Ethics Inf Technol (2015) 17:125–137
DOI 10.1007/s10676-015-9370-0
ORIGINAL PAPER
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: their knock-on effects
on the subject and on the giveness of the object
Nicola Liberati1 • Shoji Nagataki1
Published online: 24 July 2015
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract This work focuses on augmented reality glasses
and its aim is to analyse the knock-on effects on our
everyday world and ourselves yielded by this kind of
technology. Augmented reality is going to be the most
diffused technology in our everyday life in the near future,
especially augmented reality mounted on glasses. This near
future is not only possible, but it seems inevitable fol-
lowing the vertiginous development of AR. There are
numerous kinds of different prototypes that are going to
come out next year (2016). Therefore, a study on how these
modifications yield knock-on effects on the constitution of
the object and subject is mandatory. This work tackles the
topic starting from a phenomenological and post-phe-
nomenological point of view and it analyses the modifi-
cation yielded by such technology from a perceptual point
of view using the analysis of the horizons of the object
made by Husserl. We need this analysis because it is not
only the hypothetical future that may never come, but it is
the likely future very close to us that is putting pressure on
us.
& Nicola Liberati
liberati.nicola@gmail.com
Shoji Nagataki
nagataki@lets.chukyo-u.ac.jp
1
Department of International Liberal Studies, Chukyo
University (Nagoya, Japan), Tokodachi 101, Kaizu-Cho,
Toyota-City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan
Keywords Augmented reality  Mixed reality 
Phenomenology  Post-phenomenology  Philosophy of
technology
Introduction
This paper focusses on augmented reality (AR) glasses.1
Therefore, it does not concern the present and really
existing technologies, but it tackles the problem from a
hypothetical near future where everyone will use this kind
of technology.2 This position is motivated by the fact that
they are the most promising devices in this field and thus
they represent the future of AR.3
This technology is going to modify our world as every
technology did in the past.4 However, we need a finer
1
We will take into consideration glasses and not contact lenses
because, at the moment, they are the most developed ones. On contact
lenses see Parviz (2009).
2
Even if it is a speculative analysis, we will treat the topic as if AR
glasses will be pervasively used in the future.
3
We can find AR glasses commonly used in literature. Many AR
glasses will be produced in the near future. See for example Moverio
BT-200 Smart Glasses by Epson (http://www.epson.com/cgi-bin/
Store/jsp/Landing/moverio-bt-200-smart-glasses.do?ref=van_moverio
_2014), Vuzix M100 Smart Glasses by Vuzix (http://www.vuzix.com/),
Laster SeeThru by Laster technologies (http://laster.fr/products/see
thru/) or CastAR by Technical Illusions (http://castar.com/). For a
more classic reference see, for example, Gibson (1993).
4
Obviously, the modifications yielded by technologies are different
according to the kind of technology used. Therefore, the modifica-
tions that AR implies are not the same as the one produced by other
kinds of technologies, such as hearing aid technology (Ihde 2007) or
the cane of a blind man (Merleau-Ponty 1945).
123
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analysis of how it is going to happen and how the world is
going to change in order to understand its peculiar features.
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the knock-on
effects5 of AR glasses on our everyday world6 and on us.
We will analyse the modifications yielded by AR glasses
by studying the way the devices modify the perception of
the subject.
We are going to structure the paper in three main parts:
1. The first part is related to the analysis of the perception of
an object in order to identify the main aspects that could
be modified by the technology. This will be an analysis
founded on the distinction among the different hidden
parts7 of the object in Husserl’s phenomenology. The
aim of this first part is to provide the tools to improve the
analysis of the modifications made by the technology.
2. The second part focusses on the analysis of how classic
technologies which are not AR, in this case the classic
glasses, modify our world and ourselves from a perceptual
point of view. This second part studies the modification
yielded by the classic ‘‘optical’’ glasses we are so used to
wearing in our life8 and the modification yielded to the
perceived object and the perceiving subject. The aim of this
second part is to highlight how a specific technology, such
as the classic optical glasses, modifies the object and the
perceiving subject.
3. In the third part we start to study AR and we focus our
attention on how AR glasses modify our perception
and our world. In this part, we will take into account
two different types of AR glasses using the analysis of
the previous part.9 The reason for this choice is that
AR glasses are based on the classic optical glasses and
thus we can get useful elements from these old and
‘‘rudimentary’’ kind of glasses.
Summarising, this work will provide one analysis of the
modification of the subject’s perception and the world
where they live. Moreover, it will point out the political
implications related to the massive use of such technology
5 it by surfing the diffusion of smart-phones. Moreover, AR represents
Technology, in addition to the function for which it is expressively
designed, deeply changes the perceiving subject and the perceived
object. Therefore, we can talk about knock-on effects in relation to
this ‘‘secondary’’ action.
6
We use the concept of ‘‘everyday world’’ with the tacit assumption
that it is the Lebenswelt in the Husserlian phenomenological analysis.
Therefore, we use the concept of ‘‘everyday world’’ to identify the
world embedded with praxes related to the community where the
subject lives.
7
We will see that these ‘‘parts’’ are the ‘‘horizons’’ of the object in
Husserl. See ‘‘Husserl’s horizons’’ section.
8
Classic glasses are a classic example especially for the researches
related to phenomenology and perception. For example see the text
related to the post-phenomenological analysis (see Ihde 1990, 2008;
Verbeek 2005, 2011).
9
See point number 2.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
in the possible near future where AR has become a com-
mon technology used by everyone.
We will demonstrate how this technology is going to
modify the object by providing new elements that re-con-
stitute it as a ‘‘new’’ object,10 and the common perception
of the subject and by modifying the way they perceive the
background of the object. Moreover, AR glasses are going
to modify the world where the subject lives because they
enable the community to introduce augmented objects
perceivable only by those who wear AR technologies.
This near future is not only possible, but it seems
inevitable following the vertiginous development of AR.11
There are numerous kinds of different prototypes that are
going to come out in the near future, such as in the next
year.
Even if the most promising technology, the Google
Glass (http://www.google.com/glass/start/) has been
removed from the market, there are many other prototypes
which are developing. It is as if the project of the Google
Glass, even if it failed, stimulated the proliferation of
wearable computers and especially of smart glasses.
Therefore, thanks to this project we will see many different
prototype in the market soon.12
Husserl’s horizons
In order to identify where the technology acts and how it
shapes13 our perception and our world, we firstly need to
understand how the subject perceives the ‘‘external’’ object
because we encounter the perceptual world excluding the
technological mediation.
