1. Report No. 2.Government Accession No. 3 . R e c i p l e n t ' s Catalog No.

NTSB-AAR-76-11
4. T i t l e and S u b t i t l e Aircraft Accident Report - 5.Report Date
Airlift International, Inc., McDonnell-Douglas March 24, 1976
DC-8-63F, N6161A, John F. Kennedy International 6.Performing Organization
Airport, Jamaica, New York, Sept. 20, 1975 I Code
7 . Author(s) [ 8.Performing Organlzation
Report No.

9. Performlng Organization Name and Address 10.Work U n i t No.

National Transportation Safety Board 1772
Bureau of Aviation Safety 1 1 .Contract o r Grant No.
Washington, D.C. 20594
13.Type o f Report and
Period Covered
12. Sponsor I ng Agency Name and Address
Aircraft Accident Report
September 20, 1975
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C. 20594 14.Sponsoring Agency Code

16. Abstract
About 0355 e.d.t. on September 20, 1975, Airlift International, Inc. Flight 101,
a McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-63F, struck components of the runway 22L instrument landing
system, the runway 4R automatic landing system flasher, and the runway 4R field
monitor while taking off from runway 22L at the John F. Kennedy International
Airport at Jamaica, New York. The accident occurred during hours of darkness and
reduced visibility. The takeoff was made on an 8,400-foot runway using calculations
for a takeoff on a 11,352-foot runway.

The four occupants aboard were not injured. The aircraft was damaged slightly
and several ground components were destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
this accident was the captain's decision to use a runway that was too short for
the aircraft's takeoff performance capability under existing load and weather
conditions. As a result, the aircraft struck obstacles beyond the departure end of
the runway before it began to climb. The flightcrew had failed to use available
data which would have informed them that the runway was not long enough for the
takeoff .
17. Key Words 1 8 . D i s t r i b u t i o n Statement
Limited visibilities, failure to use proper takeoff This document is available
.
data, insufficient runway, takeoff accident to the public through the
National Technical Informa-
Identifier: McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-63F Accident tion Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151
19.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 20.Security Classification 21.No. o f Pages 22.Price
(of t h i s report) ( o f t h i s page)
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 17
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 History of the Flight . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Injuries to Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Damage to Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Other Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Crew Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.6 Aircraft Information . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.7 Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . 5
1.8 Aids to Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.9 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities. . . . . . . . 5
1.11 Flight Recorders. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.11.1 Flight Data Recorder . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder. . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.12 Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . 6
1.14 Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.15 Survival Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.16 Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.17 Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.17.1 Airlift International Takeoff Data Computation
and Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.17.2 Performance Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(a) Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(b) Probable Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Appendices

Appendix A - Investigation and Hearing . . . . . 11

Appendix B - Crew Information. . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C - Aircraft Information . . . . . . . 13
Appendix D Jeppesen Taxiway and Parking
Facilities Chart. . . . . . . . 14
Appendix E - Takeoff Limitations Chart, Runway 22L,
Runway Analysis Manual. . . . . . 15

ii
 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCXDENT REPORT

Adopted: March 24, 1976

AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC.

McDONNELL-DOUGLAS DC-8-63FY N6161A
JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
JAMAICA, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 20, 1975

SYNOPSIS

About 0355 e.d.t. on September 20, 1975, Airlift International,

Inc., Flight 101, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-63FY struck components of the
runway 22L instrument landing system, the runway 4R automatic landing
system flasher, and the runway 4R field monitor while taking off from
runway 22L at the John F. Kennedy International Airport at Jamaica,
New York. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness and reduced
visibility. The takeoff was made on an 8,400-foot runway using calcula-
tions for a takeoff on a 11,352-foot runway.

The four occupants aboard were not injured. The aircraft was
damaged slightly and several navigation aid ground components were
destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the

probable cause of this accident was the captain's decision to use a runway
that was too short for the aircraft's takeoff performance capability under
existing load and weather conditions. As a result, the aircraft struck
obstacles beyond the departure end of the runway before it began to
climb. The flightcrew had failed to use available data which would
have informed them that the runway was not long enough for the takeoff.

1. INVESTIGATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On September 20, 1975, Airlift International, Inc., Flight

101, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-63FY N6161A, was being operated as a
scheduled cargo flight from the John F. Kennedy International Airport
(JFK) to the San Francisco International Airport (SFO).

