AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OVERSEAS N A T I O N A L AIRWAYS, INC.

M c D O N N E L L DOUGLAS D C - 8 - 6 3 , N863F
BANGOR, M A I N E
JUNE 20, 1973
ADOPTED: FEBRUARY 7, 1974

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20591
R EP0 RT N U MB ER NT S 6- A A R - 74 - 1

~
 1 . Report No. 2.Government Accession No. 3.Recipient’s Catalog No.
NTSB-MR-74-
_ _ 1
4 . T i t l e and S u b t i t l e A i r c r a f t Accident Report - 5. Report Date
.
Overseas N a t i o h a l Airways , I n c , McDonnell Douglas, February 7 , 1974
DC-8-63 , N863F, Bangor , Maine, J u n e 20, 1973 6. Perform i ng Organ i za t i on
Code
7. Author(s) 8.Performi ng Organi z a t ion
Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10.Work U n i t No.

1241
N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
Bureau of A v i a t i o n S a f e t y 11.Contract or Grant No.
Washington, D. C . 20591
13.Type o f Report and
Period Covered
12.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address A i r c r a f t Accident Report
June 2 0 , 1973
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C. 20591 14.Sponsoring Agency Code

Overseas N a t i o n a l Airways F l i g h t 4655, a DC-8-63 e n r o u t e from Tampa, F l o r i d a , t

Geneva , Switzerland , v i a Bangor , Maine, and Amsterdam, t h e Netherlands , was involved
i n a takeoff a c c i d e n t a t t h e Bangor I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t , Bangor, Maine, on June 2 0 ,
197.3. I n t h e emergency e v a c u a t i o n t h a t followed, 34 of t h e 251 passengers on board
were i n j u r e d --
3 of them s e r i o u s l y .

During t h e t a k e o f f r o l l , the c a p t a i n heard a loud, muffled sound, l i k e t h a t of a

blown t i r e , and d i s c o n t i n u e d t h e t a k e o f f . A f i r e broke o u t i n t h e r i g h t main landing
g e a r assembly and r i g h t wing r o o t area. The passengers and crew emerged via t h e a i r -
p l a n e emergency escape c h u t e system.

The N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board determines t h a t t h e p r o b a b l e c a u s e of

t h e a c c i d e n t was t h e undetected d e f l a t i o n of a r i g h t main landing g e a r t i r e as t h e
a i r c r a f t w a s t a x i i n g f o r t a k e o f f . The a d d i t i o n a l l o a d s imposed upon two o t h e r t i r e s
caused them t o f a i l d u r i n g t h e t a k e o f f r o l l . Subsequently, t h e wheel assemblies were
damaged. The f i r e was i g n i t e d by t h e f r i c t i o n between t h e m e t a l wheels and t h e run-

19.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
(of t h i s r e p o r t )
UNCLASSIFIED
1 8 . D i s t r i b u t i o n Statement
T h i s document i s a v a i l a b l e
t o t h e p u b l i c through t h e
N a t i o n a l Technical Informa-
tion Service, Springfield,
V i r g i n i a 22 151
20.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 21.No. of Pages 22.Price
(of t h i s page)
UNCLASSIFIED
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Synopsis ........................ 1

Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Append ic es

Appendix A - Wheel and Tire Assembly History . 7

Appendix B - Aircraft Information...... 8

Appendix C - Crew Information ........ 9

iii
 F i l e No. 1-005

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: February 7 , 1974

OVERSEAS NATIONAL AIRWAYS, I N C .

McDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-8-63, N863F
BANGOR, MAINE
JUNE 20, 1973

SYNOPSIS

Overseas National Airways, I n c . , F l i g h t 4655, a McDonne11 Douglas

DC-8-63, w a s a nonscheduled c h a r t e r f l i g h t from Tampa, F l o r i d a , t o
Geneva, Switzerland, via Bangor, Maine, and Amsterdam, t h e Netherlands.
There were 251 passengers aboard t h e f l i g h t . The f l i g h t from Tampa,
F l o r i d a , t o Bangor, Maine, w a s r o u t i n e . F l i g h t 4655 departed t h e Over-
seas National Terminal a t t h e Bangor I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t about 0015
e.d.t., on June 20, 1973, and proceeded t o runway 15. A t 0024, t h e
l o c a l c o n t r o l l e r cleared t h e a i r c r a f t f o r t a k e o f f .