10
This paper uses the concept of ‘‘constitution of the object’’
according to the phenomenological tradition which is different from
usual realism.
11
In the past, the most impressive innovation was the introduction of
smart-phones in our society in a widespread way. Everyone becomes
‘‘computerised’’ by having with them a small computer. AR, at the
moment, can work on mobile devices and this element helps to spread
the merging point among virtual reality, robotics and the studies on
human computer interface, therefore it represents a ‘‘hot point’’ where
everyone is going to work. For example the studies concerning the
shift in interaction from textual information to an embodied
interaction (See, for example the following sites, Dourish 2004;
Kaptelinin et al. 2003; Rogers 2004; Williams et al. 2005) has to take
into account AR in the future because AR allows us to interact with
computers in the most natural way using our entire body.
12
See, for example, the prototypes we already introduced such as
Moverio BT-200 Smart Glasses by Epson, Vuzix M100 Smart Glasses
by Vuzix, Laster SeeThru by Laster technologies or CastAR by
Technical Illusions.
13
We will use the terms ‘‘to shape’’, ‘‘to mould’’ and ‘‘to modify’’ in
order to underline how the technology modifies what is around us by
its not-neutrality because it actively acts moulding and shaping our
surrounding and ourselves as the potter does with pottery.
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of…
An object is perceived by the subject with some char-
acteristics. For example, it gives itself with certain colours,
with a particular shape, with its peculiar malleability and so
on. These aspects of the perceived object are what the
subject perceives directly.
However, there are also other aspects of the object that
cannot be ‘‘seen’’14 in the same explicit way.
Husserl’s phenomenology tells us that the object is
perceived not with these ‘‘manifest’’ aspects only, but even
with hidden ones.15
The classic phrase ‘‘External perception is a constant
pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature,
it is not in a position to accomplish’’.16 relates to the fact
that the perception of an object always implies elements
not directly seen in the object.17
14
We are going to use the ‘‘visual’’ metaphor for perception in the
whole text. However, it should not be considered as an explicit way to
give more importance to sight instead of the other senses. Sight could
be substituted by every other sense. We are going to use this metaphor
only for two reasons:
1. Science usually prefers sight among other senses.
2. The focal point of this work is ‘‘glasses’’, therefore we are forced
to analyse sight more than the other senses.
Thus, even if partial, it is a useful approximation.
15
One of the most significant achievements of Husserlian phe-
nomenology is to have described and reflected upon different modes
of giveness of objects, including the forms of ‘‘non-presence’’or
‘‘absence’’ (Lohmar and Yamaguchi 2010, p. 293).
16
See (Husserl 2001, §1) ‘‘Die äußere Wahrnehmung ist eine
beständige Prätention, etwas zu leisten, was sie ihrem eigenen Wesen
nach zu leisten außerstande ist.’’(Husserl 1996, §1, p. 3).
17
We do not need to focus our attention on how these ‘‘hidden’’ faces
of the object are given to the subject. We can highlight only that there
are two main different interpretations (See, for example, Dahlstrom
2006, p. 214, Madary 2012 and Kelly 2004). The first one takes the
hidden faces as actually present in the object and therefore the subject
actually perceives them with the ‘‘manifest’’ ones and ‘‘in’’ them. For
example, Sean Kelly classifies Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in this
first position because ‘‘Merleau-Ponty claims that they (the indeter-
minate features of an object) have a positive presence in our
experience’’ (Kelly 2004, p. 79). The second one considers them
hidden in the literal sense and thus this second position considers
them absent and not perceived in the manifest faces. For example,
Sean Kelly classifies the Husserlian approach in this second position.
‘‘In Husserl’s account of object transcendence, the principal move is
to distinguish between the features of the object that are experienced
by me as determinate (roughly, those features for which I have sense
data) and the features of the object that are experienced by me as
indeterminate (roughly, everything else)’’ (Kelly 2004, p. 78). Even
if in Kelly’s account Husserl identified the absent aspects of the object
as something to be ‘‘known’’, ‘‘believed’’, ‘‘hypothesised’’ or
‘‘expected’’ (Kelly 2004), while Husserl never referred to them in
these terms. However, in both cases, we have a different modality of
‘‘perception’’ with which these hidden faces are perceived and this
element is enough for us because we need to know only if they can be
differentiated or not. They can be differentiated and so we can
consider the perception of an object split in two parts: the manifest
127
For example, the subject cannot see the whole object
from every point of view at the same time. The object
always hides the face on its back. However, even if the face
on the back of the object is not seen by the subject, it plays
an important role in the constitution of the object. We
cannot see the machineries inside the keyhole of the door,
but they play an important role in the constitution of the
object ‘‘front door’’ of our house.
These particular hidden faces related to the object are
identified by the ‘‘horizons’’ of the object in Husserl’s
phenomenology. With this term Husserl wants to give the
idea of something present in the object, but not present in
the same way as the manifest aspect directly seen by the
subject.18 The subject perceives the object with some
aspects, but around them there are many different other
aspects that are hidden in the mist around the object.19
Following Husserl,20 we can classify these hidden faces
in three main horizons21:
1. Inner horizon (Innerhorizont)22
2. Outer horizon (Außenhorizont)23
3. World horizon (Welthorizont)24
The inner horizon
The inner horizon25 concerns the multiplicity of faces the
object can show according to the spatial position of the
Footnote 17 continued
aspects and the hidden ones. Identifying with n Owh the i aspect of the
object n that is seen in the w way (Manifest and Hidden). We have:
[ Manifest [
n n
O¼ Oi þ n OHidden
j
i j
18
At first the term ‘‘horizon’’ was used in the same way as ‘‘halo’’ and
‘‘background’’. ‘‘‘Horizont’ gilt hier also soviel wie in §35, S. 62, die Rede
von einem ‘‘Hof’’und ‘‘Hintergrund’’’’ (Husserl 1950, §83, p. 186).
19
Das Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen, jedes Wahrgenommene hat
einen Erfahrungshintergrund. Rings um das Papier liegen Bücher,
Stifte, Tintenfaß usw., in gewisser Weise auch ‘‘wahrgenommen’’,
perzeptiv da, im ‘‘Anschauungsfelde’’, aber während der Zuwendung
zum Papier entbehrten sie jeder, auch nur sekundären Zuwendung und
Erfassung (Husserl 1950, p. 62).
20
We are going to give references to Husserl’s texts for any kind of
horizon in its related section.
21
For such distinctions see, for example, Dahlstrom (2006), (Drum-
mond 2007, p. 96).
22
See ‘‘The inner horizon’’ section.
23
See ‘‘The outer horizon’’ section.
