined, then education
(chiaOy education in a broad sense) should begin with teaching these
human relationships (jen-lun), which are indispensable for human
self-preservation.25
Li Fu was in essence an anthropogenic constructivist who believed that
human culture and civilization were intentionally created by the sage-
kings and the sages.26 In ancient China, during the time of the sage-kings
Yao, Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu,27 political authority and cultural
authority were combined in one - instructors and education policy came
from above. After kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty, although
power shifted to the duke of Chou, the Way was still retained in court. By
the time of Confucius, the Way moved down to the intellectuals (shih) as
education became common among them.28
Li Fu illustrates this assertion by pointing out that the earliest educa-
tional program was initiated by the sage-kings Yao and Shun to instruct
the minister Ch'i how to teach people the five ethical principles, that is,
the affection between father and son, the righteousness between sover-
eign and minister, the distinction between husband and wife, the proper
order between old and young, and fidelity between friends. The ancient
25. MTCK, 18/1 a.

26. The term "anthropogenic constructivist" is borrowed from Professor Yu-sheng Lin in
referring to "a belief that social, political, and moral orders of the world are inten-
tional constructions by sage-kings and sages of antiquity." See his Crisis of Chinese
Consciousness, Madison, Wise, 1978, p. 51. I employ this term in a broader sense to
include the renovations of the physical civilization by the sages.
27. The sage-kings of ancient China usually referred to two emperors, Yao and Shun, and
four kings, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu.
28. MTCK, i8/2a-2b.
84
Li Fu: his thought
text version of the Chou-li asserts that the minister of instruction teaches
three things to people: the "six virtues" (liu-te), the "six conducts" (liu-
hsing), and the "six arts" (liu-i).29 All of these are intrinsically associated
with the five human relationships, and through them a distinctively
ethical community can be formed. In that period, the sage-kings pro-
moted education from above. Those who received their teachings were
regarded as their subjects.30 Later, the sages inherited this tradition in
instructing people to farm, fish, build houses, and make weapons for
self-protection.
Through their ingenious cultural innovations and ritual practices, the
sage-kings created solidarity among the people and invented the written
language for the purpose of communication. Further, they arranged the
social hierarchy on the basis of political and economic differentiation.
For instance, in terms of political distinctions, there were the sovereign,
the ministers, the low-ranking officials, and the commoners; in terms of
professions, there were the scholars, the peasants, the workers, and the
merchants. All of these various groups originated from the five funda-
mental categories of human relations.31 Therefore, no true Way existed
outside of these five human relationships. Li Fu concludes, "If the Way
exists only in human relationships, no teaching can go beyond human
relationships. "32
Historically speaking, Li Fu believes that the later the age, the more
sophisticated the culture, and consequently, the more comprehensive
the contents of education. To Li Fu, this was the universal pattern
followed since the golden age of the sage-kings. But after the breakdown
of the Chou feudal order, cultural power became separated from politi-
cal power and fell into the hands of the intellectuals. Thereupon, people
who did not understand the Way's evolution during the ancient golden
age wrongly considered the teachings of the sages to be exclusively the
doctrine of the Confucians.33
Taking advantage of the divorce of the cultural tradition from political
authority, the first generation of heterodox teachers emerged with Yang
Chu and Mo-tzu to compete with Confucian transmission of orthodox
teachings established by the sage-kings. According to Li Fu, it was
Mencius who first reserved the word "ju" for those who fought for the
authentic Way and against heterodoxies. Before Mencius, the word ju
29. The six virtues are wisdom, humanity, sageliness, righteousness, loyalty, and harmony;
the six conducts are filial piety, friendliness, fraternity, kindness, love of kin, trustwor-
thiness, and charity; the six arts are rite, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and
mathematics.
30. MTCK, 18/ia-ib. 31. Ibid., i8/ia-2b.
32. Ibid., i8/2a. 33. Ibid., i8/2a-2b.
85
was used to refer to scholars in general. After him,ju became specifically

used to denote the members of the Confucian school.34
Yang Chu promoted the doctrine of egoistic love (wei-wo), and Mo-tzu
that of universal love (chien-ai). Although Yang Chu and Mo-tzu were
heretics, they did not entirely abandon the idea of five basic human
relationships. It was only the extreme forms of their doctrines that were
detrimental to human relations. Mo-tzu's "universal love," if pushed to
the extreme, would blur the intimate relations between father and son.
Yang Chu's "egoistic love," if pushed to its extreme, would eradicate the
obligations between sovereign and minister. Mo-tzu set forth a social
ideal directly counter to the natural expression of biological intimacy
between parents and children. In Yang Chu's case, to the extent that
egoistic love becomes a concern only for oneself, the individual would
disregard the social obligations indispensable for the functioning of
society, even though the individual survives best in a social network.
Mencius had to dispute with Yang and Mo because he was well aware of
their implicit mistakes.35 Because human relations were necessary for
self-preservation, Mencius was justified in saying, "Those who flee from
the errors of Mo naturally turn to Yang, and those who flee from the
errors of Yang naturally turn to the Confucians."36
More serious challenges to Confucianism later came from Taoists and
Buddhists who claimed that their "Way" transcended human relation-
ships. Li Fu leveled criticisms at both doctrines by showing that only
human relationships enable man's self-preservation.37 In the human
body, Li Fu maintains, there exists principle (li), spirit (sheri), vital force
{ch'i), and form (hsingh). Humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom,
and truthfulness are what he meant by principle. The operation of
consciousness is spirit. Inhalation and exhalation are vital force. Ears,
eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs are the form of the body. When
one allows principle to direct the spirit, one's spirit to control vital force,
and the vital force to circulate in the body, human relationships arise
when all of these prevail in oneself and the world.38 Viewed in this light,
Li Fu regards human relationships as the external and dynamic manifes-
tations of human endowment. Even if the "Way" of Buddhists can shed
light on the past and predict the future, they do not concern themselves
with human relations because of their obsession with the quietness of the
spirit to the exclusion of things and principles. The spirit they attain is
vulnerable to disturbance when it moves in response to things. The same
is true for the "Way" of the Taoists. At best, it can cure illnesses and
34. MTCK i8/2b. 35. Ibid., 18/33. 36. SSCC, Mencius, p. 211; MTCK, i8/2b.
37. MTCK 18/33. 38. Ibid., i8/3a~3b.
86
Li Fu: his thought
prolong human life, but their "Way" brings nothing to human relations
because of their preoccupation with the purity of vital force to the
exclusion of all things and principles. The vital force they cultivate is
vulnerable to failure in action.39 Hence, only the Confucian Way is valid
under all circumstances because it is immanent in human relations.
Worried about the spread of these heterodoxies. Han Yu (768—824),
the forerunner of Neo-Confucians, urged the government to suppress
them, and Ou-yang Hsiu (1007—72) proposed cultivation of the funda-
mental to oppose them. To Li Fu, it is superfluous to do either because
the true Confucian Way will eventually be realized in this world. The
reason is obvious: The teachings of the sages consist in the five human
relationships. To dispense with these human relationships would be to
eradicate human society. For example, without the distinction between
the sovereign and the minister, the strong would mistreat the weak, the
majority would oppress the minority, and disorder would prevail; with-
out the distinction between husband and wife, the reproductive system
would cease.40
To Li Fu, it was also incorrect for Neo-Confucians since the Southern
Sung to argue against Taoism and Buddhism by employing such abstract
concepts as "nature" or "mind." These concepts were so elusive that they
were exploited by various sides to support different positions. Often the
more one used these terms, the more confused one became. To avoid
the confusion brought about by such metaphysical discussions, one
should directly appeal to the substance of the five human relationships.
The constant performance of these human relationships in daily life was
the best demonstration of the real nature of the Way.41
Human society cannot exist even for a moment without the five hu-
man relationships, and therefore the Way of the sages will not cease for
a moment. One who fears the influence of Taoism and Buddhism is
mistaken: He does not realize that as long as men live in this world they
cannot transcend the categories of human relationships. Through his
identification of the Confucian Way with secular human relations, Li Fu
broadens the community of Confucians to include all classes of people.
Anyone who fulfills the substance of the human relationships is by
definition counted as a Confucian. Hence, peasants, workers and mer-
chants, together with the Confucian intellectuals, are all regarded as
Confucians. Confucians thus defined far outnumbered the heretics. The
influence of Confucianism was thus much greater than that of Taoism
and Buddhism.42 In accordance with the true Way, the program of
Confucian education lies in the teaching of the five human relation-
39. Ibid., 24/ib. 40. Ibid., i8/3b~4a. 41. Ibid., 24/ib. 42. Ibid., i8/4b.
87
ships, which are the practical expression of moral principle.43 In Li Fu's

mind, there apparently is a slight difference between the Way and prin-
ciple. The Way is principle in the process of operation. In other words,
until principle is acted upon, it cannot be called the Way. It is not only
true of the Way of man, but also true of Heaven's Way. The principle
of Heaven is called the Great Ultimate. When principle is accompanied
by cWi and transforms itself in the world, it is called yin and yang. The
Way is yin and yang in operation. The Way and yin and yang are invisible.
They belong to the category of "above form" (hsing-erh-shang), as Lu
Hsiang-shan had asserted in opposition to Chu Hsi.44 If the Way is
manifest only in the dimension of action, the appropriate way of learn-
ing should focus on the realization of principle in human behavior.
Li Fu's sympathy with the reforms of Wang An-shih can be explained
in terms of his notion of the Way as well.45 The true Way cannot be
remote from or ineffectual in human affairs. Nonetheless, the reforms of
Wang An-shih did not exemplify a perfect demonstration of the exercise
of the Way because of their failure in the end. By this standard of the
Way, the incomparable achievements in the civil and military service
belonged to Wang Yang-ming and were the result of the practice of his
own doctrine.46 Lo Ch'in-shun, a famous contemporary of Yang-ming,
could not compare with Yang-ming as a statesman. This provides Li Fu
with another reason to assert that Yang-ming's doctrine is far superior to
that of Lo Ch'in-shun.47
Li Fu believes that man is self-sufficient in moral resources, for he is
endowed at birth with innate knowledge of the good. Innate knowledge
that is a priori needs no borrowing from the external world. If so, what
does learning consist of? Learning as an empirical experience is, first of
all, the "imitation" (hsiao) of heaven's principle of our mind. In other
words, the effect of learning is expressed through the extension of the
innate knowledge to practical action.48 Learning thus conceived is pri-
marily an ongoing process extending from within our minds toward
what is outside.
Subsidiary to this major form of learning, book reading and other
literary activities can be considered secondary learning. They help to
nourish our mind and broaden our view "only when we are isolated from
other persons."49 This qualification indicates that the problem of human
43. MTCK, 18/ioa. 44. Ibid., 21/17a.
45. For example, his sympathy with the reform of Wang An-shih is expressed in his
justification for Wang. Like Lu Hsiang-shan, Li Fu has a more positive opinion of Wang
An-shih's reform than Chu Hsi does. See MTCK, 45/6a~7a, and his comments in
LHCC, 19/iob. For Lu's appraisal of Wang An-shih, see CTWC, 7o/6b-i3a.
46. MTCK, 45/1 lb-i2a. 47. Ibid., i8/i7a-i7b. 48. Ibid., 18/ioa.
49. MTCK{ 1740), 21/18b, MTCK 18/12b.
88
Li Fu: his thought
relatedness is of prime concern to Li Fu. The Way emerges only in

human interactions. One is not obliged to grasp everything in books. Li
Fu states:
[Reading and discussing the classics] are useful to cultivate our mind and body.
But even if we exert ourselves fully to master the classics, it in fact adds nothing
to our learning, for the principles contained in these texts are already to be
found in our nature. It does not diminish the value of our learning if we do not
understand every point in these texts, for one's degree of comprehension of any
text often depends on his own temperament.50
Therefore, for Li Fu, it is misleading for Chu Hsi and his followers to
treat textual studies and intellectual discussion as the major forms of
learning. Learning in a real sense is never a matter of discussion and
speculation.51 The first task of learning is to direct our attention to the
innate knowledge of our mind. Through the actualization of the innate
knowledge in concrete situations, the end of learning is finally achieved.
Man thus learns "something" from the process of his association of
the inner moral principle with external conditions. In this sense, we
can understand why Li Fu relegates the study of the classics to a role
of secondary importance. Similarly, ko-wu (the measurement of
things, according to Li) never means book learning and intellectual
discussion, and ch'iung-li (the search for principle) is not simply a matter
of intellectual understanding alone.52
Lu Hsiang-shan had urged people to cultivate themselves through
social interactions; still, he put knowledge prior to action. 53 Wang Yang-
ming called for vigorous and active effort in polishing and training
oneself in the actual affairs of life, but he placed knowledge and action
on the same footing temporarily.54 While this respect for the importance
of practical action finds its expression in Li Fu's thought, too, he goes
beyond his precursors in maintaining that action is the very source from
which knowledge comes.55 This unique concern with action results in his
development of a particular interpretational theory in which the original
wording of the classics concerning knowledge or learning is turned into
a description of action. A few examples will suffice for our analysis. In the
Analects, Confucius said: "[A gentleman] should study all learning exten-
sively" (po-hsiieh yu wen) .56 Rather than referring to the classic texts such
as the Book of Poetry, learning (wen) here is taken by Li Fu to mean the
items of seeing (shih), hearing (t'ing), speaking (yen), and behaving
(tung).57 By holding that Confucius's self-description about being fond
50. MTCK(1740), 2i/i8b. 51. MTCK, 18/1 lb. 52. MTCK(1740), 21/24^
53. LHCC, i2/6a-6b, 34/1 ob, 39b, 36/9^ 54. CHL, p. 31.
55. MTCK i8/ioa-i5a. 56. SSCQ Analects, p. 39. 57. MTCK (1740), 21/19b.
89
of antiquity and earnestly seeking it, Li Fu asserts something specifically

about Confucius's textual compilations rather than about a general
method of study. Certainly po-hsueh (broad learning) in the Doctrine of the
Mean cannot, in the eyes of Li Fu, be taken to mean "study, inquiry, and
reflection."58
In short, an "emphasis on praxis" permeates Li Fu's voice. In this
regard he was probably influenced by the Yen-Li school, a group of
thinkers active a generation earlier who advocated that action and only
action was the touchstone of all truth.59 However, Li Fu does not go as far
as Yen Yuan does in proclaiming that "the more one reads the more
foolish one becomes," or even that "reading a book is just the same as
swallowing arsenic."60 Li's concern for the need for action blends with
another stream of thought initiated by Ku Yen-wu and Huang Tsung-hsi.
For examples, Huang wrote, "Without wide reading one cannot confirm
the variations of the principle."61 This stream of thought gradually
reached its peak in Li Fu's day. Li Fu represents not only an authentic
Lu-Wang thinker but also a man of erudition. In order to survive in an
age dominated by an interests in textual research, a Lu-Wang scholar
had to cut his clothes in a way that was not at all compatible originally
with Lu-Wang tradition.
The relationship between mind (hsin), nature (hsing),

and principle (li)
Even if a discussion of the general view of the Way cannot clearly
distinguish a Lu-Wang from a Ch'eng-Chu scholar, an exposition of their
conceptualization of the relationship among mind, nature, and prin-
ciple should suffice. In other words, philosophically, the essential dis-
tinction between a Lu-Wang and a Ch'eng-Chu scholar can be easily seen
in their different understanding of the relationship between these three
concepts. Li Fu distinguishes himself successfully as a Lu-Wang thinker
in the early Ch'ing by inheriting and synthesizing the Lu-Wang heritage,
on the one hand, and by responding to Ch'eng-Chu scholars' chal-
lenges, on the other. Thus one of the best ways to understand Li Fu's
conception of the relationships among mind, nature, and principle is
to view his defense of Wang Yang-ming's ontology of mind and the
extension of the innate knowledge of the good (chih liang-chih).
58. MTCK, 2i/igb-2oa.

59. Li Fu has a high regard for Li Kung's personal attainment of his own learning and
viewpoint. MTCK, 33/2D.
60. Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih, vol. 1, pp. 163—164.
61. CCTC, 11/136.
9O
Li Fu: his thought
In the conversation at T'ien-ch'uan Bridge with disciples Wang Chi

and Ch'ien Te-hung, Wang Yang-ming reportedly approved of the pro-
vocative statement, "The substance of mind is without the distinction
between good or bad" {wu-shan wu-o shih hsin-chih-t'i).62 Wang's state-
ment sounded very Buddhist and therefore had evoked a series of de-
bates among scholars. For instance, Chang Lieh (1622-85) fiercely
attacked the statement in his Doubts on the Doctrine of Wang Yang-ming
(Wang-hsiieh chih-i), a book that drew Li Fu's attention.63 Yen Jo-ch'u
(1636-1704) also attacked Wang Yang-ming, in his famous Inquiry into
the Book ofHistory of the Old Text (Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng), for deviating
from the Confucian Way by holding that the substance of the mind is
neither good nor bad. Yen even went so far as to propose the removal of
Wang's tablet from the Confucian temple.64 It was such severe criticism
by Chu Hsi scholars that provoked Li Fu's defense of Wang.65
Li Fu was skeptical as to whether or not Wang Yang-ming had actually
made the provocative statement. Liu Tsung-chou (1578-1645) and
Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95) na cl earlier raised questions about the
authenticity of the statement and had thus already given Lu-Wang schol-
ars an easy way out.66 Nonetheless, Li Fu found nothing wrong with the
statement; thus it was not necessary to insist that Yang-ming never
uttered it.67 In Li Fu's view, the word t'i (substance), which demands
explication if we are to understand Yang-ming's statement, means origi-
nal and unchangeable essence. In the state of tranquillity, the substance
of mind is calm and unmoved, so the distinction between good and bad
does not arise. Only when the mind becomes active with the will (i) does
such a distinction emerge.68
62. CHL, pp. 257-258. Also see Wang Yang-ming nien-p 'u in WYCC. For a description of the
same event with a slightly different emphasis see Wang Chi, Lung-hsi Wang-hsien-sheng
ch'iian-chi, Kyoto, n.d., i/ia~3a.
63. Chang Lieh, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, n.p., n.d., appendix, pp. 1 ia-i4b; MTCK, 45/i6a-i7b.
64. Yen Jo-ch'u, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng (An inquiry into the Book ofDocuments ofthe Old
Text), n.p., 1867, 8/67a-7ob.
65. Although Yen Jo-ch'u's book was published in 1745, its manuscript had circulated for
a long while. (See postscripts to Yen's book made by his son and grandson, la-ib). Li
Fu might be one of those who read, or at least knew of, it. Li once wrote an article
criticizing Mao Hsi-ho's Apology for the Book of History of the Old Text (Ku-wen shang-shu
yiian-ts'u), which was intended to argue against Yen's writings. This showed Li's knowl-
edge of the debate between Yen and Mao. In fact, on the controversial authenticity of
The Book of History of the Old Text was a hot issue in Li's time. Probably inspired by his
friend, Wangju-lu, Li Fu wrote several articles demonstrating that the Old Text was, a
forgery. See MTCK, ig/ia-3b, 4a-6a, and 4 5 / 3 9 ^ - 4 1 ^
66. MJHA, Shih-shou, p. 7 and 16/55. According to Tsou Shou-i, the statement should read
"Ultimate good without evil is mind" (Chih-shan wu-o che hsin). Liu Tsung-chou be-
lieved that "four-sentence teaching" (ssu-chu-chiao) was initially proposed by Wang Chi
rather than Wang Yang-ming himself.
67. MTCK i8/27a. 68. Ibid., i8/27a.
91
Li Fu employs two strategies to defend his position. In one he appeals

to argument by analogy. Debating with Lu Hsiang-shan over the validity
of xvu-chi (Non-Ultimate or Great Void) in Chou Tun-i's cosmology, Chu
Hsi had justified the need for wu-chi on the grounds that it was used to
describe the shapelessness of t'ai-chi (Great Ultimate) and served as the
source of all potential transformation.69 Li Fu contended that if Chu Hsi
was justified in arguing in this way, one could describe the substance of
mind as neither good nor bad (wu-shan-o) since both employ the con-
cept wu.70 As a matter of fact, Chu Hsi used "the Non-Ultimate and also
the Great Ultimate" (wu-chi erh t'ai-chi) to describe "the reality that is
formless but possesses principle." The Great Ultimate implied nothing
other than a general name of the principle of Heaven and Earth and the
myriad things. Therefore, it is the highest good and not ethically neu-
tral.71 The Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate, which were for Chu
identical temporally and spatially, are not the same as Li Fu's description
of mind in both its active and tranquil states. Most important, for Chu
Hsi the Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate cannot be seen as the
mind. Furthermore, even if Li Fu's analogy holds, what concerns us most
is whether the substance is indeed neither good nor had. If Li Fu's
analogical reasoning seems unpersuasive, his rebuttal of an alternative
thesis, which claimed that the mind is only good but not bad, is more
revealing.
One admits, according to Li Fu, that if mind includes nature and
feelings (hsin fung hsingch'ing),72 then it is correct to assume that nature
is good, but wrong to assume that mind as a whole is completely good
since the feelings of mind are susceptible to evil. Further, if one
penetrates the concept of nature in any depth, nature, also, is not good
in its entirety. The concept of nature has two references. One refers to
moral nature (i-li chih hsing) which is totally good, the other to physical
nature {ch'i-chih chih hsing) which is subject to corruption and thus can
be either good or bad. Therefore, nature as a whole cannot be entirely
good.73
Unlike his discussion of the concept of the indeterminate destiny, in
which the possibility of independence of principle in relation to chyi is
allowed, Li Fu now maintains that principle always goes with ch'i and
nature with mind. Mind and nature are "one in two and two in one."74
This idea enables him to identify the moral nature immediately with the
mind of the Way, and the physical nature with the human mind. Conse-
69. CTWQ 36/7b-iob. 70. MTCK, 18/273. 71. CTWC, 36/14^
72. MTCK, 18/273. In Chu Hsi's context it is better read: "Mind commands the nature
and feelings."
73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., i8/27b.
92
Li Fu: his thought
quently, the thesis that mind is good cannot stand - unless the mind is
particularly specified as the mind of the Way.75 The discrepancy between
the mind of the Way and the human mind is perceived by Li Fu as a
subtle one. In disclosing this discrepancy, he indirectly exposes the gap
between man's moral and physical natures, along with that between
principle and ch'i in Chu Hsi's construction of a philosophical anthro-
pology. In other words, the means that Li Fu adopts to offer a possibly
valid interpretation for the thesis, 'The mind is good," confirms that
Chu Hsi's maxim, "Nature is principle," should be understood as "Moral
nature is principle," a conclusion we reached in Chapter 2.
In Chu Hsi's own system, mind and nature are clearly not the same.
Chu Hsi's conception of mind is more like a conscious agent than a static
substance in itself. For him, the mind of the Way (tao-hsin) refers to the
mind when consciously responding to the Way; the human mind (jen-
hsin) refers to the mind when issuing from biological needs and de-
sires.76 But there is one mind alone taking charge of those two functions.
To be good is to have the mind of the Way presiding over the human
mind, which is ethically indeterminate but is susceptible to physical
desires.77 It is Li Fu's identification of principle with ch'i, and mind with
nature, that allows him to make use of Chu Hsi's moral nature, physical
nature, the mind of the Way, and the human mind in line with the Lu-
Wang tradition. Moreover, the way Li Fu uses Chu Hsi's vocabulary
partially reveals his commitment to Chu's concept of ch'i. In Li Fu, we see
how the concept of ch 'i acquires a theoretical significance by tackling the
problem of moral cultivation - despite that this concept was originally
peripheral to the Lu-Wang tradition.78 This emphasis on the influence of
ch'i required Li Fu both to recognize its role in his own strivings for
moral perfection and to integrate it well enough be compatible with the
Lu-Wang heritage.
Li Fu's effort at assimilating the concept of ch'i in the Lu-Wang tradi-
tion is best seen in his elaboration of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the
extension of the innate knowledge of the good. In explaining the need
of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good, Li Fu cannot help
but agree with Chu Hsi that the endowment of ch'i in human bodies
constitutes a vital factor in moral cultivation.79 For from the point of view
of (human) nature, people are the same, but from the point of view of
75. Ibid. 76. CTYL, 62/2421. 77. Ibid., 62/2421-2424.

78. As far as Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming are concerned, Yang-ming was more
obsessed with the concept of ch 'i than Hsiang-shan was. When I say that the concept of
ch'i is peripheral to the Lu-Wang doctrines, I simply mean that it does not constitute
a vital element in their construction of a philosophy of man.
79. MTCK 43/16a.
93
the ch'i endowment, they are distinctive. Sages are exceptional because
they are endowed with the purest ch'i and thus can follow principle
spontaneously. Others need moral effort to compensate for the defect or
partiality in their endowments of ch'i.80
People are born with the innate knowledge of the good. The innate
knowledge of the good is the mind of the Way, which is very subtle for
people to perceive. Moreover, it is easily beclouded by desires, although
its substance can never be changed. Therefore, one cannot totally rely
on the spontaneous issuance of the innate knowledge. Instead, a delib-
erate effort is needed for moral cultivation. This is why, according to Li
Fu, Wang Yang-ming adds moral effort or "extension" (chih c) to the
inborn, innate knowledge of the good.81 The special weight that Li Fu
puts on deliberate moral practice reveals that the negative influence of
human endowment looms large in his reckoning of moral perfection. Li
Fu holds that only through a strenuous effort can original human nature
be recovered and the substance of innate knowledge be fully mani-
fested.82 Here, Li Fu must have the left wing of the Wang Yang-ming
school in mind. As Wang Chi said, the extension of the innate knowl-
edge of the good is made merely for those who are not yet enlightened.
If a man has full confidence in his own innate knowledge, he would not
transgress any principle just like a bead rolling around within a bowl.83
Wang Ken also claims that the extension of the innate knowledge of the
good is Yang-ming's early doctrine. In his later days, Yang-ming report-
edly preached only the innate knowledge of the good.84 By their inter-
pretation of this doctrine, Wang Chi and Wang Ken transformed
Yang-ming's theory of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good
into their own doctrine of the innate knowledge of the good; thus they
risked mistaking physical desires for Heaven's principle.85 Awareness of
Wang Chi and Wang Ken's favoring the spontaneous expression of the
innate knowledge of the good, and their relegating conscious moral
effort to an insignificant role, is necessary to our understanding of Li
Fu's interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine.
Since Yang-ming's program of extension for innate knowledge took
the substance of that knowledge as its point of departure in moral
cultivation, his theory of moral action was intimately related to his
ontology of innate knowledge. It is precisely Li Fu's acceptance of the
ontological status of the innate knowledge of the good that distinguishes
him from Huang Tsung-hsi, a major representative of the right wing of
the Wang Yang-ming school. Huang believed that the innate knowledge
80. MTCK, i8/2ia-2ib, 27b. 81. Ibid., i8/2ia. 82. Ibid.
83. MJHA, 12/2. 84. Ibid., 32/86.
85. Cf. Wu Chen, "Wang Ken yu Wang Chi ho-lung," Chekianghsiieh k'an, no. 4, 109-115.
94
Li Fu: his thought
of the good possessed an undisciplined quality because the mind in itself

had no substance; its substance was seen only in moral effort.86 In accept-
ing Yang-ming's doctrine, Li Fu is also forced to justify the substance
of the innate knowledge, which was directly questioned by Wang
Yang-ming's contemporary, Lo Ch'in-shun.
For Wang, the innate knowledge of the good in our mind was the so-
called principle of Heaven.87 He conceded that "nature is principle" was
valid if and only if the substance of mind were taken to be the same as
nature.88 In this way, he returned to Lu Hsiang-shan's "mind is prin-
ciple." In fact, he also made no distinction between ch'i and nature.
Metaphysically, perhaps nature conceptually meant goodness. But the
good human nature's beginnings - the feelings of commiseration,
shame and dislike, deference and compliance, right and wrong - could
be seen only in the operation of ch'i.89 In this connection, Yang-ming
could equate nature with ch'i. Unlike Lu Hsiang-shan, who disliked
discussing the concept of nature,90 Yang-ming tried hard to assimilate it
into his thought.
However, Lo Ch'in-shun, under Chu Hsi's influence, took issue with
Yang-ming on the identification of the innate knowledge with the prin-
ciple of Heaven. In his opinion, the innate knowledge was consciousness
at work; thus it was a cognitive function that could not be equal to
heaven's principle.91 In an attempt to counter Lo's criticism, Ou-yang
Ch'ung-i, a disciple of Yang-ming, employed the distinction between the
mind of the Way and the human mind to characterize the difference
between the innate knowledge of the good and consciousness. In doing
so, Ou-yang Ch'ung-i regarded the innate knowledge of the good as
knowing the "four moral germs" (ssu-tuari), and consciousness (chih-
ch'ueh) as knowing in response to the senses.92 He thereby bifurcates
knowledge into two categories.
Disagreeing with Ou-yang Ch'ung-i, Lo Ch'in-shun insisted that the
mind of the Way and the human mind had to be one, not two. The
innate knowledge of the good could be construed as "knowing without
reflection" (pu-lii-erh-chih) in the Mencian sense. It did not follow that
there was another sort of knowing other than knowing in response to the
senses. Besides, all the manifestations of knowing the "four moral germs"
had to be expressed through sense organs; for instance, the sense of
right or wrong was spoken by the mouth; the feeling of respectability was
86. MJHA, preface, p. 1. 87. CHL, p. 113. 88. Ibid., p. 64.

89. Ibid., pp. 141-142. 90. CTYL, 124/4820.
91. Lo Ch'in-shun, Lo Cheng-an hsien-shen ts'un-kao (The surviving writings of Lo Ch'in-
shun, hereafter abbreviated as LCA), Shanghai, 1936, 1/12.
92. LCA, 1/12; MTCK 18/230-23^
95
shown in one's attitude toward others; and so forth. The conceptual

distinction between "knowing morality" and "knowing perceptions of
the senses," Lo charged, originally came from Buddhist influence, which
should be resisted by any authentic Confucian.93
The heavenly nature (t'ien-hsing), with which Heaven endowed man at
birth should be, according to Lo, conceived as substance in relation to its
function, the activity of consciousness. Hence, although substance must
have some function, function cannot be regarded as the substance it-
self.94 Therefore, principle as the Heaven's nature cannot be identical to
the innate knowledge as consciousness. This claim had already been
anticipated by Chu Hsi: 'That which we are conscious of in our mind is
principle; that which brings consciousness into operation is the intelli-
gent quality of ch'i [i.e., the mind]." 95 Indeed, Lo Chin-shun can be
credited as a faithful Chu Hsi scholar with a profound comprehension of
Master Chu's teachings.
Chu Hsi's concern with an objective or cosmic guarantee of the valid-
ity of principle reappeared in Lo's critique of Wang Yang-ming's (also
Ou-yang Ch'ung-i's) neglect of the external world.96 Principle, which for
Lo could not be sought within the mind alone, must be confirmed by
Heaven and Earth, and by the ten thousand things. Not until this was
complete was principle universally to be found in everything in the
universe.97 And through principle, man was to become one with the ten
thousand things.98
93. LCA, 1/12-13. 94. Ibid., 1/13. 95. CTYL, 5/198.
96. LCA, 1/5, 9, 14-15. 97. Ibid., 1/14, 16-17.
98. Ibid., 1/5. Lo Chin-shun's belief that "through principle man becomes one with ten
thousand things" throws a new light on Chu Hsi's disagreement with Ch'eng Hao's
assertion that man becomes one with Heaven, Earth, and ten thousand things through
personal recognition and feelings. Ch'eng Hao once said: "A book on medicine
describes paralysis of the four limbs as absent of jen. This is an excellent description.
The man of jen regards Heaven and Earth and all things as one body. To him there is
nothing that is not himself. Since he has recognized all things as himself, can there be
any limit to his humanity? If things are not parts of the self, naturally they have nothing
to do with it. As in the case of paralysis of the four limbs, the vital force no longer
penetrates them, and therefore they are no longer parts of the self." (Ho-nan Ch'eng-
shih i-shu, Shanghai, 1935, 2a/i5; see also Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
P. 53O)
He also said: "[One's duty] is to understand this principle and preserve jen with
sincerity and seriousness, that is all. There is no need for caution and control. Nor is
there any need for exhaustive search. Caution is necessary when one is mentally
negligent, but if one is not negligent, what is the necessity for caution? Exhaustive
search is necessary when one has not understood principle. But if one preserves jen
long enough, it will automatically dawn on him. Why should he have to depend on
exhaustive search?" (Ho-nan Ch'eng-shih i-shu, 2a/ib, see also Chan, Source Book in
Chinese Philosophy, p. 523.)
Chu Hsi's preoccupation with an intellectual and analytical understanding forced
him to revolt against Ch'eng Hao at this point. In "On Humaneness" (jen-shuo), he
96
Li Fu: his thought
Well informed of these intellectual debates, Li Fu is ready to take up

the criticisms made by Lo Ch'in-shun of Yang-ming's doctrine." He
easily dismisses Lo's claim that the chih (knowledge) of liang-chih (the
innate knowledge of the good) cannot be read as a noun, implying not
a substance but a verb, a process of cognitive function. Li Fu picks out
several examples from ancient texts: for instance, the chih of hsien-chih
(those who are first informed) or hou-chih (those who are later in-
formed) of Mencius, or the chih of chih-chih (the extension of knowledge)
of The Great Learning. In all of these cases chih is used as a noun, meaning
a substance.100 In addition, Li Fu points out that all the texts written
before the spring and autumn period use the already mentioned chih (as
a verb meaning "know", and as a noun meaning "knowledge") to substi-
stated: "To talk about jen in general terms of the unity of things and the self will lead
people to be vague, confused, neglectful, and make no effort to be alert. The bad
effect - and there has been — may be to consider other things as oneself. To talk about
jen in specific terms of consciousness will lead people to be nervous, irascible, and
devoid of any quality of depth. The bad effect - and there has been - may be to
consider desires as principle. In one case [the mind] forgets [its objective]. In the
other [there is artificial effort to] help [it grow]. Both are wrong." (CTWQ 67/20a-
21b; the English translation is taken from Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
p. 596, with a slight modification.)
There are here two criticisms voiced by Chu Hsi. One is aimed at Ch'eng Hao's
claim. Nevertheless, the theme of becoming one with all things is upheld by all Neo-
Confucians. Chu Hsi says, "When ch'ien is regarded as the father, k'un as the mother,
and this applies to all classes of living beings without exception; this means principle
is one." (Chang-tzu ch'uan-shu, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935, 1/8.) A good
elaboration of Chu Hsi's position is made in Lo Chin-shun's formula, "In view of the
self, things are for themselves; in view of principle, the self becomes identical with
things without any differentiation" (LCA, 1/5). For Chu Hsi it was through principle
that all things become one. To understand principle required primarily the intellec-
tual effort of the investigation of things. The second criticism made by Chu Hsi
countered the claim that jen is consciousness, and this issue is directly related to our
discussion in the text. Ch'eng I once remarked, "The medical expert names those
who have no consciousness of sensation as non-jen [pu-jen], which is also commonly
used by people to call those having no consciousness of sensation and having no
recognition of moral principles. This analogy is very appropriate." (Ch'eng-tzu hsiang-
pen, n.p., 1675, i/55b.) Chu Hsi commented on Ch'eng I's remark as follows: "I-
ch'uan [Ch'eng I] is excellent to say that those who have no recognition of moral
principles are non-jen. If one is merely obsessed with the substance of mind as
consciousness, what will consciousness do with an empty mind, which has no access
to moral principles?" (Ch'eng-tzu hsiangpen, i/55b.)
In short, the difference between the Ch'eng Hao strains (including Lu Hsiang-shan
and Wang Yang-ming) and the Chu Hsi strains (Lo Chin-shun) can partially be seen
in their distinctive styles or intellectual approaches. One is experiential-holistic, the
other is intellectual-analytic. Professor Wing-tsit Chan looks at this problem with the
ideas of "substance" and "function" and comes up with another interpretation. See
his "On the Theory of Jen in Chu Hsi's Philosophy" in Universitas, 8, no. 6 (June
1981), 29.
99. Li Fu has his own account of this debate. MTCK, 18/230-24^.
100. LCA, 1/13; MTCK, 18/243-240.
97
tute whenever necessary for a n o t h e r character chih (now p r o n o u n c e d in

the fourth tone, meaning "wisdom"). 101
A textual analysis that might successfully settle the philological dis-
putes is of little help in clarifying the ontological controversy involved. Li
Fu, however, is p r e p a r e d to undertake a clarification of the ontological
issues through an intellectual theoretical discourse. To Lo Ch'in-shun,
the identity of Heaven's principle with the innate knowledge of the good
was not compatible with the fact that regardless of their lack of the
innate knowledge of the good - for Lo, the functioning of consciousness
- things such as mountains, rivers, earth, grass, wood, metals, and stones
each had its own principle. 102 Li Fu disagrees with Lo Chin-shun on this
point:
The Heaven's principle possessed by men is what is called "illustrious virtue" in

The Great Learning. Because of its intelligence and brightness it can contain
principles of all sorts, and it responds to any affair. Animals with consciousness
cannot possess principle as completely as human beings, not to mention the
inanimate things such as grass, wood, metals and stones.103
In other words, Li Fu's formulation conveys a flavor of panpsychism: All
things contain a degree of consciousness.
Man is exceptional in that he has the most comprehensive principle in
his mind. Therefore, he can stand along with Heaven and Earth as the
three ultimate standards (san-chi) for the myriad things of the universe.
Rivers, mountains, grass, and stones may only have some share of prin-
ciple, but they also have some share of consciousness. If this were not
true, we could not explain why we worship the gods of mountains and
rivers, or why in the great eras, such good omens as the purity of the
Yellow River appeared. In his descriptions of auspicious omens during
the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng periods, Li Fu demonstrates his personal
experience with these symbols. 104 At this point, Li Fu deviates somewhat
from Wang Yang-ming's teaching, for Wang had proclaimed:
The innate knowledge of man is the same as that of plants and trees, tiles and
stones. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there cannot be plants
and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even Heaven and Earth
cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. For at
bottom, Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point
101. MTCK i8/24b. 102. LCA, 1/17.

