PhilipVanPraag 2017 5ConsensusDemocracyIn PoliticalScienceAndCh

5
Consensus Democracy in the

Netherlands
Background and Future
Philip van Praag
5.1 Introduction
The Dutch political system is often described as a consensus democracy.

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Problems and conflicts are resolved in such a system by intensive consulta-

tions and compromise. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, after
the success of Pim Fortuyn and the rise of Geert Wilders’ PVV (Partij voor de
Vrijheid, Party for Freedom), a lot of people have their doubts about the future
of consensus democracy and what is known as the ‘polder model’. It is not the
first time that this has happened. The appreciation for consensus democracy
– and for the related phenomenon of the consultation economy – varies
from one period to the next. In the 1960s, the attack on the ‘authoritarian
mindset’ of the authorities and on the ‘lack of political clarity’ was launched,
but then, around 1980, criticism of the system died down. In the early 1990s,
a lot of people got annoyed once again at the search for consensus – the idea
being that it would lead to gridlock and a lack of decisiveness in politics. A
few years later, at the time of what were known as the Purple Cabinets of
social democrats and liberals, people at home and abroad spoke glowingly
of the successes of the Dutch polder model. It remains to be seen whether
the current criticism of the system will lead to major changes.
Journalistic and scholarly thinking about Dutch politics has been
strongly influenced by the work of political scientists such as Hans Daalder
(1928-2016) and Arend Lijphart. They regard the search for consensus among
the political elites as characteristic of the Dutch political culture of the
twentieth century. Lijphart sees the search for consensus arise around the
Pacification of 1917, a kind of package deal to resolve long-running conflicts
about universal suffrage, the electoral system, and the state-financing of
Copyright 2017. Amsterdam University Press.
Protestant and Catholic schools. He sees this as a conscious effort by the

political elites to resolve through consultations, from that point on, major
conflicts that arise between the subcultures or pillars (zuilen). Daalder
draws especially on the historical background. According to him the
centuries-long peaceful coexistence of different groups under the leadership
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90 Philip van Pr a ag
of elites of various religions and with different economic interests goes back
about three hundred years, to the Dutch Golden Age.
These contribution centres on the concept of consensus. I will flesh it
out further, and take a closer look at what political scientists mean when
they speak about political consensus in Dutch politics. I will also consider
the way in which Lijphart uses the concept of consensus to distinguish
between two types of democracy. And I will discuss briefly the situation
in the United Kingdom (UK), which is often seen as the opposite of the
prototypical consensus democracy.
I will analyse the various attempts that have been made to change
Dutch consensus democracy after 1966, and focus on the issues that various
political parties have used to break the consensus. The key question in
this chapter is whether we can still speak of a consensus democracy in the
Netherlands.
5.2 Consensus
Consensus indicates shared values and significant uniformity of views. If

one wants to use the concept to compare political systems and to distinguish
them from one another, a further specification is needed. British political
scientist Dennis Kavanagh offers a useful interpretation. He differentiates
three politically relevant aspects of consensus:
1 A high level of agreement across the political parties and governing
elites about the substance of public policy. In the post-war period,
it is primarily a matter, for the UK, of broader unanimity about the
economic policy and the foundations of the welfare state.
2 A high level of agreement between the elites regarding the main insti-
tutional features of the political system and the rules of the political
game.
3 A high level of agreement between the elites on the way in which
political differences should be resolved, namely through a process of
negotiation and compromise (Kavanagh 1987: 6).
These three aspects will, respectively, be referred as substantive or policy

consensus, institutional consensus, and procedural consensus. Institutional
consensus and procedural consensus play a central role in the work of Daal-
der and Lijphart especially. They focus strongly on parliamentary politics
and the role of political parties, and pass over institutions and mechanisms
for building consensus outside party politics. On the socio-economic front,
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Consensus Democr ac y in the Ne therl ands 91
then, other actors besides the political parties play an important role, and
hold consultations in their own deliberative institutions in accordance with
other procedures. Dutch consensus democracy concerns both politics in
the seat of government, The Hague, and the system of industrial relations.
5.3 The rules of the game
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch society was deeply
divided into three population groups who lived in isolation from each
other: the Catholic pillar, the Protestant/Christian pillar, and a secular
pillar, which was dominated by the socialist labour movement. Although
the majority of the population was Christian and went to church every
week, there were sharp contrasts between Protestants and Catholics. This
meant that no single group had a majority. In his classic analysis Verzuiling,
pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek 1 Lijphart (1968) shows
how, in such a highly divided society without cross connections among
the different population groups, a stable political system was still possible.
His study of pillarization (verzuiling) in the Netherlands places a strong
emphasis on the cooperative behaviour of the political elite to explain
this stability. Since the pacification of 1917, in which some long-running
fundamental political and social conflicts were resolved, the leaders of
the various blocs, Lijphart tells us, showed a great sense of responsibility
towards the proper functioning of the system.
The cooperative behaviour on the part of the Dutch political elites was
expressed, during the period of pillarization, in seven rules of the game.
These rules were not recorded or agreed among the elites, but grew over
time as part of Dutch political culture. Lijphart derived these rules from
the actual behaviour of politicians in periods of tension and crisis. They
are as follows:
– business of politics: politicians should be responsible in their behaviour,
keeping a focus on goals;
– pragmatic tolerance: ideological and religious differences must be
respected, and the majority decides only after consultation with the
minority;
– summit diplomacy: important issues are addressed in top conferences
in which the main groups take part;
1 English edition: Lijphart, A. (1975) The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy
in the Netherlands. Berkeley (CA), University of California Press; 2nd edn. (1st edn 1968).
– proportionality: benefits, appointments, and services should be dis-

tributed proportionally among the blocs;
– depoliticisation: sensitive political problems are presented as non-
political issues that can be resolved according to generally accepted rules;
– secrecy: to find a compromise on a sensitive political issue, one should
be cautious when it comes to media coverage;
– the government’s right to govern: the parties in Parliament must give
the government sufficient flexibility to carry out policy (Lijphart 1968:
120-138).
Taken together, these seven rules of the game can be regarded as a form of
procedural consensus. They guided the behaviour of the political leaders
of the blocs when it came to fundamental conflicts that deeply divided
society. They helped stop differences from getting out of hand, so groups
could co-exist peacefully while keeping their own religion, culture and
organisations.
After 1967, the changing political behaviour of political elites (which
became more competitive) and of large groups of citizens put what was
known as ‘pacification democracy’ under a lot of pressure. The disappear-
ance of many components of this pillarization, and the emergence of a
homogeneous mass culture led, according to Lijphart, to a rather troubled
and difficult transition towards a democratic system that would more
resemble the British and American systems.
5.4 Consensus democracy and majoritarian democracy
In his later work, which has a much stronger comparative character,