24
See ‘‘The world horizon’’ section.
25
So hat jede Erfahrung von einem einzelnen Ding ihren Innenhor-
izont; und ‘‘Horizont‘‘ bedeutet hierbei die wasensmäßig zu jeder
Erfahrung gehörige und von ihr untrennbare Induktion in jeder
Erfahrung selbst. (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 28; Husserl 1996, p. 7;
Husserl 1965, §49, p. 146).
123
128
subject.26 A subject can see only one face of an object at
any given moment.27 The object naturally hides its back
and occludes the possibility of such perception.28
That means the subject’s perception is related to its ‘‘po-
sition’’ in front of the object and so it is possible to have a
perception of what is on its back, but not in a direct way.
For example, in the case of a transparent object the
subject can ‘‘catch’’ the back face of the object looking
through the object. However, the face on its back has to be
considered hidden in the same way as before because the
subject still sees the object from the same point of view and
this perception through the transparent object cannot be
compared to the perception of the object as if the subject
were looking at the object from its back side.
We have the subject who can perceive two faces of the
object at the same time, but one is not a ‘‘direct’’ perception
because it is through the transparency of the object29:
SFront SFront Through Transparency
ODirect
Front þ OBack
where
SFront
OThrough
Back
Transparency
6¼ SBack
ODirect
Back
Another and more complicated example is the perception
of the back face of the object through the reflection in a
mirror. In this way the subject can see the back face of the
object by standing in the same position. Moreover, the
subject can see the back face of the object as if they were in
a different spatial position, as if they were located in the
apparent position according to the mirror.
However, the subject in the apparent position would
have a different perception of the object. The original
subject would see two faces:
SFront SFront Reflection
ODirect
Front þ OBack
While the subject in the apparent position according to the
mirror would see the back face directly:
26
‘‘Jedes Ding ist a priori als erfüllter Raumkörper beweglich, und in
infinitum’’ (Husserl 1973, §35, p. 121). ‘‘Its inner horizon comprises
what we have recently been considering as ’absent’ in a perception of
an object: the further parts and aspects of the object itself that are not
exhibited in a particular experience of the object, but are only ‘empty
meant’’’ (Smith 2003, p. 75).
27
And without inner horizons, all perception would be adequate. We
would take the one-side presentation of a thing for the thing (Hopp
2011).
28
Around this focus there is a halo of potential perceptions shading
off the meaning of the focal center (...) However, this caracterisation
of the horizon is as yet one-sided (Kuhn 1968, p. 112).
29
Identifying with Sn Ojf the face f of the object O seen by the subject
S in the spatial position n in a j way. Therefore with SFront ODirect
Front we
intend the perception of the front face of the object seen by a subject
in front of the object and in a direct way.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
SApparent
ODirect
Back
and, if we hypothesise the presence of a mirror that mimics
with its reflection the original position of the subject
(SFront ) in order to provide the perception of the front face
of the object, the subject in the apparent position would
see:
SApparent SApparent Reflection
ODirect
Back þ OFront
That is the opposite of what we have above.30
The direct perception and the perception by reflections
are not equal because they activate different possible
actions of the subject and therefore they cannot be com-
parable. For example, we can imagine a subject in a
chocolate shop. The subject is tempted to take and eat the
chocolate in front of them as they perceive it in a direct
way. While, in the case that the chocolate is perceived in a
reflection of a mirror, the subject is tempted to circumvent
the obstacle between them and to reach it.31
SFront
OReflection 6¼ SApparent
ODirect
Back Back
Moreover, the hidden faces do not consist in the back faces
only but they consist in every face of the object not directly
seen by the subject. For example, the internal walls of a
closed box are hidden faces of the inner horizon as well.
The outer horizon
The outer horizon32 concerns the aspects of the object that
are ‘‘out’’ of it.33 While the inner horizon is related to the
faces in the object that could be perceived as part of it, this
second kind of horizon is related to what lies in its back-
ground. It is no longer something directly part of the object,
but it is something ‘‘around’’ it.34
30
See ‘‘The inner horizon’’ section.
31
In this case it is not necessary to understand if the perception
through a reflection is perceived as mediated by a mirror thanks to the
mental activity of the subject that recognises the mirror as a ‘‘mirror’’.
Therefore, it is not important to understand if the mediated perception
is done without the understanding of the subject (the phenomenolog-
ical way) or with it (see Eco 2001). The only thing important here is
to catch that there is a difference between the two.
32
Das heißt, jedes erfahrene Ding hat nicht nur einen Innerhorizont,
sodern es hat auch einen offen endlosen Außenhorizont von
Mitobjekten (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 28).
33
The perceiving thing, the box before me, is more than its
momentary appearance, it is also more than the multiplicity of its
aspects. It is on the table, beside the inkstand, in the study, serving as
a receptacle for pencils. It has its ‘‘outer horizon’’ as well as its inner
(Kuhn 1968, p. 112).
34
Im eigentlichen Wahrnehmen, als einem Gewahren, bin ich dem
Gegenstade, z.B. dem Papier zugewendet, ich erfasse es als dieses
hier und jetzt Seiende. Das Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen, jedes
Wahrgenommene hat einen Erfahrungshintergrund. Rings um das
Papier liegen Bücher, Stifte, Tintenfaß usw., in gewisser Weise auch
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of…
For example, two tables have two different outer hori-
zons depending where they are. The background ‘‘living
room’’ provides the object with different elements instead
of the background ‘‘workroom’’ of a carpenter. We are not
referring our analysis to the cultural praxes related to the
two tables depending where they are located. We are
referring to the different way the tables are constructed.
One is a table where people eat or read and so it has to be
pleasing to the eye and well designed in order to fit per-
fectly in the house. The other one is a workbench made to
resist stress and bumps so it is designed in order to be
resistant.
It is important to highlight how these elements derived
from the outer horizon cannot change by the actual fact that
such a table in the living room is not well designed or the
carpenter’s workbench is not sturdy enough. They do not
compromise the simple fact that the background provides
the object with aspects because they only change our first
perception. For example, Husserl used to refer to the case
of a perception of a beautiful woman that, after a while,
changes because he recognised her as a lifeless shop
mannequin.35 The previous perception is not negated by
the new one. It is ‘‘only’’ corrected. Therefore if our table
does not have the characteristics we expected from the
outer horizon, the perception will be corrected ‘‘only’’.
This horizon can be identified by the background of the
object, but it is not related to the opposition between the
perceptual background and the foreground. It is not only
related to what is perceivable by the subject, but not in an
in-focus way. It is related to every object related to it in a
wider way, i.e. everything that is ‘‘out’’ of the object but
related to it.36 It is part of the table’s background even the
building where the table is and not only the room.
