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INDIA IS NOT SITTING ON THE GEOPOLITICAL FENCE

TANVI MADAN
OCTOBER 27, 2021
COMMENTARY
In early 2019, Gen. David Petraeus and S. Jaishankar, now India’s external affairs
minister but then in his private capacity, appeared together on a panel. The former U.S.
Central Command commander asserted that China was “the defining issue of our age”
and, seemingly in frustration, added that countries such as India “have to decide.”
Asked if India could indeed take a stand and choose a side, Jaishankar retorted, “India
should take a stand and should take a side — our side.”

Petraeus’s comments were not unusual. They reflect a prevailing view — shaped by
India’s stated non-alignment during the Cold War — that Delhi will walk a middle path
and avoid taking sides in the geopolitical competition between China and the United
States. They also flow from an assumption that India’s broader geopolitical approach
involves maintaining equidistant relationships and not making difficult choices.

But this is a misunderstanding of India’s foreign policy strategy in general, and of its
recent decisions in particular.

India does make choices and, increasingly, those are in alignment with the United
States and its allies. Delhi’s embrace of the Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad,
despite objections from friends and foes, makes this clear. That decision, evident in last
month’s leader-level summit, in turn reflects other choices policymakers have been
making in the context of India’s intensifying competition with China. Faced with Beijing’s
increasing assertiveness and the recognition that it cannot tackle this challenge on its
own, Delhi has chosen to deepen ties with partners that can help it build Indian
capabilities, offer alternatives in the Indo-Pacific, and maintain a favorable balance of
power in the region. The United States is seen as particularly useful, with former Indian
national security adviser Shivshankar Menon noting that even though the two countries
do not have a commitment to mutual defense, “India and the United States are …
moving toward a partnership that increasingly has some of the characteristics of an
alliance.”

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This is a trend in Indian foreign policy that the United States and its partners should
continue to be attentive to, nurture, and not take for granted. Just as Beijing’s choice to
confront India at the border has made Delhi more interested in cooperating with the
United States, Washington’s choices can shape the scope of that cooperation — for
better or worse.

India’s Quad Choice 

India has come a long way on the Quad in a very short period. Four years ago, the
coalition did not even exist. A year ago, the Indian government would neither use the
word “Quad” in statements nor agree to a joint statement. This was partly due to a
desire not to provoke rival China or upset partner Russia. By March 2021, however,
Delhi had agreed to elevate the grouping from the ministers’ to the leaders’ level, with
a virtual summit on March 12 resulting in a joint statement, joint op-ed, and joint
vaccine initiative. This was particularly striking because, at the time, Delhi was engaged
in sensitive negotiations with Beijing to resolve the worst Sino-Indian border crisis in
decades. Traditionally, at a moment like that, India would not have taken any steps that
could rock the boat with Beijing. But — this time — it chose to take that risk.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made only his second

international trip since November 2019 for the first in-person Quad leaders’ summit in
Washington on Sept. 24. The Australian ambassador to the United States remarked,
“India has really, I think, driven a lot of the elevation of the Quad in recent times.” 

This Indian choice to align with Australia, Japan, and the United States centers on a
shared vision of a free, open, inclusive, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. These
partners can help tackle challenges to that vision — whether that challenge is China’s
assertiveness, COVID-19, or climate change. And, thus, Delhi has been willing to
consult, coordinate, and cooperate with them to build both a balancing coalition and
resilience in the region.

Delhi is choosing to do this despite the trade-offs it entails. It has revived and elevated
the Quad and persisted with its Indo-Pacific concept in the face of Russian
unhappiness, as well as criticism and potential blowback from China. Beijing and
Moscow have both dismissed the Quad as a destabilizing U.S.-led clique, with
Russia even more vocal than China in its opposition. But the Indian external affairs
minister countered his Russian counterpart’s statements against the Quad, and by
doubling down on cooperation via the coalition, Delhi has made clear that it will not let
Moscow or Beijing veto its partnerships.

