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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian’s Philosophical Satire

Michele Solitario
Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
michele.solitario@philologie.uni-tuebingen.de

Received March 2021 | Accepted October 2021

Abstract

The Hermotimus is undoubtedly the most ambitious of Lucian’s philosophical dia-

logues, since the author undertakes a systematic study of the best philosopher in
this work. More specifically, the protagonists of this dialogue, the Stoic aspirant
Hermotimos and his antidogmatic interlocutor Lykinos, seek a definite answer to the
following questions: Does the true and authentic philosopher exist? If so, then where
is it possible to find him, and how can he prove the excellence of his philosophical
tenets? A utopian moment can be captured in nuce in these questions, for the object at
the heart of the discussion assumes all the features of a desideratum which is difficult,
if not impossible, to fulfil, implying an operation that is constantly exposed to the risk
of being reduced to nothing.

Keywords

Lucian – scepticism – philosophy – Utopia – underworld

Considering that Lucian never was (nor ever claimed to be) a philosopher,1
his reflection on the true sage, which constitutes a significant issue within
the context of his entire corpus, never takes the form of abstract or vague

1 See Salt. 2, if it is possible to see here a reference to Lucian himself (φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ μέτρια
ὡμιληκώς, ‘moderately conversant with philosophy’), and Apol. 15 (μεμνῆσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ἐπιτι-
μῶντας ὅτι οὐ σοφῷ ὄντι μοι … ἐπιτιμήσουσιν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ δήμου, λόγους μὲν ἀσκήσαντι
καὶ τὰ μέτρια ἐπαινουμένῳ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἄκραν ἐκείνην τῶν κορυφαίων ἀρετὴν οὐ πάνυ
γεγυμνασμένῳ, ‘those who censure me must remember that it is not a wise man … whom
they will censure but one from the common people, one who has trained himself in words
and received moderate praise for them, but one completely unpractised in that acme of the

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2 Solitario

theoretical speculation. Rather, the author, remaining a faithful witness of his

time, is well aware of the current situation of philosophy, divided into many
contrasting schools of thought, and offers a lively representation of these in
exquisitely comic-parodic terms.2 In this regard, the Fugitivi is exemplary,
wherein Philosophy appears under the guise of a despairing woman forced
to abandon the world of men to find refuge with Zeus. The work is a follow-
up of De morte Peregrini, a biting pamphlet aimed at Peregrinos, the false
Cynic-Pythagorizing philosopher known for having organized his spectacular
suicide on the occasion of the Olympic Games of ad 165, voluntarily launching
himself onto a carefully prepared pyre in order to ensure the greatest possible
resonance to this ‘performance’. When the miasmas released from the burning
of Peregrinos’ body reach heaven, disturbing the peace of Zeus, the father of
the gods sees a woman, Philosophy, arriving at his home in a disheveled and
visibly frightened state. She makes a dramatic request for help, for a group of
Cynic-looking pseudo-philosophers have outraged her, arrogating for them-
selves the prerogatives and the privileges of the true philosopher. Leaving aside
Philosophy’s long invective, it is important to point out that Zeus does not keep
Philosophy in the heavenly sphere, but invites her to return to earth, accom-
panied by Hercules and Hermes, who will support her in definitively defeating
this clique of ignorant charlatans.3 This step is instructive as it shows Lucian’s
usual approach: the solution to any problem cannot be found in an indefinite
elsewhere, but on earth itself, in a dimension that is concretely defined and
pragmatically tractable. In this regard, it should be noted that when Lucian
begins to describe one of the few positively depicted philosophers appearing
in his corpus, namely Demonax, he justifies his presentation of him once again
with the needs of the generation of young people of his time, in an attempt
to offer them a current model of a philosopher, rather than one enclosed in a
faded and highly idealized past.4

virtues that the cream of men display’). Translations by Harmon and Kilburn. On this, see
Alexiou 1990, 32.
2 See the overview in Solitario 2020, 24-28.
3 Fug. 23: ΖΕΥΣ εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἄπολλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἅμα καὶ τὴν Φιλοσοφίαν αὐτὴν ἔχον‑
τες ἄπιτε ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὸν βίον. τρισκαιδέκατον γοῦν ἆθλον οἴου τοῦτον οὐ σμικρὸν ἐκτελέσειν, ἢν
ἐκκόψῃς μιαρὰ οὕτω καὶ ἀναίσχυντα θηρία (‘A good idea, Apollo. But you go too, Heracles; take
along Philosophy herself and all be off, as quickly as you can, to the world. Bear in mind that
you will be doing a thirteenth labour of no mean order if you exterminate such pestilential,
shameless beasts.’) Translation by Harmon.
4 Demon. 1-2: ἔμελλεν ἄρα μηδὲ ὁ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς βίος τὸ παντάπασιν ἄμοιρος ἔσεσθαι ἀνδρῶν λόγου καὶ
μνήμης ἀξίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ σώματος ἀρετὴν ὑπερφυᾶ καὶ γνώμην ἄκρως φιλόσοφον ἐκφαίνειν … περὶ δὲ
Δημώνακτος ἤδη δίκαιον λέγειν ἀμφοῖν ἕνεκα, ὡς ἐκεῖνός τε διὰ μνήμης εἴη τοῖς ἀρίστοις τό γε κατ᾽
ἐμὲ καὶ οἱ γενναιότατοι τῶν νέων καὶ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμῶντες ἔχοιεν μὴ πρὸς τὰ ἀρχαῖα μόνα τῶν

