Newsmaking Crim

“Newsmaking” Criminology
1
or “Infotainment” Criminology?
Judith I. Buckingham
Canterbury University, New Zealand
T he role of the media in mobilising public opinion about crime

motivates some criminologists to participate as experts in media
constructions of crime and social control. These public discourses help
shape the social construction of offending, the public response to victims
of violence and the organisation of popular consent for particular crime
control strategies. This article reviews and critiques the empirical and
theoretical foundations of a criminological discourse of gender symmetry
in domestic violence, and gender bias in the criminal justice system, that
has galvanised the popular press in New Zealand and disrupted widely
accepted views of domestic violence and criminal justice processes.
In the late 1980s, Gregg Barak urged criminologists to engage with mass media
representations of crime and social reality through the practice of “newsmaking
criminology”. Barak’s invitation to progressive criminologists “to participate in
the presentation of ‘newsworthy’ items about crime and justice” (1988, p. 565)
proposed a sharing of criminological insights with the public to demystify and
recast media constructions of crime and social control. Five years later, in their
critique of mass-mediated themes of domestic violence and a general reluctance to
acknowledge the role of existing power relations in perpetuating violence against
women, Martin Schwartz and Walter DeKeseredy (1993) recommended feminists
avoid limiting their presentations to academic settings and adopt Barak’s newsmak-
ing method. Although those who oppose mainstream interpretations of the news
have been less successful in courting this form of publicity, this article examines the
foundations of a remarkable capture of New Zealand media and popular discourses
on issues of domestic violence and gender inequality.
Media constructions of domestic violence and the criminal justice response
to female and male offenders in New Zealand have amplified the criminology of
Greg Newbold, an Associate Professor at the University of Canterbury, who has
animated public opinion with his analysis of female offending in which women’s
rates of violence in the home equal or exceed those of men, and women are
sentenced more leniently by the courts. This gender bias demeans women “by not
taking their violence seriously and not demanding that they take responsibility for
their actions” (“Violence by Women ‘Ignored’”, 1996). Over a number of years,
Address for correspondence: Judith I. Buckingham, BA LLB (Hons) PhD Candidate, School
of Law, Canterbury University, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand.
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VOLUME 37 NUMBER 2 2004 PP. 253–275
JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
these themes have been rehearsed by Newbold in television interviews, radio talk
shows, articles and newspaper reports (for example, “Jail ‘Less Likely for Women’”,
1999; “Girls Gone Bad”, 2000; “Seeking an Equality of Revulsion”, 2000; “Off the
Hook”, 2000; “Study Finds Violent Women Risk Retaliation”, 2002) and they
reappear in Newbold’s academic text, Crime in New Zealand (2000), and a critique
of gender bias in the criminal justice system by his former PhD student, Samantha
Jeffries (2001). Major discrepancies between claims that male violence against
women is a pervasive social problem (Leibrich, Paulin, & Ransom, 1995; Morris,
1998) and assertions of gender symmetry in the use of violence between intimate
partners can create significant confusion among policy makers and the general
public. Images of a perverse criminal justice system that routinely trivialises serious
offending by women logically imply harsher treatment for female offenders; an
equality strategy that Newbold has not shied away from (“Seeking an Equality of
Revulsion”, 2000; “Off the Hook”, 2000).
In this article I review the research and evidence finding discrimination against
men in the New Zealand criminal justice system. I argue that methodological short-
comings resulting from inattention to context and insufficient knowledge of law
and the legal principles relevant to this critique of sentencing outcomes, confound
the gender analysis and produce seriously flawed results. I compare research
findings of gender symmetry in domestic violence with research by well respected
agencies finding gender asymmetry and suggest these apparently discordant findings
can be reconciled as the result of different methodologies, different conceptualisa-
tions of violence and a failure to distinguish between types and context of violence.
I conclude that the production and consumption of the criminology in this review
reflects the conventions and commercial imperative of popular media in its
“infotainment” approach to newsmaking.
Gender Bias in the New Zealand Criminal Justice System

In 1999 the media announced preliminary results of Jeffries’ (2001) PhD study,
Gender Judgments: An Investigation of Gender Differentiation in Sentencing and
Remand in New Zealand, supervised by Newbold,2 which found that in comparison
with women, men were more likely to be imprisoned and would serve longer terms
of imprisonment when sentenced for the same or “similar” offending (“Jail ‘Less
Likely for Women’”, 1999). At the time these findings were released to the press,
significant differences existed between men and women in this sample which might
have accounted for differential sentencing outcomes and Jeffries had not yet
completed her case studies. The timing of this media release is curious as the
research is supposedly modelled on Daly’s (1994) study, which does not support
claims of gender bias and cautions against drawing conclusions from statistical
analyses in the absence of in-depth case studies (p. 268). In 2001, accompanied by
a great deal of media hype, Newbold and Jeffries announced subsequent research
had confirmed their preliminary findings of bias against men in the New Zealand
criminal justice system. According to one media report:
With women, judges look for an explanation and an excuse for their offending.
Whereas men are just men its a case of all men are bastards, said Jeffries (“Sugar and
Spice”, 2001).
254 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

“NEWSMAKING” CRIMINOLOGY OR “INFOTAINMENT” CRIMINOLOGY?
This research and its methodology was foreshadowed in Newbold’s (2000) Crime in
New Zealand, which also received extensive media coverage of its claims of gender
bias in sentencing outcomes. On the jacket, the book is described as the “first
comprehensive study of crime in New Zealand to be published since 1970 and …
one of the most detailed works on the subject ever written”. The author seeks to
redress a perceived deficit in official data by exposing the true nature and extent of
female offending, discussing it generally throughout the work and specifically in a
chapter on “women’s crime”. Although Newbold is portrayed as an iconoclast, who
tramples over “popular notions” about sex and gender, the text is truly remarkable
for its methodology. This relies on discredited stereotypes of women, emotive-
persuasive appeals to popular prejudices and inferences drawn from small bites of
decontextualised data to analyse sentencing outcomes for female defendants. Under
the rubric of “women’s crime” Newbold asserts that criminal law traditionally patro-
nised female offenders as fragile, weak-willed, often witless, thralls of their husbands:
In spite of the advances that have been made in gender equity since then, serious
offending by women still tends to be trivialised as an odd aberration, precipitated by
supposedly extenuating circumstances. On this basis, sentences far below the normal
tariff are frequently awarded (p. 70).
A “Normal” Sentencing Tariff?

