Economics during interwar period of World Wars

Table of Contents
Introduction 2
Recognizing European economic Cycle 3
3
Monetary variables in the European business cycle during the
interwar period 4
International Business 7
Capital Flows, International Conflict, and the European
Business Cycle in the Interwar Period 8
Conclusion………………………………………………………………
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Graphs
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References
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Introduction:
Between the two World Wars, macroeconomic policy underwent a significant shift. The Great
War, which lasted from 1914 to 1918, wreaked havoc on Europe's economies in a number of
ways. It signalled the end of nearly a century of unbroken economic development. It marked the
end of a lengthy period of near-universal monetary stability and the start of a painful de-
globalization process. It ushered in a period of highly politicised labour relations. It also marked
the beginning of an age in which dramatic oscillations in economic activity and prolonged mass
unemployment became the norm.

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While World War I marked the beginning of this historic period, its consequences continued well
past World War II's conclusion. Europe's economy lagged considerably behind their historical
development patterns throughout the interwar period. Only until the Golden Age of the 1960s did
the country fully recover from this long-term malaise. However, not all of the shifts in historical
tendencies that occurred after World War I were eventually reversed, and some of the changes
were permanent. After 1918, a significant upward change in labor's income shares occurred in
Europe's most developed countries. Wages and the personal income distribution in general have
been compressed as a result of this. Both, favoured low-income earners and lowered the number
of shares taken by high-income earners. The majority of the early interwar distributional shocks
were permanent, and they may still be seen in European economies today.
Following World War I, monetary conditions were also drastically transformed. Some of the
adjustments were just temporary. The spectacular hyperinflations that devastated the erstwhile
Central Powers and their successor governments in the early 1920s were the most notable of
these. The same may be said of the

In the early 1920s, deflationary waves swept over Europe, and in the early 1930s, they swept
over the globe. Other monetary regime shifts, such as the effort to resurrect the Gold Standard in
the 1920s, were more permanent. The painful ramifications of this event have far-reaching
implications for the post-World War II restoration of the monetary system. The restriction of
international money flows, and later foreign commerce as a whole, was more persistent in
character.
Between the two World Wars, macroeconomic policy underwent a significant shift. In contrast to
the 19th century, when moderate policy involvement was the acknowledged standard, economic
policy activity became the norm. Intervention by the government in the marketplaces for
products, factors of production, and money expanded swiftly. Institutions were established,
several of which gained constitutional standing, with long-term consequences in some
circumstances. However, not all of the post-World War I policy experiments lasted as long as
others. Attempts to restore monetary stability with paper currencies were swiftly abandoned, and
in the mid-1920s, gold was reintroduced — though halfheartedly. In the early 1930s, a second
shift to paper currencies was only marginally more successful, this time due to increasingly
severe capital restrictions and import restrictions, which strangled international commerce and
capital flows in most regions of Europe. While these trade barriers were easily abolished after
WWII, it took until the 1970s to find a system that integrated regional fixed exchange rate blocs
with liberalised capital flows. However, no system exists now that can perform the functions of
the Classical Gold Standard, which was in effect before to 1914.
Economic variations between 1914 and 1945 were principally driven by two factors that
influenced events and significantly affected the economic constitution of the European polity, far
from the business cycle. The first was social strife, which resulted in institutions and labour
market reactions. The other factor was international strife, which resulted in the de-globalization
of the European economy. The interwar period, influenced by these two causes, had extremely