Lijphart no longer emphasises the political culture of the elite but focuses
on institutional criteria in characterising political systems. He contrasts
two types of democratic systems: consensus democracy versus majoritarian
democracy (Lijphart 1984). A consensus democracy has, on this view, the
following eight characteristics:
– a broad coalition government;
– a formal and informal separation of powers;
– a multiparty system;
– a party system based on a number of dimensions;
– an electoral system based on proportional representation;
– territorial and non-territorial federalism and/or decentralisation of
public powers;
– a balanced bicameral system with representation of minorities;

– a written constitution, partly to protect minorities.
Lijphart considers Switzerland and Belgium (until 1981) as good examples of

consensus democracy, but also the Netherlands has, to a reasonable degree,
the features of this type of democracy. The question of whether a society
is deeply divided, and the behaviour of the political elite, do not play a
role in this dichotomy. They still constitute an indirect factor, because the
assumption is that consensus democracy developed in the past especially
in religiously and/or linguistically divided countries. It turns out, somewhat
paradoxically, that consensus democracy originated in countries where
there was a lot of dissension. The use of the concept of consensus to char-
acterise these democracies thus refers to both procedural and institutional
consensus. It has to do with institutions, arrangements and agreements to
make it possible to address dissension in a given country. Lijphart tacitly
assumes that the fault lines (cleavages) in these countries are so wide and
deeply rooted that substantive consensus is very limited.
The second type of democracy, majoritarian democracy, also referred to
as the Westminster model, has features directly opposed to this eight points:
– a one-party government;
– a strong position for executive power;
– a two-party system;
– parties who are primarily identified by their position on socio-economic
issues;
– a first-past-the-post electoral system;
– a highly centralised government apparatus;
– a unicameral legislative power;
– an unwritten and flexible constitution.
Writing in 1984, Lijphart mentions New Zealand as a perfect example of a

majoritarian democracy. Following a number of major institutional changes,
however, New Zealand now has more of the characteristics of a consensus
democracy. The system in Great Britain is slightly different. It has a weak
bicameral system, with an Upper House that has few powers, and it does
not have a pure two-party system. Despite these divergences, the British
system lends itself well to a short analysis. Lijphart’s two-part typology sug-
gests that, in a country such as the UK, ‘consensus’ plays no role in politics.
We will look at this briefly with the help of the three-part categorisation
introduced above: substantive consensus, institutional consensus and
procedural consensus.
5.5 Consensus in the UK
Politics in the UK, particularly such as those in the Parliament in West-

minster, is focused on highlighting political differences. The often fierce
and lively debates in the House of Commons give the impression of two
political parties fighting each other tooth and nail, with diametrically
opposed views. Thanks to the electoral system, they do not need to take
into account the possibility that they might have to form a coalition with
each other. The institutional features Lijphart describes do not, indeed, lead
to open consensus-building – but this is only part of the story.
For a long time, the UK had a highly developed institutional consensus.
The foundations of the electoral system and the relationship between the
House of Commons and the government have not changed for more than
150 years. Only the relationship between the House of Lords and the House
of Commons has been amended in the course of the twentieth century, in
favour of the House of Commons. Despite the lack of a constitution, when
it comes to institutional continuity, there is some similarity to the United
States, whereas there is a big difference between the UK and many countries
in Western Europe, where the written constitution has fundamentally
changed over the last hundred years – and in some cases more than once.
The institutional consensus on the outlines of the British political system
has, however, been under pressure for some time. The Liberal Democrats
want to customise the first-past-the-post system, but a reform proposal was
rejected in a referendum in 2011. Since then, the electoral system has not been
called into question. The Scottish National Party (SNP) has been pushing
for years for some form of independence for Scotland. In 1992, its election
slogan was ‘Independence in Europe’. Since 1999, Scotland has had its own
parliament with far-reaching powers, but in 2014 the SNP lost a referendum
on the withdrawal of Scotland from the UK. It is to be expected that the in-
dependence of Scotland will be back on the political agenda once Brexit – the
British withdrawal from the European Union – has taken place around 2020.
At least as important is the question of whether the British system allows
for any consensus-oriented decision-making. It turns out in practice that
a change of government does not lead to diametrically opposed policy.
There is a remarkable continuity of policy, based on consensus-building,
that often takes place behind the scenes. The main actor responsible here
is the Civil Service. It is precisely the highly centralised nature of the Brit-
ish state, where the executive dominates the legislature, that gives the
civil servants at the departments considerable power. In such a system,
lobbying takes place via the bureaucratic apparatus. It is the ministries
in London that maintain a culture of formal and informal consultations

with employers, employees and other civic organisations. That leads to
consensus on the main elements of the policy to be pursued. In the words
of Jeremy Richardson:
Compromise is therefore institutionalized and regularized in, liter-