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 3

Similarly, in Hermotimus, undoubtedly the most ambitious of Lucian’s

philosophical dialogues,5 the true and authentic philosopher is not evoked
as an infallible example of virtue destined for vague contemplation, but as
a real model to which a reader can fully conform, observing the best coher-
ence between the professed principles (dicta) and the corresponding conduct
( facta). Lucian, in fact, does not fall back on the nostalgic re-enactment of
examples from the past (primarily Socrates), aiming rather to give an effec-
tive response to the hic et nunc in which he operates, and to the educational
emergency of his time. Thus, the would-be Stoic Hermotimos appears fully
convinced that he can regard his preceptor as a valid model of a philosopher,
since he has successfully completed his formative journey, and is definitively
endowed with a stable form of εὐδαιμονία.6
In particular, from the very first moments of the conversation, Hermotimos
introduces a metaphorical image that runs through the whole development of
the dialogue and is essential for finding a satisfactory answer to the question
initially asked, i.e. whether the true philosopher exists, and where it is possible
to find him. To Lykinos,7 however, who presumes that his interlocutor, having
accomplished twenty years of intense study, is now close to the completion of
his Stoic formation, Hermotimos replies that he is still at the beginning, at the
foot of the mountain of virtue, whose summit can only be reached after travel-
ling a very long and tortuous path:8

ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ εἰ γάρ τι μέμνημαι, σχεδὸν εἴκοσιν ἔτη ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀφ’ οὗ σε οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ποιοῦντα ἑώρακα, ἢ παρὰ τοὺς διδασκάλους φοιτῶντα καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ
ἐς βιβλίον ἐπικεκυφότα καὶ ὑπομνήματα τῶν συνουσιῶν ἀπογραφόμενον,
ὠχρὸν ἀεὶ ὑπὸ φροντίδων καὶ τὸ σῶμα κατεσκληκότα. δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἀλλ’

παραδειγμάτων σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ῥυθμίζειν, ἀλλὰ κἀκ τοῦ ἡμετέρου βίου κανόνα προτίθεσθαι καὶ ζηλοῦν
ἐκεῖνον ἄριστον ὧν οἶδα ἐγὼ φιλοσόφων γενόμενον (‘It was on the cards, it seems, that our mod-
ern world should not be altogether destitute of noteworthy and memorable men, but should
produce enormous physical prowess and a highly philosophic mind … It is now fitting to tell
of Demonax for two reasons—that he may be retained in memory by men of culture as far as
I can bring it about, and that young men of good instincts who aspire to philosophy may not
have to shape themselves by ancient precedents alone, but may be able to set themselves a
pattern from our modern world and to copy that man, the best of all the philosophers whom
I know about.’) Translation by Harmon. On this work see Fuentes-González 2009; Beck 2016
and Solitario 2021. On the figure of Nigrinus see infra n. 19.
5 Cf. Nesselrath 1992, 3451-3453.
6 Herm. 7-8.
7 On Lykinos as the mask of the author in Lucian’s texts, see Dubel 1994; Ní Mheallaigh 2014,
177-181; Baumbach and von Möllendorff 2017, 13-57.
8 On the image of the long climbing path see Dolcetti 2015 and Solitario 2020, 188-192.

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4 Solitario

οὐδὲ ὄναρ ποτὲ ἀνιέναι σεαυτόν, οὕτως ὅλος εἶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι. ταῦτ’ οὖν
σκοπουμένῳ μοι φαίνῃ οὐκ ἐς μακρὰν ἐπιλήψεσθαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, εἴ γε μὴ
λέληθας ἡμᾶς καὶ πάλαι αὐτῇ συνών.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ πόθεν, ὦ Λυκῖνε, ὃς νῦν ἄρχομαι παρακύπτειν ἐς τὴν ὁδόν; ἡ
δ’ Ἀρετὴ πάνυ πόρρω κατὰ τὸν Ἡσίοδον οἰκεῖ καὶ ἔστιν ὁ οἶμος ἐπ’ αὐτὴν
μακρός τε καὶ ὄρθιος καὶ τρηχύς, ἱδρῶτα οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔχων τοῖς ὁδοιπόροις …
ΛΥΚ. ἀλλὰ ποῦ γάρ σε φῶμεν τῆς ὁδοῦ τυγχάνειν ὄντα;
ΕΡΜ. ἐν τῇ ὑπωρείᾳ κάτω ἔτι, ὦ Λυκῖνε, ἄρτι προβαίνειν βιαζόμενον. ὀλισθηρὰ
δὲ καὶ τραχεῖα καὶ δεῖ χεῖρα ὀρέγοντος.9

LYC. If I remember, it must be nigh on twenty years that I have seen you
doing nothing but going to the teachers, and usually bent over a book
and writing notes on the lectures, always pale and wasted with study-
ing. I suppose even your dreams give you no rest, you are so wrapped
up in it. So, when I consider this, I feel that you will not be long in
reaching happiness, unless it has been your companion for years and
we have missed seeing it.
HERM. How can that be, Lycinus? I am just beginning to get a glimpse of
my way there. Virtue, says Hesiod, lives far away, and the path to her is
long and steep and rough, with plenty of sweat for travellers …
LYC. Well, where on the road may we put you?
HERM. Still down in the foothills, Lycinus, though lately struggling on. It
is slippery and rough and needs a hand to help.

This mountain is not further specified, but it presents the opportunity to define
the enormous difficulties involved in the road leading to its summit, as well as
to identify the position of the Stoic preceptor, who would presumably already
be at the peak in the company of Virtue and Happiness. From Hermotimos’
point of view, the true sage seems to be in a poorly defined upper dimension
which can be reached through a rigid lifestyle and strictly adhering to the pre-
cepts of Stoic doctrine. The discussion at this point focuses on the expecta-
tions of the aspiring philosopher. On the mountain, in fact, Hermotimos does
not hope to obtain the goods generally coveted by men, but rather a whole
series of virtues, which, in turn, should already be in the possession of his Stoic
preceptor.10

9 Herm. 2-3. Translations of Hermotimus are by Kilburn.

10 Herm. 7: ΛΥΚ. ἀλλὰ τίνα φησὶ τἀγαθὰ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἕξειν πρὸς τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἐλθόντας;
ΕΡΜ. σοφίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι βεβαίως
πεπεισμένον ᾗ ἕκαστα ἔχει. πλούτους δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ταῦτα πάντα

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 5

Nevertheless, the situation is not as clear-cut as it might initially seem.

