Forum Interview - Biba Indian Apparel Retailers Competitive Positioning Value Chain Analysis-10 Feb 2022 - Eng

INTERVIEW
Biba & Indian Apparel Retailers –

Competitive Positioning & Value Chain
Analysis
10 February 2022
Key Insights Specialist Pradeep Sharma (PS), Former Head,

Operations, Rangriti at Biba Apparels
Despite being professionally-driven, Pvt Ltd
a majority of the decision making
across the value-chain is in the
Moderator Sandeep Sharma (SS), Third Bridge
promoters hands
Sector Analyst
Organised market for ethnic
womenswear is 20%. Biba has 60%
MS followed by W (25-30%) and the Agenda
rest is split between FabIndia,
Biba Apparel’s history and competitive
Global Desi and others
positioning in the women’s apparel retail
Recent years revenue growth
industry in India, plus market share drivers
subdued by penetration of global
Portfolio breakdown across product lines and
trends and brands leading to L4L
sub-brands, highlighting revenue split across
sales declines at a time of slower
segments
store count growth. Future expected
Exploring potential market-wide and Biba-
growth at 15-20%
specific issues around the company’s flattening
Product mix – SKD (40%, 20%
growth over the past 2-3 years – highlighting
GPM, stagnant growth), M&M (25%,
discounting strategy due to inventory build-up
exponential growth), Biba Girls
Design-to-shelf lifecycle, product sourcing
(30%; 200% future growth),
strategy and distribution network
unstitched (remainder %, 25-30%
GPM, in decline). Fragrances will
grow, accessories may struggle
Rangriti revenue contribution at
15%. “Rangriti is struggling to define
clear target segmentation and make
a cut beyond the unorganised
marketplace in this pricing segment
in tier 2 and below cities”
Biba & Indian Apparel Retailers – Competitive Positioning & Value Chain Analysis – 10 February 2022
Contents
Q: How has Biba and its strategy evolved over the last decade under the leadership of Meena and Siddharth Bindra,
particularly given the investments it’s received from the Future Group, Warburg Pincus and Faering Capital? 5
Q: Biba is now one of the top three brands and has the highest share of mind for Indian ethnic wear focused on women.
What was company’s historic growth vision and how did it execute on this? Was it able to set up and enact its creative
vision alongside its commercial goals? Did any factors derail this? 6
Q: What major pitfalls has Biba experienced from a creative or strategic standpoint? How do you consider the
company’s ability to overcome these issues? 6
Q: Biba’s leadership is mainly controlled by Meena and Siddharth Bindra. How promoter- vs professionally driven do
you think Biba is across its value chain? Is decision-making decentralised to professionals, or controlled from the top
through the promoters? 6
Q: What are your thoughts on Biba’s culture and the quality of its talent vs players such as W and Manyavar? 7
Q: Around 20% of the casual ethnic wear market in India is organised and it’s intensely competitive. How does market
share split across key competitors such as W, Biba, Fab India and Global Desi? Who do you consider to be Biba’s
truest competitors, considering product pricing and target customers? 7
Q: Where do Fab India and Global Desi lead or lag vs Biba and W, which we’ve established are the top two players in
the market? 8
Q: You said Biba probably has about 60% market share. What factors allow the company to gain nearly 50% of the
market? How sustainable is its market share? Have you noticed the company’s market share erode or grow at any
point – perhaps due to its strategy? 8
Q: Biba’s revenue growth has been quite subdued over the past 2-3 years at about 4-5% vs the exponential growth
between FY08-FY18, which was about 16%. Even total growth CAGR from FY08 to FY17 was 23% YoY. This has
subdued recently, even pre-coronavirus in around 2017-18. What factors have been responsible for this revenue
slowdown? Is it an issue in the wider market, or specific to Biba? 8
Q: You mentioned potential factors behind Biba’s subdued revenue growth such as increased globalisation, market
trends and intense competition. Have the impacts of those trends that have flattened revenues mostly been absorbed
by players, or is it still a continuous threat? Might those issues continue to be prevalent for Biba, or has the company
managed to work around them? 9
Q: What do you think is a realistic growth rate for Biba? What are your 1-2-year revenue run rate expectations? 9
Q: Could you outline Biba’s revenue split across its different segments, including SKD [Salwar Kameez Dupatta], M&M
[mix-and-match], unstitched and other lines such as fragrances, accessories and weddings? Which segments are
growing exponentially vs flattening out vs shrinking? 10
Private and confidential 2

Q: Do you think Biba has not done particularly well in growing out fragrances and accessories? What have been the
major difficulties? Companies such as Fab India are also engaged in it but it doesn’t seem to be a major revenue
contributor. What about this category makes it difficult to scale? 10
Q: Could you estimate gross profit margins across SKD, M&M, unstitched and others? Could you break that down into
categories such as Biba Girl? How have gross profit margins trended, particularly given Biba’s flattening revenues over
the last three years? 11
Q: How might Biba’s margins compare those of its peers? Do you think the company has a higher or a lower margin
profile? 11
Q: ICRA reports suggest that 85% of Biba’s revenues are still coming through the Biba label, while the rest are coming
from Rangriti. Rangriti is more focused on tier 2 and value customers. What key difficulties has Biba experienced
around building out Rangriti alongside the Biba line? 12
Q: How does pricing differ between a Biba and a Rangriti product? How is the company attempting to create this price
differentiation and customer base segmentation? 12
Q: Could you elaborate on Biba’s house-of-brands creation or sub-brand creation? How has it worked for Biba vs
Trent, which did something similar with its Westside and Zudio businesses? 12
Q: What do you think about the resource allocation across the Biba vs Rangriti labels, considering capital being
invested, marketing or even the HR personnel? Do you think enough resources were allocated to Rangriti? 13
Q: Biba has made investments in Anju Modi, a Manish Arora line and even Rohit Bal. I believe there’s been a degree
of a partnership with them. There seems to have been some complexities around having Rangriti, so how did these
investments in other designer labels work out? There are many new brands in the market pursuing designer M&A such
as Aditya Birla Group, which announced a strategic partnership with Sabyasachi in January 2021. Do you think Biba
will continue with that industry trend? Is it a good idea, given its difficulties around expanding away from its core product
lines? 13
Q: ICRA also reported that Biba has resorted to discounting to reduce its inventories because it was experiencing a
build-up in the market. This also happened for players such as Fab India. Could you outline Biba’s design-to-shelf life
cycle and supply chain? What issue might have caused the inventory build-up that led to the discounting strategy? 14
Q: What's been the impact of Biba's discounting strategy? Has it impacted the company’s image? Discounting
strategies typically seem to dilute company or brand equity. 14
Q: ICRA also reported about constraints on Biba’s working capital cycle. A company’s cash conversion cycle is made
up of three components –days inventory outstanding, days sales outstanding, minus days payable. I think the issue
could lie in the company’s inventory management. What are the working capital constraints and the issues around
inventory management? Has Biba attempted to address this? 15
Q: Biba had operating margins of 8% in FY19 and then at least was expected to be 5-6% in about FY20. This is a big
come down vs 13.8% in FY18. ICRA suggested this is mainly due to higher fixed costs for rental because the company