As evidence of this claim, Newbold provides a selection of extracts from New
Zealand newspaper reports. These newspaper snippets, described as “contemporary
examples” of gender bias in sentencing outcomes, are presented as self-evident data
in the absence of detailed citation or discussion of the cases. The following snippets
illustrate this approach:
• In February 1993 a woman who had been convicted of breaking both her baby’s
arms was jailed for 18 months by Wanganui District Court. Without detailing
them, the judge said there were “mitigating circumstances” (Dominion, 1993, as
cited in Newbold, 2000, p. 70)
• In July 1993 [the female offender] was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment
after being convicted of the manslaughter of her 11-mth-old son by the High
Court in Greymouth. The child had been poisoned by being fed large quantities
of salt (Dominion, 1993, as cited in Newbold, 2000, p. 70)3
• In January 1997 in Christchurch, [the female offender] threw her baby with
such force that it turned blue and suffered permanent brain damage. She
received two years’ supervision and eight months’ periodic detention (Dominion,
1997, as cited in Newbold, 2000, p. 71).
Without the case citations that provide access to legal reports, or comparison with
reported decisions on the facts of these cases, the reader is required to infer that
these newspaper snippets are probative of claims of judicial paternalism or chivalry.
However, the validity of these data as evidence of sentencing outcomes which fall
“far below the normal tariff” is substantially undermined by a failure to provide
details of the standard against which sentences for female offenders are measured.
Presumably, the “normal tariff” relates to the sentencing of male offenders. Yet no

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
information regarding male offenders is provided. This omission may be the result
of Newbold’s belief that child abuse is predominantly a female crime (p. 59). The
claim does not accord with official data on convictions for child abuse (Ministry of
Justice, 2001)4 and a variety of newspaper reports provide the opportunity for
comparison. Had Newbold, for example, undertaken a comparative analysis it
might have incorporated the following newspaper snippets:
• Male — convicted on two charges of intentionally injuring his 7-week-old son.
On one occasion, the infant’s skull was fractured with a headbutt, and on another,
the offender broke the child’s forearm by taking the limb into his two hands and
snapping it. On this occasion the offender also broke the child’s leg. Sentenced to
12 months prison and 12 months supervision (Evening Standard, 1997, July 23)
• Male — convicted of causing grievous bodily harm to his 14 week old son. Baby
suffered 13 fractures, including a broken thigh and forearm. Police stated it was
one of the worst cases of child abuse they had seen. Sentenced to 9 months
prison (Dominion, 1997, September 9; Dominion, 1997, September 24)
• Male — convicted of assaulting a 6 year old child with a weapon. Judge noted
the specialist report stating the child’s wounds were among the worst the
specialist had seen. Sentenced to 4 months prison (Press, 2000, October 10)
• Male — convicted of the manslaughter of his 5 month old grandson. Baby died
from severe brain damage consistent with being shaken. Sentenced to 80 hours
community service (Waikato Times, 1999, February 27).
Adopting Newbold’s methodology, the latter set of newspaper snippets could be
used as “evidence” that the sentencing of female offenders provides the measure of
any normal tariff and it is the sentencing of male offenders which falls far below it.
Misrepresentations Due to Decontextualisation of Data

The unqualified use of such data as evidence of gender bias also signifies a surpris-
ingly naive indifference to the nature and complexity of issues likely to arise in
criminal proceedings and at sentencing. A further snippet illustrates this point:
In June 1993 [the female offender], who had attempted to murder her de facto husband
by stabbing him in the lung with a kitchen knife, was sentenced to two years’ supervi-
sion by the High Court in Wellington. The judge said a six-year prison term would have
been appropriate, but for the fact that the victim had forgiven [the offender] and that
the couple’s young daughter had cancer (Press, 1993, as cited in Newbold, 2000, p. 70).
In contrast to the above account of issues relevant to sentencing, consider the facts
of this case as recited by the sentencing judge (R v Teinatoa (1993) 10 CRNZ 288).
The offender and her partner had lived together for some years; the victim had
been unfaithful to his partner. On the day of the incident the female offender,
finding her partner absent, walked a considerable distance to the “other” woman’s
home armed with a knife. There she encountered the couple lying on the floor
watching television. During a struggle, the offender stabbed her male partner in the
chest. As any defence counsel would know, this is the classic scenario of a provoca-
tion analysis, traditionally employed to mitigate the killing of women by men who
discover or suspect infidelity on the part of female partners. Legal scholars point out

that the concept of provocation upholds male world visions and is primarily used to
defend male sexuality and the possession of women as property (Allen, 2000;
McDonald, 1993). The Law Commission reports the defence has been employed to
excuse domestic violence, although efforts to apply its masculinist criteria to female
experience have generally been unsuccessful (NZ Law Commission, R 73, 2001).5
The couple married before the case came to court and the victim gave evidence
at depositions, and again at trial, that he had lost his balance and fallen on the knife.
Partner forgiveness is frequently advanced as a mitigating circumstance (Hall, 1992)
and victim appeals for judicial compassion and clemency are a well-recognised and
pervasive feature of domestic violence prosecutions. Ironically, this is usually debated
as a feminist issue, since most cases of violence — including domestic violence —
that appear in court involve male offenders. Medical reports showed the couple’s
8-year-old daughter had a potentially fatal form of cancer and required a caregiver
who could be relied on to dispense her daily medication and assist with other treat-
ment. However, medical evidence also revealed the father had proved unreliable in
this respect. The judge stated “having seen the father give evidence, and without in
any way intending an unkindness, I can understand that concern” (1993, p. 290).
The court found the child’s survival was in doubt, even given full compliance with
her medication regime, which the father could not be counted on to administer.
Whether or not one concurs with the outcome in this case, a substantive
reading illustrates the danger of relying on details of offending delineated in the
newspaper snippet, which omits most of the legally relevant facts. Moreover, the
sentencing judge in this case was clearly influenced by the increased risk of fatality
to the child as a consequence of her mother’s imprisonment. Research has identi-
fied gender differences in defendants’ family responsibilities, in particular the care
and welfare of children, as an explanatory variable in sentencing outcomes for men
and women (Daly, 1989; Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993). Thus, rather
than supporting Newbold’s claims of chivalry or paternalism toward women, this
sentencing approach conforms with prior research findings that the focus is on the
welfare of children, and not on women per se.
Misrepresentation/Misunderstanding of Legal Issues Relevant to Sentencing

The text also prefigures a dominant theme in Jeffries’ (2001) research which
critiques a purported tendency to pathologise female offenders. Female assertions
of victimisation are said by Newbold to result in lenient treatment for female
offenders, while men cannot “draw on that sort of cop-out” (“Violence by Women
‘Ignored’”, 1996). As evidence, he suggests that a serial rapist was disadvantaged by
not having his childhood experiences of victimisation adequately considered by the
courts (2000, p. 72). Contrasting judicial attitudes towards this male offender and
female offenders who successfully use victimisation as an excuse to mitigate their
offending, Newbold provides this newspaper snippet:
A woman who had bashed her toddler son for wetting the bed was sentenced to three
months’ periodic detention and 18 months’ supervision in the Wellington District
Court. The judge said that the woman’s bad upbringing had induced her to suffer “disso-
ciation”, causing her to see herself as the baby and her stepbrother as the adults who
had abused her when she was a child. This had rendered her powerless to stop herself
from abusing her own child (Dominion, 1997, as cited in Newbold, 2000, p. 72).6