ally, hundreds of advisory committees (some permanent, some ad hoc)
surrounding government departments. Although this is not uniquely
British, the British have developed the advisory system to a fine art.
The incorporation of groups into the policy process had, by 1979 and
the election of Mrs Thatcher, reached what may be a unique level in
comparative perspective. (Richardson, 1993: 94-95)
Thatcherism: the end of consensus thinking?
From the time she took office in 1979, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher (nicknamed the Iron Lady) was determined to put an end to what
she saw as pernicious consensus thinking: ‘For me, consensus seems to be
the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies’ (Ka-
vanagh 1987: 7). For Thatcher, consensus was synonymous with compromise
on fundamental principles, on which compromise was not possible.
In 1991, Thatcher was forced to resign by her own party. In the 12 years of
her rule, the foundations of the British welfare state, such as the National
Health Service, were not affected. But it is also true that major policy changes
she introduced, such as privatising stateowned industries and limiting the
power of the trade unions by changing the right to strike, were not rolled
back by the governments that came after her. In these important policy
areas, a new consensus had developed. After the 1997 election victory of
the Labour Party led by Tony Blair, only a few measures of the conservatives
have been reversed. The 2016 referendum on Brexit, however, laid bare a
deep substantive division in UK politics and society. It remains to be seen
whether that will subside again over time, and whether a new consensus
emerges on the relationship between the UK and Europe.
The procedural consensus, reflected in the important role of pressure
and interest groups in the preparation of decision-making, has not been
permanently changed. Since Thatcher’s departure, the formal and informal
consultation procedures have been working again just as they did before
she came to power.
From this brief consideration of British politics, it can be concluded that
there is indeed a certain degree of policy consensus, institutional consensus
and procedural consensus. The various forms of consensus are less clearly
manifest in certain areas than in the Netherlands, but that does not mean
we can assume the absence of significant consensus. Lijphart’s two-part
typology of democratic political systems, which is based primarily on
institutional features, and in which the one generates systematic consensus
and the other does without it, is too schematic.
Regardless of the institutional structure of a system, the proper function-
ing of a democratic system requires a certain degree of consensus. It is
difficult to establish what minimum of consensus is required, but without
such a minimum, the health of any political system can run into doubt.
Below we will look at the extent to which the consensual character of Dutch
politics since mid-sixties has undergone major changes.
5.6 The background to Dutch consensus democracy
In his standard work Lijphart stresses the absence of policy consensus

among the Dutch population during the period of pillarization. He finds
little agreement among the population as a whole when it came to politi-
cal and social values and objectives. Within the various pillars there was
indeed a broad consensus, but not in the least between the pillars (Lijphart
1968: 86). He recognises, however, that even in the Netherlands, pillarized
as it was, there was a minimum of consensus, which was reflected in a
nationalism that was not all that strong and in a feeling of connectedness
with the Royal Family. More important, however, was the wish of the elites
to maintain the institutional consensus, the existing political system.
Lijphart’s point of departure – that there was only a very narrow policy
consensus – is often called into doubt. Foreign authors who look closely
at the Netherlands (such as Windmuller 1970, and Katzenstein 1985) are
much less preoccupied with the rules of the game in The Hague, the centre
of Dutch politics. They show, indeed, that the search for compromise has
led to a high degree of agreement, especially on socio-economic issues. The
planned-wage policy that was pursued from 1946 to 1959, and under which
the government determined from one year to the next how much room there
was for wage increases in the public and private sectors, has always attracted
a lot attention from outside the Netherlands. This policy, which was carried
out with the support of organisations of employers and employees alike,
made it possible to have a successful industrial policy. It gave the govern-
ment the space to make infrastructure investments, and allowed a start on
building the welfare state. A centrally planned wage policy is now out of
date, but the successful policy of wage moderation in the eighties and nine-
ties, for which the basis was laid in the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement among
unions, employers and the government, is another example of important
substantive policy consensus. The more recent retrenchment of the welfare
state has not led to major tensions between the parties or to major labour
unrest. Popular support for these changes was limited, but it was reflected,
not in mass protest, but in large electoral shifts.
Katzenstein and Windmuller before him have shown that the basis for
the Dutch system of industrial relations and the related socio-economic
politics from 1945 on, was laid in the interwar period. In the sphere of
national politics, this period saw a rapprochement between the Roman
Catholic State Party (RKSP) and the Social Democratic Workers Party
SDAP). Both parties grew markedly closer to each other in programmatic
terms in the 1930s. In the field of industrial relations, tentative steps were
taken in that decade towards tripartite talks among employers’ and workers’
organisations and the government. Around 1940, the various parties had
already come to the conclusion that cooperation and consultation were
to be preferred over labour disputes and were more fully in the national
interest. Katzenstein speaks of an ideology of ‘social partnership’ and points
to a similar development in six other small countries: Austria, Belgium,
Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. In none of these countries,
however, has this led to a comparable institutionalisation of consultations
between trade unions and employers’ organisations.
After 1945, agreement emerged between the Dutch Labour Party PvdA
(Partij van de Arbeid, successor of the SDAP) and the Catholic People’s
Party KVP (successor of the RKSP) on key socio-economic issues, and both
parties worked together in government to build a neo-corporatist consulta-
tive structure. This led in 1950 to the Public-law Organisation Act and,
pursuant to that, to the creation of the Socio-Economic Council (Sociaal
Economische Raad, SER). The Council, composed of employers’ representa-
tives, employees and independent members appointed by the government,
was both the umbrella organisation of the sectoral business associations
and an official advisory body to the government. In practice, the business
organisations were successful only in some sectors that had a lot of small
businesses, such as agriculture and retail. The formation of the Agricultural
Board, for which each farmer had to pay a mandatory tax, often led to a
real entanglement between farmers’ organisations and the Ministry of
Agriculture. The Boerenpartij (Farmers Party) of Hendrik Koekkoek, which
had populist features, emerged in the 1960s from opposition to the power
of the Agricultural Board and to politics of the dominant parties.
The SER managed to build up considerable authority in the 1950s and