103. MTCK, 18/24^-25. In this 1831 edition there is a misprint in line 9. Cf. MTCK, 1740
edition, 18/21 a.
104. MTCK, 18/24b-25a. For instance, the good omens about which Li Fu wrote were the
"magnificent clouds" of the sixtieth year of the K'ang-hsi reign, the "purification of
Yellow River in the fourth year of Yung-cheng reign," etc. MTCK, i/i8a-2ob, 29a-
31b.
98
Li Fu: his thought
at which this unity is manifested in its most refined and excellent form is the
clear intelligence of the human mind.105
To Yang-ming, mind stands out as the agent that confers meaning on all
things. For Li Fu, external things have their partial principle and thus
partial consciousness. In expressing this notion, Li Fu may, in my opin-
ion, be influenced by Chu Hsi's ideas on "principle in partiality" {li-j)'ieri)
and "principle in entirety" (li-ch'uari), which in their turn are deter-
mined by the degree of the endowment of ch 'i in the myriad things.106 To
be certain, Chu Hsi uses these two concepts in explaining the differences
among things in terms of the ch 'i endowment. Li Fu, in his preoccupa-
tion with the identity of the innate knowledge and principle, discovers
that things have partial consciousness because they are endowed with
partial principle.
In fact, Li Fu is not interested just in the "theoretical" aspect. He is
eager to put the innate knowledge of the good into practice. He is
greatly concerned with the extension of the innate knowledge as the way
of moral cultivation. In his view, Yang-ming's extension of the innate
knowledge comprises all the merits of the previous Neo-Confucians'
doctrines, even though different approaches had arisen from their indi-
vidualized realizations of the Way. For example, when understood as the
state of equilibrium of the not yet actualized (wei-fa), the innate knowl-
edge of the good is equal to Heaven's nature in its original form, in the
state of tranquillity endowed in us at birth. Hence, Chou Tun-i's (1017—
73) doctrine of "regarding tranquillity as fundamental" (chu-ching) also
implied the extension of the innate knowledge. The innate knowledge
of the good can be understood as the manifestation of the inner nature,
in which the innate knowledge, after becoming calm, becomes the inner
nature. In this state the mind appears to be broad and impartial as it
responds to all things spontaneously as they come. Thus the extension of
the innate knowledge possesses the merit of Ch'eng Hao's (1032—85)
doctrine of "calming human nature" (tien-hsing), as well as Ch'eng I's
(1033-1107) and Chang Tsai's (1020-77) doctrines. Ch'eng I advo-
cated seriousness (ching) as the way to cultivate the mind in a state of
singleness and intelligence. Chang promoted propriety (li b) as the
means to regulate the external life to cultivate the internal life. Thus for
Li Fu, the extension of the innate knowledge to examine the subtlety of
the ideas within the mind can make up for the defects of Chu Hsi's
externally oriented project of "the investigation of things." And Li's view
of the extension of the innate knowledge is closely related to Lu Hsiang-
shan's "seeking the lost mind" (ch'iu fang-hsin) because this doctrine was
105. CHL, p. 124. Instructions far Practical Living, pp. 221-222. 106. CTWQ 46/1 lb.
99
the source from which the extension of the innate knowledge devel-
oped. As Hu Po-chuan rightly points out, liang-chih (the innate knowl-
edge of the good) is interchangeable with liang-hsin (conscience), so the
teaching of "seeking the lost mind" can also be viewed as the extension
of the innate knowledge. The concept tuan-ni (clue or sign) is the innate
knowledge as the inner nature in its actualized state. Therefore, Ch'en
Hsien-chang's (1428—1500) "cultivating [moral] clues in the state of
tranquillity"(ching-chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni) was also similar to the exten-
sion of the innate knowledge. Finally, because the innate knowledge can
be seen as the manifestation of Heaven's principle, Chan Jo-shui's
(1466—1560) "experiencing Heaven's principle everywhere" (sui-ch'u t'i-
jen Vien-li) could be derived from the same extension of the innate
knowledge.107 All in all, Li Fu's doctrine of extending of the innate
knowledge of the good inherits the entire rich tradition of the
Neo-Confucians and embraces the merits of all doctrines prior to
Yang-ming.
In interpreting the doctrine of the extension of the innate knowledge,
Li Fu places a special emphasis on the importance of effort or extension
chih in a dynamic and practical sense, for the truth must be personally
realized in daily life. He disdains such speculative discussions of moral
metaphysics as "the learning of mind and nature." What one ought to do
is to realize moral maxims in practice.108 Because people do not discrimi-
nate authentic teachings from heterodoxy, Li Fu is regretfully compelled
to devote energy to this empty talk.109
He ascribes two causes for the state of oblivion to which Wang Yang-
ming's doctrine has fallen. One is the conventional scholars' immersion
in trivial textual studies to the neglect of the great meaning of the Way.
The other is the result of the doctrine of Yang-ming's "left wing" adher-
ents such as Wang Chi and Wang Ken, who misunderstand Yang-ming's
teaching. They had mistakenly claimed that there was no need for
deliberate effort to achieve moral perfection because the innate knowl-
edge is always present and spontaneous in our minds. This belief in-
evitably made them mistake physical desires for the Heaven's principle,
and thereby indulge in pleasures.110
Li Fu's emphasis on the need for effort in moral cultivation can be
seen from the perspective of a new conception of learning shared by
such thinkers as Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, Yen Yuan, and Li Kung.
They all reacted against the abstract speculations and empty talk that
dominated the intellectual milieu of their era. In their view, empty
107. MTCK i8/2 2a-23a. 108. Ibid., i8/28b.

109. Ibid., i8/23b. 110. Ibid., i8/25a-26b.
1OO
Li Fu: his thought
speculation was one of the major reasons for the Ming dynasty's fall. Li
Fu's particular emphasis on moral effort shows that he was still under the
sway of the widespread reaction to the late Ming trends. "Empty talk"
assumed a new form in Li Fu's own day - the focus of philological studies
(k'ao-cheng), which commanded most of the attention and became a
dominant intellectual movement. Li Fu's stress on the extension of
innate knowledge indicates only one aspect of his reaction to this move-
ment. His involvement with this intellectual trend toward evidential
scholarship is by no means simple, but rather a complex one, full of
tension, conflict, and compromise. We will return to this issue later in
Chapter 6.
His theory of ko-zuu

Despite that Li Fu associated himself closely with Yang-ming's doctrine
of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good, he was not
satisfied with Yang-ming's interpretation of ko-xvu as "to rectify what is
wrong in the mind."111 Although Li Fu does not give any explicit account
of why he disagrees with Yang-ming's theory of ko-wu, his justification of
the thesis that the mind is neither good nor bad might serve as a clue to
understanding his divergence from Yang-ming on this particular point.
If, as Yang-ming holds, the substance of the mind is neither good nor
bad, what is there in the mind to rectify?112 In addition, Li could not but
agree with Lo Chin-shun that "things" could not be understood entirely
as nothing more than the objects of human intentionality.113 This may
have caused Li Fu to come up with his own theory of the "investigation
of things" in an attempt to oppose Chu Hsi from another angle.
Like Wang Yang-ming, Li believes with certainty that the restoration of
the old text version of The Great Learning is necessary to bring students
back on the right track of the true Way. Chu Hsi's mistake was that he
considered the old text as an incomplete version abounding with errors,
and therefore reedited and supplemented it with his own interpolations.
In doing so, he deviated from the authentic Way. In point of fact, the old
text version of The Great Learning, which contains the essential meaning
of the Way, is an original text transmitted from the ancient Confucian
school.114 On the basis of the old text, Li Fu developed his theory of
ko-wu.
111. CHU p- 15; MTCK(1740), 2i/22a. 112. MTCK i8/27a.

113. Ibid., i8/23b. LCA, 1/9. There are three points made by Lo Ch'in-shun in this letter
criticizing Yang-ming's interpretation of a "thing" (wu); Li Fu, however, cannot agree
with the third point, which charges that the innate knowledge is not Heaven's
principle.
114. MTCK(1740), 2 i / 2 i a ; MTCK, 19/343-38^
1O1
There have been eighteen different interpretations of the word ko in

the classics. Only the exegesis of the Chapter of Ts'ang-chieh (75'ang-chieh
p'ieri), which is the oldest interpretation, meets, for Li Fu, the exact
meaning of ko in the context of ko-wu, that is, "to measure," "to evaluate"
(liang-tu) .115 Li Fu provides the following definition of ko-xvu:
Making the will sincere is to extend knowledge which consists in knowing what
is first and what is last, to measure the roots and the branches, and to know the
beginnings and the endings of all things. Only after knowing the roots can
knowledge be perfected. Therefore, the old text version of The Great Learning
states: "This is called knowing the root, this is perfecting knowledge," after
stating, "It never has been the case [that what was of great importance has been
slightly cared for, and, at the same time] that what was of slight importance has
been greatly cared for." Ko-wu simply means this, that is all.116
Li Fu, like Yang-ming, takes "making the will sincere" as his point of
departure for moral cultivation. The effort at making the will sincere, for
Li Fu, is seen in the extension of knowledge, the assessment of the
importance of things, and the measurement of all things. In other words,
things have their roots and their branches; affairs have their beginnings
and their endings. The function of ko-wu lies in adequately evaluating
their priorities. Li Fu apprehends the "eight steps" of The Great Learning
sequentially.117 From the exercise of ko-xvu, we learn that in order to
pacify the world and set the state in order, one needs to trace them back
to the sincerity of the will - the foundation and beginning of our moral
effort. Conversely, we extend our effort from ko-wu to the self, to the
family, to the state, and to the world - the final stages or results of our
moral endeavor. Among the eight steps, personal cultivation (hsiu-shen)
is fundamental because it draws the eight steps into a meaningful inter-
relationship. 118 This is why The Great Learning asserts that "from the Son
of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard the personal
cultivation as the root."119
Li Fu's understanding of ko-wu as the capacity of the mind to measure
or evaluate stands in contrast to the thinking function of the mind as a
whole. It is different from the role the mind played in Yang-ming's ko-wu
program, in which the mind was to differentiate right from wrong in a
direct moral sense.120
115. MTCK(1740), 21/17b. 116. Ibid.

117. The "eight steps" are the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the
sincerity of the will, the rectification of the mind, the cultivation of the self, the
regulation of the family, and the attainment of national order and world peace.
118. MTCK, 19/35^ 119. Ibid., 19/35^ SSCQ Ta-hsueh, p. 2.
120. CHL, pp. 241, 257.
1O2
Li Fu: his thought
Long before Li Fu, Wang Ken (1483—1541) had interpreted ko-wu as

"measuring things" (hsieh-chu or hsieh-tu). But it is very unlikely that
Wang Ken's interpretation was the source of Li Fu's intellectual inspira-
tion.121 Ko-wu in the context of Wang Ken's moral program appeared
individualistic. Wang Ken's obsession with self-cultivation (hsiu-shen) and
self-preservation (an-shen) did not match Li Fu's fundamental con-
cerns.122 Furthermore, Wang Ken's division of the eight steps of moral
and sociopolitical development of self-cultivation into two sorts of effort
{kung-fu) ran counter to Li Fu's claim that the eight steps were one
continuum.123
Mao Hsi-ho (1623-1716), in his historical survey of the various inter-
pretations of ko-wu, also anticipated Li Fu's interpretations of it.124
Nevertheless, the causal relation between the interpretations of either
Wang Ken or Mao Hsi-ho and that of Li Fu remains open. Leaving aside
this historical problem, we can detect the spirit of Lu Hsiang-shan exer-
cising an influence on Li Fu's theory - although Lu Hsiang-shan, like
Chu Hsi, understood the word ko as meaning "to reach." To Sung
thinkers, ko-wu meant "to reach things, to search for [what can be]
known,"125 an interpretation unacceptable to Li Fu.
Lu Hsiang-shan was most concerned with the starting point (tuan-hsu)
in the approach to the true Way. To him, even a slight departure from
the correct starting point of study will inevitably end up far from the
authentic Way, and one will become a heretic. Thus it becomes decisive
to know the right starting point at the very beginning of learning.
"Learning," Hsiang-shan said, "surely has no limits, but it is better to
distinguish the right starting point from the wrong one; then whether
one can attain the Way can be immediately known."126 Hsiang-shan
reinforced the point:
Things have their roots and branches; affairs have their beginnings and endings.
To know what isfirstand what is last will lead one near the Way. If one does not
extend the starting point [of learning] to its perfection, but instead devotes his
effort entirely to the branches, the results will resemble ditchesfilledwith water,
but whose dryness can be anticipated. In the end, both root and branch are
lost.127
121. Wang Ken, Hsin-chai Wang-hsien-sheng ch'iian-ch'i, reprinted in 1616, 3/4013-4lb.

Wang Ken's interpretation of ko-wu was known as the "Huai-nan ko-zuu." MJHA, 32/
69-70.
122. Ibid., 3/39.D, 41a. 123. Ibid., 3/ib-2a, 440-45^ MTCK, ig/35a-35b.
124. Mao Hsi-ho, "Ta-hsueh cheng-wen" in Hsi-ho ho-chi, Liu-ch'ao-t'ang printed, l/iob.
Mao even traced the interpretation oiko-xvu, meaning "measuring things," back to Li
Li-wu of the Sung period. Ibid., i/8a.
125. LHCC, 2o/i5a-i5b. 126. Ibid., i/2a. 127. Ibid., i/3a.
103
In short, the goal of Lu Hsiang-shan's procedure of learning can be

summed up in one of his favored statements from Mencius: "Build up the
nobler part of one's nature."128 In order to know the nobler part of one's
nature, one needs to evaluate which part is important and which is
secondary in one's constitution. Viewed in this light, the evaluating
function of the mind becomes the initial step for moral cultivation, an
idea from which Li Fu develops his theory of ko-xvu.
For Li Fu, moral cultivation begins with making the will sincere, and
this depends on first extending the mind's ability to measure the impor-
tance of all things. His theory of ko-xvu especially emphasizes knowing the
importance of some things over others, and is intimately related to the
procedure of moral perfection. Nonetheless, the results of his evaluation
are none other than those reached by Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-
ming through their respective doctrines. For all of them, the goal of ko-
xvu is to explore, and at the same time to recover, the original mind on
which Heaven bestows moral principles. Other pursuits must follow and
center around this moral concern to obtain their ultimate goal.129
Li Fu vehemently attacks Chu Hsi's theory of ko-xvu (investigation of
things) as heterodoxy because Chu Hsi misleads students toward a
search for principle outside the self. In his theory, Chu Hsi recom-
mended reaching for external things and investigating their principles.
Moreover, Chu Hsi claimed that making the will sincere could only
follow after achieving the extension of knowledge. Without the complete
consciousness of principle in the mind, the will could not be said to be
really sincere.130 Chu Hsi wrote:
But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's knowledge is incomplete.
On this account, The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the
learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he
has of their principles, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the
extreme point.131
In short, the relationship between the investigation of things, the exten-
sion of knowledge, and making the will sincere is sequential.
128. SSCC, Mencius, p. 170. As Mencius says, "The senses of hearing and seeing do not
think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with
another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of
thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to
do this. These - the senses and the mind - are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man
first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior
part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man."
Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 2, p. 418.
129. CHL, pp. 120-125; MTCK{ 1740), 21/24a.
130. Chu Hsi, SSCC, Ta-hsiieh, p. 7.
131. Ibid., p. 6. Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 365.
104
Li Fu: his thought
For Li Fu, Chu's view is absurd because even though a sage does not
know the principles of all things, it does not follow that the sage's will is
not sincere from the very beginning. In Li's system, the purpose of ko-wu
is to inform us what is important and what is secondary. By this measure-
ment of importance, we know where to make our first effort. The moral
principle within our mind is the very thing demanding our devotion.
The theory of ko-wu so conceived is reduced from both an epistemology
and moral philosophy as originally envisioned by Chu Hsi to merely a
philosophy of values. Li Fu argues that Chu Hsi's theory of ko-wu led
students to look to external things for principles or values. If Chu Hsi
were correct, principle would not be immanent in the mind. Ethically,
Chu's doctrine implied that human virtues come from a process of
socialization imposed by external surroundings. Theoretically, it denied
the possibility of moral self-transformation because it lacked an ontologi-
cal basis of moral nature in human beings. Thus Li Fu regards Chu Hsi's
theory of ko-wu as morally equivalent to the heterodox doctrine of
"seeking virtue from without" (i-wai shuo) ,132 Therefore, Chu's theory did
not square with Mencius's teachings that "all things are already complete
in us,"133 and that "everyone can become a sage like Yao or Shun."134
Li Fu points to the mind as the very source of moral cultivation. But he
does not, as a result, focus moral effort on the cultivation of the mind.
Rather, he maintains that effort should be concentrated in concrete and
practical acts that in turn will arouse and enrich the moral sensitivity of
the mind. His theory of ko-wu has a "pragmatic" flavor with a unique
stress on the importance of the act. He declares that authentic truth
must be something that can be realized in daily life. The Way that
concerns scholars merely in their metaphysical discourse cannot count
as the true Way at all. Action and action alone is the ultimate criterion
and test for the presence of the authentic Way.135
Once Li Fu said regretfully that he had read as many as fifty thousand
volumes and had engaged in Chu Hsi's theory of the investigation of
things for decades until his hair turned white, but that nothing came
from such endeavor. After this unfruitful odyssey, he came to realize that
the Way consists simply in one's ethical actions.136 But students in his day
regarded book learning and metaphysical discussion as the means for
attaining the Way. This confusion had resulted from Chu Hsi's advocacy
of textual studies and intellectual discussion, and had led students away
from realizing the Way in their personal lives.137 Because of this incorrect
understanding, they deemphasized and even entirely overlooked the
132. MTCK, i8/i2a-i3b, 19b; 34/22a. 133. SSCC, Mendus, p. 189.
134. Ibid., p. 174. 135. MTCK (1740), 2i/i9b-2ob.
136. Ibid., 2i/2ib-22a. 137. Ibid., 2i/2ib-22a.
105
experiential dimension of the Way. This trend was simply contrary to the
teachings of sages.
Li Fu does not actually negate the importance of erudition; however,
for him, erudition lacks any intrinsic value unless it is connected to
moral perfection. Whenever situations arise, all sorts of subsidiary knowl-
edge can be employed to implement the moral dictates of the mind. In
this hierarchical conception of knowledge, moral knowledge is the most
urgent and needs constant cultivation. Other knowledge is not difficult
to learn when the will to study is sincere and can be used in relation to
the immediate moral context.138 So the "exhaustive search for prin-
ciples" (ch'iung-li) cannot mean to seek every principle from all things,
but rather to make the mind sincere. As The Great Learning proclaimed,
"If the mind is sincere, then even if it does not hit upon the goal
precisely, it cannot be far away from it."139 Thus, in Li Fu's view, the
"exhaustive search for principle" is internally directed, rather than a
matter of the intellectual understanding of an outside world.140
In summary, Li Fu distinguished himself brilliantly as a Lu-Wang thinker

in two ways. First, he preserved the essence of Lu-Wang doctrines - the
idea that mind is the unique source of morality. Second, because he was
forced to respond to the later Ch'eng-Chu scholars' criticisms of Lu-
Wang doctrines, he was able to reinterpret these doctrines - especially
those concerning the relationship between mind, nature, and principle
- in a more sophisticated manner. Although he abandoned Lu Hsiang-
shan's interpretation of ko-wu, he did use Lu's teachings to develop his
own theory of ko-wu in opposition to Chu Hsi's theory. Because he
defined the Way in terms of human relations, his theory of ko-wu focused
on moral evaluation as the first and last concern. Li Fu's doctrine can be
expressed in a single statement: He combined an emphasis on the need
for moral effort with a belief in the importance of praxis. The emphasis
on moral effort was like that of the right wing of the Wang Yang-ming
school, and was formed in reaction against its left wing. The second
point, the belief in the importance of praxis, is based upon
Lu Hsiang-shan's own teachings. Li's reflections upon the concepts of
destiny and the Way may have something to do with the political-cultural
realities and ideologies of the early Ch'ing, a subject discussed in Chap-
ter 7.
138. MTCK (1740), 2i/i8b-iga. 139. SSCQ Ta-hsueh, p. 9.

140. MTCK (1740), 21 /24a.
106
6
Li Fu and the
philological turn
Li Fu's Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at

Late in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ch yuan-luri), his Intellectual Lineage of the
Learning of Master Lu (Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u), and his study of the classics
reflect the general intellectual climate of the high Ch'ing in which Li
lived.1 The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived
at Late in Life is typical of the evidential approach employed by philolo-
gists of that era. Li Fu himself was an active participant of the evidential
approach movement. The philosophically minded among both the
Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools generally opted instead for establish-
ing intellectual lineages. It is not unusual to find one or the other
approach in a scholar of this time, but it is indeed peculiar to find both
in one scholar. Li Fu is a good example of this unusual combination, and
I will try to explain this apparent peculiarity.
The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion

Arrived at Late in Life: an evidential approach to the
problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan"
li
Chu-Lu i-Vung" (Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan), which literally means
"the similarity and dissimilarity between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan,"
has become an enduring issue in the history of Confucianism since
the end of the Sung period. During their lifetimes both thinkers ex-
changed ideas on questions ranging from textual analysis to politics and
metaphysics in order to make their stance clear to each other.2 The
1. Li Fu, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, prefaced by Li Fu in 1732, eight chuan. The version
accessible to me is the microfilm made by the University of Chicago, Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u,
prefaced by Li Fu in 1732, twenty chuan.
2. See Chapter 2.
107
conventional understanding of the distinction between Chu and Lu was

exemplified by Chu Heng-tao, a contemporary of both men, whose
recollection of the Goose Lake debate provided a brief description of it.
He presented the primary difference between Chu and Lu as a whether
emphasis should be put on learning or on personal cultivation in the
process of moral perfection.3
Chu Hsi once declared that in his teaching he put somewhat more
stress on "following the path of inquiry and study" (tao wen-hsueh), and
that Lu focused solely on "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing).
Initially, Chu professed his readiness to combine these two approaches
in order to overcome the defects in each emphasis.4 Hearing this from
another, Lu Hsiang-shan remarked: "I do not believe this to be possible.
If one does not know how to honor his moral nature, how can he talk
about following the path of study and inquiry?"5 Lu's uncompromising
attitude was here explicitly expressed in his response to Chu's declara-
tion. This spirit was later fostered by both sides, and was inherited by
their disciples, who pushed their mentors' doctrines to the extreme so
that the views of Chu and Lu finally became diametrically opposed to
each other. In the end the learning of Chu was criticized for being
atomistic and that of Lu for being an oversimplification.6 However, the
controversies among their disciples became intense only after the de-
mise of Chu Hsi's major disciple, Huang Kan, who was said to be suffi-
ciently influential to restrain Chu's students from engaging in factional
disputes with Lu's disciples.7
Despite the growing antagonism, attempts were made from time to
time by those sympathetic to both Chu and Lu to reconcile their differ-
ences. The first attempt was made in the middle of the thirteenth
century by the T'ang brothers, possibly initiated by T'ang Ch'ien or his
younger brother, T'ang Chin.8 This is commonly regarded as the earliest
reconciliation tried by thinkers other than Chu and Lu after the failure
of the Goose Lake debate. But there is no writing extant that is detailed
enough to tell us how the T'ang brothers carried this out. Yet this effort
at least reveals that the conflicts between Chu's and Lu's teachings were
felt to be a real tension that needed to be resolved. A few decades later
3. LHCQ 36/18a. 4. CTWC, 5 4 / 5 b-6a.

5. LHCC, 34/8a-8b, translation in Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 582.
6. LHCC, 36/18a. 7. Yuan, Ch'ing-jung chu-shih chi, in TSCC, 21/378.
8. According to Yuan Chueh and Ch'uan Tsu-wang, it was T'ang Chung who wanted to
reconcile the difference between Chu and Lu. See Ch'ing-jung chii-shih chi, 21/378;
CCTC, 34/430-431. But by Wang Tsu-ts'ai's further investigation, it is more likely the
eldest brother, T'ang Ch'ien, who initiated the project of reconciling the difference
between Chu and Lu; SYHA, 84/113-114. Also see Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Hsi-shan wen-chi,
Ssu-pu ts'ung-kan edition, 42/26b~3ib.
108
Li Fu and the philological turn
an elderly Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333) took on the reconciliation of Chu

and Lu as his final task. He suggested that Chu's approach needed to be
complemented by Lu Hsiang-shan's teachings on "honoring the moral
nature".9 The numerous criticisms ofWu's endeavor show that tensions
between Chu and Lu were not entirely resolved.10
A new approach gradually took shape in the middle of the fourteenth
century. Chao Fang (1319-69), in answering a question of his teacher,
Yu Chi (1272-1348, who was Wu Ch'eng's student), came up with a new
interpretation - that although Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had differed
earlier, they reached the same view in their latter days. The evidence that
Chao Fang used to support this view was one of Chu Hsi's letters
to Hsiang P'ing-fu and an epigraph written by Lu Hsiang-shan in
memory of Lu Tzu-ch'ien.11 In that epigraph, Lu expressed his regret for
previously having been thoughtless and rash in his disagreement with
Lu.12 This implied that Lu Hsiang-shan had at last come to a view similar
to that of Chu Hsi, since Lii and Chu supposedly stood on the same
ground in the Goose Lake debate. In Chu Hsi's letter, Chu admitted that
since the time of Tzu-ssu, "honoring the moral nature" and "following
the path of inquiry and study" constituted two essential methods
of education. Lu Hsiang-shan had been wholly concerned with the
former, but Chu Hsi put more stress on the latter. What should be done
now, Chu Hsi proposed, was eliminate the defects in these two methods
and combine the merits of each, so as not to suffer from a one-sided
view.13 It was Chao Fang who first interpreted this letter as crucial
evidence indicating the "turn" of Chu Hsi in his old age toward Lu's
doctrine.14 The attempt to reconcile the difference between the
doctrines of Chu and Lu had thus gained considerable currency after
the time of Wu Ch'eng. But Chao Fang's suggestion that Chu and Lu
agreed in their later days was an interesting one, and this approach was
later refined by Ch'eng Min-cheng (1445-99), Wang Yang-ming, and
LiFu.
Chao Fang and those who followed his suggestion were no doubt
under great pressure from their rivals, for the Ch'eng-Chu school had
grown steadily since the end of the Sung. The idea that Chu Hsi had,
after all, arrived at the same conclusion as Lu Hsiang-shan was an ingen-
ious strategy to cope with or reduce the hostility from Ch'eng-Chu
scholars. According to Li Fu, it was Ch'eng Min-cheng who first put
9. SYHA, 92/5-6. 10. MTCK, 43/12b.

