Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

SUBMISSION of ‘ICE Mode III: Case Analysis’ for ‘Constitutional Law I’

Submitted by:
KUSHAGR KAUSHIK
PRN: 21010224090
Programme: BBA.LLB.
Division: A
Semester: III
Year: 2nd Year
Batch: 2021-26
Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA
Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune
Case Assigned: Common Cause v. Union of India
Submitted to:
Dr. Sakshi Parashar
Assistant Professor
Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA
Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune
(August-September2022)
INTRODUCTION

Common cause, a recognised organisation, filed a writ petition according to article 32 to draw attention
to the suffering of persons whose natural lifetime is shortened by catastrophic diseases and whose
painful medical procedures artificially extend their lives. The appeal was heard by P. Sathasivam, the
Chief Justice, ranjan gogoi, and shiva kirtan singh, JJ.

The petition asks whether the "right to die with dignity" is a component of the "right to live with dignity"
guaranteed by article 21's "protection of life and personal liberty." The topic of euthanasia dominated
my answer.

Occasionally referred to as "mercy killing," euthanasia is the act or practise of ending the lives of persons
suffering from physically debilitating illnesses or agonising, fatal conditions without causing them pain or
accelerating their death by postponing medical treatment or life support. The Netherlands and Belgium
were the first nations to legalise euthanasia in 2001 and 2002. As there is currently no law against eu-
thanasia in India, the court determined that its ruling would be enforced until the Indian government
enacted the necessary legislation. India and the great majority of other countries prohibit active eu-
thanasia, which includes the intentional administering of fatal drugs.

In Common Cause v. Union of India, the court clarified the scope of the right to privacy and emphasised
that without it, liberty cannot be achieved. In addition, the court said that the right to privacy is essential
for maintaining human dignity. In addition, it was believed that the right to privacy was necessary for
the preservation of a person's bodily integrity, uniqueness, and freedom of choice. This case illustrated
how the right to privacy evolved as government involvement diminished as the patient's medical condi-
tion worsened and the likelihood of recovery diminished.
THE CASE FACTS

The writ petition in this case led in a finding that the "right to live with dignity" under Article 21 includes
the "right to die with dignity," ensuring that terminally ill or neglected individuals have the opportunity
to make a living will or a modern Clinical Directive. Due to inconsistencies in Indian case law on the right
to die, this case was shifted from a three-judge bench to a single judge.

According to the petitioner, innovative medical procedures should not be employed to prolong the lives
of those in a persistent vegetative state since it would prolong their agony and violate their autonomy
and dignity. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the right to live and the right to die with dignity
were inextricably linked. Because this is a basic human right recognised by common law, no one may be
forced to get medical treatment against their choice. The right to life, as interpreted by the court, does
not include the capacity to commit suicide, but it does include the right to retain one's nobility until
death. As a result of this appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of legalising passive euthanasia. Fur-
thermore, it states that it is opposed to the legalisation of active euthanasia, in which a person is pushed
into taking lethal medications in order to terminate their own life.

The Ministry of Health and Family Affairs, which is responding in this issue, said in an affidavit that eu-
thanasia is very difficult to manage since each circumstance is unique and general rules or standards are
meaningless. Despite the fact that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution preserves the right to a decent
existence, the defendant claimed that it is restricted to the provision of food, housing, and necessary
medical treatment. The right to die with dignity, it was contended, is distinct from the right to live with
dignity.

Minoo Masani, a Mumbai-based activist who formed the Society for the Right to Die with Dignity in
1981, has filed an intervenor application in this case. The Supreme Court recognised a social impact. The
speaker proposed euthanasia as a remedy in his presentation. The judgement directs the execution of
measures to ensure a painless death and the abolition of all suffering. As part of free will, the power to
choose between life and death was emphasised. The intervenor supported living wills and provided an
example in an affidavit filed to the court.
CASE PROBLEMS

Issues in the 2014 litigation involving Common Cause vs. Union of India -

 Is Article 21's guarantee of the right to live in dignity sufficient to ensure the right to die in dig-
nity?
 Is it legal for someone to refuse medical treatment or have life-sustaining equipment taken from
them, resulting in death?
 Is the Indian Law Commission in favour of utilising euthanasia to alleviate the suffering of pa-
tients?

THE CASE ANALYSIS

Dipak Misra, a former Indian Chief Justice, authored the majority opinion. He focused most intently on
the ability to refuse medical treatment or have life-supporting equipment removed, resulting in the sub-
ject's death. Justice Misra categorises this matter as falling under the purview of law, ethics, morality,
and society standards in his decision. These rights may also be utilised commercially.