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abnormal macroeconomic performance, yet it was formative for the European economy in the
second half of the twentieth century.
2. Recognizing the European economic cycle
During the interwar era, there were a series of short-term business cycles, as well as a long-term
recession based on historical productivity trends. This downward deviation began during the
First World War and continued until the end of the Second World War. During the three decades
after 1914, Europe's economy was in recession compared to trend for 14 years, losing 30% of its
potential production.
Three short-term recessions were entwined in Europe's long-term gloom. The first lasted from
1914 to 1921 on average, the second from 1929 to 1932, and the third from 1940 to 19462 on
average. With two of these recessions tied to the World Wars, only one authentic interwar
recession would remain.
The WW1 recession hit Germany and most of Continental Europe hard, with output cuts of up to
25%. Britain and Italy, on the other hand, had a postwar economic boom. A massive world
recession in 1920/21 significantly reduced national output in these two nations (by 20% and
25%, respectively), but had little effect on the rest of Europe.
Throughout the rest of the 1920s, continental Europe's economy recovered strongly, approaching
or even surpassing the historical productivity trend (Figure 2). The two major exceptions to the
tendency were Germany and the United Kingdom, where recovery remained woefully
inadequate: neither nation had recovered to much more than 80% of its capacity by 1929, despite
a 2% productivity trend.
The international recession of 1929 impacted all of Europe, but in different ways. By the mid-
1930s, the depression had reduced most of Europe to the poor use of its potential that had
previously defined Germany and the United Kingdom in the 1920s. The late 1930s saw a period
of stagnation or worsening conditions, which was hastened in Southwest Europe by the Spanish
Civil War and elsewhere by World War II. Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia are
the three biggest outliers to this pattern. In 19333, a reversal of the trend began. The most
successful recovery was in Scandinavia, which had almost entirely recovered by 1939. Germany
made a strong comeback until 1939, but was unable to maintain this momentum through World
War II. The recession of 1929-32 impacted Britain less heavily than Germany, and as a result,
the recovery was slower. During World War II, however, Britain's position in relation to the
trend improved dramatically, and it swiftly caught up to Germany.
3. Monetary variables in the European business cycle during the interwar period
While most of Europe had monetary quiet under the late nineteenth-century Classical Gold
Standard, Europe's monetary and financial institutions were damaged by World War I.
In 1914, all governments ceased gold convertibility, and price levels had risen by 50% or more
due to wartime inflation. Inflation was remained common in the newly founded weak
democracies in Central Europe after the war ended. In other nations with a more favourable

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political climate, postwar monetary stabilisation was greeted by a new phenomena of downward
inflexible wages, which was partially a result of newly implemented collective wage negotiating
methods. In other countries, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, deflation is accompanied by
rising unemployment, low rates of output growth, or even outright recession. After the war,
Europe's monetary stabilisation took more than a decade, and it had only recently been
completed when the 1929 financial crisis struck.
In Germany, as well as Austria, Hungary, and Poland, hyperinflation was rampant. After the
breakup of the Habsburg monarchy and the reversal of the 18th century division of Poland
between Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburgs, the first two recovered their freedom, while the
latter two had recovered their freedom. Inflationary war finance, inadequate tax systems, new
customs borders and the accompanying drop in trade, as well as political turbulence at the end of
WWI, all contributed to monetary instability in these countries. By 1919 or 1920, prices had
risen tenfold or more in compared to 1914.
The United Kingdom, as well as the majority of World War I's neutral countries, reverted to gold
at pre-war parity, reversing wartime inflation. Deflation from wartime pricing levels was
significant, although it did not reach pre-war levels, as it did in the United States. Consumer
prices in these nations were still on average 50% higher than in 1914 by the end of the 1920s,
putting them in par with the United States. Stabilization was effective once more, since the price
levels of 1925 were not reached in most of these nations before World War II (see Figure 3b).
With the critical difference that there was no post-war deflation in these nations after 1945,
wartime inflation after 1940 essentially followed the trend of moderate inflation from World War
I.
Several countries, headed by France, chose the middle ground, allowing prices to rise seven to
tenfold during World War I but avoiding post-war hyperinflation and striving to restore to pre-
war gold parities. Prices in these nations varied around the levels reached in the early 1920s
throughout the interwar era. In World War II, this group of economies proved to be far less
resistant to the return of wartime inflation than the others. After World War I, the monetary
policies of several European countries drew a lot of scholarly interest. Since Keynes cautioned
against the repercussions of deflation, Britain's choice to tolerate post-war deflation to prepare
for the restoration (ultimately in 1925) to pre-war parity has been criticized. He suggested that
downward wage rigidities would raise real wages, turning deflation into depression. This
relationship between the 1920/1 recession and post-World War I deflation is widely established.
Countries that were experiencing inflation at the time were fortunately spared from the slump.
The same nations, on the other hand, had reached the bottom of their profound recessions. At the
same time, a British return to gold parity after an insufficient degree of price deflation, according
to Keynes, would raise the real exchange rate in comparison to nations that did not deflate or
stabilised following hyperinflations. Following the return to gold in the late 1920s, relative price
levels throughout Europe varied greatly. When the price level data is converted into real
exchange rates, the hyperinflation nations' currencies appear to be undervalued in relation to the
pound (albeit far less so for Germany). Currencies that stabilised at pre-war parity were often
near to purchasing power parity with the pound, with the Netherlands being the only notable