11. Chao Fang, Tung-shan ts'un-kao, in Ssu-k'u-chiian-shu chen^pen, second series, 2/18a-
18b.
12. LHCC, 26/ia-3a. 13. CTWC, 54/5b-6a.
14. Chao Fang, Tung-shan ts'un-k'ao, 2/18a-18b.
109
Chao Fang's idea into a book; Wang Yang-ming later adopted the same
approach.15
Although initially only by accident, Wang took advantage of this
exposition to support his own doctrine indirectly. While in the capital,
Wang was attacked from all sides for proclaiming his doctrine. In
order to deflect these criticisms, he edited some of Chu Hsi's writings,
which he claimed showed Chu's deep remorse about his own early
scholarship.16 Wang Yang-ming thereby implied that there was no signi-
ficant difference between Chu's final doctrine and Wang's own teach-
ing. The persuasive effect of the compilation was unexpectedly great.
With this "proof," scholars came to accept what Wang Yang-ming advo-
cated: that Chu changed his intellectual orientation in his mature
years.17
A dimension not mentioned in Wang's letter was his awareness of
intellectual debt to Chu Hsi, In reply to Lo Ch'in-shun's question
concerning his motive behind the compilation,18 Wang expressed his
feelings with anguish:
I wrote Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life because I could not avoid
it.... All my life Chu Hsi's doctrine has been to me a revelation as if from the
gods. In my heart I could not bear suddenly to oppose him. Therefore, it was
only because I could not avoid doing so that I did so.19
Therefore, to understand why Wang undertook the compilation one has
to take into consideration the objective social pressures as well as Wang's
personal feelings.
In his compilation of the writings of Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming chose
passages from thirty-four letters that he judged to be from Chu's later
years. He deliberately excluded selections from the Classified Conversa-
tions of Chu Hsif for he believed Chu's disciples compiled them in a
factious spirit. Outside of his preface, Wang let Chu's letters speak for
themselves. Although Ch'eng Min-cheng's Compilation of Essays on the
Oneness of the Way (Tao-ipien) had intended to serve the same purpose, it
actually invited more disputes because Ch'eng had not allowed Chu's
letters to speak for themselves, but had rather juxtaposed the writings of
Chu and Lu.20 Ch'eng had concluded: "In the beginning, the relation-
ship between the learning of Chu and Lu was like ice and fire; in the
15. Li Fus Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'iian-lun, pp. 8a-8b. Also see Ch'en Chien, Hsiieh-pu t'ung-
pien, hereafter abbreviated as HPTP(f), i.e., the Japanese edition, Chung-wen ch'u-
pan-she, preface, 5a~5b and i/8a-gb. Li Fu's observation is confirmed by the writings
of Ch'eng Min-cheng and Wang Yang-ming. See Ch'eng Min-cheng, Tao-i pien, pref-
aced in 1489, microfilm, chuan 6; and WYCC, 4/17-18.
16. WYCC, 4/17-18. 17. Ibid. 18. Lo, Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts'un-kao, 1/6-8.
19. CHL, p. 171. 20. WYCC, 4/17-18; Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, microfilm.
HO
middle year, they were 'half convinced and half suspicious' of each
other; but in the end, their doctrines became as complementary as the
wheels to one cart."21 Ch'eng's rendering had unintentionally refreshed
memories of Chu's early conflicts with Lu and further provoked fac-
tional disputes. Even at the risk of relegating Lu Hsiang-shan to the
background, the reason Wang Yang-ming published Chu's writings
alone was his desire not to offend Chu Hsi scholars.
Ch'eng's and Wang's compilations, and especially the latter's, won
wide acceptance among scholars - even by some within the Chu Hsi
school.22 Disputes over "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" were not an
isolated intellectual exercise, for the disputes affected the political inter-
ests of scholars and civil service examination candidates. Although the
examinations were officially based on the Ch'eng-Chu commentaries on
the classics, the Wang Yang-ming school influenced the minds of admin-
istering officials and competing candidates. Ku Yen-wu claimed that this
was particularly true after the Lung-ch'ing reign (1567-72). Indeed, the
problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" often appeared in civil
service examination questions from local to metropolitan levels. An
acceptable standard answer to this question would definitely influence
the candidates and thereby ultimately the political status of the Chu or
the Lu school. Such scholars as Ch'en Chien (1497-1567), Ku Yen-wu
(1613-82), Wang Fu-chih (1619-92), and LuLiu-liang (1629-83) were
not insensitive to the political consequence of these long-standing aca-
demic disputes.23 Their concern was well justified in the light of the
political vicissitudes of the two schools after the Sung. Ch'en Chien
complained: "Recently, whenever there has been a question concerning
Chu and Lu in the provincial examinations, all candidates answered on
the basis of Ch'eng Min-cheng's Compilation ofEssays on the Oneness of the
Way."24 While still a local official in southern Fukien, Ch'en Chien
learned of the proposal at court to admit Lu Hsiang-shan's tablet into
the Confucian temple. Worried that this would cause "a shift of the
transmission of the Way and confusion of the [correct] intellectual
lineage," he compiled A General Critique of Obscure Learning {Hsu'eh^pu
t'ung-pien) to criticize Wang Yang-ming's Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion
21. Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, preface, 2b~3a; idem, Huang-tun Ch'enghsien-sheng wen-ts'ui, 1506,
13/ia-ib.
22. Ch'en Chien, Hsueh-pu t'ung-pien (hereafter abbreviated as HPTP), in TSCC, preface, p.
1; and Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682), Jih-chih lu (Knowledge acquired day by day), Taipei,
1979,21/535.
23. HPTP, 3/25; Ku, Jih-chih Lu, 20/530-532, 539; Lu Liu-liang, Lu Yung-hui wen-chi, in
Kuo-ts'ui ts'ung-shu, 1908, 5/176; Wang Fu-chih, Chiang-chai shih-hua chien-chu, Peking,
1981, appendix, pp. 214-215.
24. HPTP, 3/25.
Ill
Arrived at Late in Life.25 After seven years, Ch'en Chien accomplished his
project in 1548.
Earlier Lo Ch'in-shun, in his correspondence with Wang Yang-ming,
had already pointed out the anachronism in Wang's dating of the letters
of Chu Hsi.26 To take one example, Wang incorrectly dated Chu's letters
to Ho Shu-ching after Chu's Commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius.
We know that the letters to Ho included indefinite ideas in Chu's middle
years, and that the commentaries were his final conclusions.27 Thus the
truth turned out to be the reverse of what Wang Yang-ming had pre-
sented. The factual mistakes Wang committed were so obvious that they
could hardly escape notice. Therefore, besides Lo Ch'in-shun, other of
Wang's contemporaries such as Ku Tung-ch'iao (1476-1545) and Wei
Chuang-ch'u (1483-1543) also challenged Wang's thesis.28
It was Ch'en Chien however, who first made sweeping, yet detailed,
criticisms of Wang's thesis. Ch'en Chien proclaimed that his intention
was to attack comprehensively Ch'eng Min-cheng's and Wang Yang-
ming's work.29 By closely investigating each letter they included and
interpreted, he found many errors in chronology. For example, Ch'eng
had placed the correspondence of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan on the
issue of the Non-Ultimate before the Goose Lake debate.30 Contrary to
Ch'eng Min-cheng, Ch'en Chien argued that in the beginning as well as
in Chu's youth, Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had similar learning, for
both were immersed in Zen Buddhism. After Chu Hsi turned to ortho-
dox learning in his middle years, he became "half convinced and half
suspicious of Lu's learning; in the end, the learning of Chu and Lu was
like "the relation between ice and fire." Ch'en Chien concluded that this
conflict was particularly intense in the years immediately after Lu passed
away.31 He further pointed out that Wang Yang-ming and Ch'eng Min-
cheng drew their conclusion from unreliable sources. In the last analysis,
he charged that Wang and Ch'eng, as well as Lu Hsiang-shan, had simply
preached Buddhism in a Confucian guise. This vital point, he further
claimed, had not been grasped well by Lo Ch'in-shun and Huo T'ao
{chin-shih, 1514) - even though both were Wang's contemporaries and
had rightly criticized Wang's ideas.32 Although finished in 1548, Ch'en
Chien's work became known and acclaimed only after the famous Tung-
25. Huang Ch'ang-ch'u, Lo Min yuan-liu-lu, g/28b-2ga.

26. Lo, Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts'un-kao, 1/6-7. 27. Ibid., 1/6.
28. CHL in WYCC, p. 35; Wei Chuang-ch'u, Chuang-ch'u i-shu, in Wen-Yiian-ke Ssu-k'u-
ch'uan-shu (hereafter abbreviated as WSQ, Taipei, n.d., 3 / 3 ^ - 3 4 3 .
29. HPTP, 3/25. 30. HPTP(J), 3/7a-8a; cf. Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, l/ia and 3/8a-8b.
31. HPTP(J), preface, 2a-2b.
32. Ibid., i2/i3a-i3b. Huo T'ao compiled Hsiang-shan hsiieh-pien (A critique of Lu
Hsiang-shan's doctrine), frequently quoted by Ch'en Chien in HPTP.
112
lin leader Ku Hsien-ch'eng (1550-1612) wrote its preface in 1605.33 As

expected, Ch'en's work was highly acclaimed by the Chu Hsi scholars.34
It was to be the major target of Li Fu's bitter criticisms.
Two decades after Ch'en had written his book, Feng K'e (1524-1601)
composed a work in 1573 on Wang Yang-ming's Instructions for Practical
Living (Ch'uan-hsi lu) and frequently singled out Wang's thesis about
Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan for criticism.35 Ever since Ch'eng Min-
cheng and especially Wang Yang-ming had presented their thesis, a
number of writings emerged arguing for and against it.36 It was precisely
in this context that Li Fu took up his ceaseless debates with Ch'en Chien
and other Chu Hsi scholars who followed the work of Ch'en.
Among a number of writings following Ch'en Chien's, two received Li
Fu's particular attention: A Rectification of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion
Arrived at Late in Life (K'ao-cheng Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun) by Sun
Ch'eng-tse (1593-1675), and Doubts on the Doctrines of Wang Yang-ming
(Wang-hsiieh chih-i) by Chang Lieh (1622-85).37 Sun, a renowned Chu
Hsi scholar, charged Wang with using Chu Hsi's own learning against
Chu Hsi.38 Chang claimed his conversion to Chu's teaching only after
fifteen or sixteen years fruitlessly immersed in Wang Yang-ming's doc-
trines.39 Both scholars were very unsatisfied with Wang's compilation.
Chang Lieh was also uncompromising in his contention that any at-
tempted reconciliation merely favored the dissemination of Wang's doc-
trine and could never lead one to Confucius's teaching.40 Chang Lieh
pointed out that the year Wang Yang-ming passed the metropolitan
33. HPTP(J), preface by Ku Hsien-ch'eng, 1-11.

34. For example, Chang Lu-hsiang (1611—1674), Yang-yuan hsien-shen ch'iian-ch'i, Taipei:
Chung-hua wen-hsien ch'u-pan-she, n.d., 40/14b; Lu Lung-chi (1630-1693), San-yii-
t'ang wen-chi, WSC, 5/29^ and Ku Yen-wu, Jih-chih-lu, p. 538.
35. Feng K'e, Ch'iu-shih pien, Japanese edition, Kyoto, n.d., 4/38a~42b (pp. 259-271),
6ob/68b (pp. 306-323).
36. According to Ssu-k'u ch'u'an shu tsung-mu t'i-yao (abbreviated as SCTT), the books listed
are related to the problem at issue. On the Chu Hsi side, for example, there were:
Hsien-p'i lu by Ch'eng T'ung (SCTT, p. 193) and Tao-hsueh hui-lan by Wang Yin (SCTT,
p. 1997), in the Ming period; and in the early Ch'ing period, K'ao-cheng Chu-tzu wan-
nien ting-lun by Sun Ch'eng-tse (SCTT, p. 1999), Wang-hsiieh chih-i by Chang Lieh
(SCTT, pp. 2013-2014), Chou Ch'eng Chang Chu cheng-mai by Wei I-chieh (SCTT, pp.
2005-2006), Tzuyang ta-chih by Chin Yun-shuang (SCTT, p. 2010), Chu-tzu sheng-hsueh
k'ao-lieh by Chu tse-yun (SCTT, p. 2006), and Chu-tzu wei-hsueh-k'ao by T'ung Neng-lin
(SCTT, p. 2028). On the Lu-Wang side, there were: Hsin-hsueh lu by Wang Ming
(SCTT, p. 1974), Shuo-li huei-pien by Chi Pen (SCTT, p. 1975), Hsien-shih-pien by T'ang
He-cheng (SCTT, p. 1985), an&Jihyen by K'ung Ch'eng-t'i (SCTT, pp. 1983-1984) in
the Ming period; and San-tzu ting-lun by Wang Fu-li (SCTT, p. 2016) and Tung-wan
hsueh-an by Wu Ting (SCTT, p. 2030) in the early Ch'ing.
37. MTCK, 45/133-15^ i6a-i7b. 38. Ku, Jih-chih lu, p. 538.
39. Chang, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, prefaced in 1681 by Chang himself, Cheng-i-t'ang, 2a.
40. Ibid., ia-2b.
examination coincided with fires at the Confucian temple and the

Chien-yang Academy (which had been built in Chu's memory). These
omens sent by Heaven showed that the rise of Wang Yang-ming would be
disastrous to the teachings of Confucius and Chu Hsi. Unfortunately
people did not realize the exact meaning of these omens.41 Chang
even went so far as to propose that Wang Yang-ming's tablet should be
removed from the Confucian temple.
Chang fully agreed with Ku Yen-wu, whose writings were typical of the
early Ch'ing view that blamed Wang's learning for the fall of the Ming
regime.42 Confucian scholars commonly assumed that ideas played the
decisive role in the sociopolitical arena. When Ku Yen-wu and other
scholars condemned the doctrine of Wang as vicious heterodoxy, they
were inevitably led to the conclusion that "before the reigns of Hung-
chih (1488-1505) and Cheng-te (1506-1516)," social, political, and
intellectual affairs were in good order because of the firm acceptance of
Chu Hsi's teaching; because of the spread of Wang's doctrine after these
periods, things deteriorated and ended in calamity and the breakdown
of the Ming society.43
Facing these charges against the teaching of Wang Yang-ming, Li Fu
was compelled to argue repeatedly that Wang's political and military
achievements were far superior to those of any of his intellectual rivals.
If Confucian assumptions were right about correct ideas leading to
positive effects, Wang's objective accomplishment and therefore the
validity of his doctrine were beyond doubt.44
Li Fu also used a documentary approach to attack the problematic of
Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan. Regarding whether or not Chu Hsi in
his mature years held the same view as Lu Hsiang-shan, Li's answer was
affirmative. In the light of what Li called "reality," the learnings of Chu
Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan in their early forms were "half-similar and half-
different" from each other; in middle age, "less different and more
similar"; and in the end, they were "in complete agreement."45 But in the
realm of "personal opinion," Chu and Lu at the beginning were "half-
doubting and half-believing" each other; in the middle "less doubting
and more believing"; and in the end their relation was like "that of ice to
fire."46
The huge gap between Chu's and Lu's philosophies - as perceived by
themselves and others - had to be explained away if Li Fu was to prove
that at least at the very end Chu did not essentially differ from Lu. Li
41. Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/12b.
42. Ku,Jih-chih lu, p. 539. Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/14b, 12a-12b.
43. Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/12a-i 2b. 44. MTCK, 4 5 / 1 7 ^
45. Ibid., 3 2 / 3 ^ 46. Ibid.
114
ascribed the misunderstanding between Chu and Lu to two things: first,

the distorted communications through their disciples about the sayings
of the other party;47 and second, the "superfluous debate" (pu-chi chih
pieri) on the problem of the Non-Ultimate (wu-chi).48 Regarding this
problem, Li Fu claimed that Chu and Lu differed only in terms, but not
in substance. Both regarded the Great Ultimate (t'ai-chi) as a formless
principle. The debate simply derived from "the different readings of the
classics" and thus was not really relevant to the problematic of Chu
versus Lu.49 Although in principle none of the writings on this debate
should have been included in his compilation, Li could not ignore the
significance of the debate in assessing the relation between Chu and Lu
in their final stage. Thus he included both Chu's and Lu's letters from
the debate on the grounds that the debate unintentionally triggered the
controversy over "the problematic of Chu versus Lu."50 This second
reason is more significant in intellectual history because it reveals the
antimetaphysical mentality dominating philosophical discussion and
ushering in the philological emphasis of his era.
Avoiding the errors in chronology that Ch'eng Min-cheng and Wang
Yang-ming made, Li Fu scrupulously drew his compilation from the
entire corpus of Chu Hsi's writing.51 The compilation was ten times the
size of Wang's work. Li selected writings by Chu Hsi from the age of fifty-
two to seventy-one.52 This was based on Li's periodization of Chu Hsi's
intellectual life, which Li later articulated more clearly in The Period in
which Chu Hsi was Free from Perplexities (Chu-tzu pu-huo lu). This later book
covered Chu's writings from the age of thirty-one to forty, a period in
which Chu's ideas were, according to Li, consistent with Li T'ung's
teachings and Confucian doctrine.53 This compilation aimed to rebut
Ch'en Chien's claim that Chu's writings - such as his letters to Ho Shu-
ching - from this period were immature and could not be used to
support Wang Yang-ming's thesis.54 Li divided the life of Chu Hsi into
four distinct stages of intellectual development.55 Before the age of thirty
Chu was exposed to the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism. Between
thirty-one and forty, while under the influence of Li T'ung, Chu Hsi was
converted to "pure Confucianism." From forty tofiftyChu discarded the
teaching of Li T'ung and concentrated on philological studies of the
classics in an attempt "to imitate the undertaking of Confucius' literary
47. Ibid., 32/3!). 48. Ibid. 49. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, l/yJb.
50. Ibid., i/44b. 51. Ibid., 8a-8b. 52. Ibid., 7a.
53. MTCK, 32/5%; also see his Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 8/274b.
54. MTCK, 32/6a-6b.
55. Li Fu, in the preface of Chu-tzu pu-huo-lu, in MTCK, 3 2/5a. Ch'ien Mu makes a
criticism of Li Fu's periodization of Chu Hsi's intellectual life in Chu-tzu hsin hsueh-an,
vol. 2, p. 173.
project." At fifty-two Chu returned to true Confucian teaching because

he was inspired by the lecture Lu Hsiang-shan gave in Nan-k'ang at
Chu's own invitation.56 Whether Li Fu's periodization does justice to the
intellectual growth of Chu Hsi is not crucial here. More important to our
discussion is that it reveals that Li's approach to Chu's doctrine was from
the teaching of Lu Hsiang-shan. Chu's alleged final conversion to Lu's
doctrine was really based on little more than Li's own prejudice. It was
precisely this bias that often led Li to interpret Chu Hsi's writings out of
context. For example, Li Fu considered the "one"(i) in Chu Hsi's "prin-
ciple is 'one' but its manifestations are many" (li-i fen-shu) equivalent to
the "one" in Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine that "'one' thread runs through
all" (i-kuari).57 Furthermore, Li Fu singles out the character hsin (mind)
in Chu's letters to demonstrate that Chu put as much emphasis on the
learning of mind as Lu had.58 Whenever Chu Hsi mentions "seeking the
lost mind" (ch'iu fang-hsin), Li reads it as identical to Lu's doctrine of
mind. 59 In so doing, Li disregards the specific context in which Chu Hsi
employs the character hsin and thus fails to comprehend the different
connotations in Chu's and Lu's usages.60
Li Fu's friend Wan Ch'eng-chang once wrote a long essay proving that
li (principle) was also the ultimate concern of Lu's teaching, and thus
that in the final analysis the discrepancy between Chu and Lu did not
exist.61 It is worth noting that at that time Wan served as Li's chief
assistant in compiling the Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final
Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life and the Intellectual Lineage of the Doctrine
of Master Lu; moreover, Li placed Wan's essay in the appendix of this
second work. One might say that Li's focus on mind and Wan's focus on
principle were each designed to complement the other's thesis about
similarities in Chu's and Lu's doctrines. The intention underlying their
endeavor could be seen when Li admitted:
People have long been obsessed with the difference between Chu Hsi and Lu
Hsiang-shan. It is hard to persuade them to study the teaching of Master Lu; on
the other hand, it is proper to urge them to study Chu Hsi's mature teaching. In
this manner, studying Chu is equal to studying Lu, even though Master Lu is not
accorded the credit he deserves.62
This passage, among many others, is a good example of Li's transfor-
mation of the problematic of Chu versus Lu from a philosophical to a
textual one. This merits special examination in our exploration of the
56. MTCK, 32/5a-6a. 57. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 7/22o,a-22o,b.
58. To take a few examples, ibid., i/6ia, 2/82a, and 7/244^.
59. Ibid., 2/75a, 80a, 4/130b, 57165b; these are a few examples among many.
60. Cf. Hsia, Shu-Chu chih-i, 10/2b; and Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'uan shu ts'ung-mu t'i-yao.
61. LTHP, 2o/3ga-5ia. 62. MTCK,
116
intellectual climate of Li Fu's time. Here, a peculiar trait in the style of

Li's approach attracts our attention. Li is inclined to analyze and solve
intellectual problems through a documentary approach.
The intellectual transmission of Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine:

the establishment of an intellectual lineage
When Mencius (ca. 371-289 B.C.) constructed his line of the transmis-
sion of the Way, he attempted to clarify and strengthen his intellectual
position in opposition to heterodoxies such as those of Mo-tzu and Yang
Chu.63 When Han Yu (768-824) assumed the idea of the authentic Way,
he was aiming at resisting the overwhelming influence of Buddhism and
Taoism in his day.64 When Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi restructured the
legitimate line of the transmission of the Way, they made a distinction
between their own doctrines and Buddhism and Taoism, on the one
hand, and between themselves and other Confucians, on the other.65
From this historical perspective, Li Fu's construction of the Lu-Wang
school's intellectual lineage was as an attempt to oppose the Ch'eng-Chu
school's unique claim to the authentic Confucian Way.
Before taking a close look at Li Fu's establishment of an intellectual
lineage for the Lu-Wang school, we should first briefly discuss the histori-
cal background of the Ch'eng-Chu school, which had been rising stead-
ily since the end of the Sung. This discussion will provide a better basis
for understanding the pressures faced by Li Fu and other Lu-Wang
scholars in contending with Ch'eng-Chu scholars for a true understand-
ing of the Way.
Claims to preserving and inheriting the "transmission of the Way"
became common among Chu Hsi's followers, although their interpreta-
tion of this concept differed considerably from Chu's. They favorably
appraised Chu's achievements as embodying two aspects of the Way-
bearer who both recovers the Way from the lost transmission and passes
it on to later generations properly. Chu's editing confused texts, and his
annotation of the classics aimed at promoting and preserving - rather
than rediscovering - the Way.66 Huang Kan, Chu's favorite disciple,
wrote in his account of Chu's life:
The Way never disappears from the world, but the transmission of the Way
depends on the proper men to carry it on. It was not until one thousand years
63. SSCC, Mencius, pp. 90-91.
64. Han Yu, Han Ch'ang-li wen-chi, Hong Kong, 1972, 1/8.
65. ECCS, 7/iob-iia; CTWC, 86/12a.
66. Professor de Bary discussed these two types of transmissions at length in his Neo-
Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind and Heart, New York, 1981, pp. 9-13.
117
after Mencius that Chou [Tun-i], Ch'eng [Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I] and
Chang [Tsai] discussed the lost Way. But soon after them, the Way was gradually
distorted. It was Master Chu who not only synthesized the orthodoxy of their
Lien-Lo learning but also revitalized the teachings of Confucius and Mencius
from a state of decline. What a magnificent contribution Master Chu has made
to the Way of all previous sages and wise men.67
The conviction that the legitimate line of the transmission of the Way
awaits the authentic Confucian was clearly expressed here. Chu Hsi in
his Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean had already publicized his idea
of "the legitimate line of transmission of the Way" (tao-t'ung) in 1189.68
Even as early as 1170, the Chu Hsi scholar, Li Yiian-kang, had drawn a
diagram showing the transmission of the Way beginning with the sage-
kings Yao and Shun and ending with the two Ch'eng brothers. 69 Besides
a chart showing the Way's transmission (Ch'uan-tao t'u), Chao Fu in the
early Yuan dynasty made a Shih-yii t'u showing those who had transmitted
the Way by following Chu's scholarship. 70 The second chart is more
important in view of subsequent developments in the construction of the
intellectual lineages, for it conveyed not only a sense of community but
also the historical continuity of Chu's learning.
The adoption of Chu Hsi's commentaries on the classics as the
standard texts for the civil service examinations by the Yuan, Ming, and
Ch'ing regimes further reinforced the dominance of the Ch'eng-Chu
school on the intellectual scene. Historically, the political and cultural
interactions between Chu scholars and these rulers were complicated.
One fact, however, that can be stated with certainty is the increasing
growth of the Ch'eng-Chu school from the end of the Sung dynasty,
regardless of whether the Sung and Mongol rulers approached the
scholars out of an authentic belief in Chu Hsi's doctrine or out of
political expediency. 71
Subsequently, Chu Hsi's teaching received its sponsorship from the
Ming regime through the active effort of such Ming scholars as Sung
Lien (1310-81) and Wang Wei (1321-73). They further enhanced the
Chu school's political power.72 Moreover, in part because the Ming
rulers had the same family name as Master Chu, the Ch'eng-Chu school
enjoyed imperial backing in spreading its doctrine and scholarship. The
political advantage derived by the Ch'eng-Chu school from its wide
dissemination is beyond doubt. Li Fu could not but admit:
67. CTNP, p. 240. 68. CTWC, 76/2ia-23a.

69. Li Yuan-kang, Sheng-meng shihyeh-t'u, in Pai-ch'uan hsiieh-hai, Taipei, n.d., pp. 9 9 9 -
1001.
70. Sung Lien, Yuan shih, Peking, 1976, 189/4314. 71. Liu, "Neo-Confucian School.'
72. Jung Chao-tsu, Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih (The history of Ming thought), pp. 7-13.
118
Because of the government's promotion of Chu Hsi's teaching, vulgar scholars

tend to slander Lu Hsiang-shan to curry favor. They are blind to the fact that
both Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan have been awarded the great honor of
receiving sacrifices in the Confucian temple. The government, in effect, is not
partial to either one, but the civil service examination stipulates testing official
candidates on the basis of the commentaries written by Chu Hsi. By contrast, Lu
Hsiang-shan did not write any annotations of the classics, for he held the view
that the "Six Classics are footnotes to me." Had he written commentaries, these
would have been widely circulated throughout the world [and the Lu school
could compete with the Chu school on an equal footing] .73
Li Fu's observation illuminates the advantage enjoyed by Ch'eng-Chu

scholars because of Chu's commentaries on the classics.
Li Fu deemphasized the fact that in 1241 the Sung had already
bestowed on Chu Hsi the honor of receiving sacrifices in the Confucian
temple;74 however, this honor came to Lu Hsiang-shan only much later
through the petition of Wang Yang-ming's disciple Hsueh K'an in
1530.75 Having one's tablet placed posthumously in the Confucian
shrine was considered the greatest honor a Confucian scholar could
expect. Symbolically, it also implied that one's contribution through
learning to the transmission of the authentic Way wasfinallyand conclu-
sively recognized by later generations. These far-reaching implications
can be illustrated by the 1584 debate about whether Wang Yang-ming
should receive sacrifices in the Confucian temple. T'ao Ta-lin, trying to
calm down Lu Shu-shen, said, "It is not difficult for the court to bestow
the rank of count upon Wang Yang-ming, not to mention the honor
of receiving sacrifices in the Confucian temple."76 Lu replied, "The rank
of count is merely an honor of one generation, but the receiving of
sacrifices in the Confucian temple is an honor for ten thousand genera-
tions."77 Everyone then recognized the appropriateness of Lu's com-
ment.78 In light of this, that Lu Hsiang-shan entered the Confucian
temple almost three hundred years after Chu Hsi is a significant
indicator of the flourishing of Chu's teaching and the relative oblivion of
Lu's.
73. MTCK (1740), 41/13a-i3b.

74. T'uo T'uo, Sungshih, Peking, 1977, 429/12769. For a general English introduction to
the institution of the Confucian temple, see John K. Shryock, Origin and Development of
the State Cult of Confucius, New York, 1966. For a detailed and analytical study consult
my "Ch'iian-li yu hsin-yang" (Power and belief), Continent, 86, no. 5 (May 1993), 8-34.
75. Chang Ting-Yu, Ming shih, Peking, 1974, 50/1300.
76. Sun Ch'eng-tse, Ch'un-ming meng-yu-lu, Hong Kong, 1965, 21/36b; and idem, T'ien-fu
kuang-chi, Peking, 1962, 9/89.
77. Sun, Ch'un-ming meng-yu-lu, 21/36b; idem, T'ien-fu kuang-chi, 9/89.
78. Sun, T'ien-fu kuang-chi, 9/89.
In 1712, during K'ang-hsi's reign, Chu Hsi's status in the Confucian

temple was raised even higher to the rank of shih-che, considered equal to
the "ten brilliant disciples of Confucius" or "ten Confucian philoso-
phers."79 This promotion in Chu Hsi's status linked his teaching directly
to that of Confucius, and his relationship to the transmission of the
Confucian Way was thus acknowledged publicly by the constituted politi-
cal authority. Although the tablets of Lu Hsiang-shan (since 1530) and
Wang Yang-ming (since 1584) were also in the Confucian temple, Lu's
was put in the east corridor and Wang's in the west corridor. Both were
placed under the rubric of "Confucian scholar" (hsien-ju), a rank below
"Confucian wise man" (hsien-hsien), and two ranks below Chu's status as
"Confucian philosopher."80 Thus, the hierarchy within the Confucian
temple is both intellectually and politically meaningful. Furthermore,
such scholars as Yen Jo-ch'u (1636-1704) had been proposing the
removal of Lu Hsiang-shan's and Wang Yang-ming's tablets because Lu
and Wang allegedly deviated from the Confucian Way.81
Politically and intellectually the continuity of transmission of Ch'eng-
Chu's teaching since the end of the Sung was beyond question. Even in
the middle of the Ming period, when Wang Yang-ming and his adher-
ents rose to challenge its authority, the Ch'eng-Chu school had by no
means disappeared. The Yang-ming school indeed exerted a great sway
over the intellectual orientation of its era, but it did not dominate
intellectual life completely. The Ch'eng-Chu school represented by Lo
Ch'in-shun (1465-1547) and the Tung-lin movement cannot be over-
looked as vital responses to the Lu-Wang school. In Li Fu's day, the
Ch'eng-Chu school rose again to a peak through the sponsorship of
the K'ang-hsi emperor and the promotion of Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718),
who ironically had served as Li Fu's examiner in the metropolitan
examination and was thereby his "teacher."82
As a Lu-Wang follower, Li Fu certainly felt stifled by the overwhelming
dominance of the Ch'eng-Chu school, and displayed his feelings un-
reservedly in many of his writings.83 In order to oppose the Ch'eng-Chu
school, Li Fu was determined to undertake a compilation of an intellec-
tual lineage of the Lu-Wang school. The underlying reason for this
commitment was that if the authentic Way had indeed been discovered
by Master Lu, it should be appreciated, shared, and continued by his
followers in later ages. Though the continuity of the Ch'eng-Chu school
was an accepted fact, it had occurred by various mixed motives - not only
by the sincere commitment to the Way of the Ch'eng-Chu school but
79. Ch'ingshih, 85/1067. 80. Ibid., 85/1068.
81. Yen, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng, 8/673-71 a.
82. MTCK, 33/ib. 83. Ibid., 41/4^ 38/i2b-i3a.
12O
also by the search for fame and wealth. Therefore, if Li Fu could recon-
struct an uninterrupted line of Lu-Wang scholars who were deeply com-
mitted to it as the true Way and were untainted by impure motives, then
presumably the superiority of the Lu-Wang doctrines over those of the
Ch'eng-Chu school would become self-evident. Certainly, Li's reasoning
took into consideration both human susceptibility to external tempta-
tions and the ability to overcome these temptations and eventually to
make moral and rational choices.
Li Fu's direct inspiration to compile the intellectual transmission of
the Lu-Wang school ironically arose in reaction to Chu Hsi's pioneering
works to demonstrate his own intellectual origins. Chu Hsi cooperated
with Lu Tsu-ch'ien in compiling Reflections on Things at Hand (Chin-ssu
lu) to present the thought and words of Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng
brothers, and Chang Tsai. Chu Hsi also described their actions in The
Development of I-Lou Learning (I-Lou yuan-yuan lu). In doing so, Chu Hsi
had, according to Li Fu, puts words (yen) and acts (hsing) into separate
categories - a serious mistake that he wished to avoid in his own works.84
For this purpose, Li Fu compiled two books: The Development of Yang-
ming's Learning (Yang-ming hsueh-lu); and the Intellectual Lineage of the
Learning of Master Lu (Lu-tzu hsueh-f'u, prefaced in 1732).85 Because the
book on Wang's learning is unavailable to me and probably not extant,
our analysis will focus on Li's work on Lu's learning.
In this book, Li Fu first gives a comprehensive exposition of the
doctrines of Master Lu with particular emphasis on their relation to the
"family learning" shared by Lu's clan.86 The stress on the milieu of Lu's
family as an important context in which Master Lu developed his unique
thought also enabled Li Fu to broaden the former chronology of Master
Lu in a comprehensive manner.87 Since Master Lu proclaimed that the
bulk of his own learning was formed by his understanding of Mencius,88
it was not necessary to trace Lu Hsiang-shan's learning to earlier schol-
ars. Lu's teachings were basically a kind of moral learning through
personal demonstration. The flourishing of the Lu school during his
own lifetime bore witness to his moral charisma. But the power of his
personal charisma could not be felt beyond the first generation of
his disciples. Even worse, owing to apparent similarities between Lu's
doctrines and Zen Buddhism, some of Lu's disciples were attracted to
Zen doctrines. Such major disciples as Yang Chien, Fu Tzu-yiian, and
84. Ibid., 32/ia.

