File No.

A-0003

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

LOFTLElDlR ICELANDIC AIRLINES, INC.
DOUGLAS DC-8-61
JOHN F. KENNEDY
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Jamaica, New York
June 23, 1973
NTSB-AAR-73-20 I
4. T i t l e a n d Subtitle Aircraft Accident Report - I
I 5.Report Date
L o f t l e i d i r Icelandic Airlines, Inc. , Douglas DC-8-61, December 5, 1973
.
John F Kennedy International Airport , Jamaica , New 6.Performing organization
York, June .23, 1973 I Code
7. Author(s) I 8.Performing Organization
Report No.
9. Performing Organization Name a n d Address 10.Work Unit No.
National Transportation Safety Board 1207-A
Bureau of Aviation Safety 1 1 .Contract o r Grant No.
Washington, D. C . 20591
I3.Type of Report a n d
Period Covered
12.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Aircraft Accident Report
June 23, 1973
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C. 20591

15.Supplementary Notes
This report contains Aviation Safety Recommendations A-73-111 and 1 1 2 .
3 1 .Sponsoring Agency Code

16.Abstract
On June 23, 1973, Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines, Inc. , Flight 509, a scheduled
passenger and cargo f l i g h t , was involved i n a landing accident a f t e r an instrument
landing approach t o runway 31R a t the John F . Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica,
New York. O f the 119 passengers and 9 crewmembers aboard the f l i g h t , 6 passengers
and 2 stewardesses w e r e injured seriously; there were no f a t a l i t i e s . The a i r c r a f t
was damaged substantially.
When the a i r c r a f t was about 40 f e e t above the runway, the ground spoilers were
inadvertently deployed. The a i r c r a f t descended rapidly and h i t the ground , t a i l -
f i r s t , 20 f e e t short of the displaced runway threshold.

17. Key Words 18.Distribution Statement

Airlines , scheduled f l i g h t , landing , spoiler system, This document i s available
high r a t e of descent, design c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , change t o the public through the
i n design. National Technical Informa-
tion Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151

19.Security Classification 2O.Security Classification 21.No. o f Pages 22.Price

(of t h i s report) (of t h i s page)
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 32
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Synopsis........................ 1
1 . ......................
Investigation
....................
History of Flight
2
2
1.1
1.2 ...................
Injuries to Persons 2
1.3 ...................
Damage to Aircraft 2
1.4 ......................
Other Damage 3
1.5 ....................
Crew Information 3
1.6 ..................
Aircraft Informtion 3
1.7 ...............
Meteorological Information 3
1.8 ...................
Aids to Navigation 4
1.9 ......................
Communications 4
1.10 .............
Aerodrome and Ground Facilities 4
1.11 ....................
Flight Recorders 4
1.12 ....................
Aircraft Wreckage 5
1.13 ..........
Medical and Pathological Information 5
1.14 Fire .......................... 6
1.15 ....................
Surviva1 Aspects 6
1.16 ....................
Test and Research 6
1.17 ...............
Other Pertinent Information 6
2.
2.1 Analysis
................
Analysis and Conclusions
........................
7
7
2.2 .......................
Conclusions 8
....................
(a) Findings 8
.................
(b) Probable Cause 9
3 . .....................
Recommendations 9

Appendices
Appendix A Investigation and Hearing ....... 11
Appendix B Crew Information ............ 12
Appendix C ..........
Aircraft Information 14
Appendix D .........
Cockpit Voice Recorder 15
Appendix E Recommendations ............ 29

iii
 F i l e No. A-0003

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C . 20591

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: December 5 , 1973

L O F n E I D I R ICELANDIC AIRLINES, I N C .
DOUGLAS DC-8-61
.
JOHN F KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
JAMAICA, NEW Y O N
JUNE 2 3 , 1973

SYNO PS IS

L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s , I n c . , F l i g h t 509, a scheduled pas-

senger and cargo f l i g h t , was involved i n a landing a c c i d e n t a f t e r a n
instrument landing system (ILS) approach t o runway 31R a t t h e John F.
Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t , i n Jamaica, New York. The a c c i d e n t oc-
curred a t 0358 e . d . t . , on June 23, 1973; 119 passengers and 9 crewmembers
were aboard t h e a i r c r a f t . S i x passengers and two stewardesses were in-
jured s e r i o u s l y ; t h e r e were no f a t a l i t i e s .

J u s t b e f o r e touchdown and when t h e a i r c r a f t w a s on t h e f l a r e , t h e

c a p t a i n c a l l e d f o r t h e ground s p o i l e r s t o b e armed. During t h e arming
process, t h e a c t i v a t i n g lever w a s i n a d v e r t e n t l y pulled back, which
caused t h e s p o i l e r s t o deploy f u l l y . The a i r c r a f t ' s r a t e of descent
promptly i n c r e a s e d , and t h e a i r c r a f t s t r u c k t h e runway, t a i l f i r s t , 20
f e e t s h o r t of t h e displaced runway threshold. The a i r c r a f t w a s damaged
substantially.

The passengers and f l i g h t c r e w used i n f l a t a b l e escape s l i d e s t o evacu-

ate the a i r c r a f t .
The evacuation w a s o r d e r l y , and no i n j u r i e s r e s u l t e d .

The National T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board determines t h a t t h e prob-

a b l e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t w a s t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r ' s i n a d v e r t e n t deploy-
ment of t h e ground s p o i l e r s i n f l i g h t while he w a s attempting t o a r m t h e
s p o i l e r system. The c a p t a i n ' s d e c i s i o n t o delay arming of t h e s p o i l e r s
u n t i l j u s t b e f o r e touchdown w a s a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r , because t h e t i m -
ing varied from normal procedures and required t h e crewmembers t o act
quickly, without t i m e f o r c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n .