Before departing, the captain checked the flight plan and

weather and accepted the weight and balance calculations that had been
 - 2 -

computed by t h e s t a t i o n a g e n t f o r a t a k e o f f on runway 22R. The a i r c r a f t ' s

g r o s s weight had been computed t o b e 347,819 l b s . a t 24.5 p e r c e n t MAC.
Runway 22R i s 11,352 f e e t long.

The ground c o n t r o l l e r i s s u e d t h e f o l l o w i n g t a x i c l e a r a n c e :

"Taxi l e f t on runway 13L, Kennedy weather i n d e f i n i t e

c e i l i n g z e r o , sky obscured, v i s i b i l i t y 1/8 m i l e and fog.
Runway 22R v i s i b i l i t y i s less t h a n 1 / 4 m i l e ; runway 22L
i s a v a i l a b l e f o r d e p a r t u r e w i t h a v i s u a l range of 1,400
f e e t and a r o l l o u t of 1,4,00 f e e t . "

S i n c e t h e v i s i b i l i t y on runway 22R w a s below t a k e o f f minimums, t h e

c a p t a i n a c c e p t e d c l e a r a n c e f o r runway 22L which had more t h a n t h e
runway v i s u a l r a n g e (RVR) r e q u i r e d f o r t a k e o f f .

A t 0345, 1/ t h e f l i g h t l e f t t h e g a t e ' w i t h t h r e e crewmembers

and a nonrevenue rider i n t h e jumpseat. I t w a s c l e a r e d t o t h e San
F r a n c i s c o I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t i n accordance w i t h a s t o r e d i n s t r u m e n t
f l i g h t r u l e s (IFR) f l i g h t p l a n . The a s s i g n e d en r o u t e f l i g h t l e v e l
w a s 310 (31,000 f e e t ) . - 2/

The p i l o t of a n o t h e r a i r c r a f t , which w a s a l s o t a x i i n g o u t , and

communicating w i t h t h e ground c o n t r o l l e r on t h e same frequency as
A i r l i f t F l i g h t 101 r e p o r t e d t h a t h i s a i r c r a f t w a s t o o heavy t o t a k e o f f
from runway 22L. The ground c o n t r o l l e r suggested t h a t he u s e runway
13R, and t h e p i l o t a c c e p t e d . Runway 13R i s 14,572 f e e t long and had an
RVR of 1,600 f e e t ; runway 13R w a s a l s o a v a i l a b l e t o F l i g h t 101.

The c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e he w a s occupied i n t a x i i n g t h e
a i r c r a f t toward runway 22L i n l o w - v i s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , he r e q u e s t e d
t h a t t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r "check" and see i f t h e runway w a s adequate f o r
t a k e o f f . The f i r s t o f f i c e r t h e n looked a t t h e Jeppesen taxiway and
p a r k i n g f a c i l i t i e s c h a r t ( s e e Appendix D) and advised t h e c a p t a i n
t h a t runway 22L w a s a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s c h a r t does n o t c o n t a i n runway
l i m i t a t i o n s d a t a . However, t h e a p p l i c a b l e c h a r t i n t h e Runway A n a l y s i s
Manual ( s e e Appendix E ) , which i s c a r r i e d i n t h e a i r c r a f t and which w a s
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e f l i g h t c r e w , s t a t e d t h a t t h e maximum a l l o w a b l e t a k e o f f
weight on runway 22L f o r t h e DC-8-63F a i r p l a n e w i t h JT3D-7 e n g i n e s and
configured w i t h f l a p s of 23", when computed a t 68°F and 0 wind, was
314,800 l b s . The crewmembers d i d n o t r e f e r t o t h e Runway A n a l y s i s
Manual.

1/ A l l t i m e s h e r e i n are e a s t e r n d a y l i g h t , based on t h e 24-hour c l o c k .

-
2/ A l l a l t i t u d e s h e r e i n are mean sea l e v e l u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e noted.
-
 - 3 -

F l i g h t 101 changed from t h e ground c o n t r o l frequency t o tower

c o n t r o l frequency and w a s c l e a r e d f o r t a k e o f f on runway 22L. The f i r s t
o f f i c e r made t h e t a k e o f f from a s t a n d i n g s t a r t , u s i n g t h e same V speed
v a l u e s t h a t had been computed f o r runway 22R (V1 146 k n . ; VR I 5 3 kn.;
and V2 1 6 4 kn.). The p r e c i s e t a k e o f f s t a r t i n g p o i n t on t h e runway could
n o t b e determined.