85. The work was unavailable to me. Most likely it is no longer extant.
86. Li Fu, Lu-tzu-hsueh-f'u (hereafter abbreviated as LTHP), Wu-nu hsuan prefaced in
1732, chuan 5.
87. MTCK, 32/7a-7b. 88. LHCQ 35/37^
121
Yen Tzu-sheng were only a few among many to drift in that direction.89
The unspeakable shame associated with this trend, along with the rapid
decline of the Lu school after the first generation of Lu's disciples, truly
hampered Li Fu in his attempt to draw an uninterrupted line within the
Lu school that could begin to rival the Chu school.
Despite this intrinsic defect in the history of the Lu school, Li Fu was
ingenious enough to employ the idea of "self-declared disciple" to refer
to those who did not directly receive the instruction of Master Lu but in
earnest admiration cultivated themselves on his model. Li Fu derived
this idea from the example of Mencius, who called himself the "self-
declared disciple" (ssu-shu) of Confucius, although he was born more
than a hundred years after the latter's demise.90 Using this concept, Li Fu
had little difficulty filling in the gap between Lu and his admirers in later
times.91
The first figure Li Fu chose as an illustration of the "self-declared
disciples" of Master Lu was Wu Ch'eng, whose life spanned the late Sung
and early Yuan dynasties.92 The advantage in choosing Wu Ch'eng was
threefold. First, Wu Ch'eng began his intellectual pursuits as a Ch'eng-
Chu scholar but later, due to an exposure to Lu's teaching, converted to
the doctrines of Lu Hsiang-shan; hence, the primacy of Lu's teaching
over Chu's was recognized even by a former Chu scholar. Second, Wu
Ch'eng was also a native of Lin-ch'uan, a fact of which Li Fu was very
proud.
Li Fu also used Wu Ch'eng's case to justify accepting government
office under an alien regime. Wu Ch'eng was born in 1249 and passed
the provincial examination at the age of twenty, five years prior to the
Mongol conquest of the Southern Sung. Wu was reluctant to assume
certain officially assigned academic offices and agreed to them only after
he had declined several times.93 Wu Ch'eng believed that intellectual
pursuits had to be associated with concern for moral perfection; other-
wise, they would degenerate into trivial textual studies. Wu attempted to
reconcile the doctrines of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan as complemen-
tary.94 He regarded Chu as good at intellectual learning and Lu as good
at moral cultivation. This paradigm for comprehending the contrast
between Chu and Lu was taken up by Li Fu as well.95 As Li would later
attempt to do, Wu Ch'eng tried to broaden the cultural heritage of his
era in opposition to more narrow-minded Chu scholars such as Hsu
89. MTCK, i8/2oa-2ob. 90. SSCQ Mencius, pp. 117, 202. 91. LTHP, 18/ia-ib.
92. Ibid., i8/ia-4b. For a description in English of Wu's life see David Gedalecia, "Wu
Ch'eng and the Perpetuation of the Classical Heritage in the Yuan," in John D.
Langlois,Jr., ed., China under Mongol Rule (Princeton, N.J., 1981), pp. 186-211.
93. MTCK 24/ga-na. 94. SYHA, 23/5. 95. CWing-shih lieh-chuan, 15/8,1.
122
Heng (1209-81). Hsu taught at Imperial College for years, basing his
work primarily on Elementary Learning (Hsiao-hsileh), a book reportedly
composed by Master Chu to discuss the fundamental ritual practices for
the commencement of learning.96
In 1435, Wu Ch'eng was granted the posthumous honor of sacrifices
in the Confucian temple.97 But in 1530 this sacrifice was terminated
because he was charged with unrighteous behavior by serving the alien
Mongol regime without regard to the fact he had been born and had
passed the provincial examination in the Sung dynasty.98 When propos-
ing to deprive Wu of the honor,99 Hsieh Tu said: Wu "had lived in [Han]
China under Han control but later served the barbarians. He forgot
the loyal duty of a subject and cooperated with the barbarians, suppos-
edly his enemies as well, an improper act that did not conform to the
propriety of a sage or wise man in taking or declining an office."100
Li Fu strove to defend Wu and urged the restoration of his honor in
the Confucian temple. For Li Fu, Wu Ch'eng was a scholar indifferent to
fame and wealth. Even during the Sung, Wu was only "forced" by his
grandfather to take the civil service examination; how much less plaus-
ible, then, that he should crave office under the Mongol regime. His
service on the Mongol court was imposed by the peculiar political de-
mands of his time. Moreover, although Wu Ch'eng passed the provincial
examination during the Sung, he did not assume any government post
under that dynasty. Thus the doctrine of the proper relationship be-
tween ruler and minister could not be applied in the case of Wu's
relation to the Sung dynasty.101 More revealing, it seemed to Li Fu that
political legitimacy based on the distinction between the Han Chinese
and barbarians was incompatible with principle(li). In an attempt to
support his rationalization of alien rule in China, Li cites from the Kung-
yang commentary to the Ch'un-ch'iu, the phrase "to treat as a family [or
unite] China's multitudinous states and to keep at a distance the
neighboring countries around China" (nei-chu-hsia erh wai-ssu-i),102 He
regards this as suggesting a convenient expediency for ruling all the
people in China and downplays the implication of racial discrimination.
"Historically" speaking, he noted, the sage Shun was an eastern barbar-
ian, and King Wen was a western barbarian. After becoming China's
rulers they brought about the most prosperous and peaceful ages in
96. LTCP, i8/2a. 97. Ming-shih, 50/1297. 98. Ibid., 163/443; MTCK, 24/9.
99. Ming-shih, 50/1299-1300. 100. MTCK, 24/9^ 101. Ibid., 24/1 ob.
102. Ibid., 24/1 lb. The original wording of the Kung-Yang commentaries is nei-chu-hsia erh
wai-i-ti, meaning "to familize the multitudinous states of China and to distance i-ti
[barbarians]." Kung-Yang Chuan, SPPY. i8/5b. The replacement of i-ti by ssu-i (the
neighboring countries) on the part of Li Fu reveals the high pressures of the literary
inquisition by the Ch'ing regime.
123
antiquity. He further noted that in his own time, people never criticized
Shun and King Wen for their origins because their achievements have
been universally appreciated. 103 Li sought to make the examples of these
sage-kings relevant to the case of Wu Ch'eng. The Yuan regime had
peacefully ruled China for a considerable period; therefore, driving the
Mongols out would conflict with the goal of maintaining a secure order
for the people's livelihood - even if the government did not entirely
satisfy Confucian political standards.
In short, Li Fu's justification of Wu Ch'eng's action is reminiscent of
his own situation. His experience as a Lu-Wang scholar-official under an
alien regime would make him more likely than others to sympathize with
Wu Ch'eng. In 1737, Wu Ch'eng's tablet was eventually restored to its
place in the Confucian temple. 104 This would have pleased Li Fu greatly,
for it was in part the result of his years of pleading. 105
The implausible nature of Li Fu's intellectual lineage of Lu's teaching
did not escape Ch'uan Tsu-wang's notice. Despite that he was an inti-
mate friend of Li and a Lu-Wang scholar himself, Ch'uan points out that
quite a few figures Li mentioned, such as Ts'ai Yu-hsueh, Lu Tsu-ch'ien,
Hsiang An-shih, and Tai Hsi, could in no way be counted as Lu scholars
or Lu's disciples.106 Li Fu's motivation for including these figures in the
Lu camp may reflect his desire to compete in terms of the numbers of
mambers of the Chu school. His obsession with the number of adherents
of the Lu school can be illustrated by the preface Li wrote for his
biographies of Lu's disciples:
Confucius had three thousand students, of whom only seventy-two had mastery
of the six arts, and among whom five are included in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Records of
the Grand Historian. [By contrast], Lu Hsiang-shan promoted his doctrines in the
Southern Sung, and his disciples numbered in the thousands. It so happens that
among Lu's students, the names of more than seventy can be found in historical
records and gazetteers; furthermore, more than one hundred others can be
found in Lu's writings without specific reference to their official titles.. .. Here,
I simply choose Lu's most brilliant students [for my description] in these ten
chiian.107
But in Ch'uan Tsu-wang's opinion, Li Fu's concern with membership

alone would inevitably confuse the genuine transmission of Lu's teach-
ing just as his intellectual rival, the author of The Origins of Chu Hsi
Learning (K'ao-t'ingyuan-yuan lu), debased the lineage of Chu scholars
because of his inability to differentiate a real Chu scholar. 108 Li Fu's and
Ch'uan Tsu-wang's criteria of classifying a Lu scholar was sometimes
103. MTCK, 24/1 lb. 104. Ch'ing-shih, 85/1067. 105. MTPK, 25/11 a-i2b.
106. CCTC, wai-p'ien, 44/1322-1323. 107. LTHP, 6/ia. 108. Ibid., 44/1323.
124
contradictory. For instance, in his Philosophical Records of the Neo-Confu-

cians of the Sung and the Yuan, Ch'iian remarked that Wu Ch'eng's work
as a whole sided with Chu Hsi.109 The divergent views held by these two
Lu-Wang scholars about the continuity of the Lu school itself seemed to
be so acute as to leave outsiders in doubt about the authenticity of the
line.
As a matter of fact, the history of Lu's teaching is characterized more
by discontinuity than by continuity. A generation later, Chang Hsueh-
ch'eng faced similar difficulties when he attempted to link the Che-tung
(Chekiang) school's study of historiography with the spirit of Lu-Wang
in order to distinguish them from Tai Chen's Che-hsi (Kiangsi) school's
study of the classics from the Ch'eng-Chu perspective.110
However, Li Fu's preoccupation with constructing an intellectual lin-
eage by means of historical exposition reflected the intellectual fashion
of his time. His historical approach was certainly predicated on his
philosophical position as a Lu-Wang scholar; however, the exposition
itself involved more than making a chart of the orthodox transmission of
the Way, as Chao Fu had done during the early Yuan. Li's work assumed
the form of historical exposition. His approach also differed from that
of the Sung Confucians, who emphasized discontinuity rather than con-
tinuity, claiming to be rediscovering the Way after a thousand years'
break. Since the Way had been rediscovered by the Sung Confucians, Li
Fu and other Lu-Wang scholars, as might be expected, stressed its pres-
ervation and transmission through every generation. Consequently their
approach possessed a unique historical style.
The rise of the Wang Yang-ming school precipitated the conflict
between the doctrine of Ch'eng-Chu and that of Lu Hsiang-shan be-
cause of people's association of Wang Yang-ming's doctrines with those
of Lu - whose ideas at the time had fallen into oblivion. The battles
between these two schools took place at various levels. Spurred by politi-
cal, social, and intellectual confrontations, both Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-
wang scholars became more concerned than ever with their own
ideological purity, and the question of intellectual origins became a
crucial concern for both schools. Aside from engaging in philosophical
disputes, they were eager to justify their learning in terms of the true
transmission of the Way, an approach indirectly learned from Zen
Buddhists' focus on the transmission of their doctrines.111 Confucians
109. SYHA, 23/5.

110. This subject is well explored by Professor Yii Ying-shih in On Tai Chen and Chang
Hsueh-ch'eng (Lun Tai Chen yii ChangHsiieh-ch'eng), Hong Kong, 1976, p. 59.
111. Historically speaking, James T.C. Liu was right in saying that "[the tradition of the
Way] was a double borrowing: on the one hand, from Confucian historiography on
not only took account of their own intellectual heritage, but also com-
mented on the origins of their rivals. For example, a Chu scholar, Huang
Ch'ang-chu, stated in 1682:
We, the Ch'eng-Chu school, unified the learning of the early Ming, but for about
a century, the heterodoxies rose to compete with us. Without the least regard for
Tseng-tzu and Mencius, they claimed to inherit the teachings of Confucius
directly and also sought to dismiss the Sung Confucians. They actually knew that
they were not standing on solid ground. .. . Not having a well-founded argu-
ment, they differentiated Ch'eng's doctrine from Chu's doctrine by charging
that the latter was not faithful to the former. Moreover, they differentiated
between the two Ch'eng brothers, saying that Ch'eng I-ch'uan's teaching went
against that of Ch'eng Ming-tao. They even went to the extreme of concluding
that the teaching of the Min region [that of Chu Hsi] was not the genuine
transmission of Lo teaching [that of the Ch'eng brothers] in their attempt to
further sever the teaching of Lo from that of Confucius.112
Huang's criticism inadvertently informs us that Lu-Wang scholars' in-

quiry into the formation of the Ch'eng-Chu school actually arose from
their philosophical disputes. Hence, the effort by the Lu-Wang side
to separate the components of Ch'eng-Chu teaching was a logical result
of the long-term confrontation between the schools over the true
transmission of the Confucian Way.
Long before Li Fu's construction of a Lu-Wang lineage, adherents of
the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school had made many similar
attempts to set up their own lineage of intellectual transmission. The
Ch'eng-Chu school works included A Sequel to Master Chu's Origins ofl-Lo
Learning (I-Lo yuan-yuan hsu-lu) by Hsieh To (1435-1510), 113 and The
Intellectual Lineage ofHsin-an Area (Hsin-an hsueh-hsi lu) by Ch'eng T'ung
(chin-shih, 1508), in 1508.114 Both were Wang Yang-ming's contem-
poraries. A few decades later, The Origins of Chu Hsi's Learning (K'ao-t'ing
yuan-yuan lu) was finished by Hsueh Ying-ch'i, with a preface written by
the legitimacy of dynastic successions known as cheng-t'ung; and on the other hand,
from the Buddhist practice of transmitting this teaching from one patriarch to the
next, especially in Zen Buddhism." See his "Neo-Confucian School," 490-491. How-
ever, Wing-tsit Chan does not agree with the second point Liu makes. Chan contends
that Chu Hsi's making up the tradition of the Way is out of necessity of Chu's
intellectual concern and development. See his "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confu-
cianism."
112. Huang Ch'ang-ch'u in his preface to Lo-Min yuan-liu lu, 1682, pp. 2a—2b.
113. Hsieh To, I-Lo yuan-yuan hsu-lu, n.d., microfilm by the National Central Library,
Taipei.
114. Ch'eng T'ung, Hsin-an hsueh-hsi lu, prefaced 1508, in Anhwei ts'ung-shu, first series,
1932, p. 3a.
126
Hsu Chieh in 1569.115 In Li Fu's writings this book was mentioned and
criticized.116 Around Li's time, other works included The Development of
the Learning of Lo and Min Areas {Lo Min yuan-liu lu) by Chang Hsia in
1682,117 The Transmission of Orthodox Learning (Hsueh-t'ung)by Hsiung
Ssu-lu (1635-1709) in 1685,118 Records of the Transmission of the Way {Tao-
tung lu) by Chang P'o-hsing (1652-1725) in 1708,119 and The Origins of
the Learning Transmitted to the South (Tao-nan yuan-wei) by Chu Heng in
1709 or earlier.120 Among these four works, Chang Hsia's writing re-
ceived Li Fu's special attention, and he composed an essay devoted to
criticizing it.121 In 1749, a year before Li's death, An Investigation of the
Learning of the Neo-Confucians of the Middle Min Area {Min-chung li-hsiieh
k'ao) was written by Li Ch'ing-fu.122 Prior to Li Fu, the Lu-Wang line, or
scholars who were interested in Lu-Wang learning, produced several
works, among them Philosophical Records of Various Confucians {Chu-ju
hsiieh-an) by Liu Yuan-ch'ing. This work reminds us of the "philosophical
records" later made by Huang Tsung-hsi.123 In addition, The Origins of the
Learning of T'ai-chou {T'ai-hsueh yiian-liu), a piece written by Chin Pen-
heng (Chin-shih, 1514),124 The Orthodox Transmission of the Sage Learning
{Sheng-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan) by Chou Ju-teng in 1605,125 and The Orthodox
Transmission of Neo-Confudanism {Li-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan) by Sun Ch'i-feng
115. Sung Tuan-i, K'ao-t'ing yuan-yuan lu, microfilm by the National Central Library,
Taipei, only six chu'an available. Sung Tuan-i (1447-1501) initiated the compilation
of this book but merely composed a draft of it. It was Hsueh Ying-ch'i who finalized
the manuscripts. See also K'ao-t'ing yiian-yiian-lu, prefaces written separately by Hsu
Chieh and Hsueh Ying-ch'i, Japan's edition. Twenty chu'an were republished by
Chung-wen ch'u-pan-she.
116. LTHP, i/22a-22b, 59b.
117. Chang Hsia, Lo-min yuan-liu lu, prefaced in 1682, p. 5.
118. Hsiung Ssu-lu, Hsiieh-t'ung, 1685, included in TSCC.
119. Chang P'o-hsin, Tao-tunglu, 1708, included in TSCC.
120. Chu Heng, Tao-nan-yiian-wei, completed by Chang Po-hsing, prefaced in 1709.
121. MTCK (1740), 45/16a-i7b.
122. Li Ch'ing-fu, Min-chung li-hsiieh yuan-yuan k'ao, SKCS (Ssu-Ru ch'iian-shu) edition,
prefaced in 1749, but composition started in 1728. See p. 1.
123. SCTT, p. 1984. The title, Chu-ju hsiieh-an, appears as one "philosophical record" in
Huang's work. See my "Hsiieh-an t'i-ts'ai pu-lun" (On the term hsiieh-an), Shih-huo,
16, nos. 9—10. But before that, Liu's teacher, Keng Ting-hsiang (1524-1596) had
already employed the term hsiieh-an for the biographies of Lu Hsiang-shan and his
disciple, Yang Chien (1140-1225). See Ch'ih Sheng-ch'ang, "Keng Ting-hsiang yu
T'ai-chou hsueh-p'ai," (Keng Ting-hsiang and the T'ai-chou school), master's thesis,
National Taiwan Normal University, 1990, p. 30.
124. Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao, Taipei, n.d., p. 1346.
125. Chou Ju-teng, Sheng-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan, prefaced in 1605. Chou's book is detailed in
the description of the Confucians of the ancient period, but relatively sketchy in that
of recent centuries; hence, Liu Lin-ch'ang composed another book and patterned it
after the style of Chou's to make up this defect. Liu's book was titled Che-hsueh tsung-
ch'uan. See SCTT, p. 1371.
127
in 1666, are all in the Lu-Wang strain.126 These are the only works
available to me. There may well be others beyond my knowledge or that
have been lost in circulation. 127
The meaning of Li Fu's works can easily be located within the spec-
trum of such compilations, and he was certainly not the one who first
initiated the construction of partisan intellectual lineages. The motive
behind all such endeavors was to compete with the opposing school in
establishing an orthodox transmission of the Way.
The ideological drives by both sides to construct intellectual lineages
provides a background for understanding Huang Tsung-hsi's work, The
Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucians (Ming-ju hsueh-an) .128 Dissatis-
fied with the writings of Chou Ju-teng, Huang charged that Chou's
commitment to Zen resulted in subjective interpretations of the differ-
ent schools. Huang was also critical of Sun Ch'i-feng's undiscriminating
use of source materials. Aware of such limitations in both schools,
Huang Tsung-hsi attempted to be impartial and prudent in selecting
subjects.129 Even so, Huang could not escape criticism, in one case even
by an admirer, Ch'iian Tsu-wang, who said, "Nevertheless, Huang suffers
profoundly from his factional view."130 In commenting on The Philosophi-
cal Records of the Ming Confucians, the authors of the Imperial Catalog
{Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu tsung-mu Vi-yao) shared Ch'uan's judgment:
[Huang] Tsung-hsi was born in Yao-chiang [the birthplace of Wang Yang-ming].
He would not feel happy to deprecate Wang [Yang-ming] and honor Hsueh
[Hsuan], but in view of the circumstances of his situation, he was not allowed to
deprecate Hsueh and honor Wang, either. It turned out that he apparently sided
with the school of Hsueh, but actually took a roundabout way to criticize it. His
defense of the school of Wang was disguised by his superficial attacks on it.131
Thus, the influence of Huang's philosophical viewpoint on his own work

has been widely recognized.
Despite that their works had a somewhat similar format, a distinction
must be made between Huang Tsung-hsi and Li Fu in terms of their
goals and motivations. Li's aim was to justify his intellectual stand
126. Sun Ch'i-feng, Li-hsueh tsung-ch'uan, Taipei, prefaced 1666.

127. The books mentioned in Li Ch'ing-fu's preface to his work bear witness to my
assertion. Min-chung li-hsueh yuan-yuan k'ao, pp. ia-5a.
128. Huang did not finish the Philosophical Records of the Confucians of the Sung and the Yuan.
Later, through the effort primarily of Ch'iian Tsu-wang and secondarily Wang Tsu-
ts'ai, this work was completed. For a more detailed investigation of the relationship
between "intellectual genealogy" and "philosophical records," see my article, 'The
Emergence of a Historical Genre: The Background to the 'Philosophical Records'"
(Hsueh-an t'i-ts'ai ch'an-sheng ti ssu-hsiang pei-ching), Chinese Studies, 2, no. 1 (June
1984), 201-221.
129. MJHA, p. 1. 130. CCTC, wai-fien, 44/1332. 131. SCTT, p. 1286.
128
through a seemingly "historical" reconstruction of a philosophical

school. By contrast, Huang at least claimed to be more interested in
presenting the historical evolution of various schools impartially and
comprehensively.132 Furthermore, Huang consciously separated his own
comments from his descriptions of different schools in order to avoid
confusing his own evaluations and the historical subjects he presented.133
To evaluate how well he realized his goals is important, but not critical to
our present inquiry. What concerns us now is rather that Huang created
a new genre of historical writing from within the old-fashioned antholo-
gies of "intellectual lineages." Yet it cannot be judged by its format alone,
for the substance and the results of the composition are crucially rel-
evant, too. However, Huang's genre did not entirely displace the "intel-
lectual lineage" genre, for each had its faithful followers. Li Fu's type of
intellectual lineages were still being constructed in the 1920s.134 None-
theless, in the light of the subsequent development of Chinese
historiography, Huang's approach has received wider acceptance than
Li's,135 especially because of Ch'uan Tsu-wang - ironically, a historian
and a Lu-Wang scholar - who continued Huang's unfinished Philosophi-
cal Records of the Sung and the Yuan Confucians, which has been viewed as
a modern "intellectual history" in spirit and in substance.136 But our
study of Li Fu's dedication to the establishment of the intellectual lin-
eages serves to remind us of the long-forgotten ideological origins of a
genre invented, modified, and adopted by Li and his predecessors, and
132. MJHA,p. 1.
133. Cf. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsiieh-shu shih, Taipei, n.d., pp. 77-
78.
134. Shao Ch'i-hsien, ed., Wang-hsueh yuan-yuan lu, printed in 1920. Or Huang Ssu-tung,
Tao-hsueh yuan-yuan lu, Feng-shan hsueh-she, 1908; 100 volumes. To take one exam-
ple from those made in the nineteenth century, see Tso Chung-ch'uan, Tao-nanyuan-
yuan lu, prefaced in 1848.
135. A brief description of the development of the form of "philosophical record" (hsu'eh-
an) can be found in Chin Yu-fu's Chung-kuo shih-hsueh-shih (History of Chinese
historiography), Hong Kong, n.d., pp. 202-204. Also see Juan Chih-sheng's "A
Preliminary Investigation of the form of 'Philosophical Record'" in Tu Wei-yun and
Huang Chin-shing, eds., Chung-kuo shih-hsueh-shih lun-wen hsuan-chi (Readings in the
history of Chinese Historiography), Taipei, 1976, vol. 1, pp. 574-596; and Ch'ien
Mu, The Masterpieces of Chinese Historiography {Chung-kuo shih-hsueh ming-chu), Taipei,
1973, pp. 285-317. These sources do not explore the intellectual or ideological
origins of "philosophical record," however.
136. In fact, Huang Tsung-hsi made only the outline of this book. Of 100 chu'an, he
finished merely 17. Ch'uan Tsu-wang continued the project for ten years without
putting it in a publishable form. Another scholar, Wang Tsu-ts'ai, primarily following
the work of Ch'uan, finally brought it to an end. As for the comparison between
Huang's Philosophical Records of the Confucians of the Ming and this book, one can
consult Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's comments on both. In his judgment, the latter made
progress on the former. Liang, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih, pp. 147-
H9-
129
upon which Huang Tsung-hsi drew in making his own philosophical

records.
The cultural trend that inspired Li Fu to construct Lu-Wang's intellec-
tual lineage in opposition to the Ch'eng-Chu school may also shed light
on Chang Hsueh-ch'eng's similar efforts. Chang set up an eastern Che
school as "a way of expression "to oppose the western Che school repre-
sented by his contemporary, Tai Chen. Professor Ying-shih Yii has
pointed out this implicit psychological tension between Chang and
Tai.137 Constructing an intellectual lineage was not the exclusive mono-
poly of the philosophers of the Ch'eng-Chu or the Lu-Wang schools. The
evidential research school also saw the advantages of intellectual line-
ages in undermining the legitimacy of Sung and Ming Confucian phi-
losophers who claimed that after more than a thousand-year break in the
transmission of the Way,138 their doctrines directly linked them to the
teachings of Confucius and Mencius. To contest this claim of legitimacy,
such scholars as Ch'en Yu-fu and Chiang Fan established their own
intellectual lineage for the school of evidential research by associating
themselves with the Han and T'ang Confucians who had anticipated
their own philological interests.139 In this view, it was the scholars of the
Han and the T'ang who had inherited the Way through preserving the
classics, a contribution that subsequent Confucians could not match.140
To support their emphasis on the value of philology within their own
intellectual lineage, members of the evidential research school greatly
depreciated the significance of the doctrines of Sung and Ming Confu-
cians; thus, the status of philologists was securely confirmed. Hence, the
use of intellectual lineages was available not only to Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-
Wang scholars, on the one hand, but also to their common enemies, on
the other.
Li Fu and the study of classics

Li Fu's study of classics is a clear indication that the rise of the evidential
approach to scholarship was intimately linked to the disputes between
the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang schools. Li Fu and the other scholars
in the early Ch'ing were not doing Wao-cheng (evidential research) for its
own sake. Their evidential studies were a part of their larger philosophi-
137. Yu Ying-shih, Lun Tai Chen yii Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Hong Kong, 1976, pp. 53-75.
138. For example, this idea is seen in the epigraph of Ch'eng Hao written by Ch'eng I,
ECCS, 7/1 oa-11 a; and in the epigraph of Chu Hsi written by Huang Kan, CTNP,
p. 240.
139. Ch'eng Mai-fu, Cheng-hsueh-hsu (Continuity of the orthodox learning), in TSCC, 1/
1-4.
140. Ibid., p. 7. Chiang Fan, 1/1-2.
130
cal concerns. Li Fu's own interests were wide-ranging and included

history, ritual, geography, poetry, the classics, and essay writing. We will
use case studies of The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The
Book of Documents to demonstrate first, that Li Fu was a competent
philologist; second, that the relationship between philosophy and phil-
ology was an affirmative one, at least during the early Ch'ing; and finally,
that the evidential approach was a neutral weapon available to various
schools.
The Great Learning (Ta-hsueh)

Among Neo-Confucian interpretations of the classics, those dealing with
The Great Learning tend to be most revealing of their basic philosophical
position. Li Fu's study of The Great Learning demonstrates this point
perfectly. The Great Learning was originally merely a chapter of The Book
ofRites (Li-chi). Ssu-ma Kuang (1019—86), in the Northern Sung period,
was said to be the first one to publish it as a separate work.141 But it
probably appeared as an independent text earlier because in 1030 the
Sung emperor Jen-tsung bestowed it on scholars who had recently
passed the metropolitan examination.142
Dissatisfied with the structure of the text of The Great Learning, Ch'eng
Hao and Ch'eng I separately reorganized the structure of the text and
thus produced different versions of it.143 Chu Hsi further rearranged the
work by dividing it into the main text (ching, literally "canon") and its
commentaries (chuan, literally "paraphrase"). In an attempt allegedly to
complete the meaning of the fifth chapter, he also composed and in-
serted a passage on ko-wu (investigation of things) and chih-chih (exten-
sion of knowledge).144 In doing so, Chu Hsi expounded his own theory
of ko-wu. Chu Hsi's undertaking marked a milestone in the history of
Confucianism. First, as a result of his advocacy, The Great Learning, to-
gether with The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects, and Mendus, replaced
The Five Classics as the most important texts of Confucian learning.145
Second, The Great Learningthereafter came to be regarded as the gateway
to the Confucian study of classics and moral perfection.146 Third, Chu
Hsi's version of The Great Learning, together with his commentaries to the
other Four Books, were prescribed as the standard texts for the imperial
examinations from 1313 onward.
141. Chul-chun, Ching-i k'ao, SPPY, 156/ia.

142. MTCK, ig/34a; also see Mao Hsi-ho, Ta-hsueh cheng-wen, in WSC, i/6a.
143. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, Erh-Ch'eng chi, Peking, 1984, pp. 1126-1132.
144. SSCC, Ta-hsueh, pp. 5-6.
145. Ch'ien, Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsueh-an, vol. 1, p. 189. 146. SSCC, Ta-hsueh, p. 1.
Although Chu's new text received unanimous approval from the

political establishment, the response of intellectuals was far more com-
plicated. Traditionally a classic was considered sacred and was to be
preserved unaltered. Given the scale of transformations that he wrought
on the text, Chu Hsi was indeed a radical. Although some scholars
had their reservations about Chu's alteration of the classic, many of
his followers went as far as he did. Following Chu Hsi, several versions
of the text were suggested by Wang Po, (1197-1274) Tung Huai
(d. 1262), and other scholars.147 But Chu Hsi's version retained its
ascendancy because of a combination of political and intellectual
influences.
Chu Hsi's supremacy went unchallenged until Wang Yang-ming
reintroduced the old text of The Great Learning to support his own
doctrines; thereafter, a serious philosophical dispute, grounded in the
textual problems, raised doubts about the validity of Chu Hsi's version. 148
A quest for the authentic edition of The Great Learning became some-
thing of a fashion, as is evident in the emergence of a number of
newly arranged texts in the wake of Wang Yang-ming's challenge. 149 An
ancient stone-inscription version of The Great Learning (Shih-ching
Ta-hsiieh) even appeared that was first accepted by quite a few famous
scholars, including Ku Hsien-ch'eng (1550—1612) and Liu Tsung-chou
(1578—1645). It later proved to be a forgery. 150 Liu Tsung-chou, who
was well versed in contemporary scholarship on The Great Learning,
lamented:
In sum, The Great Learning has been an unsettled case for a long time. The old
text and the stone-inscription text [of it] are all uncertain. The texts of the
Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi and Kao P'an-lung [1562—1626] are also uncertain.
Whether or not the passage ko-wu and chih-chih is complete is uncertain; there-
fore, the interpretations of it are uncertain. Alas! When can these problems be
solved? Although I have studied until this old age, I can never clear my doubts
about The Great Learning}51
As the study of The Great Learning after Wang Yang-ming's challenge

became linked to one's philosophical position; those who argued for
147. Chu I-tsun, Ching-i-k'ao, i57/3a-3b. Wang Po's suggested version is seen in Mao Hsi-
ho's Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 4/19—20b; Tung Huai's version is in Huang-shih jih-ch'ao, in
WSC, 28/42a-5oa.
148. Chang, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, appendix, pp. I2a-i2b.
149. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 159—161.
150. Mao, Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 1/2D-4D, 2/2a-i2b; and Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, i6o/6b~7a,
151. Liu Tsung-chou, Liu-tzu ch'iian-shu chi i-jrien, Kyoto: Chung-wen ch'u-pan-she, 36/2b.
132
Wang Yang-ming inevitably challenged Chu Hsi's version, and vice

versa.152
Ch'en Ch'ueh (1604—77), a disciple of Liu Tsung-chou, carried this
debate to an extreme by arguing that The Great Learningwas not a sacred
book at all. Ch'en's daring assertion sought to undermine Chu Hsi's
theory of ko-mu:
Yang-ming did not directly attack The Great Learning when [based upon his
proposed old text] he argued against Chu Hsi's interpretation of ko-mu and chih-
chih.... In the end, Chu Hsi's school used The Great Learning to triumph over
Yang-ming's doctrines. This is why the dispute between them has been unable to
come to an end. Alas! the fault lies in Master Yang-ming [for he did not attack
The Great Learning directly] .153
C h ' e n ' s r e m a r k d e m o n s t r a t e s that t h e study of The Great Learning was

closely related to t h e philosophical a r g u m e n t s between C h u a n d Wang.
C h ' e n ' s iconoclasm toward The Great LearningW?LS also a straightforward
b u t illogical answer to Liu Tsung-chou's confusion a b o u t t h e a u t h e n -
ticity of its various texts. T h e quest for t h e a u t h e n t i c Great Learning h a d
i n d e e d b e c o m e pressing by t h e early C h ' i n g .
Li Fu d i d n o t follow C h ' e n C h ' u e h ' s conclusion, b u t r a t h e r basically
a g r e e d with W a n g Yang-ming. Li a g r e e d that t h e restoration of t h e old
text of The Great Learning was necessary to show C h u Hsi's mishandling
of t h e original text, a n d thus his m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ko-xvu.154
Li Fu raises m a n y d o u b t s a b o u t C h u Hsi's study of The Great Learning.
In his preface to t h e text, C h u Hsi h a d asserted that Tseng-tzu was its
a u t h o r , b u t Li Fu was skeptical. 155 T h e r e h a d b e e n n o evidence of its
a u t h o r s h i p before C h u Hsi c a m e u p with t h e n a m e of Tseng-tzu. 156 Li Fu
also p o i n t e d o u t that t h e C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s h a d n o t b e e n t h e first ones to
p r o m o t e The Great Learning as a n i n d e p e n d e n t text, as C h u Hsi h a d
claimed. A l t h o u g h t h e Sung e m p e r o r h a d given The Great Learning to
new d e g r e e holders in 1030, C h u Hsi h a d concealed this to glorify t h e
C h ' e n g brothers. 1 5 7
As we m i g h t expect, Li Fu r e g a r d e d C h u Hsi's gravest e r r o r to b e his
dividing t h e text itself into two parts a n d a d d i n g his own writing to it. For
m o r e t h a n a t h o u s a n d years, n o scholar h a d ever c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t
lapses o r omissions in t h e text, so h o w could t h e C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s a n d
152. Hu Wei, Ta-hsiieh i-chen, in WSC, vol. 3. Not all Ch'eng-Chu scholars approve of Chu
Hsi's version, however. For example, Li Kuang-ti accepts the Old Text version rather
than Chu Hsi's. Li Kuang-ti, Ta-hsiieh ku-^pen-shuo, in WSC, la—17a.
153. Ch'en Ch'ueh, Ch'en Ch'ueh chi, Peking, 1979, p. 565.
154. Cf. Hu Wei, Ta-hsiieh i-chen, 3/8D-9D. 155. MTCK, 19/343.
156. Mao, Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 3/2%—4a. 157. MTCK, 19/343.
Chu Hsi suddenly discover such alleged omissions? Moreover, each of

them had, within a mere few decades, brought out his own edition. What
criterion should one use to select one of them rather than the older
one?158 Furthermore, if the text of The Great Learning were merely one
chapter of The Book of Rites, it might not deserve our respect. However, if
it were indeed linked closely to Confucius himself, its original form
should be preserved, and not even the slightest modification was permis-
sible, not to mention the extreme case of Chu Hsi's additions and
amendations.159 Li Fu's charge against Chu Hsi's violation of textual
rules was actually intended as a refutation of his philosophy. It was, after
all, based on the inserted passage on ko-wu that Chu Hsi preached a
theory that dissociated not only mind from experience but also knowl-
edge from action. Thus Li claimed that Chu's altered text led people
into unorthodox learning. In other words, what Chu Hsi had done was
to "transform tradition" (pien-ku) rather than "restore tradition" (fu-ku),
an act that ruined the ancient method of education.160
As Li Fu rightly pointed out, the controversies over Chu Hsi's version
of The Great Learning had never really ceased. Even scholars within the
Chu Hsi school such as Tung Huai (d. 1262) and Wang Po questioned
the necessity of Chu Hsi's inserted passage. Yang-ming's restoration of
the old text further aroused criticisms of Chu Hsi.161 Having for centuries
used Chu Hsi's version of The Great Learning in the civil service examina-
tions, scholar-officials were shocked when they heard that an "old and
original" text existed.162
Li Fu also appealed to the early T'ang commentaries of K'ung Ying-ta,
which proclaimed that great learning should start with the sincerity of
the will; thus, the T'ang commentaries supported Wang Yang-ming's
reading of the text.163 In spite of his general agreement with the tenets of
Wang Yang-ming's doctrines, Li Fu believed that his own theory of ko-wu
matched the meaning of the old text more precisely and thus proved
that there was no need for Chu's alteration of it.164 Li Fu's final conclu-
sion thus derived from the conjunction of his textual research and his
philosophical views.
The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung)

In comparison with Chu Hsi's fundamental errors regarding The Great
Learning, his version of The Doctrine of the Mean had only minor mistakes.
Nonetheless, Li Fu complained that it was improper for Chu Hsi to
158. MTCK, ig/34b-35a. 159. Ibid., 19/34^ 160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., i9/36b-37a. 162. Ibid., ig/37a-37b. 163. Ibid., ig/36a-36b.
164. Ibid., ig/37b-38a; MTPK, 2i/22a.
divide the text into six sections and thirty-three paragraphs under the
claim of clarifying Tzu-ssu's supposed meaning.165
The Doctrine of the Mean was also initially only a chapter of The Book of
Rites. Tzu-ssu, the grandson of Confucius, had reportedly once written a
book with forty-nine chapters that was also titled the Chung-yiing. But the
bibliography of The History of the Han Dynasty (Han-shu) records the entry
for Chung-yiing-shuo (On Chungyiing) as having only two chapters.166
Although there has been much speculation on the relationship between
The Doctrine of the Mean, the Chung-yiing, and the Chung-yung-shuo, there
are still no conclusive answers.
The Doctrine of the Mean must have appeared as an independent book
much earlier than The Great Learning because it is so listed in the bibli-
ography of The History of the Sui Dynasty (Sui-shu) ,167 Philosophically, it
was Li Ao (772-ca. 838) who first took The Doctrine of the Mean as a point
of departure for the Confucian revival.168 In the Northern Sung dynasty,
there were many studies of The Doctrine of the Mean, and the works of
the Ch'eng brothers and their disciples stand out as the most important.
It was largely on the basis of their writings that Chu Hsi composed
three commentaries on The Doctrine of the Mean.169 Of these, Chung-yiing
chang-chii (Commentaries on Chung-yiing), was the one that Li Fu reviewed.
There had certainly been scholars long before Li Fu who had chal-
lenged Chu Hsi's authority on The Doctrine of the Mean. For instance, Li
Li-wu in the Southern Sung proposed a fifteen-chapter version;170
moreover, in the Ming, Liao Chi suggested a twenty-five-chapter version,
and Kuan Chih-tao, a thirty-five-chapter version.171 In the early Ch'ing, Li
Kuang-ti proposed a twelve-chapter version, and there is no need to
mention Mao Hsi-ho, who never gave up an opportunity to attack Chu
Hsi.172
Li Fu argued that unlike The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean was
not a single piece of writing.173 It consisted of many different writings
under the title Chung-yiing. The Doctrine of the Mean was probably like
some other chapters in The Book of Rites that lumped together various
items under the heading taken from the primary term of the first chap-
ter. Li noted that after the fifteenth chapter, Chu Hsi's edition of the
text referred to the concept of chung-yiing only once - in the twenty-sixth
chapter, where it appeared in contrast to the term kao-ming (brilliance)
and had nothing to do with the key concept of the text. Li Fu thus
165. MTCK, ig/32a. 166. Pan Ku, Han-shu, 30/709.