1960s. The mostly unanimous advices it offered on a large number of socio-
economic issues were almost always taken up rapidly by the government.
With the Council’s help, politicians could be assured of broad support for
their policies. Consensus on the conduct of socio-economic policy and
procedural consensus were closely linked during this period.
5.7 The dominance of the denominational parties
The substantive policy consensus described briefly here fits poorly into
Lijphart’s pillarization model. In 1980, the Amsterdam political scientist
Hans Daudt turned against another important part of this model: the state-
ment that the political leaders of the various blocs regarded each other as
equal partners in putting together the government. Daudt was responding to
the failed attempt in 1977 to build a second coalition Cabinet leaded by the
social democratic leader Den Uyl. In fact, he turns against an important part
of the procedural consensus, and rightly points out that the pacification of
1917 started a long era of Christian Democratic dominance. The resolution of
the conflicts about the financing of religious schools and universal suffrage
removed a major point of disagreement between the liberals and the large
confessional parties. It opened the way to permanent and mostly stable
cooperation of the Christian parties with the various liberal parties. The
introduction of universal suffrage and proportional representation in 1917
was not so much the starting point of overall cooperation between equal
elites, but was above all the beginning of a period of more than 80 years in
which large denominational parties were dominant.
If we survey the period from 1917, it turns out that the Catholic KVP,
later absorbed into Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), took part in every
government up to 1994, and also showed a clear preference for non-left
coalition partners such as the Liberals or, before 1939, the Liberal Democrats.
It was only in 1939 that the Social Democrats were invited for the first time
to take part in a ruling coalition. After World War II, the Labour Party PvdA
participated in government for 12 years, from 1946 to 1958. After that, the
party was a semi-permanent opposition party for more than 30 years. Its
only substantial period in power up to 1989 came during the years of the
Den Uyl Cabinet, from 1973 to 1977.
Daudt is of the opinion that, in 1925, W. H. Nolens, the leader of the
Roman Catholic State party RKSP, formulated the principle according to
which potential left-wing government partners were approached: ‘in dire
necessity’ could they come up for consideration as partners in a coalition

government. Daudt does understand this:
Actually, it is quite obvious: why should groups who find the existing
society in principle acceptable and who rely on a large majority of votes
and seats, cooperate in government with groups who say they stand
for drastic changes in society through government intervention? This
is in fact done ‘only in dire necessity’, and whether it is to happen is
determined, on behalf of the non-left-wing potential governing parties,
mainly by successively the RKSP, KVP, and CDA. (Daudt 1980: 186)
He does add that it is not necessarily a matter of conscious, preconceived

intentions, whereby the denominational negotiators would already have
had a clear goal in mind from the beginning in forming the Cabinet. And he
shows what role substantive political and numerical considerations of ‘dire
necessity’ have played in the Labour Party’s participation in government
after 1945. The Den Uyl Cabinet could be formed only because there was
no alternative majority.
Even if we don’t agree with Daudt on all points (Van den Berg 1986), we
can see all the same that his views are an important addition to Lijphart’s.
Dutch politics after 1945 cannot be understood without taking into account
the dominant position of the denominational parties, and the efforts of
the Labour Party, and later D’66 (Democraten ’66) as well, to erode that
dominance. From 1966 on, these efforts were expressed both in proposals
for constitutional renewal and in attacks on the political rules of the game.
5.8 The end of institutional consensus: proposals for

constitutional renewal
In the second half of the 1960s, there was a change in the attitude on the
part of large groups of the Dutch public to politics and the major political
parties. The reason for this must be sought in major post-war social changes,
such as the development of the welfare state, the rapid rise in prosperity,
secularisation and depillarization. The political docility and passivity of
the citizens declined, especially among the younger generations. The rise
of D66 (written D’66 up to 1985) and of the Farmers Party were a symptom
of this. Both the institutional consensus and the procedural consensus
have been debated since the 1960s. The institutional conservatism of CDA
and the conservative liberal VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie,
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) in particular would, however,