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
The newspaper reports reveal the female defendant was charged with her step-
brother and admitted “slapping” the child for soiling his bed. The court heard
that the child had been repeatedly struck by the co-offending stepbrother. Expert
medical evidence showed that although the stepbrother beat the child, the mother
suffered a state of dissociation resulting from past abuse inflicted on her:
Psychologists said that though her brother … beat the boy, the mother suffered a
state of “dissociation”. This meant she was powerless to do anything [author’s emphasis]
because she saw herself as the baby and her brother as the adult figures who had
abused her in many different ways during her own childhood (Dominion, 1997,
September 20).
The implication that this woman evaded responsibility because she abused the
child while in a state of dissociation is incorrect. The defendant was sentenced on
the basis that she failed to protect the child from her violent stepbrother, due to
the dissociation she suffered as a result of her own experiences of abuse. Newbold’s
wildly inaccurate account of data contained in the newspaper report also obscures
the legally relevant circumstance that the stepbrother, and not the mother, was
the principal perpetrator of abuse in this case. The female defendant’s status as a
secondary party radically alters the characterisation of offending in the newspaper
snippet and would undoubtedly influence the sentencing outcomes of both the
woman and the principal male offender.7
The Stereotypical “Bad” Mother and Trivialisation

of Violence Against Women
Treatment of the snippets as self-evident data suggests a cathartic response to
female offenders who avoid the imposition of substantial criminal law sanctions was
relied on to obviate the need for further enquiry. While emotional catharsis is a
highly effective mass media stratagem, it is no substitute for scholarly analysis.
A noteworthy example is Newbold’s discussion of a case of egregious offending by a
male against women and children in which a decision not to prosecute the battered
mothers is described as a “classic example” of judicial blindness to the malice of
female offenders (2000, p. 73). Notwithstanding that parents have never been
required by law to deliberately risk serious harm or injury to themselves in order to
prevent harm to their children, the cultural and stereotypical view of the mother as
selfless protector of the child is commonly expressed in the assertion that “a mother
protects her child against all odds — and I don’t care if that mother is battered to a
pulp” (as cited in Skinazi, 1997). Such emotive responses eschew consideration of
the batterer’s cooperation with mothers’ efforts to protect, the increased danger to
children of intervention and the risk of death or serious bodily injury to the mother
who intervenes or attempts to leave the relationship.
Interestingly, this “classic example” of judicial inability to recognise women’s
malice fails to consider the highly publicised internal review of this case by the
Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service. The review found that the
male offender’s “extraordinarily violent and intimidating behaviour” also terrified
social workers, who were so intimidated by [W] they “put up with” his threats to
physically attack themselves and their families, including threats to “track down

social workers’ children and attack them at their schools”. Staff became “desensi-
tized” and this accommodative response to [W’s] behaviour “impacted on [the social
workers’] ability to protect [W’s] daughter” (“Threats to Harm Children”, 1996;
“What Others are Saying”, 1996; “Social Welfare Admits it Failed [W’s] Child”,
1996; “Sensitive Service Monstered”, 1996; “Social Worker in Fear of Sex ‘Beast’ —
Report”, 1997). The grievous nature of offending in this case and inability of child
social workers to successfully perform their role may well have been relevant to the
battered mothers’ own perceptions of the likelihood of successful intervention. In
relation to this issue, the review discovered “a pervasive belief that any unsuccessful
legal action to protect [W’s] child would place her at greater risk” (“What Others are
Saying”, 1996). Such fears are not groundless, since intervention may precipitate a
lethal attack on the child (see R v Howse, 2002, T 015257) and is dangerous to the
intervenor or others nearby (Skinazi, 1997). The risks associated with intervention
to protect children have been recognised in the United States (US) with the enact-
ment of affirmative defences for mothers held criminally responsible for the violent
actions of male partners (Schernitzki, 2000). By permitting a defence if action taken
to stop the abuse would have caused serious physical harm to the mother, or
increased the risk of injury to the child, these legislative measures affirm a woman’s
legitimate interest in her own physical integrity and acknowledge the increased risk
to children of battered mothers’ efforts to protect.
In contrast, stereotypical constructions of the psychologically weak mother who
refuses to protect herself or her children (Newbold, 2000, p. 73) frequently misrep-
resent the mother as passive, ignoring past efforts to protect, and presume that the
mother could have safely taken action to prevent harm to her child.
If the mother can be blamed for the failure to protect the child, it is easier to avoid
examining the nature of power relationships within the family which maintain
domestic violence, as well as the reasons for society’s failure effectively to protect
women and children from that violence (Fielding & Scott, 1999, p.1, as cited in
O’Hara, 1994).
Newbold’s simplistic account of the complex dynamics of violent relationships takes
the form of a polemic in which battered men are counter-posed as equivalent victims
of domestic violence; compassionate initiatives to support battered women are conse-
quently disparaged as gender bias. Multifaceted narratives of offending are reduced in
the text to binary oppositions, and a highly selective use of data from newspaper
reports obscures the context and nature of offending and the legal issues relevant to
sentencing. No inferences of gender bias can safely be drawn from the newspaper
snippets, although their incorporation in an academic text may inappropriately
convey to the reader the authenticity of a carefully crafted empirical argument.8
Gender Misjudgments
In Gender Judgments (2001) Jeffries appears to acknowledge that recent Ministry of
Justice research (Triggs, 1999) cannot be cited as evidence of theories of gender
bias. Yet in their published work, both Jeffries (2002) and Newbold (2000b) cite
Triggs’ statistical analysis in support of their claims that the criminal justice system
discriminates against men. However, Triggs states that reasons for gender differences

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
in sentencing outcomes could not be determined from her study and suggests some
of the disparity may be due to factors that could not be measured, such as gender
differences in the gravity of offending within specific offence types or differences in
the actions or circumstances of offenders (1999, pp. 30, 123). Clearly, this research
does not support claims of judicial chivalry or paternalism toward women, or bias
against men.
The Data
Jeffries’ research acknowledges the limited ability of statistical analyses to capture
the complexities of individual cases by comparing sentencing outcomes for
“matched pairs” of male and female offenders. The case studies purport to compare
offence gravity using data extracted from police summaries of facts, trial transcripts
and judges’ sentencing remarks. The latter two sources are viewed as equivalent
in evidentiary value and merged into a single brief account of offending. This
methodology is insupportable. Allegations of offending in police summaries or at
trial cannot be uncritically relied upon as evidence of facts taken into account at
sentencing. At trial, the prosecution is required to prove any aggravating fact
disputed by a defendant. When sentencing a defendant, the judge is bound to dis-
regard disputed allegations unless the prosecution has established their truth in
accordance with ordinary legal principles (R v Bryant [1980] 1 NZLR 264 CA).
A defendant who pleads guilty may also dispute matters contained in the informa-
tion at sentencing; in practice, counsel are usually able to resolve such disputes by
agreement or through submissions (Hall & O’Driscoll, 2002). As noted by the
Law Commission:
The offender does not by his or her plea … admit what is narrated in any statement
of facts. Nor, where there are depositions, oral or by written statement, is he or she to
be taken to have admitted their truth. Nor, indeed, where there has been a trial, is
he or she necessarily bound by every aspect of the evidence before the jury (as cited
in NZ Law Commission, R 76, 2001, p. 10).
Furthermore, reliance on data from trial transcripts and police summaries provides
only a limited account of evidence that may be available to the sentencing judge.
At sentencing, depending upon the timing of the guilty plea, the judge will have a
statement of facts supplemented by any statements received or evidence taken at
depositions, the depositions, or the aforementioned evidence and whatever other
evidence there is. If the offender is found guilty at trial, the judge will have all the
Crown’s evidence and any evidence given by or for the offender:
Thus, on sentence, the judge may have at one extreme a summary of facts, usually
relatively brief and general, and at the other a body of sworn evidence, sometimes
considerable. Even in the latter case, significant disputes of fact are not unknown
and may call for the taking of evidence (NZ Law Commission, R 76, 2001, p. 3).
Missing Data
As discussed above, the narrative on which the prosecution relies to describe the
offence and the effect on any victim does not stand alone at sentencing. Apart
from the fact that this is the context in which disputes about the facts of the