167. Wei Cheng, Sui-shu, 32/923. 168. Huang Chen, Huang-shih jih-ch'ao, 25/1 a.
169. CTWC, 76/22b-23a. 170. Li Li-wu, Chung-yiingfen-chang, in WSC, 721-736.
171. SCTT, 37/761-762; Chu, Ching-i-k'ao,
172. SCTT, 37/777. 173. MTCK, 19/29^
implied that the concept of chung-yungcould not be the central theme of

the text, and that it was wrong for Chu Hsi to treat the entire text as a
single essay.174
Li Fu cites another piece of evidence to attack Chu Hsi. According to
K'ung-ts'ung-tzu, a work written by certain K'ung families in the Han
period, The Doctrine of the Mean that Tzu-ssu composed had forty-nine
chapters (p'ieri). Therefore, Li reasoned, it could not be divided into
thirty-three chapters (chang), as Chu Hsi did.175 On the basis of Li's
reading of the original text, he recommended a new version of The
Doctrine of the Mean.176
Li Fu further sought to contest Chu Hsi's philosophical interpretation
of The Doctrine of the Mean by deemphasizing its metaphysical flavor.
According to Chu Hsi, The Great Learning provided students with a
methodology for Confucian learning; The Analects and Mencius gave the
content of Confucian teaching; and The Doctrine of the Mean supplied
moral metaphysics. Viewed in this light, The Doctrine of the Mean is the
most difficult and the last to be read of The Four Books.111 To Chu Hsi, the
first chapter of The Doctrine of the Mean provided an essential description
of the Confucian Way. As we saw in Chapter 1, Chu Hsi elaborated the
theory of "equilibrium and harmony" (chung-ho shuo) on the basis of it.
But for Li Fu, the first chapter was characterized by a lack of attention to
the substance of the Confucian Way. It was much too vague and unable
to provide a sharp contrast between the Confucian Way and the ways of
Buddhism and Taoism.178
If Tzu-ssu had merely discussed the concepts of nature (hsing) and the
Way (tao), there would be no difference between him and the Buddhists
and Taoists, for they also employed these metaphysical ideas to support
their doctrines. Since the Southern Sung period, according to Li, Con-
fucians had argued with the Buddhists and Taoists by using metaphysics,
but the more these Confucians argued, the more confused they be-
came.179 The only cure was to reintroduce the five ta-tao (literally, the
path taken by all to attain the Way), namely, the traditional five constant
relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, husband and
wife, elder and younger siblings, and among friends. Li Fu contends that
these social and ethical relationships unambiguously distinguished the
concerns of Confucians from those of heterodoxies.180 In Li Fu's concep-
tion, the twentieth chapter (in Chu Hsi's edition) of The Doctrine of the
174. MTCK, i9/3ob.

175. Ibid., 19/32b. That the K'ung-ts'ung-tzu is really made by the K'ung family is question-
able. See SCTT, pp. 187-188.
176. MTCK, 19/3 2a. 177. CTYL, 14/1 a. 178. MTCK, 24/1 a.
179. Ibid., 24/ia-ib. 180. Ibid., 24/ib-2b.
136
Mean, which involves the discussion of these five constant relationships,

actually became the core of the whole text. The shift of emphasis from
the first chapter to the twentieth chapter thus nicely corresponded to Li
Fu's conception of the Way.181
The Book of Documents (Shang-shu)

Two studies of the classics pioneered the evidential approach in the early
Ch'ing period. One was the Evidential Analysis of the Old Text Documents
(Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng) by Yenjo-ch'u (1636—1704); the other was
An Investigation of the Diagrams in the Book of Changes (I-t'u ming-pien) by
Hu Wei (1633—1714). Yen proved that the Old Text Documents (Ku-wen
Shang-shu), unlike the New Text Documents (Chin-wen Shang-shu), was a
forgery. And Hu debunked the myths about the diagrams in the Book of
Changes. Both studies were taken as paradigms of the evidential ap-
proach.182 It appears, however, that Li Fu had not read either of these
books in spite of the fact that he was very much involved with the
discussion of them, especially of The Book of Documents.
Ironically, when invited to write a preface for a friend's work on the
diagrams of the Book of Changes, Li Fu argued, in accordance with Huang
Tsung-yen (1616—86), that these diagrams came from dubious Taoist
sources.183 On the issue of the diagrams, the Huang brothers, Huang
Tsung-hsi and Huang Tsung-yen, were in accord with Li Fu. But in their
work on the Book of Changes, the Huang brothers vehemently attacked
Chu Hsi. Huang Tsung-yen argued, "Chu Hsi further added Buddhist
doctrines to them [the diagrams of Vai-chi that came from Taoism]."184
The factional spirit is unreservedly conveyed in Huang's charge against
Chu Hsi.185 Huang thus continued the debate between Chu Hsi and Lu
Hsiang-shan over the diagrams of the Great Ultimate (Vai-chi). Li Fu was
skeptical of the sources of these diagrams as well. He made three points
about the issue of the diagrams of the Book of Changes. First, according to
Ch'en T'uan (d. 989), who had transmitted them, the diagrams had
been made by Fu Hsi and did not appear on the mythical dragon-horse
as was widely believed; second, the hsien-Vien diagram did not fit the text
of Hsi-ts'u; third, even if Ch'en T'uan were correct, why had no one - for
the two or three thousand years before him - ever talked about it?186
181. Ibid., 24/1 a-ib.

182. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsueh shih-ch'eng-chi, pp. 6—11, 13—15. As for English
writing on the evidential approach, one can rely upon Benjamin Elman's From
Philosophy to Philology, Cambridge, Mass., 1984.
183. MTPK (1740), 24/ia-ib. 184. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 7i/i8a.
185. SCTT, p. 88. 186. MTPK (1J40), 21/ia-ib.
Doubts about the Old Text Documents had first been raised in the
Southern Sung period by Wu Yu (chin-shih, 1117).187 In comparison with
the literary style of the New Text Documents, which is difficult to read, the
style of the Old Text Documents seemed to Chu Hsi too easy and fluent,
and hence unau then tic.188 After Wu Yu and Chu Hsi, scholars ques-
tioned the Old Text Documents. Among these were Wang Po in the
Southern Sung; Chao Meng-fu (1254—1322) and Wu Ch'eng in the
Yuan; and Kuei Yu-kuang (1506—71), Hao Ching (1558—1639), and Mei
Cho (who passed the local examination in 1513) in the Ming.189 Mei Cho
was the first one to apply the evidential approach to the study of the Old
Text Documents. Yen Jo-ch'u, although not informed of Mei Cho's
research, further developed this approach in his work on the same
book.190
Regarding Yen Jo-chii's work as an attack on Lu-Wang doctrines, Mao
Hsi-ho composed his Apologia for the Old Text Documents (Ku-wen Shang-
shu yuan-ts'u) in an attempt to defend them. In his book, Mao Hsi-ho
appealed to The History of the Chin Dynasty (Chin-shu) to justify the argu-
ment that the transmission of the Old Text Documents had never been
interrupted. Li Fu was critical of Mao's work. He argued that although in
the T'ang period there were seven versions of The History of the Chin
Dynasty, the one quoted by K'ung Ying-ta, the commentator of The Book
of Documents, could be the only official version of The History of the Chin
Dynasty.191 Li's point was that there were no grounds for either K'ung
Ying-ta or Mao Hsi-ho to make such a reference.
Li Fu further argued that it was very likely that Huang-fu Mi had made
up the Old Text Documents, a thesis that agreed with Mei Cho's findings.192
He also rebuts his friend Fang Pao's claim that the writing style of the Old
Text Documents could not be initiated by anyone other than its tradition-
ally ascribed author. Li Fu also offered some counterexamples.193 In the
end, Li Fu showed that Mao Hsi-ho's underlying motive was to attack
Chu Hsi rather than to defend the Old Text Documents.™
In another essay, "Textual Examination of the Old Text Documents'
{Ku-wen Shang-shu k'ao), Li Fu confirmed Mei Cho's earlier observation
that the "sixteen characters" in the "Counsels of Yu the Great" (Ta Yu
mo) of the Old Text Documents were forged by someone in the Han or Wei
187. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 8o/6b. 188. CTYL, 78/3142-3143.
189. Chu, Ching-i-k 'ao, 84/2b~4b, 85/1 a~3b, 91/1 b-2a.
190. Yen knows only Mei's Shang-shu-p'u, but not Shang-shu k'ao-i, which is much more
sophisticated than the former. Cf. Tai Chun-jen, Yen Mao ku-wen Shang-shu kung-an,
Taipei, 1963, chapter 2; and Lin Ch'ing-chang, Ming-tai k'ao-chu-hsiieh, Taipei, 1983,
chapter 3.
191. MTCK, 45/39b-4oa. 192. Ibid., 45/40^
193. Ibid., 45/4ob-4ia. 194. Ibid., 45/41^
138
periods.195 Mei Cho had proven that the "sixteen characters" were taken
from The Analects and the Hsiin-tzu.196 Li Fu further pointed out that The
Classic of the Way (Tao-ching) cited by Hsiin-tzu could not be The Book of
Documents. In the first place, whenever Hsiin-tzu quoted The Book of
Documents, he referred to it as Shu (the Documents), and not as Tao-ching.
This implied that before the book burnings during the Ch'in, the forged
section had not appeared in the text of The Book ofDocuments.197 Second,
before the Han period, only Taoist writings (e.g., Lao-tzu's Tao-te ching
and Chuang-tzu's Nan-hua ching) - not Confucian classics such as / {Book
of Changes), Shih (Book of Poetry), CWun-ch'iu (Book of History), or Shu (Book
ofDocuments) - were canonized as ching.198 Finally, Li Fu showed that the
two surviving pieces of the original Old Text Documents in the Records of the
Grand Historians (Shih-chi) do not match the style of the present Old Text
Documents at all.199 In his view, the doubts about the present Old Text
Documents were textually well confirmed.
In sum, Li Fu's contribution to the study of The Book of Documents lies
primarily in his strengthening Mei Cho's arguments.200 Ts'ui Shu (1740—
1816), the famous philologist of the middle Ch'ing period, was a great
admirer of Li Fu, whom he believed to have been the most erudite
scholar of the preceding hundred years.201 Apparently ignorant of the
works of Yen Jo-ch'ii and Mei Cho, Ts'ui Shu (1740-1816) was deter-
mined to take up where Li Fu left off, and thus delivered a final blow to
the Old Text Documents.202
Unlike some radical scholars who wanted to remove the Old Text
Documents entirely from the syllabus of Confucian learning, Li Fu held
that the Documents were still worth reading, for they contained fragments
of the authentic Book of Documents. Nevertheless, certain statements like
"chia-mo ju-kao" (which had something to do with political manipulation)
harmed the correct way of government and should be deleted.204 "The
'sixteen characters' in the Old Text Documents laid the foundation for the
later development of Sung and Ming neo-Confucianism and served as
the method of mind transmission for rulers," Li Fu pointed out. "This is
195. Ibid., 19/1 a. The sixteen characters read as follows: "The human mind is precarious
[liable to make mistakes]; the mind of the Way is subtle [follows moral law]. Have
absolute refinement and single-mindedness and hold fast the Mean." The English
translation is based upon CHL, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, p. 119. On the shift from
philosophy to philology on the discussions of the human mind and the mind of the
Way, see Benjamin Elman, "Philosophy (I-li) versus Philosophy (K'ao-cheng): The Jen-
Hsin Tao-Hsin Debate," T'oungPao, 69, nos. 4-5 (1983), 175-222.
196. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 88/6b~7b. 197. MTCK, 19/ia-ib.
198. Ibid., i9/ib-2a. 199. Ibid., 19/23-30.
200. Wang Yun-wu, ed., Hsii-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu t'iyao, Taipei, 1971, p. 186.
201. Ts'ui Shu, Ts'ui Tung-pi i-shu, Shanghai, 1983, p. 597.
202. Ibid., pp. 581-602. 203. MTCK, 45/41^ 204. Ibid., 45/41^
the reason Chu Hsi once raised questions about the Old Text Documents
but ended up doing nothing about it."205 It appears that by singling out
the "sixteen characters" for criticism, Li Fu managed to undermine the
foundation of the metaphysical trend within Sung-Ming Confucianism.
In his time, Li had been famous for his photographic memory. It was
said that he could recall any record he had read.206 Relying on this gift,
he liked to argue with others about historical events.207 Li's habit of
dealing with an intellectual problem by reading and recalling enormous
amounts of material, rather than by engaging in theoretical speculation,
was representative of the general intellectual trend of his day. In a letter,
he said that within six or seven years he had carefully read the works of
Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang
Yang-ming ten or more times.208 Thus, Li felt he could reject Chu Hsi's
charge that Lu's teaching was one of "sudden enlightenment" (tun-wu),
because he had gone through Lu's complete works a dozen times with-
out being able to find the term tun-xvu therein.209 He also rebutted Ch'en
Chien's argument - based on a Buddhist poem Lu quoted - that Lu was
influenced by Buddhism. After his wide reading, Li had been unable to
find the poem in any Buddhist writings.210 Li also dismissed the claim
that Wang Yang-ming's teachings were some kind of Zen doctrine be-
cause he was able to show that Wang's term, chao-hsin (shining mind),
was not to be found in the writings of the Buddhists.211 In order to refute
Sun Ch'eng-tse's and Chang Lieh's criticisms of Lu and Wang, it seemed
to Li reasonable and adequate to claim that it was only their incomplete
and sporadic reading of Lu's and Wang's works, or even of Chu Hsi's,
that had given rise to their mistaken views.212
The predisposition to reduce philosophical issues to an argument over
documentary or philological evidence was by no means characteristic of
Li Fu alone.213 Li's approach, although empowered by his excellent
memory, should not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. His intel-
lectual style should be seen in the perspective of what Professor Yii has
called "the rise of Ch'ing Confucian intellectualism."214 In other words,
Li Fu was entering the era of "following the pursuit of inquiry and study,"
while still in the mold of the learning of Lu and Wang. At first glance,
205. MTCK, 19/1 a. 206. Juan Kuei-sheng, Ch'a-yii k'o-hua, Shanghai, 1959, p. 226.
207. Ibid., p. 225. 208. MTCK, 43/iob. 209. Ibid., 18/iga.
210. LTHP, n / i g b . 211. MTCK, 43/17^ 212. Ibid., 45/13^ 16b.
213. Cf. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsiieh shih-ch'eng-chi, which discussed the rise of the
philological approach from the early Ch'ing.
214. Yu, "Preliminary Observations." In this paper, Professor Yu uses the term "intellectu-
alism" somewhat differently from the philosophical doctrine that claims human
intellect is the source of truth; Yu's sense is that "knowledge is good and desirable."
140
this statement may seem self-contradictory, for both Lu and Wang had a
certain independence of spirit toward book learning, which they re-
garded as subordinate to "honoring the moral nature." Theoretically,
according to Lu and Wang, book learning and intellectual discussion
were not necessary to achieve moral perfection. However, neither phil-
osopher excluded them totally from the methods of moral cultivation in
practice.
In spirit, Li Fu followed Lu and Wang, for he often declared that
although the sages did not exclude book learning from moral cultiva-
tion, real learning never solely consisted in it. The learning of the sages,
Li argued, was seen rather in the realization of the norms of the "five
human relationships." Only after these relationships had been cultivated
could one really study the classics.215 In addition, Li also challenged the
prevailing philological approach, which appealed to the ancient annota-
tions (ku-hsuri), especially those made in the Han period, as the highest
authority in deciding questions about truth.216 Li even went so far as to
quote Chu Hsi, who had once claimed that "textual study is trivial
learning" (k'ao-cheng shih mo-liu), in order to depreciate the value of
philology as a whole.217 Li's distrust of the authority of ancient commen-
taries was consistent with Lu and Wang's doctrine that the ultimate
authority should be one's mind or the innate knowledge of the good
therein.
On the other hand, Li Fu did not ignore the ready-made weapon
provided by the philologists for attacking metaphysical discussions -
which Li agreed led nowhere. He also concurred with philologists such
as Mei Cho or Yen Jo-ch'u that the Old Text of The Book of Documents was
a forgery.218 Li thus undermined the sacredness of the "sixteen-character
mind-transmitted maxim" contained in this text, which had been used to
imitate metaphysical discussions of mind and nature. Thus Li Fu em-
ployed the methods of philology to tackle a philosophical problem. Li,
the Lu-Wang philosopher, however, did not contradict Li, the scholar of
philology. Although philology prescribed textual learning as the sole
access to truth, Li Fu rejected it as a valid theoretical guide for acquiring
the true Way. However, he accepted philology as an efficient weapon for
fighting his intellectual enemies, both Ch'eng-Chu scholars and other
metaphysical "empty talkers."
The appeal to sources as authority in the Lu-Wang school can be
traced back to Wang Yang-ming, who at the same time ironically stood as
215. MTCK 9/5b. 216. Ibid.,
217. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 6/i87a-i88a.
218. Yen Jo-ch'u, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng, proves that Old Text of The Book of Documents
was a forgery.
the exemplar of the "honoring morality" approach. Wang Yang-ming

confirmed what he had achieved his first enlightenment in Lung-ch'ang
by memorizing the texts of the Five Classics.219 Wang also went back to
The Great Learning in the Old Text version to justify his interpretation of
ko-wu.220 Moreover, he edited Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in
Life, where he implied basic similarity between his thought and Chu
Hsi's mature positions in order to deflect pressure from his critics.221
Li Fu's Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at
Late in Life can be also seen in a context similar to Wang's. One of the
differences is that in Li's time the authority of Chu Hsi loomed larger
than ever. Moreover, Li had to come to terms with an age in which the
study of philology was becoming a dominant intellectual trend. The
philological method of evidential research definitely influenced Li's
approach in compiling the Comprehensive Compilation, the Intellectual
Lineage of the Learning of Master Lu, and his other studies.
219. WYCC, 22/417, 32/614-615. 220. Ibid., 7/58.

221. Ibid., 3/83-84, 4/17-18.
142
7
The price of having a
sage-emperor
The assimilation of the tradition
of the Way by the political
establishment in the light of the
K'ang-hsi emperor's governance
Since the time of Confucius, thinking about the relationship between

political rulers and cultural elites had evolved into a particular
conceptualization. The Way and political power had separated and their
final unity was ideologically prescribed as the ultimate political-cultural
goal. The author of The Doctrine of the Mean was aware of this commit-
ment when he wrote:
One may occupy the throne, but if he does not have the proper virtue, he should
not presume to make ceremonies or music. One may have the virtue, but if he
does not occupy the throne, he likewise should not presume to make ceremonies
or music.
As a matter of mutual interest, both political and cultural elites had to
accept a basic division of labor: rulers were in charge of government,
while Confucian scholars supervised the preservation and transmission
of the Way. The Records of the Rites in The New T'ang History illustrated this
point quite well:
Before the Three Dynasties, the ruling authority came from one source, and
ceremonies and music spread to the world; after the Three Dynasties, the ruling
authority came from two sources, and ceremonies and music became empty
names.
Since they saw themselves as representatives of the Way, Confucians were
theoretically justified in opposing political authorities whenever the
situation required. Authentic Confucians since Confucius and Mencius

had upheld this idea, and Sung and Ming Confucians with their sense of
"continuity" or "tradition" further reinforced it. By and large, the role of
the Confucian Way in checking government was very much alive in the
minds of Confucians until the early Ch'ing period. Nevertheless this
concept was eliminated when the K'ang-hsi emperor successfully appro-
priated the long-aspired Confucian political ideal - the unity of power
and truth. This coup proved to be an ideological trump card in the
emperor's hand. Here was the transformation of a political ideal by a
dynamic autocracy.
Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime is just one example among
many that could be used to reflect this subtle but fundamental change
on the part of Ch'ing Confucians in conceptualizing political reality as
manipulated by the rulers of their day. This transformation of political
ideology was to have far-reaching implications.
Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime

In his preface to a series of essays celebrating K'ang-hsi's sixtieth birth-
day, Li Fu noted that His Majesty had repeatedly declined to participate
in the traditional ceremony in which the emperor would assume an
honorific title and receive certain ceremonial tablets. The emperor had
also refused to permit buildings to be erected in commemoration of his
unprecedented achievements. Li Fu viewed this as modesty unparalleled
in history.1 He continued:
His Majesty possesses such a great virtue: Besides having already accomplished
what the former sagely emperors Yao and Shun had done for the world, he has
also mastered the profundity of Heaven's nature and the subtlety of the sagely
Way through the learning of the "sixteen-character maxim" as the way of trans-
mitting the mind. His realization of the Way frees him from superficial formality
and conventional constraints. [Because he stresses substance rather than name,]
he is not concerned about an honorific title, to which the emperors of the T'ang
and Sung much aspired, and neither does he care for the ritual of worshiping
Heaven and Earth [on the mountains of T'ai and Liang-fu] to inform Heaven of
his achievement. How fortunate we are to live in such a grand age [sheng-shih] !2
At first glance, one hesitates to judge whether Li Fu's appraisal of the
K'ang-hsi emperor is an expression of genuine feelings or a mere
rhetorical paean.
Suspending our judgment for a moment will facilitate probing Li Fu's
wording. The phrase saying that the emperor had "already accomplished
1. MTPK, 40/43. 2. Ibid., 40^-4!).

144
The price of having a sage-emperor
what the previous sagely emperors Yao and Shun had done for the
world" attracts our attention. To be sure, urging or admonishing a ruler
to become a sage was quite common among responsible scholars, who
regarded this as their duty. But to say that an emperor was already equal
to a sage-king is qualitatively different from a mere exhortation. Li Fu's
statement asserts that the K'ang-hsi emperor had fulfilled the highest
Confucian ideal: sageliness within and kingliness without, an ideal that
had awaited actualization since the remote golden age of Yao and Shun.
Even in the mostfloweryof essays, this kind of praise was rarely bestowed
on any other emperor in Chinese history.3
Indeed, Li Fu was very much impressed by the emperor's accomplish-
ments in both military and civil affairs.4 Very few Chinese rulers could
rival the K'ang-hsi emperor in both these spheres. The emperor's out-
standing achievements have been commonly recognized by past and
present historians. Even Marxist historians have had to concede that
there were some "progressive" aspects of his reign.5 Thus, Li Fu's high
esteem for the emperor was solidly based. Precisely because of the K'ang-
hsi emperor's unique achievements, Li Fu felt that the emperor was as
sagacious as Yao and Shun.
Li Fu held the emperor to be the embodiment of the two traditions of
governance {chih-t'ung) and the Way (tao-t'ung).6 He based this opinion
on the fact that the emperor had achieved unity of ideology with actual
achievement. The emperor's ideas were handed down to his successors
and thus established a political ideology for the Ch'ing regime. In Li Fu's
view, the emperor's successors not only inherited the tradition of
governance but also that of the Way.7
His perception of the K'ang-hsi emperor was widely shared by
other scholars at that time. Li Kuang-ti, the leading representative
of the Ch'eng-Chu school, expressed the same view. He anticipated
3. In the Shih-chi, we find the paean for Ch'in Shih-huang, which reads, "(His) merits were
beyond that of the Five Emperors." See Shih-chi, Shanghai, 1972, 6/236, 6/245.
4. M7P/C4o/ia-i6b, 4 i / i a - i 2 b .
5. For a typical Marxist historical view of the K'ang-hsi emperor, see a standard text
designed for the youth of Communist China: Chung-kuo ku-tai-shih ch'ang-shih, Ming-
Ch'ing pu-fen (The common knowledge of China's ancient history, the Ming and Ch'ing
periods), Peking, 1979, pp. 215-225. For the traditional assessments of the K'ang-hsi
emperor, see Ch'ing-shih kao (The manuscript of the Ch'ing history), which was com-
piled by Chao Erh-hsun and others from 1914 to 1927; and K'ang-hsi Cheng-yao (The
politics of the K'ang-hsi emperor), which was edited in 191 o by Chang Ch'ing, hereafter
abbreviated as KHCY. Both can be put in the category of Confucian historiography.
Even a nationalistic historian such as Hsiao I-shan had high regard for the emperor; see
Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing tai t'ung-shih (A general history of die Ch'ing period), Shanghai,
1927, vol. 1, chapter 6.
6. Li Fu, Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao, hereafter abbreviated as MTCK, 46/333.
7. MTPK 25/1 lb.
Li Fu's feeling in his memorial to the K'ang-hsi emperor of 1680:

I observed that in the ancient period the Way [tao] and governance [chih] came
from one source. But afterward, they came from separate sources - Confucius
was born after the Chou dynasty had moved to the East; Master Chu was born
after the Sung regime had moved to the South. Although Heaven endowed them
with the Way, they lived in a time unfavorable to the realization of the Way. This
was the reason the Way and governance separated. Your Majesty was born five
hundred years after Master Chu. It is the right timing for the rise of a true king
(wang) like you who can practice the learning of sages. Is it not the will of
Heaven to bring back the time of Yao and Shun so that the tradition of the Way
and the tradition of governance will converge once again?8
The interaction between the K'ang-hsi emperor and the Confucian
scholars of his time is complex. In retrospect, the emperor certainly took
Li Kuang-ti's advice and assumed the responsibility of combining the
tradition of governance and that of the Way. Confucians gained a gener-
ous patron in the emperor, one who fulfilled their cultural ideal. But this
was achieved at the expense of the autonomy of the tradition of the Way.
The ideological difference between the tradition of the Way and that of
governance was blurred, because they now functioned in a single person.
Furthermore, the emperor's cultural preferences now overwhelmed the
scholars. When the once-renowned Lu-Wang scholar Mao Hsi-ho
learned of the K'ang-hsi emperor's decision to elevate Chu Hsi's status in
the Confucian pantheon, he was so frightened that he immediately
destroyed the printers' plates for his Corrections of Chu Hsi's Commentaries
on the Four Books (Ssu-shu kai-tsyuo). In his original draft for this book, Mao
had severely criticized Chu Hsi's annotations.9 Hsieh Chih-shih was sen-
tenced to death on account of his Lu-Wang deviation from orthodox
interpretations of the classics.10
Li Fu's relationship with his rulers was a good example of this loss of
the Way as a standard for criticizing the political establishment, for he
never criticized or admonished the emperors from the standpoint of a
representative of the tradition of the Way. This shows that the K'ang-hsi
emperor's ideology had indeed assimilated the Way into government,
8. Li Kuang-ti, Jung-tsun ch'iian-shu, io/3a~3b. Prefaced by Li Fu. Also see MTCK, 33/lb.
9. CCTC, wai-pien, 12/828.
10. CSK, 293/10328-10329. Although Hsien Chih-shih was sentenced to death, he was
pardoned by the emperor, Yung-cheng. Hsieh's case was actually linked with a political
conspiracy, but what concerns us is that he was accused of deviating from orthodox
interpretations. Later he was impeached again by a local official for attacking Chu Hsi
in his writings. The Ch'ien-lung emperor ordered an investigation of his works. The
punishment was limited to the confiscation and destruction of Hsieh's writings, thanks
to the "mercy" of the emperor. See Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yu tang,firstseries, pp. ia-2b.
146
and that the ruler had become the supreme authority both in the realm
of politics and of culture. Thus Li and other Confucians lost their
grounds for confronting the ruler as a follower of the Way should.11
As a Lu-Wang scholar, Li Fu was courageous enough to oppose the
officially backed Ch'eng-Chu school. Intellectually, he stuck to his
belief in Lu-Wang doctrines, but he did not step beyond that limit to
criticize the Ch'ing regime in either political or cultural terms. The
Ch'ing rulers' support for the Ch'eng-Chu doctrines did not in any way
diminish his acceptance of their alien regime.
On the contrary, the extent to which he had embraced the Ch'ing
regime was apparent in his poem rationalizing the Manchu Ch'ing
invasion of China.12 This poem, which he had composed in his youth,
before taking office, blamed the fall of the Ming dynasty on the corrup-
tion of Ming politics and the violence of bandits.13 It was to the merit of
the Manchus that they came to the rescue of the Han Chinese amid
intolerable suffering.14 The ethnic origins of the alien Manchu rulers did
not, in Li Fu's opinion, lessen the legitimacy of their regime; he asked,
"Did not the sagely emperors Yao and Shun come from barbarian
places?"15
Li Fu also queried the accepted version of history when he argued that
the expedition of King Wu had not so much deliberately replaced the
Shang dynasty given that it had been invited by the Shang rulers them-
selves, who had thus brought upon themselves their own final destruc-
tion.16 He thus implied that the relationship between the Ming dynasty
and the Manchus was similar. In another essay, "The Massacre of Fang
Hsiao-ju's ten Clan," Li Fu pointed out that the Ming ruler Yiing-lo's
cruelty toward officials and scholars stood in sharp contrast to the toler-
ance and generosity of the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng emperors. He
remarked, "In contrast to the ten-clan massacre of the scholar Fang
Hsiao-ju during the Ming, we can now really appreciate our good
fortune in living in a grand age, the most splendid of all time."17
Four factors may facilitate understanding of Li Fu's acceptance of the
Ch'ing regime. First, as is evident in our earlier discussion of his concep-
tion of the Way, Li Fu had been deeply immersed in Confucian political
ideology. Second, he was born twenty-nine years after the fall of the Ming
dynasty. Third, his birthplace suffered very little during the transition
from Ming to Ch'ing. This distance he felt from the actual historical
experience of fighting against the Manchus made it easier for him to
believe that the Ch'ing regime was a legitimate one.
11. Contrast this with Chapter 3. 12. MTCK, 2/3*3-4^ 13. Ibid.,
14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 24/1 lb. 16. MTCK (1740),
17. Ibid., 24/12b.
Fourth and most important, the K'ang-hsi emperor's endeavor to

combine the tradition of the Way and that of governance also suggested
to contemporary scholars a return to the golden age of Chinese history.
This image of a return to an ideal past was based not only on the
emperor's real accomplishments but also on his political ideology. The
famous but frustrated essayist Fang Pao (1668—1749) once claimed that
no ruler in history could be compared with K'ang-hsi both as a ruler and
as a teacher because the emperor performed these two roles so well.18
This was precisely what caused Li Fu and others to believe they were
living in a golden age (sheng-shih).
Was not the Confucian's highest ideal a ruler who could embody both
the tradition of the Way and that of governance? This perception of a
grand age cannot be explained by Ch'ing hard-line policy, such as the
literary inquisitions, alone. It was brought about by the ruler's realization
of a long-aspired-to Confucian political ideal. After all, the poet Yuan
Mei (1716-98), after showing his sympathy for Li Fu's eventful life,
remarked: "Nevertheless, he [Li Fu] was fortunate to live in a grand age;
otherwise, his life would have been much worse."19
A sage-emperor emerges: K'ang-hsi's appropriation of