As a r e s u l t of t h i s a c c i d e n t and of a review of s i m i l a r a c c i d e n t s ,
t h e National T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board on December 7 , 1973, made two
recommendations t o t h e F e d e r a l Aviation Administration. (See Appendix
E.)
 - 2 -

I. INVESTIGATION

1.1 History of F l i g h t

L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s , I n c . , F l i g h t 509 was a scheduled i n t e r -

n a t i o n a l cargo and passenger f l i g h t from Stockholm, Sweden, t o New York,
U.S.A. , via Oslo, Norway;and Reykjavik, Iceland.

The f l i g h t departed Keflavik A i r p o r t , I c e l a n d , a t 2214 1/ on June

22, 1973, w i t h instrument f l i g h t r u l e s (IFR) c l e a r a n c e . There were 119
passengers, 9 crewmembers, and 7,446 pounds of cargo on board. The
f l i g h t from Keflavik t o t h e o u t e r marker of the ILS f o r runway 3 1 R a t
John F. Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t w a s r o u t i n e .

A t 0356 on June 23, F l i g h t 509 contacted t h e tower a t t h e JFK a i r -

p o r t and w a s c l e a r e d t o land on runway 31R; t h e wind was 200' a t 3 k n o t s .

The c a p t a i n decided t o arm t h e s p o i l e r s j u s t b e f o r e touchdown rather

than j u s t a f t e r t h e landing gear had been extended. The l a t t e r i s c a l l e d
f o r i n t h e before-landing c h e c k l i s t . S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e c a l l t o a r v t h e
s p o i l e r s , t h e a i r c r a f t s t r u c k t h e runway, t a i l f i r s t , and i n a nose-high
a t t i tud e.

Later, t h e c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h a t he had c a l l e d f o r t h e s p o i l e r s t o
be armed a t an a l t i t u d e between 20 and 30 f e e t . A f t e r impact, a l l en-
g i n e s were s h u t down by means of f i r e shutoff levers; f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s
were discharged. Normal braking and nosewheel s t e e r i n g were used t o
d e c e l e r a t e t h e a i r c r a f t and t o keep i t from running o f f t h e runway.

The f i r s t o f f i c e r s t a t e d t h a t because he could not a r m t h e s p o i l e r s

w i t h h i s l e f t hand, he had t o use both hands. H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he
might have pulled back on t h e a c t i v a t i n g lever which deployed t h e s p o i l e r s .

1.2 I n j u r i e s t o Persons

Injuries -Crew Passengers -

Other

Fatal 0 0 0
Nonfat a1 2 6 0
None 7 113

1.3 Damage t o A i r c r a f t

The a i r c r a f t w a s damaged s u b s t a n t i a l l y on impact. F i r e damaged t h e

a f t end of t h e n a c e l l e and t h e wing i n t h e area of t h e No. 1 pylon.

-1/ Eastern Daylight t i m e based on t h e 24-hour clock.

 - 3 -

1.4 Other Damage

A gouge, 2 3 f e e t long, 5 inches wide, and 2 t o 3 inches deep, w a s
found on t h e runway c e n t e r l i n e a t t h e d i s p l a c e d threshold b a r . Two
l i g h t s on t h e edge of t h e runway were destroyed.

1.5 C r e w Information

Crewmembers were p r o p e r l y c e r t i f i c a t e d . (See Appendix B.)

1.6 A i r c r a f t Information

The a i r c r a f t w a s c e r t i f i c a t e d and maintained according t o regula-

tions. (See Appendix C.) The a i r c r a f t , N8960T, had been c e r t i f i e d f o r
a maximum takeoff weight of 328,000 pounds and a maximum landing weight
of 258,000 pounds. Its a c t u a l takeoff weight w a s estimated t o b e 316,421
pounds. The c e n t e r of g r a v i t y (c.g.) w a s a t 28.3 p e r c e n t mean aerodynamic
chord (MAC). The takeoff c.g. l i m i t s w e r e from 15 t o 33.6 percent MAC.
Landing c o g . w a s about 24.1 percent MAC a t 223,421 pounds.

Ground s p o i l e r s on t h e Douglas DC-8 are used as a groundspeed brake

t o d e c r e a s e t h e l e n g t h of t h e landing r o l l . Ground s p o i l e r s should not
b e deployed i n f l i g h t .

Ground s p o i l e r s are a c t i v a t e d by
t h r o t t l e quadrant. They are armed by
When t h e s p o i l e r s are armed, t h e main
a u t o m a t i c a l l y moves t h e handle a f t t o
deploys t h e s p o i l e r s .
a l e v e r on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e
p u l l i n g t h i s lever forward and up.
wheel a n t i s k i d transducer s p i n up
t h e extended p o s i t i o n and thereby

While i n f l i g h t , ground s p o i l e r s may be deployed manually by p u l l i n g

t h e handle a f t from e i t h e r t h e armed o r unarmed p o s i t i o n . To do s o re-
q u i r e s a f o r c e of 35 pounds. The systemwas so designed t o prevent in-
a d v e r t e n t s p o i l e r deployment i n f l i g h t . Manual deployment i s not author-
i z e d by t h e a i r c r a f t f l i g h t manual.

1,7 Meteorological Information

Selected p o r t i o n s of s u r f a c e weather observations a t John F. Kennedy
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t j u s t b e f o r e and s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t were as
follows :

0351 r e g u l a r : P a r t i a l obscuration; 10,000 f e e t s c a t t e r e d ; s u r f a c e

and tower v i s i b i l i t y - 3 m i l e s w i t h ground fog and smoke; temperature-
64O F.; dew point-64O F.; ~ i n d - 1 8 0a~t 5 knots; altimeter s e t t i n g -
30.03 inches.

