Philippine Government Peace Treaties with

the Muslim Filipinos.

Abstract

The stalemate between the Philippine government and the insurgent forces of

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ongoing global War on Terror, and the

government's desire for peace in the southern Philippines to help the country's economy

have created an environment conducive to resolving the Muslim secessionist rebellion

in the south. A change in leadership in the MILF has also provided an opportunity to re-

energize and seek new approaches to the peace process.

The most difficult issue in the peace process is not whether the parties can reach

an agreement, but whether that agreement can truly bring about long-term peace and

development in the south. The conflict's long history and failed approaches to resolution

have created deep divisions among Muslims and the general Filipino population, which

views any peace agreements with skepticism or, at best, guarded optimism.

The peace agreement must be able to provide a thorough road map that

specifically attends to the complaints of Muslims in the Philippines. However, that

roadmap will only significantly advance peace if it is backed by the majority of Filipinos.

The MILF and the government need to engage their own supporters in the peace

process by reaching out to them. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the president, must actively

engage in wooing the extremists and building support across the country. To come up

with practical solutions for the issues facing the nation's Muslim minority, the

government and the MILF must look beyond their particular group interests.

The parties must consider all possibilities for a political framework that can

accommodate their divergent interests if they are to find common ground. They must

abandon the "independence-autonomy track" that has stifled prior peace efforts and
look at alternative models and political institutions that have been successful in

resolving secessionist crises in other parts of the world.

Strong implementation measures must be included in any peace accord.

Previous peace processes have resulted in good agreements but were ineffective.

Implemented. To oversee the implementation, an unbiased third party must be enlisted.

The peace accord.

Introduction

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government are currently in

peace negotiations. (MILF) that started in 1997 will reach its critical stage in Kuala

Lumpur in February 2005. As the parties begin talks in Malaysia to come to an

agreement regarding the fundamental disputes in the battle. This round marks a turning

point in a protracted peace effort. Frequently derailed by claims that the MILF has ties to

terrorist groups, two major Wars, infrequent skirmishes, and accusations and denials of

cease-fire violations On July 18, 1997, the parties forged an agreement.

To arrive at this point, both sides had to make compromises. Despite the

opposition of hardliners, The Philippine government removed arrest warrants for the

MILF leaders for allegedly taking part in bombings and repositioned its troops away

from rebel strongholds.  All throughout the nation. The MILF, on the other hand, sent

details to disarm groups.  Engaged in kidnappings to refute claims that it has ties to

terrorist group’s organizations, in particular with the local terrorist organization Abu

Sayyaf, who publicized foreigner kidnappings and Jemaah Islamiyah.

The United States was the target of terrorist strikes on September 11, 2001,

which gave the Islamic Philippines militancy, particularly on Mindanao, the second-

largest island in the nation and the scene of the MILF's fight for a sovereign Islamic

state. Reports about the links between the separatist movement and Jemaah Islamiya,

Abu Sayyaf, and al Qaeda shocked the Philippine government has entered a frenzy of

solution-seeking on its Muslim issue.

It is impossible to overstate the strategic significance of a peace agreement

between the government and the MILF. The final key component for achieving long-
term peace in the southern Philippines is negotiations with the MILF. The Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF), the nation's first Muslim revolutionary group, and Manila

negotiated a peace treaty in 1996. This agreement, which establishes autonomy in

provinces and cities that voted to be part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM), puts an end to the MNLF's 25 years of armed struggle for

independence (the MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1977).

The MILF has reaffirmed its demand for the creation of an independent Muslim

state, while the MNLF chose to pursue its aspiration for self-determination through

autonomy. The MILF views this vehicle for limited self-rule as a complete failure. The

MILF stated prior to the talks that it would reject the same or even a more enhanced

autonomy arrangement because it believes autonomy has failed to address the

fundamental grievances of the armed revolution. Manila, on the other hand, continues to

reject any demand for a separate state. The southern Philippines' Muslim state.

Despite the seemingly incompatible positions, the ongoing negotiations should

give the procedure the much-needed impetus to move forward. There are grounds for

optimism. The government-MILF cease-fire is still in effect, first. Monitors from

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) members, notably Malaysia, Brunei, and

Libya, are assisting in putting the terms of the ceasefire agreement into effect in the

southern Philippines. Second, a neutral third party is facilitating the talks. For the

Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia has been driving peace efforts in the

southern Philippines since March 2001. The United States Institute of Peace is

supporting the facilitation process.

Third, since 1997, the lectures have been much better organized. The parties are

now. Have decided to talk about their general objectives before specific political

formations. in June The framework and the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement between

Manila and the MILF the principles for the negotiation process and makes mention of

the incremental nature of the peace process.3 This indicates that the current round of

negotiations is to move forward in a way that the three important issues—specifically,

"ancestral domain" Security arrangements in MILF areas, the rehabilitation of conflict-

affected communities, and Muslims' historical claim to the southern Philippines as their

homeland—will all be Prior to the negotiations of mutually agreed political institutions,

these issues are dealt with in stages.