Some have argued that India’s embrace of the Quad is not a meaningful geopolitical
choice because it is also a member of the Sino-Russian promoted Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. But India’s motivations for membership in — and level and
kind of engagement with — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are not
equivalent to its involvement in the Quad. Delhi participates in the former to keep
Russia from drifting even closer to China, and to maintain its ties with Central Asian
countries. It also does not want to leave the mechanism to its rivals, China and
Pakistan, which are both members. Moreover, India participates because it wants to
have a voice at the table when issues such as Afghanistan are discussed. Finally, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a platform for India and its rivals to
discuss their divergences. But there is little doubt that those rivalries and contradictions
can spill over and limit the group. For instance, India’s national security advisor walked
out of a meeting due to his Pakistani counterpart’s background display of a map that
showed Kashmir as part of Pakistan, and India withdrew from a Russian military
exercise with Shanghai Cooperation Organization partners in 2020 due to Chinese and
Pakistani participation.
The Quad, on the other hand, is based on convergence on what kind of region the
members would like to see and shared concerns about China’s assertiveness.
Moreover, its members are not just like-minded on key issues — they also have no
major disputes with each other.

What’s Driving India’s Decisiveness 

The deterioration of ties with China is increasingly shaping India’s geopolitical choices.
Border tensions have been a feature of Sino-Indian relations since General Secretary Xi
Jinping came to power in 2012. After two and half decades of relative calm, there were
major military stand-offs in 2013, 2014, and 2017. A far more serious one began in
2020, with India accusing China of unilaterally attempting to change the status quo at
several locations along their border. This crisis has resulted in the first fatalities and first
known shots fired at the border in decades, and the stand-off continues to this day. It
has brought Sino-Indian relations to their lowest point since the two countries fought a
war in 1962.

Many external observers have underestimated the extent to which Indian perceptions of
China have hardened over the last year and a half. India already viewed China
competitively, with some concern and mistrust. However, the border crisis and the killing
of 20 Indian soldiers, as well as Beijing’s COVID-era approach, have intensified this
perception of China as a challenge. This has not only resulted in India’s well-
known TikTok ban, but also affected India’s posture at the border, its policies at home,
and its partnerships abroad. This is evident from its acquisition of additional military
equipment, increased forward deployment of troops, bolstered border infrastructure,
improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, progress with
regards to the implementation of long-pending military reforms, and restrictions or extra
scrutiny on Chinese activities in various sectors (economic, technology,
telecommunications, civil society, and education). And Delhi is making choices in each
of those realms (e.g., India’s decision to reorient one of its strike corps away from a sole
and primary focus on Pakistan, or to exclude Chinese companies from India’s 5G trials).

The deterioration of India’s relationship with China has also contributed to Delhi
overcoming one of its earlier hesitations about the Quad — that the grouping would be
provocative to China and result in blowback. The increased scale and intensity of
Chinese pressure that India is facing have changed its cost-benefit calculation about the
Quad. There is also a sense that China seems perennially provoked regardless of
India’s actions. Moreover, India holding back on the United States or the Quad or
the inclusion of Australia in the annual India-Japan-United States Malabar maritime
exercise did not deter Beijing from salami-slicing efforts at the border last year. And it
did not stop Russia from deepening its ties with China and Pakistan either.

India and the United States: A Different Cost-Benefit Calculation

India’s Quad choice also reflects — and has been made possible by — a recalibration
of Indian views about the United States and its utility regarding China.
This recalibration toward a more positive view of the United States did not happen
overnight — it has been occurring over two decades —
but American support during the crisis with China in 2020–2021 has further fueled the
shift. From the 1970s through perhaps the 1990s, the dominant view in Delhi was that
American power was a problem, and its presence in the region was unwelcome and
needed to be deterred. Moreover, there was a sense that Washington sought to contain
India’s rise. That perspective has not entirely disappeared in India, but the dominant
view today is that, with Chinese power and the Chinese-Indian capabilities gap growing,
American power is part of the solution. Now there is a perception that the U.S. presence
in the region is desirable, if not essential, and it can help facilitate India’s rise. Thus,
unlike both Chinese and Russian officials, Indian policymakers have pushed back
against the notion that the United States is a destabilizing outsider, and
have emphasized that the Indo-Pacific is also home to the United States. And they have
deepened ties with the United States across the spectrum, but particularly on defense
and security issues.