Lykinos, in fact, immediately responds to the optimistic statements of his
interlocutor, recounting a couple of anecdotes, by which the morally imper-
fect character of the Stoic master is exposed, along with the inconsistency of
the doctrine that he seeks to instill in Hermotimos himself. In the first case,
Lykinos reveals that the Stoic master behaved aggressively towards one of
his disciples who defaulted on the payment of an agreed remuneration; in
the other, he acted disgracefully at a banquet, revealing a conduct marked by
intemperance and greed.11 At the end of these short accounts, Hermotimos
appears visibly irritated, to the point of threatening to break off the conversa-
tion with Lykinos. The demystifying effect of Lykinos’ words, however, is irre-
versible: the Stoic master, the self-styled paragon of wisdom, in fact, is brought
down from the heights of his presumed irreproachable sagacity to the most
miserable of human realms. It should also be noted that while Hermotimos
had only vaguely sketched the residence of his master, this same master is
quite precisely located in space and time in Lykinos’ words: the evening before
the dialogue he took part in a banquet, exhibiting completely unregulated
behavior to the point of quarreling with a Peripatetic, and drinking and eat-
ing beyond all measure. As a consequence, he had to suspend his lessons for
the next day, preferring to recover at home. To summarize, while Hermotimos
initially imagined his master on the top of the mountain of virtue, Lykinos, on
the other hand, presents an absolutely pedestrian image of him, rendering the
initial question more compelling than before:12 if Hermotimos’ Stoic precep-
tor cannot be the ideal philosopher, then what defines him, and where can he
be found?
Lykinos, at this point, skillfully employs a series of Sceptical arguments,
the so-called tropes, which enable him to properly challenge Hermotimos’

κάτω ἀφῆκεν καὶ ἀποδυσάμενος ἀνέρχεται (‘LYC. If not these then, what does he say are the
good things which those who complete their training will get? HERM. Wisdom, courage,
beauty itself, justice itself, the sure certainty of knowing everything as it really is. Riches
and glories and pleasures and bodily things are all stripped off the climber and left down
below before he makes his ascent.’)
11 Anecdotes frequently occur in moralizing literature since they can decisively depict a
character within a brief space. See Ps.-Herm. Progymn. 3.1 (χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα
λόγου τινὸς ἢ πράξεως ἢ συναμφοτέρου σύντομον ἔχον δήλωσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου
τινὸς ἕνεκα, ‘a chreia is a recollection of a saying or action or both, with a pointed mean-
ing, usually for the sake of something useful’, translation by Kennedy). On this genre see
Kindstrand 1986, 214-243 and on its relevance in Lucian see Bompaire 1958, 463-464; Clay
1992, 3425-3429; Anderson 2009.
12 Lykinos is not merely the Sceptical counterpart of Hermotimos, since he demonstrates
that he is imbued with solid rhetorical competences. On this point see Solitario 2020, 1-5.

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6 Solitario

confidence in the correctness of his preference for Stoicism.13 Lykinos insists

first on the ‘diaphony’ issuing from the numerous philosophers, since each of
them has the same claim to truth, so that it is not at all easy to identify the
most trustworthy. Translated in metaphorical terms: who could be the most
reliable guide to reach the summit of the mountain of virtue?14 Although this
question remains unanswered, Lykinos gradually provides more defined con-
tours to the specific sphere in which the excellent and virtuous philosopher
should be placed. Virtue, in fact, is compared to an ideal city, the inhabitants
of which enjoy the highest degree of happiness and live together in harmony
and mutual peace. Constructing a long and composite simile, with this image
Lykinos condenses the fundamental thematic nucleus of the dialogue: the uto-
pian character of the city, in fact, alludes to the arduous discovery of the excel-
lent doctrine and the supreme philosopher, while the obstacles that render
this place unreachable imply the difficulties that are necessarily encountered
by an aspiring philosopher during his studies. Let us now consider in detail the
peculiarities of this city.15
This πόλις appears to be composed from a complex potpourri of utopian
motifs, that lend it a profoundly different outline to that of any socio-political
reality. The citizens who inhabit this place are called happy, wise, courageous,
just, prudent, even god-like (πόλις τις εὐδαίμονας ἔχουσα τοὺς ἐμπολιτευομένους …
σοφοὺς ἐς τὸ ἀκρότατον, ἀνδρείους ἅπαντας, δικαίους, σώφρονας, ὀλίγον θεῶν ἀποδέ-
οντας, Herm. 22), with all these peculiarities corresponding to the ἀγαθά listed
above by Hermotimos that were meant to be the prizes located at the moun-
tain’s summit (σοφίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πάντα
ἐπίστασθαι βεβαίως πεπεισμένον ᾗ ἕκαστα ἔχει, 7). Thus, Lykinos makes the prin-
ciples advocated by Hermotimos the keystones of a fictitious dimension, so
as to illustrate better all the incompatibilities with the dynamics of a real city.
Although he is not interested in any political aspect per se, Lykinos juxtaposes
several political concepts in a manner difficult or even impossible to find in a
real city. Thus, this non-existent city seems to be an ideal city, distinguished by
very utopian peculiarities corresponding to the similarly utopian features of a
life conducted according to philosophical virtue.

13 The use of the Sceptical tropes in Lucian’s corpus has been detected by Schwarz 1914 and
later focused on Hermotimus by Nesselrath 1992; Esposito 1995; Bonazzi 2010; Solitario
2020, 22-61.
14 Herm. 22-24.
15 Cf. Solitario 2020, 283-305.