owns many of its stores, alongside employee and ad spending. What major factors or costs do you think led to the
huge decline in operating margins happening at the same time as stagnating revenues? 15
Q: Are companies such as W and Global Desi also discounting due to inventory-related issues and working capital
constraints, or is it just Biba? 16
Q: Biba has 381 EBOs [executive boutique outlets], including 36 franchise stores – meaning the company is slowly
trying franchising – and then 750 MBOs [multibrand outlets]. How does revenue split across pure EBOs vs franchise
stores vs MBOs vs online? How does that revenue split by distribution channel? 16
Q: How do you evaluate Biba’s franchising strategy? Vedant Fashions which has Manyavar – is using a franchising
model, but is experiencing issues around getting the franchisee receivables, so getting payment on time from
franchisees. What are the risks to Biba moving towards a FOFO [franchise-owned franchise-operated] model,
considering this issue and its working capital constraints? What hurdles might impact the company? Do you think
franchising is a viable strategy for Biba? 17
Q: How well-penetrated is Biba in India? Rangriti is a brand that the company is trying to build out, more so in tier 2
cities. Are there separate Rangriti stores or are they all Biba-only stores? What might the company’s expansion strategy
be, given its plans to roll out 200 more stores? 17
Q: You mentioned online represents a substantial 20% of total sales, up from about 5% in 2014. How does Biba’s
online go-to-market strategy differ from competitors’? Is it better, underperforming or in-line? How much of that 20% is
coming from Biba.com vs marketplaces such as Flipkart, Amazon and Myntra? 18

Biba & Indian Apparel Retailers –

Competitive Positioning & Value Chain
Analysis
Transcription begins at 00:00:00 of the recorded material
SS: Hello, everybody. Good evening, and welcome to Third Bridge Forum’s Interview entitled Biba &
Indian Apparel Retailers – Competitive Positioning & Value Chain Analysis. My name is Sandeep Sharma,
and I’ll be moderating today’s Interview. On our end, we’re pleased to have with us Mr Pradeep Sharma,
former Head, Operations, Rangriti at Biba Apparels.
Pradeep, before we start today’s Interview, could you please state I agree or I disagree to the following
statement: You understand the definition of material non-public information and agree not to disclose
any such information, or any other information which is confidential, during this Interview.
PS: I agree.
SS: Could you introduce yourself and your background?
PS: My name is Pradeep Sharma. Myself, talking about my professional experience, I have more than 15
years of retail sales and operations. I have worked with brands like Titan, Biba, Casio, Aditya Birla
Fashion & Retail Limited, and currently I am working with Maspar Industries Pvt Ltd, which is into
premium home furnishing segment. I have been into channel sales, retail operations and e-comm
operations, as well. This is a brief background about my professional run.
[00:01:23]
Q: How has Biba and its strategy evolved over the last decade under the leadership of Meena and
Siddharth Bindra, particularly given the investments it’s received from the Future Group, Warburg
Pincus and Faering Capital?
PS: I’ll take you back to some history of Biba. Just to start with, Biba was started by Mrs Meena Bindra,
who is the mother of Mr Siddharth Bindra. She started way back, some two decades back, with a small
store in Delhi with the ethnic wear. Then, with her greater vision, she started this brand called Biba,
which apparently means pretty lady. It’s a Punjabi word, it means pretty lady. Over the years, with the
brand evolving, Indian ethnic market evolving into larger trends, Biba is a stand-out brand with its
growth vision, and it is among the top three brands when we talk of Indian women’s ethnic wear in
Indian market context. Over the last decade, with their original approach, they have done and fared well
in terms of catering to the consumer need in this segment, what they are into.
SS: Over the course of the last decade, more particularly from a commercial perspective, how did PE
investment into Biba shift the company’s growth strategy and vision?

PS: In terms of private equity, if I talk about that, they are not much of the investors here. It’s only Mr
Siddharth Bindra and Mrs Meena Bindra who are heading this. In terms of equity, I cannot really
comment on the exact percentage of what equity holdings do they have. I’m not really in the position to
comment on these actual equity positions.
[00:03:37]
Q: Biba is now one of the top three brands and has the highest share of mind for Indian ethnic wear
focused on women. What was company’s historic growth vision and how did it execute on this? Was it
able to set up and enact its creative vision alongside its commercial goals? Did any factors derail this?
PS: I’ll talk about the longer vision a decade back. Mr Bindra had a clear vision to make it a very known
brand in each and every household of India, and he had a particular vision of taking the brand to INR
1,000 crore turnover within 10 years of sales operations. At the current state of affairs, it is in line with
what Mr Bindra had vision about, Meena Bindra’s vision. It is in line with the target revenues which they
had projected at 10 years down the line, that Biba would be around INR 1,000 crores of revenue growth.
Currently, they are rightly placed with their strategy but of late, with this pandemic happening, it has
taken slightly a back foot in terms of where it would have reached by now. In the mix of events, Biba also
launched a brand called Rangriti. Biba caters to upper of the premium segment of the customers. They
identified a gap where the value pricing was a big gap in terms of Indian ethnic branded clothes per se, so
they had launched the brand called Rangriti some five years back. Vision for Rangriti is also to take up
that brand up to INR 500 crores in the next five years.
[00:05:22]
Q: What major pitfalls has Biba experienced from a creative or strategic standpoint? How do you consider
the company’s ability to overcome these issues?
PS: Since we know that Biba was mainly into Indian ethnic wear market, the major issues which of late
they have been facing every other brand also faced. Because this market is evolving so fast and the trends
are changing so fast in this dynamic market, actually it is getting a very difficult affair for each and every
brand to keep up that pace, to cater to the ever-changing needs of the consumer, to understand what
exactly customers are wanting from the Indian ethnic wear space. Over a period of time, I would really
commend on that part to Biba. With the continuous emergence and improvements in the product line, to
the larger extent, they have been able to cater to this problem of identifying the consumer needs at the
right point of time. It still remains the pain point area for Biba to actually run with the emerging market
trends, and to continuously innovate and have the new products which can actually be commercialised in
this market.
[00:07:05]
Q: Biba’s leadership is mainly controlled by Meena and Siddharth Bindra. How promoter- vs
professionally driven do you think Biba is across its value chain? Is decision-making decentralised to
professionals, or controlled from the top through the promoters?
PS: This is an interesting question, because although Biba has evolved itself into a very professional
company over this period of time, larger part of decision making still lies with Mr Bindra, who is the
promoter of the brand. For different brand set-ups, he has different key decision makers, but if you talk
about one point as such, I’d say that promoter decisions are still the most important across the value
chain for decision making. Even though it is a completely professional organisation set-up where they
have the professional heads for each and every department, so it’s basically informative and collective