offence usually arise, the problem of missing data in relation to criminality is

compounded by a failure to analyse the relevance of offender characteristics to
sentencing outcomes. Research examining the effects of offenders’ social circum-
stances, personal history and personal characteristics on sentencing outcomes has
identified a broad range of contextual variables, including the high priority given
to women’s caretaking role, as crucial to gender differences in court outcomes.
Regarding the childcare variable, the research sample shows female offenders were
primarily responsible for childcare:
In the total sample, women were more than eight times as likely to have sole child-
care responsibility as the men. Judges, we know, take considerable account of this
(Jeffries & Newbold, 1999, p. 25)9
An offender’s personality, character, childcare responsibilities, medical problems
and financial difficulties are closely related to judicial consideration of rehabilita-
tive potential and consequently to sentencing outcomes (Hall, 1985b; Triggs,
1999). Thus at sentencing, the judge will have a wide and diverse range of materi-
als relating not only to the offence, but also to the offender and to any victim.
These will usually include: a victim impact statement; perhaps an emotional harm
report; a pre-sentence report; perhaps a reparation report; other reports, for
example, a psychiatric report, a psychological report; alcohol and drug assessment;
counsel’s submissions; and letters from the offender or his or her family, friends,
employers or referees (Law Commission, R 76, 2001, pp. 1–2). Stories of criminal-
ity, decontextualised from offenders’ personal and social circumstances are
meaningless, as this information is indispensable to the court’s task of tailoring the
sentence to both the offence and the offender.
The Case Studies

Crude measures of the nature of offending within a broad offence category are also a
formidable impediment to gender-based comparisons, as prior research suggests
female offenders tend to commit less serious forms of crime within offence categories
(Daly, 1994; Steffensmeier et al., 1993). Unfortunately, Jeffries’ case studies depend
upon her subjective perceptions of crime seriousness, analyses of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the appropriate weight they should receive, unaccom-
panied by corroborating data. While the non-lawyer may suppose that law is a rigid
body of rules, uniformly applied and accessible from prosecution narratives of offend-
ing, the day-to-day task of drawing inferences from facts presented and weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors involves questions of law and the exercise of judge-
ment (R v White [1988] 1 NZLR 264, 267 CA). As illustrated by the following case
study, Jeffries’ presumption that allegations in police summaries and trial transcripts
could elucidate not only the facts taken into account at sentencing but also how the
relevant law was applied in an individual case and the weight given by the sentenc-
ing judge to various aggravating and mitigating factors, is fatal to the analyses.
A Case Study Comparison — Joan and Gary (Jeffries, 2001, pp. 124–125)
These offenders were both convicted of possessing Class C drugs for supply. Noting
that Gary’s offending involved a significantly larger amount of cannabis (70 foils:

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
40 foils), Jeffries employs a process of equivalence: calculating the price of a

cannabis foil at $20, adding the amount of money each defendant had in their
possession and thereby concluding that Gary’s offending involved $1600 worth of
cannabis, while Joan’s involved $1500 worth of cannabis. Acknowledging that
Gary’s crime had “gang connections” and these may have increased his culpability
by attaching a degree of professionalism to the offending, Jeffries suggests this
aggravating factor might have been offset because Gary was “taking the rap” for
other gang members. In any event:
General “prejudice” toward gang members could have [author’s emphasis] resulted in
harsh judicial treatment — yet this can hardly legitimate it (2001, p. 125).
Thus she concludes that while “perhaps overly cautious”, Gary’s higher drug values
and gang connections render his criminality “marginally more serious” than Joan’s,
but Joan has more convictions than Gary (18:8) so this evens the score. The pair’s
overall criminality is therefore declared to be “similarly serious”. Since Joan was
remanded on bail with special conditions and sentenced to 6-months imprison-
ment while Gary was remanded into custody for 24 days, bailed with standard
conditions and sentenced to 16 months imprisonment, Gary had been the victim of
gender bias.
Jeffries’ understandings of criminality are substituted for those of the court;
circumventing discussion of the latter’s view of each defendant’s offending.
Although Jeffries believes it would be illegitimate to hold Gary’s gang-related
offending against him, the Crimes Act 1961 specifically denounces offences
committed in the context of a gang (s 98A). Gary’s “gang connections” may well
have been viewed as offending that involved a professional operation, thereby
invoking a harsher response (Hall, 1985a, p. 141). The significance of this aggravat-
ing factor is acknowledged by Jeffries, and subsequently ignored. Notwithstanding
her perceptions of Gary’s offending, if Joan’s did not indicate the same degree of
professionalism to the court, this case study would a fortiori be comparing apples
and oranges.
Further misconceptions are marshalled in support of equivalent offending in
this comparison. The relating of money in each defendant’s possession to quantity
of drugs is inapposite. In the course of establishing whether the offence was
committed, an intention to supply the drug may be inferred from possession of a
significant amount of money in the absence of a reasonable explanation. It cannot
be simply presumed that the money in each defendant’s possession was also treated
as an aggravating factor for both (or either) defendants at sentencing. The Crimes
Act forbids attempts to obstruct the course of justice and the making of false state-
ments (ss 116, 111). So it is difficult to understand why Gary’s refusal to name his
associate, resiling from his original statement that the drugs were his, and attempts
to shift responsibility to another, which is described by Jeffries as “taking the rap”,
should be viewed as mitigating factors. This is particularly curious since in a differ-
ent case study Jeffries reasoned that the female offender’s failure to cooperate with
the police added to the seriousness of her criminality (p. 134).10 No details are
provided on the nature of Gary and Joan’s prior offending, so it is impossible to
compare the overall gravity of criminal histories or guess how the court viewed the
disparity in prior convictions. Conjecture, in the absence of meaningful data,

provides no basis for determining whether the court — as opposed to Jeffries —

ultimately considered Gary’s offending to be more egregious than Joan’s, or the
relevance at sentencing of prior criminal history, or how the court determined the
quantum of the penalty.
As discussed above, determining the appropriate sentence for a particular
combination of factors directly related to offending is only the starting point of
sentencing. The Court must then examine whether the overall offending is aggra-
vated or mitigated by the personal circumstances and characteristics of the defen-
dant. Relevant characteristics, attributes and history serve to put the offending in
context and assist in assessing its gravity. Without an investigation of this second
stage of sentencing, Jeffries’ case study comparisons, and the inferences drawn from
them, remain at best, highly speculative.
Judges’ Sentencing Remarks and Probation Officers’ Pre-sentence Reports