the tradition of the Way
Having an introspective bent, the K'ang-hsi emperor demanded of him-
self that he should be a good ruler in every sense. During his reign, he
not only consolidated Manchu rule over China proper and Manchuria
but also extended Manchu control over a vast area beyond his territory,
extending it to Mongolia, Sin Kiang, and Tibet. Being sensitive to Con-
fucian doctrine, the K'ang-hsi emperor was no doubt aware of Confucian
historians' sharp criticism of such militarily ambitious rulers as Ch'in
Shih-huang and Han Wu-ti. In the opinion of Confucian historians, their
expansionist policies had damaged the people's livelihood back home.
Such judgments obliged him to pay attention to domestic affairs.20
18. Fang Pao, Fang Pao chi, Shanghai, 1983, vol. 2, p. 440.
19. Yuan, Sui-yiian ch'iian-chi, 27/2D. Since one lives in a grand age, nothing, politically or
collectively, can be blamed for one's misfortune, except for one's own fate and talent.
This peculiar feeling was shared by quite a few scholars of the time. Yuan Mei's
judgment on Li's life is only one among many. Chao I (1727-1814), the poet and
historian, expressed similar reflections on his own life; Chao I, Ou-pei shih-ch'ao (Poetry
of Chao I), in Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts'ung-shu, Shanghai, n.d., pp. 368, 424-425.
20. Yii-chih K'ang-hsi wen-chi, hereafter abbreviated as YCWQ fourth series, 21 /9a-13b. For
an interesting English biography of the K'ang-hsi emperor see Jonathan D. Spence,
Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi (New York, 1975). Historians criticize Ch'in
Shih-huang and Han Wu-ti; see Shih-chi, 6/276-277, and Han-shu, 6/212. For the
K'ang-hsi emperor's awareness of these, see YCWC, fourth series, 2i/9a~9b.
148
K'ang-hsi's contributions in the social and economic spheres were no

less great than his military exploits. His sincere concern with the peo-
ple's livelihood was remarkable. He journeyed to the South six times to
acquire firsthand knowledge of commoners' daily lives, and also to work
out a way to channel the troublesome Yellow and Huai rivers directly to
the sea and away from the vast area they often flooded.21 The emperor
also worried about the tax burden on the peasants. His decision to grant
exemption from land tax was unprecedented in Chinese history. By his
decree of 1711, he permanently froze the amount of the national head-
tax {ting) payment. Privately, he led a frugal and restrained life despite
his position as the ruler of a wealthy nation.22 The emperor was prudent
in appointing local officials and rewarded them generously if they per-
formed well. Under his capable leadership, the bureaucracy functioned
almost perfectly.23 The resulting stable social and political order brought
economic affluence, reflected in the rapid growth of the population
during his reign.24
The K'ang-hsi emperor did create a "literary inquisition" to crack
down on those dissidents who still refused to recognize the legitimacy of
the Ch'ing regime. But this inquisition was limited in scope and its
punishments lenient - if compared to those of the subsequent Yiing-
cheng and Ch'ien-lung reigns. He vetoed the proposed punishment in
Tai Ming-shih's case five times, and pardoned three hundred or so
implicated persons. The only one sentenced to death was Tai himself.25
In 1678 the emperor ordered a special examination to be held for
"erudite scholars" (po-hsiieh hung-ts'u), to recruit them into govern-
ment.26 The following year, he comissioned a history of the Ming
dynasty, as a successor dynasty should.27 In doing so, the emperor se-
cured the legitimacy of his regime and simultaneously appeased Ming
loyalists.
Combining the traditions of governance and of the Way was K'ang-
hsi's most significant cultural-political policy. Because this aspect of his
reign has been relatively overlooked, it is necessary to explore further
K'ang-hsi's contribution to the tradition of the Way.
The emperor's profound interest in cultural and intellectual matters
can be traced back to his childhood. As the emperor himself said, he had
been fond of book learning (tu-shu) form the age offive.After ascending
21. MTPK, 4o/2a-2b, 8a; Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-ship, pp. 643-645.
22. MTPK, 4i/ia-2b; Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, pp. 661-665. 23. Ibid., 4o/2b~3a.
24. Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 13 68-1955, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1959, pp. 266-270.
25. MTPK, 4i/6a-9b, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, vol. 1, p. 751.
26. CSK, 109/3175-3177, 6/199-200. 27. Ibid., 6/199.
the throne at the age of eight, he often asked his entourage about
the commentaries on The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean.28
He would not feel satisfied with himself if he did not completely under-
stand the text. The young emperor was so fond of reading that at times
it made him seriously ill. Even so, he did not stop.29 The scope of his
interests was unusually broad. He burned with curiosity to know almost
everything culturally meaningful, including astronomy, physics, mathe-
matics, mechanics, and of course the classics. Li Fu was not the only one
among his ministers to be surprised at the breadth of the emperor's
knowledge.30
The emperor gave special attention to the institution of ching-yen, the
lectures given by selected scholars to the ruler. The topics of these
"classics mat" lectures were selected from the Confucian classics. They
were held according to a definite schedule in the inner court and before
the emperor alone. The emperor manifested his enthusiasm for the
classics-mat lectures by scheduling them daily, a departure from previous
practice of holding the lectures only every other day.31 Further, in order
to make full use of his study time, he scheduled his daily discussion with
his attendant scholars before dawn and thus prior to his court audience.
After receiving a court audience, he came back to resume the discus-
sion.32 K'ang-hsi disapproved of earlier rulers who had treated the clas-
sics-mat lectures as a mere formality. Playing a much more active role, he
interpreted the text and only then invited comments from scholars, or
he would recapitulate what the lecturer had said to make sure that he
had fully comprehended.33 He was almost never absent from the lec-
tures; he made no exception even for his birthday or an expedition.34
Why did the emperor take the lectures so seriously? An obvious expla-
nation is that they constituted a major source of knowledge for him. In
his view, learning was the foundation of all things. Through study of the
sages' works, one could cultivate oneself and acquire knowledge to help
deal with the external world.35 He repeatedly told his sons to study hard
so that their conduct in later life would be correct.36 He pointed out that
the Sung emperor Li-tsung's lack of learning had prevented him from
making good political judgments. Letting his mind drift, the Sung em-
peror allowed his power to slip into the hands of opportunistic ministers,
so the deterioration of state affairs was inevitable.37
28. KHCY, 7/6a; YCWC, fourth series, l/ia. 29. KHCY, 7/11 a.
30. Ibid., 7/8a; MTPK, 4o/2a.
31. KHCY, 7/1 b. The emperor's stress on the ching-yen lecture also received Li Fu's
attention. MTCK, 40/1 b.
32. KHCY, 7/5b. 33. Ibid., 7/8a-8b, 4a. 34. Ibid., 7/6b.
35. YCWC, second series, 4o/2a-2b. 36. Ibid., ô/^.-^. 37. KHCY, 7/ga.
150
The K'ang-hsi emperor's predilection for the classics and histories

derived from his view that the former contained the Way of governance
and the latter the concrete examples of it. Both were indispensable for
statecraft.38 As a ruler, he was inclined to evaluate philosophy and history
in terms of their practical application. His key role in the imperial system
required him to use his own wisdom to deliberate on various political
issues. Wisdom for him meant not only understanding how to manage
state affairs but also knowing how to secure his own political power.
When it came to the management of state affairs, learning was the best
way to absorb principles for tackling anything and everything. So he
urged all officials, whether military or civil, to read many books in order
to improve their ability to deal with state business. K'ang-hsi's concern
for consolidating the ruler's power is evident in his criticism of Sung
Li-tsung.
Aside from this practical concern for daily administration, K'ang-hsi's
emphasis on book learning was also connected with his political ideol-
ogy. He believed that "where there is a tradition of the Way, there is the
tradition of governance." 39 A ruler, if he is to be called a sagely ruler,
should manifest this principle in his worldly actions. K'ang-hsi said, "The
reason Heaven sets up a ruler for the people is not to bestow wealth and
power on the ruler alone, but to endow him with the responsibility of
educating and sustaining his people." 40 Ultimately, the ruler should
make "all men in the world become what they are [morally] supposed to
be."41 This is the kingly Way (wang-tao) that a virtuous rule should
achieve. It is at this point that education receives a special emphasis. And
because the sagely Way is laid down in the classics, the study of the
classics becomes central to the education of the ruler as well as of his
people. 42 In the preface to the Lecture Notes to the Interpretations of the Four
Books (Ju-chiang Ssu-shu chieh-i hsu), K'ang-hsi stated:
I think that the reason Heaven gives birth to sages is to make them the rulers and
teachers of people. The tradition of governance is at all times linked to the
transmission of the tradition of the Way. Confucius, Tseng-tzu, Tzu-ssu, and
Mencius were born after the sagely emperors Yao, Shun, Yii, and T'ang, and after
the sagely kings Wen and Wu. Likewise, after the Five Classics, there came the
Four Books, and through the teachings of these four philosophers, the Way of
the sagely emperors has been transmitted. It is also because of the Four Books
that the Way of the Five Classics is completed.43
The emperor believed that historically no ruler's governance was better
than that of Yao and Shun, because "their success in governance was
38. YCWQ first series, ig/3b. 39. Ibid., ig/7a. 40. Ibid., ig/8a.
41. Ibid., i8/ioa-i2a. 42. Ibid., io/5b-6a; KHCY, i6/2ob.
43. FCWC,firstseries, ig/5b-6a.
nothing but the result of their learning."44 Thus, understanding the

teachings of the sagely rulers was crucial to good governance. According
to K'ang-hsi, the learning of the sagely rulers essentially consisted of "the
learning of mind" or "the method of mind-cultivation" {hsin-fa). In the
narrowest sense, this term refers to learning the method of the "sixteen-
character maxim" on transmitting the mind.45 More broadly interpreted,
it refers to the learning of mind and nature as a whole.46 In the emper-
or's view, the rule of the ancient sagely rulers was based on the Way -
something perceived in the mind. Hence, their success lay not so much
in the sophistication of their governance, but rather in their understand-
ing of "the learning of mind" and "the learning of the Way" (tao-fa).47
Learning was thus the foundation of governance, and a ruler's learning
should begin with the learning of the mind.48 The emperor even be-
lieved that the rise and fall of a government and the shift of Heaven's
mandate were also associated with the flourishing of "the learning of
mind."49
In K'ang-hsi's understanding of the learning of mind, the concept of
seriousness (ching) stands out as the central idea. He extended Chu Hsi's
doctrine of "observing seriousness" (chu-ching) in one's state of mind
from the realm of personal self-cultivation to that of politics.50 He did not
hesitate to criticize would-be Confucians at his court for their inability to
match learning with deeds.51 Their moral defects resulted simply from
their neglect of the principle of seriousness as the most important guide
in life. He held that embodying seriousness was the highest principle of
political action.52
The influence of the Sung Confucians, especially that of Chu Hsi, is
nowhere more clearly shown than in the emperor's belief that the
"learning of mind" was related to both self-cultivation and politics. In
the emperor's view, it was the Sung Confucians who really shed light on
the concept of the learning of mind. His understanding of the Sung
Confucians opened up the Confucian Way for him, for they had redis-
covered the long-lost Way and made it known to the world once again.53
Among them, Chu Hsi towered supreme. For several decades, the em-
peror was inspired by the life and thought of Chu Hsi and set himself the
task of living what he had learned from Chu Hsi's writings.54 When The
Complete Works of Chu Hsi (Chu-tzu ch 'uan-shu) was published, the em-
peror said that he had it compiled because of his high regard for this
great thinker, and not out of any desire to gain fame for himself.55 His
44. YCWQ 28/2a-2b. 45. Ibid., 19/ia-ib. 46. Ibid., ig/2a-2b.
47. Ibid., 19/ia. 48. Ibid., i9/8b-ga, 19/ia-ib. 49. Ibid., lg/gb.
50. KHCY, i / n b - i 2 b . 51. Ibid., i6/23b-24a, 24b-25b. 52. Ibid., i/nb-i2a.
53. YCWQ fourth series, 21/ib. 54. Ibid., 2i/i2a. 55. Ibid., 2i/i2b-i3b.
admiration for Chu Hsi's achievements in the study of the classics even-
tually led him in 1712 to enhance Chu's status to the rank of the "ten
philosophers" (shih-che) in the Confucian temple.56 He made this deci-
sion on the advice of Li Kuang-ti. At first, the emperor had decided to
raise Chu Hsi to a rank equal to "the four most outstanding Confucian
disciples" (ssu-p'ei), whose honor and status are considered just next to
those of the Master. Although also an admirer of Chu Hsi, Li memorial-
ized the emperor: "Indeed, the learning of Chu Hsi is not inferior to that
of the four disciples. But the fact that Chu Hsi was born more than a
thousand years after the ten philosophers would make Chu Hsi feel
uneasy if his tablet were placed above theirs."57 In the end the emperor
adopted Li's proposal and thus clearly signaled his own approval of the
Ch'eng-Chu school. The influence of such Ch'eng-Chu scholars as
Hsiung Tz'u-lu (1635—1709), Lu Lung-ch'i (1630—93), and Li Kuang-ti
on the emperor's intellectual orientation cannot be underestimated.
Nonetheless, the emperor's fondness for book learning since his child-
hood had made him inherently receptive to the learning of Chu Hsi,
who had stressed the role of book learning in the process of moral
cultivation.
As an alien ruler particularly conscious of the significance of Confu-
cian ritual practice, the K'ang-hsi emperor in 1684 paid a visit to the
Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu and initiated a new, expanded version
of the ritual ceremony there. Alighting from his sedan chair, the
emperor entered the main hall of the Confucian temple on foot. He
knelt down to read an epigraph on Confucius and performed the rite
of "three kneelings and nine bows" instead of "two kneelings and six
bows," a degree of reverence that a ruler had never given to Confucius.58
The emperor also composed a poem to express his reverence for
Confucius:
Coming to eastern Lu,
I ascended to the hall of the Master.
Libations stand between two columns;
Crossing the high wall I discover the Master's profound learning,
perpetuating the tradition of the Way of Yao and Shun, and extending
like the rivers of Chu and Ssu.
Then entering the grove, I touch light pine and fir trees, I bow with
solemnity.59
56. Ibid., l/ia-ib; MTPK, 41/43, 42/12b-13a.

57. See Wen-chen-kung nien-p'u in Li Kuang-ti's Jung-ts'un ch'uan-shu, B/5oa-b.
58. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi (Memoir concerning the K'ang-hsi emperor's visit
to the Confucian temple), in Chao-tai ts'ung-shu, second series, i8/4b.
59. This poem is seen in K'ung Shang-jen's Ch'u-shan i-shu chi, 18/15b.
This is one of very few poems that rulers dedicated to Confucius on their
visits to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu.60 Deliberately departing from
the practice of former rulers who had given gold or silver utensils as gifts
to the temple, the K'ang-hsi emperor, as a unique favor, left his own
royal yellow umbrella in the temple, and wrote 'The Teacher of Ten
Thousand Generations" {wan-shih shih-j)iao) in praise of Confucius.
K'ang-hsi explained that his intention was to enhance unprecedentedly
the rite of revering Confucius.61
To K'ang-hsi, there were two kinds of sages. The first kind gained
political power and could fulfill the Way within their own lifetimes. The
second did not have political position (wei) and thus could not actualize
the Way. Sagely emperors Yao and Shun, who combined the duties of
ruler and teacher, were the sages that fulfilled the Way. As the transmit-
ter of the Way to later generations, Confucius was the sage that mani-
fested the Way. The sages that fulfilled the Way were glorious in their
own day, but the sage that manifested the Way endured forever. Without
Confucius, the Way-manifesting sage, the Way would not have been
transmitted beyond the golden age.62 For only through the teaching of
Confucius did rulers have access to the learning of mind of the former
sagely emperors.63 Here, the K'ang-hsi emperor echoed Chu Hsi's idea
that although Confucius never achieved the position of political leader-
ship he deserved, he was greater than Yao and Shun in terms of realizing
his cultural inheritance from the past and transmitting its legacy to
future generations.64
In 1686, the K'ang-hsi emperor established the Mind-Transmitting
Hall (Ch 'uan-hsin Tien) as a place to listen to lectures and worship such
60. Another poem composed by the T'ang emperor Hsuan-tsung, entitled "When Passing
Through Lu, Sacrificing to Confucius and Mourning Him," reads:
How is it with you, Master K'ung,
Who strove for your belief a whole age long?
This place is still the Tsou family's ground,
Your home became a palace for the duke of Lu.
You signed for a phoenix and lamented your ill luck.
You grieved for the unicorn and mourned the failure of your teaching,
As I watched the libation poured between two columns.
I thought of your dream - all was just the same!
See 300 T'ang Poems, trans, by Innes Herdan, Taipei, 1973, p. 218. The T'ang emper-
or's poem, although it conveys a sympathetic feeling for Confucius, lacks the sort of
reverence for him that is found in the K'ang-hsi emperor's poem. The difference in
mood between these two poems tells us much about the image of Confucius adopted
by the rulers of different periods.
61. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi, 18/1 lb.
62. YCWC, first series, 25/ia-ib. 63. Ibid., 25/ib-2b.
64. Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu wen-chi, in Ssu-pu pei-yao edition, entitled Chu-tzu ta-ch'uan, Taipei:
Chung-hua shu-chu, 76/2 2b.
154
mentors as Confucius, the duke of Chou, and the nine sage-kings of

antiquity.65 This practice implied that the tradition of governance was
transmitted through the teaching of Confucius, the first transmitter of
the Way. That the tradition of governance could gain its legitimacy only
through the tradition of the Way was thus recognized not only in theory
but also in practice.
This linkage of the tradition of governance with that of the Way in the
K'ang-hsi emperor's conception of politics was his justification for claim-
ing to embody both traditions. The emperor already had the exclusive
access to the tradition of governance because none besides a ruler could
assume supreme political power. In addition, thanks to his enthusiastic
patronage of Confucianism, he was also seen as the patron saint of the
tradition of the Way.
The emperor's obsession with the concept of the ideal ruler as the
embodiment of both traditions made him initiate a number of cultural
projects. Unlike previous rulers, he not only took the initiative in asking
officials to compile many books,66 but personally participated in the
process of compilation and editing.67 His deep involvement with these
cultural activities influenced his son, the Yung-cheng emperor (1678—
1734) and his grandson, the Ch'ien-lung emperor (1711—99) to per-
petuate this tradition. Both his successors also practiced his expanded
version of Confucian rites.
In the first year of his reign (1723), the Yung-cheng emperor gener-
ously bestowed the title of king (wang) on all five generations of Confu-
cius's ancestors in the Confucian temple.68 This measure sharply
contrasted the Ming emperor Shih-tsung's decision in 1530 to remove
all noble titles from the Confucians who qualified for the ritual of
sacrifice in the temple.69 Ming Shih-tsung's edict was generally regarded
as a downgrading of the status of Confucius.70 By contrast, the Yung-
cheng emperor ordained that people should refrain from mentioning
Confucius by name or writing any of the characters of his name (pi-
hui). Thereby, he extended to Confucius the same privilege as the
65. P'ang Chung-lu, Wen-miao ssu-tien-k'ao (A study of the Confucian temple), Taipei,
1977, hereafter abbreviated as WMSK, 1/4D; CSK, 84/2532; MTPK, i2/7a. The other
one to accompany the nine sagely emperors is the duke of Chou. The nine sagely
emperors are Fu Hsi, Sheng Nung, Hsuan Yuan, Yao, Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu.
CSK, 84/2532.
66. For a brief list of the K'ang-hsi emperor's cultural engagements, see Hsiao, Ch'ing-tai
t'ung-shih, vol. 1, pp. 781-784.
67. Examples of these are his participation in the compilations of Hsing-li ching-i and Tzu-
chih t'ung-chien kang-mu; YCWC, third series, 2i/ia~3a; fourth series, 2i/7a-8a.
68. WMSK, i/8a; CSK, 84/2534. 69. Ming-shih, 50/1298-1299.
70. Shen Teh-fu, Wang-li yeh-huo^p'ien, Peking, 1980, pp. 361-362; and Chiao Hung, Yu-
t'ang ts'ung-yu, Peking, 1981, pp. 92-93.
emperor.71 He also demanded that the whole nation abstain from eating
meat on Confucius's birthday as a token of the highest respect for him.72
Thanks to the emperor, twenty-six Confucians received the sacrifice in
the Confucian temple,73 a number second only to those benefiting from
the decrees of the T'ang emperors Tai-tsung and Hsiian-tsung in 647
and in 739 respectively.74 Among those celebrated Confucians with the
Yung-cheng emperor's approval, thirteen were Ch'eng-Chu scholars, but
none was a Lu-Wang scholar. Intellectually, the Yung-cheng emperor
acted as a final arbitrator for the different sects of Buddhism; moreover,
he debated the legitimacy of the Ch'ing regime with Tseng Ching
(1679—1736), a onetime admirer of the Ch'eng-Chu scholar, Lu Liu-
liang (1629—83).75 All these gestures once again demonstrated that the
emperor regarded himself not only as a political leader but also as an
intellectual authority.
Continuing this tradition, the Ch'ien-lung emperor paid nine visits to
the Confucian temple at Ch'u-fu76 and ordered the adoption of the color
yellow, an imperial perquisite, for the roof and gate of the Confucian
temple.77 The emperor visited the Confucian temple more times than
any ruler in Chinese history. On his first visit, the emperor made
arrangements for the marriage of his beloved daughter to a K'ung, a
seventy-second-generation descendant of Confucius.78 Before his abdica-
tion, the Ch'ien-lung emperor managed to hold the ritual sacrifice
ceremony in honor of Confucius by himself. By then, he was eighty-five
years old and his age already prevented him from attending other
middle-level ceremonies.79 Emperor Ch'ien-lung's generous patronage
of many large-scale cultural projects was admirable. Most conspicuous
of these was the compilation of the Complete Works of the Four Libraries
(Ssu-k 'u-ch yiian-shu) .80
Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung's deliberate intensification of cultural
activity could be read as being in tune with the K'ang-hsi emperor's
ideology, which had proclaimed that the tradition of governance was
71. WMSK, i / i o b - n a . 72. Ibid., i / n a - i 2 a .

73. Ibid., l / g b - i o a . 74. Ibid., 2/1 lb, 13b.
75. For example, in Chien-mou pien-i lu (Criticisms of Buddhist heresies), 1733 edition,
introduction; and in Ta-i Chueh-mi lu, Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, i / 2 a - i 3 a , he
argues against the Fa Tsang sect of Zen Buddhism. For the Buddhist debates in the
early Ch'ing, consult Ch'en Yuan's Ch'ing-ch'u seng-ching-chi, Li-yun shu-wu, 1944.
76. WMSK i/i7b-24a.
77. Ibid., i / i 4 b . In fact, the Yung-cheng emperor had already ordered that yellow tiles be
used for the roof of the Confucian temple. Also see Ch'ing-shih kao, 82/2538.
78. K'ung Te-mao, K'ung-fu nei-chai i-shih, Tien-chin, 1982, p. 24.
79. WMSK, i/24b-25b.
80. As for The Complete Works of the Four Libraries, see Kuo Po-kung's Ssu-ku ch'iian-shu tsuan-
hsiu k'ao.
156
linked to that of the Way. More precisely interpreted, it represented

more of an extension of political power into the cultural sphere than
vice versa, since it was the political authority that had taken the initiative
to intrude into the cultural arena. Now, the two once-separated tradi-
tions had merged in the position of emperor, and the emperor had
become the ultimate authority for both. This phenomenon reflected the
continuing growth of autocracy since the Sung period.81
Before the K'ang-hsi emperor, the development of autocracy had
primarily taken the form of restructuring political institutions in order
to monopolize political power. Autocracy became complete only when
it usurped the cultural authority formerly embodied in Confucian
scholars alone. This, then, was one of the K'ang-hsi emperor's primary
ideological achievements.
The implications of the unity of the tradition of the Way

and that of governance
The goal of combining these once-separated traditions was inherited by

all of K'ang-hsi's successors, but the success of this endeavor is best
measured through the achievements of K'ang-hsi himself and those
of his two successors, Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung. Their real success
lay in the way they absorbed the tradition of the Way into the political
establishment. As Ch'ing rulers became the unique representatives
of both traditions, no independent ground was left for Confucians
to oppose political power. The critical function of the Way, which
was once exercised by the Sung and the Ming Confucians, was thus
eliminated.
Another school of thought represented by Fei Mi (1625—1701), who
attacked the Sung and the Ming Confucians from a pragmatic stand-
point, may also have incidentally helped to undermine a more in-
dependent tradition of the Way. Fei Mi criticized Sung and Ming
metaphysicians for their empty talk in the name of the tradition of the
Way, offering no practical contribution to daily life at all.82 Only those
who wielded substantial political power were entitled to speak for the
81. For the growth of autocracy after the Sung, see Ch'ien Mu's Kuo-shih ta-kang (Outline
of Chinese history), Taipei, 1956, vol. 2 chs. 36 and 37; his Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih
te-shih (Historical evaluation of Chinese politics), Taipei, 1974, pp. 65—67; and his
"Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'uan" (On the rights of the Sung prime minister), in Chung-kuo
wen-hua yen-ch'iu hui-k'an, 1942, 145-150.
82. Fei Mi, Hung-tao shu (Book devoted to glorifying the Way), in Hsiao-i chia-shu ts 'ung-shu,
la-ib. For a brief introduction to the life and thought of Fei Mi and his son, see Hu
Shih, Hu Shih wen-ts'un, second series, Taipei, 1953, pp. 48-90.
157
tradition of the Way.83 In other words, only the ruling political authority
was able to embody the Way in the world.
In spite of their different motives, Fei Mi, the K'ang-hsi emperor, and
Li Kuang-ti all came very close to each other in their final conclusions.
All of them implied that, once separated from the political establish-
ment, the tradition of the Way was not only useless but groundless.
Therefore, it was best for the tradition of the Way to hinge on that of
governance in order to continue and fulfill itself. As they saw it, the
e m p e r o r was much more qualified than anyone else to act or speak for
the tradition of the Way.
T h e initiative to integrate both traditions within the state thus came
from the interaction between the ruler and his Confucian ministers;
however, this initiative did not necessarily mean that the Ch'ing rulers
were committed to Confucian political doctrine. T h e K'ang-hsi emperor
did indeed appear to have a real and deep commitment to Confucian-
ism. But by contrast, the Yung-cheng emperor manipulated this new
political ideology to serve his own interests. T h e Ch'ien-lung e m p e r o r
fell somewhere between these two extremes. 84
Regardless of motive, the resulting meaning was quite clear: In the
context of Chinese political history the merging of the tradition of the
Way and that of governance was the last step in the growth of autocracy.
Full autocracy implies a ruler with absolute political power, a power that
is unrestrained. Historically, the tradition of the Way symbolized Confu-
cian cultural power and was political in that it was used as the criterion
for judging the legitimacy and competence of a government. The inde-
p e n d e n c e of the Way from the political establishment served as a check
on political power and so blocked possible autocracy. No one under-
stood this better than Lii K'un (1536-1618) when he reflected on the
relationship between power and truth:
While ministers dispute with one another at court, no one dares to defy or speak
after the issuance of the edict from the emperor. Although scholars argue with
one another in school, everyone agrees and keeps silent when someone invokes
the words of Confucius. Therefore, in the world only principle (li) and political
power (shih) are most respectable {tsun), but principle is supreme. The emperor
cannot suppress principle with his power at court. Even if he did so, prinicple
would nevertheless exist in the world forever. In fact, political power lies within
the realm of emperors, whereas principle lies within the realm of sages. If the
reign of an emperor is not legitimized by the principle of sages, it will decline.
83. Fei Mi, Hung-tao shu (Book devoted to glorifying the Way), in Hsiao-i chia-shu ts'ung-shu,
lb. Later, Chang Hsueh-ch'eng developed this idea more radically in promoting the
"unity of state and education."
84. Cf. Huang Pei, Autocracy at Work, Bloomington, 1974, pp. 44-48.
158
This is the reason political power needs principle for the justification of its
existence and exercise.85
To be sure, just because a political ruler claims absolute power does
not necessarily mean that he has identified with the tradition of the Way;
nor does it mean that political and cultural authority are united in the
ruler. The ruler might attempt to challenge or even destroy the tradition
of the Way and the power of the Confucian authorities as a means of
expanding his power over that tradition. Such were the measures
adopted by the founder of the Ming dynasty, T'ai-tsu.
In 1369, the second year of his reign, T'ai-tsu issued an edict ordering
that the spring and autumn sacrifices offered in the Confucian temples
could be held only in the temple at Ch'u-fu, and nowhere else in the
nation. 86 In this way, T'ai-tsu attempted to localize the Confucian sacrifi-
cial ritual and restrict its symbolic meaning to a specific place, while his
own political power remained universal. Confucian scholar-officials
memorialized, but the ruler persisted in doing things his way.
In 1372, the fifth year of his reign, Ming T'ai-tsu abolished the sacri-
fices usually made to Mencius because he disliked Mencius's precept of
mutual responsibility between ruler and minister. What irritated the
emperor - so much that he threatened to execute anyone who dared to
dissuade him from removing Mencius's sacrifice from the Confucian
temple - was Mencius's statement, "If a ruler treats his subject as mud
and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy." 87 The emperor even or-
dered his guards to shoot at the image of Mencius with arrows. 88 Ch'ien
T'ang memorialized against the emperor's measure, however, saying "It
would be a great honor for me to die for Mencius." 89 This was exactly
the sort of price the ruler could not afford, and so shortly thereafter,
the sacrifice to Mencius was restored. 90 In 1382, the sacrifices at the
Confucian temple were once again permitted nationwide. 91
In fact, Ming T'ai-tsu was aware that it was essential for his newly
established regime to be recognized by Confucius's descendants if it was
to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Once he wrote to K'ung
K'e-chien, a descendant of Confucius, after K'ung had excused himself
from an audience with the emperor:
I am told that you have been sick for a long time, but I wonder whether that is
true. Your K'ung family is a distinguished house known for your ancestor's
teachings, which have been followed by generation after generation of rulers.
Your family has served different dynasties over history and should surely make no
85. Lu K'un, Shen-yin yii, Taipei, 1975, 1/4-12a. 86. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3981.
87. Ibid. 88. WMSA, 4/35. 89. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3982; WMSK, 4/3!).
90. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3982. 91. WMSK,
exception to this rule when it comes to my regime. I have received the mandate
of Heaven to lead the Chinese people and drive away the barbarians in order to
bring peace to China. This despite the fact that I came from among the common
people, but so did the founder of the Han dynasty, Kao-tsung [sic, the correct
title is Kao-tsu] in the ancient period. Hence, it is not permissible for you to
neglect my state on the pretext of illness!92
Undermining an independent tradition of the Way was a perfectly
logical step in the process of strengthening autocracy. The methods
varied, however, as is clear from the differences between those used by
Ming T'ai-tsu and by the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi. In retrospect, the
Ch'ing emperor, even though an alien ruler, was much more successful.
Unlike the Ming founder, the Ch'ing emperor did not directly confront
the tradition of the Way, the symbol of cultural authority. The K'ang-hsi
emperor was more sensitive to, and more conscious of, the subtle influ-
ence of Confucian symbolism on Chinese politics and society.93 His
promotion of Confucian temple rituals was only one of many demonstra-
tions of this sensitivity. The Ch'ing emperor used the Confucian cultural
heritage as a means of reinforcing his political legitimacy. Through his
restructuring of the relationship between the tradition of the Way and
that of governance, the K'ang-hsi emperor assumed the leadership of
both.
The integration of the tradition of the Way and the tradition of
governance in the Ch'ing regime was what most worried Wang Fu-chih
(1619—92), one who could never bring himself to accept Manchu power
on account of his radical racist nationalism.94 In a discussion on past
conquest dynasties, Wang fiercely attacked the "corrupt Confucians"
(jou-ju) who had sold the tradition of the Way to the "barbarians" (i-ti)
and so helped invaders to gain access to the sages' teachings.95 With the
help of "corrupt Confucians" an alien conqueror could temporarily
pretend to be a Confucian ruler. Among such Confucians, Wang particu-
larly blamed Lien Hsi-hsien, Hsu Heng, and Yao Shu of the Yuan dy-
92. Kung-fu tung-an hsien-pien, Peking, 1982, vol. 1, p. 17.

93. As Ch'ien Mu observed on his visit to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu, most of the
tablets of epigraphs dedicated to Confucius were set up by alien rulers. See Ch'ien Mu,
"Shih-yu tsa-i" (Recollections of teachers and friends) in China Monthly, 2, no. 4 (May
1980), 59. According to The Records of Ch'ueh-li, there are thirteen pavilions built on
stone tablets (pei-t'ing) dedicated to the Confucian temple; nine of them were put up
by these three Ch'ing rulers. K'ung Chi-fen, Ch'ueh-li wen-hsien k'ao, 1762, 12/1 b. As for
the buildings of the Confucian temple, the author also confirmed that "nothing can be
further added since our dynasty has increased it to such an utmost extent." Ch'ueh'-li
wen-hsien K'ao, 11 /1 a.
94. Wang Fu-chih, Tu T'ung-chien-lun (Reading the T'ung-chien), 13/408-490. Wang de-
fines an orthodox dynasty by race rather than by culture.
95. Ibid., 13/409.
160
nasty, who had used their understanding of the learning of principle (li-
hsiieh) to help the Mongol rulers establish a new cultural order.96 Despite
such help, said Wang, alien dynasties could only imitate cultural forms,
never grasping their essence. A conquest dynasty could never win the
mandate of Heaven and was destined to fall shortly after "its superficial
adoption of Confucian culture."97 Wang's anger at the "corrupt Confu-
cians" reflected his fear that through the exploitation of Confucian
symbols, alien rulers could legitimize their domination over China. Be-
cause Wang Fu-chih died in the thirty-first year of K'ang-hsi's reign, his
apprehension about the adoption of Confucian culture by alien rulers
was quite accurate in the context of K'ang-hsi's success in appropriating
Confucian symbolism to support his power.98
The Ch'ing rulers' embodiment of both cultural and political tradi-
tions shaped the nature of their regimes. A few examples will suffice to
reveal the far-reaching impact of this political ideology on the concept of
political authority and the relationship between ruler and subjects.
First, the contrast between the visits made by a Han emperor and a
Ch'ing emperor to the Confucian temple of Ch'ueh-li in Ch'u-fu is
revealing: Han Chang-ti in the year 85 paid a visit to the Confucian
temple. After participating in the rites there, he remarked to K'ung Hsi,
"My present visit glorifies your clan, doesn't it?" Thereupon the descend-
ant of Confucius replied: "I have learned that none of the sagacious
rulers fail to respect the Master and his teachings. The visit Your Majesty
pays to our place is exactly a manifestation of reverence for the Master
and one by which Your Majesty will increase your virtue. As for glorifying
our clan, we dare not receive the honour." Laughing and acknowledging
this witty response, Han Chang-ti said, "Only a descendant of the sage
could come up with such a good answer."99
Even down to the end of the Ming period, the K'ung family still
preserved this enduring Confucian ethos. The famous essayist Chang Tai
put it in a nutshell. When he visited the Confucian temple shortly before
the fall of the Ming regime, he met the K'ung family and was told:
There are only three notable families in the world: the [Taoist] Chang family of
Chianghsi, the [royal] Chu family of Feng-yang, and our K'ung family. Among
them, the K'ung family stands out as the most distinguished, for the Chang
family appears to be vulgar in its religious character [tao-shih-ch'i\, and the
parvenu Chu family behaves like people of low birth.100
96. Ibid., 14/467. 97. Ibid., 13/409.