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exception. The undervaluation of the French Franc has piqued academic interest, not least
because of the implied charge that France exploited the Gold Standard for political gain. See
Prati (1991), Mouré (1991), and Sicsic (1991) for more recent work on French internal instability
and inflation as a source of monetary instability in the 1920s (1993).
Regardless of the political considerations, France was clearly not an outlier. Breach of
purchasing power parity was prevalent in countries that had stabilised at lower parities during the
late 1920s Gold Standard, and market forces did not quickly correct them.
Overall, it appears that nations that stabilised at new parities fared far better in terms of
unemployment in the 1920s than those that did not. Figure 5 displays unemployment indices
(1932=100) for the same countries as previously. Figure 5a shows that the unemployment
experience of nations stabilising following hyperinflations was uneven.Countries that had gone
through deflations to return to pre-war parities had a history of long-term unemployment dating
back to the 1920s (Figure 5b). Those who stabilised at lower rates, on the other hand, had near-
full employment in the 1920s.
The unpleasant shock that occurred with the world slump after 1929 hit every country in Europe
hard. However, the crisis hit Europe's countries in various ways and at various dates. The crisis
was not caused by a deflationary or real exchange rate shock: deflationary tendencies in gold
parity nations had already begun in the 1920s and had only recently escalated after 1929. Figure
5c shows that the nations that stabilised below par in the 1920s were latecomers to the Great
Depression of the 1930s. In comparison to their stellar success in the 1920s, they were
particularly heavily struck by the Great Depression, and it took them longer to recover in the
1930s.
The extent to which monetary policy contributed to the economic collapse after 1929 is still a
point of contention. The downturn, as well as much of the depression as a whole, has been
blamed on contractionary monetary policy in the United States in the late 1920s, according to
monetarist orthodoxy (see Friedman and Schwartz).

The year was 1963. Critics argue that Europe, particularly Germany, has produced its own
deflationary forces. Reduced U.S. capital exports are the proximate cause of monetary
contraction in Europe, according to the credit-oriented theory that dominates today's debate (see
Kindleberger (1973), Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo) (1997). However, the ostensibly evident
link between deflation and unemployment is difficult to uncover in the data. According to
Clarida, Gertler, and Gali's research on the dynamic Phillips curve, there are short-term trade-
offs between inflation and unemployment that allow monetary policy to have an influence until
the natural rate of unemployment is restored (1999). Despite the fact that unemployment and
inflation varied widely over the interwar era, no regular pattern emerges from the data, even
when the 1920s and 1930s are considered independently. The picture that emerges from Figure 6
is that the natural rate of unemployment fluctuated independently of inflation, regardless of
whether a country relied on gold or not.

