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DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW


UNIVERSITY

POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PROJECT

THE PROBLEM WITH HINDI- CHINI BHAI BHAI CONCEPT

SUBMITTED BY- SUBMITTED TO-

RITUNJAY SINGH DR. MONIKA SRIVASTAVA


200101109 POLITICAL SCIENCE
BA-LLB
1ST SEMESTER (SECTION-B)
. ACKOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regards to my guide Dr.

Monika Srivastava, Assistant Professor (Political Science) for her exemplary guidance,

monitoring and constant encouragement throughout the course of this project. I would like to

thank and express a deep sense of gratitude to my Professor for allocating this project to me and

valuable information and guidance, which helped me in completing this task through various

stages. I would also like to thank my colleagues, friends and parents for their constant

encouragement without which this assignment would not have been possible.

Ritunjay Singh
INTRODUCTION

“Our emancipation, the emancipation of the Indian people and the Chinese will be signal of the

emancipation of all the down-trodden and oppressed.” - Mao Tse Tung India and China are the

two formidable forces, as far as Asia is concerned, to reckon with. Even the daunting Himalayas

could not act as stumbling blocks in the interaction and cultural exchanges between these two

countries. Both countries shared historical and cultural relations in the past. Attainment of

independence by India and the advent of communist regime in China in 1949 were momentous

events that afforded new opportunities for both countries to renew their age old friendly ties.

Both the countries started off in a very amiable manner. The relations were not soured from the

day one. But the scenario turned upside down in a matter of a decade. Various factors like border

dispute, Tibetan issue, Sino-Indian border war, Cold War alignments, power asymmetry and

mutual distrust and the most recent India-China border standoff have embittered the relations

shared by these two countries. India and China are both ancient civilizations, with histories

stretching over 5,000 years. Their mutual relations are also ancient. India and China have long-

term intellectual and cultural ties, which historically fell in the domain of religion. These strong

ties date back to the first century AD, when Buddhism spread from India to China. The history of

Buddhism chronicles give detailed accounts of religious and cultural bonds between the two

neighbours. During the early part of the twentieth century India and China remained aloof and

stand offish.
INITIAL NATURE OF TIES

The first decade of relations between India and the People’s Republic of China was tranquil and

devoid of any conflict. Under the leadership of India’s first Prime Minister, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru,

India pursued a policy of accommodation towards China, which was even reciprocated.

However, this has been termed by John W. Garver as the “policy of appeasement”. China and

India started bilateral relations with a clean slate and forged a strong bond in order to invigorate

Third World Solidarity. India became the second nonsocialist country, after Burma (Myanmar),

to recognize the new China and the first nonsocialist country to establish diplomatic relations.

Indian Government even consistently struck to its stand and continued in making efforts to get a

seat in UN for the Peoples Republic of China. During the Korean Crisis (1950-53), the

Government of India took a just stand and championed the cause of the PRC, which strengthened

India and China friendship. When PRC actually intervened in the Korean War in opposition to

the UN forces and drove them back, India opposed the UN resolution branding China as an

aggressor. The development of friendly relations between the two countries reached a

consummating level with the two countries reaching at an accord on 29 April, 1954, “Trade and

Intercourse between India and Tibet”. The agreement on Tibet referred to the territory as “Tibet

region of China” somewhat ambiguous term which definitely implied that it was not just a

formal part of China, but this was the phrase the Chinese themselves were using. The preamble

of the resolution, the two countries re-affirmed they would abide by the five principles of

peaceful co-existence. The five Principles are:-

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.


2. Mutual non-aggression.

3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

4. Equality and mutual benefit.

5. Peaceful co-existence.

Panchsheel was a great contribution towards the cause of India-China relations as well as

towards bolstering the international relations. India recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet by

signing the Panchsheel agreement. People close to Nehru constantly made attempts towards

making the PM realize that such a gesture towards this neighbour can have far reaching

repercussions. In April, 1955, the first Asian-African Conference was held at Bandung,

Indonesia. India was one of the five sponsors of the Asian-African conference. China

acknowledged and owed her participation in the conference to India. On the Taiwan and Goa

questions, China and India mutually supported each other. As far back as 1949, the PRC had

declared its determination to liberate Taiwan occupied by the Guomindang Government and

other off-shore islands. In 1954, US entered into a mutual security pact with Taiwan and openly

declared its intention to protect Taiwan and other off-shore islands. India consistently refused to

accept the concept of two Chinas and never accorded recognition to the Guomindang

Government of Chiang KaiShek in Taiwan. China, on its part, supported India’s right to liberate

Goa, if necessary, by force. China, on its part, supported India’s right to liberate Goa, if

necessary, by force. Between June, 1954 and January, 1957 Chou En –lai, the Chinese Premier,

paid four visits to India while Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, visited China in October,