This section of the research is “ordered and presented according to analytical
themes” (p. 150) and said to provide “a more subtle and meaningful account” of the
judicial processing of offenders (p. 147). The themes are employed as a framework
within which to sort data and are accompanied by brief extracts from sentencing
remarks and pre-sentence reports. No in-depth examination of the circumstances
and biographies of offenders are undertaken, the extracts are not linked to any of
Jeffries’ case studies and no details of past convictions, types of sentences or the
circumstances of current offending are supplied.11 If this method is intended to
remedy a previous failure to acknowledge or integrate characteristics of offenders
in the case studies, it falls substantially short of its aim. Jeffries’ use of decon-
textualised fragments of data from pre-sentence reports and sentencing remarks —
reminiscent of snippets from newspaper reports — simply results in a series of
highly dubious analogies. The following examples are taken from the study of
probation officers’ pre-sentence reports.
Four snippets from pre-sentence reports are said to “clearly illustrate” that
although women are perceived to be necessary to family harmony, probation
officers construct many men as “destructive in terms of family harmony” (p. 164).
As evidence of this unwarranted construction of male offenders, Jeffries provides
this extract from a pre-sentence report:
Mathew acknowledges that his relationship with his partner has been turbulent …
he seems willing to examine his destructive patterns of communication which have
at times culminated in abusive behaviour (Violent Offence; p. 164).
In the current climate of concern about domestic violence and its effects on families
and children, it would be surprising if Mathew’s abusive behaviour toward his
partner was not viewed by the probation officer to be “destructive in terms of family
harmony”. We are not told what else the probation officer wrote — for example,
whether a community-based sentence was recommended — and no extract from the
judge’s sentencing remarks is given in relation to Mathew. There is no case study
relating to Mathew or information regarding biography, criminal history, social
circumstances or the sentence Mathew received. From the meagre information
provided in this snippet, there is no obvious basis for inferring that the probation

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
officer’s benign approach, which accords Mathew the benefit of the doubt in terms
of his willingness to reform, “clearly illustrates” a negative construction of Mathew.
A number of extracts from pre-sentence reports are offered as evidence of a
further contention that gendered constructions of men “support a masculine ideol-
ogy which minimises men’s feelings, vulnerability and weakness” (p. 170). The
following snippet is held to provide evidence of this theme:
Bill described the symptoms of apparently manic depressive episodes, which he said,
thrust him back into pill taking in an attempt to calm himself down. However, past
psychiatric reports conclude that Bill shows no evidence of psychological disturbance
(Property Offence; p. 171).
No other data — including sentence recommendation and sentencing outcome —
is provided in relation to Bill. So it is impossible to assess the support Bill received
by way of supervision or counselling. As a consequence, Jeffries’ inference of gender
bias, based solely on the probation officer’s acknowledgement of past medical
reports, remains unconvincing.
On the basis of three ambiguous snippets from pre-sentence reports and the
omission from judges’ sentencing remarks of reference to the men’s status as fathers
(the sentencing remarks are not supplied), Jeffries’ findings of bias in attitudes to
men’s caregiving are generalised and elevated to the status of a gendered sentencing
principle. In the absence of other data from pre-sentence reports, case studies,
criminal histories, sentencing recommendations and knowledge of sentencing
outcomes for these three fathers, it is impossible to ascertain whether the snippets
accurately reflect the substance of the reports, or whether the inferred gender bias
influenced the sentencing recommendations or actual outcomes in any way at all.
Thus Jeffries’ departure from prior research finding equal treatment of men and
women with primary childcare responsibilities must be viewed with some caution.
Criminological Theory or Common Sense?

Although Newbold and Jeffries insist on pathology as a governing principle of
sentencing in relation to women, but not men, Newbold also acknowledges without
comment, the critique by “new criminologists” of the tendency of traditional
and conflict criminology to view criminal activity as pathological (2000, p. 17).
A theory of the “new criminological” criminal as rational human agent arose from
this critique of the pathologising of male offenders. Thus Beverley Brown questions:
“how can a critique of the pathologising of the individual male offender be, in
conscience, borrowed to deny male pathologisation?” (1995, p. 425). Legal commen-
tators point to a variety of sentencing principles designed to explore “reform” poten-
tiality (Hall, 1985a, 1985b). These well-established legal principles cannot be
displaced by criminological theory, or simply reduced to attributions of male ratio-
nality and intentionality, as opposed to female irrationality and pathology.
In contradiction of prior research finding significant differences between female
and male defendants in criminality and in danger or threat to society, Jeffries’ study
also describes an unwarranted judicial emphasis on the gravity of male offending:
I was constantly struck by the focus given to the seriousness of men’s criminality, the
danger they posed to public, the need to pull men out as cases worthy of public

condemnation, and the need to teach men a lesson so they would not offend again
(2001, pp. 185–186).
This assertion that judges typically inflate the culpability of male offenders does not
extend to an examination of the circumstances and gravity of current offending, or
the extent and nature of past criminal histories. Thus it is impossible to test the
adequacy of Jeffries’ interpretations of criminality and matters of public safety. Nor
is it possible to assess whether risk of non-compliance with community-based terms
(or some other facts or circumstances in relation to the offender or past and present
offending) were found to outweigh the possibility of a community-based sentence
for these male defendants. Research finding judges create widespread injustice by
unreasonably emphasising the gravity of male offending, devoid of details of the
harm that is said to be disproportionate to the punishment, makes sensational
media copy. However, at the very least, some cursory investigation of past and
present offending, and responses to prior rehabilitative and deterrent criminal
justice interventions would be required to accept Jeffries’ understandings of the
public interest as qualitatively superior to those of sentencing judges.
As a corollary of the notion that judicial assessments of public safety are biased,
Newbold and Jeffries lament a purported failure to pathologise male defendants. On
the other hand, they deplore a supposed tendency to pathologise female defen-
dants.12 It is not immediately clear why the theorising of differences between men’s
and women’s abuse histories as an artefact of norms of masculinity should preclude
an acknowledgement of the extent and relevance of women’s experiences of abuse.
In this respect, Jeffries’ research sample is revealing: 34.2% of the women in her
sample had suffered physical or sexual violence in their adulthood, compared to
2.6% of men (Jeffries & Newbold, 1999, p. 22). There is a preponderance of data
describing the severe physical, social and psychological consequences that accrue
to women and children as a result of physical and sexual assaults (Arias, 1999;
Kazantzis et al., 2000). As observed by other researchers in this field, gender differ-
ences in courtroom outcomes may reflect real differences between male and female
defendants in criminal involvement, danger or threat to society, childcare responsi-
bilities and extent of mental and health problems:
To the extent that these gender-linked considerations are viewed as legitimate
antecedents of judicial decisionmaking, an overall pattern of more lenient outcomes
for women may still be defined as warranted and ought not necessarily be construed
as gender “bias” (Steffensmeier et al., 1993, p. 439).
Discourses of gender bias are frequently expressed by Newbold and Jeffries in essen-
tialist terms as universally benefiting women and discriminating against men
(Newbold, 2000b, p. 374; “Sugar and Spice”, 2001). Yet as outlined in Jeffries’
research, if some men (and some women) either benefit or are disadvantaged by
gendered constructions, claims of uniform gender bias are insupportable. Feminist
organisations such as Women’s Refuge are implicated in this supposed failure to
pathologise men due to their concern with harsher punishments for male offenders
(Jeffries, 2001, 2002). Paradoxically, Jeffries simultaneously cites research showing a
decline in the use of imprisonment and periodic detention for domestic violence
offences over the period 1991 to 1995 and the high probability of a sentence of

