Saint Thomas Aquinas' Cardinal Virtues
In order to make reliable judgments about what
A cursory glance at the second part of the
Summa Theologica would reveal a host of
virtues that are indicative of human goodness.
But there are essentially four virtues from
which Aquinas' more extensive list flows. These
virtues are prudence, justice, temperance, and
courage (ST lallae 61.2). Aquinas refers to
these virtues as the "cardinal" virtues. They
are the principal habits on which the rest of the
virtues hinge.
1. Prudence - Saint Thomas Aquinas
defined prudence as "wisdom
concerning human affairs."
To make good moral judgments, a two-fold
knowledge is required:
- one must know the general moral
principles that guide actions
- and the circumstances in which a
decision is required.
We must also "grasp what is pertinent and to
assess what ought to be done in complex
circumstances." More so, Aquinas reiterated that
prudence illuminates for us the course of
action deemed most appropriate for achieving
our antecedently established telos.
Telos – ultimate objective or inherent
purpose/end goal.
It does this through three acts:
(1) counsel, whereby we inquire about the
available means of achieving the end;
(2) judgment, whereby we determine the proper
means for achieving the end; and finally
(3) command, whereby we apply that judgment.
As a cardinal virtue, prudence functions as a
principal virtue on which a variety of other
excellences hinge. Those excellences include:
memory, intelligence, docility, shrewdness,
reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution.
is really good; our passions need some measure
of restraint so that they do not corrupt good
judgment.
- To be prudent, you carefully consider
the possible things that may happen and
make safe, logical choices to make sure
you are not in trouble if things go
wrong. It's basically the opposite of
being impulsive, and it implies being a
bit cautious and forward-thinking.
- An example of being prudent is saving
money for a time when it might be
needed unexpectedly.
2. Temperance - In its more restricted
sense, temperance concerns the
moderation of physical pleasures,
especially those associated with eating,
drinking, and sex. Temperance is that
virtue, as it denotes a restrained desire
for physical gratification.
To Aquinas, the purpose of temperance
is to refine the way we enjoy bodily
pleasures. Specifically, it creates in the
agent a proper sense of moderation with
respect to what is pleasurable. Thus,
Aquinas insists that "sensible and bodily
goods are not in opposition to reason but
are subject to it as instruments which
reason employs in order to attain its
proper end."
- Temperance is when an individual
voluntarily refrain him or herself from
succumbing to physical gratification.
Controlling his or her desires under the
command of reason and restraining
oneself from temptation.
Like prudence, temperance is a cardinal
virtue. There are a host of subsidiary
virtues that fall under temperance
because they serve to modify the most
 insatiable human passions. For example, Specifically, it denotes a sustained or
chastity, sobriety and abstinence-which constant willingness to extend to each
denote a retrenchment of sex, drink, and person what he or she deserves. The
food, respectively. Thus, Aquinas also purpose of legal justice is to govern our
thinks meekness, clemency, and actions according to the common good.
studiousness are parts of temperance. Construed this way, justice is a general
They, too, restrain certain appetitive virtue which concerns not individual
drives: specifically, anger, the desire to benefits but community welfare.
punish, and the desire to pursue vain According to Aquinas, everyone who is
curiosities, respectively. a member of a community stands to that
community as a part to a whole.
Whatever affects the part also affects the
3. Courage Occasionally, the difficulty in whole. And so whatever is good (or
achieving or avoiding certain objects harmful) for oneself will also be good
can give rise to various degrees of fear (or harmful) for the community of which
and, in turn, discourage us from one is a part. For this reason, we should
adhering to reason's instruction. In these expect the good community to enact
cases, we may refuse to endure the pain laws that will govern its members in
or discomfort required for achieving our ways that are beneficial to everyone.
proper human good. In these cases, we
need a virtue that moderates those
appetites that prevent from undertaking
more daunting tasks. According to
Aquinas, courage is that virtue. We need
courage to restrain our fears so that we
might endure harrowing circumstances.
Yet courage not only mollifies our fears,
it also combats the unreasonable zeal to
overcome them. An excessive desire to
face fearful circumstances constitutes a
kind of recklessness that can easily
hasten one's demise. Thus, we need
courage in order to both curb excessive
fear and modify unreasonable daring.
Without courage, we will be either
governed by irrational fear or a
recklessness that eschews good counsel,
making us vulnerable to harm
unnecessarily. The courageous person
will have patience and perseverance.
That is, he will not be broken by stress
or sorrow, nor will he be wearied or
discouraged due to the exigencies of his
endeavors.

4. Justice - The virtue of justice, however,

governs our relationships with others.