Ana Acatrinei (NIA 100409055) – Group 55

Transitional justice and democratization

11. 10. 2022
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Linz, 1967)
“We shall focus on those more strictly political variables that tend to be neglected in many other approaches
to the problem of stable democracy, because in our view political processes actually precipitate the ultimate
breakdown.”
In our view, one cannot ignore the actions of either those who are more or less interested in the
maintenance of an open democratic system or those who, placing other values higher, are unwilling
to defend it or even ready to overthrow it.
- Our model, therefore, will be probabilistic rather than deterministic.
The conditions leading to democratic success involve not only underlying conditions in society, long-
standing historical trends and events, but also decisions and actions taken by political actors. What they do in
the end with what they had, matters a lot.

How does a new democracy get started?

Deconsolidation of previous autocratic regime
 Regime founding coalition: set of political actors working together with the goal of setting an
agreed new regime (broadening and opening of autocratic regime giving way to democracy). It
does not necessarily include everyone (exclusion on practical grounds (not relevant enough,
impracticable…) or on principal grounds (folk setting a new democratic regime considered
them illegitimate))
 Linz thinks that this coalition should be as broad and inclusive as possible [avoiding
disloyal opposition, legitimation in Weberian terms]
 Regime founding agenda: set of objectives set out by the regime founding coalition as the
identifiable and intrinsic goals of the new regime (depolitization of issues in the foundations of
the democratic regime / constitution)
 Narrow and minimalist scope of the founding agenda, in order to include as many people as
possible in that basic commitment [focus on creation of new democratic institutions (
what is considered to be inherent to democracy and what not, what is essential and can be
depoliticized and what isn’t)]. You cannot be so ambitious as you initially may have
wanted if you want to include as many people as you can (balancing between the two).
Those who call for more profound changes will be more disappointed and will be required
to have more patience in order to pursue those goals. [political issues open for debate]
 Fail to provide for a deep enough basis of democracy: satisfaction with transitional
extension. *dimension of democratic depth as the extent to what democracy is seen to do
more than meeting the minimal requisites of democratic elections. There might be
democratic elements that are left out during the democratic transition that do not satisfy the
requirements of certain actors/analysts in categorizing that case as democracy. The
aftermath of the transitional process leads to a tension between the doing too much or not
enough in pushing democracy forward (danger of conflict and democratic breakdown)
[trade-off between these two]. (Debate between Stephan and Linz in worries concerning
this trade-off)
 Linz provides a rationale for what happened during the Spanish Transition
[implications for transitional justice]
 For many political actors, a narrow founding agenda might lead to suboptimal results,
disappointment, and in the end to loss of legitimacy (lack of stability 
deconsolidation). That would end up being a counterproductive effort.
 It might be unnecessarily too cautious (debate Stephan-Linz)
 Ana Acatrinei (NIA 100409055) – Group 55
Transitional justice and democratization
11. 10. 2022
 Linz: practicality in government and deactivation of topics in the agenda that
the government cannot solve (gov should not deal with problems they cannot
successfully advance in resolving)
  question of efficacy, effectiveness, legitimacy: ability to come up with
solutions, ability to enforce their decisions and legitimacy. Legitimacy is
partly a matter of ideas, beliefs and principles not just strategic calculations.
[example of Great Depression (systemic support for the regime, endurance of
the political system despite economic collapse)]

Criteria for democratic regimes:

 Legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with concomitant rights to civil liberties
and basic freedoms of person (free association, freedom of speech, etc.)
 Free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule
o It would be enough of the existence of the possibility for turnover of parties of power, even when such
alternation did not yet take place (e.g. Congress Party in India)
 Inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process
 Provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political
preferences