1954.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE BORDER DISPUTES

In the year 1957, the Government of India came to know that the Chinese had built a road across

the Aksai-Chin of Ladakh and felt perturbed very much. So, in 1958, India sent two detachments

to examine the new Chinese road in the Aksai-Chin area. Out of this one detachment was

captured by the Chinese. India protested against the high handedness of China, but all went in

vain. In the meantime, the Chinese by violating the treaty of 1954 suspended the autonomy of

Tibet. By 1959, they tightened their hold on Tibet, committed great atrocities and spread a reign

of terror. The Chinese encroachment of Indian Territory really threatened Nepal, Sikkim and

Bhutan. This awoke Nehru to the realities of the danger and for the first time, he spoke bluntly of

Chinese aggression and warned China that any encroachment on the three Himalayan states

would be resisted by India with force. Despite, reluctance of prominent officials of Nehru’s

government in agreeing with this policy of the Chinese, his behaviour was marked by pangs of

conscience in fighting with China over this matter. Matters worsened and Chinese premonition

pertaining to Tibet’s India connection intensified when India committed itself to grant asylum to

the Dalai Lama along with his followers. India inferred that the Chinese did not stand by their

words of assurance pertaining to the Tibetan autonomy. China distinctly used a policy of double-

standards. The cause of the Sino-Indian border War in 1962 was a dispute over the question of

territorial sovereignty; of the widely separated Aksai Chin (in Jammu& Kashmir) and Tawang

(in Arunachal Pradesh) border regions. Along the Ladakh border, India sticks mostly to a

boundary drawn by British civil servant W.H. Johnson in 1865, which showed Aksai Chin as

part of Jammu and Kashmir. In the northeast of India, New Delhi sticks to the McMahon Line,

which was agreed to by representatives of the British empire and Tibet at a conference in Simla
in 1914, where though Chinese representatives were present they didn’t agree to the final

detailed maps. China claims that Tibet is not a sovereign nation and thus its approval has no legal

standing. Beijing claims the entire Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. The Middle Sector along

Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand is almost settled, with both sides not differing much. Chinese

troops had then occupied Tawang and destroyed portions of the monastery. By the end of 1957,

they had secretly built a strategically important road to the Aksai Chin region. In 1957-58, this

road was extended up to the Ladakh region of the Jammu and Kashmir State. In short, by 1958,

the Chinese without trying any diplomatic negotiation over the exact location of the Sino-Indian

frontier, they had unilaterally altered the status quo, particularly in the strategically important

Ladakh area. The real intentions of the Chinese in the Himalayas region became transparent in

1958 when the Chinese published an old version map of the Sino-Indian frontier in China

Pictorial Magazine. These maps claimed about 50,000 square miles of territory which was also

claimed by India. The Sino-Indian border war became a full-fledged war on 20 October 1962,

when the PLA attacked a number of Indian positions in the eastern sector at Khinzemane, Dhola

and Tsangdhar. On 10 October, 1962, massive Chinese attack was launched on Indian posts and

the next day the Chinese captured Thagla Ridge, the traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary. On 12

October, 1962, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian armed forces “to free Indian

territory in the NEFA of Chinese intruders”. By the end of October, they had penetrated

approximately 15 miles at two places beyond Mc Mahon Line and had occupied territory up to

the Line they claimed in the western sector. Meanwhile, the Indian government request Russia to

urgently lend a helping hand but the Soviet Ambassador advised to Nehru to exercise restraint,

obtain an immediate cease-fire and not break diplomatic relations with Beijing and did not

discuss a resolution pertaining to the Chinese aggression against India at the “World Peace
Council”. The appeal of help was responded to positively by the USA that supplied ammunition

to India and also condemned the Chinese aggression. The growing closeness between China and

Pakistan was also evident. Military help came from Britain, Canada, France, and Italy as well

and ultimately even from the USSR. Due to tremendous international pressure and forfeit of

advancing deeper into better populated Indian Territory which would have been much more

difficult to hold, China declared unilateral cease fire on 20 November 1962 and withdrew the

soldiers behind the Mc Mahon Line in the NEFA sector. After the 1962 war, Sino-Indian

relations were cold and hostile for almost two decades. After the 1962 war, Sino-Indian relations

were cold and hostile for almost two decades. Even the Ambassadors were withdrawn but

diplomatic relations were maintained at the minimum possible level. The Sino-Pakistan border

agreement signed on 2nd March, 1963 and China openly supported Pakistan in 1965 war against

India. This nexus between Pakistan and China serves as a quintessential example of the

Kautilyan dictum “your enemy’s enemy is your friend”. This period was also marked by US-

China reconciliation and China had already by now backed Pakistan. All these factors

culminated into the signing of Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation in

August 1971. The India-China relations again hit a low point in 1998 following nuclear tests.