The a i r c r a f t l i f t e d o f f n e a r t h e end of t h e runway and t h e

l a n d i n g g e a r s t r u c k several f i x e d s t r u c t u r e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
n a v i g a t i o n a l a i d s beyond t h e runway which w e r e l e s s t h a n 5 f e e t above
t h e runway e l e v a t i o n .

The c a p t a i n and f i r s t o f f i c e r d i d n o t r e c a l l a n y t h i n g t h a t t h e
a i r c r a f t s t r u c k , b u t t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r r e c a l l e d t h a t h e f e l t and heard
some "thumps" a f t e r l i f t o f f .
A f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t had reached an a l t i t u d e of 5,000 f e e t , t h e
f l i g h t e n g i n e e r r e p o r t e d t o t h e c a p t a i n t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t was not
p r e s s u r i z i n g . The c r e w r e p o r t e d t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s t o t h e New York A i r
Route T r a f f i c C o n t r o l C e n t e r when t h e a i r c r a f t reached 16,000 f e e t .

The f l i g h t changed i t s d e s t i n a t i o n t o A t l a n t a , Georgia, and

w a s c l e a r e d by New York ARTCC t o m a i n t a i n 16,000 f e e t . Later on, company
p e r s o n n e l a d v i s e d t h e f l i g h t t o d i v e r t t o M i a m i . The f l i g h t a r r i v e d
b e f o r e d a y l i g h t and h e l d t o t h e w e s t , A f t e r i t became l i g h t , t h e f l i g h t
made a low approach and f l e w by t h e M i a m i Tower w i t h l a n d i n g g e a r extended,
Tower c o n t r o l l e r s t o l d t h e f l i g h t c r e w t h a t one inboard l a n d i n g g e a r t i r e
w a s f l a t on each of t h e main g e a r s . The f l i g h t proceeded t o a f u e l dump
area where a l l e x c e s s f u e l w a s dumped t o lower t h e l a n d i n g weight.

The approach and l a n d i n g a t M i a m i I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t (MIA)

t o runway 9R w a s r o u t i n e , e x c e p t t h a t a d d i t i o n a l t i r e s blew o u t d u r i n g
t h e landing.

1.2 I n j u r i e s t o Persons

Injuries Crew Passengers Other

Fatal 0 0 0
Nonfatal 0 0 0
None 3 1

1.3 Damage t o A i r c r a f t

Main l a n d i n g g e a r t i r e s Nos. 1, 2 , 3 , 4 , 5, and 6 w e r e e i t h e r

damaged o r d e s t r o y e d . A 4-inch by 6-inch s k i n d e p r e s s i o n and p u n c t u r e
w a s l o c a t e d a t t h e lower i n b o a r d r i g h t wing, 2 f e e t outboard of t h e
f u s e l a g e s t a t i o n and b o r d e r i n g t h e l a n d i n g g e a r c u t o u t X. Orange marks
 -4-

and a skin depression were found on the lower right fuselage skin,
between station 1220 and 1292. The fuselage skin adjacent to the aft
rear baggage compartment door at fuselage station 1385 was torn. A
4-inch by 6-inch gouge was located in the aft rear baggage compartment
door's exterior skin, near stations 1420 to 1424. The cabin pressure
outflow butterfly valve hinge was damaged at station 1640. The circum-
ferential fairing around the butterfly valve door, near stations 1630 to
1645, was torn. The lower edge of the butterfly valve was scored and
dented. The fuselage tail skid fairing and associated metal were crushed
and torn near station 1766. The right-hand fuselage skin near station
1805 was punctured and contained a 3-inch by 4-inch tear. The right
horizontal stabilizer's leading edge (station 76.500) had a skin
depression and a 4-inch by 4-inch puncture. The lower skin on the right
horizontal stabilizer, near the spar and station XFS 145.500 had a
3-inch by 5-inch skin puncture.

