1. Manuel v.

People
FACTS:

2. Marbella - Bobbis vs Bobbis

FACTS:
Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Petitioner filed a complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
Respondent then initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending
civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. His
reasoning for the belated filing of the civil case is his ignorance of Article 40 of the Family Code.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code can be
invoked as an excuse by the respondent to allow him to file his subsequent civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage which constitutes a prejudicial question
to a criminal case for bigamy, thus suspending his the criminal case against him

RULING:
The SC on the negative.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an
excuse. Art. 40 of the Family code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the
law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an
act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, he should not be allowed to belatedly obtain
that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution.

In should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. Moreover, when
respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is
that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.

3. People vs Patalin

FACTS:
I will not focus on the gruesome details of the criminal case but would center the discussion on
the facts, issue and ruling relevant to our lesson in PFR, particularly Article 4 of the Civil Code on
Retroactivity of the laws.
On October 11, 1985, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged
under Criminal Case no. 18376 with the crime of robbery, and in Criminal Case No. 18305
together with Nestor Ras wherein they were charged before the same court with the crime of
robbery with multiple rape. After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered by the RTC
on June 14, 1995, wherefore, finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
these two cases. In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the
members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles
taken from them.
In their appeal, accused-appellant assigned three errors in their individual briefs. The third one
reads: “Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the
crimes charged, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was
suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution”. At the time the crimes charged were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code).
However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1),
Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it
could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death
Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994. Accused-appellants are of the position that
since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to
the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no
longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on
June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 1987 Constitution's abolition of the death penalty when it was ratified had
retroactive effect on the case of the accused-appellants despite its restoration by Congress in
Jan 1, 1994 thru RA 7659.

RULING:

Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. 1987 Constitution Article III Section 19 which abolished
the death penalty had a retroactive effect on the case of the accused-appellants thus giving
them vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer
cover them.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to
hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails. Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were
harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but
human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders
considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is
axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to
the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected. The nobility of our intention
is insufficient. (italized kay nice hehe)

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same."
Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which abolished the death penalty is penal in character
since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be
given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the
crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but
the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out. Clearly, accused-
appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by
virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

The subsequent reimposition of the death penalty under Republic Act 7659 will not affect them.
The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress
reimposing the death penalty can only have prospective application.

A subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under
the old law. The rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used, in
order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights.

Wherefore, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

4. People vs. Valdez

FACTS:
On October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening Marcelo Valdez was under
his nipa house talking with his son Labrador Valdez. In the course of their conversation, Labrador
was lying sideways on a carabao sled, placed under the family nipa house. He was facing his father
at the eastern side of the house, at a distance of about less than two (2) meters from each other.
Suddenly, two consecutive gunshots were fired coming from the western side of the house by an
assailant. Marcelo Valdez who was talking to his son, immediately called for help while the victim
 

managed to walk upstairs towards the kitchen. The stunning sound of the two gunfire and Marcelo’s
cry for help alerted Imelda Umagtang and her common-law husband Rolando Valdez, who were
both lying on bed, to verge upon the kitchen where they saw the victim bathed in his own blood.
When Rolando inquired from the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was the appellant
Domingo Valdez y Dulay. At this time, the victim’s brother and in-laws arrived. They also asked the
victim what happened and the latter once more said that it was appellant who shot him. At such time,
the search for the passenger jeep that will transport the victim to the hospital continued. After an
hour, they were able to find a passenger jeep but the victim already succumbed to death .

The RTC finds the accused-appelant Domingo Valdez y Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2
crimes: (1) the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under republic Act No. 7659 otherwise
known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been committed with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime,
thereby sentencing him the ultimum supplicium of DEATH.
(2) the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition punished under P.D. 1866 and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs.

Appellant questions his conviction arguing that the court a quo erred in not applying the provision of
R.A. 8294 specifically Sec. 1 Par. 3 “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance”, which amended P.D. 1866. The crime in this case was committed in 1995, the
amendatory law (R.A. No. 8294) became effective on July 6, 1997. Appellant posits that there should
only be one crime, the crime Murder in which the 2nd crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
ammunition should only be an aggravating circumstance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8294 should be given retroactive effect

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Republic Act No. 8294, since it is favorable to appellant, shall be given a retroactive effect.
Therefore, the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm may no longer be separately
charged and only one offense should be punished, viz., murder in this case, and the use of
unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Considering that  

appellant is liable for murder, the illegal possession case can no longer be pursued because it is
merely treated as an aggravating circumstance.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
killing was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such circumstance will be treated
merely as an aggravating circumstance under R.A. 8294. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, such
as reclusion perpetua to death, there being one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
(death) shall be applied. However, the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
cannot be appreciated in this case because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to the
accused, since the higher penalty of death would necessarily be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. In Criminal Case for MURDER, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant DOMINGO

VALDEZ Y DULAY is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

2. In Criminal Case for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, the sentence imposed on

accused-appelant DOMINGO VALDEZ y DULAY is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the
case is DISMISSED/

Explaination: what SC did was it applied retroactivity on RA 8294 thus setting aside and annulling
the 2nd case of Illegal Posession of Firearms, and thus charging only one offense, the crime of
murder. However, SC in the same light did not apply retroactivity on appreciating the use of
unlicensed firearm as aggravating circumstance otherwise Article 63 of the RPC will apply.

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.  - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.

5. People vs Patricio Amigo

FACTS:

On December 29, 1989, the victim, Benito Ng Suy was driving a Ford Fiera back home with his
daughter Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son.On their way home
and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven
by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, without
noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. Due to the unexpected veer made by
Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw. Right after the
collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who
also went down from his vehicle. While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation,
Patricio Amigo alias Bebot who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat
of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was
merely a small and minor accident. A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito
rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. The
heated exchanges of the 2 men inded up in the stabbing incident

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder. Subsequently, due to the death of the
victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of murder.

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to
death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial
court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that
Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed

and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him
twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by
pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not
content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter
embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the
left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare
her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door.
(Ibid. p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn
shouted for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but
to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after
her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that
she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood,
embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of
several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not
able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him
inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where
he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13)
stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently
brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)

In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to
Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of
confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH — SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This
means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should
have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance
of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and
killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion
perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible
from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being
no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in
the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.