0451 r e g u l a r : P a r t i a l obscuration; 10,000 f e e t s c a t t e r e d ; s u r f a c e

and tower v i s i b i l i t y - 3 m i l e s w i t h ground fog and smoke; temperature-
 - 4 -

64' F.; dew point-64' F.; wind-190' a t 4 knots; a l t i m e t e r s e t t i n g -

30.03 inches

1.8 Aids t o NavLgation

Not a p p l i c a b l e .

1.9 Communications

N o communication d i f f i c u l t i e s were encountered between t h e crew and

air t r a f f i c control f a c i l i t i e s .

1.10 Aerodrome and Ground F a c i l i t f e s

Runway 31R a t John F. Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t i s 10,000 f e e t

long and 150 f e e t wide and has a displaced threshold 1,024 f e e t from t h e
a c t u a l end of t h e runway. This displaced threshold i s a load-bearing
p o r t i o n of t h e runway t h a t i s used f o r t a k e o f f s when 31R i s t h e active
d e p a r t u r e runway. The f i e l d e l e v a t i o n i s 12 f e e t above mean sea level
(m.s.1.)

1.11 F l i g h t Recorders

The a i r c r a f t , N8960T, w a s equipped w i t h a UCDD (Sundstrand) model

FA-542, s e r i a l No. 2852, f l i g h t d a t a r e c o r d e r (FDR) , and a United Data
Control Model V-557, s e r i a l No. 2013, cockpit voice recorder (CVR) .
F l i g h t Data Recorder

Because t h e FDR was w i r e d through a switch on t h e main landing g e a r ,

t h e recording stopped when t h e main landing gear s t r u c k t h e runway. Con-
sequently, no traces were recorded a f t e r impact. The magnetic heading
trace mechanism w a s i n o p e r a t i v e . According t o t h e FDR, during t h e l a s t
57 seconds of recorded f l i g h t , t h e a i r c r a f t descended 750 f e e t a t a des-
c e n t r a t e of about 800 f e e t per minute. During t h e same 57 seconds,
t h e a i r s p e e d trace decreased from 155 mi/h t o 148 mi/h.

Cockpit Voice Recorder

The t r a n s c r i p t of t h e CVR t a p e i n d i c a t e s t h a t approximately 8 minutes

10 seconds b e f o r e impact, t h e c a p t a i n s a i d t h e s p o i l e r s could b e armed
b e f o r e touchdown. F i v e minutes 41 seconds l a t e r , ground s p o i l e r opera-
t i o n w a s discussed f o r 1 minute 46 seconds. I n t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h e r e
were q u e s t i o n s as t o how t h e ground s p o i l e r s could be deployed, what ac-
t i o n would r e s u l t from v a r i o u s methods of deployment, and when during
t h e landing they should be a c t i v a t e d . Three and one-half seconds b e f o r e
impact, t h e c a p t a i n s a i d , "Okay, arm them." Two seconds l a t e r , t h e
f l i g h t engineer shouted, "No! No! No! No! No'" , The sound of impact w a s
a u d i b l e 1 1 / 2 seconds l a t e r .
 - 5 -

The l a s t 8 minutes of recorded c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e c o c k p i t are

t r a n s c r i b e d i n Appendix D.

1.12 A i r c r a f t Wreckage

The a i r c r a f t ' s i n i t i a l p o i n t of impact w a s 20 f e e t s h o r t of t h e run-

way on t h e c e n t e r l i n e of runway 31R. From t h a t p o i n t , t h e a i r c r a f t r o l l e d
and stopped 6,048 f e e t f a r t h e r down t h e runway. F i r s t , t h e t a i l s k i d
s t r u c k t h e runway s u r f a c e . Then, t h e N o . 1 engine separated from t h e a i r -
c r a f t 720 f e e t from t h e i n i t i a l p o i n t of impact. The engine came t o rest
on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e runway 1,012 f e e t from t h e p o i n t o f s e p a r a t i o n .

Compression caused buckling j u s t inboard of t h e No. 2 and N o . 3

pylons and on t h e underside of t h e f u s e l a g e from t h e c e n t e r of t h e lower
a f t cargo door rearward about 12 f e e t . Stringers and formers w e r e a l s o
damaged and scraped. The t a i l s k i d w a s crushed upward and t o t h e rear,
and t h e f a i r i n g s were crushed and bent over about 180°. Both main land-
ing g e a r s t r u t s had c o l l a p s e d .

Most overhead h a t r a c k s i n t h e passenger c a b i n separated longitudin-

a l l y . The rear of t h e c a b i n w a s damaged most s e v e r e l y . The rear l e g s
of four passenger s e a t s had c o l l a p s e d ; t h e stewardesses' seats i n t h e
g a l l e y had s e p a r a t e d from t h e mountings; and two l i f e r a f t s i n t h e
c e n t e r c e i l i n g had separated from t h e mountings.

The e n t i r e lower s u r f a c e s k i n of t h e f u s e l a g e , from t h e r i g h t rear

cargo door a f t t o , and i n c l u d i n g , t h e t a i l s k i d , was s e v e r e l y scraped
and buckled.

F i r e damaged t h e a f t outboard p o r t i o n of t h e pylon f a i r i n g s k i n and

t h e lower l e f t a i l e r o n s k i n outboard of t h e No. 1 engine exhaust. The
No. 4 engine remained i n t a c t , although i t had separated p a r t i a l l y near
t h e forward leading edge of t h e pylon a d j a c e n t t o t h e engine's forward
a ttach point.

The nose landing g e a r remained i n t a c t and without v i s i b l e damage.

The main landing gear wheels d i d not f r a c t u r e . A l l t i r e s remained i n -
f l a t e d , although t h e r e w a s evidence of severe s i d e w a l l compression.