Fourth, international assistance agencies and civil society groups actively

participate in the peace process. NGOs are mobilizing to support the implementation of

the cease-fire agreement, such as the "Bantay Cease-Fire" (Cease-Fire Watch). Once a

peace accord with the Taliban is signed, foreign countries and international aid

organizations have committed to support rehabilitation and post conflict development

initiatives. MILF is in operation.

Body of the paper

Where the Conflict Started

5 percent, or about 4 million people, of the 82 million people living in the

Philippines are Muslims. Geographically, they are concentrated on the southern

Philippine islands of Mindanao and Sulu, where they make up about 20% of the more

than 16 million people living there. The Maguindanaoans in the Pulangi River Basin of

central Mindanao, the Maranaos in the Lanao Lake region of central Mindanao, and the

Tausugs in the Sulu archipelago are three major (and ten minor) ethnolinguistic groups

to which they belong. Muslims predominate in the five ARMM member provinces

(Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) as well as the Islamic City

of Marawi.

Mindanao and Sulu were historically considered by the Muslims to be their

motherland. General Legaspi's arrival in the Philippines in 1565 marked the start of

Spanish colonization. Local Islamic groups and settlements of foreign Muslims were

already thriving in Sulu by the later half of the thirteenth century. Around 1450, the first

sultan of Sulu came to power; around 1515, Sharif Kabunsuan arrived in Mindanao and

established the Maguindanao sultanate. Consequently, long before the Spaniards

established their dominance over Islam was growing in the southern islands of the

Philippines, while it was thriving in the north where the sultanates of Sulu and

Maguindanao were already well-established. Muslim traders were doing well with their

trade and business both within and outside of the Malay regions.
 The southern Muslims successfully resisted Spanish colonial incursions for three

centuries; only the northern Christians were able to gain a firm foothold. The Spanish

referred to the Muslims in the south as "Moros," just as they did their adversaries from

Mauritania and Morocco. This term later evolved into a representation of bravery and

national pride for the Muslims in the Philippines. The Moros were the rulers of Mindanao

and Sulu, where they made up 98 percent of the population, as the unconquered people

of the South.

But by 1914, American colonialism had succeeded in taming the Muslim south. In

contrast to the Spaniards' repeated failures, Aijaz Ahmad has pinpointed the causes of

the Americans' comparatively quick success. First, the balance of forces: The

Americans had advanced weapons and the capacity to efficiently concentrate their

forces across the archipelago. Second, a fresh approach to colonial governance: the

Americans gave the city and district administrations significant administrative autonomy,

which solidified their devotion to the colonial authorities. Third, the demographic model

of colonization: Whole populations, mostly landless and ambitious, were encouraged to

migrate from the Visayas and Luzon to establish Christian enclaves in predominately

Moro areas—that is, on lands the Muslims claimed as their own4—during the

establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. Government policy was already

geared toward integrating the Moros into the larger Philippine society.

The Moros became a minority in the territory they considered their home when

major Christian resettlement groups sprang up swiftly in Mindanao from the 1930s on;

their share of the population plummeted from 98 percent to 40 percent by 1976 to now

about 20 percent. Moros currently possess fewer than 17% of the islands' real estate,

especially in rural, underdeveloped areas. According to recent estimates, 80 percent of

Moro people lack land.

Political groups made up primarily of Moro students ran a number of campaigns

from 1968 to 1971 calling for the recognition of the Moros' right to self-determination as

a people with a distinct history and identity. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),

led by University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari, was established as a result of

these movements. Numerous young Moros were sent to Malaysia for paramilitary
training; Sabah in Malaysia developed into the Moro rebels' supply and communication

hub. Paramilitary incidents involving Christian and Moro groups were more aggressive

at the same period. When the Philippine Constabulary sided with Christian paramilitary

organizations in offensives against the Moro rebels in 1971, these incidents took on a

more foreboding dimension.

President Ferdinand Marcos enacted martial law on September 21, 1972, to quell

the escalating uprising. The MNLF launched armed counteroffensives and demanded

that the Bangsamoro (also known as "the Moro homeland") be recognized as an

independent state. Military and civilian fatalities totaled 120,000 from 1972 to 1976.

Around one million residents of the southern Philippines were internally displaced, and

over 100,000 people fled to adjacent Malaysia. The MNLF was acknowledged by the

Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1975 as speaking for Muslims in the

Philippines. A cease-fire agreement and the beginning of negotiations between the

government and the MNLF were aided by President Marcos' plea for peace and flurry of

diplomatic initiatives with OIC members.