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 7

Lykinos firstly states that peace and concord reign over this city, indicating
two central concepts of Greek political thought.16 The search for peace is the
driving motive of some ancient comedies, for example the Acharnenses, Pax,
and Lysistrata, all works in which Aristophanes builds a dramatic plot centered
on the persistent will to seek or establish peace, taking a clear position against
the dominant belligerent party in the city.17
In Lykinos’ city, εἰρήνη represents the stable and imperturbable condition of
the perfect philosopher, the citizen of the ideal πόλις. The belligerent charac-
ter of the alleged Stoic teacher of Hermotimos collides with this ideal profile
which is embodied in Demonax. This Cynic philosopher at first irritated his
interlocutors with his frankness, but the irenic aims of his actions soon became
clear, so that the citizens of Athens even worshipped him as a benefactor of
the city after he had died.18 Apart from specific figures of true, conciliatory
philosophers,19 philosophy is claimed to be the champion of a peaceful coex-
istence, a fact that is, however, constantly contradicted not only by a mass of
false philosophers committing numerous crimes and destabilizing the social
order,20 but also by the competitive and aggressive approach prevalent among
prominent philosophers.21

16 Herm. 22: οἷα δὲ πολλὰ γίγνεται παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἁρπαζόντων καὶ βιαζομένων καὶ πλεονεκτούντων,
οὐδὲν ἂν ἴδοις, φασίν, ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πόλει τολμώμενον, ἀλλὰ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ ξυμπολιτεύ-
ονται. (‘All those things that you find here—robbery, violence, cheating—they say you
would find none of them ventured in that city; no, they live together in peace and har-
mony naturally enough.’). In Hes. Th. 902 Eirene, Dike and Eunomia constitute the triad
of the Horai with the task of watching over the lives of men. Cf. Pi. O. 13.7, where Eirene
rejects arrogance as the cause of all sorts of conflicts within the civic body.
17 On utopian motives in Aristophanes, see Bertelli 1983; Dunbar 1995; Farioli 2001;
Canfora 2014.
18 Demon. 7-9 and 63-67.
19 In Lucian’s oeuvre, also Nigrinus is depicted as a respectable philosopher, worthy of being
held up as an example for those who wish to live according to philosophy’s tenets (Nigr. 14
and 26: οὐ μικρὰ δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα παρέχει τοῖς ζηλοῦν ἐθέλουσι παραδείγματα, τῆς τροφῆς τὸ
ἀπέριττον καὶ τῶν γυμνασίων τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὸ αἰδέσιμον καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος τὸ
μέτριον, ἐφ᾽ ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις τῆς διανοίας τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ τὸ ἥμερον τοῦ τρόπου, ‘he likewise
sets no mean example for those who care to imitate him in his simple diet, his moder-
ate physical exercises, his earnest face, his plain clothes and above all, his well-balanced
understanding and his kindly ways’, translation by Harmon). On Nigrinus see Clay 1992
and Deriu 2017 (with an up-to-date bibliography).
20 In Fug. 5, for example, Philosophy claims to have been sent by Zeus to men in order to
convince them to desist from all kinds of violence and abuse, which are largely commit-
ted also by false philosophers (id. 15-20).
21 See also Symp. 44, Eun. 1-3 and Pisc. 34. On the warlike character of false philosophers in
Lucian, see Männlein 2000 and Gerlach 2005.

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8 Solitario

The importance of ὁμόνοια in the constitution of an ideal citizenship, on

the other hand, is evident since the pre-Socratics,22 especially in Pythagorean
environments.23 Plato deepens this reflection, regarding ὁμόνοια as a harmoni-
ous atmosphere of agreement within the city, where each individual, accord-
ing to his own qualities, wisely occupies a fair position.24 Aristotle, on the other
hand, understands concord as an identity of views with respect to the interests
of the city, defining it overall as ‘political friendship’ able to ward off any kind
of endemic στάσις.25
According to Stoic thought, ὁμόνοια refers to the ‘science of the common
good’,26 which is the exclusive domain of wise men ready to collaborate actively
with each other. In this way, Lykinos reproduces a further quality of the Stoic
philosopher within an imaginary socio-political framework: just as the latter is
ready to establish a solid and sincere friendship with his fellow men, the citi-
zens manifest full mutual harmony even in the city of virtue.
In the course of the description of the πόλις, Lykinos introduces other cen-
tral terms of the Greek political lexicon, ultimately resulting in a mixture that
cannot be charted under any ideological label.27 The term εὐνομία, for example,
primarily denotes a conservative ideal, contrary to a wide distribution of polit-
ical and economic powers.28 Sparta is the proverbial eunomic city, but also
Crete and Corinth, all notoriously ruled by aristocratic regimes. The εὐνομία
on which the ideal city of Lykinos is founded does not imply an excellent leg-
islative system. On the contrary, the city of Lykinos is characterized by the
abolition of all laws, since it is structured according to a spontaneous social
harmony, which shelters it from any conflictual anarchic transformation.

22 Fr. 27 Democr. D 357 L.-M.: ἀπὸ ὁμονοίης τὰ μεγάλα ἔργα … δυνατὸν κατεργάζεσθαι (‘It is from
consensus that great deeds … can be brought to a successful conclusion’, translation by
Laks-Most) and fr. 37 Antiph. D 38a L.-M.
23 See for example Iamb. Ep. Περὶ ὁμονοίας ap. Stob. 2.33.15, p. 257 Wachsmuth.
24 R. 4, 432a: ὀρθότατ’ ἂν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος
κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ (‘We should be quite
right in affirming this unanimity to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior
and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual’, translation by
Shorey). See also R. 1, 351d, where injustice is considered a source of hostility and conflict,
while justice generates concord and friendship.
25 Arist. EN 9, 6.1167a22-1167b34 and EE 7, 7.1241a15-33.
26 SVF 3.625: ἐπιστήμη κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν. See also SVF 3.292, 630 and 661.
27 On the possible satirical hint to the contemporary political thought, especially to the
Roman propaganda, see the overview in André 1989.
28 Herm. 22: γαληνόν τινα καὶ πανευδαίμονα βίον βιοῦσιν ξὺν εὐνομίᾳ καὶ ἰσότητι καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς. (‘So they live a calm and perfectly happy life with good government,
equality, freedom, and the other blessings.’) On this concept see fr. 3 G.-P.2 = 4 W.2 of Solon
and the detailed commentary by Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 258-261.