Indian policymakers have also pushed back against the idea of American decline. The
external affairs minister recently asserted that the United States is “the premier power of
our times and will remain so” and cited its “extraordinary capacity to really reinvent itself,
re-energize itself.”

This sentiment is not a partisan one. In July 2020, as the United States struggled with
COVID-19, Menon dismissed the idea of America as a declining power and noted its
capacity for reinvention. A recent task force, which included scholars and former
officials who were involved in the 2012 Non-Alignment 2.0 report, concluded that “it is in
India’s interest that the U.S. remains engaged in the Indo-Pacific and continental Asia,
and for India to work with the U.S. to keep the area open, plural and free of single-
power domination.” While the current Bharatiya Janata Party-led government elevated
India’s relationship with the Quad, it is worth noting that it was a Congress-party-led
coalition government that first joined the Quad in 2007, as well as the India-Japan-U.S.
trilateral in 2011. Perhaps more notably, that government signed a civil nuclear
agreement with the United States during the Bush administration despite Chinese and
Russian disapproval.

This does not mean that Delhi likes all aspects of American power. For instance,
Washington’s use of sanctions has constrained India’s options and decision-making
space vis-à-vis Iran and Russia. And while today there’s not much of a China debate in
India, there continues to be a debate on how far and fast to cooperate with the United
States.

At the moment, however, India worries more about the potential decline of U.S. power
or any moves toward retrenchment. Unlike many in Beijing and Moscow, Delhi did not
want to see an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, even as policymakers
understood the drivers for the move and expected it. Indian observers have not just
been upset about the flawed execution of the withdrawal, but also concerned about
Pakistan and anti-India terrorist groups taking advantage of the vacuum in the region. In
addition, there is apprehension that this could potentially require a diversion of Indian
resources and attention from addressing China-related challenges. At the same time,
however, Delhi will assess how Washington deals with Chinese influence in
Afghanistan, and whether the withdrawal from Afghanistan does lead to more American
focus on or investment in the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the Biden administration’s
continued high-level attention to India, the Quad leaders’ summit, and even the new
Australia-U.K.-U.S. security partnership (or AUKUS) are likely to have been reassuring
to Delhi.

In turn, Delhi’s decisiveness on the Quad is part of India’s investment in a partnership

with the United States and even a bet on American power. Simultaneously, the grouping
is a mechanism to encourage a U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific and to keep
Washington interested and engaged in the region. This was particularly the case during
the Trump administration, but the uncertainty about America’s commitment to the region
hasn’t dissipated. The Quad helps make the case to Washington that it has like-minded
partners in the Indo-Pacific theater willing to share the burden of regional security and
resilience. At the same time, it also facilitates Delhi’s pursuit of partnerships with
Canberra and Tokyo, which help hedge against overreliance on the United States and
uncertainty about the future of U.S. foreign policy.

India’s Ties With Australia and Japan Are Better Than Ever

India is also choosing to balance China through closer partnerships with Japan and
Australia, which, in turn, made the Quad choice possible. While the deepening of the
Indian-Japanese relationship goes back further, in recent years the development of their
defense and security ties has been an added focus. But it is really the transformation of
India’s ties with Australia that has bolstered the Quad.