A peace agreement between the Marcos administration and the MNLF was

signed in Tripoli in December 1976, and it called for the creation of autonomy in 13

provinces and 9 cities in the southern Philippines. But there were significant differences

between the two sides over how to carry out the agreement, particularly in relation to

the topic of a plebiscite. The Tripoli Agreement was implemented unilaterally by

President Marcos, who also established provisionally autonomous governments in two

regions that included the provinces and cities covered by the agreement. A MNLF

denied the legitimacy of the independent administrations and charged the administration

with breaking the conditions of the Tripoli Agreement. It wasn't until the 1996 peace

accord that when former General Fidel Ramos was president of the Philippines, the

MNLF and the Philippine government reached an agreement on how to implement the

Tripoli Agreement that the MNLF could accept as well as a plan for autonomy.

The Government-MILF Peace Process' Development

Due to disagreements in theory and tactics, a faction within the MNLF attempted

to seize control of the movement in 1977. This faction was led by vice-chair Salamat
Hashim. In 1984, Salamat, a charismatic cleric who attended Cairo's Al-Azhar

University, founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The MILF pursued a religious

agenda under Salamat and a core group of ulamas (Islamic scholars), while MNLF chair

Nur Misuari led the MNLF toward a secular and nationalist political movement.

The MNLF received support from the government's diplomatic and peace

initiatives from 1977 until the signing of the peace agreement in 1996 as the only

officially recognized representative of Filipino Muslims in the OIC. The MILF covertly

grew its armed forces and supporter base as Manila mediated with the MNLF. The MILF

had more than 12,000 armed fighters distributed among 13 main camps and 33 satellite

enclaves by the time the Philippine government ended talks with the MNLF. The MILF

had significant influence over many Muslim grassroots communities in central Mindanao

because Islamic religious leaders held prominent positions in the movement.

As part of the comprehensive Mindanao peace process, President Ramos began

similar negotiations with the MILF immediately after signing the peace agreement with

the MNLF. Even though the MILF disapproved of the Manila-MNLF pact, it welcomed

Ramos's approach by taking part in preliminary talks that led to formal negotiations.

The MILF offered a single talking point at the beginning of the discussions: a

solution to the Bangsamoro problem, which, in its view, involved a wide range of social,

cultural, economic, and political issues, including but not limited to the following:

Recognizing the Moros' ancestral territory, their displacement and lack of access

to land, the need for real agrarian reform, violations of their human rights, social and

cultural discrimination against Muslims, policies that corrupt the Moros' minds and moral

fiber, economic inequality and widespread poverty among Muslims, exploitation of the

natural resources of the Moro homeland by outsiders.

After Estrada was overthrown in early 2001, Macapagal-Arroyo became

president, which paved the stage for the revival of the MILF peace negotiations. She

unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fire and began preliminary negotiations with the MILF.

This time, Manila agreed to the three demands made by the MILF: that the negotiations

be mediated by the OIC or by a nation that is a member of the OIC, that the parties

uphold the terms of prior agreements, and that the negotiations take place in a foreign
location. Malaysia actively participated in the exploratory phases, which were held in

Kuala Lumpur, as a third-party facilitator. In Tripoli, the parties reached the following

agreements during the first formal round of negotiations:

 The discussions will center on the three major issues of security, rehabilitation,

and ancestral territory.

 Both parties acknowledge that maintaining a Bangsamoro homeland is not

inherently incompatible.  With the independence and integrity of the Philippines.

 The Bangsamoro people and other indigenous peoples are recognized by both

sides.

 The Moros' complaints will be addressed in phases as the peace process

proceeds.  Be dealt with while the peace process is ongoing.

 The Bangsamoro people will be consulted, and new formulas will be that will

consistently satisfy their desires have been investigated.

The 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement, the Implementing Guidelines of the Security

Aspect of the Tripoli Peace Agreement, the Manual of Instructions for the Coordinating

Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Local Monitoring Teams, the Joint

Communiqué on Criminal Interdiction, and the Implementing Guidelines of the

Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Peace Agreement

were all produced as a result of the negotiations that took place from November 2000 to

February 2003.

Deserving of Resolution

The conflict in Mindanao has matured to the point where both sides see more

benefits to ending it than to continuing the warfare, which lends "ripeness" to the

resolution of the conflict. In the Philippines, people are beginning to understand that

fighting it out on the battlefield is ineffective. Manila did not benefit from the major wars

in 2000 and 2003. Or any tactical edge for the MILF. In fact, the offensives not only cost

lives and caused chaos among civilians, but they also encouraged the MILF to engage

in guerilla warfare, which was more challenging for the government to contain.
 However, occupying rural communities, attacking military installations, and being

evasive about its affiliations to terrorist organizations made the MILF's cause appear

less legitimate and encouraged the government to employ more force. The offensives

also hindered efforts to improve relations between Christians and Muslims. The

country's majority of Christians overwhelmingly supported the offensives, encouraged

by government propaganda, raising the possibility of the separatist conflict turning into a

religious clash.

