5/6/22, 12:09 PM Logistic Lessons in the Russia-Ukraine War | The Cove

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Logistic Lessons in the Russia-Ukraine

War

This article takes another look at the logistics lessons from the Russia-Ukraine I
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An Army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without

bases of supply it is lost.
– Sun Tzu

Following on from Alexander Scott’s article The Weakening Logistics Chain of the
Russo-Ukrainian War: An Unfolding Case Study, this article takes another look at the
logistics lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war to date. It examines strategic logistics

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successes prior to the conflict through to failures being experienced at the tactical
level.

If you don’t know the history of Russia and Ukraine, take a quick look at the videos in
this Russia-Ukraine Crisis Primer.

On the 24th of February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his nation
would commence immediate military action in Ukraine. This announcement was likely
intended to cripple the Ukrainian people with fear, leading to the timely surrender of
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and leaving Ukraine under Russian rule. Now,
weeks into the invasion and after formidable resistance by both the Ukraine military
and civilians, there is no end in sight. At the time of publishing, Russia is stalled in a
fight that was planned to be swift and decisive.

Background to the War

Putin’s intent was clear. He sought the isolation of Ukraine from NATO and a promise
that NATO will cease its expansion into Eastern Europe. NATO’s non-compliance with
this demand was used as the rationale and pretext for invasion. Putin labelled NATO’s
expansion as an act of aggression toward his nation’s sovereignty. He also claimed
Ukraine as part of Russia based on its historical ties to the Soviet Union. He went
further to state that large parts of Ukraine had been ‘nazified’ and claimed mass
genocide within Ukraine. Many Western nations have since placed sanctions on Russia,
which was cited by Putin as an act of aggression.

How we Measure Militaries

Militaries are often measured by the standing Army size or number of Main Battle
Tanks (MBT), fighter aircraft and warships available. Russia, with a reported military
many times larger than Ukraine in each of these metrics, was expected to force Ukraine
to capitulate quickly.

The war in Ukraine shows that a nation’s military power is not purely measured on its
size, but rather its ability to defend, or to project force, and sustain it in conflict. Of
course, the skill and tactics of the military also play a large part in achieving this.

Military power should also be measured by the following components:

Economy – money and raw materials available to sustain the force.

Industry – intrinsic fabrication of military equipment and supplies or import
capability.
Strategic Infrastructure – air and sea ports, roads, rail and fuel assets.

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End-to-end Supply Chain – supply of individual components of warfare from

supplier to front line. For example, bullets, food, repair parts, computer chips and
the means to transport them from where they are produced to where they are
used.
Equipment – military and civilian equipment with people to operate it in support
of war efforts.

Russia is having each of the above components of military power systematically

dismantled via external sanctions while Ukraine operates against the physical military
component.

Russian Preparations on the Path to War

After Russia annexed Crimea, two key logistics outcomes were met. Firstly Crimea
provided Russia with a naval stronghold to the south of Ukraine. From this base, forces
and equipment could easily be projected into Sevastopol for military build-up. This is a
strategically important port and guarantees domination of the Black Sea. It also
enables control of shipping routes contained within. Secondly, the Kerch Strait Bridge
was built in 2019. It linked Crimea to Russia and provided a rail link to the south of
Ukraine. This is an important historical event noting Russia’s heavy reliance on rail for
military logistics.

Crimea provided Russia with a secure staging base for military build-up prior to the
war, as well as ongoing sustainment. This is perhaps why the Russian advance has
progressed more quickly in the south. Russia has since fought to connect Crimea to
the Donbas Region to form a land bridge to Russia. Controlling the ‘Mariupol Line’ has
been a strategic objective of Russia since Crimea was annexed. The region houses
additional strategic rail networks, as well as key steel and industrial production, and
export hubs.

Russian Logistics during the War

On the first day of conflict, Russia seized the disused Chernobyl powerplant on the
northern fringe of Ukraine. Although the reason for seizure was not fully known, control
over the asset would be considered strategic as the facility still requires active
maintenance to avoid further disaster giving Russia considerable power over Ukraine.
The site is also close to the border of Belarus, a nation which supports Russia and its
Soviet Union claims in the region. This gave Russia its first foothold in the north of
Ukraine and secured a northern avenue of approach into Kyiv on the western side of
the Dnieper River.