The ground s p o i l e r lever i n t h e c o c k p i t w a s i n t h e a f t and up-and-

locked p o s i t i o n . The f l i g h t and ground s p o i l e r s w e r e extended f u l l y .

The i n - f l i g h t s p o i l e r s and t h e ground s p o i l e r s functioned normally.

The only malfunction noted during t h e o p e r a t i o n s check w a s t h a t t h e
s p o i l e r . l i g h t remained i l l u m i n a t e d when t h e s p o i l e r s were r e t r a c t e d ,
1.13 Medical and P a t h o l o g i c a l Information
S i x passengers and two crewmembers were i n j u r e d s e r i o u s l y . These
i n j u r i e s included neck and back s t r a i n s and compression f r a c t u r e s t o
 - 6 -

v e r t e b r a e . The i n j u r i e s were a l l caused by v e r t i c a l loads during t h e

c r a s h landing.

1.14 Fire

S h o r t l y a f t e r s e p a r a t i o n of t h e N o . 1 engine from t h e a i r c r a f t ,
severed e l e c t r i c a l wires i g n i t e d a f i r e i n t h e No. 1 engine pylon. The
f i r e was f e d by a ruptured f u e l l i n e .

The Kennedy A i r p o r t F i r e / S e c u r i t y Dispatch Center received t h e

c r a s h alarm a t 0358. Six f i r e f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s responded and t h e f i r s t
c r a s h truck a r r i v e d a t t h e scene 1 minute a f t e r the alarm was received.
The f i r e was extinguished w i t h foam 30 seconds l a t e r .

1 15 Surviva 1 Aspec t s

A l l passengers but one were evacuated through one of t h r e e evacua-

t i o n s l i d e s a v a i l a b l e . The two r i g h t j e t e s c a p e s and t h e l e f t r e a r e n t r y
door were used a s exits during the evacuation. 3 , o l i f e r a f t s obstructed
t h e r e a r a i s l e and impeded passenger movement toward t h e r e a r exit. Ac-
cess t o t h e two j e t e s c a p e s was impeded by p o r t i o n s of t h e overhead hat-
r a c k s which had protruded i n t o t h e access r o u t e t o t h e s e e x i t s . F i r e i n
t h e l e f t wing prevented escape through t h e l e f t j e t e s c a p e and overwing
exits.

Most crewmembers l e f t t h e a i r c r a f t through emergency evacuation

s l i d e s a f t e r passengers had e x i t e d t h e a i r c r a f t . The remaining passen-
g e r , who was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d , and t h e c a p t a i n were evacuated by means
of a g a l l e y s e r v i c e v e h i c l e .

1.16 Tests amd Research

I n a simulated f l i g h t , t h e s p o i l e r s could be armed normally. I n

repeated t e s t s , t h e s p o i l e r l e v e r was armed without d i f f i c u l t y by using
two f i n g e r s . I n a simulated landing, t h e s p o i l e r l e v e r moved a f t auto-
m a t i c a l l y , and ground s p o i l e r s deployed f u l l y .

When t h e s p o i l e r c o n t r o l l e v e r was moved a f t manually, t h e s p o i l e r

panels extended. However, both hands and a f o r c e of 35 pounds of pres-
s u r e w e r e r e q u i r e d . The s p o i l e r s extended when t h e s p o i l e r handle was
moved approximately 1 inch a f t .

1.17 Other P e r t i n e n t Information

Douglas A i r c r a f t Company released t h e following c a b l e t o o p e r a t o r s

of DC-8 type a i r c r a f t on August 7 , 1970:
 - / -

DC-8 Ground S p o i l e r Actuation

"The nomenclature of 'Ground S p o i l e r s ' c o n s t i t u t e s c l e a r

i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t t h e s p o i l e r s should not ,be deployed i n f l i g h t
and i n t h e manual and t r a i n i n g i n s t r u c t i o n they have always
been r e f e r r e d t o as 'Ground S p o i l e r s . '

"Of c o u r s e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a c t u a t e t h e s p o i l e r s i n f l i g h t
on any DC-8 equipped w i t h H y t r o l Mark I1 o r Mark 111 a n t i - s k i d brak-
i n g system by p u l l i n g t h e a c t u a t i n g handle a f t from e i t h e r t h e armed
o r disarmed p o s i t i o n providing t h e r e i s s p o i l e r systempressure. How-
ever, t h i s improper procedure r e q u i r e s a f o r c e of 35 pounds, a deter-
r e n t t o such abnormal a c t i o n . I f thus a c t u a t e d , t h e s p o i l e r exten-
s i o n cannot be modulated, t h e s p o i l e r s w i l l deploy i n less than one
second, b u t i f t h e handle i s returned forward, t h e s p o i l e r s w i l l
f u l l y retract i n approximately 3 seconds. I'

Seaboard World - DC-8 Operating Manual

The amplified before-landing c h e c k l i s t c o n t a i n s t h e following informa-

t i o n on s p o i l e r s :

"Spoilers ........ Armed, P r e s s u r e up (F/O -

F/E). P i l o t
not f l y i n g w i l l r a i s e s p o i l e r c o n t r o l handle o u t of d e t e n t t o ARM
p o s i t i o n a f t e r a l l g e a r down and locked.

Caution: DO NOT MDVE LEVER REARWARDS AS SPOILERS WILL EXTEND."

2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

2.1 Analysis

There was no evidence of s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e , malfunction, o r abnormal-

i t y of t h e a i r f r a m e , f l i g h t c o n t r o l s , o r s p o i l e r system w i t h t h e exception
of t h e c o c k p i t s p o i l e r l i g h t switch. The s p o i l e r l i g h t had malfunctioned
when t h e s p o i l e r s were r e t r a c t e d a f t e r a landing a t Keflavik.