China was one of the strongest international critics of India’s nuclear tests and entry into the

nuclear club. Cut to 2017 when Bhutan rose to the spectre of Chinese soldiers who had arrived

with bulldozers and excavators, in order to build a high-mountain road near India’s border in an

area the two nuclear-armed giants have disputed over for decades. India responded to the call by

sending troops to evict the Chinese army construction party from the Doklam Plateau. The

situation grew tensed with each passing day. Army sources said, the two sides got into an

acrimonious, physical jostling. China purported that the road was constructed on its sovereign
territory. This had raised fears of a wider conflict between the Asian giants who fought a brief

border war in 1962. Fortunately, these two sides agreed to an “expeditious disengagement” of

troops in the disputed border area. New Delhi agreed to restrain antiChina activities by Tibetans

in India. Both sides reached some understanding on border issues and agreed to settle through

peaceful and friendly negotiations. It was also agreed that efforts would made to develop other

aspects of the relationship so as to create the atmosphere and conditions conducive to the

reasonable and just settlement of border issues.

EN ROUTE NORMALIZATION

In April, 1976, both India and China, had decided to upgrade their full diplomatic relations at

ambassadorial level. India appointed Mr K.R. Narayanan as the ambassador to Beijing after a

gap of 15 years. Similarly, Beijing reciprocated by appointing Zhao Yuan as the Ambassador to

New Delhi. Thereafter, visits and exchanges at a functional level, in what have been traditionally

seen in international relations as areas of trade, economic linkages, exchanges of students,

academicians, sportspersons, scientists, etc. gained momentum. China even encouraged the other

nations of the vicinity to resolve disputes with India and stopped funding the secessionist

movements within India. The first high level meeting between the leaders of the two countries

since Sino-Indian hostilities took place between the then Indian foreign minister Shri Atal Bihari

Vajpayee and his Chinese counterpart Huang Hua. But the visit had to be cut short because

China attacked Vietnam when Vajpayee was in China. This visit was marked by talks with

regard to climatic and other crucial problems and an effort to side line the past conflicts. On 26

June, 1981, China’s Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited New Delhi, the first visit by a top

Chinese leader in 21 years. The two countries decided to resume discussion on border issue as

well as all other aspects of bilateral relations. The very decision to hold talks entailed some
concessions on both sides. The ‘package deal’ involved the adjustment or concessions of

disputed areas along the Lines of Actual Control in both the eastern and western sectors- China

in the Eastern sector and India in the Western sector. He also announced that two pilgrims-

Mansarovar and Kailash will be opened. Various rounds of bilateral meeting followed this visit.

China stuck to it package deal which India declined. However, they agreed to be continued

discussion and exchange of cultural troupes, television and broadcasting material and experts;

and in other areas such as railways, wheat breeding, dairy development, science and technology,

film festivals and academic experts. They also decided to expand bilateral trade between the two

countries. These talks continued for a while, however, the border issue didn’t resolve. In fact,

during the seventh round of IndiaChina border talks held in July, 1986 China laid claims to

90,000 sq. km. of territory occupied by India in Arunachal Pradesh. Reportedly, China had built

a helipad inside the Indian Territory in Arunachal Pradesh along the Sino-Indian border and set

up tents and huts in that area and claimed Indian protests as “unjustified”. On the other hand,

China in an unprecedented move, distributed at the UN headquarters a press release, presenting

the Chinese version of the India-China border dispute accusing India of usurping large tracts of

Chinese territory. However, India was in no mood of granting a territorial concession. In August,

1986, both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces and create a no man’s land. The Indian

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China from 19-23 December, 1988, which was called as

“path breaking” between India and China relations. Both India and China started their economic

and trade relations in the year 1950. Despite some early dissension and controversy over certain

issues, India-China relations continued progress in a cordial manner and culminated in friendly

exchanges. On 1st January 1951, the first rice-jute barter system agreement was signed between

India and China and in the later stage China agreed to supply 50,000 tons of rice to India; in turn
India would supply 16,500 packs of jute. In the 1960s economic and trade intercourse between

the two countries stopped for the time being due to deterioration in their political relations. For

the prospects of IndiaChina bilateral trade, China’s open door policy and its massive drive for

modernization in the agricultural and industrial fields undoubtedly makes it a potentially

attractive market for India nbecause for the supply of intermediate technology. WAY AHEAD