Even if the outer horizon concerns ‘‘only’’ what is
‘‘outside’’ the object, such as the room where the object is
placed, it is important to define what the object is.
[ Backgroud
Oj ! OInner Aspects
j Even a blade of grass in the middle of a field has its hidden faces
While the inner horizon is hidden in the sense that the
subject cannot perceive every aspect of the object at the
same moment, the outer horizon is hidden because it is
related to what lies ‘‘around’’ in the surrounding environ-
ment. The subject is directed to the perception of the object
without considering what is in the ‘‘surroundings’’, even if
Footnote 34 continued
‘‘wahrgenommen’’, perzeptiv da, im ‘‘Anschauungsfelde’’, aber
während der Zuwendung zum Papier entbehrten sie jeder, auch nur
sekundären Zuwendung und Erfassung (Husserl 1950, p. 62,§35).
35
See Husserl’s example of a wax figure or a mannequin (Husserl
1973, §15, p. 45); Husserl 1939, §21b, pp. 99, 100; Husserl
1980, §23).
36
See (Husserl 1965, §49, p. 147).
129
these elements in the ‘‘background’’ provide the constitu-
tion with the perceived object too.
The object cannot be dissociated from the environment
where the object is inserted.
The world horizon
The world horizon37 concerns the entire experience of the
subject in its wholeness.38
The perception of an object always comes with antici-
pations and expectations.39 The object always shows itself
in a way that suggests some action or some praxis related to
it and we perceive the object as something known. The
object is always perceived as part of the whole life of the
subject and it never comes alone, but with other
experiences.40
This kind of horizon is similar to the outer horizon but
with some modifications. Every object is immersed not
only in a background but even in a world that is ‘‘not
directly’’ perceived by the subject.
The world horizon is similar to the outer horizon
because it concerns ‘‘absent’’ aspects that are not ‘‘in’’ the
object.41 However, it has peculiar characteristics.
The world horizon cannot be perceived by the subject as
an object.42 It is not only ‘‘absent’’, but it cannot be an
object of perception at all.43 It is not something given as
the inner or the outer horizons.44
The world horizon is something completely different
from the previous two cases.45
37
First of all, we must point out that the concept of ‘‘Welthorizont’’ is
quite a problematic term even for the translation: it can be identified
as ‘‘Horizont der Welt’’ or as ‘‘Welt als Horizont’’. See (Geniusas
2012, §10.2, p. 179).
38
We could extend the whole experience of the subject by including
the whole experience related to the community where the subject
lives. However, we need only the basic conception of the world
horizon in order to understand how to deal with it and we will not deal
with intersubjectivity.
39
and we anticipate them on the basis of its visible one.
40
‘‘The realm of natural experience constitutes the ‘‘total horizon’’’’
(it is held to encompass all that is), which is called ‘‘the world’’
(Brainard 2002, p. 38).
41
Husserl on his part developed this notion to an all-encompassing
trascendental concept of ‘‘world horizon’’ which functions, so to
speak, on the back of everyday consciousness (Cho 2007, p. 11).
42
Es besteht aber ein grundsätzlicher Unterschied in der Weise des
Weltbewußtseins und des Dingbewußteins, des Objektbewußtseins (in
einem weitesten, aber rein lebensweltlichen Sinne), während ander-
erseits eines und das andere eine untrennbare Einheit bilden (Husserl
1976, §37, p. 146).
43
Welt gibt es für Husserl nicht an sich, so wenig wie für Kant. (Fink
1990, p. 149).
44
See (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 33).
45
The inner horizon (section ‘‘The inner horizon’’) and the outer
horizon (section ‘‘The outer horizon’’).
123
130
The object is always immersed in something ‘‘wider’’ than
the outer horizon and the world horizon focusses on this
specific aspect. In order to fully understand what this horizon
is, we need to analyse it from three different points of view.
1. Wherefrom: Every object gives itself as immersed in
the world. This world has no particular determinations
and cannot be perceived as an object because it is what
gives the possibility for every manifestation of the
object. Therefore, it is a horizon in the sense that it is
the way the object gives itself as part of the totality
where the subject lives. The world is the ground for all
modalities of experience.46
2. Wherein: The world is identified as the ‘‘horizon of all
horizons’’. Every object the subject can perceive
entails the world in the sense that it is always
anticipated by the subject because it takes the object
as a pre-known object with some characteristics.47 It is
the world conceived as the totality of typification.48
3. Whereto: The world is open to new experiences. Every
perception is given with some expectation, but when
these expectations are not fulfilled the object changes.
This modification in the object is what concerns the
world as the ‘‘whereto’’. The world is always open to
new experiences that can change its aspects.49
Also the world horizon is ‘‘hidden’’ to the subject in the
sense that it is not perceived in a manifest way because the
subject perceives the object in front of them without per-
ceiving the whole world. However, despite its not-mani-
festability, this horizon contributes to the constitution of
the object in front of the subject as in the previous cases50
because its gives the framework for this object. It provides
the way every object is perceived, it gives the ground, the
pre-givenness and the openness of the experience.
As we have seen with the different kinds of horizons,51 the
object cannot be identified by the sole manifest aspects
46
See (Husserl 1939, §21; Geniusas 2012, p. 185).
47
That means the subject always takes the perceived object as
something predelineated. The object always gives itself as a typified
object. ‘‘Die Auffassung als ‘‘Gegenstand überhaupt’’—noch in
völliger Unbestimmtheit, Unbekanntheit—bringt also schon ein
Moment der Bekanntheit mit sich, eben als eines Etwas, das
‘‘irgendwie ist’’ , das explikabel ist und nach dem, was es ist,
bekannt werder kann; und zwar als ein Etwas, das im Horizont der
Welt als Allheit des Seienden daristeht, das selbst schon so weit
bekannt ist, daß es Seiendes ‘‘in der Welt’’ ist, korrelativ gesprochen
Seiendes, das eingehen muß in die Einheit userer strömenden
Erfahrung.’’ (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 35).
48
See (Husserl 1939, p. 33).
49
See (Geniusas 2012, §12.1).
50
In the case of the inner and the outer horizon. See sections ‘‘The
inner horizon’’ and ‘‘The outer horizon’’.
51
See ‘‘The inner horizon’’, ‘‘The outer horizon’’ and The world
horizon’’ sections.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
because the hidden faces are important for its perception as
well. Two objects with the same manifest face could be very
different objects according to the difference in their
horizons.