block many proposals for several decades.
In the mid-1960s, three coalitions appeared, each time with a different
political composition, on the basis of the 1963 election results. This was a stum-
bling block for many citizens. After a difficult formation period the Marijnen
Cabinet was formed consisting of the three major Christian Democratic parties
– the Catholic KVP, the orthodox Protestant ARP (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij),
and the Protestant CHU (Christelijk Historische Unie) – as well as the liberal
VVD. In 1965, this Cabinet fell and was replaced by the Cals Cabinet of KVP,
ARP and the social democratic PvdA. After more than a year this Cabinet in
turn was brought down in the Second Chamber of Parliament2 by the KVP (on
what is known as the Schmelzers’ Night3) and succeeded by Zijlstra’s interim
Cabinet, which had members from the KVP and the ARP. Various proposals
for constitutional reform were circulated in response to these developments.
That marked the beginning of a debate on the voters’ lack of influence on the
composition of the coalition cabinet. And the debate is still going on.
The founders of the progressive liberal D66 spoke in 1966 about their
‘sense of displeasure regarding a number of phenomena in our parliamen-
tary democracy’. The new party called for an elected Prime Minister and
a ‘modern form of the first-past-the-post system’. Breaking up the existing
party system was an important objective for the democrats. After the
successful elections of 1967, D66 leader Hans van Mierlo spoke about the
desirability of having the existing parties ‘explode’.
In the 1967 report Een stem die telt (A Vote That Counts), the Labour
Party PvdA called for the formation of two political concentrations through
ballot-box agreements before the elections (Van Thijn 1967). Each bloc
would have to try to get a majority on the basis of a common programme,
a common list of candidates for parliament, a candidate for Prime Minister
and candidate ministers. A conservative ballot-box agreement was to form
around the conservative liberal VVD, while the PvdA would be at the heart
of a progressive ballot-box agreement. There was no longer any room in
this vision for the denominational parties. The elected Prime Minister was
rejected as contrary to the Dutch parliamentary system and as conducive
to a further erosion of the position of Parliament. However, the PvdA called
for a revision of the electoral system to give more influence to the voters
over the formation of the government.
2 Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer) is the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, the First
Chamber or Senate is the Higher House of the Parliament.
3 Schmelzer was in 1966 the political leader of the KVP.
The proposals by D66 and the Labour Party had in common that they
wanted to increase the influence of the voters and wanted to avoid a situ-
ation in which the main compromises in Dutch politics would be adopted
after the elections, during the Cabinet formation. A not-insignificant side
effect of the proposals would be that the power of the Christian centre
parties to choose a coalition partner during the formation of the Cabinet
would disappear. D66 was guided by the example of the presidential system
in the United States, while the Labour Party was charmed more by practice
in the UK.
In the period after 1967, several concrete proposals for constitutional
(institutional) reforms were discussed in the Second Chamber of Parlia-
ment. The proposals put forward by a majority of the State Advisory Com-
mittee on the Constitution and the Electoral Law, better known as the
Cals-Donner State Commission, included the introduction of an elected
Cabinet formateur – a person who was charged with forming a new govern-
ment and who was a weak variant of the elected Prime Minister – and
a moderate district system: there were to be 12 multi-member districts
within which the system of proportional representation would apply. The
De Jong Cabinet of Christian Democratic parties and the Liberal party,
which the State Commission had installed, did not adopt the proposals.
Just a single change proposed by the Commission was passed: the abolition
of compulsory voting (1970).
In 1985, a new commission, the State Advisory Commission on the Rela-
tion between Voters and Policy-Making (the Biesheuvel State Commission)
recommended, among other things, that the role of the Second Chamber
of Parliament in forming the Cabinet be bolstered. To this end, the Second
Chamber had to appoint, within three weeks of the elections, a formateur,
who, if the exercise was successful, would automatically become Prime
Minister. If their formation did not succeed, the Second Chamber would
once again have to appoint a formateur. The accountability of the formateur
to the Second Chamber House was an important principle of the Biesheuvel
Commission. The Commission also was hoping to increase openness and
to shorten the formation period. The role of the King in the formation of
the Cabinet, the last important political role of the Head of State, would
disappear. The Commission in addition proposed to introduce a corrective
legislative referendum. In such a referendum, a bill that is approved by the
Second Chamber can be subject of a referendum. A corrective referendum
would have to take place if 300,000 voters requested it. Such a referendum
gives the voters the ability to veto a bill. The coalition of CDA and VVD did
not adopt the state commission’s proposals.
Small institutional changes
In 1994 CDA and VVD lost their majority in the Second Chamber of Parlia-
ment, it created some room for institutional changes. The parties of the
purple Cabinet – the social democratic PvdA, the conservative liberal VVD
and the progressive liberal D66 – agreed in 1994, on a proposal by D66, to
introduce a binding referendum. The required amendment to the Constitu-
tion needed two readings in Parliament. At the second reading, where no
changes can be made to the proposal, a two-thirds majority in both Houses
of Parliament is required. The proposal to introduce a corrective referendum
failed, it was voted down on a second reading in the First Chamber of Upper
House in 1999. (This was known as the Night of Wiegel).
An Advisory Referendum Act was finally passed in 2015. This private
member’s bill, introduced by the Labour Party, D66 and GroenLinks (Green-
Left), makes it possible to request a non-binding referendum on a bill that
has been adopted, provided the request is supported by at least 300,000
citizens. The outcome is valid if at least 30 percent of the electorate vote.
The referendum on the association treaty with Ukraine in 2016 was the first
to be held under this law.
The first national referendum in the Netherlands, however, on the Euro-
pean Constitution, was already held in 2005. It was a so-called consultative
referendum, which did not take place at the request of the voters but was initi-
ated by the legislature. What happens formally in a consultative referendum is
that the Upper and Lower Houses ask the electorate for advice before making
a decision. In both an advisory and a consultative referendum, Parliament can
ignore the results in whole or in part, but that will often lead to discontent.
At the local level, a good number of municipalities already offer their
citizens the possibility of requesting a referendum. Such a corrective
referendum at the local level is similarly not binding, but in practice the
municipal councils follow the results if the conditions have been met.
Especially in Amsterdam (the IJburg construction project) but also in cities
such as Rotterdam, Groningen, Zwolle and in some smaller towns, different
referenda of this kind have been held (Van Praag 2000).
Another institutional point that was debated for years concerns the
appointment of the Mayor. The Crown still appoints the Mayor on the
recommendation of the Minister for the Interior, but these days the opinion
of the City Council in question is decisive. Many parties want to change the
appointment by the Crown. For that to happen, the Constitution has to be
changed. In 2005, the First Chamber rejected, in a second reading, a proposal
by D66 Minister Thom de Graaf. The Labour Party group voted against,
among other things because the party wants to replace the appointment by
the Crown with an appointment by the City Council and not with a mayor
elected by the citizens.
On another point, an important change was indeed passed, but no change
in the law was needed for that. For the formation of the Cabinet in 2012, for
the first time, in accordance with the earlier proposals of the Biesheuvel
Commission, the formateur and the informateur – the politicians appointed
to organize the formation of a coalition government – were appointed by
the Second Chamber of Parliament. The Head of State no longer plays a role
in the building of a governing coalition.
In many countries, the political debate in recent years has been marked
by an increasing criticism of the political system in its existing institutional
form. The institutional consensus is declining not only in the Netherlands,
but in a lot of other countries, too. Various forms of referenda are on the rise.
What is striking is that, regardless of whether a country has an electoral
system based on proportional representation or a first-past-the-post system
or one or another kind, the criticism is often directed at the electoral system.
The fact that in almost all countries there is dissatisfaction with the electoral
system leads to modest expectations about the benefits of any change.
5.9 Attack on the rules of the game in politics
From the 1960s on, many politicians also saw another way to change Dutch
consensus democracy. This approach took the form of an outright rejection
of the compromise-oriented political culture and its rules of the game.
The attack on procedural consensus came especially from D66 and the
Labour Party, they wanted to increase clarity in politics by announcing
before the elections with which parties they might want to form a coalition,
and with which ones not. Programmatic clarity to the voters was provided
by indicating in advance which points of their programmes they wanted to
see included in the coalition agreement and which ones the party would not
compromise on. This led to the presentation, during the election campaign,
of a non-negotiable minimum programme, which would have to be accepted
without changes by any coalition partners. In practice, the Labour Party
PvdA heightened considerably the differences with the confessional parties
in particular, in what would come to be known as the polarisation strategy.
The hope was that the pursuit of clarity before the elections would prevent
the traditional way of building a coalition through negotiations after them,
and undermine also the dominant position of the denominational parties.
In 1972, the three cooperating progressive parties (PvdA, D66 and a