98. Wang Fu-chih completed Tu T'ung-chien-lun one year before his death in 1692.
99. Fan Yeh, Hou-Han shu, 79/2562.
100. Chang Tai, T'ao-an meng-i, Shanghai, 1982, p. 10.
161
This statement made by certain members of the K'ung family highlights

the pride of the K'ung family in assessing itself side by side with a
powerful royal house.
In contrast, humbler feelings overwhelmed the K'ung family during
the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi's visit in 1684. In answer to K'ang-hsi's
question about the sights of the temple, K'ung Shang-jen (1648-1718)
replied,
Most of the relics of the sage have been ruined. It is not worth Your Majesty's
while to look at them. Nevertheless, after your viewing them, all the things in this
temple will automatically become precious and magnificent. Your Majesty's act
will go down in history and make the whole world know the respect Your Majesty
has paid to the sage and his teaching. The honor will not be confined to our
family alone.101
The difference between the two dialogues is clear. In the first dia-
logue, K'ung Hsi maintained that the imperial visit to the Confucian
temple bestowed moral benefit and political prestige to the Han em-
peror. In the second dialogue, the Ch'ing emperor conferred glory on
Confucius by the very fact of his visit. In K'ung Shang-jen's reply, the
Ch'ing emperor is seen as the embodiment of both the tradition of the
Way and that of governance. The Confucian temple has come to rely on
endorsement by the political authority of its status as a major cultural
institution. This trend, however, did not contradict the Ch'ing ruler's
intensified use of the Confucian symbols. The emperor knew the mean-
ing of Confucian symbolism only too well; thus he was able to choose
the right symbols to convey unequivocally any desired message to the
Confucian community. The Ch'ien-lung emperor revealed this strategy
clearly. Noting the way the emperors K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng had
intensified Confucian ritual practice, he remarked that "only a sage
[Emperor Yung-cheng] is able to understand another sage [Emperor
K'ang-hsi]."102
The Ch'ing rulers' efforts to combine political and cultural traditions
can be regarded as the ideological component of an ever-growing auto-
cracy. The authoritarian character of the Ch'ing regime was ever more
explicitly expressed through the character of its rulers, a phenomenon
that may well have been the result of this political and cultural combina-
tion. At the trial of Tseng Ching, the Yung-cheng emperor fiercely
refuted Tseng Ching's "vicious idea" that the emperorship would be best
101. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi (Memoir concerning the K'ang-hsi emperor's
1684 tour to the Confucius temple), in Chao-tai ts'ung-shu, 15a-!5b. K'ung is famous
for his play, Peach Blossom Fan (T'ao-hua shan).
102. Ch'ing Kao-tsung, Yii-chih-wen ch 'u-chi (Writings of Ch'ing Kao-tsung, first series), 17/
3b.
162
given to virtuous Confucians. For instance, Tseng said that in the Spring
and Autumn period, Confucius should have been the ruler; in the
Warring States period, Mencius; after the Ch'in dynasty, the Ch'eng
brothers and Chu Hsi; and at the end of the Ming, Lu Liu-liang. 103 The
emperor rebuked Tseng:
The reason why Confucius and Mencius are great is because they set norms for
human relations. They rectified the people's minds for ten thousand genera-
tions and expounded the great meaning in history. But there never has existed
a principle that they should become the ruler. If they had obtained the political
position to carry the Way out, they would have merely fulfilled the duty of
a minister. There is absolutely no reason for plain scholars to become rulers.
I do not know what Tseng Ching has in mind. What he has done seems to me
to slander the sages because he imposes the vicious crime of usurpation on
Confucius and Mencius.104
For the Yung-cheng emperor, Confucius and Mencius and their teach-
ings occupied a fixed position in the equally fixed hierarchy of the ruler
- subject relationship. He regarded this fixed relationship as the basis for
the other four human relationships. In his mind, the sages had no right
to oppose their rulers at all, and certainly no right to become rulers.
For the Ch'ien-lung emperor, even the significance of the prime
minister was relegated to the background. Through the position of
prime minister, a Confucian scholar was supposed to be able to help his
ruler to embody the Confucian Way for the world. But the Ch'ien-lung
emperor reduced the prime minister's role to that of a bureaucrat,
deemphasising his critical functions. He quite frankly expressed his
dissatisfaction with Ch'eng I's conception of a prime minister:
It is the emperor who employs a prime minister. If the emperor is only con-
cerned with self-cultivation in solitude and hands over the governing power to
the prime minister, he will either be fortunate to have good prime ministers such
as Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen, who will, nevertheless, argue with him at court,
or be unfortunate enough to have bad ministers, such as Wang An-shih and Lii
Hui-ch'ing, who will make a mess of the world.105
The emperor eventually made a final remark on what he really
thought: "It is particularly wrong for a prime minister to take state affairs
as his sole duty and to neglect the existence of his emperor." 106 In point
of fact, there was no office in the Ch'ing bureaucracy equivalent to the
103. Ch'ing Shih-tsung, Ta-i ch'ueh-mi-lu (Record of great tenor for the deluded) in Chin-
tai Chung-kuo shih-liao t'sung-k'an, no. 3, Taipei, 1966, 2/5a~5b.
104. Ibid., 2/5b-6b.
105. Ch'ing Kao-tsung, Yu-chih-wen erh-chi (Writings of Ch'ing Kao-tsung, second series),
ig/8b.
106. Ibid., ig/8b.
163
post of prime minister. What the Ch'ien-lung emperor said merely

reflected the effects of autocracy on his acceptance of the idea of having
a prime minister. He wished to deprive Confucian bureaucrats not only
of their power but also of their political ideals. 107
Ch'uan Tsu-wang, a close friend of Li Fu, was also a Lu-Wang scholar
who had ambivalent feelings about the Ch'ing regime because he had
grown up in a place historically antagonistic to the Manchus. Despite this
bias, we can still detect the influence of autocracy on his understanding
of the ruler's legitimate power. In the Philosophical Records of the Sung
and the Yuan Confucians, Ch'uan Tsu-wang borrows a passage from the
Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-shan to exemplify Lu Chiu-shao's political
views:
Sung-nien once asked Suo-shan [Lu Chiu-shao, the elder brother of Lu Hsiang-
shan] , "Mencius persuaded feudal princes with the kingly Way. Did he mean to
advise them in practicing the kingly Way to honor the Chou house, or to advise
them in practising the kingly Way to obtain Heaven's mandate?"
"To obtain Heaven's mandate," answered Suo-shan.
"Doesn't Mencius then instigate usurpation?" Sung-nien said.
'The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and
grain come next; last comes the ruler," replied Suo-shan.
After listening to Sung-nien's report on this conversation with his brother, Lu
Hsiang-shan sighed {Van), saying, "My brother used not to hold this view. Nei-
ther has this view been uttered since remote antiquity."
Said Sung-nien, "Po-i does not know this principle, but King Wu does." [Italics
added]108
Surprisingly, Ch'uan has distorted the meaning of the original. The
passage in the Complete Works ofLu Hsiang-shan reads as follows:
Sung [Sung-nien] at a time asked Suo-shan, "Someone asked me, 'Mencius
persuades feudal princes with the kingly Way. Does he mean to advise them in
practicing the kingly Way to honor the Chou house, or to advise them in
practising the kingly Way to obtain Heaven's mandate?' How should I answer
him?"
'To obtain Heaven's mandate," answered Suo-shan.
"If so, how can one remove the common doubt that Mencius is inciting feudal
princes to usurp?" Sung-nien said.
'The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and
grain come next; last comes the ruler," replied Suo-shan.
After listening to Sung-nien's report on his conversation with his brother,
Master Lu Hsiang-shan praised again and again {tsai-san ch'eng-t'ari), saying, "My
107. For the rise of the ruler's power and the decline of prime minister's in Chinese
history, one can consult Professor Yu Ying-shih's Li-shih Yu ssu-hsiang, pp. 47-76.
108. SYHA, 57/130.
164
brother used not to hold this view." After a long while, Master Lu Hsiang-shan
said, "Neither has this view been uttered since remote antiquity."
"Po-i does not know this principle," said Sung. Master Lu agreed. Sung said
again, "King Wu knows this principle."
"Since Fu-hsi everyone has known this principle" Master Lu concluded. [Itaics
added]109
Here Lu Hsiang-shan approves of his brother's political ideas; but
according to Ch'uan, he disapproved. Although the literary inquisition
haunted the scholars of the time, it played no role in Ch'uan's distortion
of the Lu brothers' political views. Ch'uan would not have been held
responsible for Lu Hsiang-shan's idea, as Lu was born almost six hun-
dred years before and was one of those honored with sacrifices in the
Confucian temple. The explanation of Ch'uan's distortion lies, rather,
in the growing influence of autocratic thinking on contemporary
scholars, who now began to prescribe such a position as an acceptable
political stand.110
Commenting on Lu K'un's reflections on the relationship between
principle and political power, the renowned philologist Chiao Hsiin
(1763—1820) bore further witness to the strength of this influence:
In the Ming period, Lit K'un wrote a book in which he discussed the relationship
between principle and political power. According to him, in the world principle
and political power are most respectable, but principle is supreme. The emperor
cannot suppress principle with his power at court. Even if he did so, principle
nevertheless would exist in the world forever. This is exactly a kind of heresy,
since Confucius taught that a subject should treat his ruler with propriety (li b),
but never threaten his ruler with principle (li). What Lu K'un said indicates the
character of a usurping minister and an evil thief [Italics added] 111
What is involved here is a change in the criterion of political conduct.

If principle is the essence of the tradition of the Way, then political
power is the foundation of the tradition of governance. Lu K'un, at the
end of the Ming, recognized that principle, and thus the tradition of the
Way, performed the function of criticizing political authority. In the eyes
of Chiao Hsun, however, this critical dimension of principle had been
eliminated, for Chiao lived in an age that was autocratic both in theory
and in practice.
109. LHCQ 34/44b.

110. It is Mao Huai-hsin's note that draws my attention to the discrepancy between the
original version and Ch'uan's quotation. But I cannot agree with his interpretation
that Ch'uan's misrendering was caused by his fear of the literary inquisition. Cf. Mao
Huai-hsin, "Tu-shu cha-chi san-tse" (Three notes) in Chung-kuo che-hsueh, vol, 2, pp.
152-154.
111. Chiao Hsiin, Tiao-hu chi, in Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien, 10/151.
165
The last but not the least example that shows the political climate of
the time comes from the Annotated Catalog of the Complete Work of the Four
Libraries (Ssu-ku ch'uan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao). When Chi Yun, the chief
editor, commented on the Essential Reading from Liu Tsung-chou {Liu-tzu
chieh-yao) by Yun Ju-ch'u, he was generous in his praise for the selections
made, but felt sorry for Yun Ju-ch'u because his editing had not censored
some improper political views in Liu Tsung-chou's writings. Chi Yun
wrote:
With respect to the selection and classification of the content, this anthology is
very strict. But the editor included some disputative statements that should have
been deleted. For example, Liu wrote in his book that "the bond between ruler
and subject holds when Heaven's mandate has not been broken off; when it has,
the ruler becomes a mere fellow (tu-fu). Therefore, it is opportune for King Wu
to rise in arms on the chia-tzu day. If he did so one day earlier (k'uei-hai), he
would become a usurper; and if he did it one day later (i-ch'ou), he would be out
of tune with the will of Heaven and lose the opportunity." The above statements
should not be uttered by a subject [like Liu Tsung-chou]. Statements like these should
be expunged.112
Chi Yiin's remark on Liu Tsung-chou's writings shows that he denied any
transcendental ground on which a Confucian can assess the legitimacy
of a political regime. In other words, he reduced the role of a Confucian
from that of standard-bearer for the Way to that of a submissive subject
obsessed with the concept of absolute loyalty. Chi's view was also seen in
the criticism he made of some Ming Confucians' conception of the
tradition of the Way, in which they regarded the ancient sage-kings such
as Yao and Shun as Confucian (ju) as well, and thereby enhanced their
own status, an act Chi condemned as usurpation. 113
The disappearance of the critical strain in the Confucian thought of
the day was reflected in formal intellectual articulation as well. For
example, Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng (1738-1801) maintained that the real
Way was the Way both in name and in substance. For Chang, the Sung
Confucians' metaphysical discussions were indicative of their obsession
with the name of the Way, a grave mistake that caused them to lose the
correct perspective for understanding its substance. 114 According to
Chang, the substance of the Way was immanent in the historical process.
After the formation of society, it could be seen through the intermedia-
tion of political mechanisms. There was no point in talking about the
112. Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'u'an-shu tsung-mu t'iyao, Taipei, p. 1991.
113. Chi Yun's criticism is seen in his preface to Wan Ssu-t'ung's/w-/m tsungj)'ai, Taipei,
n.d., 2a.
114. Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng, Wen-shih t'ung-i, p. 44.
166
Way apart from its concrete manifestations (hsing) in history.115 A lack of

transcendentalism in Chang's conception of the Way is apparent here,
for if the Way is always manifested in the concrete forms of history, its
capacity to stand above the historical process and criticise an existing
power are logically denied. This theory laid the needed foundation for
Chang Hsiieh-chang to favor the unity of state and education (chih-chiao
ho-i).116
Chang's statement also sheds light on why, unlike most of the Confu-
cians, Chang Hsueh-ch'eng assessed the achievement of the duke of
Chou to be greater than that of Confucius.117 To Chang, the duke of
Chou "combined virtue [te] and political power [wei]" and fulfilled the
reality of the so-called great synthesizer (chi-ta-ch 'eng) better than Confu-
cius did. In Chang's view, it was the opportune moment (shih-hui) rather
than the difference in their inborn talents that made the duke of Chou
superior to Confucius.118 Nevertheless, Chang's judgment reveals the
Zeitgeist of his time: the unity of truth and power.119
In the twenty-fifth year (1686) of K'ang-hsi's reign, the renowned anti-
Manchu scholar Huang Tsung-hsi (1610—95) in a letter to his friend
praised the current situation as "the time Confucian scholars have been
best treated, and so one unexpectedly witnesses the coming of a grand
age."120 Huang's comment demands our attention, for it reveals that
although he never betrayed his status as a Ming loyalist, he was not
mindlessly bound by his loyalty to the Ming dynasty. Huang's apparent
contradiction can be resolved if we understand his praise for the Ch'ing
ruler (Emperor K'ang-hsi) as a reflection of his anticipation of the
coming of a sage-emperor, a dream that had occupied the minds of
115. Ibid., pp. 39-41. 116. Ibid., p. 42. 117. Ibid., p. 37.
118. Ibid. On the one hand, when comparing their achievements, Wang Yang-ming gave
sage emperors Yao and Shun more credit than Confucius. He gave them a metaphori-
cal "ten thousand Hang (a Chinese unit of weight) in gold for their accomplishments,
but Confucius only "nine thousand Hang" On the other hand, Wang Yang-ming did
not subsequently regard Yao and Shun as superior to Confucius. Ch'uan-hsi lu, pp.
72-73. Nevertheless, Wang's seemingly "quantitative" assessment of Confucius in-
vited severe criticism from scholars like Feng K'e (1524-1601) and Lu Lung-chi. See
Feng K'e, Ch'iu-shih-p'ien, Kyoto, n.d., 3/8b-iob; and Lu Lung-ch'i, San-yu-t'ang wen-
chi, in Wen-yiian-ke Ssu k'u-ch'iian shu, 5727b. Furthermore, Ch'en Chien agreed with
Hu Ching-chai that Confucius was greater than Yao and Shun even in terms of
practical affairs (shih-kung). See Ch'en, Hsueh-pu t'ungpien, Japanese edition, Kyoto,
n.d., 12/ioa-iob.
119. Hu Shih does not grasp Chang's point in an adequate context, therefore Chang's
assessment of the duke of Chou appeared "ridiculous" or "mistaken" to Hu Shih. See
Hu Shih, Chang Shih-tsai hsien-sheng nien-p'u in Chang Shih-tsai hsien-sheng nien-p'u hui-
pien, Hong Kong, 1975, p. 115.
120. Huang Tsung-hsi, Huang Tsung-hsi Nan-lei tsa-chu-kao chen chi, Chekiang, 1987, p. 278.
167
Confucians for more than two thousand years. But the coming of this
particular sage-emperor had been at the expense of the autonomy of the
tradition of the Way, which previously had entitled Confucians to criti-
cize those with political authority. Such is the paradox inevitably derived
from deep within Confucian political ideology.
168
Conclusion
This study has used the Lu-Wang school to explore two major themes:
the change in intellectual climate from the Sung to the early Ch'ing, and
the Ch'ing regime's assimilation - largely through the efforts of the
K'ang-hsi emperor - of the tradition of the Way.
The Lu-Wang school has been chosen as the focus of this study. In
contrast to its rival, the Ch'eng-Chu school, the Lu-Wang school had, an
independent spirit toward book learning and was never supported by the
political powers as the holder of official doctrines. In the final analysis it
appears that the Lu-Wang school was better suited than the Ch'eng-Chu
school to reflect the depth and breadth of these themes. Though initially
detached from book learning, the school was influenced by the fashion
of evidential study in the early and middle Ch'ing. Despite that the Lu-
Wang school never received formal political patronage, it adapted quite
easily to the rule of the alien Ch'ing regime. That Li Fu would be both
a Lu-Wang scholar and a high-ranking official is a clear example of
this.
As a Lu-Wang scholar, Li Fu depreciated the importance of book
learning. However, in order to convince his contemporaries of the truth
of Lu-Wang doctrines, he was compelled to use arguments based on an
evidential research. The discrepancy between means and ends in Li Fu's
expression can be grasped only through an understanding of his intel-
lectual context. Scholars of the time were generally hostile to metaphysi-
cal speculation. As Li Fu himself admitted, he did not like the learning
of nature and principle by intuition.1 The reaction against the meta-
physical ideas of the late Ming had led scholars either to stress the
practical aspect of their teachings, to solve problems by means of an
empirical approach, or to do both. Therefore, it is not surprising that Li
Fu emphasized the practicality of Lu-Wang doctrines and also appealed
to evidential scholarship to prove his arguments.
Besides changes in the intellectual approaches, what began as a purely
1. MTCK, i8/28a-28b.
169
Conclusion
intellectual argument between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan became

more and more complicated because of extra intellectual considerations
in later generations. For instance, Ch'eng-Chu doctrine was prescribed
by the ruling class as the required curriculum of the civil service exam-
inations. Since success in the civil service examinations brought such
worldly gains as status, fame, and profit, one's interest in Ch'eng-Chu
learning became entangled with more immediate material and social
concerns. Thus, a Lu-Wang scholar had to fight on two fronts, one
intellectual and the other social and political. This was the inevitable
situation a scholar faced if he committed himself to the Lu-Wang
doctrines.
In relation to the question of political power prior to the K'ang-
hsi period, these two schools shared a view of Confucian scholars
as a group of Way-bearers. On the one hand, their disagreement in
philosophy did not influence their critical stand toward their rulers.
On the other, their philosophical quarrels did not reduce their rulers'
respect for them as Way-bearers. Rulers had little interest in tackling
the bothersome intellectual debates arising from different systems of
thought. What they did was recognize ad hoc the victory of one school
over the other and take advantage of the doctrines held by the propo-
nents of the mainstream - usually the Ch'eng-Chu school. Rulers'
passive role in intellectual life, and their willingness to listen to Con-
fucians, may have been a major reason that the tradition of the Way
and its bearers could retain a critical attitude toward the political
establishment.
By actively participating in cultural life, the K'ang-hsi emperor, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, took away this critical dimension from the tradition
of the Way. Having realized the significance of Confucian symbolism
only too well, his sensitivity to and his activism in Confucian culture went
hand in hand with his remarkable accomplishments in civil governance.
As a result, Confucian intellectuals perceived him as a sage-emperor, and
thus he satisfied their long-standing nostalgia for the return of a golden
age.
Since the time of Confucius a new conceptualization of the relation-
ship between political rulers and cultural elites had evolved. This was
based on the perception that the Way and political power had become
separated; their eventual reunification was ideologically prescribed as
the ultimate political-cultural goal. As the author of The Doctrine of the
Mean enthusiastically suggested:
One may occupy the throne, but if he does not have the proper virtue, he may
not dare to make ceremonies or music. One may have the virtue, but if he does
170
Conclusion
not occupy the throne, he likewise may not presume to make ceremonies or
music.2
Here the message is conveyed unambiguously that cooperation between
rulers and scholars is indispensable for successful governance. Both
political and cultural elites agreed on a division of labor for their mutual
interests: Rulers were in charge of governance, and Confucian scholars
increasingly focused on the preservation and transmission of the Way.
Nonetheless, Confucians never hesitated to take advantage of the highly
suggestive symbol - the "golden age" in which the Way and power were
combined - as a justification for their active participation in political
affairs. Furthermore, in defending their importance in society, Confu-
cians devised the idea of the tradition of the Way to argue against other
intellectual competitors (heterodoxies) and thus to legitimize their
leading role in cultural and intellectual arenas on which political prac-
tice was, in turn, founded. Before the K'ang-hsi emperor, the unity of
power and truth was to a certain extent fulfilled under this cooperative
arrangement.
With this perception among Confucians, the emergence of a sage-
emperor such as the K'ang-hsi emperor would inevitably be at the cost of
the independence of the tradition of the Way from political power. In
achieving the unity of the tradition of governance and the tradition of
the Way, the emperor became both the political and cultural ruler.
Confucians could no longer tap their intellectual tradition for the
strength to oppose current political authorities. In other words, there
were no grounds left for Confucian scholars to "rectify their ruler's
mind." Objectively, the elimination of the critical function of the tradi-
tion of the Way coincided with the growth of autocracy in Chinese
political history. Is it not an irony that a golden age could return and a
sage-emperor reappear only in the fulfillment of autocracy - both in
practice and in theory?
2. SSCC, ChungyiXng, p. 25. English translation by James Legge, Li Chi, New York, 1967,
vol. 2, p. 324.
171
Chinese Glossary
an-shen
Carsun Chang 3ft®Hf
Chan Jo-shui IS ?r 7JC
chang M
Chang Hsia 3i I t
Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng
Chang Lieh 3RS1
Chang Lu-hsiang 31111 #
Chang Nan-hsiian (Chang Shin) 3ftlSfF ' 3ft tt
Chang Po-hsing f fi
Chang Tai 3ft I
ch' ang-sheng
Chao Meng-fu
Chao Fang S
Chao Fu
chao-hsin
Che-hsi
Che-tung
Ch'en Chien
Ch'en Ch'ueh
Ch'en Hsien-chang
Ch en T uan
Ch'en Yuan-yu
Ch'eng-Chu S *
Ch'engHao UM
Ch'engl I B
Ch'eng-huang W
ch'eng-i M ^
Ch'eng Min-cheng
Ch'eng T'ung S B l
chi (accumulation) K
ch'i (vital energy) M
173
Chinese Glossary
ch'i (b) (instrument, form)

Ch'i (great minister) i?
chi-ta-ch'eng H^C®
ch'i-chih chih hsing
Ch'i Huan WU
chia-mo ju-kao ^
chiang-lun Hlfw
Chiao Hsiin HfM
chiao Wi
chien ffi
chien-ai 5$: ft
Ch'ien-lung f£K
Ch'ien Mu &ft
ch'ien-ssu pai-nan
Ch len T ang W& m
Ch'ien Te-hung
chih $P
chih (b) (to reach)
chih (c) (extension)
chih (d) (wisdom)
chih-chiao ho-i
chih-chih Sfc^
chih-chiieh
chih-hsing ho-i
chih liang-chih
chih-shan M #
chih shih ch'eng-i R
chih-tang kuei-i U
chih-t'ung
chih yii tao
ch'in-min
Chin Pen-heng
Chin-shu S #
Chin-wen (Duke Wen of the Chin)
chin-wen 4*3t
Ch'in %
ching (seriousness) ^[
ching (b) (classics) M
ching chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni
ching-i wu-erh ^ W ^ ^
Chin-ssu-lu S&
ching-yen MM
ch'ing I'W
ch'iu fang-hsin
ch'iung-li I I J !
174
Chinese Glossary
Chouju-teng J i f t S
chou lif
Chou-li ffl®
Chou Tun-i JURIS
chu-ching
ChuHeng
Chu Hsi
Chii-lai E?fc
Chu-Lu i-t'ung ^F
Chu-tzu ch'iian-shu
Chu-tzu pu-huo-lu
Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'iian-lun
Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun
Ch'ii-fu ffl#
chuan H
Ch'un-ch'iu i-shih #^C~^S
chun-tzu © ~f
Ch'iian Tsu-wang (Ch'iian Hsieh-shan) ^ I & H ' ÎB"ill
Ch'uan-hsin Tien H j tJS
Ch'uan-tao t'u
Ch'ueh-li HM
chung >f> i
chung-ho shuo
Chung-yiing + fit
Chung-yiing chang-chii
Chung-yiing shuo t
Erh-ya
fa-chiieh
Fan Chung-yen
Fang Hsiaoju
Fang Pao ^
Fei Mi »
Feng K'e 8|W
feng-kuo ch'ing-hsin
fu iff
fu-ku « *
Fu Shun-kung
Fu Tzu-yiian
Fung Yu-lan
Han Ch'i
Han-shu 31 id
han-yang S #
HanYii
Hao Ching
heng-she W. JS
175
Chinese Glossary
hou-chih
Hsi-ts'u
Hsi Yuan-shan f% 7U ill
Hsiang An-shih
hsien-t'ien
hsiao Sfc
Hsiao-hsiieh /h
Hsiao-shan /h jJLj
Hsiao-ching #
Hsieh Chi-shih
hsieh-chii
Hsieh To
hsieh-tu
hsien-chih
hsien-hsien
hsien-ju
hsien-yii
hsin >lLN
hsin chih pen-t'i
hsin-fa 'llNft
hsin-min ^ff S
hsin t'ung hsing ch'ing
hsing (nature) tt
hsing (b) (form) j&
hsing (c) (action) fi1
hsing-erh-hsia JU M ~F
hsing-erh-shang IB- M _t
Hsing-li ta-ch'iian tt
hsiu-shen j ^ #
HsiiAi
Hsu Chieh
Hsiieh K'an
Hsiieh Ying-ch'i
Hsiieh-pu t'ung-pien
Hsiung Tz'u-lii
Hsu Fu-kuan
hsii-ling
hsu-shuo
Hsiian-ch'eng
hsueh $
Hsiieh Hsiian
Hsiin Tzu
Hu Ch'i-heng
HuKuang S
Hu Po-ch'uan
176
Chinese Glossary
HuWei
HuWu-feng
Huai-nan ko-wu
Huang Ch'ang-ch'u Jfciifff
Huang Chen He IS
Huang Kan (Huang Mien-chai) ##
Huang Tsung-hsi 11^11
Huang Tsung-yen
Huang-fu Mi S I " I S
hui-fu 'KH
Huo-yii ts'ao ^
i (will) jft
i (b) (one) -
i (c) (righteous)
I a
i-ch'ou
Hi
i-fa
i-kuan ~ H
Mi ««
i-li chih hsing
i-ti ^ i t
I-t'u ming-pien # M W I?
i - t u a n MrVfiQ
i-wai shuo
jen t
jen-hsin
jen-lun
ju M
Kanju-lai
kao-ming
Kao P'an-lung
K'ang-hsi M
k'ao-cheng
k'ao-cheng shih mo-liu
ko-wu $t$J
Ku Hsien-ch'eng
ku-hsun Infill
Ku Tung-ch'iao
ku-wen "Sf^C
Ku Yen-wu (Ku Ning-jen)
Kuan Chih-tao Wfe
Kuan Chung
Kuang-hsi t'ung-chih
kuang-hsin ftf
177
Chinese Glossary
Kuei Yu-kuang
kung-fu ft 3
k'uei-hai ^
kung-kuo-ko
Kung-i-tzu
K'ung Hsi
K'ung K'e-chien
K'ung Shang-jen ?L ini tt
K' ung-ts' ung-tzu L HI P
K'ung Ymg-ta
Kweichow
Lang T'ing-chi
li (principle)
li (ritual) (b)
Li-chi
li-chih
Li Ch'ing-fu
li-ch'eng
Li Ao ^ H
Li Fu (Li Mu-t'ang)
Li Hung Îfe
li-ifen-shu
Li Kuang-ti
Li Li-wu
li-ming chih-hsueh
LiP'o $ 6
Li Po-min
Li Shang-yin
Li Yiian-kang
liang-chih
liang-hsin
liang-tu
Liao Chi
Lien Hsi-hsien
ling-ming II ^
Lin-ch'uan IJ
Liu Chin
liu-hsing
liu-i A ^
liu-te A ^
Liu Tsung-chou
Liu Yiian-ch'ing S!l7n!W
Lo Ch'in-shun S l i H
lou-ju
Lou Liang
Chinese Glossary
Lu Chiu-ling
Lu Chiu-shao
Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yuan)
Lu Lung-ch'i H H ^
Lu Shu-sheng
Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u
Lii Tsu-ch'ien
Lu-Wang B 3:
mm
Lii Hui-ch'ing
LiiK'un S t t
Lu Liu-liang S H
Lung-ch'ang H #
Mao Hsi-ho
Mei Cho 1618
ming 1w
Ming-ju hsiieh-an
Mo-tzu i§ "f*
Mou Tsung-san
Nan-hua ching S ¥ M
Nei-chu-hsia erh wai-ssu-i ft IS ITO^h O ^
nien-p'u ^ I H
Ou-yang Ch'ung-i fc#
Ou-yang Hsiu fe
pen-hsin ^
pi-hui
pien-ku
p'ien ^
p'ien-hsiu 18 ft
po-hsueh hung-tz'u
pu-chi chih pien
po-hsiieh yii wen
pu-lii erh chih
san-chi H ffi
san-chiao ho-i
san-fan H3I
san-li H|fi
shang-chih ^
ShangK'o-hsi
Shang-shu i^ ^
shen tt
shen-chung ju-shih
Shen Tseng-chih tfc g1
sheng-shih ^1tt
shih (intellectual) ±
Chinese Glossary
shih (b) (event) 9-

shih (c) (trend) J5*
shih (d) (look) U
shih-che +1?
Shih-ching Ta-hsueh
shih-fei chih hsin s
shih-hui $f^t
shih-li tang-jan chih chih
Shih Mi-yuan ^MH
shih-shang mo-lien
shih-tu-hsueh-shih
shih-wen chih chien
Shih-yu t'u
shih yii tao ho
shih-yiin 1fl:S
shu f&
Shu #
shu-tzu ffi •?
Sui-shu n #
Shun If
ssu-jen ch'ien-ku pu mo-hsin
ssu-jen ch'ien-tsai tsui ling-hsin
Ssu-k'u-ch'iian-shu *^#
Ssu-ma Ch'ien ^] S
ssu-ming chih hsiieh
ssu-p'ei 09 BB
ssu-shu f£ $J
Ssu-shu kai-ts'o
Ssu-shu ta-ch'iian
ssu-tuan E9 ^S
Su Tung-p'o
sui-ch'u t'i-jen t'ien-li
Sun Ch'eng-tse MM
Sun Ch'i-feng
Sung Lien |
Sung-nien
Sung Tuan-i
ta-ch'en
Ta-hsueh ku-pen-shu
ta-pen wei-fa A ^
ta-tao ^ H
Ta-yii mo
t'ai-chi
T'ai-chi-t'u shuo
TaiHsi
180
Chinese Glossary
Tai Chen
Tai Hsien
fan ft
tang M
T'ang Ch'ien
T'ang Chin
T'ang Chun-i
tao IE
Tao-ching II
tao-fa l i f e
tao-hsin Ui'fr
Tao-i p'ien U
tao-mai Hi US
tao-shih ch'i
tao-t'ung
tao-wen hsiieh
T'ao Ta-lin
te-hsing kung-fu
t'i II
t'ien-hsing
t'ien-li
t'ien-ming chih hsing
T'ien Wen-ching
ting T
ting-hsing vStt
t'ing %
tsai-san ch'eng-t'an
ts'ai ^t*
Ts'ai T'ing
Ts'ai Yu-hsueh
Ts'ang-chieh-pien
Tseng Ching t
Tseng Rung
Tseng-tzu
Ts'ui Shu
Tu Fu tt*
tu-fu ® *
Tsun te-hsing
tsung-kuan
tu-shu t l
tuan-hsii
tun-wu
tung W)
Tung Chung-shu
Tung Huai t $
181
Chinese Glossary
t'ung-tao W| JH
t'ung-chih 1^3 ;fe
T'ung-shu tltlf
Tzu Hsia ~?jC
Tzu Rung f l
Tzu Liu
Tzu Ssu
Wanju-lu
wan-shih shih-piao
Wan Ssu-t'ung H
wang 3:
Wang An-shih
Wang Chi
WangFu-chih
Wang Hsi-chih
Wang Ken
Wang Po
Wang Shih-chen i ± M
wang-tao j£ H
Wang Tsao
Wang Tzu-ts'ai
Wang Wei
Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-jen)
Wei Chuang-ch'ii
wei-fa ^ #
wei-hsiieh
wei-wo
wen A
Wen T'ing-yun
Wing-tsit Chan
Wu ^
WuCh'eng
wu-chi ^
wu-chi erh t'ai-chi
Wu-ching i-shuo 5
Wu-ching ta-ch'uan
wu-lun S f^
wu-erh wu-shan ^
Wu-nu-hsiian
wu-shen iX
wu-ting chih ming
WuYii ^ M
Wu Yii-pi
Wu Yii-chai
182
Chinese Glossary
WuYiian-ying
Yang Chien
Yang Chu H
Yang Kuei-shan (Yang Shih) 1§ft ill
Yang-ming hsueh-lu
Yao H
Yao Shu tttil
Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai
Yenjo-ch'u B
yen g
Yen-Li
Yen Sung
Yen Tzu-sheng j|il~jP
yii-ting chih ming ^
yii ¥
YuChi
yu-chou
Yu Ying-shih
Yuan Huang
Yuan Mei
yueh ,^J
Yiieh ffi
Yiin-t'ang
Yiing-cheng
yiing chih fang fa-te-chu-lai
183
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Yii Ying-shih. "Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of Ch'ing Confucian
Intellectualism," in the Tsing-Hua Journal of Chinese Studies fff¥^$K new
series, nos. 1-2, 105-144.
^ ^ N F . Lun Tai Chen yii Chang Hsueh-ch'eng W^WLM.^^-^WL (On Tai
Chen and Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng). Hong Kong, 1976.
Li-shih yii ssu-hsiangM^t^&tM, (Histoy and thought). Taipei, 1977.
Chung-kuo chih-shih chieh-ts'eng shih-lun, ku-tai pien ^B^f&II^Sifilij '
(A historical survey of the Chinese intellectual class, the ancient
period). Taipei, i98o.
• Shih-hsueh yii ch'uan-t'ung j&^HflFlfii (History and tradition). Taipei,
i98 2 .
Yuan Chiieh Mffi. Ch'ing-jung chu-shih chi 8 f $ g ± H . In TSCC
Yuan Mei Mftt. Sui-yuan ch'uan-chi MM^M (The complete works of Yuan
Mei). Shanghai, i98i.
Index
"actualized" (i-fa), 11, 43 Chang Hsia, 127