The a i r f r a m e and powerplant assemblies w e r e damaged by t h e hard

landing which w a s caused by i n - f l i g h t deployment of t h e s p o i l e r s j u s t
b e f o r e touchdown.

The major c a u s a l f a c t o r i n t h e a c c i d e n t sequence w a s t h e d e c i s i o n

t o a r m t h e ground s p o i l e r s j u s t b e f o r e touchdown. This d e c i s i o n may
have been influenced by t h e f a u l t y s p o i l e r l i g h t switch which caused t h e
s p o i l e r l i g h t t o i l l u m i n a t e i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . Consequently, t h e s p o i l e r s
were armed o u t of t h e normal sequence called f o r i n t h e before-landing
c h e c k l i s t . Since t h e c a l l t o a r m t h e s p o i l e r s came a t an a l t i t u d e from
20 t o 30 f e e t , t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r had t o act quickly t o a r m them b e f o r e
touchdown.
 - a -

The f i r s t o f f i c e r s t a t e d t h a t because h e could not a r m t h e s p o i l e r s

w i t h only h i s l e f t hand, he had t o u s e b o t h hands. Immediately a f t e r t h e
f i r s t o f f i c e r t r i e d t o a r m t h e s p o i l e r s , t h e a i r c r a f t sank r a p i d l y and
s t r u c k t h e ground.

I f t h e s p o i l e r system has hydraulic p r e s s u r e , t h e ground s p o i l e r s

may b e a c t i v a t e d i n f l i g h t by p u l l i n g t h e a c t i v a t i n g lever a f t from
e i t h e r t h e armed o r unarmed p o s i t i o n . To do s o , however, i s improper
and r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e lever move less than 1 i n c h a f t . A f o r c e of 35
pounds i s required t o deploy t h e ground s p o i l e r s . Thus a c t i v a t e d , t h e
s p o i l e r extension cannot b e modulated, and t h e s p o i l e r s w i l l deploy i n
less than 1 second.

From statements by f l i g h t crewmembers and from t h e t r a n s c r i p t of

t h e CVR, i t i s evident t h a t t h e s p o i l e r s w e r e deployed by t h e a f t move-
ment of t h e s p o i l e r arming lever. Conversations during t h e last 4 min-
u t e s of f l i g h t i n d i c a t e t h a t some of t h e crewmembers were unfamiliar w i t h
t h e s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e DC-8 ground s p o i l e r system and i t s
operation. The lever p o s i t i o n on t h e t h r o t t l e quadrant i s t o t h e l e f t
and forward of t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r ' s seat. I n h i s h a s t e t o a r m t h e s p o i l -
ers b e f o r e touchdown, the f i r s t o f f i c e r apparently exerted enough rear-
ward p r e s s u r e t o deploy t h e ground s p o i l e r s . The f l i g h t engineer re-
peated warning shouts of "no" i n a n attempt t o prevent t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r
from improperly a c t i v a t i n g t h e gro.und s p o i l e r s .

The pilot-in-cormnand i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s a f e t y of t h e
passengers, t h e crew, t h e cargo and a i r c r a f t w h i l e t h e a i r c r a f t i s i n
f l i g h t . During t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s a c c i d e n t , t h e S a f e t y Board did
not f i n d a reason f o r t h e pilot-in-command's d e c i s i o n t o a r m t h e s p o i l e r s
when t h e a i r c r a f t w a s s o c l o s e t o touchdown.

The c a p t a i n had been concerned by t h e f a c t t h a t when t h e s p o i l e r s

were r e t r a c t e d on t h e ground, t h e s p o i l e r l i g h t stayed on. This condi-
t i o n w a s d u p l i c a t e d several t i m e s during t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The problem
w a s a f a u l t y switch i n t h e i n d i c a t i n g system, and not t h e ground s p o i l e r
a c t i v a t i n g system. The f i r s t o f f i c e r w a s obviously anxious t o a r m t h e
s p o i l e r s b e f o r e t h e a i r c r a f t touched down.

I f t h e before-landing c h e c k l i s t i t e m s had been accomplished i n t h e i r

prescribed sequence, t h e s p o i l e r s would have been armed a t a n a l t i t u d e ap-
proximately 1,000 f e e t m.s.1. I n t h e event of a n unwanted s p o i l e r deploy-
ment, t h e r e would a l s o have been enough t i m e t o i n i t i a t e c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n
by moving t h e s p o i l e r lever f o r w a r d o r b y a d v a n c i n g t h e e n g i n e power levers.
2.2 Conclusions
(a) Findings

1, The crewmembers were q u a l i f i e d and c e r t i f i c a t e d f o r t h e

operation
 - 9 -

2. The a i r c r a f t was c e r t i f i c a t e d and maintained according t o

regulations.

3. The f l i g h t w a s dispatched according t o r e g u l a t i o n s .

4. The a i r c r a f t ' s weight and balance were w i t h i n prescribed

limits.

5. The c a p t a i n decided t o d e l a y arming t h e s p o i l e r s u n t i l j u s t

b e f o r e touchdown .
6. The f i r s t o f f i c e r had d i f f i c u l t y arming t h e s p o i l e r s .

7. The s p o i l e r s were deployed when t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r inad-

v e r t e n t l y moved t h e s p o i l e r a c t i v a t i n g lever a f t .

8. The f l i g h t engineer shouted a warning when t h e s p o i l e r s

were being armed.

9. There w a s no f a i l u r e o r malfunction of t h e ground s p o i l e r

system, except f o r a f a u l t y s p o i l e r - i n d i c a t o r l i g h t .

10. Before impact, t h e a i r p l a n e s t r u c t u r e , powerplants, and

components functioned properly.