Looking back at the past 70 years, China-India relations have moved ahead despite wind and rain

and gone through an extraordinary development path. From the 1980s, the two sides agreed to

solve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultation, established strategic and

cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity, and achieved all-round development of

bilateral relations. After 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra

Modi initiated the "hometown diplomacy", held two informal summits in Wuhan and Chennai

respectively, carried out strategic communication on overarching, longterm and strategic issues

of global and regional importance, and agreed to strengthen the closer partnership for

development between the two countries. At present, China-India relations stand at a new starting

point and usher in new opportunities. We should draw wisdom from our thousands of years of

civilizations and explore a way for neighbouring and emerging major countries to get along with

each other in accordance with enhancing mutual trust, focusing on cooperation, managing

differences and seeking common development. We also need to master the four keys of "leading,

transmitting, shaping and integrating". "Leading" means to reach consensus and guide the

direction of the development of bilateral relations under the guidance of our two leaders.

"Transmitting" means to transmit the leaders’ consensus to all levels and translate it into tangible

cooperation and outcomes. "Shaping" means to go beyond the mode of managing differences,

shape bilateral relations actively and accumulate positive momentum. "Integrating" means to
strengthen exchanges and cooperation, promote convergence of interests and achieve common

development. Indian President Ram Nath Kovind and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have both

said that the whole world is a family, which strike a chord with Chinese philosophy concept of

"universal peace" and "universal love". The ancient oriental wisdom is still full of vitality today.

In the recent years a few events have marked the relations between these two countries. In 2017,

the bilateral ties were marred by rancour and bitterness over the USD 60 billion China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a pet project of

President Xi Jinping to consolidate China's influence abroad. The commitment to improved

relations was embodied in the informal Mamallapuram summit, a follow-up to the Wuhan

summit, which demonstrated that the informal summit mechanism between the countries’ leaders

and their personal relationship will play a central role in managing relations. China and India

have also sought to build confidence and expand cooperation by joint international projects. For

instance, in June 2019 China and India made a tentative attempt to revive the long-planned

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor, while in November they presided over the

second edition of a joint training program for Afghan diplomats agreed during the Wuhan

summit. The two sides also made concessions to each other in 2019 to keep the upward

trajectory of relations. China took a relatively balanced position during the Indo-Pakistan

military crisis that followed the Pulwama attack and might have even mediated to de-escalate

tensions. Beijing also agreed to stop blocking the UN from listing Masood Azhar as terrorist, a

long time Indian complaint, after some hard bargaining and international pressure. For his part,

PM Modi clearly bowed to Chinese sensitivities when he did not invite the political head of the

Tibetan government-in-exile and a Taiwan representative to his second inauguration in 2019 as

he did to the first one in 2014. Moreover, the Indian government consistently sought to sideline
the “Tibet issue” in the past year and remained completely silent of the 60th anniversary of the

Dalai Lama’s flight to India. India’s change of Kashmir’s status in August was the most

important point of tension that shook China-India relations in 2019, as Beijing brought the

Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council and leaned toward Pakistan’s position as India

postponed regular talks on the border dispute. However, both sides ensured that tensions would

not go out of hand and moderated their positions prior to the Mamallapuram summit. At one

instance, the Chinese convoy even thanked India for the support it has lent during these trying

times of Covid-19. However, in the public sphere, though, anti-China sentiment has gone

mainstream in a way usually reserved for India’s other rival, Pakistan with a retired diplomat

even calling it a “Wuhan Virus”. In order to build up stronger and more robust ties, the following

should be doneUpgrading the current Sino-Indian Strategic and Economic Dialogue meetings to

a higher level – for example, by having future dialogues led by the Chinese State Councillor and

Indian National Security Advisor, with the full participation of diplomatic, economic and

military policymakers; • Strengthening co-ordination and communication in regional and global

institutions; • Nurturing a more positive image of each other, both in government and society; •

Working on non-traditional security issues, such as the maritime security cooperation, and

making it a basis for better mutual understanding; • Higher engagement with regards to sports,

education and tourism. • Knowledge sharing in the area of poverty alleviation and recognizing

each other’s might in the Asian region.


CONCLUSION

In the 1950s, the leaders of the older generation of the two countries made the historical decision

to establish diplomatic relations between China and India, and jointly advocated the Five

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers)

resounded throughout our two countries. However, an ugly turn of event soured this relationship

and understanding. An understanding is definitely needed in this area and a failure to foster it

will increase the hostility, the ramifications of which can be serious. Several measures that have

been propounded and discussed surely show a way further. Greater engagement at the grassroot

level is also required.


REFERENCES

Ivan Lidarev, ‘2019: Reviewing a Passable Year in China-India Relations’ (2020) accessed on 4

May, 2020.

Politics in India since Independence Textbook in Political Science for Class – 12.

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