The Indian-Australian dyad was perhaps the weakest link in the first version of the Quad
in 2007–2008. The two countries had a relationship, but the common quip was that it
only involved cricket, curry, and the Commonwealth. On strategic issues — particularly
China — Canberra and Delhi were not on the same page. Indeed, while it remains
hotly debated, many in India pointed to Australia’s desire to deepen its relations with
China as significantly contributing to the demise of the first iteration of the Quad. This
also made Indian policymakers hesitant first to revive and then to elevate the grouping.

However, over the last few years, Delhi and Canberra have invested in the Indian-
Australian relationship, and this helped change Indian minds about the Quad. Strategic
convergence on China helped fuel the closer bilateral relationship. And greater
familiarity, in turn, helped India better understand that Canberra has become more
concerned about China than it had been five or 10 years ago.

That has led to a closer defense and security partnership. Today, Australia is one of
only a handful of countries with which India has signed a logistics sharing agreement,
holds a 2+2 ministerial, and conducts military exercises of increasing sophistication.
Delhi also overcame its initial reluctance (based in part on concern about China’s
potential reaction) and finally invited Australia to the Malabar exercise. Australia is one
of only seven countries that has a liaison at India’s Information Fusion Center for the
Indian Ocean region, and Delhi and Canberra’s discussions have included sensitive
issues like resilient supply chains and cyber security. Australia is also perhaps India’s
favorite partner for trilaterals — they have ones with France, Indonesia, and Japan. It
has also supported India’s stance during recent crises. 

India’s Pivot to Plurilaterals

India’s Quad choice would also not have been possible without its recent embrace of
coalitions — or plurilaterals, as Delhi calls them. It was not that long ago that Indian
observers criticized the plurilateralism — and the departure from multilateralism (i.e.,
working through established international organizations) — that the Trans-Pacific
Partnership represented. But it has come around for much the same reason many
Trans-Pacific Partnership (now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership) members turned to that approach. As the Indian external
affairs minister put it: “Multilateralism has fallen short. And bilateral delivery is not what it
used to be.”

There is another benefit for India. Coalition membership does not require joining an
alliance, but it does facilitate alignment and deeper cooperation on issues or shared
interests with like-minded states. The Quad, for instance, allows India to do more with
the United States and two American allies, providing a mechanism that is less than an
organization but more than ad hoc meetings. Moreover, it does so without locking Delhi
into commitments with which it is not yet comfortable.

In the Indo-Pacific, this kind of coalition helps fill the gaps left between India’s bilaterals,
the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, and the American hub-and-spoke alliance
system. Delhi does not see these coalitions as a replacement for its bilaterals or for the
Association for Southeast Asian Nations, but a supplement. Thus, India participates in
the Quad, as well as several trilaterals: India-Japan-United States, India-Maldives-Sri
Lanka, Australia-India-Japan, Australia-India-Indonesia, Australia-India-France,
and India-Italy-Japan. The latter two serve as a bridge between European and Indo-
Pacific partners. There have also been Track II dialogues of India-Japan-South
Korea since 2012 and India-Japan-Russia in 2021 — this last one is in part an effort to
wean Russia away from the Chinese position on the Indo-Pacific.

Much like India’s partnerships are not all equal, these coalitions are not all alike. They
involve different issues and levels of investment, move at different paces, and include
members with different threat perceptions (on the basis of which countries can pick
specific coalitions to join). From Delhi’s perspective, in an ideal world, these interlocking
coalitions — and its like-minded partners’ other minilaterals — would pull in the same
direction. India, for instance, hopes that the Australia-U.K.-U.S. security partnership will
supplement the efforts of the Quad. However, the fallout with France after the
announcement of that initiative also made evident that managing coalitions will be a
delicate task — not just for Washington, but for Delhi as well.
The Possibilities and Limits of India’s Choices

This is not the first time that India is making clear strategic choices. For instance, it
decided to align with like-minded partners in 1962–1963 (with the United States) and
1971 (with the Soviet Union). In both cases, the objective was internal and external
balancing vis-à-vis China, and now that is the case again. The choices won’t
necessarily be heard in India’s rhetoric, but they will be seen in its actions, as the Quad
summit demonstrates.