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
supervision or community program for these offenders (Triggs, 1999). This sentenc-
ing approach is consistent with the Domestic Violence Act 1995 emphasis on court
mandated batterer treatment programs in response to violence against partners. If
feminists can be assumed to universally favour harsher treatment for domestic
violence offenders, which is open to doubt, the current legislative and judicial
response suggests that their efforts in this area have been unsuccessful. Moreover,
the charge of “male assaults female” under s 194 of the Crimes Act is used as a proxy
for domestic violence assaults in Triggs’ and other official statistics on crime (Spier,
1999). Thus it seems clear that this group of male offenders are more likely to be
viewed by criminal justice personnel as requiring treatment over incarceration.13
In an astonishing conclusion to the research, Jeffries warns that men will
“continue to vent [their] frustration” unless feminists, the criminal justice system
and the rest of society acknowledge men’s weaknesses, and women will feel the
destructive consequences of this frustration (2001, p. 205). This extraordinary claim
envisages violence against women as a consequence of ignoring male pathology as
women are “so often the victims of men’s outrage” (Jeffries, 2002, p. 37). Irrespective
of this ominous portent, Jeffries’ research provides no cogent or compelling evidence
to substantiate its depictions of bias in criminal justice processes.
Violence Between Intimate Heterosexual Partners

The problem of violence against women also appears as a dominant theme in
Newbold’s text and his various media commentaries. He asserts that:
Contrary to popular belief, there is good evidence that men are not the principal
perpetrators of family violence. In fact, the propensity of females to assault their male
partners seems at least equal to the reverse, if not greater (2000, p. 59).
As evidence, Newbold cites the longitudinal Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health
and Development Study (hereafter referred to as the Dunedin Study), that found
perpetration rates of 21.8% for males and 37.2% for females (Magdol, et al., 1997;
Moffit, et al., 2001), and a “barrage” of American studies showing equal rates of
violence between male and female partners (2000, p. 59). The American studies
are discussed below. In relation to the Dunedin Study, it appears Newbold has
overlooked contradictory evidence of dramatic gender disparities in the use of
violence by men and women in the Dunedin sample.
Using the same research sample, John Langley, director of the Injury Prevention
Unit at the University of Otago, and his colleagues, conducted research on partner
assaults among this cohort of 21-year-olds (Langley, Martin, & Nada-Raja, 1997).
Approximately four times as many women as men reported having been assaulted
by a partner at least once in the preceding 12 months. A disproportionate number
of partner incidents resulted in treatment: 13% of the assaults against women
resulted in hospital, medical or first aid treatment; none of the assaults reported by
men did. These findings led Langley to describe claims of gender symmetry in
intimate partner violence as “misleading” and to conclude that research on partner
assaults establishes “just how much more dominant partner abuse is in a woman’s
life compared to a man’s” (“Report findings that Men are More Bashed than
Bashing ‘Misleading’”, 2000; “Victims of Violence”, 1997).

Fundamentally opposed findings issuing from the same Dunedin Study sample
demonstrate that different conceptualisations of violence and different methodolo-
gies produce findings of gender symmetry on the one hand and alarming accounts
of male violence against women on the other. The National Violence Against
Women Survey (NVAW) sponsored by the US National Institute of Justice and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention used a nationally representative sample
of 8000 women and 8000 men, representing 16,000 households and found:
Women are significantly more likely than men to report being victims of intimate
partner violence whether it is rape, physical assault, or stalking and whether the
timeframe is the person’s lifetime or the previous 12 months (Tjaden & Thoennes,
2000, pp. iii–iv)
Large scale annual crime surveys also report high rates of male violence against
intimate partners. Data from the US Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime
Victimization Surveys (NCVS), in which around 50,000 households are surveyed
annually, consistently reports about 85% of victimisations by intimate partners are
perpetrated against women (Rennison, 2001; Rennison & Welchans, 2000).
In comparison, “family conflict” studies generally show about equal rates of
assault by men and women (Straus, 1999). These studies are based on a model of
domestic violence that assumes violence is a normal and everyday response to
conflict between intimate partners, and usually employ the Conflict Tactics Scale
(CTS) developed by Murray Straus and his colleagues as their unit of measuring
assaults by partners (Straus, 1995; Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980). As a leading
exponent of family conflict research, Straus argues that apparent discrepancies
between family conflict research and large scale crime victimisation studies are the
result of a failure by some analysts to distinguish between the different types of
violence and different groups of people represented in the two types of studies:
Most of the violence that is revealed by surveys of family problems is relatively minor
and relatively infrequent, whereas a large portion of the violence in crime studies
and clinical studies is chronic and severe and often involves injuries that need
medical attention. These two types of violence probably have a different etiology
and probably require a different type of intervention (1999, p. 29).
Different prevalence rates have been theorised by Straus (1999) as an outcome of
the different contexts in which survey questions are asked. The NCVS and similar
studies are described to respondents as crime, personal safety, injury or violence
surveys, whereas the CTS is expressed to respondents in terms of family problems
and conflicts (see also Kimmel, 2002). For example, an operationalisation of
verbal aggression which equates such incongruent behaviours as “crying” and
“sulking” with “throwing, smashing, or hitting objects” (Magdol et al., 1997) will
not capture criminal law distinctions. Similarly, family conflict researchers empha-
sise the importance of collecting data on “the most minor and ‘harmless’ slap”
(Straus, 1999, p. 29). However, conceptualising a “harmless” slap from a female,
and a push by a male partner as equivalent forms of “minor physical violence”
(Magdol et al., 1997) may be a poor reflection of the reality of many violent
relationships. Research shows female victims of violence are more condemning of