decisions, the larger decision-making lies with Mr Bindra in the entire value chain of the decision
making.
SS: Do you think this is a potential issue for the company? Have there been any particular missed
opportunities? Have professionals not had any particular decisions or strategies not being implemented
as a function of how centralised this is in the hands of the promoter?
PS: I was not part of that, if I talk about in my capacity, in terms of what I was talking about, the missed
opportunities in terms of ever-changing or evolving fashion trends in this market segment. I would
rather not give an important comment on this, because I don’t have much more information regarding
this, if at all there were missed opportunities in this.
[00:10:00]
Q: What are your thoughts on Biba’s culture and the quality of its talent vs players such as W and
Manyavar?
PS: As I told, over a period of time, Biba has evolved itself as a very high-skilled and professional
organisation where the culture is actually very people-oriented. It’s a largely goal-driven culture, what
Mr Bindra has set up. Mr Bindra gives a lot of freedom to the complete organisation people, where they
can take decisions, where they can take part of the discussions. The best of Biba is that Mr Bindra gives a
lot of scope to fail, learn and evolve again. In terms of you talk about the overall culture, the set-up by Mr
Bindra, what he has laid down, it’s very fantastic. It’s actually goal-driven, and people actually look for
the opportunities for growth. That’s why, as I told, Biba stands as one of the top three players in this
market.
[00:11:08]
Q: Around 20% of the casual ethnic wear market in India is organised and it’s intensely competitive. How
does market share split across key competitors such as W, Biba, Fab India and Global Desi? Who do you
consider to be Biba’s truest competitors, considering product pricing and target customers?
PS: If I talk about the size of Indian ethnic wear market, it will be roughly around USD 15m-17m, where
90% is dominated by the women’s segment and almost 10% is dominated by the men’s segment. Out of
this 90%, I’m talking about the Indian ethnic wear space. Largest players, you have all these names like
Global Desi, Fab India, W, Biba. These are the larger four players in terms of this space. If I talk about the
direct competition of Biba, it would be only W, because like Biba, it matches the product offerings as well
as the price range to the different customers. If I talk about Fab India, Global Desi, yes, they are into the
India ethnic segment, but they foray into different product segmentation. For example, Global Desi is
into complete fusion wear, unlike Biba. Biba does fusion wear but it has the whole set of offerings, which
W also does.
For true competitors by product, Desi, and target segmentation will only be W, because W, like Biba, also
plays with two brands in the market, W and Aurelia. Aurelia is a lesser-price point product like Rangriti
here in Biba. In terms of target segmentation, because their target segment is also similar kinds of
product offerings, these two brands give to the market almost similar. Certain SKUs might be different,
but Fab India, Global Desi, they try to follow these trends set, I’d say W and Biba are the trend setters in
their own category in the Indian ethnic space, because largely only 20% is occupied by the organised here
and 80% is from unorganised market here in India. This is where they stand in that as now. Anyway, to
talk about market share out of these 4-5 players, Biba would be roughly around 60% of the market share.
W would be around, say, 20%, 25-30% market share. The rest, 10%, is divided among the others.

[00:13:52]
Q: Where do Fab India and Global Desi lead or lag vs Biba and W, which we’ve established are the top two
players in the market?
PS: Fab India is just not into the Indian ethnic segment. It has a whole different lot of categories to offer
into the Indian consumers. When we talk of Biba and W, their main core category is the women wear
segmentation. Global Desi follows only one trend. They follow largely the fusion wear market. They want
to cater the more younger generation with more hippy, tribal or swim sorts of wear. On the contrary, Biba
and W target the different segments of the consumers. They have their ethnic wear, they have their
leisure wear, they have their urban wear and they have their SKDs, a similar kind of product offering
which W and Biba give. Global Desi and Fab India are actually way behind in terms of product offering to
the consumers.
[00:14:59]
Q: You said Biba probably has about 60% market share. What factors allow the company to gain nearly
50% of the market? How sustainable is its market share? Have you noticed the company’s market share
erode or grow at any point – perhaps due to its strategy?
PS: I would say that it has never eroded. In fact, it is only the growth trajectory itself and the kinds of
innovations Biba does, as Biba actually tries to set the trends in the market. Trends in the market, for
example, I will talk about the fusion wear or the mix-and-match concept, because Indian ethnic wear
market can be divided into four or five different categories. You can talk about SKDs, then there are mix
and matches, then there are only the kurtis, then they have other, different products like casual wear,
and the products are defined based on the occasion wear. This is where Biba has done quite well and
sustained, and I’m quite sure it is sustained for a longer period of time, with its immaculate or newer
innovations. As I mentioned, this was a challenge earlier, so with a bit of time, they have understood,
they have evolved as an organisation, where they lead the charge, where they are into higher product
innovation, and they try to set the trends in the market where other competitors try to follow normally.
For example, mix and match was a concept started by Biba, and it really took off well so all of the other
players followed in that trend. Then dress kurtis and (audio cuts out 16.37), that was a trend started by
Biba (audio cuts out 16.40) and the kinds of product offerings it gives. It actually sets Biba apart from the
other competitors in terms of innovation, in terms of matching the right product at the right time for the
consumers, because it caters to a large segment of the society, right from the teenage group, where they
have launched a brand by the name of Biba Girls. It’s a sub-category where they target the teens of
between the age of 15 to 20. Then, from that, they have different categories, so they have a very clear,
defined strategy to target different segments of the customers with different product offerings and, to
add to it, more importantly, affordable, which actually makes Biba a more aspiring brand or the
differentiated-factor brand.
[00:17:32]
Q: Biba’s revenue growth has been quite subdued over the past 2-3 years at about 4-5% vs the
exponential growth between FY08-FY18, which was about 16%. Even total growth CAGR from FY08 to
FY17 was 23% YoY. This has subdued recently, even pre-coronavirus in around 2017-18. What factors
have been responsible for this revenue slowdown? Is it an issue in the wider market, or specific to Biba?