1.4 Other Damage

At JFK, the red approach lights for runway 4R, located 250
feet from the end of the runway and 1 foot above the elevation of the
runway, were destroyed. The instrument landing system (ILS) monitor
locations 1 and 2, located 325 feet from the end of the runway and 2.75
feet above the elevation of the runway, were destroyed. A section of
the railing on the landing light pier, located between 625 and 750 feet
from the end of the runway and 4.5 feet above the elevation of runway
4R, was destroyed. The instrument landing system's localizer antenna
system, located 500 feet from the end of the runway and 4.5 feet above
the elevation of the runway, was destroyed. An approach light and
stanchion, located 650 feet beyond the end of the runway and 4.5 feet
above the elevation of the runway, were destroyed. An approach light
and stanchion, located 850 feet beyond the end of the runway and 4.5
feet above the elevation of the runway, were destroyed.

1.5 Crew Information

The three crewmembers were properly certificated for the

flight. (See Appendix B.)

1.6 Aircraft Information

The aircraft was certificated, equipped, and maintained in

accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements.
(See Appendix C.) The center of gravity was within the prescribed
limits. The aircraft's gross weight was less than the maximum allowable
limit.
 - 5 -

1.7 Meteorological Information

The JFK 0351 surface weather observation was, in part, as

follows:

Record special observation, ceiling -- indefinite zero,

sky obscured, visibility -- 1/8 mile, fog, temperature
-- 68"F, dew point -- 68"F, wind -- 140" at 3 kn,
altimeter setting -- 30.00 in., 10-minute extreme
values of RVR for runway 4 right were 1,600 feet lowest
value and 1,800 feet highest value.

The air traffic control specialist reported the visibility as

1/16 mile at the actual departure time of Flight 101.
The official surface weather observations taken during the
2 hours before takeoff showed that prevailing visibilities at JFK
fluctuated between 1/8 and 3/16 of a mile.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

Not applicable.

1.9 Communications

No communications difficulties were reported.

1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities

JFK is at an elevation of 12 feet. Runway 22R is 11,352 feet

long and has RVR measuring equipment installed. Runway 22L is 8,400
feet long and is not equipped with RVR measuring equipment. Runway
13R is 14,572 feet long and is equipped with RVR measuring equipment.

1.11 Flight Recorders

1.11.1 Flight Data Recorder

The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild Model 15600-501,

Flight Data Recorder (FDR) serial No. 5148. There was no evidence of
recorder malfunctions. The foil medium was undamaged and all parameter
traces had been recorded clearly.

The recorded data were plotted for a 2-minute period beginning

with the tqkeoff roll: Although the airspeed trace showed many aberrations
during the takeoff, the data were faired and examined to determine
airplane acceleration and distance. The examination showed that the
airplane reached 164 kn within 47 seconds, at which time a slight decrease
 -6-

in altitude, indicatdve of liftoff; was recorded. The corresponding

distance calculated from the rate of change in airspeed was approximately
7,500 feet.
One second later, 48 seconds after the start of the takeoff
roll, excursions in vertical acceleration were recorded. Peak amplitude
varied between +2 and 0 g for the next 5 seconds. Thereafter, all
traces appeared normal for a departure climb.

1.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is designed so that the

recording tape operates in a continuous loop, erasing recordings every
30 minutes as new ones are added. Since the flight was airborne for
several hours after the accident, any conversations recorded during
the takeoff were erased.

1.12 Wreckage

Not applicable.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

There was no evidence of preexisting physical problems which

could have affected the crewmembers' judgments or performances.

1.14 -
Fire

Not applicable.

1.15 Survival Aspects

This was a survivable accident.

1.16 Tests and Research

None

1.17 Other Information

1.17.1 Airlift International Takeoff Data Computations and Procedures

Airlift International, Inc., employed the procedure of having

the company agent prepare the weight and balance sheet, compute the
takeoff "V" speeds, and compute other flight data for the crewmembers
before the flight. The flight computations prepared for this flight
were computed for a departure on runway 22R.
 - 7 -

The procedures also required the pilot to consult the Runway

Analysis Manual if any of the precomputed takeoff conditions changed,
including a change in the takeoff runway.

1.17.2 Performance Data

According to calculations furnished by the McDonnell-Douglas

Corporation, the aircraft's performance from a standing takeoff, using
normal takeoff procedures, was as follows:

Knots Feet

V1 138 5 ,250
VR 154 6,5 9 5
VLOF 164 7,540
v35 168 8,8 3 2

The above VLOF represents the speed and distance obtained by

the airplane at liftoff from the runway. The V 3 5 represents the speed
and distance obtained at 3 5 feet above the runway's elevation with all
engines operating.