The c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h a t he heard a "loud, muffled sound" during t h e

takeoff r o l l . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e w a s a " s l i g h t j a r r i n g of t h e a i r c r a f t
t o t h e r i g h t . I ' The c a p t a i n then r e j e c t e d t h e takeoff and brought t h e
a i r c r a f t t o a s t o p on a taxiway a d j a c e n t t o runway 15. F i r e broke o u t
i n t h e area of t h e r i g h t main landing g e a r and s e v e r e l y damaged t h e r i g h t
main landing gear system, t h e r i g h t wing, and t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e fuse-
lage. Thirty-four passengers were i n j u r e d , t h r e e of them s e r i o u s l y , as
they evacuated t h e a i r c r a f t through t h e emergency escape system.

The National T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board determines t h a t t h e prob-

a b l e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t was t h e undetected d e f l a t i o n of a r i g h t main
landing g e a r t i r e as t h e a i r c r a f t w a s t a x i i n g f o r t a k e o f f . The a d d i t i o n a l
loads imposed upon two o t h e r tires caused them t o f a i l during t h e takeoff
r o l l . Subsequently, t h e wheel assemblies were damaged. The f i r e w a s i g -
n i t e d by t h e f r i c t i o n between t h e metal wheels and t h e runway pavement.

INVESTIGATION

Overseas National Airways, I n c . , F l i g h t 4655, a McDonne11 Douglas

DC-8-63, N863F, w a s a nonscheduled c h a r t e r f l i g h t from Tampa, F l o r i d a ,
t o Geneva, Switzerland, v i a Bangor, Maine, and A m s t e r d a m , t h e Nether-
lands. Two hundred and f i f t y - o n e passengers and a crew of t e n were
aboard t h e a i r c r a f t when i t departed Tampa, F l o r i d a , a t 1945 e . d . t . , J /
w i t h instrument f l i g h t r u l e s (IFR) c l e a r a n c e , nonstop, t o Bangor, Maine.
The f l i g h t from Tampa t o Bangor w a s r o u t i n e .

-1/ All times used h e r e i n are e a s t e r n d a y l i g h t , based on t h e 24-hour clock.

 - 2 -

About 0015, F l i g h t 4655 departed t h e t e r m i n a l area a t t h e Bangor

I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r p o r t and t a x i e d , via t h e p a r a l l e l taxiway, t o runway
15. The c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t had performed normally during
t h e taxi o p e r a t i o n s and t h a t a l l necessary c h e c k l i s t i t e m s had been ac-
complished without any d i s c r e p a n c i e s . A t 0024, F l i g h t 4655 w a s c l e a r e d
f o r takeoff on runway 15. The c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h a t he had heard "a loud,
muffled sound" during the takeoff r o l l . I n a d d i t i o n , he stated t h a t
t h e r e w a s a " s l i g h t j a r r i n g of t h e a i r c r a f t t o t h e r i g h t . " The c a p t a i n ,
who assumed t h a t a t i r e had blown, r e j e c t e d t h e t a k e o f f . According t o
t h e f l i g h t c r e w , t h e a i r c r a f t ' s speed w a s between 105 and 110 knots when
t h e takeoff w a s r e j e c t e d , The a i r c r a f t stopped 8,000 f e e t from the ap-
proach end of runway 15, on Taxiway Kilo. A f i r e , which s t a r t e d during
t h e takeoff r o l l i n t h e area of t h e r i g h t main landing g e a r , burned f o r
approximately 5 minutes b e f o r e i t w a s extinguished by t h e a i r p o r t f i r e
d epar tmen t .
The cockpit v o i c e recorder (CVR) t a p e revealed t h a t t h e emergency
evacuation d i d not begin u n t i l about 3 minutes a f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t stopped.
The evacuation w a s i n i t i a t e d by t h e s e n i o r c a b i n a t t e n d a n t , who w a s sta-
tioned i n t h e rear of t h e passenger cabin. Passengers w e r e evacuated
through 9 of t h e 12 a v a i l a b l e emergency e x i t s . The c a b i n a t t e n d a n t ' s
announcement over t h e p u b l i c address system t o "unfasten s e a t b e l t s , " s i g -
naled t h e o t h e r c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s t o s t a r t t h e evacuation. However, t h e
a t t e n d a n t s , who were s t a t i o n e d i n t h e rear c a b i n , were not standing by
a t t h e i r assigned evacuation s t a t i o n s when t h e order was g i v e n , because
they were attempting t o c a l m e x c i t e d passengers. Eventually, four of
t h e s e a t t e n d a n t s reached t h e t h r e e e x i t s i n t h e r e a r cabin. The t h r e e
o t h e r a t t e n d a n t s were s t a t i o n e d a t t h e emergency e x i t s , from row 1 t o
approximately row 23. Despite shouted warnings not t o u s e t h e overwing
e x i t s , a t least e i g h t used t h e two exits over t h e l e f t wing; a n overying
e x i t on t h e r i g h t s i d e w a s opened, but w a s not used. Two passengers,
who c a r r i e d t o t e bags a s they e x i t e d through a l e f t overwing window, were
among those i n j u r e d . The evacuees had t o stumble through smoke a t
v a r i o u s p l a c e s i n s i d e t h e c a b i n , on t h e l e f t wing, and a t t h e bottom of
t h e two l e f t rear c a b i n escape s l i d e s .