PS: I would rather subject this query in a different manner. With the emerging trend, as I say, and people
getting more global, I would say, exposure, more and more customers are actually exposed to what global
trends are, all those players coming into the market, all those players trying to take that share. What
happened is that Biba was largely focusing on opening up new stores during a period of time. What
happened, this was overall the market segment where many, many players were emerging in this market,
and they were trying to capture all the latest trends in the market. What happened, their like-to-like
growth, which was supposed to come from the older stores, the like-to-like growth actually subdued, so
the larger growth driver for Biba was only the new store openings. The last four or five years, they were a
little slow on new store openings and getting the like-to-like growth. It was largely because the
customers were getting more and more exposure to what the global trends are. More and more brands
were entering this space, so this was the common phenomena faced by each and every brand during this
period of time.
SS: How has it changed recently?
PS: Recently, the strategy, I don’t know. After COVID I cannot say as clearly but earlier, they did not have
a lot of focus on their e-comm sales or exploring new opportunities or new channels for their sales. Now
they have explored, they are trying to explore the online space, where they are trying to gather or
accumulate as much of the market share they want to take from online space. This one channel was not
explored to the larger extent by all these brands. Over the last five years of time or three years of time,
every brand is trying to move into a different space, of finding different channels to reach and increase
more and more stores over a period of time. Just to give you a small context, for example, Mr Bindra sets
a vision that, next couple of years, he’s going to open 200 more stores. Currently it’s 300, so he wants to
take his store count to 500 stores. Even though he wants to grow very bullishly in the e-comm space, on
the other hand, he is really practical to give the equal weight into the offline market share.
[00:20:46]
Q: You mentioned potential factors behind Biba’s subdued revenue growth such as increased
globalisation, market trends and intense competition. Have the impacts of those trends that have
flattened revenues mostly been absorbed by players, or is it still a continuous threat? Might those issues
continue to be prevalent for Biba, or has the company managed to work around them?
PS: What trend is happening nowadays is that most of the brands actually have understood that, going
forward, there will be more competition coming in, too, because it’s only 20% of the organised players,
so there’s a huge scope of other players to enter at any point in time and give the product offering the
consumers need. It will be, I would say, a continuous trend or opportunity to explore for all the players.
Similarly, brands have evolved over the period of time, and I’m quite sure there’ll be past trends data
they’re trying to understand, figure out. Rather than being reactive to a situation, now brands are getting
proactive to situations before launching any products, to do the market study or to understand the
changing consumer behaviours, what new global trends are. Brands are actually trying to cope with that,
but yes, this is going to remain one of the key challenges in this market space.
[00:22:16]
Q: What do you think is a realistic growth rate for Biba? What are your 1-2-year revenue run rate
expectations?
PS: With Biba doing quite exceptionally well, not only Biba, other players also doing quite exceptionally
well on the e-comm space, the rate of growth would exactly reach to around 15-16% over the next couple
of years. After a couple of years, when markets are settled down, this period of pandemic goes away, all

the brands are likely to hit the 20% growth mark again in the next couple of years.
[00:22:52]
Q: Could you outline Biba’s revenue split across its different segments, including SKD [Salwar Kameez
Dupatta], M&M [mix-and-match], unstitched and other lines such as fragrances, accessories and
weddings? Which segments are growing exponentially vs flattening out vs shrinking?
PS: As I mentioned, Biba has always been a leader while innovating the new products, setting the new
trends in the market. When it started up a couple of decades back, its main category or the main bread-
and-butter category was the SKD category, where salwar, kurta and dupatta were the main categories.
Still the larger part of the revenue is coming from SKD, so if I talk about the revenue it would be around
25% of these revenues are still coming from the SKD section. M&M section is the largest or the
exponentially growing category for them. This is where the innovation comes into picture, because it’s
all mix and match. You can play with designs, you can play with colours, you can play with all the shades
you want to bring in. This one product category is growing, say, by 100% every year now. SKD growth has
become somewhat stagnant, because SKD more or less has become only occasional wear or festive wear
kind of attire. Mix and match, it’s a party wear, it’s a casual wear. Women are preferring it for office
spaces as well for the casual gatherings, so M&M is growing largely. That’s why even other players also
are putting their larger bets on M&M category itself. Roughly around 20% is the contribution coming
from M&M, as well, like SKD. It will surpass SKD sooner than later. I’d presume, or I am quite sure, that
M&M would be around 30% or 35% in this space for each and every player, provided they are well-
equipped with the latest trends and the colours in the market.
Then this category of unstitched. This is one space where it has traditionally moved from the very old
tradition to now women actually want unstitched, because there are a lot of size issues in terms of Indian
women getting to talk about. There are no standard sizes here. The women here are… I’ll not say it. There
are a lot of size issues there, so this category was doing quite well for Biba. Of late, this has seen a decline,
this category, because now a younger generation is moving towards more stitched or ready-made wear.
With this growing as a category, Biba actually understood to launch new categories, so recently, they
have introduced fragrances and accessories to them. Biba Girl is one category where other brands actually
are trying to catch up with Biba, because Biba Girl is doing exceptionally well. This category is only for
the girls. They give mix and match, SKDs, to the girls between five to 15 years of age. After 15, they go to
main-line Biba. This category is around 30% contribution to them, so 30% SKD, 25% mix and match,
30% by Biba Girl is coming from them. This category is poised to grow by more than 200% in the next
couple of years, because this one category Biba has really cracked really well, the Biba Girl category, and
they are of late opening the exclusive stores for Biba Girl. Earlier, what they used to do, they used to have
a designated space in the stores for Biba Girl. Now they are opening flagship stores especially for Biba
Girl, so this is one key category where they are banking upon very positively.
[00:26:48]
Q: Do you think Biba has not done particularly well in growing out fragrances and accessories? What have
been the major difficulties? Companies such as Fab India are also engaged in it but it doesn’t seem to be a
major revenue contributor. What about this category makes it difficult to scale?
PS: Actually, talking about accessories, accessories basically talks about bags, ladies’ handbags, and the
(audio cuts) as a category. This is largely dominated by the unorganised players in India, so that is why,
and plus, Biba is seen as more of a garment wear brand rather than an accessories brand. It is really
difficult for a brand which is set up as a space, in a different space, to get that mind to the consumers
that, “We are a good fragrances manufacturer,” or, “We can give the good accessories to you.”