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The burden on the financial system was intensified by downward spiralling prices, which proved
politically unsustainable in 1931. Austria was hit by a banking crisis in May 1931, and a run on
the national bank was nearly avoided. 10 Following a bank run in July, Germany partially
stopped convertibility, requiring international short-term creditors to roll over previous debts.
Scandinavian nations had linked their currencies to the pound sterling. Many nations in
continental Europe followed Germany in losing convertibility, resulting in whatever parity they
maintained being only a numéraire with no economic significance. In the French-dominated
Gold bloc, which disintegrated in 1936, only a tiny handful of countries held on. Breaking the
"Golden Fetters" (Eichengreen, 1992) contributed to recovery, much as the gold standard did in
transmitting recessionary impulses throughout the world.
Both Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Bernanke and James (1991) proposed a link between the
speed with which the economy recovered from the Great Depression and the move away from
gold. According to this agreement, nations who stuck to the gold standard saw their currencies
overvalued, were obliged to keep interest rates high, and paid the price with slow and delayed
economic recovery. Inflation and GDP growth in the 1930s for nations on and off gold are
shown individually in Figure 7a. While there is a small positive association in both situations, the
nations that are not gold producers have better total GDP growth, which is to be anticipated.
In the 1930s, Figure 7.b looks at the relationship between a currency's overvaluation compared to
the pound and its GDP growth. The devaluating nations' real exchange rates appear to cluster
around two levels: parity with sterling and undervaluation of roughly 70%, with no evident
economic benefit for either group. While devaluation boosted development in the 1930s, it had
little effect on inflation or foreign competitiveness, owing to inadequate exchange rate pass-
through. According to Wolf (2008), the choice to devalue was substantially influenced by
external factors, and it might have been endogenous to both inflation and currency
undervaluation. That would be supported by the evidence in Figure 7. The process of leaving the
gold standard was completed by the late 1930s. The ubiquity of bilateral exchange agreements,
which frequently subjected extensive lists of items to quotas and an extensive system of split
exchange rates, was a defining element of the new currency system. Germany became the centre
of this structure after 1933, although not being the first country to do so.
As the most common understanding of the interwar depression today, monetary reasons play a
role in its explanation in varied degrees. Deflationary monetary policy is still a common
explanation for the UK and US recessions of 1920/21. However, as we've shown, deflation. The
role of exchange rates in the development of the Great Depression after 1929 is undeniable. In
the 1930s, countries that abandoned the gold standard fared better than those that did not. The
processes underlying this, however, appear to be less evident than they look. without depression
was commonplace throughout Europe during WWI, throwing doubt on this hypothesis.
5. International Business
The pre-1914 period in most European countries was characterised by low tariffs, which were
typically imposed for budgetary reasons rather than to defend domestic markets. Allied embargo
and – to a lesser extent – German submarine warfare and other counter-blockade efforts cut trade

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to a bare minimum throughout the 1914-18 conflict. As a result, international trade in Central
Europe was significantly hampered towards the conclusion of the war, although it was
significantly less so in Western Europe, which had access to the Atlantic Ocean. This disparity in
commerce during the war tends to explain a substantial part of the differences in the timing of
the wartime recession in Continental and Western Europe. The recovery of commercial
commerce following World War I was slow, in part due to the German reparations dispute and
the escalating hyperinflations in Central Europe. Tariff disputes between Germany and Poland
and France, on the one hand, and Poland and France, on the other, further slowed trade recovery
in the mid-1920s. In East Central Europe, trade was further inhibited by the erection of tariff
barriers between the former parts of the Habsburg monarchy. In addition, post-revolutionary
turmoil in Russia and the establishment of a state monopoly in foreign trade seriously damaged
Central Europe’s trade with Russia.
The start of the international downturn caused trade volumes to plummet once again. Due to a
lack of foreign loan inflows that had sustained its trade deficits in the 1920s, Germany
implemented a dramatic deflationary strategy, resulting in significant trade surpluses since 1930,
spreading a significant recessionary impetus over Europe. Concerns over foreign exchange
reserves grew in 1931, prompting the widespread implementation of bilateral trade and exchange
agreements, essentially combining trade flows and capital restrictions. The protectionist
Smoot/Hawley tariff of 1930 in the United States, as well as the Commonwealth's Ottawa
preferences of 1932, fueled this trend.
In 1933, Germany implemented strict capital restrictions and trade restrictions, solidifying the
new trade regime. As a result, international commerce in the 1930s failed to fully recover from
the depression, and Europe's economies were less open than they had been since the mid-
nineteenth century (Table 1). At the same time, capital account imbalances have practically
vanished. In the 1930s, achieving balance of payments and balance of trade equilibrium at the
same time became a top economic policy priority, and it was achieved by policy fiat rather than
market forces.
The 1930s trade policies were not solely motivated by financial considerations. Import
substitution programmes were aimed at areas that were believed to be strategic. Agricultural
protectionism was designed to increase self-sufficiency in the face of future wars. As a result,
significant resources were spent in the development of industries ranging from steel to chemicals
and textiles.
This meant that a large portion of revenues would be redistributed to indigenous agriculture and
import substitution sectors. As a result, the rate of decline in agricultural employment was
slowed, and large numbers of unemployed people were channelled into the new, war-related
import substitution industries. As a result, Europe reverted to mercantilism in the 1930s,
foregoing trade advantages in favour of increasing national self-sufficiency, a policy aim that
was incompatible with market processes.
6. Capital Flows, International Conflict, and the European Business Cycle in the Interwar
Period