The object, in addition to the manifest aspects, is con-
stituted through different horizons.52
That means a modification in the horizon yields a
modification in the object. Therefore, we need to analyse
the modification yielded by the technology even in these
horizons because they produce a related modification in the
object’s constitution.
Technology can modify the object in a more subtle way
than a ‘‘brute’’ modification of the manifest faces by
interacting with the horizon of the object.53
Manifest Hidden
zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl
ffl}|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{ [zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{
[ j
O ¼ ðOiNaked þ OTech Þ þ ðOkNaked þ OhTech Þ
i;j k;h
‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications
AR technology can be an innovative technology, but the
device on which it is mounted can have a long history. In
our case the device which the AR is applied to has an
incredibly long history.
Glasses have been used for several centuries and, what
is more important, they are the object of numerous studies
on how they continually enhance our perceptual capabili-
ties. Thus, we can use the studies on such technology in
order to get hints on how AR glasses are going to modify
our world.
We use classic glasses to enhance our sight and to level
our perception to a standard perception of 20/20. Wearing
this technology helps us to achieve a better perception of
distant objects.54 Thanks to this device, a subject can see a
shop sign instead of a blurred bundle of colours in the
distance.55 Or the subject can see a person who is gesturing
in the distance and recognise him or her as a friend.
The blurred object becomes sharper and we detect more
details in it. The blurred object becomes embedded with
52
We use a phenomenological concept of constitution of an object.
The description of how the object is constituted cannot be discussed
herein details. In order to have a more complete analysis on it see
Geniusas (2012), Sokolowski (1970) and Biceaga (2010).
53
Identifying the object with OiNaked the manifest aspects of the
j
object perceived in a naked way, with OTech the manifest aspects of
the object perceived through technology, with OkNaked the hidden
aspects of the object perceived in a naked way, with OhTech the hidden
aspects of the object perceived through technology.
54
Or near objects if we are talking about presbyter subjects and not
myopic ones.
55
We are assuming short-sightedness in this example.
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of… 131

hidden faces that can be ‘‘reached’’ by the subject thanks to However, the object is ‘‘improved’’ in both cases and so
the usage of the technology ‘‘glasses’’ or by getting closer we can elude this problem in our analysis. In the first case
to it. Wearing glasses is an action comparable to getting the object is improved by the technological device because
closer to the object, even if with some modifications. the subject can perceive different details. In the second, the
object is improved because the subject can achieve the
SDistant
OThrough
Details
Glasses
perception of such details without getting closer to the
SClose
ODirect
Details object by simply wearing glasses.
Therefore, the fact that the details are not new details
The perception through glasses is not a direct perception
perceivable only through the device or they are completely
and therefore it entails modifications related to the medium
different details is not of importance to this study. The
used. For example, the use of glasses implies chromatic
subject, by using the glasses, can achieve a better percep-
aberrations or distortion. Thus, even if we are perceiving
tion without getting closer to the object and that is enough.
the same details and the same object, the two perceptions
It is a different way to perceive the details, even if these
cannot be equal:
details are the same as the details perceived by the naked
SDistant
OThrough
Details
Glasses
6¼ SClose
ODirect
Details eye by getting closer to the object.
That means glasses modify the inner horizon59 of the
However, without going into detail, we can say that the
object because they ‘‘improve’’ the object with new
introduction of glasses provide a ‘‘richer’’ perception of the
details.60 Moreover, the modification of one horizon yields
object because they allow the subject to perceive more
a related modification of the object because the horizon is
details of the object.
an integral part of the object itself.
The modification in the perception yields two important
The object is made up of these new details and it is seen
consequences56:
as ‘‘blurred’’ when the subject does not reach its new
1. A modification of the object ‘‘richness’’.
2. A modification of the subject The re-constitution of the object yielded by the use of
glasses is not so evident, even if it is present. The modi-
Firstly, the object is reconstituted57 according to this new
fications related to the use of glasses are modification that
‘‘richness’’ of details.
can be perceived even by getting closer to the object.
The object is perceived in a new richer way and the
subject can reach new details. There are two different Therefore, we could be tempted to consider them as not
‘‘real’’ modification of the object.
possible options. The first one says that the details per-
We can think of a telescope in order to highlight this
ceived through the device are different from the details
perceivable by the naked eye if the subject gets closer to effect in a clearer way.
In the case of a telescope, we have a greater magnifi-
the object. This option points out that the medium ‘‘glas-
cation of the object than with glasses and this helps us to
ses’’ yields modifications in the content such as chromatic
aberrations or distortions58 and these modifications com- identify the way the object is re-constituted through the
technological use.
promise the identity among them.
With a telescope, we can perceive the mountains of the
The second option says that the details perceived
through the glasses and the ones perceived by the naked Moon. The object ‘‘Moon’’ becomes embedded with these
new details and it becomes ‘‘richer’’. Thus, when we look
eye if the subject gets closer to the object are identical. This
at the Moon with our naked eye, it is presented as ‘‘blur-
one points out that the details concern the same object and
the same particulars of the object and therefore they have red’’ and inadequate because it has details not perceived by
the naked subject. This perception of the object is not
to be the same even if with some changes due to the
enough to achieve every detail of it because the object is
medium.
re-constituted by the details perceivable through the tech-
56
nology, which is a re-constitution according to the inner
We can identify these two consequences as different aspects
horizon provided by the telescope.
because we can focus our attention on the subject or on the object
separately. However they are two sides of the same coin because of a The object without such new details presents itself as
modification in one of them yields a modification in the other one. ‘‘blurred’’ and ‘‘inadequate’’. The subject does not look at
57
The object is made up of its aspects, which means they are part of
it and they form it as an unity that is perceived by the subject.
59
Therefore, we can use the term ‘‘reconstitution’’ because the object is These ‘‘new’’ details are related to something ‘‘in’’ the object,
shaped by the technology used. The ‘‘old’’ constitution related to a therefore, it is the inner horizon that is modified by the technology.
naked subject has to change in favour of the ‘‘technological subject’’ 60
Obviously the glasses yield a modification of the outer horizon as
who uses the technology to modify its perceptual capabilities. well because even what lies in the background is ‘‘improved’’ with
58
See above at the beginning of this section. more definition.

123
132
the moon and recognises the absence of such richness, but
it is the object which gives itself to the subject as inade-
quate. The ‘‘reconstitution’’ of the object entails the fact
that the object is presented to the subject in a new way. The
perceived object is no more the old one.
Secondly, even the subject is reconstituted by such new
inner horizon of the object.