2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

2.1 Analysis

The aircraft was certificated, equipped, and maintained in

accordance with FAA requirements and approved procedures.

Based on the investigation, the flightcrew's statements, and

the performance analysis, the Safety Board concludes that the aircraft's
powerplants, airframe, electrical and pitot/static instruments, flight
controls, and hydraulic and electrical systems were not factors in this
accident. The flightcrew was route and airport qualified.

Because the captain was occupied with taxiing in restricted

visibilTty conditions, the responsibility for determining whether runway
22L was adequate for takeoff was assigned to the first officer. Instead
of checking the appropriate data contained in the Runway Analysis
Manual, the first 'officer looked at a taxiway and parking facilities
chart which did not contain sufficient information from which to make
this determination.

The Safety Board believes that the captain and the,first officer
were remiss in their duties since they did not determine that the aircraft
could be operated safely from a different runway than that for which
takeoff data had been calculated. The captain should have instructed one
of the flightcrew to review specifically the Runway Analysis Manual t o
determine if the gross weight of the aircraft restricted a takeoff on
runway 22L.
 - 8 -

S i n c e a n o t h e r DC-8 on t h e same ground c o n t r o l frequency

r e q u e s t e d a t a k e o f f on a l o n g e r runway because h i s t a k e o f f weight
r e q u i r e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l l e n g t h , t h e f l i g h t c r e w of F l i g h t 1 0 1 should
have been even more a l e r t t o t h e need t o c o n s u l t t h e manual. The
manual would have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e t a k e o f f weight of t h e a c c i d e n t
a i r c r a f t w a s 33,019 l b s . over t h e maximum weight allowed f o r t a k e o f f
on runway 22L.

A runway of a d e q u a t e l e n g t h w i t h t h e r e q u i r e d t a k e o f f RVR
w a s a v a i l a b l e t o F l i g h t 1 0 1 -- runway 13R. The runway w a s 14,572 f e e t
long and had a r e p o r t e d RVR of 1,600 f e e t . Runway 13R would have been
a l o g i c a l c h o i c e f o r t h e weight of t h e a i r c r a f t .

T h e o r e t i c a l performance d a t a showed t h a t t h e a i r p l a n e should

have become a i r b o r n e a t a n a i r s p e e d of 164 kn a f t e r a t a k e o f f r o l l of
7,540 f e e t . The a i r s p e e d and a l t i t u d e v a l u e s recorded by t h e f l i g h t
d a t a r e c o r d e r correspond t o expected performance v a l u e s and i n d i c a t e
t h a t t h e a i r p l a n e a c c e l e r a t e d as expected. T h i s evidence shows t h a t t h e
a i r p l a n e became a i r b o r n e w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s of t h e runway; however, t h e
d i s t a n c e from t h e t h r e s h o l d a t which t h e t a k e o f f t h r u s t w a s e s t a b l i s h e d
and t h e d i s t a n c e from t h e d e p a r t u r e end a t which t h e a i r p l a n e a c t u a l l y
l i f t e d o f f could n o t b e determined.

The S a f e t y Board b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e a i r p l a n e l i f t e d o f f n e a r
t h e end of t h e runway and t h a t i t w a s b e i n g r o t a t e d t o t h e climb a t t i t u d e
when i t s t r u c k t h e n a v i g a t i o n a i d s t r u c t u r e s beyond t h e runway's end.

Although t h e a i r c r a f t d i d become a i r b o r n e , t h e i n s u f f i c i e n t
runway l e n g t h d i d n o t a l l o w t h e margin of s a f e t y t h a t i s provided i n
t h e normal t a k e o f f c r i t e r i a as r e q u i r e d by 1 4 CFR 121.189, which relates
t o takeoff requirements.

T h i s a c c i d e n t demonstrates t h e need f o r f l i g h t c r e w s t o b e
aware of t h e f a c t o r s which c a n a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t t h e s a f e o p e r a t i o n of
t h e i r f l i g h t and t o b e f a m i l i a r w i t h , and u s e , a l l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s
a v a i l a b l e t o them f o r t h i s purpose.

2.2 Conclusions

(a) Findings

1. The crewmembers were c e r t i f i c a t e d and q u a l i f i e d

f o r t h e intended f l i g h t .