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Numerous other strategic infrastructures have since been seized by the Russian
military including airports, sea ports, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (which
is the largest plant in Europe). This has in effect isolated Ukraine by sea and allowed
Russian forces to control a significant portion of Ukraine’s national power generation
capability. Additionally, Russia has struck Ukrainian military bases with missile attacks.

Ukraine Actions on Russian Logistics

Just as Russia has sought to seize and retain key logistics infrastructure, Ukraine
sought to deny it from the hands of Russia. On the 26th of February 2022, Ukrainian
Railways confirmed that all rail links between Russia and Ukraine had been destroyed.
This was seemingly an effort to deny Russian military use. Since that point, Russia has
been plagued with apparent logistics deficiencies including entire military convoys
being halted for days at a time. Military vehicles have also been reported as running
out of fuel on route to Kyiv. Russia, having relied heavily on rail for projecting its military
force had to rely on vehicles and road networks. This, in effect, physically dislocated
Russian columns from supply bases and disrupted the supply chain of the Russian
military.

Ukraine then started actively targeting logistics vehicles. Russia adapted to conceal fuel
vehicles as cargo variants but Ukraine quickly identified the tactic. Further, Ukraine
were sheltering in the complex terrain of cities and attacking Russian convoys by night,
enabling the targeting of critical logistic vehicles. This disrupted Russian
communication with higher headquarters and stretched their supply lines. Conversely,
Ukraine has an active international supply chain and has received weapons and
munitions from other nations, a luxury that Russia currently does not share.

Weather and Environment

In January, US President Joe Biden stated Putin may be waiting for optimum freeze
conditions prior to commencing operations. The Ukrainian winter runs from December
to February with average temperatures below zero in January which causes much of
the ground to freeze. By March, the temperatures had increased to averages of low
single digits (celsius). In this spring period, much of the ground defrosts and turns to
mud. The Russian T72B3, T80-U, T90-A and T14 MBTs are some of the lightest MBTs
currently in service, with all weighing in at below 50 tonnes. Most NATO military MBTs
weigh more than 60 tonnes prompting fears that war in Eastern Europe would be
extremely difficult not only due to the ground conditions, but also the many bridges
unable to hold the load of a NATO MBT.

The Russian military is not new to these conditions, training year round in various
weather conditions. Despite this, we have seen many examples of Russian tanks and
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supply vehicles stuck in mud either during training exercises directly before the
conflict, or during the conflict. While many commentators have said that this indicates
poor planning for the timeline of the invasion, it potentially indicates something
different. Not that Putin and his Generals timed the invasion poorly, but rather that the
conflict was planned to be a rapid victory. Some military analysts are saying that
Russia’s plan accounted for immediate victory; expecting that Ukraine would either
surrender or collapse within minutes or hours. With the thaw well and truly set in, it
seems that the window for Russia to achieve a swift ground victory may be closing.

Conclusion

The difference in size between the Russian and Ukrainian military is immense, but the
outcomes of the war to date have clearly shown this not to be a decisive factor. While
Russia seized strategic logistics infrastructure prior to and early on in the war, it is clear
the strategic advantage that provided is dwindling with every tactical failure. Ukraine
has protected its own logistics assets while targeting that of Russia’s. While Russia
planned for a swift and decisive victory, Ukraine has found ways to make Russia’s
operational objectives increasingly difficult to obtain. Ukraine has elongated the war
forcing Russia to fight over vast distances in poor conditions with stretched supplies,
and without the benefit of strategic rail assets. Regardless of the eventual outcome of
this war, much can be learnt by the way in which each state has fought this war, and
more lessons will undoubtedly come in the weeks and months ahead.

Biography
Robert Gibson

Robert Gibson is currently a member of The Cove team in a part time capacity. He
works full time in fast moving consumer goods as a Logistics Manager. He is most
passionate about human resources, organisational culture, leadership and change
management theory. His writing aims to evoke a response in its readers to stimulate
discussion and encourage divergent thinking.

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Comments

Submitted by: Justin Ryan 16/03/2022

Hi Gibbo,
Great article mate, really useful to highlight the differences between tactical and
operational/strategic logistics for the junior logisticians.

1 Reply

Reply by: Gregory Niven 17/03/2022

Good article. Shows both sides of the logistics story which is an
interesting insight in an objective view.

Reply

Submitted by: Tevita Biudole 21/03/2022

Great article mate.

Reply

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