(b) Probable Cause

The National T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board determines t h a t t h e prob-

a b l e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t w a s t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r ' s i n a d v e r t e n t deployment
of t h e ground s p o i l e r s i n f l i g h t w h i l e he w a s attempting t o a r m t h e s p o i l -
er system. The c a p t a i n ' s d e c i s i o n t o d e l a y arming of t h e s p o i l e r s u n t i l
j u s t b e f o r e touchdown w a s a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r , because t h e timing
v a r i e d from normalprocedures and required t h e crewmembers t o act quickly,
without t i m e f o r c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n .

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

A s a r e s u l t of t h i s a c c i d e n t and a review of similar a c c i d e n t s , t h e

S a f e t y Board on December 7, 1973, made two recommendations (Numbers
A-73-111 & 112) t o t h e F e d e r a l Aviation Administration. (See Appendix
E.)
 - 10 -
BY THE NATIONAL TRA”SPORTATI0N SAFETY BOARD

/s/ JOHN H. REED

Chairman

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS

Memb er

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER

Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS

Member

/s/ WILLIAM R. HALEX

Member

D e c e m b e r 5 , 1973
 - 11 -
APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION AND HEARING

1. Investigation

The Board was notified of the accident by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's Eastern Region Communication Center at 0415 on June 2 3 ,
1973. Investigators from the Board's New York and Washington offices
went immediately to John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New
York, and initiated the investigation that same day. Working groups
were established for operations, structures, and human factors. Parties
to the investigation included Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines, Inc., Sea-
board World Airlines, Inc., McDonne1.1 Douglas Aircraft Company, and the
Federal Aviation Administration. The on-scene investigation was com-
pleted on June 25, 1973.

2. Hearinq

A public hearing was not held.

 - 12 -
APPENDIX B

CREW I N F ' O W T I O N

Captain Olaf 0. Olsen, age 48, w a s employed by L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c

A i r l i n e s , I n c . , on September 1, 1944. H e held A i r l i n e Transport P i l o t
C e r t i f i c a t e (ATE) No. 1308382 , w i t h a i r c r a f t multiengine land (AMEL)
r a t i n g s . H e was type rated i n Douglas DC-3, 4 , 6 , and 8, CL-44, and PBY
a i r c r a f t . Captain Olsen possessed a f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e
dated March 8 , 1973, w i t h t h e l i m i t a t i o n , "Holder must wear c o r r e c t i n g
g l a s s e s while e x e r c i s i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e s of h i s airman c e r t i f i c a t e . "

H e completed h i s l a s t p r o f i c i e n c y check on A p r i l 29, 1973, h i s last

l i n e check on February 1 7 , 1973, and h i s l a s t r e c u r r e n t ground t r a i n i n g
i n November 1972. The c a p t a i n had accumulated approximately 18,000 hours
of f l y i n g t i m e , of which 1,638 were i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . H e received
h i s type r a t i n g and w a s upgraded t o c a p t a i n on t h e DC-8 on March 18,
1970. Captain Olsen had flown 122 hours during t h e previous 90 days and
23 hours during t h e previous 30 days. H e had been o f f duty over 24
hours b e f o r e r e p o r t i n g f o r duty. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , he had
been on duty 7 hours, of which 5 hours 52 minutes were f l i g h t t i m e .

F i r s t O f f i c e r Arni Sigurbergsson, age 40, was employed by L o f t l e i d i r

I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s , Inc. , October 10, 1961, t o February 24, 1962, H e
w a s reemployed on January 1, 1963, and flew a s n a v i g a t i o n p i l o t u n t i l
June 16, 1965, when he became f i r s t o f f i c e r . H e held C o m e r c i d l P i l o t
C e r t i f i c a t e No. 2233507 (issued under and s u b j e c t t o F e d e r a l Aviation
Administration exemption No. 1115, as amended) w i t h a i r c r a f t multiengine
land (AMEL) w i t h a r a t i n g i n t h e DC-8 of second-in-command. F i r s t
O f f i c e r Sigurbergssonpossessed an I c e l a n d i c f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i -
cate dated May 10, 1973, w i t h no l i m i t a t i o n s .

H e completed h i s l a s t p r o f i c i e n c y check on November 29, 1972. H i s

o r i g i n a l second-in-command q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t w a s com-
p l e t e d February 27, 1970, and h i s last r e c u r r e n t ground t r a i n i n g w a s com-
p l e t e d i n November 1972. F i r s t O f f i c e r Sigurbergsson had accumulated
about 5,000 f l i g h t hours and about 2,000 a d d i t i o n a l hours a s a navigator.
H e has 1,791 f l i g h t hours i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . He had flown 131 hours
during t h e previous 90 days and 52 hours during t h e previous 30 days. H e
had been o f f duty over 24 hours b e f o r e r e p o r t i n g f o r duty. A t t h e t i m e
of t h e a c c i d e n t , he had been on duty 7 hours, of which 5 hours 52 minutes
were f l i g h t t i m e .

F l i g h t Engineer Adalmundur Magnusson, age 37, was employed by

.
L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s , Inc , December 1, 1947 , as an a i r c r a f t
mechanic. I n May 1956, he became a f l i g h t engineer. H e held F l i g h t
Engineer C e r t i f i c a t e No. 2233555 (issued under and s u b j e c t t o F e d e r a l
Aviation Administration exemption No. 1115, as amended). F l i g h t Engineer
Magnusson possessed an I c e l a n d i c f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e dated
January 23, 1973, w i t h no l i m i t a t i o n s .
 - 13 -
H e completed h i s last p r o f i c i e n c y check on November 25, 1972, and
h i s l a s t l i n e check on A p r i l 2 , 1973. H i s o r i g i n a l f l i g h t engineer
q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n t h e DC-8 w a s completed March 14, 1970, and h i s l a s t
r e c u r r e n t ground t r a i n i n g w a s completed i n November 1972.