It will be important to have realistic expectations about India’s choices, which will not be
all-encompassing. Delhi will opt to align with the United States to balance China, but not
to isolate Russia. Furthermore, its choices and the related shifts will need to be
measured not against, say, what the United States does with an ally like Australia, but
rather what India does with various countries or what India was previously willing to do
with the United States (though these days, arguably non-ally India is more aligned with
Washington on China than many American allies).

Delhi’s preference for strategic autonomy (i.e., the freedom to make independent

judgments based on India’s interests) will also persist. But its foreign policy decisions do
reflect a recognition that its desire for autonomy has to be balanced with the need for
alignment to protect India’s security. They also reflect an acknowledgment that an
assertive China, with an expanding footprint in South Asia, could be one of the most
significant constraints on Indian autonomy — and partnering with like-minded states
might not just help protect India’s security interests, but also help preserve and even
enhance Delhi’s decision-making space.

India’s decisions can and will be shaped by other countries’ choices. Beijing’s recent
moves at the Sino-Indian boundary, for instance, have affected Delhi’s decisions
regarding the United States and other partners worried about China. The longer the
crisis continues, the more time those choices will have to solidify. Canberra’s altered
stance on China has made it a more attractive partner for Delhi. Even as
Russia remains relevant for Delhi — especially when it comes to Afghanistan or
defense equipment — Moscow’s choice to deepen ties with Beijing has limited its utility
for India and increased Delhi’s willingness to take actions that might displease it. On the
other hand, Washington’s choice to compete with China and partner with India have
facilitated Delhi’s decisions to deepen ties with the United States.

India is also persuadable. Partners can get Delhi to yes. To do so, they should
understand that India often makes choices — as it did with the Quad — in a step-by-
step way. This stems from Delhi wanting to assess the initiative or the commitment of
the partners involved, and needing to build internal support if not consensus, including
within government. Such an approach might be too high-maintenance for some
countries, but for those seeking to develop a partnership with India, it’s worth keeping in
mind that persistence and patience can pay off. Initially, Delhi might say no to a
proposal — perhaps even multiple times. But when the time is right and a window of
opportunity opens, it does reconsider its options and make choices about which it was
previously reluctant.

This raises the question of whether India can be persuaded to reverse a choice. For
instance, if Beijing moves to resolve the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis, will Delhi
change course with China and the United States? It might change pace, but its direction
will likely remain the same.

From Delhi’s perspective, Beijing didn’t just choose to grab some territory at the border
— it chose to violate the agreements that made a broader Sino-Indian relationship
possible. Moreover, it did so in a brutal way when India was particularly vulnerable
during the pandemic. Thus, while Delhi might revisit some specific policies (e.g.,
restrictions on Chinese investment in non-sensitive sectors), it is unlikely in the near
future to trust that Beijing will respect its commitments broadly and at the boundary in
particular. That lack of trust means that Delhi will continue to seek a little help from its
friends.

What’s likely to have a greater effect on India’s willingness to make choices regarding
the United States is its assessment of American willingness and ability to play the role
that Delhi envisions for it in Asia. That could be affected by U.S. developments at home
(e.g., political polarization, economic setbacks, retrenchment) and abroad (e.g.,
accommodating China, rehyphenating India and Pakistan, sanctions directed against
Russia that end up targeting India, a stalled pivot to the Indo-Pacific, greater skepticism
of India). If Delhi believes Washington may become a more uncertain or unreliable
partner, its risk-reward calculation will change accordingly. And so will its foreign policy
choices.

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Tanvi Madan is a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the
Foreign Policy program, and director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution in
Washington, DC. She is the author of the book Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped
US-India Relations during the Cold War (Brookings Institution Press, 2020).

Image: Official White House (Photo by Adam Schultz)

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