When t h e Nos. 1 and 2 engines were s h u t down, a l l electrical power

was c u t o f f , and t h e p u b l i c a d d r e s s system became i n o p e r a t i v e . The s e n i o r
c a b i n a t t e n d a n t then used hand s i g n a l s and shouted d i r e c t i o n s . The two
a v a i l a b l e p o r t a b l e megaphones w e r e not used. Although t h e emergency l i g h t -
i q system operated normally a f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t ' s e l e c t r i c a l system was
cist o f f , one c a b i n a t t e n d a n t used a f l a s h l i g h t . According t o some passen-
g e r s , t h e meaning of t h e three-word i n s t r u c t i o n , "sit and s l i d e , " w a s not
clear. I n f a c t , they could not understand what was expected of them.

During t h e emergency evacuation, 34 passengers were i n j u r e d , 3 of

them s e r i o u s l y . Some passengers were i n j u r e d when they f e l l from t h e
escape s l i d e s . Slower moving passengers w e r e s t r u c k from behind by
 - 3 -

o t h e r s who w e r e jumping down t h e door s l i d e s . S t i l l o t h e r passengers

were i n j u r e d as they jumped o r f e l l from t h e edge of t h e l e f t wing, o r
as they r a n and stumbled away from t h e a i r c r a f t . The escape s l i d e s t h a t
w e r e i n f l a t e d manually operated normally. Three j e t e s c a p e s l i d e s in-
f l a t e d normally; t h e f o u r t h had t o be i n f l a t e d manually. A f l i g h t at-
tendant, who had d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e l e f t forward boarding door, eventu-
a l l y succeeded i n opening i t w i t h a s s i s t a n c e from t h e c a p t a i n . Later,
examination of t h e door assembly d i s c l o s e d no malfunction of t h e l a t c h -
ing mechanism.

Black wavy l i n e s w e r e found on t h e ramp and taxiway used by F l i g h t

4655 t o t a x i t o runway 15. They w e r e p a r t of t h e t r a c k s made by t h e No.
7 t i r e of t h e r i g h t main landing g e a r . The wavy l i n e s were more d i s -
t i n c t , l i k e a p a t t e r n of shredded rubber, as they reached t h e runway s u r -
f a c e . The p r i n t made by t h e No. 8 t i r e contained rubber smears, The
p r i n t w a s w i d e r than normal i n a t i r e of t h i s s i z e and model.