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International politics had surprisingly little impact on European economic fluctuations between
the 1860s and 1914. Capital exports and direct investment in the periphery of Europe were
attempted by Europe's advanced countries as a strategic advantage. The majority of the economic
struggle between Europe's Great Powers, however, was channelled through colonial operations.
Closer to home, the predominant view was to avoid utilising market interventionism as a means
of gaining an advantage in foreign contests. The "commercialization" of France's reparations to
Germany during the war of 1870/1 is one example. France sold bonds on foreign markets, paid
off the Germans, and thereby converted its political burden to a purely commercial obligation.
Parts of the revenues were used to support Germany's new currency, the mark, which was
connected to the gold standard of the United Kingdom rather than the French-dominated
bimetallic system.
Nonetheless, discriminatory monetary policy measures were mostly absent. Money and financial
markets were viewed as a subject for specialists to handle, free of government meddling. Central
bank collaboration remained under the classical gold standard, which began in the 1870s, even
when political tensions between governments were at an all-time high, as in the crises of 1907
and 1911. During the conflict, both sides devised plans for punitive reparations. The financial
exploitation of occupied Belgium by Germany served as a blueprint for future financial warfare.
Huge-scale territorial changes were planned, and policy suggestions floated in German
government circles even urged ethnic cleansing of large areas of Eastern Europe25. Given such
circumstances, the 1918 armistice and the economic circumstances that accompanied it appear to
be less dramatic than they seemed at first.
Historians have long claimed that the dispute over German reparations, as well as its twin, the
inter-allied credits due to the US by France and the United Kingdom, overshadowed financial
relations between the two countries. Political meddling has hampered the proper operation of
international capital markets at times, and has harmed domestic stability in some of the core
nations. According to Feldman, the 1921 reparations law led to tax rebellion, civic upheaval, and
the move to hyperinflation in Germany (1993). The reluctance of Germany to pay reparations at
the agreed-upon rates contributed to the destabilisation of the French budget in the early 1920s,
with long-term ramifications for the Franc. 26 The Dawes Plan of 1924, which was mediated by
the United States, re-established capital flows between Germany and foreign markets. The US
imposed a credit restriction on France as a result of the French reluctance to service these
obligations to the US unless they were completely securitized by future German reparations. This
effectively cut the French off from the American market, motivating France's widely criticised
gold hoarding strategy, which led to the destabilisation of the interwar gold standard. 28
Despite this, capital transfers between the United States and Europe were significant in the
second half of the 1920s. Many of these credit flows went to Germany, which absorbed nearly all
of the United States' net capital exports in the second half of the 1920s. Germany became the
world's greatest net capital importer for a half-decade, allowing the Germans to pay all Dawes
Plan reparations on credit.
Historians contend that the Germans took advantage of the Dawes Plan to overborrow in foreign
markets, and that they had every incentive to do so based on sovereign debt theory. When the