Fragrances they have recently launched from one year back, so it’s a little nascent in the stages, but
fragrance was launched after a lot of research work done. This was a space where they could feel that,
actually, consumers are looking for affordable premium perfume, other fragrances in there, so it was
launched after a lot of research. Accessories, it’s one big area where they are trying to figure out how to
improve the hardware [sic] and the sales there, so this category, you are right. You mentioned that they
are struggling to scale the operations in terms of accessories, but fragrance, it will grow.
[00:28:23]
Q: Could you estimate gross profit margins across SKD, M&M, unstitched and others? Could you break
that down into categories such as Biba Girl? How have gross profit margins trended, particularly given
Biba’s flattening revenues over the last three years?
PS: Biba’s largest gross margin category was the unstitched category. Even though it was a de-growing
category, the largest or the highest gross margin was made in the unstitched category, then the SKD and
then the M&M. Roughly, if I give you the ballpark figures, unstitched gross margin was roughly around
25-30%, SKD was around 20% and mix and match was around 17-18%.
SS: What about the movements or the trends in the gross profit margins? Were we seeing any downward
pressure on gross profit margins?
PS: Not of late. I cannot comment what has happened over the last couple of years for these growth
trends in terms of gross margins, but due to pandemic, it had a hard ball rolling to each and every brand.
I’m quite sure, if I remove these last couple of years, there was no asset concern in terms of revenue,
gross margin going down. They were pretty flat 3-4 years of time. Lastly, because of the scale of
operations we were projecting or Mr Bindra was having a vision in terms of expansion, in that sense, it
was a flattened gross margin there but if I look at the operational perspective, this should bounce back.
[00:30:28]
Q: How might Biba’s margins compare those of its peers? Do you think the company has a higher or a
lower margin profile?
PS: I would say that, if I talk to competitors, it’s a higher margin profile. If I talk about the procurement
strategy and the costs and how they control the COGS, I would suggest that Biba has acquainted to a
wonderful model, where Biba are designing in-house, they procure the raw materials on their own, but
the manufacturing is outsourced. In a way, they have tried to restrain the COGS and the cost of the goods
sold, and they have been able to have the higher gross margins on the products.
SS: Do you think that this is sustainable in the long term, or do you think other players will catch up?
PS: This is sustainable because the kinds of the volumes they put out are huge volumes. To manufacture
these huge volumes, no brand would like to put up their CAPEX initially just to build up the capacities for
this kind of production to happen. They have a wonderful team for in-house designing, then raw material
procurement, they have different vendors set up. They can actually try and reduce the costing structure
here. The manufacturing outsourced gives a lot of scope, actually, to have greater margins. Yes, all other
players are trying to adopt to this model. As far as I know, most of the players are actually trying to follow
the same model, where they are trying to do the manufacturing outsourced and designing, raw material
procurement, doing that in-house.

[00:32:08]
Q: ICRA reports suggest that 85% of Biba’s revenues are still coming through the Biba label, while the
rest are coming from Rangriti. Rangriti is more focused on tier 2 and value customers. What key
difficulties has Biba experienced around building out Rangriti alongside the Biba line?
PS: I was part of Biba and Rangriti is a new brand, it was launched just four years back. Major difficulty
which Biba faced was to actually differentiate, because both of these brands were into Indian ethnic wear
market. The major challenge was to differentiate the target segmentation in terms of design acceptability
or the design and taste sensibility for the consumers in the market. Biba stands for one point, and Biba
customers have a certain sense and taste in terms of design. The major, I would say, difficulty which they
face to actually clearly demarcate or differentiate the offerings in terms of designs which they want to
offer, it’s the same. Even though the prices are lower, the space is same, the consumer would be same.
They adopted a strategy to drive into tier 2, tier 3 markets but then reducing the prices created another
hindrance there or the hurdle there, because, in that space, largely the unorganised market was
dominant in this sector, and the kind of price point which Rangriti wanted to foray was a very, very
difficult space to capture there. Two basic difficulties. They’re still struggling, I would rather say, to
design, to define the clear target segmentation for this sub-brand, for Rangriti, and to make a cut beyond
the unorganised marketplace in this pricing segment.
[00:34:12]
Q: How does pricing differ between a Biba and a Rangriti product? How is the company attempting to
create this price differentiation and customer base segmentation?
PS: If I talk about examples, for one kurta, how the price differential happens with Biba and Rangriti is
Biba, you will find the starting pricing from INR 1,200 to INR 1,300 in the Indian market context, whereas
Rangriti’s starting price would be a INR 699 or INR 799 kurtis. If I talk about a starting price of Biba, it’s
the end price of Rangriti. Rangriti products you will find between the prices of INR 699 to, say, INR 1,399
or INR 1,499. There are certain products which are much higher value. The basic differentiation which
they wanted to create or which they wanted to establish as the Rangriti should be the entry price point for
my partner, for the consumer, and Biba should start where Rangriti ends so that, over the period of time,
if they want to upgrade a customer, they can upgrade from a Rangriti to the Biba standpoint.
[00:35:29]
Q: Could you elaborate on Biba’s house-of-brands creation or sub-brand creation? How has it worked for
Biba vs Trent, which did something similar with its Westside and Zudio businesses?
PS: As I told, it has worked really well, because they wanted to first get the… Biba is a very aspirational
brand here for women who want to wear a INR 5,000, INR 4,000 kurta, so Biba is a very aspirational
brand for tier 2, tier 3 cities, women there. They wanted to create a brand where actually women could
take the entry level to the house of Biba and, subsequently, they could be upgraded to a more premium
segment of there by helping them to buy Rangriti. This strategy was quite successful but, over the last
couple of years, I would not rather say because of this situation happening, Rangriti has taken a beating
in terms of not being able to be as sustainable as they would have wanted, because they squeezed gross
margins there. They had followed a similar strategy that Westside followed, but Westside has a large
network of their own set of stores where they could promote both of the brands simultaneously. As for
Rangriti, the strategy Mr Bindra followed, he created a different brand altogether. He opened exclusive
stores, and we created a different value chain altogether in terms of a point of sales for Rangriti and Biba.

