Jadewell Parking Systems vs.

Lidua
G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City
Ordinance. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any
motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma
Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin
Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure owned by Edwin Ang.
Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly
forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal
parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other.
Jadewell filed two cases of robbery. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against
respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom
was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. Preliminary
investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed
a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees
with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion.
Two criminal Information’s were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated
July 25, 2003. The other accused, together with respondent Benedicto Balajadia filed a
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation on February 2, 2004 through their counsel.
Respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the
February 10, 2004 Order.
Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in
Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date
of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7,
2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003,
the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cases.

The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April 20,
2005, the RTC of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Issue:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against
respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

Ruling:

Resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply. In Romualdez v.
Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue of
prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. Commencement of the
prescription period is also governed by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense
was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on
the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period. The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the
filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in
an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v.
Reyes which held that the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was
committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is
to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
that.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription
in criminal cases is a substantive right.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the
prescription period.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did
not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as: SEC. 5. Information. - An information is
the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor,
and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor
signing the same.

Digested By: Vicente, Joanlin S.