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world slump hit in 1929, Germany's foreign debt, including the present value of reparations, was
close to a percent of GDP.
Once issues developed, crisis management under the informal principles of central bank
cooperation established in the nineteenth century would have required rapid and discrete support
for the German currency. For a time, the Dawes Plan's attempt at ersatz commercialization of
German reparations appeared to have succeeded in detaching international politics and financial
connections. The old relationship between the two was fully re-established with the considerably
tougher Young Plan of 1929/30. The Young Plan, which was basically a repayment mechanism
for inter-allied war loans, united French and British interests in paying off their war debt with
America's interest in avoiding credit default. At the same time, it essentially put Germany under
Allied financial supervision, inexorably linking any future Gold Standard monetary rescue
measures with the German debt. The Bank of International Settlements was established to
depoliticize central bank collaboration in these circumstances. When the German payments crisis
came out in 1931, following two years of forced deflation and austerity, classical-style, discrete
central bank collaboration proved unworkable. 35 Financial aid plans quickly became encrusted
with political difficulties, and it became clear that no debt relief could be achieved without
addressing the deeper concerns that underpin the Young Plan. Only until the US suggested a one-
year moratorium on all political debt, and thus finally accepted the relationship between
reparations and inter-allied debt, was a temporary solution found. The installation of capital
controls in July 1931, and therefore Germany's withdrawal from the Gold Standard, was the
price for this political agreement in lieu of central bank collaboration.
Through the mid-1930s, financial markets were plagued by German debt concerns and foreign
strife. Reparations negotiations were postponed until mid-1932, prompting more deflationary
measures in both France and Germany. Following the termination of German reparations (in
August 1932), France and the United Kingdom declared default on their inter-allied war debt to
the United States (in December 1932). Germany defaulted on a growing amount of its
commercial debt and was able to reschedule the rest. By 1935, the default rate had risen to
between 80 and 90%. 36 As a result, Europe's foreign financial contacts were channelled via a
network of increasingly restrictive capital and exchange control agreements. 37 Prior to World
War II, commerce and payments in most of Europe had become a political and bureaucratic
mess, spawning a new, severe kind of mercantilism whose main goal was to use commerce as a
weapon in international war.
 Conclusion:
A long-term negative divergence from Europe's output and income growth tendencies occurred
during the interwar era, resulting in a true Great Depression that lasted from 1914 to 1945 and
had no precedent in the nineteenth century. a century There were three severe recessions nested
in it, each of which would have been the biggest European recession since the Industrial
Revolution if not for the succeeding, even deeper one. This chapter looked at a few of the most
popular interpretations of these downturns. It has been suggested that this profoundly diseased
phase of European economic history cannot be understood without considering two elements of
warfare that plagued the continent at the time. One is international conflict, as shown by

10
Germany's two wars with its neighbours. The other is social conflict, which is linked to the
growing importance of labour movements and the resulting changes in economic distribution, as
well as the first expansion of civil rights and the changing position of women. During the
interwar period, both elements of warfare had a significant influence on business cycle results.
One factor that may have steered Europe's economies away from their previous long-term
growth path is social conflict: unionisation, the eight-hour workday, and the expansion of
welfare benefits all altered the balance of bargaining power in labour markets, resulting in higher
wage shares and lower profit margins. Social conflict was also a major factor in the rise of
authoritarian regimes across continental Europe, which attempted to reverse the effects of the
Great Depression by forcing economic growth at the expense of living standards – usually
succeeding in the latter but not always in the former policy goal.
In the war-related recessions of 1914-1918 and 1940-45, international warfare was at the
forefront. However, during the real interwar years, it also played a key role in the failed attempts
to stabilise European economy. It is said that the ongoing dispute over Germany's reparations
severely hampered the functioning of international financial markets throughout the interwar
period, as well as preventing central bank cooperation from defusing the Gold Standard crisis in
1931. The German debt default has become a global issue.

The European interwar monetary system's acute but potentially controllable problem has turned
into a disaster with long-term ramifications. It's difficult to imagine how a more stronger
international financial infrastructure could have been developed under the pathological political
conditions that prevailed in Europe during the interwar era and achieved considerably better
results.

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