small new party) went one step further and published, before the election,
a detailed common coalition agreement, Keerpunt 1972 (Turning Point 1972),
which could not be negotiated after the elections that year. In addition the
progressive three also presented a shadow Cabinet led by Den Uyl, just as
they had in 1971. During the process of forming the Cabinet in late 1972/
early 1973, it seemed as though the objectives of the progressive parties
would be realised. After a difficult and tumultuous formation process, the
Den Uyl Cabinet, strikingly left-wing by Dutch standards, came into being.
It was made up of 10 ministers from the progressive three and 6 from the
Christian Democratic parties KVP and ARP.
The rules of the game from the pillarization played only a limited role in
the formation of the Den Uyl Cabinet and, more generally, in the period from
1967 to 1977. Business of politics was replaced in the case of the progressive
parties by an aversion to compromises with the confessional parties. The
tolerance and the respect for each other’s principles had given way to a
strong tendency in the Labour Party to overdo conflicts with the Catholic
KVP and denigrate this party. In addition, the progressives consciously
dropped the principle of proportionality in building the Den Uyl Cabinet.
Depoliticisation was replaced by a commitment to politicisation. In 1974, in
the terminology of those days, Daalder offered the overview shown in table 1.
Table 1 Changing Rules of the Game in Dutch Politics
Rules of the game, 1917-1968, Dominant rules of the game in 1974

according to Lijphart according to Daalder
Unmasking of the ideology of the Establishment:

1 Business of politics
the need for a critical social vision
2 Tolerance Contestation and conflict model
3 Summit diplomacy Self-determination at the base
Polarisation as a means of forming an exclusive
4 Proportionality
majority based on a one’s own fixed program
5 Depoliticisation Politicisation
6 Secrecy Openness
‘Rule of the Council of Ministers’,
The government right to
7 ‘The Fourth Estate’,
govern
‘Powerless Parliament’,
Source: Daalder 1974: 38
For quite some time, the Labour Party maintained the illusion that it had
finally conquered the dominant position in Dutch politics. The disintegra-
tion of the confessional parties was expected to steadily continue. In 1977,
the polarisation strategy came back like a boomerang against the Labour
Party (Van Praag 1991).
In the elections, the Labour Party, led by Den Uyl, won 10 seats with the
slogan ‘Choose the Prime Minister, choose Den Uyl’, and became the largest
party, with 53 seats of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber of Parliament.
The three Christian parties, participating for the first time under the name
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), however, recaptured their powerful
position in the centre of Dutch politics. The party could form a majority
coalition both with the social democratic PvdA and with the liberal VVD.
To the dismay of many PvdA politicians, the Christian Democrats decided,
after five months of difficult negotiations with the Labour Party, to govern
with the VVD, the conservative liberals. The polarisation strategy of PvdA
had failed.
Up to 1982, CDA was still somewhat ill at ease in its use of the dominance
it had regained, but with the arrival of Ruud Lubbers as political leader
and prime minister, it displayed increasing self-confidence. In 1986, CDA
even made the continuation of the coalition with VVD an issue in the
elections (‘Let Lubbers Finish His Job’). It was a great success: the party
won 9 seats, thus increasing its total haul to 54. In 1989, Lubbers managed
to keep this number of seats, but five years later there was an end to the
success of the Christian Democrats. After a dramatic election defeat, with
a loss of 20 seats, the dominant position of CDA finally seemed to have
come to an end.
As the largest party that year, the Labour Party formed a coalition with
conservative liberal VVD and progressive liberal D66. This became known
as the first purple Cabinet. For the first time in 75 years, no denominational
party participated in the Cabinet. In 1998, CDA was still only the third party
in the Netherlands, but in 2002, the tumultuous year in which Fortuyn was
murdered, it won 43 seats under Balkenende’s leadership and recaptured
its position as the largest party. Up until 2010 it remained the largest party,
and could once again decide whether it wanted to form a centre-right or a
centre-left coalition. In 2010 it had to yield the leading position as the largest
party to the VVD, led by Mark Rutte.
Temporarily restoring the rules of the game?
Parallel to Christian Democratic Appeal’s regaining its dominant position,

the rules of the political game from the time of pillarization made a come-
back in the eighties. The explanation for this development must be sought
in the slow de-ideologising and depolarising that took place after 1977. In
the early 1980s, the issue of locating cruise missiles was for the moment the
last highly polarising conflict in Dutch politics. In the last decade of the
twentieth century, it was rather the case that the political elites emphasised
so strongly the need for constructive cooperation that a purple governing
coalition between PvdA and VVD – who had turned their backs on each
other for decades – became possible. The rules of the game were brought
back into practice bit by bit. Thus, the openness around the formation of
Cabinets was considerably reduced, there were multiple summit meetings
within and between the governing parties, and the political elites once
again attached great importance to proportionality.
For the period after 1977, it is not only that the rules of the game were
brought back in. Two important new rules were also added. The first con-
cerns the call for new elections after a Cabinet crisis in which things can no
longer be patched up. Before 1967, a rupture in the Cabinet still led at times
to a Cabinet with a different make-up, such as in 1965, when the Marijnen
Cabinet was followed by the Cals Cabinet. After 1967, the political parties
no longer saw this as an acceptable option. An unresolvable conflict in the
Cabinet or between a party in the government and the Cabinet now leads
to fresh elections. What is important is that this new rule of the game puts
the brakes on an interim change in partners on the part of a major ruling
party. It forces parties to be accountable to voters after a Cabinet crisis.
A second new rule of the game is the practice whereby the Prime Minister
belongs to the largest party in the government. Up to 1972, the Prime Min-
ister regularly came from another party (Colijn in 1933 and 1937, Drees in
1948, Biesheuvel in 1971), partly because the largest party in the government,
the Catholic KVP, was in the habit of not having its political leader join
the government. The increased power of the Prime Minister within the
Cabinet, and the electoral appeal of a successful Prime Minister at elections,
make the Presidency of the Council of Ministers today a much-sought-after
position. As a result, election campaigns over the last few decades have
been strongly dominated by the question of which party will be the largest.
However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the largest party will take part
in the government. If it is unable to form a majority coalition, it sometimes
ends up in opposition.
Table 2 Recent developments in the rules of the game
Rules of the game, 1917– Rules of the game in 2017