2. The a i r c r a f t w a s c e r t i f i c a t e d , equipped, and

maintained i n accordance w i t h FAA requirements
and procedures.
 - 9 -

3. The aircraft's weight, center of gravity, and

load distribution were within established
limits.

4. The weight calculations were made for a takeoff

on runway 22R; however, visibility on runway 22R
precluded its use for takeoff.

5. The RVR on runway 22L was greater than required

for takeoff and the captain elected to use the
shorter runway.

6. The captain did not request that any of the crew-

members consult the Runway Analysis Manual; the
manual would have indicated that Flight 101 was
33,019 lbs overweight for a takeoff on the 8,400-
foot runway.

7. A runway of sufficient length and with adequate

visibility was also available for takeoff.

8. The takeoff was made on a runway that was too

short for the performance capability of the aircraft.
Consequently, the aircraft lifted off near the
runway's end and there was not sufficient time or
distance in which to rotate the aircraft and
establish a climb.

9. The aircraft struck objects 1 foot above the

elevation of the runway and 250 feet beyond the
end of the runway. It also struck objects 4.5
feet above the runway elevation and 850 feet beyond
the end of the runway.

10. The aircraft could not be pressurized properly

because it was damaged during takeoff.

(b) Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the

probable cause of this accident was the captain's decision to use a
runway that was too short for the aircraft's takeoff performance
capability under existing load and weather conditions. As a result,
the aircraft struck obstacles beyond the departure end of the runway
before it began to climb. The flightcrew had failed to use available
data which would have informed them that the runway was not long
enough for the takeoff.
 - 10 -

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

/ s / WEBSTER B. TODD, JR.

Chairman

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS

Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER

Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS

Member

/s/ WILLIAM R. HALEY

Member

March 2 4 , 1976
 - 11 - APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION AND HEARING

1. Investigation

The Board was notified of the accident at 0600 on September 20,

1975, by Airlift International, Inc., Miami, Florida. An investigator
was dispatched from the Safety Board's Miami Field Office. The Federal
Aviation Administration and Airlift International, Inc., participated in
the investigation. The on-scene portion of the investigation was completed
on September 22, 1975.

2. Hearing

A hearing was not held.

 - 12 - APPENDIX B

CREW INFORMATION

Captain P a t r i c k J . Cavella

C a p t a i n Cavella, 56, h o l d s A i r l i n e T r a n s p o r t P i l o t C e r t i f i c a t e
No. 92378-41 w i t h t y p e r a t i n g s i n C-46, DC-4, DC-6, DC-7, DC-8, B-707,
B-720 and B-727. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , he had accumulated about
25,784 f l i g h t - h o u r s , 2,535 h o u r s of which had been i n t h e McDonnell-
Douglas DC-8. H i s l a s t p r o f i c i e n c y check i n t h e DC-8 w a s completed
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on A p r i l 28, 1975. H e possessed a c u r r e n t F i r s t - c l a s s
Medical C e r t i f i c a t e , d a t e d June 9 , 1975, w i t h no l i m i t a t i o n s .

F i r s t O f f i c e r Sidney C. Sims, Jr.

F i r s t O f f i c e r S i m s , 54, h o l d s A i r l i n e T r a n s p o r t P i l o t C e r t i f i c a t e
No. 132030 w i t h t y p e r a t i n g s i n Douglas DC-4, DC-6, DC-7, Lockheed
C o n s t e l l a t i o n , C-46, and Canadair CL-44. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t ,
h e had accumulated about 24,000 f l i g h t - h o u r s , 2,000 hours of which had
been i n t h e McDonnell-Douglas DC-8. H i s l a s t p r o f i c i e n c y check i n t h e
DC-8 was completed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on January 29, 1975. H e possessed a
c u r r e n t F i r s t - c l a s s Medical C e r i f i c a t e , d a t e d October 20, 1974, w i t h a
waiver s t a t i n g t h a t h o l d e r s h a l l p o s s e s s c o r r e c t i n g g l a s s e s f o r n e a r
vision.

