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Wilson Gives The Allies A Heart-Attack - Zelikow, Philip. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle To End The Great War
Wilson Gives The Allies A Heart-Attack - Zelikow, Philip. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle To End The Great War
Zelikow, Philip. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War
As he dispatched his letter to pressure the British government (the House-Grey letter being carried
across the Atlantic), and as he also completed his draft peace note, Wilson took another big step.
He showed the British and French that he knew just how financially vulnerable they were. Before his
reelection, Wilson voiced his realization that Americans were now the “creditors of the world.”
They could “determine to a large extent who [was] to be financed and who [was] not to be
financed.” Wilson would now use that leverage.28
As a Morgan executive observed in the company’s internal history prepared right after the war, “The
stupendous financial requirements of the British Government now dominated the whole
situation.”29 Back in September and October, London decided to embark on a huge, desperate
credit scheme built around a novel group of short-term, unsecured government loans, or Treasury
bills, due in as little as thirty to sixty days. As each set of loans came due, fresh short-term loans
would be used to pay off the last set. The British leaders and their American financiers hoped this
plan could get them through the next six months so that their gold and securities could last that
much longer. The scale of the credit scheme was at least $1 billion, then equivalent to about 6
percent of the entire British gross domestic product.
Having seen the Federal Reserve Board already take action to warn banks about some French loans
in October, the key Morgan partner in London, Henry Pomeroy Davison, decided to go back to the
United States and make the pitch in person to convince the Fed board to support the firm’s large
short-term, unsecured Treasury bill plan before it was made public. Davison made his presentation
on November 18. It did not go well. Board members were extremely anxious. Davison pushed
ahead. He announced the planned bond offering on November 22.30
The Federal Reserve Board was worried about the exposure of the large city banks that planned to
buy the T-bills. But politics were also a factor. The vice chairman of the board, Paul Warburg, came
from a German Jewish banking family and had himself been a leading banker in Germany before the
war. His brother ran an important bank in Hamburg. Warburg did not like Prussian militarism, but
he retained sympathy for Germany, and he did not want America to join in the war on the Allied
side.
The board’s chair was an Alabama banker, William Proctor Gould Harding. He too was uneasy about
the politics of this Morgan loan plan. “I cannot escape the conclusion,” he wrote to the powerful
head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, then convalescing out west, “that the United States
has in its power to shorten or prolong the war by the attitude it assumes as a banker. If we decide
to finance one group of belligerent powers by giving it unsecured credits, we assume in large part a
burden which another group of belligerents is carrying on its own account [paying on its own], and
the possible complications which may come from this policy are fearful to contemplate.”31
Harding, Warburg, and the rest of the board wanted to issue a public statement, to caution banks
about these new, short-term, unsecured British and French Treasury bills. The issue was so sensitive
that Harding went to see President Wilson about it on Saturday, November 25. He wanted Wilson’s
advice.
As he received Harding in the White House that Saturday, Wilson had his peace move in front of
mind. He had just instructed House to send that tough letter to Grey. He had just finished drafting
Government.” Davison quickly cautioned Morgan against any such anti-Semitic attack, saying it
would be “futile as well as harmful.”
Davison guessed (rightly) that the real issue was policy. He guessed (rightly) that the real source of
the trouble was President Wilson. He sensed “there was something in the air” about “an important
Peace movement.”
At the German embassy in Washington, Bernstorff also correctly surmised, as he cabled Berlin, that
this warning was “the first indication that this Government proposes to exert pressure upon our
enemies in the cause of peace.” To the British ambassador in Washington, the situation was equally
obvious. “The object of course is to force us to accept President’s mediation by cutting off
supplies.”34
Zelikow, Philip. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917 (S.173).
PublicAffairs. Kindle-Version.