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 9

Thus, the ideal πόλις is a place where the individual can reach, in concert
with the community, full moral perfection. The integration of each individual
into a unitary political context recalls Platonic reflection within the fifth book
of De republica. Here, Plato introduces the image of the πόλις-σῶμα, project-
ing the organicism of a living body onto the wider socio-political sphere, to
the point that physiological harmony becomes the concrete sign of a complete
unification of feelings and affections necessary on a collective level.29 Only this
form of homogeneity is a guarantee of order and balance, acting as an effec-
tive remedy against the onset of any internal sedition. However, Plato’s city is
based on the principle of οἰκειοπραγία according to which each of the three
social classes is recognized as having its own functions and prerogatives.30 In
contrast to this, Lykinos describes a picture freed from a rigid set of rules and
provisions: the city is a place where anyone, if he wants, can enter, becoming
an integral part of it (ἔλεγε δ’ οὖν περὶ τῆς πόλεως … ὅλως μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τὸν
βουλόμενον, 24), provided that he has walked the philosophical path to the end.
This suffices to mark the distance between Lykinos’ utopian dimension and
the political plan described by Plato in his καλλίπολις, to which Lykinos seems
to respond provocatively by delineating a parodic image of this ideal socio-
political conglomerate.31
Above all, the concept of ἐλευθερία is used in the Greek political lexicon to
indicate liberation from foreigners or from a tyrannical regime. Plato seems
to have assumed a firm stance against the excessive freedom of a democratic
regime, stressing the dangerous consequences for the overall structure of the
state.32 Freedom, however, soon acquires a moral connotation, denoting a state
of the soul that is free from disturbances. In Cynic thought, in fact, ἐλευθερία
becomes a central concept, relating to the need to free oneself from all forms
of social conditioning or impediment, both material and moral. The freedom
of the Cynic, in fact, consists in the full dominion of oneself (αὐτάρκεια) and in
the ability to master one’s passions (ἀπάθεια). The Stoics also depict freedom
as a state of the soul immune to passions (SVF 3.448 and 591), and free from

29 Pl. R. 5, 464b. On this section, see Vegetti 2000, 131.

30 See R. 4, 434a-c, in opposition to πολυπραγμοσύνη, which implies the disruption of social
and moral roles. On this concept see the recent overview in Murgier 2017 with further
bibliography.
31 Cf. Nesselrath 1993, 42, who, referring to the Verae historiae claims that the author here
did not only use utopian motifs, but also distorted them parodically. That Lucian pro-
duces another “Parodie einer Utopie” in Hermotimus is later analyzed, see infra. See also
Aristides Or. ad Rom. 60-62, where the universal ‘democracy’ of Rome is tendentiously
depicted. A satirical hint to this ideological background cannot be ruled out. See supra
n. 27. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
32 Pl. R. 8, 557b-564a.

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10 Solitario

any kind of opinion (SVF 3.603). This condition is favored by the use of correct
reason, which is one of the peculiarities of the sage, the only one capable of
being truly free (SVF 3.355, 361, 364). The wise man, in fact, cares exclusively
for the needs of the soul, considered the source of true wealth, which enables
him to acquire authentic happiness (SVF 3.592-602). In Lucian, the concept of
ἐλευθερία recurs to define the profile of true philosophers: Nigrinus exalts phi-
losophy and the freedom that derives from it,33 while Demonax seems to have
devoted himself entirely to the exercise of freedom, especially in the use of
free speech.34 In Lykinos’ city, freedom and the other accompanying concepts
mentioned are not further specified, nor is there any prospect of their concrete
application in the dimension of the πόλις. Rather, they constitute a slogan that
is easily recognizable to the learned audience, which is presumably capable of
grasping the link between the different semantic levels contained in the words:
in addition to the properly political level necessary to construct the image of
the ideal city, there is also that of morality, which contributes to drawing the
portrait of the Stoic sage.
The requirements of potential citizens, in fact, as well as the criteria for
the selection of the civic body (for which neither census, nor the family to
which they belong, nor any of the other criteria usually used in determining
citizenship are taken into consideration) do not correspond to those in force
within any existing political reality. Rather, they refer to the sum of the virtues
to be possessed by the authentic philosopher who, in Lykinos’ eyes, despite
numerous examples of false philosophers, appears as an attainable model.
The sense of the simile of the ideal city outlined by Lykinos emerges more
distinctly when one considers that Lucian may have taken into consideration
the models of ideal cities ascribed to the Cynic-Stoic tradition, handed down
to us only fragmentarily and known only in their fundamental principles. The
Cynic πόλις would have been characterized by a radical rejection of every
norm and by a rigidly individualistic approach, which is why the needs of the
individual would have prevailed over those of the entire civic body. A clear
example of this is given by Crates’ fragment on the city of Πήρα (the ‘knap-
sack’), the inhabitants of which are satisfied with simple products such as
thyme, garlic, figs, and bread without aspiring to goods such as silver or glory.
This enables them to renounce the use of weapons (SSR VH 70 = SH fr. 351).

33 Nigr. 4: προήχθη γὰρ αὐτήν τε φιλοσοφίαν ἐπαινέσαι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τῶν
δημοσίᾳ νομιζομένων ἀγαθῶν καταγελάσαι (‘For he went on to praise philosophy and the
freedom that it gives, and to ridicule the things that are popularly considered blessings’,
translation by Harmon).
34 Demon. 3, even at the cost of attracting the hostility of the Athenians. See supra n. 18.