(…)
We have not included a number of postcolonial democracies that had little time to become
institutionalized, whose form of government was largely a transplant of the mother country, and
whose consolidation of political institutions usually coincided with the process of state-building.
What about state transitions? – Germany, Austria, France post WWII  Linz allegedly
focuses here on regime transitions of returning democracy while state is assumed to be
“continuistic”. However, what happens when the state is shattered? Are we going back? Or
would it be similar to the processes taking place in postcolonial states, where consolidation
of democratic institutions is linked to a (re)new(ed) state apparatus?
Why distinguishing between competitive democracies –which could apply to a wider
spectrum of non-western contexts (and include regimes previous to the expansion of political
rights to the whole adult citizenry, namely universal suffrage)– and liberal democracies?
[possible selection bias?]
(…) It could be argued that in many cases the attack was not initially directed against democracy
itself but against the particular content that the regime-building and sustaining forces wanted to give
it.
! There are some opinions and ideals that cannot be tolerated under a democratic regime, even if they
are to be considered as not being entirely constitutive of democracy  in the long run those ideas
can potentially erode the foundations and institutions of democracy ( dimension of quality and
depth)
- Support of systematic exclusion of certain groups from domains of the public sphere and
power while other ordinary constituency groups do have unrestricted access.
- Tendencies towards authoritarianism and subversion of democratic structures from
within
o Lack of mutual toleration and respect [non-abidance to democratic values]
(…) In fact, willingness to offer those favoring a different political and social order a more effective
role and some guarantees within the democratic process might have prevented their disaffection.
really? (Levitsky, Ziblatt, 2018 // competitive authoritarianism)  subversion from within
 Ana Acatrinei (NIA 100409055) – Group 55
Transitional justice and democratization
11. 10. 2022
- Need for nonpartisan sources of legitimacy!!
- Is democracy compatible in the long run with cooption of disloyal opposition?
- What should be taken into account for including semi-loyalists in the early stages of democracy
and admitting them as legitimate participants in the political process so that the ultimate
democratic values (mutual toleration, forbearance, but also freedom of thought) are respected to
their last consequences?

In a democracy, is normal for political actors to disagree, even strongly disagree. However, this does not
imply that they are disloyal to the democratic regime itself. There is a need to recognize the democratic
commitment and political rights of people who disagree with you. Respect of the outcome of democratic
procedures and elections [loyal opposition]. The disloyal opposition is that which not only disagree with
the government but also think that they are illegitimate and that another system should be in place.
 Semi-loyal opposition is that which might find sometimes convenient to ally with disloyalists in
order to achieve political goals if convenient. Loyalists should form alliances and reach
understandings with semi-loyalists and bring them closer to the regime, even if they disagree on
the ends to be pursued. Need for acknowledgement, recognition and joint work between them.
Linz didn’t necessarily imply that grand coalitions should always be pursued, but pro-democratic
forces should always put in first place the survival of democracy.
 Need for undoubted commitment to democratic procedures and rules.
o How to recognize semi-loyalists? How to determine who is a true loyalist?
o Political pressures for political actors to renounce to their ideals and show strong commitment to
democracy. What is desirable, that commitment to democracy is worth pursuing even if it is very
costly. Way more costly would be to live under a non-democratic system.
o Pragmatic toleration of politically intolerant actors [right to contestation and legitimacy of the
system as a whole]

Theorists of the dependencia tend to consider the solution of social problems the prerequisite of a stable
regime. On a broad historical scale, Barrington Moore has advanced the thesis that unless societies have
experienced a basic socioeconomic revolution, particularly in the agrarian power relations and the economic
systems associated with the great political revolutions of the West, democracy has no chance of survival.
“No regime enjoys the full support or compliance of all its citizens”

(…) The problem for the builders of a new democracy is whether these challengers should be admitted as
fully legitimate participants in the political process, or if their participation should be conditional upon their
full acceptance of the changes introduced by the regime founders. [what about semi-loyalists?]
We must emphasize the importance of defining the disloyal opposition clearly and at some stages
isolating it politically, but this process can be successful only if there is concomitant readiness to
incorporate into the system those who are perceived as at least semi-loyal by some sectors of the
regime-building coalition.

In our view, stabilization requires the maximum continuity in the symbols of the state and the nation as
consensual basis between those committed to the new regime and those they intend to incorporate into it.