F l i g h t Engineer Madison 0. Rogers

F l i g h t Engineer Rogers, 51, h o l d s F l i g h t Engineer C e r t i f i c a t e

No. 460122872, t u r b o j e t . H e a l s o h e l d s a n A i r l i n e T r a n s p o r t P i l o t
C e r t i f i c a t e No. 218838 and Mechanic C e r t i f i c a t e No. 1162605, w i t h t y p e
r a t i n g s i n C-46, DC-6, DC-7, DC-8, ASIW 650, L-382 and B-25. A t t h e t i m e of
t h e a c c i d e n t , he had accumulated about 16,724 f l i g h t - h o u r s , 1 , 0 5 3
h o u r s of which had been i n t h e McDonnell-Douglas DC-8 as f l i g h t e n g i n e e r
and 1,947 hours i n t h e DC-8 as p i l o t . H i s l a s t p r o f i c i e n c y check i n
t h e DC-8 w a s completed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on December 11, 1974. H e
possessed a c u r r e n t F i r s t - c l a s s Medical C e r t i f i c a t e , d a t e d June 2 2 , 1975,
w i t h a waiver s t a t i n g t h a t h o l d e r s h a l l wear g l a s s e s f o r d i s t a n t v i s i o n .
 - 13 - APPENDIX C

AIRCRAFT INFOJXMATION

Make and Model MeDonnell-Douglas DC-8-63F

Registration N6161A
Serial No. 45969
Date of Manufacturer September 25, 1968
Total Flight-Hours 27,391:23
Engines Pratt and Whitney JT3D-7

No. S /N Total Time Time Since Overhaul

671440 17,468:35 -
11
671172 16,259:39
671253 16,152:22
671026 22,709: 20

1/ The engines were maintained by United Air Lines under their logical
-
information based on reliability analysis (LIBRA) program.
 - 14 -
APPENDIX D

S E E R E V E R S E SIDE

40 31

0 - outer Per,me,er
I = I n n e r Perlmelet
 - 15 -
APPENDIX E

DC-8-63F JT3D-7 2 3 O FLAPS A....

AIRLIFT
I I... 1.1.. ..e.

LENGTH 8400. ELEV 12.

RUNWAY L I M I T E D GRAD 0.0 NEW YORK, N.Y.
JFK Im'L.
VR INCREMENT STRUCT
TEMP-F TEMP ZERO /CLIMB
G/W V I v2 20 50 8 0 1 1 0 DEG F WIND L I M I T

755 141 165 11 11 9 8 -10 34@5 3550

i 5 n 133 164 11 11 10 8 0 3369 3550
34P 1 3 7 162 12 12 10 9 10 3334 355@
770 174 160 12 12 11 9 20 3300 3550
3 2 D 131 1 5 8 13 13 12 10 30 3267 3550
310 128 1 5 5 13 13 12 10 32 3 2 6 1 755C

30p 127 153 14 14 12 11 34 3254 3550

290 1 2 5 151 14 14 13 12 36 3248 3550
I?RO 1 2 7 148 14 14 13 12 ?8 3241 355C
77P 121 146 15 15 14 13 40 3235 3550
760 1 1 R 144 16 16 15 14 42 322R 3550
250 1 1 5 141 16 16 15 14 44 3222 355C

74Q 111 1 3 9 15 15 16 15 46 3215 3550

7aa r n q 116
VMC G
u
1 3 113 1 1 3 1 0 2
48
50
3209
3203
355P
3550
52 3198 3550
54 3193 3551,
GROSS WEIGHT C D R R E C T I O N S 56 3188 355G

9 A R O PRES5-FOR FACH a 1 I N H( 58 3183 355C

BELOW 29.70 U S E 1 DEG 60 3172 755C
HOTTER TEYP. 62 3166 355C
64 3160 3550
NTYO-ADJUST Z E R O WIND COLUMN 66 3154 3550
ADD 6 2 0 LBS/KT H.W. 68 3148 355C
S U R 2470 LRS/KT T O W .
7(! 3142 3550
72 3137 3550
74 3131 355C
00 NOT EXCEED STRUCT/CLIMB W' 76 3125 3550
78 3119 3550
80 3114 3550

82 3105 3550
84 3096 3550
86 3081 3550
88 3065 3527
90 3048 3496
92 3030 3463

94 3012 3430
96 2994 3398
98 2975 3365
100 2957 3333
110 2856 3162
120 2745 2982
122 2721 2945
9 9 OCT 3 1 1968
A S 1 M A X WT- SUB 1 2 0 0 0 LRS FROM R W LIMJT UT.