About 1,200 f e e t down t h e runway, t h e black rubber marks w e r e more

pronounced and w e r e v i s i b l e t o t h e p o i n t where t h e a i r c r a f t stopped.
M e t a l l i c d e p o s i t s were d i s c e r n i b l e i n s p o t s 3,700 f e e t and 5,700 f e e t
down t h e runway. An examination of t h e a i r c r a f t ' s r i g h t main landing
g e a r revealed t h a t :

1. The two rear t i r e s and wheel assemblies (Nos. 7 and 8) had d i s -

i n t e g r a t e d and had s u s t a i n e d e x t e n s i v e f i r e damage. Mainten-
ance and i n s p e c t i o n d a t a d i d not d i s c l o s e any previous malfunc-
t i o n of t h e s e t i r e s . The No. 7 t i r e had been recapped n i n e t i m e s ,
and t h e N o . 8 t i r e had been recapped e i g h t times. (See Appendix
A*)

2. The forward inboard t i r e (No. 3 ) w a s d e f l a t e d . It contained 6 -

and 8-inch wide h o l e s i n t h e t i r e c a s i n g . There w a s evidence
of e x t e n s i v e f i r e damage.

3. The outboard forward t i r e (No. 4 ) was i n f l a t e d , b u t s u s t a i n e d

e x t e n s i v e f i r e damage. F i r e a l s o damaged t h e wheel assembly.

The f l i g h t engineer s t a t e d , "During my p r e f l i g h t i n s p e c t i o n , a l l

t i r e s appeared s a t i s f a c t o r y and brakes were not e x c e s s i v e l y warm." This
i n s p e c t i o n w a s conducted i n t h e d a r k w i t h t h e a i d of a f l a s h l i g h t .

Segments of t h e No. 7 brake assembly had d e t e r i o r a t e d from f r i c t i o n .

A f u s e plug i n t h e No. 7 wheel w a s open (blown). The o t h e r brake as-
semblies i n t h e r i g h t main landing g e a r showed no evidence of abnormal
w e a r . The f u s e plugs i n t h e o t h e r t h r e e wheels had not blown.

The r i g h t inboard wing panel and f l a p assembly was h e a v i l y damaged

by f i r e and f l y i n g d e b r i s . F i r e a l s o damaged a small area on t h e r i g h t
s i d e of t h e f u s e l a g e near t h e r i g h t wing r o o t .
 - 4 -

Comprehensive e l e c t r o n i c tests were performed on t h e a n t i s k i d con-

t r o l s h i e l d . The equipment operated i n accordance w i t h s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .

The e i g h t a n t i s k i d wheel transducers were removed from t h e a i r c r a f t

and t e s t e d . F i v e of t h e transducers operated normally; t h e remaining
t h r e e could not be t e s t e d f u l l y because of damage. Also, heat and f i r e
damage prevented tests of t h e inboard and outboard d u a l s e r v o a n t i s k i d
valves.

The h y d r a u l i c f i l t e r s i n t h e h y d r a u l i c brake system d i d not c o n t a i n

excessive contaminants, and flow t e s t r e s u l t s w e r e w i t h i n s p e c i f i e d
tolerances.

A review of t h e a i r c r a f t ' s maintenance r e c o r d s d i s c l o s e d t h a t t h e

a i r c r a f t had been maintained according t o F e d e r a l Aviation Administration
(FAA) r e g u l a t i o n s and t h e company's procedures. (See Appendix B.)

ANALYS I S

The f l i g h t c r e w and c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s were q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e f l i g h t .

(See Appendix C . )

The rubber and metal marks on t h e runway c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e

No. 7 t i r e on t h e r i g h t main landing gear d e f l a t e d as t h e f l i g h t taxied
f o r t a k e o f f . The d e f l a t e d t i r e p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e f a i l u r e o f , f i r s t , t h e
No. 8 t i r e and, then, t h e N o . 3 t i r e .

The subsequent d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e Nos. 7 and 8 tires caused t h e

m e t a l wheels t o c o n t a c t t h e runway s u r f a c e . F r i c t i o n i g n i t e d t h e f i r e .
Flying fragments of t i r e rubber and metallic d e b r i s caused s t r u c t u r a l
damage t o t h e underside of t h e wing.

The black wavy l i n e s found on t h e ramp and taxiway were caused by

t h e d e f l a t e d No. 7 t i r e . The r e s u l t i n g overload on t h e No. 8 t i r e caused
t h e imprint of i t s t r e a d on t h e runway t o be wider than normal.