[00:38:00]
Q: What do you think about the resource allocation across the Biba vs Rangriti labels, considering capital
being invested, marketing or even the HR personnel? Do you think enough resources were allocated to
Rangriti?
PS: I would say enough resource allocation was done. In fact, from the organisation’s decision-making
structure standpoint, a CEO was hired only to drive Rangriti business because that business was quite
promising. As I told, the vision was to take INR 500 crores in the next five years for this Rangriti brand.
Eventually, it could not happen in four years. The top line is quite low. It stands only at around, say, 30%
of what was projected in five years. The organisation structure was done with quite a lot of positivity to
drive that business, because that had a lot of scope. That segment, particularly with the venturing into
tier 2, tier 3 towns themselves, there’s huge opportunity here, with more and more women trying and
aspiring for more premium brands to wear.
As I mentioned, it has taken the beating, because Biba, I would not say it got confused, but the
segmentation was not very clear in terms of what product to offer, price. The gross margins were very
skewed up because they wanted to be confident in that price range, but the customer segmentation was
actually in doubt. Which customers are they actually catering to? Do we want to really become a fusion
brand? Do we want to take only the ethnic market space? Do we want to go in the mix-and-match
category? The segmentation was not determined properly, which led to this beating of this Rangriti in the
last couple of years, but now they are trying to make it fall in line, and again, the growth trend seems to
be positive for this brand, Rangriti.
[00:40:04]
Q: Biba has made investments in Anju Modi, a Manish Arora line and even Rohit Bal. I believe there’s
been a degree of a partnership with them. There seems to have been some complexities around having
Rangriti, so how did these investments in other designer labels work out? There are many new brands in
the market pursuing designer M&A such as Aditya Birla Group, which announced a strategic partnership
with Sabyasachi in January 2021. Do you think Biba will continue with that industry trend? Is it a good
idea, given its difficulties around expanding away from its core product lines?
PS: The thing is, the segmentation here in India is too fragmented, because we have the customers in the
tier 2, tier 3, tier 4 towns and we have a very high upmarket customer, as well, who is looking for these
designer brands. In terms of strategy, this was a very good call to introduce the product range by Rohit
Bal, then later on by Anju Modi, but the problem was, with that, when you associate a brand with
different kinds of labels, these different labels have a certain expectation in the market. A Rohit Bal
customer would associate itself that, “I would rather like to buy directly from Rohit Bal rather than going
to a Biba store and buying a INR 30,000 or INR 40,000 suit for myself from a Biba store, where I can get a
similar-looking, good-looking product with half the price.” Exactly, if I talk about Rohit Bal in terms of
projected revenues, it’s not fared well for Biba, to be honest, but yet the Anju Modi line is doing quite
well. Why? Because Anju Modi line is a bit different from what Biba is offering. Rohit Bal, the offering was
almost similar to Biba’s offering but at relatively lesser prices. The customer walking into a Biba store
actually was confused, a INR 20,000 suit with a INR 3,000 suit or a INR 7,000 SKD with almost good-
looking quality, same quality, so Rohit Bal in terms of Biba’s vision could not make it to the extent they
wanted.
Offerings also were too less. For example, only from INR 1,200 to INR 1,300 got introduced for Rohit Bal
collection, and around 25-30 options were introduced for Anju Modi’s collection. If you want to foray
into this space, it should be very clearly delimited or guided what kind of option level you want to keep,

what kind of space you want to give to these brands, because their brand has a certain average order to be
catered. Is it going to be the correct SSPD [sic] or the SSPF in the stores or not? This is challenging for the
all the brands, but if you talk about the brands like Aditya Birla Group acquiring Masaba or, say, Tarun
Tahiliani’s partnership or with the Shantanu & Nikhil partnership, the kind of scale of operation with
Aditya Birla is at a different level, that is a different because the whole value chain set-up for companies
like Aditya Birla and a Reliance or a Biba is quite on a different scale. It can be a good strategy, provided
you have that scale of operations to cater to these kinds of needs.
[00:43:31]
Q: ICRA also reported that Biba has resorted to discounting to reduce its inventories because it was
experiencing a build-up in the market. This also happened for players such as Fab India. Could you
outline Biba’s design-to-shelf life cycle and supply chain? What issue might have caused the inventory
build-up that led to the discounting strategy?
PS: I’ll talk about, in India, this ethnic wear space market works in basically two cycles or seasons. We
have spring-summer, then we have autumn-winter. Each and every brand, be it Fab India, Global Desi, W
or Biba, they work with the projection that during the full-price season, they would liquidate around 70%
of their stock, and during discounting, in the EOSS, which runs two times a year, they will liquidate
around 20% of their stock. Roughly they take around 90% of sell-throughs for whatever inventory they
make. What happens when these positions are not met, due to market prices or whatever it is, inventory
is produced, you do not get the sell-throughs as expected, you have higher inventories lying up in your
warehouse, you have the new season inventories which are planned which are to come.
The capital is stuck there, for all the brands, actually, if the sell-throughs are not as to be expected. They
expect around 90% of sell-through, but for actual, over the last three or four years, each and every brand
is seeing the sell-throughs in the range of 70-75%. Instead of 10% of leftover inventory, all these brands
have around 20-25% of leftover inventory. (Audio cuts) have the proper cash flows so that the inventory
which is supposed to come for the new season is not blocked, so these brands were actually forced to take
the discounting route, which is still continuing. Earlier, even the period used to be shortening. Now we
see that EOSS period is extended up to, say, 35-40 days or even 45 days to give a longer run for the
discounted products to be in the market, so that actually brands can generate the cash not to be blocked
in terms of inventory there. This is one bottleneck each and every brand is trying to figure out, to have
the right models of projection in terms of their sell-throughs or the kinds of models to work so that they
can project the inventories in a more scientific or a much more realistic way.
[00:46:10]
Q: What's been the impact of Biba's discounting strategy? Has it impacted the company’s image?
Discounting strategies typically seem to dilute company or brand equity.
PS: There has been a lot of discussion about impacts of discounting. For example, the reduction in the
gross margin is one impact where each and every brand was facing the heat now. As I told and as I
mentioned earlier, it was the uncalled decision to go the discounting way, because had it not been the
case, more and more inventory would have been piled. Over the period of time, brands are taking a call to
reduce the sales period of time from 45 days to, say, 25 days so that their gross margins are intact. The
image was Biba was supposed to be a premium brand, not a discount. Now it is discount for the major
part of the year. This image each and every brand, or rather Biba, is trying to change also, because of this
over-extended version of discount was uncalled for and because they had a lot of inventory pressures, all
the brands had inventory pressures on their heads.