1968, according to Lijphart
1 Business of politics Businesslike and emotional politics
2 Tolerance Limited tolerance
3 Summit diplomacy Selective Summit diplomacy
4 Proportionality Proportionality
5 Depoliticisation Symbolic politicisation
6 Secrecy Restricted openness
7 The government rules Big role for the governing parties
8 – No change in a coalition without elections

The Prime Minister comes from the largest
9 –
governing party
5.10 The end of businesslike politics?
Two thousand and two was a turbulent year, especially with Pim Fortuyn’s
success and dead, and it marked the start of a renewed attack on a few
important rules of the game in consensus democracy. It also marked the
end of the substantive consensus on a number of key social issues. Fortuyn
introduced a new style in politics whereby the norm was no longer a certain
restraint and detachment, but the emotional concerns of the politician
concerned: I say what I think (De Beus 2002; Wansink 2004). The business-
like approach to social problems and tensions has been under pressure ever
since (table 2). It is reflected in topics with which Wilders, following the
footsteps of Fortuyn, has created a name for himself. It’s about topics that
worries large groups of the population: security, the influx of refugees, the
role of Islam in society, and European integration. Some voters feel insecure
and threatened by the rapid social and cultural changes, and believe that
many established parties are ignoring their concerns.
Since 2002, politicians from various parties consciously play up the strong
living feelings of voters, made harsh and little nuanced statements, and come
up with radical proposals whose effectiveness and feasibility are sometimes
dubious. Thus in 2016, Prime Minister Rutte commented on images of young
people of Turkish descent who were harassing a cameraman from NOS news,
public television, by telling them to ‘piss off’. The current media landscape
guarantees maximum attention to this kind of statement (see Chapter 10, on
the media). The brutal and sometimes emotional confrontations between
politicians are an expression of the sharply increased divisions in society.
The tolerance of cultural, religious and sometimes ideological differences
is on the wane. In the past, the rules of the game functioned to make sure
that deep divisions in society would not be further polarised by the politi-
cal elite. The rules of the game made it possible for Catholics, Protestants
and secular groups to co-exist peacefully while keeping their own beliefs,
culture and organisations. But the fact is, the way some politicians are
conducting themselves these days is not helping things. However, it is still
too early to declare that these typically Dutch rules of the political game are
a part of the past. The criticism around 1970 of consensus democracy and
the accompanying rules of the game rules also died down over the years.
It is not impossible that this will happen again. In the Dutch multi-party
system, parties who want to come to power still have to be ready to work
together and engage in compromises.
5.11 New dissension and a changing political balance of power
The turbulent 1960s and 1970s have had little impact on the institutional
features of Dutch democracy. In 1989 Lijphart observed that the eight charac-
teristics of a consensus democracy that he had previously posited, still applied
to the Netherlands. Almost 30 years later, it can be determined that while
minor institutional changes have been made – such as the introduction of the
consultative referendum and the appointment of the Cabinet formateur by
Parliament – the structural features of the political system have not changed.
Lijphart’s conclusion about the institutional conservatism applies not
only to the political institutions but also to the Dutch consultation economy.
The SER (Socio-Economic Council), the tripartite consultative body of
employers, employees and independent experts, has shown a remarkable
ability to survive. In the debate on the desirability of institutional reforms,
it has stayed well out of harm’s way. It was only in the 1990s that its formal
position within the Dutch collective-bargaining economy was called into
question and that the Second Chamber decided that the Government was no
longer obliged to seek its advice on numerous policy issues. But this change
has had no major consequences for its position. Although it no longer has the
authority it had in the first 20 years of its existence, and while it sometimes
has to put in more work to come to a unanimous opinion, its role is certainly
not finished. When it comes to important socio-economic issues such as

the position of self-employed professionals without staff, the change of the
law governing dismissal, and the statutory minimum wage for youth, its
recommendations still have considerable influence on decision-making.
Lijphart noted in 1989 that in Dutch consensus democracy the com-
position of the coalition Cabinets had changed markedly. Up to 1967, the
multi-party Cabinets were usually oversized – that is, more parties took
part in the government than was strictly necessary for the majority in the
Second Chamber. After 1967, the minimal winning majority Cabinet of two
or sometimes three parties became much more common. This trend has
continued ever since, and has gone hand in hand in the last decades with
radical changes in the balance of power between parties.
The electoral position of the two largest traditional parties, Christian
Democratic CDA and the social democratic PvdA was weakened consider-
ably, and the third traditional party, the liberal VVD, although it has been
the largest since 2010, is less dominant than CDA in earlier decades. The
Christian Democrats determined in most cases whether a centre-right or
a centre-left governing coalition would be formed, but the liberals are less
capable of doing that. That is not only because the liberals have enjoyed
less electoral success than the Christian Democrats did in the past, the best
result of the liberals is 41 seats in 2012, but also because the parties on the
far left and the right have more power and position themselves outside the
traditional political centre (Pellikaan et al. 2016). This primarily involves
Geert Wilders’s right-wing populist PVV (Party for Freedom), but also the
left wing SP (Socialist Party). These two parties are opposing core elements
of the more moderate centrist parties’ policies, and are unwilling, or at least
disinclined, to compromise on policy areas that are important to them.
The electoral success of these parties hampers the formation of a majority
Cabinet. For the first time in 2010, a minority Cabinet was formed – the first
Rutte Cabinet, made up of members of VVD and CDA. This Cabinet had
the parliamentary support of Wilders’ PVV, which unexpectedly withdraw
that support after two years, however. The willingness of these two parties
to govern with the PVV has since been absent entirely or close to it. Other
parties had already had longstanding principled objections to governing
with Wilders’ PVV. If it is possible to form a majority Cabinet made up
of centrist parties, it cannot be taken for granted, given the increase in
electoral volatility, that the Cabinet has a majority in the Upper House. The
second Rutte Cabinet of VVD and PvdA (2012-2017) had a narrow majority
in the Second Chamber of Parliament, but operated in the First Chamber
as a minority Cabinet.
The fragmentation of the political landscape is a problem, and forces the