Analects, 26, 65, 89, 131, 139 Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, 24, 29, 80-1,
Annotated Catalog of the Complete Work 130, 166-7
of the Four Libraries, 166 Chang Lieh, 91, 113
Annotations on the Great Learning of the Chang Lii-hsiang, 80
Old Text (Hsieh Chi-shih), 69 Chang Shih (Chang Nan-hsuan), 10—
Annual of Spring and Autumn (Li Fu), ll
> 55>57
74 Chang Tai, 161
Apologia for the Old Text Documents Chang Tsai, 11-12, 14, 99
(MaoHsi-ho), 138 Chan Jo-shui, 30
Chan, Wing-Tsit, 29
Book of Changes, 137 Chao Fang, 109-10
The Book of Documents (K'ung Ying-ta Chao Meng-fu, 138
commentator), 137-42 Ch'en Chien, 111-13
The Book of Filial Piety, 65 Ch'en Ch'ueh, 133
book learning (tu-shu): Ch'eng-Chu Ch'eng-Chu school: on book learning
scholars' use of, 1, 73; Chu Hsi's (tu-shu), 1; Chang Hsueh-ch'eng
view of, 108, 141; corresponding study of, 125; evolution of, 29-
to destinies, 78; human 30; intellectual transmission of,
interactions vs., 89; Li Fu's view 126-8; Li Fu's rejection of, 73,
of, 65, 89-90, 141, 169; Lu's 84; official learning status of, 71;
procedure of, 1, 104, 108; political support for, 118-19,
source of, 41; supported by 169-70; rise of, 2, 120-1; see also
K'ang-hsi emperor, 149-52; vs. Chu Hsi school
abstract speculations, 100-1; see Ch'eng Hao: Chu's compilation of
also education; knowledge work by, 11; doctrine of
Book of Poetry, 89 "calming human nature," 99; The
The Book of Rites, 131, 134, 135 Great Learning promoted by,
Buddhism: during T'ang dynasty, 54; 133-4; a s influence on Li T'ung,
influence of Huang, 137; ledgers 9; the Way revived by, 55; the
of merit/demerit within, 80-1; Way transmission ending with,
view of the "Way" by, 86; Zen, 9- 118
10, 121-2, 125 Ch'eng I: Chu's compilation of work
195
Index
Ch'eng I (cont.) 104-5; legitimate transmission

by, 11; conception of prime of, 55-6; letters on Lu by, 109;
minister by, 163; doctrine of Li T'ung's influence on, 9-10;
"calming human nature," 99; The on nature of truth, 25; on
Great Learning promoted by, political power, 59-60; on
133-4; as influence on Li T'ung, principle, 12-13, 33, 96; shih-che
9; on moral knowledge, 39; rank given to, 120; on study of
praises Ch'eng Hao, 55; the Way the classics, 22; Wang Yang-ming
transmission ending with, 118 criticism of, 42, 45-6; see also
Ch'eng Min-cheng, 109-11 Ch'eng-Chu school
Ch'en Hsien-chang, 29-30, 100 Chu Hsi school: ascendancy over Lu
Ch'en T'uan, 137 school by, 26-8; criticism of
Ch'en Yu-fu, 130 Wang Yang-ming by, 91;
ch % see vital force (ch 'i) interaction between rulers and,
chi (accumulation), 79-80 26-8, 118-19; Li Fu on Lu-Wang
Chiang Fan, 130 school vs., 107-17; Lu-Wang
Chiao Hsiin, 165 school vs, 25-6, 90-101; Wang
Ch'ien-lung emperor, 75, 155-6, Yang-ming's struggle with, 2 9 -
158, 163-4 32, 45-6; see also Ch'eng-Chu
Ch'ien Mu, 10 school
Ch'ien T'ang, 159 Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at
Ch'ien Te-hung, 91 Late in Life (Chu Hsi), 44, 142
Chien-yang Academy, 114 Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at
chih-li (fragmented), 26 Late in Life (Wang Yang-ming),
Chi K'ang, 58 3, 71, 111-12
Ch'ing regime: Li Fu's praise of, Chii-lai, see Li Fu
147-8; political/cultural legacy Chung-yung chang-chii, 135
of, 155-7; political ideology of, Chungyiing-shuo, 135
145; use of the Way by, 157-8, Chung-yung (Tzu-ssu), 135
160-3; see a^° K'ang-hsi emperor civil service examination: Chu Hsi's
Chiu-ling, 4 doctrine in, 2, 27-8, 118, 134;
Chiu-yuan, see Lu Hsiang-shan Li Fu disqualified from, 64
ChiYiin, 166 The Classic of Filial Piety, 56
Chouju-teng, 128 the classics: Chu Hsi's editing of, 26,
Chou Tun-i, 8, 14, 41, 99 118; civil service examination
Ch'uan Tsu-wang, 72, 76, 124-5, use of, 27-8; "classics mat"
129, 164 lectures from, 150; learning
Chu Heng-tao, 5-6, 108 through, 22; Li Fu's study of,
Chu Hsi: attends Goose Lake debate, 130-42; protest against emphasis
4-6; Ch'eng brothers' influence on, 14; Wang Yang-ming's
on, 11; dating of letters of, 112; attitude toward, 44; the Way
debate with Lu Hsiang-shan, 2, preserved in, 13, 28, 105-6
57; editing of classics by, 26, "classics mat" (chingyen) lectures,
118, 131-4; Huang brothers' 150
attack on, 137; K'ang-hsi's The Classic of the Way, 139
admiration of, 152-3; on ko-uru, Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi, 110
196
Index
Commentaries on the Analects and the defense of Kuan Chung by, 5 1 -

Mencius ( C h uHsi) , 1 1 2 2; duke of Chou compared to,
The Commentaries on the Doctrine of the 167; honored by Ch'ing regime,
Mean (Chu Hsi), 56, 118 153-6; honored by Mongols, 27;
community: relationships within, 5 7 - honored as sage, 55; on learning
8; Way-bearers as, 57 for moral action, 35-6, 89-90;
Compilation of Essays on the Oneness of on politics and the Way, 48-9,
the Way (Ch'eng Min-cheng), 58, 61; redefines "intellectual"
110-11 by, 47-8
The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, 152 correct from incorrect (shih-fei chih-
Complete Works of the Four Libraries, hsin), 39
156 Corrections of Chu Hsi's Commentaries on
Complete Works ofLu Hsiang-shan, the Four Books (Mao Hsi-ho), 146
164-5 cosmology: description of Chu Hsi's,
The Comprehensive Collections of the Four 6-9; development of Chu Hsi,'
Categories, 72 14
Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's "Counsels of Yii the Great," 138
Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in cultivation (han-yang), 9
Life (Li Fu), 107-17, 142
Confucianism: adopted as state destiny (ming): chi (accumulation) of
doctrine, 54; Challenge to Tzu- good deeds and, 79;
kung/Tzu-hsia, 18; Chu Hsi's determinate/indeterminate, 78-
conversion to, 115-16; Chu Hsi's 9, 82; tasks of, 77; vital force
philosophy of, 6-13; community and, 78-80
of, 57-8; criticism of alien access determinate destiny (yu-ting chih
to, 160-1; distinguished from ming), 78
Buddhism, 136; distinguished The Development ofl-Lou Learning
from heterodoxy, 10; Goose (Chu Hsi), 121
Lake debate over, 4-6; The Development of the Learning ofLo
intellectual lineage of, 117-30; and Min Areas (Chang Hsia), 127
'ju" used within, 85-6; K'ang-hsi The Development of Yang-ming's
emperor and, 146-58, 160; Learning (Li F u ) , 1 2 1
Ming, 157-8, 166; on political The Doctrine of the Mean (Chu Hsi
power, 61, 170-1; political version), 59, 83, 90, 131, 134-7,
response by, 51, 143-4; sincerity 170-1
of the will principle of, 38; Sung, The Doctrine of the Mean (Tzu-ssu
27, 125, 152, 157-8, 166; see also version), 136, 143
the Way {tad) Doubts on the Doctrine of Wang Yang-
Confucian ritual practice, 153, ming (Chinag Lieh), 91, 113
159-60 duke of Chou, 53, 55, 167
Confucian temple: Chu Hsi/Lu status Duke Mu, 53
within, 119-20, 153; erected by
Mongols, 27; Han/Ch'ing education: human interactions as, 89;
emperors' visit to, 161-2; Wu purpose of earliest, 84-5; unity
Ch'eng's status within, 123-4 of state and, 167; see also book
Confucius: contributions of, 13; learning (tu-shu)
197
Index
"eight steps" (The Great Learning), The Great Learning of the Ancient Text
102-3 (Chu Hsi version), 32, 44, 131-4
Elementary Learning (Chu Hsi), 123 The Great Learning of the Ancient Text
"empty talk," 100-1 (Wang Yang-ming version), 3,
Erh-ya, 65 21-2, 42-3, 44, 101-2, 106,
"erudite scholars" examination, 73 132-3
Essential Reading from Liu Tsung-chou Great Ultimate (tfai-chi), 8, 13, 92,
(Yiinju-ch'u), 166 H5» !37
Evidential Analysis of the Old Text the Great Void (xvu-chi), 7-8, 92,
Documents (Yen Jo-ch'u), 137 112, 115
evidential approach (k'ao-cheng):
development of, 3, 137-42; Li Han Chang-ti (Han emperor), 161
Fu's use of, 75, 107, 130-1, Han Yii, 87
141-2; Lu-Wang use of, 1-2 Hao Ching, 138
extension of knowledge (chih-chih), heaven-conferred nature (t'ien-ming
32-3 chih-hsing or i-li chih hsing), 12
heavenly nature (t'ien-hsing), 96
"false learning" (wei-hsiieh), 26 Heaven's principle, 43, 95, 100
Fang Pao, 74, 76, 138, 148 heterodoxy: Chu Hsi's doctrine as,
feeling (ch'ing), 9 16; Confucianism distinguished
Fei Mi, 157-8 from, 10
Feng K'e, 113 Historian's Record (Ssu-ma Ch'ien),
The Five Classics, 32 65
five ethical principles, 84-8 The History of the Chin Dynasty (seven
The Four Books, 27 versions), 138
"four moral germs," 95-6 The History of the Sui Dynasty, 135
Four Statements (Wang Yang-ming), Ho Ch'ang-ling, 76
38-9 "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-
fundamental mind (pen-hsin), 6 hsing), 1-2, 6, 45
Fung Yu-lan, 20 Ho Shu-ching, 115
Fu Tzu-yuan, 121 Hsiang An-shih, 124
Hsiang-shan, see Lu Hsiang-shan
A General Collection of Commentaries of Hsiao-shan, see Li Fu
the Five Classics, 28 Hsieh Chi-shih, 68-9, 146
A General Collection of Commentaries of Hsieh Tu, 123
the Four Books, 28 Hsi-pao, 69
A General Collection of Hsing-li Hsiung Tz'u-lu, 153
Learning, 28 Hsu Ai, 32, 36
A General Critique of Obscure Learning Hsueh Hsuan, 29
(Ch'en Chien), 111 Hsiieh K'an, 119
General History of the Eight-Banner Hsu Fu-kuan, 6, 21
System, 71 Hsu Heng, 160
General History of Kwangsi, 68 Hsiin tzu, 12, 53, 139
gentleman (chun-tzu), 48 Hsun-tzu, 139
Goose Lake debate, 4-6, 13, 108 Huang Ch'ang-chu, 126
the Great Learning, 42 Huang-fu Mi, 138
198
Index
Huang Kan, 25, 108, 117-18 Jentsung (Sung emperor), 27, 131
Huang Tsung-hsi: on Book of Changes 'ju," 85-6
diagrams, 137; on book learning,
90; defense of Wang by, 91; on K'ang-hsi emperor: Li Fu on, 144-8;
innate knowledge, 94-5; use of the Way by, 62, 146-58,
philosophical records of, 127- 160; visit to Confucian temple
30; praises Ch'ing ruler, 167-8 by, 162; see also Ch'ing regime;
Huang Tsung-yen, 137 political establishment
Hua-yen Buddhism, 8 Kanju-lai, 68
Hu Ch'i-heng, 70 Kant's moral philosophy, 23
Hu Kuang, 28 King Wu, 147
human interactions, 84-9, 136-7; see knowledge: of the good, 90-2, 94,
also the Way (tao) 97-8; Li Fu's discourse on, 97-
Huo T'ao, 112 101; nature of innate, 43, 94-5;
Hu Po-chuan, 100 parallel between will and, 37-8;
sources of, 39-40, 98-9; unity of
I-li, 65 action and, 28, 32, 35-7, 41-2;
Imperial Catalog, 128 see also book learning (tu-shu);
indeterminate destiny (xvu-ting chih moral knowledge
ming), 78-9, 82 knowledge of good {liang-chih), 35
innate knowledge, 43, 94-5; see also ko (rectified), 33
knowledge ko-uru (reaching to obtain principle):
innate knowledge of the good (chih attack against Chu Hsi's, 133;
liang-chih), 90-2, 94, 97-101 Chu Hsi' theory of, 32-3, 37,
Inquiry into the Book of History of the 104-5, 1315 Li Fu's theory of,
Old Text, 91 101-6; see also principle (It)
Instructions for Practical Living (Wang ko-wu (rectification of the mind)
Yang-ming) ,113 theory, 3, 39-40, 43
"instruments" (ch'ib), 7 Kuan Chih-tao, 135
intellectual discussions (chiang-lun), Kuan Chung, 51-2
25 Kuei Yu-kuang, 138
The Intellectual Lineage ofHsin-an AreaKu Hsien-ch'eng, 113, 132
(Ch'engT'ung), 126 K'ung Hsi, 161-2
Intellectual Lineage of the Learning of K'ung K'e-chien, 159-60
MasterLu (Li Fu), 107, 121, 142 K'ung Shang-jen, 2, 73, 162
"intellectual pursuits" (tao wen-hsueh), K'ung-ts'ung-tzu (K'ung families), 136,
6,45 161-2
"intellectual" (shih), 47-9, 61-2 K'ung Ying-ta, 134
An Investigation of the Diagrams in the Ku Tung-ch'iao, 38
Book of Changes (Hu Wei), 137 Ku Yen-wu, 90, 111, 114
An Investigation of the Learning of the
Neo-Confucians of the Middle Min language: experiential dimension of,
Area (Li Ch'ing-fu), 127 15-16; value of written, 13
i (righteousness), 50 learning, see book learning (tu-shu)
"the learning of mind" (hsin-fa),
jen (humanity), 50 152
Index
Lecture Notes to the Interpretations of the 57; invited to Goose Lake

Four Books, 151 debate, 4-6; Li Fu's defense of,
ledgers of merit/demerit (kung-kuo- 65; on nature of truth, 25; on
ko), 80-1 political power, 60, 164-5; o n
Liang T'ing-chi, 66 source of learning, 41; on the
Li Ao, 135 "starting point," 103; Wang
Liao Chi, 135 Yang-ming criticism of, 41-2,
Lien Hsi-hsien, 160 45" 6
Li Fu: on The Book of Documents, 137- Lu K'un, 158, 165
42; as champion of Lu-Wang Lu Liu-liang, 80, 156
school, 3; character of, 65, 72, Lu Lung-ch'i, 153
140; on character of the Way, Lii Tsu-ch'ien, 4, 57, 124
84-90; on Ch'ing regime, 144-8; Lu-Wang school: on book learning
on Chu Hsi vs. Lu Hsiang-shan, {tu-shu), 1; conflict with Chu Hsi
107-17; conception of destiny school, 25-6, 90-101; decline of,
(ming), 77-84; on The Doctrine of 2; intellectual transmission of,
the Mean, 134-7; early life of, 117-30; Li Fu on Chu Hsi vs.,
63-6; government service of, 6 6 - 107-17; Li Fu as proponent of,
8, 74-5; on The Great Learning 3, 63, 71-2; Li Fu on
texts, 131-4; on knowledge, 9 7 - transmission of, 117-30; Mou
101; legacy of, 75-6; politically Tsung-san on, 23
disfavored, 69-71; study of Lu Yu, 73
classics by, 130-1; support of Lu-
Wang doctrine by, 71-3, 75, Mao Hsi-ho, 103, 135, 146
106; theory of ko-ivu by, 101-6; "The Massacre of Fang Hsiao-ju's Ten
on transmission of Lu's doctrine, Clan" (Li Fu), 147
117-30 Mei Cho, 138, 139
Li Kuang-ti, 64, 66, 135, 145-6, 153 Mencius, 17, 21, 41, 65, 104, 131
Li Li-wu, 135 Mencius: constructs tradition of the
lineage of the Way (tao-mai), 56 Way, 54-5, 117; on
Li Po-mien, 19 differentiating, 39; on human
Li T'ung, 9-10, 115 nature, 12; on indeterminate
Liu Chin, 31 destiny, 82; on investigation of
Liu Tsung-chou, 91, 132 things, 18-19; o n right °f
Li Yiian-kang, 118 "revolution," 50; on role of
Lo Ch'in-shun, 44, 95-7, 101, 110, intellectuals, 48-50; as "self-
112 declared disciple," 122; T'ai-tsu
Lou Liang, 31 attack against, 159; use of 'ju"
Lu brothers, see Chiu-ling; Lu Hsiang- by, 85-6; on virtue, 105
shan Metzger, Thomas, 10
Lu Chiu-shao, 164 "mind" (hsin): actualized/not yet
Lu Hsiang-shan: approach to actualized, 11, 43; Chu Hsi's
principle/mind by, 12-19; view of, 2, 6-12; Li Fu's view of
awarded Confucian scholar rank, nature, principle and, 90-101;
120; criticism of the Great Void Lu Hsiang-shan's view of, 2, 9,
by, 7-8; debate with Chu Hsi, 2, 12-19; as principle, 42;
2OO
Index
rectification of, 40, 42; as source during Ming period, 29-30;

of moral enlightenment, 30, reemphasizes practice/study, 28;
104-6; substance and operation on unity of all things, 34-5; see
of, 10-11; Wang Yang-ming on, also Confucianism
33-4 The New T'ang History, 143
Mind-Transmitting Hall, 154-5 New Text Documents, 137-8
Ming Confucianism, 157-8, 166 Non-Ultimate (or Great Void), 7-8,
Ming dynasty: adoption of Chu Hsi 92, 112, 115
school by, 28; attack against the "not yet actualized" (wei-fa), 11, 43
Way in, 159-60; fall of, 101,
114; intellectual climate of, 29; Old Text Documents, 137-8
Li Fu's praise of, 147 "The Old theory of Equilibrium and
Mongols: as Sung regime rival, 27; Harmony" (Chu Hsi), 11
Wu Ch'eng service under, 123-4 "On Destiny" (Li Fu), 81
moral behavior: human destiny and, On Immortality (Wang Yang-ming),
79-80; learning vs., 141-2; Li 44-5
Fu's definition of, 81-2, 94; The Origins of Chu Hsi Learning (Hsu
perfection of, 83 Chieh/Hsueh Ying-ch'i), 124,
moral knowledge: Ch'eng I on, 39; 126-7
decision making through, 50-1; The Origins of the Learning of T'ai-chou
mind as source of, 30, 104-6; (Chin Penheng), 127
perceptions of the senses vs., 96; The Origins of the Learning Transmitted
principle and, 83; unity of action to the South (Chu Heng), 127
and, 28, 32, 35-6; used by The Orthodox Transmission of Neo-
political leaders, 61-2 Confucianism (Sun Ch'i-feng),
Mo-tzu, 85-6, 117 127
Mou Tsung-san, 23 The Orthodox Transmission of the Sage
Mu-t'ang, see Li Fu Learning (Chou Ju-teng) ,127
Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao (Li Fu collection), Ou-yang Ch'ung-i, 95
76 Ou-yang Hsiu, 64-5, 87
Mu-t'angpieh-kao (Li Fu collection),
76 Pao Min-tao, 57
The Period in which Chu Hsi was Free
nature (hsing): feeling, mind and, 9; from Perplexities (Li Fu) , 1 1 5
honoring the moral, 108-9; Li philology, 141-2
Fu's view of principle, mind and, philosophical anthropology, 20-1
90-101; linked to ch'i, 95; Lu The Philosophical Records of the Ming
Hsiang-shan on, 16; physical vs. Confucians (Huang Tsung-hsi),
heaven-conferred, 12; principle 128
and, 7; within the mind, 11-12 Philosophical Records of the Neo-
"nature is the principle," 12-13, 93, Confucians of the Sung and the
95 Yuan (Ch'iian Tsu-wang), 125,
Neo-Confucianism: claim of 129
legitimacy by, 55; Goose Lake Philosophical Records of the Sung and the
debate over, 4-6; Li Fu's Yuan Confucians (Ch'uan Tsu-
criticism of, 87; redirection wang), 164
201
Index
Philosophical Records of Various Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life

Confucians (Liu Yuan-ch'ing), (Ch'en Chien), 113
127 rectification of the mind, 3, 39-40,
physical nature (ch'i-chih chih hsing), 42
12 Reflections on Things at Hand (Lii Tsu-
political establishment: bringing ch'ien), 121
order to, 52-5; criticism of, 3,
54; determinate/indeterminate sage-emperors: K'ang-hsi as, 148-57;
destinies of, 78-9; impact of price of having, 168, 171; two
academic disputes on, 111-12; kinds of, 154; use of the Way by,
implications of using the Way 157-68
for, 157-68; issue of alien, 123- sagehood: achieving, 17-18; ch'i
4; principle (li) and, 161, 165; within, 94; Chu Hsi/Lu's desire
ruler/subject relations in, 50; for, 56-7; Chu Hsi school on,
split between the Way and, 57- 31; Wang Yang-ming's
62; unity of education and, 167; enlightenment on, 32-3; see also
use of the Way in, 48-51, 84-5, the Way (tao)
143-57; vital force and rise of, sage-kings, 84, 124
83-4; see also K'ang-hsi "seeking the lost mind" (ch'iu fang-
emperor's rule hsin), 99-100
principle of Heaven, 43, 95, 100 "self-declared disciple," 122
"principle is one but its A Sequel to Master Chu's Origins ofl-Lo
manifestations are many" (li-ifen- Learning (Hsieh To), 126
shu), 10 "seriousness" (ching), 29
principle (li): Chu Hsi on, 7-9, 12- Shao Yung, 14
13, 33; ko-wu concept on, 32-3; Shih Mi-yuan, 26-7
Li Fu's view of mind, nature and, Shih-tsung (Ming emperor), 155
90-101; Li Fu on the Way and, sincerity of the will, 37-8, 42-3
88; Lu Hsiang-shan's approach "sitting in silence and clarifying one's
to, 14; mind as, 42 (add to this); mind" (mo-tso cheng-hsin), 10
political power and, 161, 165; as The Six Classics, 18
source of moral discourse, 83; "sixteen characters," 138-41, 152
vital force and, 7-9, 82; Wang "six virtues" (liu-te), 85
Yang-ming on, 33-4; see also ko- Speculation on "TheFive Classics,'*32
wu (reaching to obtain starting point (tuan-hsu), 103
principle) Sun Ch'i-feng, 128
"the principle of things," 19 Sun fu-hsien, 73-4
prosperity, 78 Sung Confucianism: criticism of,
"the pursuits of inquiry and study" 157-8, 166; influence on K'ang-
(tao wen-hsueh), 1-2 hsi of, 152; transmission claim
of, 27, 125
Records of the Grand Historians, 139 Sung dynasty, 26-7, 54
Records of the Rites, 143 Sung Lien, 28, 118
Records of the Transmission of the Way Sung Li-tsung (Sung emperor),
(Chang P'o-hsing), 127 150-1
A Rectification of Chu Hsi's Final Surviving Fires (Li Fu), 64
2O2
Index
Tai Chen, 130 and, 78-80, 83; Li Fu on

Tai Hsi, 124 principle and, 93-4; Lu Hsiang-
Tai Hsien, 31 shan on, 16-17; nature linked
Tai Ming-shih case, 74, 76, 149 to, 95; political power as, 83-4;
T'ai-tsu (Ming emperor), 28, 159-60 principle and, 7-9, 82
T'ang Ch'ien, 108
T'ang Chin, 108 Wan Ch'eng-chang, 116
T'ang dynasty, 54 Wang Chi, 91, 94, 100
Taoism, 54, 86-7 Wang Fu-chih, 54, 61-2, 160-1
T'ao Ta-lin, 119 Wang Hsi-chih, 64
"The Teacher of Ten Thousand Wang Ken, 94, 100, 103
Generations" (K'ang-hsi), 154 Wang Po, 132, 134, 138
"Textual Examination of the Old Text Wang Shih-chen, 66, 74
Documents' (Li Fu), 138 Wang Wei, 28, 118
Three Rites, 72, 74 Wang Yang-ming: awarded Confucian
three ultimate standards (san-chi), 98 scholar rank, 120; contributions
T'ien Wen-ching, 68-70 of, 2-3, 88; criticism of Lu by,
t'i (substance), 91 41-2, 45-6; epistemology of, 34-
tradition of the Way (tao-t'ung), 3, 54, 5; Four Statements of, 38-9; Li
56; see also the Way (tao) Fu's criticism of, 100; on Lu/
The Transmission of Orthodox Learning Chu Hsi's agreement, 109-10;
(Hsiung Ssu-lu), 127 moral philosophy of, 29;
truth: nature of, 25; political power ontology of mind and
and, 158-9, 167, 171; realized in knowledge, 90-2; on political
daily life, 100 power, 60-1; on source of
Ts'ai T'ien, 69 knowledge, 39-40, 98-9; on
Ts'ai Yu-hsueh, 124 source of learning, 41; struggle
Tseng Ching trial, 162-3 with Chu Hsi's learning by, 29-
Tseng Kung, 64-5 32, 45-6; teachings blamed for
Tseng Tsu, 53 Ming fall, 114; theory of
Tseng-tzu, 48, 133 knowledge/action by, 28, 32,
Ts'ui Shu, 139 35"7> 4i-2, 94-5
T'ung-ch'eng school, 76 Wang Yang-ming school, 81, 125-6
Tung Chung-shu, 54 Wanju-lu, 72
Tung Huai, 132, 134 the Way (tao): Confucianism
Tzu Hsia, 53 reintroduction of, 136-7;
Tzu-ssu, 53, 135-6 described, 7; intellectual quest
for, 47-8; K'ang-hsi emperor's
"unity of all things," 34-5 use of, 148-57; legitimate
unity of knowledge and action (chih- transmission of, 55-7, 117-30;
hsing ho-i), 28, 32, 35-7, 40-2 Li Fu on, 84-90; Lu's grasp of,
unity of three teachings (san-chiao 56; political establishment and,
ho-i), 81 48-51, 143-68; political order
through, 52-5; split between
vital force (ch'i): Chu Hsi on, 17; political power and, 58-62;
described, 6-7; Li Fu on destiny starting point (tuan-hsu) of, 103;
203
Index
the Way (tao) (cont.) Yang Chu, 85-6, 117

used in political criticism, 3; Yao Shu, 160
Wang Yang-ming's quest for, 3 1 - Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai, 27
2, 44-5; within the classics, 13, Yen Jo-ch'u, 91, 120, 138, 139
28, 105-6; see also Confucianism; Yen-Li school, 90
sagehood Yen Sung, 74
Western post-Kantian philosophy, Yen Tzu-sheng, 122
22-3 Yin-t'ang, 69-70
the will: knowledge and, 37-8; yin and yang, 78, 88
sincerity of, 42-3 Yuan Huang, 80
will (i), 34 Yuan Mei, 148
will is knowledge {chih), 34 Yu Chi, 109
Writings from Our Dynasty on Statecraft Yung-cheng emperor, 68-71, 155-6,
(Ho Ch'ang-ling), 76 158, 162-3
Wu Ch'eng, 109, 122-4, 1 3 ^ Yiing-lo, 147
Wu (Han emperor), 54 Yung-lo Encyclopedia, 72
Wu Pu-pi, 29 Yunju-ch'u, 166
Wu-shen memorial, 59 Yu, Ying-shih, 47, 130, 140
Wu-tsung (Ming emperor), 31
WuYu, 138 Zen Buddhism: influence on Chu Hsi
Wu Yuan-ying, 27-8 by, 9-10; Lu's doctrines and,
Wu Yii-pi, 30 121-2; transmission of, 125; see
also Buddhism
Yang Chien, 121
204

(Chin-Shing Huang) Philosophy, Philology, and Politics

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This book explains the general intellectual climate of the early Ch'ing

William T. Graham, Jr. "The Lament for the South":

© Cambridge University Press 1995

First published 1995

A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

ISBN 0 52148225 9 hardback

Foreword by Professor Ying-shih Yii page ix

1 The original argument (1): "Chu Hsi versus Lu

2 The original argument (2): Wang Yang-ming and

3 The critical dimension in the Confucian mode of

4 Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in

5 Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in

6 Ii Fu and the philological turn 107

approach to the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus

Li Fu (1675-1750) is practically unknown in the West. Neither is he

There can be no question that a book-length study on Li Fu and the

movement, needless to say, would require a thorough examination, on

inclination to reconcile his philosophical differences with Lu Hsiang-

While in Nanking he made a sacrifice in person at the tomb of the

were concerned. As Chang Ping-lin (1867-1936) points out, the "speak-

Princeton, New Jersey

When Professor Ying-shih Yu first suggested that I select Li Fu as a

encouragement. In the process of revising my thesis into a book, Pro-

CCTC Chi-ch'i t'ing-chi

1. K'ung Shang-jen, Hu-hai chi, Shanghai, 1957, 9/203-204.

Wang Yang-ming restored The Great Learning of the Ancient Text as a

In 1175, Chu Hsi (1130—1200) and the Lu brothers, Chiu-ling (1132—

However, Hsiang-shan felt somewhat dissatisfied with the second line of

shan), hereafter abbreviated as LHCC, 1823. Punctuated by Li Fu. 34749a. Professor

lows: "During the meeting at the Goose Lake, in a discussion of educat-

In discussing the origin of the earth, Chu Hsi said:

12. LHCC, 2 / i o b - i 4 a . 13. CTWC, 3 6 / 7 b - i o b .

21. Li T'ung, Li Yen-p'ing chi, 3/39.

Chu Hsi subsequently adopted the view of Chang Tsai (1020—77).

perspective when he met Lu Hsiang-shan at the Goose Lake temple at

30. CTYL, 124/4826. 31. Ibid., 59/2262-2263. 32. CTWC, 77/6b.

Lu Hsiang-shan's approach to principle is considerably different from

Lu Hsiang-shan, however, followed another path to resolve his con-

48. LHCC, 36/5b-6a. 49. Ibid., 35/2oa-2ob. 50. Ibid., 34/22b.

principles and violate righteousness, do so because they do not think,

60. Ibid., 32/7a; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 580.

"things" here deserves a closer look. Lacking an unambiguous context,

Thus, we can see that Chu Hsi and Lu's disagreements on

We should keep this in mind when we enthusiastically seek to apply

T'ang Chun-i, a well-known Neo-Confucianist in modern times, ap-

87. T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yiian-lun (A fundamental exposition of Chinese

Despite their real intellectual differences, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and

1. LHCC, 35/16b. 2. C7WC, 34/343-34^ 3. Ibid., 34/17a-17b.

school's leading intellectual position and restored political and social

11. SYHA, 65/87.

The great historical thinker Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738-1801) wrote

14. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Wen-shih-t'ung-i (General meaning of historiography), Taipei,

Wang Yang-ming's experience with Chu Hsi's learning is supposed to

Kweichow, to become the head of a postal station. This misfortune in

24. Nieni>'uin WYCC, 32/614-615.

tion of things (ko-wu) in The Great Learning. T h e extension of knowledge

T o b e sure, in C h u Hsi's view, principle is i m m a n e n t in m i n d , b u t it

action in a concrete situation. In such a way, the importance of learning

41. CTYL, 9/1 a.

in such a case was mediated by selfish desires; they were no longer

56. CHL, p. 243; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 258.

63. CHL, pp. 158-159. 64. Ibid., p. 215.