A subject who cannot perceive such new ‘‘richness’’
becomes unfitted as well. Their perception simply cannot
provide an adequate perception of the object in front of
them. In the case of the telescope, nobody can actually
perceive such new technological ‘‘richness’’ and so the
inadequacy of the subject’s perception is seen as an inad-
equacy of the naked perception in general. Nobody can
actually perceive the mountains of the Moon from Earth
with many details and therefore the perceiving subject is
unable to have such rich perception. They are as unable as
everyone else is.
However, in the case of the glasses the unfitness of the
subject’s perception is not the unfitness of the naked per-
ception in general, but they are unfitted in relation to other
subjects. They see the object in a blurred way while other
subjects can perceive the object in its ‘‘true’’ richness.
The subject is re-constituted according to the new inner
horizon as a person who cannot achieve the ‘‘normal’’
richness common people can achieve.61 For example, they
are classified as myopic or presbyter (near/far sighted) and
they ‘‘suffer’’ from this distinction in their everyday life.
The usage of glasses, or the use of a telescope, modifies
the ‘‘normality’’ of the object and subject. It modifies the
objects in its normal ‘‘aspects’’ and it modifies the subject
in their normal required perceptual capabilities. Therefore,
the use of this technology, yields knock-on effects on the
constitution of the object and subject.
These are the key elements we are going to use with AR
glasses.
Due to the modification of the horizon, the entire object
changes. What is yielded by the usage of the technology is
the way the subject relates to this new object. It modifies
the ‘‘normality’’ of the object and how it is commonly seen
by the subject. Moreover, it modifies the subject because it
creates a normality in what the perception should achieve.
The usage of glasses is not passive at all because it shapes
61
It is not a subject’s re-constitution in the sense that the subject gets
some new capabilities thanks to the technology, but in the sense that
the subject’s perceptual capabilities are ‘‘normalised’’ according to
the technology used. The important point here is not if the perceptual
capabilities are modified by the technology, but if the perceptual
capabilities are ‘‘normalised’’ by them. The normal subject is shaped
according to the presence of such technologies which give a standard
for the abilities the subject must have. The stress falls on the creation
of a new standard and not on the novelty of the perceptual capabilities
provided by technology.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
the object and the subject according to the new details that
they provide.
AR glasses and their modification
AR glasses touch a wide range of devices that provide very
different kinds of ‘‘augmentations’’.62 We cannot analyse
every single pair of AR glasses. Therefore, we need a
classification in order to identify the main features of each
class and to analyse their knock-on effects related to them.
A simple classification could be based on what the AR
glasses are studied to produce. This classification is not
rooted in the way the programmes run or in the technical
apparatus developed. It is based on the way the subject
perceives the augmentation and on the type of augmenta-
tion the subject gets from the AR device.
Following this idea we can create two main classes of
different AR glasses:
1. The first one is the class comprehending all of the
glasses that provide informational text to the subject.
That means glasses which provide information about
the surrounding world where the subject lives and help
the subject in their common life or in some particular
praxis.
2. The second class comprehends all of the AR glasses
that provide entire objects intertwined with the every-
day world. That means glasses that create objects in the
world where the subject lives. These glasses can create
objects that can interact with other ‘‘physical’’ objects
as if they where physical as well. Although these types
of glasses are still developing, there are some proto-
types63 that try to achieve this goal. Moreover, in our
analysis in this work, we are not interested in what
already exists, but in what will exist in the near
‘‘proximate’’ future. Therefore ‘‘interesting’’ and ‘‘fu-
turistic’’64 technologies can be taken into account in
order to provide interesting examples.
The first kind of AR glasses
cs displays an informational text related to an external
object. The information is shown on the lens in a window
that frames the text.65 They can be about anything.
62
We are going to use the term ‘‘augmentation’’ in order to identify
the ‘‘product’’ of AR technologies.
63
See, for example, the glasses developed by META https://www.
spaceglasses.com/.
64
Such as DAQRI http://www.daqri.com/.
65
See, for example, Fig. 1.
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of…
Fig. 1 This is an example of the
first kind of AR glasses. The
subject achieves information as
a string of text displayed on the
lenses
However, in most the cases the information focusses on
what the subject actually sees and it focusses on a present
perception.
What does this first kind of glasses yield?
In order to figure out what is modified by such tech-
nology we can focus our attention on where the augmen-
tations are displayed. The textual information is not
provided directly ‘‘in’’ the object. It ‘‘gravitates’’ around it.
Moreover, the way in which it is displayed can help us to
understand that the information is not something ‘‘in’’ the
object because it is framed into a window on the lens and
not directly in the ‘‘flesh’’ of the object.
There is a modification of the object due to the presence
of these augmentations, because the subject gets informa-
tion about it and thus they change their attitude toward it.
Moreover, this modification cannot be a modification of the
‘‘manifest’’ aspects of the object because it remains with
the same identical ‘‘face’’ of the object without such aug-
mentations. There is a modification of some hidden aspects
of it.
It is not a modification of the inner horizon because it is
not something ‘‘in’’ the object, as we have said before. The
object is not enhanced in the same way as through optical
glasses.66
Moreover, as we have said above,67 the world horizon
cannot be directly perceivable by the subject.
Therefore, if it is a modification of hidden faces and we
have excluded two horizons out of three, the modification
has to entail the outer horizon.
Moreover, the position ‘‘around’’ the object gives us
elements to support this assumption. The information is
around the object. It is not in focus because the subject
perceives directly only the original object. They gravitate
around it and they create an informational background
similar to the common background of a living room.68 The
background becomes informational and provides elements
to define the object in focus.
The background of the object becomes69:
66
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.
67
See ‘‘The outer horizon’’ section.
68
See ‘‘The outer horizon’’ section.
69
Where with j stands for the classic elements of the background and
i for the elements of the informational background.
133
[ [
OCommon Backgroud
þ OAugmented Backgroud
! OAspects
i j
i j
In the case of a classic pair of glasses we have the modi-
fication of the object because it becomes embedded with
every detail perceivable through the glasses.70
In this case we have something similar. The object
changes and it becomes constituted by this new ‘‘infor-
mational’’ background. Therefore, for example, an object
without this new background could give the subject a dif-
ferent feeling and interact with their possible actions. The
object without such informational background would be
perceived as ‘‘blurred’’.71 For example, we can take into
consideration the case of a subject who wants to buy an
object without perceiving the informational background of
it. This subject could be tempted not to buy the object
because the object is not ‘‘clear’’. In order to conclude such
an action, the subject would need information about the
price of that object on the internet, the subject would need
the information if there are other cheaper shops in the
neighbourhood, if it is a well built object that will last, if it
is an object produced in their country and so on. These are
possible pieces of information reachable by a simple search
with AR glasses and the ‘‘sole’’ fact that the subject can
commonly achieve such information implies that the object
without this new ‘‘normal’’ background is perceived as
partial.