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
a push by a partner than are men and women with no experience of intimate
partner violence:
This difference occurred because victims perceived the injuries to be more severe
when they imagined falling from a push … than when they imagined that their
partners attempted to hit them or had struck their faces several times (Stalans,
Lurigio, & Arthur, 1995).
The CTS has been much criticised for analyses of domestic violence that are
devoid of consequences (whether injuries were caused), context and meaning to
the parties, as these can produce misleading generalisations (Dobash, Dobash,
Wilson, & Daly, 1992; Kimmel, 2002; NZ Law Commission, R. 73, 2001, p. 80).
The oft-noted fact that woman are much more likely to be injured in violent
confrontations between heterosexual partners calls for careful analysis of claims
that women and men are identically motivated to initiate assaults, when the
predictable consequences are far more damaging for women (Dobash et al., 1992).
Research shows women’s violence is often in retaliation or self-defence (Healey,
Smith, & O’Sullivan, 1998; Jacobson et al., 1994; US Department of Justice,
1998). Other studies indicate that while women tend to take their male partner’s
violence seriously, many men view female partner violence as ineffective and non-
threatening (Hamberger & Guse, 2002; Jacobson et al., 1994). Although there are
certainly cases of serious female offending against male partners, available data
demonstrates gender differences in intention, motivation, consequences, escalation
and reciprocity, even when both partners are violent (Dobash et al., 1992; Jacobson
et al., 1994; James, 1999; Johnson, 2000, 1995).
In summary, the research indicates that men and women are equally likely to be
subject to acts of verbal and physical abuse by a heterosexual partner. However,
women are much more likely than men to be subject to the serious form of domestic
violence that constitutes battering (NZ Law Commission, R 73, 2001).
While the Dunedin Study did not measure assaults by ex-partners, the Otago Injury
Prevention Unit research provided an opportunity for respondents to report assaults
in any number of partner relationships they may have had over the previous 12
months.14 Divorced or separated women report more intimate partner violence
than do current spouses or cohabiting women. The NVAW Survey found married
women who lived apart from their husbands were nearly four times more likely
to report that their husbands had raped, physically assaulted and/or stalked them
than were women who lived with their husbands (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000).
Empirical studies also indicate that between 45 and 56% of all intimate partner
homicides committed by men are precipitated by women’s attempts to leave, or
actual exit from the relationship (Barnard, Vera, & Newman, 1982; Nourse, 1997;
Wilson & Daly, 1993). This link is more than incidental:
Homicidal husbands often did exactly what they had threatened to do should their
wives leave them, and they often explained their homicides as responses to the intol-
erable stimulus of the wife’s departure (Browne et al. 1999).
A mistaken assumption that data from family conflict studies also apply to cases
known to the police, courts and battered women shelters is said by Straus (1999) to

be responsible for much of the controversy over assaults by women. The conflation
of these disparate data also creates problems for criminal justice goals of prediction
and targeted intervention. Research has shown that the hitting or pushing behav-
iours associated with family conflict research rarely escalate into injurious or life
threatening acts (Johnson, 1995; Johnson & Ferraro, 2000; Straus, 1999). In com-
parison, the more serious and chronic psychological and physical abuse revealed by
national crime surveys often increases in severity over time so that earlier more
“moderate” forms of violence are likely to be followed by more severe violence.
Spousal homicide data shows that significant numbers of women killed by their
partners or ex partners were earlier victims of ongoing violence in the relationship
(Browne, Williams, & Dutton, 1999; Dugan, Nagin, & Rosenfeld, 1999; Easteal,
1993; Polk, 1994). Courts, probation officers, and intervention providers, con-
cerned with issues of victim safety, need accurate information on high-risk batterers
and the ability to differentiate between much of the violence in family conflict
studies which Straus states may not be “experienced as a crime or as a threat to
personal safety or violence” (1999, p. 23), and chronic violence that escalates when
necessary to exert control over a partner and frequently results in injury.
Rejecting the misuse of data from family conflict research to found assertions of
gender symmetry in intimate partner violence, authors of the CTS note that:
Unfortunately, the data on wife-to-husband violence have been misreported, misinterpreted
and misunderstood [author’s emphasis]. Research uniformly shows that about as many
women hit men as men hit women. However, those who report that husband abuse is
as common as wife abuse overlook two important facts. First, the greater average size
and strength of men and their greater aggressiveness means that a man’s punch will
probably produce more pain, injury and harm than a punch by a woman. Second,
nearly three-fourths of the violence committed by women is done in self defense.
While violence by women should not be dismissed, neither should it be overlooked or
hidden. On occasion legislators and spokespersons … have used the data on violence
by wives to minimize the need for services for battered women. Such arguments do a
great injustice to the victimization of women (Gelles & Straus, 1999, p. 424).
The above discussion of domestic violence research illustrates differences of
approach in the way statistics are constructed and interpreted in the context of a
broader analysis of gender and political activism. Michael Kimmel (2002) suggests
that notwithstanding clear evidence that women are injured more often and
more seriously than men, some advocates of gender symmetry view compassion as a
“zero-sum game” in which policies and strategies to assist battered women are met
with claims that men are victimised too; initiatives on behalf of battered women are
disparaged as failing to address male victims of violence. In the New Zealand context,
Newbold criticises the additional protection of temporary orders under the Domestic
Violence Act because “the potential for abuse by vindictive partners [read women]
is great and respondents have little protection from vexatious applicants” (2000,
p. 129). In contradiction of this claim, recent research commissioned by the Ministry
of Justice and Department for Courts reveals that although women constituted 92%
of the applicants for protection orders, allegations that vindictive (or any) women use
protection orders to gain a strategic advantage over their partners were not confirmed
as an issue in the full process evaluation (Barwick, Gray, & Macky, 2000).

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
While feminist analyses have undoubtedly influenced legal and social reforms,
legal remedies and advocacy on behalf of victims need not be reduced to a rhetori-
cal battle in which support for initiatives to enhance the safety and protection of
battered women must automatically exclude an acknowledgement that men are
also victims of violence. Furthermore, initiatives to reduce men’s violence against
women appear also to benefit men, as US research suggests efforts to protect
women have had the effect of substantially reducing the homicide rate of men by
their female partners (Browne, et al., 1999; Dugan, et al., 1999).15 “It turns out that
those very initiatives that have greatly benefited women — shelters, hotlines, and
the like — save men’s lives as well” (Kimmel, 2002, p. 1355).
A recognition that the violence associated with large scale crime surveys and
that revealed by family conflict research are not the same phenomenon permits the
development of more comprehensive theories of domestic violence, while calling
attention to the imprudence of carelessly generalising from one type of study to
another. Conversely, by ignoring a large body of contradictory evidence, assertions
of gender symmetry in domestic violence distort the nature and magnitude16 of this
pervasive social problem and may foster a dangerous neglect of policy and strategies
to enhance the safety of battered women and children.
Conclusion:“Newsmaking” or “Infotainment”?
The enthusiastic mainstream media dissemination of Newbold’s and Jeffries’ claims
illustrates the political acceptability of such arguments, which are readily incorpo-
rated within dominant belief systems. Media acceptance and use of this material to
construct and limit public understandings of domestic violence and gender inequality
in New Zealand stands in marked contrast to recent research on women’s experiences
of violence, conducted under the auspices of Auckland Healthcare Services and
supported by the University of Auckland, Department of Community Health (Hand
et al., 2002). This research calls inter alia for immediate mass media challenges to
culturally embedded discourses which deny or minimise abuse of women in the home,
justify the abuse and blame women for the violence. Instead, constructions of a
“victim feminism” that stereotypes women as passive, dependent and helpless; gender
symmetry in domestic violence; and a New Zealand judiciary who routinely ignore or
trivialise female violence, combine to deflect public attention away from common
patterns of domestic violence in which men injure, and in extreme cases, kill their
female partners. Women victims of violence are transformed into perpetrators, whose
abuse stories have hoodwinked the criminal justice system into a collective blindness
to female malice. A semi-educated gloss on the news is achieved by reducing complex
legal and social relations to misleading and inaccurate sound bites.
I argue that this use of sociological evidence to provide shadings on news is not
the “newsmaking criminology” of Barak’s envisioning. The difference is a privileg-
ing of conventions associated with more sensational forms of journalism over
accepted standards of scholarship, and fair and accurate reporting of scholarly
research. Discourses of gender symmetry in domestic violence and gender bias
against men in the courts, decontextualised from social structures of power,
conform with media conventions relating to lack of attention to context, the polar-
isation of the social world into simplistic binary confrontations and a reductionist