The loud, muffled sound heard by t h e c a p t a i n during t h e takeoff

r o l l w a s e v i d e n t l y caused when t h e overloaded No. 8 t i r e f a i l e d . The
a i r c r a f t j a r r e d t o t h e r i g h t s i d e because i t became unbalanced l a t e r a l l y
when both rear tires on t h e r i g h t main land€ng g e a r f a i l e d .

The heavy f r i c t i o n damage t o t h e No. 7 brake assembly and t h e blown

f u s e plug are evidence t h a t t h e brake assembly w a s overloaded because of
excessive braking a c t i o n . The overload might have been placed on t h e
brake assembly during t h e previous landing and subsequent t a x i i n g of t h e
a i r c r a f t . The overload caused t h e f u s e plug t o blow and a i r t o escape
from t h e N o . 7 tire. The reason f o r t h e excessive braking a c t i o n and
t h e overheating of t h e brake could n o t b e found because t h e f u l l capa-
b i l i t y of t h e a n t i s k i d system could not b e determined.
 - 5 -

The p r e f l i g h t i n s p e c t i o n conducted by t h e f l i g h t engineer began

s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t landed and w a s parked f o r r e f u e l i n g . The
f l i g h t engineer walked around t h e a i r c r a f t and checked t h e g e n e r a l con-
d i t i o n of t h e a i r c r a f t w i t h regard t o a i r w o r t h i n e s s . Since t h e inspec-
t i o n w a s made i n t h e dark w i t h only a f l a s h l i g h t f o r l i g h t i n g , and s i n c e
t h e o t h e r t h r e e tires on t h e r i g h t landing g e a r were supporting t h e a i r -
c r a f t i n i t s low-fuel s t a t e , t h e f l i g h t engineer may not have been a b l e
t o see t h a t t h e No. 7 t i r e was p a r t i a l l y d e f l a t e d .

A f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t w a s stopped i n t h e r e j e c t e d t a k e o f f , approxi-
mately 1 minute and 23 seconds elapsed b e f o r e t h e f i r s t c a b i n door w a s
opened. Although numerous remarks were passed among t h e f l i g h t c r e w , t h e
c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s , and t h e tower about t h e l o c a t i o n , i n t e n s i t y , and prog-
ress of t h e f i r e , t h e f l i g h t c r e w d i d not attempt t o assess t h e e x t e n t of
i t . The l e f t engines i d l e d f o r more than 3 minutes a f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t
stopped and f o r n e a r l y 2 minutes a f t e r t h e door l i g h t came on.

The CVR tape i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f l i g h t c r e w w a s not concerned about

t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e f i r e nor t h e immediate danger t o t h e passengers.
The c a p t a i n d i d not go i n t o t h e passenger c a b i n u n t i l t h e evacuation
had begun. A f l i g h t o f f i c e r should have gone t o t h e cabin immediately
a f t e r t h e a i r c r a f t stopped t o assess t h e f i r e and t o inform t h e c a p t a i n
of h i s f i n d i n g s . The c a p t a i n d i d not use a l l a v a i l a b l e means of informa-
t i o n regarding t h e l o c a t i o n , i n t e n s i t y , and progress of t h e f i r e .

Wind forced smoke i n t o the c a b i n through t h e open e x i t s on t h e r i g h t