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 11

The free relations established between the members of the city and the cos-
mopolitanism that animates the political project reveals the unconventional
character of the Cynic proposal, i.e. its radically innovative features, that are
coherent with the intention of returning to a state of nature and opposing all
forms of civilization.35
The Stoic city, on the other hand, as it emerges from the fragments attrib-
uted to Zeno, does not consist of a simple juxtaposition of individuals, but
rather lies in the pursuit of the common good, which should be facilitated
through the establishment of solid bonds of friendship. The members of the
πόλις are endowed with perfect wisdom, that is, a moral profile marked by the
full possession of virtue, so that those who are not perfectly wise cannot be wel-
comed into the city.36 On the contrary, Chrysippos seems to have transformed
the terrestrial city of Zeno into the notion of a cosmic city, in which men and
gods are united by just reason.37 There is, however, one element common to
these two ideal cities: both suppress the properly political characteristics of
a city or a social association, without claiming to be a model for the founda-
tion or improvement of an existing political community. The eminently mor-
alistic imprint of the political model elaborated within the Stoic school does
not seem to be entirely extraneous to the city conceived by Lykinos from the
ideological background of his interlocutor. Therefore, it cannot be excluded
that Lucian primarily refers by means of such a dialectical key to Cynic-Stoic
socio-political thought in this section of the dialogue. This has engendered
considerable debate over the past centuries. From the sources at our disposal,
in fact, there emerges a bitter discussion centering on the aforementioned
political models that continues until the Imperial age, during which Cassius
the Sceptic38 and Sextus Empiricus39 display a deep distrust on the concrete
application of such programs, insisting on the greedy nature of human beings.
Returning to Hermotimos’ ideal city, we must now take a final step in the
analysis to fully understand the meaning of this complex simile. The fact that
the characteristics of this city are incompatible with any real configuration of
cities seems to contradict the fundamental exceptionalism of the sage sought
by both interlocutors, who should be able to make an effective contribution to

35 On Cynic political thought and the impracticality of their proposals see Dawson 1992,
111-159 and Husson 2011.
36 See SVF 1.222, 226 and 262 (= Plu. Alex. mag. for. 6 = Mor. 329A-B): all virtuous individuals
are not enclosed in a well-defined city, being able to share an indefinite space of action,
extended to the whole universe.
37 Cf. SVF 1.259-271 and SVF 3.625-636.
38 D.L. 7.32-33.
39 Pyrrh. 3.245-249 and Adv. math. 11.189-194.

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12 Solitario

the community referenced. The paradoxical nature of this πόλις becomes more
evident considering that its constitution is very similar to that regulating the
world of the afterlife.40 In Cataplus, for example, peace prevails in the realm
of the dead because all earthly needs have been completely suppressed,41 just
as peace is practicable given the absence of those conflictual dynamics usually
present in a real city in the πόλις outlined by Lykinos.42 Furthermore, the after-
life is distinguished by an absolute equality among its members, encompassing
a wide range of aspects aesthetical, social and political:

ἔλεγε δ’ οὖν περὶ τῆς πόλεως, εἴ γε μέμνημαι, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ τάδε,
ὡς ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπήλυδες καὶ ξένοι εἶεν, αὐθιγενὴς δὲ οὐδὲ εἷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
βαρβάρους ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι πολλοὺς καὶ δούλους καὶ ἀμόρφους καὶ μικροὺς καὶ
πένητας, καὶ ὅλως μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τὸν βουλόμενον· τὸν γὰρ δὴ νόμον αὐτοῖς
οὐκ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐγγραφὴν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ σχημάτων ἢ μεγέθους ἢ
κάλλους οὐδ’ ἀπὸ γένους, [οὕτω λαμπρὸν ἐκ προγόνων], ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὐδὲ
νομίζεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῖς.43

He told me much about the city, if I remember, and in particular this, that
all the inhabitants were aliens and foreigners, not one was a native; there
were even many barbarians among the citizens, as well as slaves, cripples,
dwarfs, and paupers—in a word anyone who wanted to take part in the
city; for property, apparel, height, good looks, family, brilliant ancestry,
were not required by law for enrolment.

All the dead collected in the afterlife are reduced to mere skeletons, which, now
stripped of flesh, can no longer preserve a living body’s distinctive features.44

40 Camerotto 2016, 16 n. 16 points out that “ovunque nelle rappresentazioni lucianee

dell’Aldilà, anche dove non è necessario, affiora il lessico di una politeia”. On Lucian’s
world of the afterlife, see also Carsana 2008; Nesselrath 2017; Camerotto 2020, 44-50.
41 Cat. 15 (εἰρήνη δὲ πᾶσα καὶ πράγματα ἐς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀνεστραμμένα, ‘all are at peace, and the
tables are turned’). Cf. Dial. mort. 20.7 (ἐν ᾅδου γὰρ εἰρήνη καὶ οὐδὲν ὅπλων δεήσει, ‘there’s
peace in Hades and weapons won’t be needed’, translation by Harmon and Macleod). See
Camerotto 2020, 216. Nevertheless, in the Dialogi mortuorum there are several examples
of arguing individuals (see Dial. mort. 12, 20, 25, etc.).
42 See supra.
43 Herm. 24.
44 See Cat. 22 (πάντα γὰρ ἴσα καὶ ὁμόχροα καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε κάλλιον, ‘all things are alike
and of the same colour, and nothing is either beautiful or more beautiful’) and Nec. 15
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τῶν παλαιῶν γνωρισμάτων αὐτοῖς παρέμενεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοια τὰ ὀστᾶ ἦν, ἄδηλα καὶ
ἀνεπίγραφα καὶ ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἔτι διακρίνεσθαι δυνάμενα, ‘none of their former means of iden-
tification abode with them, but their bones were all alike, undefined, unlabelled, and