Suicide attempts are prohibited under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, which was argued
to violate fundamental rights in P. Rathinam v. Union of India. In Maruti Shripati Dubal v. the State of
Maharashtra, the Supreme Court of India pronounced Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code to be uncon-
stitutional, while admitting that basic rights could have both favourable and unfavourable effects (1987).
It was agreed that this right to die followed naturally from the right to live. The ability to choose suicide
was sometimes argued to be a component of the right to life. In a case challenging the constitutionality
of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional
since Article 21 of the Indian Constitution expressly guaranteed the right to die. As a result, Article 309
of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 was declared illegal.
A year after the P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) decision was made public, the Gian Kaur v. State of
Punjab case was filed, but it didn't directly address the P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) issue (1996).
(1996). In spite of the fact that choosing to remain silent is a covert act, P. Rathinam erred when he
came to his conclusion, which presupposed that other fundamental rights include the "right not to." In
contrast to suicide, this doesn't often have visible warning indications. Despite the fact that suicide is
covered under Article 21, the requirement that the suicidal individual take an overt action in order for it
to be recognised is still in place. Therefore, the right to life would not protect against an untimely death.
In Airedale NHS Trust v. Anthony Bland, the court distinguished between the "right to die" and the "right
to die with dignity" (1992). (1992). A terminally ill or chronically vegetative patient whose natural death
has already begun will die if life support is removed. It was also determined that Sections 306 and 309 of
the Indian Penal Code of 1860 are legitimate.

The court also decided that people had the right to refuse medical treatment if they so desired. A per-
son who executes an advanced medical directive must be at least 18 years old, in good health, and fully
aware of its implications. It must be completed without undue coercion, pressure, or restraint. It must
be in writing and include details on how and when treatment will end. The executor of the present
treatment directive shall have the authority to revoke the present treatment directive at any time. Ad-
vance medical directives may only be signed by executors with the First-Class Judicial Magistrate's con-
sent. The first evaluation must be provided by a hospital-organized medical community comprising at
least three to four doctors with at least 20 years of experience in this field. A second medical board has
been constituted by the District Collector to evaluate the hospital's accreditation. Before the official can
visit the person to confirm his decision, the Board must first notify the First-Class Judicial Magistrate of
its decision. These limitations will continue to apply unless new legislation is passed.

In the 2011 case Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India and Others, the Supreme Court of India
upheld the legitimacy of passive euthanasia and the administrative processes that go along with it. Ac-
cording to the Court, "severe conditions of patient suffering may be admissible in passive euthanasia."
The patient, a rape victim who has been in a coma for 42 years, is entirely responsible for this. Addition-
ally, the consensus opinion emphasised the idea's significance. If getting the patient's consent is not pos-
sible, this legislation is applicable. Sometimes a doctor must take an unpopular stand in order to act in
the patient's best interests. This intervention would be necessary since the patient is unable to give in-
formed consent. Only someone with common sense can make the decision in the patient's best interest.
According to Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Article 21 only permits passive euthanasia.
CONCLUSION
I believe that before granting someone permission to use their authority to perform contemporary med-
ical operations, the Honorable Court ought to have demanded both a psychiatric evaluation and advice
from a medical expert. However, they do not outline a process for withdrawing such orders, which could
result in disputes about whether the patient actually did so.

Unmistakably, the Court declared that the Gian Kaur decision did not support passive euthanasia. The
Court's decision in Mrs. Shanbaug, which held that passive euthanasia could only be legalised through
legal methods, was shown to be wrong, the study concluded. The Court argued that the ability to imple-
ment a modern medical Directive was a step in the correct direction of safeguarding individual auton-
omy and self-determination rights. A approach that promotes the patient's best interests, allowing a
caregiver to step in and make the decision on their behalf, may be employed when patients are unable
to make an informed decision.

The New Jersey Supreme Court found in Re Quinlan (1976) that as a person's health declines, the state's
interests significantly change and the person's right to privacy over their personal integrity increases.
The court used this verdict as evidence to support its position. Never force a patient to continue receiv-
ing therapy against their will. The Indian Supreme Court stated that "patients' right to individual auton-
omy and integrity, which Apex Court has recognised as a component of their right to privacy, is also
breached in this instance, along with the concept of informed consent." The relationship between au-
tonomy and the right to privacy was extensively discussed in the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India. The Court referenced many judgments in this case. Even the relationship between pri-
vacy rights and how they might affect euthanasia was taken into account by the court. Both interna-
tional and Indian court judgments were referred to in the judicial.