[00:47:29]
Q: ICRA also reported about constraints on Biba’s working capital cycle. A company’s cash conversion
cycle is made up of three components –days inventory outstanding, days sales outstanding, minus days
payable. I think the issue could lie in the company’s inventory management. What are the working capital
constraints and the issues around inventory management? Has Biba attempted to address this?
PS: If I talk about the inventory outstanding or the stock outstanding, the route of Biba or any of the
brand players take, because they are into multiple channels, they have their own exclusive stores, they
have their dealer-distributor networks, then they have their e-comm space. Then they have the large-
format stores, like, for example, Shoppers Stop or Lifestyle or any other department stores. The major
important constraint when any of these channels does not perform, they are not performing, I mean to
say the kinds of projections for inventory they had, their respective channels, certain channels are there
where inventory is blocked, where there is a lot of outstanding as well as the stock constraints there.
What happens, these factors, the relevant channel does not perform, so each and every channel has an
inventory limitation that this channel can take up this inventory pressure, the distribution can take up
that much of inventory per se. Overall, if the projections have not lined up even for the one channel, these
things will happen.
What happens when you have a lot of outstandings on the payables on the market, because distributors
give the stock to the dealers and dealers have not paid back to the distributors, the distributors don’t pay
back to the brand, so there is a gap in terms of cash conversion cycle from one channel or other. This
leads to the constraints what each and every brand actually faces. Biba is trying to reduce it. They’re
trying to model out certain ways and means where the cash outstanding in the market is reduced to a
certain extent, where the credit given to the partners is aligned and the inventory pressure, as I have
mentioned earlier, they’re trying to model out better ways to have much more scientific approaches,
where they can have inventory projections much more realistic of approach. In a way, they are trying to
work out to improve the cash conversion cycle so that the cash circulation is into complete alignment.
SS: What are the solutions that the company is attempting to address with this? Might this remain an
issue for the company? Working capital constraints might indicate the need for further funding. What is
the solution? Is there a solution in sight for this or not?
PS: There are certain solutions which I can think of. As I told, they are trying to reduce the credit limit for
all the distributors and dealers. Earlier, it used to be 60 days. Now they are trying to bring it down to 40
days, so that they can have the proper cash cycle at the stores. Then, if they are going to the lean way in
terms of mapping and measuring the inventory at the warehouse level so that the inventory cash burn is
not there, inventory cash drop is not there, the money which comes from the different partners is aligned
with what they intend to, certain measures like going the lean way in terms of inventory measurement at
the warehouse, more upgraded versions or largely deploying the more advanced technology in terms of
inventory management, these are certain small steps which I think every brand, or at least Biba, is taking
to reduce this and hence follow a proper cash flow cycle.
[00:51:31]
Q: Biba had operating margins of 8% in FY19 and then at least was expected to be 5-6% in about FY20.
This is a big come down vs 13.8% in FY18. ICRA suggested this is mainly due to higher fixed costs for
rental because the company owns many of its stores, alongside employee and ad spending. What major
factors or costs do you think led to the huge decline in operating margins happening at the same time as
stagnating revenues?

PS: During this period of time, what happened actually, Biba was looking for a very, very aggressive
expansion. They wanted to foray into different channels, points of sales, they wanted to appoint many
distributors, they wanted to open their main stores. If I give you a small context, an example, they take
really big spaces in terms of when they want to open the flagship stores. Currently, they have around 35
flagship stores, and going down the line, when I said that Biba is trying to open another 200 stores in
another three years of time, out of 200 stores, they are planning to open 80 flagship stores. Flagship
stores are really big in size, about 5,000 square feet of space. When you intend to open these kinds of
bigger spaces, there is a lot of CAPEX involved. When they want to grow aggressively in terms of offline
presence and also opening in terms of investing in the CAPEX, actually what happens is the operating
margins tend to get stagnated, because the kind of growth they project for themselves has not happened
in the last 3-4 years. It is flat, it is not growing, what they wanted to grow, but these factors will certainly
make and help the brand to grow in the next coming years, actually.
SS:
Do you think this was short-term? You mentioned that the costs are very high, but do you think that the
company should continue going ahead to expand all these stores? In the current environment, do you
sense that this might actually be a disadvantage if the company is planning for at longer-term growth vs
shorter-term profitability, given the fact that there are so many constraints on the business?
PS: I would say it’s a promising long-term strategy, because it’s not just that they are on a store opening
spree. Of late, what they do, the profitability analysis of every store is done very stringently, and over the
last couple of years, I know Biba has sold 70 non-performing stores. In a way, they are well-informed.
They are taking well-informed decisions on which areas they want to expand, which stores do they want
to continue, so that they have the items into the stores which give them everything, the higher gross
margin, and hence the profitability is ensured. I would rather say it’s a good strategy in terms of long
term, where you want your vision to be part of every Indian home, where each and every woman wants to
be, and where you have 50% of market share, you want to be the market leader in terms of presence,
whether you want to foray into tier 2, tier 3, tier 1 towns also. With this strategy, I feel expansion is quite
good. It will pay back. It was only a short evaluation on whether they had to give up on the margins or the
gross margins, but this was short-lived. For a longer strategy, it is going to give very good results.
[00:55:12]
Q: Are companies such as W and Global Desi also discounting due to inventory-related issues and
working capital constraints, or is it just Biba?
PS: I will say that each and every brand in the space is trying the same boat, rowing the same boat only,
because each and every brand, the target for their sell-throughs is almost 90%. Out of it, they want to sell
at 70% during full price and 20% during discounting season, but these kinds of sell-throughs have not
happened for any of the brands, be it W, be it Fab India, Global Desi or Biba. This is one particular area
where each and every brand is actually trying to figure out the issueto have the more scientific approach
to work around the inventory issues. This is also an issue faced by each and everyone, not particularly by
Biba.
[00:56:13]
Q: Biba has 381 EBOs [executive boutique outlets], including 36 franchise stores – meaning the company
is slowly trying franchising – and then 750 MBOs [multibrand outlets]. How does revenue split across
pure EBOs vs franchise stores vs MBOs vs online? How does that revenue split by distribution channel?