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 13

Likewise, beauty turns out to be insignificant as a selection criterion in the city

of Lykinos, so that individuals with an unpleasant appearance may find their
place within this city. The absence of any ornamentation or distinctive features
is also a characteristic of the world of the dead, where all the structural mark-
ers that exist in the world of the living have decayed. In the Dialogi mortuorum,
Diogenes argues that somatic features disappear in the realm of the dead, and
everything is reduced to ashes or to an indistinct mass of denuded skulls,45
whereas Charon explains to Hermes in Contemplantes that everyone will have
to leave their possessions behind and walk naked to Hades upon death.46 The
nudity of the dead is also mentioned by Lykinos in the depiction of the ideal
πόλις, where Hermotimos might arrive naked (in which case it would be neces-
sary for him to leave the mantle to which his relatives would cling, hindering
him to leave) without fearing any consequences.47 Moreover, according to the
special πολιτεία of the city,48 Lykinos says that wealth is no longer important
there, so that the poor and more generally those unable to boast a noble birth
have the right to join the civic body. Besides this social ἰσότης, there is also
a political one, with the consequence that any distinction between Greeks

unable ever again to be distinguished by anyone’, translation by Harmon). Cf. Dial. mort.
26.2. On this aspect of the Hades see Camerotto 2020, 217-219.
45 Dial. mort. 1.3 (πάντα μία ἡμῖν κόνις, φασί, κρανία γυμνὰ τοῦ κάλλους, ‘all with us, to quote the
proverb, is one and the same dust, skulls bereft of good looks’). Cf. Cat. 22, Nec. 15 and Dial.
mort. 1.3 and 5.1 (on the beauty of Helen).
46 Cont. 20 (παύσασθε κάμνοντες· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀεὶ βιώσεσθε· οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνταῦθα σεμνῶν ἀΐδιόν ἐστιν,
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπαγάγοι τις αὐτῶν τι σὺν αὑτῷ ἀποθανών, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸν μὲν γυμνὸν οἴχεσθαι, τὴν
οἰκίαν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγρὸν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἀεὶ ἄλλων εἶναι καὶ μεταβάλλειν τοὺς δεσπότας, ‘cease
toiling, for your lives will not endure forever. Nothing that is in honour here is eternal, nor
can a man take anything with him when he dies; nay, it is inevitable that he depart naked,
and that his house and his land and his money go first to one and then to another, chang-
ing their owners’, translation by Harmon). Cf. Dial. mort. 5.1 (Menippus says he sees in
Hades κρανία τῶν σαρκῶν γυμνά, ‘bare skulls’) and Dial. mort. 29.2 (φαλακρὰ γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ
γυμνά, καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ὁμοίως προφαίνομεν καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀφῃρήμεθα καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας ἀπο-
σεσιμώμεθα, ‘both of them are bald and bare, both of us show our teeth in the same way,
and have lost our eyes, and have snub noses now’). See also Dial. mort. 20.5 and Nec. 15.
47 Herm. 23: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοιεν ἢ μὴ δύναιντο, ἀποσεισάμενον αὐτοὺς χωρεῖν εὐθὺ τῆς πανευδαίμονος
ἐκείνης πόλεως καὶ αὐτὸ ἀπορρίψαντα τὸ ἱμάτιον εἰ τούτου ἐπειλημμένοι κατερύκοιεν, ἐσσύμε-
νον ἐκεῖσε—οὐ γὰρ δέος μή σέ τις ἀποκλείσῃ καὶ γυμνὸν ἐκεῖσε ἥκοντα (‘If they will not, or
cannot, we must shake them off and make straight for that all-happy city, throwing off our
very cloak should they hold on to it to drag us back as we hurry there—for there is no fear
of being shut out, even if you come there naked’). See also the same principle in Nec. 12
(γυμνοὶ κάτω νενευκότες παρειστήκεσαν) and Cat. 24-28 (the dead have to appear naked at
the court of Rhadamanthys).
48 On the πολιτεία ruling in the Hades see also Luct. 2. See Nesselrath 2009 for the critical
opposition to the depraved city of Rome.

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14 Solitario

and barbarians loses its meaning.49 Similarly, the socio-political equality in

the afterlife implies that kings have the same rights as the masses without
exception,50 and that everybody can participate in the public assembly, as
nobody is excluded because of the specific regulation of citizenship.51
The assimilation of the constitution of the ideal city to that in force in the
realm of the dead reveals Lykinos’ satirical intention, which confines the city
of virtue to an otherworldly dimension, far from any concrete realisation.
Furthermore, it is clear that no-one in Lucian wishes to go to Hades (apart
from the Cynic philosophers), despite its idealistic traits. The Dialogi mortu-
orum, for instance, are littered with a series of examples of characters who
execrate the moment of death, trying in every way not to lose contact with the
world of the living. Even the virtuous Socrates, peering from a distance at the
entrance to Hades, tries in every way to escape from it, searching in vain for
a way out.52 Other significant examples are in Cataplus, where Charon’s boat
is described as ferrying the sorrowful souls of the dead, which is harshly criti-
cised by Kyniskos, characterised in explicitly Cynic terms.53 Even in De luctu,
all the parody of funeral rituals has as its counterpart a paradoxical description
of death as an ideal dimension, to which nobody could lend credence out-
side the confines of Lucian’s amusing booklet. Far from advocating a nihilistic
perspective, Lucian describes Hades as an upside-down world which exerts
no fascination on the world of the living beyond the limits of a biting satiri-
cal provocation. From this perspective, Hades still represents a dystopic place
hardly preferable to the real world.54
What are the consequences of this for the ideal city depicted by Lykinos?
The attribution to the ideal city of characteristics proper to the world of the
dead in a far from utopian sense is best seen in one of the most exhilarating

49 Herm. 24, see supra n. 43.

50 Nav. 40 (σὺ δέ, ὁ οὕτως ὑψηλός, καταπεσὼν ἀνάσπαστος ἐκ τοῦ βασιλείου θρόνου τὴν αὐτὴν
ὁδὸν ἄπει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἰσότιμος ἐλαυνόμενος ἐν τῇ ἀγέλῃ τῶν νεκρῶν, ‘from what a height you
will fall when, jerked from your royal throne, you depart by the same road as the common
crowd, all equal as you are driven in the herd of the dead’, translation by Kilburn). See
Tomassi 2020, 263-264.
51 Nec. 19 (προὔθεσαν οἱ πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίαν περὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων· ἰδὼν οὖν πολλοὺς
συνθέοντας ἀναμίξας ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς νεκροῖς εὐθὺς εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν τῶν ἐκκλησιαστῶν, ‘the city
fathers called a public meeting to discuss matters of general interest; so when I saw many
people running in the same direction, I mingled with the dead and speedily became one
of the electors myself’). On this, see Camerotto 2020, 256-257.
52 Dial. mort. 4.
53 On Cynic philosophers in Lucian, see Nesselrath 1998 and Camerotto 2018.
54 On the characterization of Hades as a dystopic utopia see Halliwell 2008, 454-462 and
Camerotto 2020, 44 and 214-215.