Last is, the country's economy, which has been languishing behind those of its

neighbors for years, needs to be revived by a negotiated solution with the MILF. Global

governments' advice banning travel to the islands and international media reports on the

conflict in Mindanao provide the idea that the southern Philippines is a refuge for

terrorists and insurgents, which is harming the country's reputation with foreign

investors. The expensive conflict with the MILF depletes the country's resources and

enhances Mindanao's reputation as a virtual war zone.

Issues in the Conversations

Even if there is hope surrounding the government and MILF's negotiations, there

is no assurance that they will be successful. There are undoubtedly some significant

challenges in the way of a settlement.

To bring lasting peace and development to the southern Philippines, the

government and the MILF must first be able to craft a practical and effective agreement.

The question of whether an agreement will actually address the root causes of the

conflict is becoming more and more important than whether the parties will reach an

agreement. The Philippines' history of peace negotiations is rife with agreements that

look good on paper but fall woefully short when it comes to implementation. The MILF

will undoubtedly use the government's alleged inability to uphold its half of the bargain

in order to press for tougher assurances and enforcement measures.

The parties will also need to compromise their opposing views on the subject of

political structures. The parties will need to address the difficult question of political

structures sooner rather than later, despite the fact that the talks are intended to avoid

discussions on it. Negotiated agreements are, after all, essentially political agreements,
and problems like ancestral domain, security, and rehabilitation cannot be solved

without agreement on a particular type of political agreement. Additionally, a political

framework must be established as a means of carrying out any negotiated agreement

successfully.

Conclusion

Although the MILF peace process is a crucial component of establishing long-

term stability and development in the southern Philippines, it is in no way a quick fix for

all of the region's issues with instability and underdevelopment. The residents of the

southern Philippines are so profoundly divided as a result of the conflict's lengthy history

and several failed attempts to resolve it that any roadmap is likely to be regarded with

skepticism or, at the very least, cautious hope. The ability and desire of the parties to go

beyond their group interests will determine whether the MILF peace process is any

different from previous ones.

There is no doubt that every effort possible was made throughout the current

negotiations to guarantee that the parties could come to a consensus; the government

and the MILF's resolve appears to be unquestionable. Many are more worried about

whether or not the Filipino people would accept the peace agreement as their shared

road map for peace and development in Mindanao than they are about the parties

signing a peace agreement. The terms of the peace treaty can only be carried out in a

fashion that directly allays the problems of the Moro people when there is genuine

national agreement on this roadmap. As a result, the following peace process elements

need to be strengthened:

 By holding additional discussions on the topics covered in the

negotiations, both parties must create a national consensus on the plan

reached during the negotiations. The government needs to get in touch

with the leaders of the Christian majority, especially with Congressmen

and local leaders. The MNLF and traditional Muslim leaders must be

contacted by the MILF.

 Religious leaders from the Christian and Muslim faiths must take the

initiative in mobilizing their own followers to support the peace process. In

 order to effectively mobilize this support, the Bishop-Ulama Forum, a

gathering of Christian and Muslim religious leaders in the Philippines,

must take an active role.

 The MILF and the government must establish reliable and efficient

mechanisms for putting the peace accord into action. To directly monitor

Manila and the MILF's adherence to the agreement's terms, a neutral third

party must be named.

 Funding for implementation needs to be specifically designated and

distributed without regard to any groups or party's partisan or personal

interests.
References

1. In her book, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of al Qaeda’s Newest Center of

Operations in

Southeast Asia (New York: The Free Press, 2003), CNN correspondent Maria Ressa

cites numerous classified police and military intelligence reports of the MILF’s links with

al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya.

Similar claims are made in the International Crisis Group’s report, Southern Philippines

Backgrounder:

Terrorism and the Peace Process. Asia Report, no. 80 (Singapore/Brussels:

International Crisis Group,

July 13, 2004).

2. “Autonomy not answer, say Moro rebs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer Philippine Daily

Inquirer (Manila), October 13, 2004, (Manila), October 13, 2004,

quoting MILF vice-chair for political affairs Ghadzali Jaafar. Online. Available:

http://news.inq7.net/

regions/index.php?index=1&story_id=14799.

3. This interim pact is referred to as the Government of the Republic of the Philippines-

MILF Tripoli

Agreement on Peace of 2001, which should not be confused with the Tripoli Agreement

between the

government and the Moro National Liberation Front signed on December 23, 1976.

4. Ahmad Aijaz, “Class and Colony in Mindanao,” in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A

Reader on Muslim

Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, ed. Eric Gutierrez et al. (Quezon City:

Institute for
Popular Democracy, 1999), 5–6.