Another example could be the analysis related to an AR
game: Ingress by Google.72 This game is a rudimentary AR
game which creates augmented space overlapping the real
one where two opposite teams try to win by activating
portals. The ‘‘basic’’ goal of activating portals hides an
important change in the objects around us. If you are
playing, the object in front of you becomes embedded with
new importance thanks to the AR game. A place without
any importance in the city could be embedded with new
importance by the introduction of a lot of AR portals in it.
Therefore the place changes according to the technology
used by the subject. The AR game embedded the classic
70
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.
71
As in the previous case the object without details was seen as
blurred. See at page xxx.
72
See http://www.ingress.com/.
123
134
Fig. 2 This is an example of the
second kind of AR glasses. The
device ‘‘creates’’ an entire
perceivable object in front of the
subject
spatial position with its new importance and therefore it
moulds the space and the city around the subject.
Moreover, in the case of the classic optical glasses, we
have the modification of the subject as well. In this case we
have a similar modification in the subject of optical glas-
ses.73 A subject who cannot achieve this new kind of
background74 simply has not the capabilities to achieve a
‘‘normal’’ perception. These subjects are unfitted to per-
ceive the object in its optimal way.
Subjects who cannot reach such augmentations of the
object are cut off from normal perception because they live
in the world without reaching some aspects of the objects.
For example, in the case of the AR game Ingress a
hypothetical subject without this game could not under-
stand the reason why a lot of people go in an unimportant
place of the city, such as a dump.75 They cannot simply see
the place in its wholeness. They do not catch every aspect
of the place and they do not perceive the new spatial
importance given by this AR game.
We can easily understand that what is important in this
passage is not what information is provided to the subject,
but the ‘‘sole’’ fact that information is provided. The
modification does not concern the content of the informa-
tion, but the structure of the subject’s perception in general.
The classic problem focussed on how the subject should
use the information or which information should be given
and which should be secured from such public diffusion is
not relevant for our analysis. We are working at a deeper
level on the way subjects perceive their surrounding world.
Every problem concerning the content of such informa-
tional background is not important for our study.
Our analysis is not aimed to solve the question on what
is ‘‘right’’ to know or on where the limit to the information
about the surrounding world a subject should easily get is.
Our analysis concerns the modification of the way the
subjects perceive the object in front of them and about the
creation of the ‘‘normality’’ of such perception. It is about
the moulding process through which the body76 of the
73
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.
74
That has become a ‘‘normal’’ part of the background.
75
We are choosing a dump but it could be any place of the city.
76
We used the term ‘‘body’’ in the sense of the phenomenological
term Leib.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
subject and their perceptual capabilities are constituted.
Also in the previous case with optical glasses,77 we have
the modification of the subject through the technology and
what was important did not concern what the subject could
see with such lenses, but the fact that the subject achieves a
better perception ‘‘in general’’ of the object. The case of the
classic glasses was not focussed on the particular content of
the object, but it was focussed on the possibility of
achieving a ‘‘new’’ content in general.
If we take into consideration the previous case,78 our
analysis concerns the way the subject becomes myopic or
presbyter and not on the details of such perception, whether
the information be open or restricted.
What is at stake here is the modification of the normality
of the subject because it modifies the way the subject
perceives the background of the object in general.
The second kind of AR glasses
The second kind of glasses does not provide any infor-
mation to the subject, or, at least, this is not their goal.
What they provide is an augmented object.79
These glasses present to the subject objects that are
intertwined with the ‘‘real environment’’80 created by the
computational activity of the device.
The difference with the previous technologies is evident.
In the previous cases81 we had devices that allow a dif-
ferent perception of an already existing object. The tech-
nology moulds, shapes and enhance the perception of the
subject because they allow them to achieve a finer per-
ception of what is in front of them even in a naked per-
ception. Now, this kind of second AR glasses does not
improve any previous perception at all.
77
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.
78
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.
79
See, for example, Fig. 2.
80
We use the term ‘‘real environment’’ according to the classic
distinction made by Milgram. He identified a continuum with two
extremes: the the ‘‘real environment’’, which is the world without
digital elements in it, and the ‘‘virtual reality’’, which is the world
created entirely by computers. See Milgram (1994).
81
See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ and ‘‘The
first kind of AR glasses’’ above sections.
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of… 135

We are no longer talking about ‘‘hidden faces’’ made The world becomes composed of two different parts: the
visible by the technological device. The device creates the common one and the augmented.84
manifest aspects of the object with the hidden ones. Therefore, the knock-on effects are related to this kind
We cannot limit our analysis to the horizons’ level of modification.
because we are tackling a wider problem. We can just follow the previous case of optical glasses.
Obviously, the modification related to the re-constitu- With optical glasses we have a modification of the object
tion of the object derived by the technological usage cannot because it becomes blurred85 and, moreover, we have a
exist in this case. It cannot be a re-constitution for the modification in the subject because it normalises their
simple fact that it is not constituted before the technolog- body.
ical use and so we can talk of a ‘‘mere’’ constitution only With the second kind of AR glasses we have something
and not of its re-constitution. In the previous case we similar. We have a modification in the object even if now
had82: we are not talking about a single object which is ‘‘im-
[ [
O ¼ Onaked
i þ Otech
j
proved’’ by the device, but we are talking about an entire
i j world. Moreover, we have a relative modification in the
subject as well.
Now we have only:
[ 1. Firstly, we have a modification of the world because it
O ¼ Otech
j becomes embedded with these new augmented objects.
j
Therefore, as in the case of optical glasses86, the world
because becomes ‘‘blurred’’ to the naked eye because the
[ subject cannot perceive every ‘‘detail’’ of it, even if
Onaked
i ¼ ;
i
now the details are not parts of an object but are entire
objects as part of our world. The world without these
However, we have knock-on effects on other levels, even if new augmented objects would be considered a poor
we do not have them in the constitution of the object. and derivative world.
This kind of AR glasses yields a modification of the 2. Secondly, we have even the modification of the subject
world where the subject lives. It is not the singular object in the same way as the optical glasses,87 with the
which changes according to the technological perception, ‘‘sole’’ modification that now we are not talking about
but it is the objects in our world which change in their single objects but of the world. A subject who cannot
number. The world becomes ‘‘embedded’’ with augmented achieve the perception of augmented objects cannot
objects as well as normal objects. While before we had the perceive the world in its new aspects and therefore
modifications of the aspects of the objects, now we have they are ‘‘unfit’’. We have already seen this production
the production of entire objects in the world. of ‘‘unfit’’ subjects.