F l i g h t Engineer Magnusson accumulated about 14,000 f l i g h t hours

He h a s . 1 , 6 8 8 hours 43 minutes i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . H e had flown 173
hours 45 minutes during t h e previous 90 days and 52 hours 19 minutes
during t h e previous 30 days. H e had been o f f duty over 24 hours b e f o r e
r e p o r t i n g f o r duty. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , he had been on duty 7
hours, of which 5 hours 52 minutes w e r e f l i g h t t i m e .

Stewardess J y t t a H j a l t e s t e d l w a s employed by L o f t l e i d i r I c e -
l a n d i c A i r l i n e s from May 1, 1961, t o August 15, 1963; from A p r i l 1,
1964, t o J u l y 31, 1971; and from May 1, 1973, t o p r e s e n t . Her l a s t
r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g w a s completed May 8 , 1973.

Stewardess Iris Dungal w a s employed by L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r -

l i n e s on January 1, 1971. H e r last r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g w a s completed
May 7, 1973.

Stewardess S i g r i d u r Gudmundsdottir w a s employed by L o f t l e i d i r Ice-

l a n d i c A i r l i n e s from May 1, 1971, t o October 1, 1971; from May 15, 1972,
t o November 1, 1972; and from A p r i l 1, 1973, t o p r e s e n t . Her last r e c u r -
r e n t t r a i n i n g w a s completed March 5, 1973.

Stewardess Adalbjorg S i g u r d a r d o t t i r w a s employed by L o f t l e i d i r

I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s from May 5, 1972, t o September 15, 1972, and from
June 6 , 1973, t o p r e s e n t . H e r l a s t r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g w a s completed
June 8, 1973.

Stewardess Anna E i n a r s d o t t i r ,was employed by L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c

A i r l i n e s on May 19, 1973. Her t r a i n i n g w a s completed May 28, 1973.

Stewardess Solveig S t e f a n s d o t t i r w a s employed

- - by L o f t l e i d i r Ice-
l a n d i c A i r l i n e s on May-8, 1973. H e r t r a i n i n g w a s completed on May 18,
1973.
 .. 14 -
APPENDIX C

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

A i r c r a f t N8960Ty a Douglas DC-8-61F w a s manufactured on February

2 , 1968. The l a s t major i n s p e c t i o n w a s accomplished 237 €light-hours
b e f o r e t h e accident. The a i r c r a f t had accumulated a t o t a l of 21,258:38
flight-hours a t t h e time of t h e accident.

N8960T was owned by Trans I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r l i n e s and leased t o Sea-

board World A i r l i n e s , who subsequently subleased t h e a i r c r a f t t o Loft-
l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s . The a i r c r a f t w a s maintained by Seaboard i n
accordance w i t h i t s continuous a i r w o r t h i n e s s maintenance program and
manual. The o p e r a t i n g manual used by L o f t l e i d i r i s a Seaboard World
manua 1.

P r a t t & whitney JT3D-3B engines were i n s t a l l e d as follows:

Hours Since Engine

P o s i ti o n S e r i a l No. Total Time Heavy Maintenance

1 669231 16,210:20 10,620:44

2 66 94 19 14,263 :43 8,314 :43
3 644839 24 176 :02 3,102 :38
4 669304 16 644 :44 887:38
 - 15 -
APPENDIX D

TRANSCRIPT OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DATA ON

LOFTLEIDIR N 8 9 6 0 T , DOUGLAS DC-8-61F, FLIGHT NO. 509
J U N E 23, 1973

CAM Cockpit area microphone v o i c e o r sound source

RDO Radio transmissions from L o f t l e i d i r 509

-1 Voice i d e n t i f i e d as Captain

-2 Voice i d e n t i f i e d as F i r s t O f f i c e r

-3 Voice i d e n t i f i e d as Second O f f i c e r

- ? Voice u n i d e n t i f i e d

KAPP JFK Approach Control

KTWR JFK Tower

9; U n i n t e l l i g i b l e word

Questionable text

Editorial insertion

Pause

Elapsed t i m e given
 Im-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

oo:oo.o
CAM-1 We ah---,we w i l l arm them as soon as
---,just as we touch down t o arm them
00:04.5
CAM- 2 Yes

00:05.5
CAM- 1 Just before
00:32.0
KAPP Loftleidir f i v e oh nine, a l t i t u d e

00 :34.5
rd0-2 Coming through s i x thousand f i v e
I
hundred
r
rn
00:38.0 I
KAPP Roger
00:48.0
CAM- 1 Is the outer marker on?

00:50.0
CAM-2 Y e s , it i s on

00 :52.5
CAM-2 shaii we read ---
CAM-? *
0 1 :22.0
KAPF Loftleidir f i v e oh nine, a l t i t u d e

01:24.5
REO-2 ' Four thousand two hundred, f i v e
oh nine
 - 17 -
a,
P
k
c .d
JJ
G
3 ri
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h
JJ
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!=!
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8ho ti v1

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Ln In In
 - 18 -

I
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ri rl
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In In In Ln 0 0 0
0
P-.
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATLONS

TIME & TIME &

-
SOURCE CONTEW SOURCE CONTENT

03 :29.5
CYN-1 They a r e down on

CAM-? *
03:35.0
CAM-1 What ?