s i d e of t h e a i r c r a f t . Although some passengers and f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s
r e p o r t e d t h a t v i s i b i l i t y w a s somewhat hampered by smoke and dim c a b i n
l i g h t i n g , t h e evacuation e v i d e n t l y w a s not delayed, nor were any of t h e
i n j u r i e s caused by r e s t r i c t e d v i s i b i l i t y i n t h e cabin. I f t h e smoke had
been t h i c k e r o r t h e aisles l i t t e r e d w i t h d e b r i s , then i t would be question-
a b l e whether emergency l i g h t s a l o n e would have been enough t o guide passen-
g e r s and a t t e n d a n t s t o t h e e x i t s . A s p a s t a c c i d e n t s have shown, personal
f l a s h l i g h t s c a r r i e d by t h e c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s are o f t e n t h e only source of
i l l u m i n a t i o n during emergency evacuation. A r e c e n t NTSB recommendation
t o t h e FAA has urged t h a t p o r t a b l e , h i g h - i n t e n s i t y l i g h t s be i n s t a l l e d a t
each a t t e n d a n t ' s s t a t i o n . It i s o p t i o n a l t h a t a i r carriers i n s t r u c t
t h e i r c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s t o have f l a s h l i g h t s r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e during
landing and takeoff .
According t o t h e carrier's operating procedures, an a t t e n d a n t should
have been s t a t i o n e d a t t h e overwing e x i t s when t h e evacuation w a s ordered.
However, most c a b i n a t t e n d a n t s were l a t e i n following t h i s procedure.
The s e n i o r c a b i n a t t e n d a n t should n o t have had t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
ordering t h e evacuation. I f t h e s e n i o r c a b i n a t t e n d a n t had been a t h e r
assigned s t a t i o n , t h e overwing area, she would have had a n e x c e l l e n t view
of a l l e x i t s . I f she had used a megaphone t o d i r e c t t h e evacuation, her
shouted i n s t r u c t i o n s would have been more a u d i b l e and, t h e r e f o r e , more
.
e f f ec t i v e
 - 6 -

Use of t h e overwing e x i t s caused problems. E x i t hatches which

w e r e placed on t h e f l o o r between seats obstructed t h e exits. Some pas-
sengers out on t h e l e f t wing d i d not know how t o g e t t o t h e ground. A
f a b r i c s t r a p , which i s intended f o r persons t o hold as they walk on t h e
wing, remained stowed above t h e a f t overwing e x i t . A similar s t r a p
located a t t h e forward e x i t , i s intended t o d e t e r persons from walking
toward t h e wing leading edge. I n t h i s case, however, passengers held
t h e s t r a p as they walked on t h e wing and s l i d from t h e wing t r a i l i n g
edge f l a p t o t h e ground. Passengers were not informed about t h e use o r
l o c a t i o n of t h e s e s t r a p s ; t h e r e f o r e they could not b e expected t o use
t h e s t r a p s properly .
The Board c o n s i d e r s i t hazardous t o allow passengers t o c a r r y hand
luggage and personal belongings w h i l e evacuating an a i r c r a f t .

The evacuation of F l i g h t 4655 took i n excess of 3 minutes. The

evacuation, conducted a t n i g h t , involved a number of v i s i b l y e x c i t e d ,
apprehensive, e l d e r l y persons, along w i t h t h e o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s a l r e a d y
d e s c r i b e d , These f a c t o r s lead t h e Board t o conclude t h a t , although t h e
evacuation w a s o r d e r l y and t h e r e f o r e s u c c e s s f u l , t h e r e were c e r t a i n de-
f i c i e n c i e s p r e s e n t i n t h e evacuation procedures as h e r e i n b e f o r e pointed o u t .

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Safety Board determines t h a t t h e prob-

a b l e cause of t h e a c c i d e n t w a s t h e undetected d e f l a t i o n of a r i g h t main
landing gear t i r e as t h e a i r c r a f t w a s t a x i i n g f o r t a k e o f f . The addi-
t i o n a l loads imposed upon two o t h e r t i r e s caused them t o f a i l during t h e
takeoff r o l l . Subsequently, t h e wheel assemblies were damaged. The
f i r e was i g n i t e d by t h e f r i c t i o n produced between t h e metal wheels and
t h e runway pavement.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS

Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER

Men& er

/S/ ISABEL A . BURGESS

Nember

John H. Reed, Chairman, and W i l l i a m R. Haley, Member, were absent and

d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e adoption of t h i s r e p o r t .

February 7 , 1974
 - 7 -

APPENDIX A

WHEEL AND TIRE ASSEMBLY

1. P o s i t i o n Number 3
2. Wheel S e r i a l Number BO925
3. T i r e S e r i a l Number (Goodyear) 2862161
4. Number of Recaps 3
5. Wheel Overhaul D a t e March 14, 1973
6. -
Wheel I n s t a l l e d on A i r c r a f t N863F A p r i l 24, 1973
7. Number of T a k e o f f s and Landings as of Accident Date 162

1. P o s i t i o n Number 7
2. Wheel S e r i a l Number H19/H118
3. T i r e S e r i a l Number (Goodyear) OP116 13
4. Number of Recaps 9
5. Wheel Overhaul Date May 18, 1973
6. -
Wheel I n s t a l l e d on A i r c r a f t N863F May 22, 1973
7. Number of T a k e o f f s and Landings as of Accident Date 79