PS: If I talk about the online space from Biba, the last couple of years, from 5-10% it has gone up to 20%,
so online space is giving around 20% of revenues to Biba currently. MBO is giving another around 15% of
revenue to Biba. EBOs are the major revenue driver for them. Around 65% contribution is coming from
EBOs, and the rest is coming from the franchisee stores. When I say they are into expansion mode also,
when I say they are planning to open 200 more stores in the next couple of years, out of 200 stores, they
are planning to give away around 45-50 franchisee stores, the rest all company-owned stores.
[00:57:20]
Q: How do you evaluate Biba’s franchising strategy? Vedant Fashions which has Manyavar – is using a
franchising model, but is experiencing issues around getting the franchisee receivables, so getting
payment on time from franchisees. What are the risks to Biba moving towards a FOFO [franchise-owned
franchise-operated] model, considering this issue and its working capital constraints? What hurdles
might impact the company? Do you think franchising is a viable strategy for Biba?
PS: Franchising is a viable strategy for any of the brands, I would rather say. For example, you take the
example of Blackberrys Group or Aditya Birla Group or the Reliance Group, Biba going the franchisee way
is a profitable venture but yes, there are certain constraints, which you rightly mentioned. Taking the
money on time, that capital block is an issue, but that can be taken care of. It is not such a bigger issue
which cannot be handled or cannot be taken care of, because going by the franchise route, brands actually
try and save the CAPEX, which they can spend on marketing or the product development or the
innovation of the product. Once they plan to open their own COCO stores, their CAPEX is struck. If the
CAPEX is struck, their operating margins have to take a hit. If you don’t want to take a hit, if you want to
make your presence grow to a larger extent, when you have people trusting your brand, it’s very easy, or
I’ll not say easy, I’ll say it’s a very profitable venture, to move the FOFO model. Following Biba, all the
brands are actually following the same suit, because the receivables issue is not, I would say, of a bigger
hassle. It can be tackled with the right technology. Making use of the right technology and making use of
the right SOP processes, this issue is quite easily resolvable.
[00:59:29]
Q: How well-penetrated is Biba in India? Rangriti is a brand that the company is trying to build out, more
so in tier 2 cities. Are there separate Rangriti stores or are they all Biba-only stores? What might the
company’s expansion strategy be, given its plans to roll out 200 more stores?
PS: Under the brand, they had created different value channels altogether for Rangriti, so they are
opening up exclusive stores for Rangriti as well as Biba. Of late, where they have seen viability in terms of
margin and the revenues, now they are doing the experiment of opening up Biba and a Rangriti store
together. For example, they take a 2,000 square foot of space, they give 500 space to Rangriti, 1,500 to
Biba. They are trying to experiment with this model, planning to put Rangriti in the same store as Biba.
Until now, they had been following a different strategy of opening exclusive, separate stores for Biba and
Rangriti, Rangriti basically foraying into tier 2, tier 3 and tier 4 towns, where they see the value coming
out of a store can be INR 15-20 lakhs from every store. This was the strategy they had been following.
Now, talking about the cap on the store count or the store roll-out strategy, Mr Bindra is very clear. In
terms of presence, he wants to be present all across, and he has a vision of taking the store count to, say,
500-600 in the next five years from currently 300, which I already told to you. Currently for Rangriti,
they already opened some 100 stores, and they’re planning to take store count of Rangriti to 200 in the
next couple of years. Rangriti, they are focusing it very aggressively, because this is a market they want to
capture which they had not been in, unluckily for them. This is the kind of strategy they are exploring for
Biba and Rangriti, and as an experimental process, certain stores are there where they’re trying to have

one common store, like giving 80% of the store to Biba, 20% of the store to Rangriti and trying to
experiment with this kind of business model.
[01:01:49]
Q: You mentioned online represents a substantial 20% of total sales, up from about 5% in 2014. How does
Biba’s online go-to-market strategy differ from competitors’? Is it better, underperforming or in-line?
How much of that 20% is coming from Biba.com vs marketplaces such as Flipkart, Amazon and Myntra?
PS: Just taking back to what I said earlier, previously, before pandemic, Biba was utterly focusing into
their offline stores, be it their EBOs, be it the large-format stores or distribution-dealer network. With
the advent of this pandemic, they were forced to go to the online. They really started to focus on the
online before some couple of years back, when this pandemic started. From 5% of the negligible
contribution, they are at around 20-25% contribution right now, and I believe that Mr Bindra’s vision is
to take the contribution of the e-comm space to 30-35% in the next couple of years. If I talk about the
brand strategy, they are quite in line, or I would rather say they are quite a way ahead with the peers in
terms of adapting to the new technologies or adapting to the new ways and processes, so that the e-
comm space can be explored to the larger extent. If I talk about the revenue differentiation or the revenue
bifurcation, out of the total sales, the own website is giving around 65% of sales. The rest, 35% of sales,
is coming from the marketplace. Biba is spending quite good amount of money in terms of marketing
with the partners like Myntra, Amazon, Flipkart, as well as they are trying to promote their own website,
called Biba.in. The process, the orientation is quite in sync, that the online space would be around 30-
35% in the next couple of years of time of the total sales.
[01:03:55]
SS: Mr Pradeep, this is all the time we have for today’s Interview, so let me close by saying thank you so
much for your time. It was really informative. Clients, if you would like to speak to Mr Pradeep in a
private call or meeting, please let your relationship manager know, but for now, this is the end of today’s
Interview. Mr Sharma, thank you so much. We really appreciate your time. Have a good day.
PS: Thank you very much, Sandeep. Thank you everyone. Bye.
SS: Thank you. Bye.
Transcription ends at 01:04:16 of the recorded material.
If you'd like to speak to Pradeep Sharma in a private call or meeting, please let your
relationship manager know.

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representation and accept no liability for the Content or for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies in respect of it. The views of the specialist expressed
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INTERVIEW

Biba & Indian Apparel Retailers –

Key Insights Specialist Pradeep Sharma (PS), Former Head,

Private and confidential 2

Private and confidential 3

Private and confidential 4

Biba & Indian Apparel Retailers –

Transcription begins at 00:00:00 of the recorded material

SS: Could you introduce yourself and your background?

Private and confidential 5

Private and confidential 6

Private and confidential 7

Private and confidential 8

SS: How has it changed recently?

Private and confidential 9

Private and confidential 10

Private and confidential 11

Private and confidential 12

Private and confidential 13

Private and confidential 14

Private and confidential 15

Private and confidential 16

Private and confidential 17

SS: Thank you. Bye.

Transcription ends at 01:04:16 of the recorded material.

Private and confidential 18

Private and confidential 19

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