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Dystopic Utopia in Lucian ’ s Philosophical Satire 15

passages of the Hermotimus, where Lykinos invites his interlocutor to count

the years necessary to complete his philosophical training.55 The two inter-
locutors arrive at the sum of about two hundred years, which they are ready
to reduce to one hundred and fifty years. In any case, this time span appears
easily to exceed the duration of a human life, and as such insinuates that
Hermotimos has apparently decided to tackle philosophy with a view to a bet-
ter life after death.56
This is a clear distortion of the conception of philosophy as μελέτη θανάτου;57
while in Plato this is linked to the “contemplation of the Whole and elevation
of thought, which rises from individual, passionate subjectivity to the univer-
sal perspective”,58 in Lucian it becomes only a reason to ridicule the inanity of
philosophy and its speculative research.59 In fact, if philosophy fails to play a
concrete role in the present, then it seems to lose any validity, becoming some-
thing of an ineffectual weapon at the service of hopeless plans by thoughtless
aspiring philosophers. In short, the exercise of philosophy, far from leading to
an ideal city, risks leading to the depths of hell, or at the most to the deleteri-
ous illusion of being able to reach the summit of maximum happiness. In this
sense, the utopian dream of philosophy may lead to death, which still hints at
a dystopic place, unworthy of desirability.
In conclusion, the search for the true philosopher (or rather the true philo-
sophical doctrine) in the Hermotimus was initially outlined in utopian terms,
at least on the part of the Stoic Hermotimos, who appeared to be sure of his
chosen school promising a condition of living far preferable to that of any

55 Herm. 48-49: ΛΥΚ. λογισώμεθα οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· εἴκοσι τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ ἐτίθεμεν, εἶτα Πλάτωνι
τοσαῦτα ἕτερα, εἶτα ἑξῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις. πόσα δὴ οὖν ταῦτα συντεθέντα ἐν κεφαλαίῳ γένοιτ’ ἄν,
εἰ δέκα μόνας θεῖμεν τὰς προαιρέσεις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ; ΕΡΜ. ὑπὲρ διακόσια, ὦ Λυκῖνε. ΛΥΚ. βού-
λει οὖν ἀφαιρῶμεν τὸ τέταρτον, ὡς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἔτη ἱκανὰ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ ὅλον;
ΕΡΜ. αὐτὸς ἂν εἰδείης ἄμεινον· ἐγὼ δὲ ὁρῶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὀλίγοι ἂν καὶ οὕτω διὰ πασῶν ἐξέλθοιεν ἐκ
γενετῆς εὐθὺς ἀρξάμενοι (‘LYK. Let us count them up from the beginning: we gave twenty
to Pythagoras, the same to Plato, and to all the others the same. What would the total be if
we assume only ten philosophical sects? HERM. More than two hundred years, Lycinus.
LYK. Shall we take off a quarter, and make a hundred and fifty years enough, or a whole
half? HERM. You would know better than I. I see this: few would get through them all
even on this reckoning, if they began right from the day they were born’).
56 Herm. 78: εἰ μή τι ἐς ἄλλον, ὦ γενναῖε, βίον προγυμνάζεις ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἐς ἐκεῖνον ἐλθὼν ἄμεινον
διαγάγοις, εἰδὼς ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ βιοῦν (‘Unless, my noble friend, you are putting in train-
ing for a future life, so that you can live it better when you get there, knowing how to live’).
57 Pl. Phd. 81a.
58 Hadot 1995, 97.
59 On the problematic identification between Lucian and the fictive figure of Lykinos see
supra n. 7. On the specific approach of Lucian (and Lykinos) to philosophy, see Solitario
2020, 5-10.

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16 Solitario

layman. However, this ideal place is impossible to reach, so that all the psycho-
physical efforts undertaken may ultimately lead only to death. In fact, the ideal
dimension depicted by Lykinos by means of the Stoic ideological arsenal bears
utopian traits potentially alluding to an afterlife dimension where every philo-
sophical doctrine, apart from the Cynic, proves useless. Thus, philosophy, at
least according to the principles of the canonical (especially Stoic) schools
of thought, is destined to fail, leading to Hades rather than to much-desired
happiness.60 In order to avoid this risk, Lykinos contrasts the proposals of the
various dogmatic philosophical currents at the end of the dialogue, suggesting
rather a simple, rationally inspired, morally responsible, and positively opera-
tive conduct of life within the social context in which each individual lives.61

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60 On the eudaemonist aim of Hellenistic philosophies see Goulet-Cazé 1986, 141-191 and
Long 1999, 617-641.
61 Herm. 84: ΛΥΚ. καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ἐπείπερ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν ἂν ἄμεινον ποιήσαις βίον
τε κοινὸν ἅπασι βιοῦν ἀξιῶν καὶ συμπολιτεῦσαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐδὲν ἀλλόκοτον καὶ τετυφωμένον
ἐλπίζων, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνῇ, ἤνπερ εὖ φρονῇς, εἰ γέρων ἄνθρωπος μεταμαθήσῃ καὶ μεταχωρήσεις
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον (‘LYK. And so with you; since that is your view, you will do better in the
future to make up your mind to join in the common life. Share in the city life of every-day,
and give up your hopes of the strange and puffed-up. You will not be ashamed, if you are
wise, to learn afresh in your old age and make a change for the better’). This alternative
philosophy of the ‘common life’ is suggested also in Nec. 21 (see Camerotto 2020, 266-269).
On the provocative potential of this assertion within the παιδεία of the Second Sophistic,
see Solitario 2020, 567-569.

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