INTRODUCTION TO

LAW AND THE

LEGAL PROFESSION
PART II

BY: GHENALYNNE DJ.

SANTOS, LPT.JD
FACULTY-CCJE
 Section 3. (1) The
Privacy of
Article III OF THE privacy of
Communication
BILL OF RIGHTS, communication and
and
SECTION 3 par. 1 correspondence shall
Correspondence
be inviolable

except upon lawful

(2) Any evidence
order of the court, or
obtained in violation
when public safety or as prescribed by law.
of this or the preceding
order requires
section shall be
otherwise,

inadmissible for any

purpose in any
proceeding
ZULUETA VS. CA
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Decision Date: 1996-02-20
GR Number: G.R. No. 107383
Summary:
Cecilia Zulueta broke into
her husband’s office and
obtained his alleged private
correspondence with his
paramours. What
happened next will shock
you! RTC, CA, and SC all
rendered the evidence as
inadmissible.

This Photo by Unknown author is licensed under CC BY-SA.

The Law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged.

Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists.

Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as

to any communication received in confidence by one against
the other
ONLY
EXCEPTION
The only exception to the provision in the
constitution is if there is a lawful order from a
court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as provide by law.
(Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) Any
violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3,
Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)
 The law ensures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the
other without consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.
(Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither
maybe examined without the consent of
the Other ,as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court)
Freedom of Expression
Article III of the Bill of Rights, Section 4 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v
CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15,
2000
T H E M E M B E R S O F T H E E D I T OR IAL
B OAR D O F T H E M I R IAM C O L L E GE
F O U N DAT IO N ’ S S C HO O L
PAP E R WER E SU B J E C T E D TO
D I S C I P L I NARY S ANC T IO N BY T H E
C O L L E GE D I S C I P L I N E C O M M I T T E E
AF T E R L E T T E R S O F C O M P L AI N T
W E R E F I L E D B E F O R E T H E B OAR D
F O L L OW I NG T H E P U B L ICAT IO N O F
T H E S C HO O L PAP E R T HAT C O NTAI NS
O B S C E N E , V U L GAR , AN D S E XUALLY
E XP L IC I T C O N T E N T S .
Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the
defendants, they were required to submit
a written statement to answer the
complaints against them to the Discipline
Committee but the defendants, instead of
doing so wrote to the Committee to
transfer the case to the DECS which
they alleged to have the jurisdiction over
the issue
ISSUE
 WHETHER OR NOT THE DISCIPLINE
BOARD OF MIRIAM COLLEGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS.
The court resolved the issue before it
by looking through the power of DECS
and the Disciplinary Committee in
imposing sanctions upon the
defendants.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of
the Constitution guarantees
all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom
Institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint.
Such duty gives the institution the right to
discipline its students and inculcate upon
them good values, ideals and attitude.
The right of students to free speech in school
is not always absolute.

The court upheld the right of students

for the freedom of expression, but it
does not rule out disciplinary actions of
the school on the conduct of their
students.
Z A L D I V A R V. S A N D I G A N B A YA N
 Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest.

One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antimony
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.

An issue of balancing the role of the media vis-a-vis judicial independence.

The Court has used two formulas to
balance the constitutional guarantee
of free speech and of the press and
judicial independence
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the
determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an
attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary
between freedom of expression and independence of
the judiciary.
the “clear and present danger” rule the “dangerous tendency” rule.
 The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the
evil consequence of the comment or utterance must
be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high” before the utterance can be punished.

The danger to be guarded against is the “substantive evil”

sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the “disorderly
and unfair administration of justice.”

This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It

provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under
this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be
abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
The “dangerous tendency” rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There
must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that
the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute.

They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of
the courts against contempt

(Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325)