Instead of:
[ [ (a) In the case of optical glasses, there is the
O ¼ Onaked
i þ Otech
j production of myopics and presbyters.88 People
i j
are near/far sighted also without the existence of
now we have83: classic optical glasses. However, glasses modify
[ [ the richness of the object and so they modify
World Sn ¼ Oicommon þ Okaugmented also the perceptual capabilities required to reach
i k
its new richness.
Where the common object is composed of the aspects (b) In the case of the first kind of AR glasses, there
perceivable by the naked body, the aspects perceivable by is the production of subjects who cannot
classic technology and the aspects perceivable by the first
84
kind of AR glasses. That is the classic conception of augmented reality where it is
[ j
represented as the intertwinement of digital data and real objects.
Ocommon ¼ ðOinaked þ Otech þ Ohaugmented Þ 85
The case of the classic glasses (see ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and
i;j;h their modifications’’ section). Moreover, we can take into account
even the modification yielded by the first kind of AR (see ‘‘The first
kind of AR glasses’’ section), because it is similar.
82 86
Identifying with Owi the aspect i of the object O perceived in the See also the modification created by the first kind of AR glasses
w way (in the naked way or in the technological one). ‘‘The first kind of AR glasses’’ section.
83 87
Identifying with Owi the object i perceived in the w way (natural See also the modification on the subject yielded by the first kind of
way or technological and augmented one) and with World Sn the world AR glasses. See ‘‘The first kind of AR glasses’’ section.
88
where the subject Sn lives. See ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifications’’ section.

123
136
perceive the richness of the object because they
cannot reach the information about the object in
front of them.89
(c) Now, in the case of the second kind of AR
glasses, there is the production of subjects who
simply cannot perceive the world where the
community lives any more. They are completely
alienated because they cannot ‘‘touch’’ the same
world as the others.
WorldSWithoutAR 6¼ World Community
This may not be very important from the practical point of
view if the AR is not so well developed and widespread in
the society. However, if we take into consideration the
proximate future where augmentations are social con-
structions on which all the society is grounded, this subject
without AR glasses would have difficulty living in.90 For
example, this subject simply could not vote if the vote is
cast on an augmented ballot in order to save paper.91
Another example we can have in order to clarify this
point is an augmented monument in the middle of a square.
If the subject does not have a correct device, they simply
cannot see part of the city and cannot appreciate parts of it.
Inadequate subjects, the ones who do not use AR glas-
ses, simply do not live in the same world as others.
Conclusions
The object is made up of numerous kinds of aspects that
can be classified in four main groups derived from the
manifest aspects and from the three different horizons.
[ Manifest
O¼ ðOi þ OInner
j þ OOuter
h þ OWorld
k Þ
i;j;h;k
Therefore, the modification produced by technology can be
related to each single part of a such subdivision.
89
See ‘‘The first kind of AR glasses’’ section.
90
There are many technologies that embed our world and without
which we cannot live so ‘‘easily’’. Moreover this is not something that
is related to our ‘‘time’’ or to our culture. Every culture always
follows the same constitution relation we have shown before and it
has to deal with the re-constitution of the object through technology.
Therefore it is not a ‘‘topic’’ related to our ‘‘western’’ culture only.
However, this new second type of AR technology has a peculiar
effect. It is not a sole reconstitution of the world where the subject
lives, but it implies an introduction of new objects in our world. While
other technologies simply modify other pre-existing objects, now the
technology creates the world on its own.
91
We are not assuming the AR ballot will replace the paper-based
one. This example shows only that part of the world of such a society
could be inaccessible by who does not use AR technology.
123
N. Liberati, S. Nagataki
Moreover, the modification of the object yields a rela-
tive modification of the subject.92 Thus every introduction
of a technology implies our modification because we
depend on the ‘‘naturality’’ that is moulded by technology.
This kind of modification yielded by technology has not
to be taken in a pessimistic way, such as the introduction of
the technology which turns our ‘‘happy’’ days into a dark
and gloomy era. It is just an analysis of how we are shaped
by the tools we use and therefore we cannot think about
them as a neutral being.
While the first studies on augmented reality related some
specific device93 will tackle the problem what should be
displayed on the lens and what should be forbidden or, at
least, restricted, we have to raise the question the shaping
action of such a technology.
We have seen possible knock-on effects of two kinds of
different AR glasses:
1. The first kind of AR glasses yields the modification of
our common perception because they provide the
‘‘access’’ to a different kind of ‘‘background’’, which is
the ‘‘informational background’’.94
2. The second kind of AR glasses yields a modification of
a different kind. The world where the subject lives
becomes embedded with new augmented objects.95
Therefore, the first is going to make the ‘‘naked’’ and ‘‘non-
augmented’’ perception a partial perception of the object. It
is going to make the object whisper to the perceiving
subject ‘‘I am richer than I appear. Put on your glasses and
you will see me better. Use the AR’’.
Whereas the second AR glasses are going to make the
world whisper to the subject ‘‘I am richer than I appear.
Live in my wholeness. Use the AR’’.
The introduction of a new kind of technology cannot be
analysed only at the level of what it manifestly does: if the praxes
made possible by such technology are ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’.96
We should not focus our attention only on what we can do
with such technology, but even on what we become by using it.
Acknowledgments Nicola Liberati worked on Sects. 1, 2 and 4.
Shoji Nagataki worked on Sect. 3. Nicola Liberati is supported by the
92
See sections ‘‘‘‘Optical’’ classic glasses and their modifica-
tions’’, ‘‘The first kind of AR glasses’’ and ‘‘The second kind of
AR glasses’’.
93
Such as Google Glass.
94
See ‘‘The first kind of AR glasses’’ section.
95
See ‘‘The second kind of AR glasses’’ section.
96
We should not focus the attention on the direct effect of the
technology only. This work shows there is another hidden level
related to how the technology shapes the subject and the objects
around them. Therefore, the ethical questions about the goodness or
the badness of a technology should not be restricted to what the
subject can do with such a technology, but they should focus the
attention also on how they are shaped by it.
The AR glasses’ ‘‘non-neutrality’’: Their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of…
PostDoctoral Research Fellowship of the Japan Society for the Pro-
motion of Science (JSPS) No. P14782. Shoji Nagataki is supported by
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), No. 25370034.
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