Radar and HF

CAM-2 * ---- off

03 :45.0
CAM-3 Engine a n t i - i c e

CAM- 2 *** off

03:48.0
m-3 A l t i m e t e r setting simultaneously
CAM- 2 Checked

03:49.5
CAM- 1 It i s on, a t my s i d e
03 :47.5
KAPP L o f t l e i d i r f i v e oh nine, turn
r i g h t , heading t h r e e f o u r zero,
f i v e f o r t h e markeqcleared ILS
t h i rty-one r i g h t approach

03:53.5
RDO-2 Three f o r t y on t h e heading, t h i r t y -
one right; approach, f i v e oh nine
 - 20 -

o m
a, P m .d
0 *d
-P
-P
a,
m

* rd
m
H I
* 3!0
* d
4 * a
 - 21 -
a,
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0 0
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L n 0

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a,
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9
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m *ri
a, k k m
u k a,
0 N s a,
N -P rl
m 3 0 3
a,
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2
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P
3
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3
rl
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4
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9
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Ln In
 - 22 -

w I

.d
8
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m
 II”FA-COCK€’IT A I R-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

!rIIm& TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT
05:20.5
CAM- 2 That i s two hundred and f i f t y feet, set
both s i d e s

05:24.0
CAM-3 Landing gear down, three green, q u a n t i t y and
pressure normal

05 m . 5
CAM-3 Then it i s t h e s p o i l e r s

0 5 :29.5 05 :29.5
CAM-2 Yeah, wait w i t h them RDO-2 Sound of outer marker begins
I
05:30.0
CAM-1 Wait w i t h them, only ---- 10
w
W a i t w i t h them u n t i l ---- I

05 :33.0
CAM-3 Anti-skid

05:34.5
CAM-2 It i s armed

05t35.5
CAM-3 Landing f l a p s

05:37.0
CAM Sound o f buzzer

05 :37*5
CAM-2 There are f u l l f l a p s on t h e gauge

05 39.0
CAM-3 Then it i s flag scan
 IFIW-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME 5.8 TIME &.

SOURCE SOURCE CONTENT

05 :41.0
CAM-3 Must it be pulled up o r i s it possible t o
pull it s t r a i g h t back

0 5 :44.0
CAM-1 N o , he can arm t h e m j u s t p r i o r t o touchdown

O’j:k7.0
CAM-3 Yes

05:48.0
CAM-1 Just watch out f o r the wheels ---- I would
r a t h e r not have them pulled up
I
05 :55.0
CAM-2 Yeah ---- ( l i t t l e laughter) N
.F-
I
05 :57.0
CAM Sound of buzzer

05:59.0
CAM-1 See i f they w i l l come up, you see, it i s
uh ----
it could very w e l l be b e s t t o leave
them alone

CAM Sound of tone

06 :03.0
CAM-3 Y e s , it i s permissible after w e reached
t h e ground t o arm them and p u l l them
back and see what happens

06:io.o
CAM-2 Manually
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 - 29 -
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

APPENDIX E

ISSUED: December 7, 1973

Honorable Alexander P. B u t t e r f i e l d
Administrator SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I ON (S)
F e d e r a l Aviation Administration
Washington, D. C. 20591 A-73-111 & 112

On June 23, 1973, a L o f t l e i d i r I c e l a n d i c A i r l i n e s , Inc.,

Douglas Model E-8-61 ( ~ 8 9 6 0 ~ w a) s involved i n a l a n d i n g
a c c i d e n t a t John F. Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t . The N a t i o n a l
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board's i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e a c c i d e n t dis-
c l o s e d an a i r c r a f t design f e a t u r e which does n o t provide optimum
p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t human e r r o r .

I n t h e above a c c i d e n t , t h e a i r c r a f t made a s h o r t , hard

l a n d i n g , a f t e r t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r had i n a d v e r t e n t l y a c t i v a t e d t h e
ground s p o i l e r s during t h e f i n a l phase of t h e l a n d i n g approach.
The a i r c r a f t was damaged e x t e n s i v e l y when it h i t t h e runway, and
i n j u r e d 38 persons.

On J u l y 5, 1970, a n a c c i d e n t involving an A i r Canada E-8-63

occurred a t t h e Toronto I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t . The a c c i d e n t w a s
a l s o caused when t h e ground s p o i l e r s were i n a d v e r t e n t l y a c t i v a t e d
during f l i g h t . The a c c i d e n t k i l l e d l o 9 persons.

As a r e s u l t of t h e A i r Canada a c c i d e n t , t h e F e d e r a l Aviation
Administration cautioned p i l o t s a g a i n s t i n - f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n of
ground s p o i l e r s by r e q u i r i n g t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of a warning p l a c a r d
i n t h e cockpit and t h e i n s e r t i o n of a n a d d i t i o n a l Operating
L i m i t a t i o n i n t h e F l i g h t Manual.
 - 30 -
Honorable Alexander P. B u t t e r f i e l d (2)

The Board b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e L o f t l e i d i r a c c i d e n t i n d i c a t e s
t h a t a d d i t i o n a l c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s necessary t o prevent human
e r r o r i n t h e operation of t h e Douglas Model E-8's ground s p o i l e r s .
The Board recognizes that it may be necessary t o r e t r o f i t t h e
E-8 f l e e t ; however, t h e hazard p o t e n t i a l well j u s t i f i e s such
action.

Based on t h e above information, t h e National Transportation

S a f e t y Board recommends t h a t t h e Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Require that a p r o t e c t i v e device be i n s t a l l e d

as a p a r t of t h e a c t i v a t i n g l e v e r mechanism
of t h e ground s p o i l e r system i n Douglas Model
E-8 a i r c r a f t . Such a device should prevent
t h e i n a d v e r t e n t deployment of ground s p o i l e r s
i n flight.

2. Amend 1 4 CFR 25 t o r e q u i r e t h a t ground decel-

e r a t i o n devices which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e l i f t
generated by t h e wings be designed s o t h a t they
cannot be i n a d v e r t e n t l y operated i n f l i g h t .

Personnel from our Bureau of Aviation S a f e t y w i l l be made

a v a i l a b l e i f any f u r t h e r information o r a s s i s t a n c e i s d e s i r e d .

m D , Chairman, McADAMX, THAYER, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members,

concurred i n t h e above recommendations.

Chairman