ruling coalition in the daily practice to seek broad support. Whereas in the
past the coalition agreement automatically guaranteed the Cabinet a major-
ity in both Houses, it often happens now that there have to be negotiations
with the opposition parties on each important decision. This stimulates
public debate on important policy measures, and gives parties outside the
government influence on policy. The political support for many drastic
measures in the Second Chamber is often considerable. On this score, the
institutions and procedures of consensus democracy work as they should.
Despite the broad parliamentary support for many policies, it is clear that
substantive consensus among the population has seen a steep decline in
recent decades. A large minority of the population, and sometimes even a
majority, disagree fundamentally with the policy on important topics. This
concerns not only the influx of immigrants and refugees, but also European
integration, the increase in retirement age, and care for the elderly. A lot of dis-
sension and new divisions mark the current political landscape (see Chapter
7). Many voters feel they are not being taken seriously, and this could in time
erode the legitimacy of the system (Thomassen et al. 2014). It is a challenge
for the current political system, but it is precisely a consensus democracy,
developed to keep contradictions manageable, that could meet this challenge.
5.12 Concluding remarks
Consensus democracies evolved in small societies with strong religious

and linguistic divisions such as Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
The political institutions and political procedures in these countries aim to
promote compromises, generate consensus and stop groups from dominat-
ing one other. Compromises are usually made after the elections, and this
prompts increasing resistance. Since the 1960s in the Netherlands, there has
been a debate about institutional changes that would give more influence
to the voter, but that has led only to the introduction of the non-binding
consultative referendum. Nothing has changed in the electoral system based
on proportional representation, which is essential for consensus democracy.
Despite the criticism of the system, significant institutional changes cannot be
expected. For that to happen, a broad new consensus on the changes deemed
to be desirable would have to evolve, and there is still no evidence of that.
The political culture of the elite, as it appears from the informal rules of
the game, seemed for a long time to be a lot easier to change. The citizens’
political behaviour, both inside and outside the polling station, has changed
markedly since the 1960s. That forces the political elite to reflect on her
style of conducting politics. The attempts that have been made in that
direction since the 1960s have had no lasting impact. Discontent with the
political culture has subsided, the rules of the game have been adjusted
on a few points, but have proved difficult to change on others. The success
of Pim Fortuyn led to a renewed attack on important aspects of political
culture, such as the businesslike way of engaging politics, respect for your
opponents, and openness to compromise. Geert Wilders’ PVV, but also
politicians of other parties, consciously respond to emotions that live among
the population. It remains to be seen whether this will keep eating away at
the rules of the game. The current electoral system continues however to
force the parties to cooperate.
Compromises are still necessary but are made considerably harder by the
new divisions in politics. There is no broad consensus among the popula-
tion, not just on important areas in which the welfare state is undergoing
retrenchment, such as the retirement age and the pension system, but also
on topics such as the influx of immigrants and refugees and European
integration. In the past, a reasonable consensus developed over time on
hotly contested topics. The question is whether Dutch consensus democracy
will be capable of bringing this about again.
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5

Consensus Democracy in the

Philip van Praag

The Dutch political system is often described as a consensus democracy.

Problems and conflicts are resolved in such a system by intensive consulta-

Protestant and Catholic schools. He sees this as a conscious effort by the

Consensus indicates shared values and significant uniformity of views. If

These three aspects will, respectively, be referred as substantive or policy

5.3 The rules of the game

– proportionality: benefits, appointments, and services should be dis-

5.4 Consensus democracy and majoritarian democracy

In his later work, which has a much stronger comparative character,

– a balanced bicameral system with representation of minorities;

Lijphart considers Switzerland and Belgium (until 1981) as good examples of

Writing in 1984, Lijphart mentions New Zealand as a perfect example of a

5.5 Consensus in the UK

Politics in the UK, particularly such as those in the Parliament in West-

in London that maintain a culture of formal and informal consultations

Compromise is therefore institutionalized and regularized in, liter-

Thatcherism: the end of consensus thinking?

5.6 The background to Dutch consensus democracy

In his standard work Lijphart stresses the absence of policy consensus

The SER managed to build up considerable authority in the 1950s and

5.7 The dominance of the denominational parties

necessity’ could they come up for consideration as partners in a coalition

He does add that it is not necessarily a matter of conscious, preconceived

5.8 The end of institutional consensus: proposals for

People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) in particular would, however,

Small institutional changes

5.9 Attack on the rules of the game in politics

In 1972, the three cooperating progressive parties (PvdA, D66 and a

Table 1 Changing Rules of the Game in Dutch Politics

Rules of the game, 1917-1968, Dominant rules of the game in 1974

Unmasking of the ideology of the Establishment:

Source: Daalder 1974: 38

Temporarily restoring the rules of the game?

Parallel to Christian Democratic Appeal’s regaining its dominant position,

Table 2 Recent developments in the rules of the game

Rules of the game, 1917– Rules of the game in 2017

1 Business of politics Businesslike and emotional politics

2 Tolerance Limited tolerance

3 Summit diplomacy Selective Summit diplomacy

5 Depoliticisation Symbolic politicisation

6 Secrecy Restricted openness

7 The government rules Big role for the governing parties

8 – No change in a coalition without elections

5.10 The end of businesslike politics?

5.11 New dissension and a changing political balance of power

not finished. When it comes to important socio-economic issues such as

The fragmentation of the political landscape is a problem, and forces the

5.12 Concluding remarks

Consensus democracies evolved in small societies with strong religious

Berg, J.Th.J. van den (1986). ‘Hervormingen, machtsverhoudingen en coalitievorming in Ne­

Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-

You might also like

Table 1 Changing Rules of the Game in Dutch Politics

Table 2 Recent developments in the rules of the game

Berg, J.Th.J. van den (1986). ‘Hervormingen, machtsverhoudingen en coalitievorming in Ne