1. P o s i t i o n Number 8
2 . Wheel S e r i a l Number B1195
3. T i r e S e r i a l Number (Goodyear) DX11506
4 . Number of Recaps 8
5. Wheel Overhaul Date N/A
-
6 . Wheel I n s t a l l e d on A i r c r a f t N863F May 31, 1973
7. Number of T a k e o f f s and Landings as of Accident Date 54
 - 8 -

APPENDIX B

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

A i r c r a f t N863F i s a McDonne11 Douglas DC-8-63, s e r i a l No, 46001,

which w a s leased t o Overseas National Airways, I n c . , by t h e Flying Tiger
Line, I n c . , of Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a .

N863F w a s manufactured i n October 1967 by t h e McDonne11 Douglas

A i r c r a f t Company i n Long Beach , C a l i f o r n i a .

A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e a i r c r a f t had flown 18,453 hours,

of which 5 hours were flown a f t e r t h e last maintenance w a s performed.
The a i r c r a f t i s equipped w i t h four P r a t t and Whitney JT3D-7 j e t engines.
The No. 1 engine, P67017, had a t o t a l of 15,136 f l i g h t hours; t h e No. 2
engine, P6713, had 12,757 f l i g h t hours; t h e No. 3 engine, P671201, had
14,994 f l i g h t hours; and t h e No. 4 engine had 12,531 f l i g h t hours.
 - 9 -

APPENDIX C

CREN INFORMATION

Captain Robert W. Templeton, age 53, w a s employed by Overseas

National Airways, I n c . , on A p r i l 26, 1967. H e possesses A i r l i n e Trans-
p o r t P i l o t C e r t i f i c a t e (ATPC) No. 1741478, w i t h r a t i n g s i n a i r p l a n e
multiengine land and Douglas DC-8, and commercial p r i v i l e g e s i n Boeing
707/720. H e h a s 16,864 f l i g h t hours, of which 4,800 hours were flown i n
t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . H i s f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e , dated May 4 ,
1973 , r e q u i r e s : "Holder s h a l l possess c o r r e c t i n g l e n s e s f o r near v i s i o n
w h i l e e x e r c i s i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e s of h i s airman's c e r t i f i c a t e . "

F i r s t O f f i c e r Rasmus Nielsen, age 32, was employed by Overseas

National Airways, Inc., on November 18, 1968. H e possesses A i r l i n e Trans-
p o r t P i l o t C e r t i f i c a t e (ATPC) No. 1618046, w i t h multiengine l a n d , s i n g l e -
engine land, and commercial p r i v i l e g e s . H e has 6,139 f l i g h t hours, of
which 1,050 hours were flown i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . H i s f i r s t - c l a s s
medical c e r t i f i c a t e , dated June 4 , 1973, has no l i m i t a t i o n s .

F l i g h t Engineer Alvin F. Quack, J r . , age 44, w a s employed by Over-

seas National Airways, I n c . , on J u l y 22, 1966. H e possesses F l i g h t
Engineer C e r t i f i c a t e No. 1384677. H e has 8,410 f l i g h t hours, of which
3,100 hours were flown i n t h e DC-8 a i r c r a f t . H i s second-class medical
c e r t i f i c a t e , dated October 19, 1972, h a s no l i m i t a t i o n s .

Overseas National Airways' r e c o r d s show t h e following information

regarding c a b i n a t t e n d a n t emergency t r a i n i n g . A l l r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g
w a s accomplished on DC-8 type a i r c r a f t .

Initial
-
Name Date Hired Training Recurrent T r a i n i n g

Barney, S. May 8, 1972 May 1972 Scheduled f o r June 1973

Gretz, C. March 10, 1969 March 1969 January 1973
Harrington, G . June 24, 1972 June 1972 June 1972
Hildebrand, P. March 5 , 1973 March 1973
Martin, L. March 5 , 1973 March 1973
Meyer, A. A p r i l 3, 1972 A p r i l 1972 March 1973
Schaefer, J . March 5, 1973 March 1973