approach due to the short timeframe in which news is presented. A preference for
style over substance characterises this “infotainment” criminology. The commercial
imperative of popular media advantages these discourses which lack analytical
depth over more considered and less sensational forms of journalism, which require
close attention to competing perspectives and the complex political, cultural and
economic relations that exist in the institutions and social practices of our society.
An expectation of scholarship in the production of research and its use in the
media by sociologists reflects an understanding that the mass media sell objective,
rational, “truths”; reported information becomes common sense “knowledge”. Such
knowledge, reinforced by the voice of an “expert”, shapes public responses to
domestic violence and the organisation of popular support for state services to
victims, and legal and social reforms. It follows that the voluntary assumption of
standards of scholarship and accountability by criminologists who participate in
public debates represents an acknowledgement of obligations that are owed, both
to those whom one’s newsmaking seeks to persuade and to those men and women
who will bear the brunt of proposals for criminal justice reform.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. All opinions
and any errors are my own.
Endnotes
1 The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this descriptive term.
2 Newbold is cited as co-author of the preliminary report Gender disparity in court sentencing:
Preliminary results of a New Zealand Study (1999) Unpublished. Also cited in Newbold (2000,
pp. 68, 76).
3 Although Newbold chose to name the female defendants in his newspaper snippets, I viewed
this method as inappropriate, and have removed their names.
4 The Ministry of Justice (2001) study of sentencing outcomes for offences against adult and
child victims found 91% of offenders were male. Statistics provided to the author by the
Ministry of Justice show a total of 3063 convictions for non-sexual child abuse over seven
offence categories from 1990 to 1999; 2285 of these offences were committed by males and
778 by females.
5 Provocation has been used to reduce the culpability of men who have killed their female
partners because they reported a severe beating to the police after promising under threat not
to do so, or were found in a compromising situation with another man or had taunted their
partners with sexual or other inadequacies (NZLC, R 73, 2001). Judith Ablett-Kerr QC has
been reported as criticising the Commission’s recommendation that provocation as a partial
defence to murder charges should be abolished, on the basis that the defence has largely been
of benefit to male defendants, so this would amount to discrimination against men (Lawyer
Criticises Sentencing Proposals. (2001, July 20). Waikato Times).
6 Newbold’s citation for this report: Dominion, October 20, 1997 is incorrect; the correct refer-
ence is Dominion, September 20, 1997.
7 The male offender was later convicted on the more serious charge of injuring the child with
intent to injure and sentenced to a 9-month suspended prison term, 6 months periodic deten-
tion, 12 months supervision and ordered to undertake counselling (Evening Post, November
22, 1997).

JUDITH I BUCKINGHAM
8 The text is listed as required reading in 2003 for “Sociology of Deviance” students at
Canterbury University.
9 To examine the effect of sole childcare on sentencing outcomes in her statistical analysis,
Jeffries collapsed three variables: childcare, marital status and “living arrangements” into a
single category described as “Overall Familial Situation”.
10 Jeffries also downplays the significance of disparate criminal histories and fails to notice the
wearing of masks (balaclavas) by male offenders — well established in law as an aggravating
factor. The male in this study was also sentenced on an unspecified date to a prior term of
imprisonment. If this was the legal response to his last conviction, parole issues may have
been relevant to current offending and the male would have been incarcerated during the
period he receives credit from Jeffries for remaining conviction-free. (Other particularities of
offending in this study illustrate the problems associated with simplistic comparisons).
11 Jeffries states that for privacy reasons she changed the original names for her case studies and
then changed them again in relation to pre-sentence reports and judges’ sentencing remarks
(2001, p. 151). Whether or not this was necessary, the decision removed from the reader the
opportunity to link the snippets from probation reports and sentencing remarks to any other
data in relation to these offenders.
12 Newbold (2000) and Jeffries (2001) refer to the “pathologising” of female offenders as negating or
neutralising the dangerousness, culpability, responsibility and accountability of female offenders.
13 A recent national survey of judges, court staff, lawyers and police found research participants
overwhelmingly approved of the rehabilitative focus of New Zealand domestic violence legis-
lation (Barwick, Gray, & Macky, 2000).
14 This may go some way toward explaining the discordant results between this research and the
Dunedin Study. Also, while Langley et al.’s study focused on assaultive incidents, the CTS
focus on behaviours meant that a wide range of behaviours could be reported in the Dunedin
Study that related to a single assault incident (Langley et al., 1997). The format and wording
of questions, the age of respondents and the context in which questions about violence
against partners are asked, also affect the responses.
15 The number of men murdered by an intimate partner fell 60% from 1976 to 1998. While the
number of black females killed by intimate partners dropped 45% in this period, white females
represent the only category of victims for whom intimate partner homicide has not decreased
substantially since 1976 (Puzone, et al, 2000; Rennison & Welchans, 2000).
16 The NZ Law Commission notes the “less well-known” finding that New Zealand seems to
have a much higher prevalence rate of domestic violence than America, Canada, Finland,
Sweden, Australia and England (NZLC, R 73, 2001, p. xii). The extent to which “race” differ-
ences contribute to domestic violence in New Zealand (Newbold, 2000, pp. 123–124) may
have less to do with race and ethnicity than they do with socioeconomic differences (see
overseas research as cited in Johnson & Ferraro, 2000; for NZ research, see Blakely,
Woodward, Pearce, Salmond, Kiro, & Davis. [2002]. Socio-economic factors and mortalitiy
among 25–64 year olds followed from 1991–1994: The New Zealand Census-Mortality Study.
New Zealand Medical Journal, 115, 93).
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“Newsmaking” Criminology

T he role of the media in mobilising public opinion about crime

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 253

Gender Bias in the New Zealand Criminal Justice System

254 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

A “Normal” Sentencing Tariff?

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 255

Misrepresentations Due to Decontextualisation of Data

256 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

Misrepresentation/Misunderstanding of Legal Issues Relevant to Sentencing

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 257

The Stereotypical “Bad” Mother and Trivialisation

258 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 259

260 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

offence usually arise, the problem of missing data in relation to criminality is

The Case Studies

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 261

40 foils), Jeffries employs a process of equivalence: calculating the price of a

262 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

provides no basis for determining whether the court — as opposed to Jeffries —

Judges’ Sentencing Remarks and Probation Officers’ Pre-sentence Reports

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 263

Criminological Theory or Common Sense?

264 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 265

Violence Between Intimate Heterosexual Partners

266 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 267

268 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 269

270 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 271

272 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 273

Jeffries, S. (2001). Gender judgments: An investigation of gender differentiation in sentencing and

274 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 275

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