Nuclear Korea 1671794631

Hee Yong Lee
NUCLEAR KOREA
The Evolution of
Technological
Independence
Copyright © 2019 by JEIL Partners
All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright may be repro-
duced, distributed, or utilized in any form, electronic or mechanical, or by any means
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DISCLAIMER AND TERMS OF USE

The author and publisher make no representation or assurances with respect to the ex-
actness, applicability, appropriateness, or wholeness of the accompanying materials and
the contents of this book. The information contained herein is strictly for informative
and development purposes.
ISBN: 979-11-968430-0-7
Contents
PART I Introduction 1
1 Historical Events 3
2 Announcement of the UAE Project 11
PART II Planning the First NPP 21

3 Policy Decision for NPP Introduction 23
4 A Long-Term Power Development Plan 41
5 Feasibility Study for NPP Construction 53
PART III Preparation for the First NPP 63

6 Organization Required to Introduce a NPP 65
7 Legislation Required for the Introduction of NPPs 75
8 Nuclear Human Resources Development (HRD) 91
9 Site Selection 107
PART IV Project Implementation 115

10 Contract for NPP Construction 117
11 Safety Analysis Report 137
12 Environmental Impact Assessment 147
iii
iv Contents
PART V Localization and Technological Independence 153

13 Localization and Technological Independence 155
14 NPP Standardization 163
15 Project Management of NPP Construction 167
16 Localization of Major Equipment (Doosan Heavy Industry) 179
17 Technological Independence in Architect
Engineering (KEPCO E&C) 189
18 Technological Independence in Nuclear Fuel 197
19 Quality Assurance for Nuclear Power 209
20 Commissioning, Operation, and Maintenance221
21 Development of the Gen III Reactor Technology (APR1400) 233
Epilogue: My Life at KEPCO261

Notes 275
Index 279
Acknowledgments
Everyone has their own story, which they would like to share with others. The
story of the success of the Korean nuclear industry, I am confident, is one such
story and represents an important model that other countries can adopt. Since
the Korean War (1950–1953), Korea has made an effort to foster economic
growth despite the difficulties created by the political whirlpool.
In particular, while facing the global oil crisis in the 1970s, Korea decided
to actively introduce nuclear power to the country. In addition, the government
and the nuclear power industry itself were strong advocates of localization of
nuclear technology. As a result, Korea succeeded in developing the OPR1000, a
localization model, which was followed by the development of the Gen III reac-
tor, APR1400, and the export of four units to the UAE, which are now under
construction. In 2010, Korea established a Nuclear Safety Day and honored the
elders who had originally pioneered the Korean nuclear industry. As I write this
book, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the hard work and passion
of the seniors who, through their vision, have elevated the Korean nuclear in-
dustry to its current success.
I would also like to thank the many people who have worked to achieve
technological independence in regard to design, manufacturing, construction,
nuclear fuel, project management, and operations. As a result, Korea’s nuclear
infrastructure is exemplary. There has been significant controversy regarding the
development of Gen III nuclear technology, and the voices of opposition have
been loud. Nevertheless, I thank all of you for your success without breaking
your will for the future. It brings me great pleasure to organize your extraordi-
nary efforts and bring them to life in this book.
v
vi Nuclear Korea
In writing this book, I used many references and citations from KHNP’s
report “Korea’s experience and recommendations for the first nuclear power
plant development.” Because I organized that report along with many experi-
enced seniors, I wanted to share the positive experience with countries that are
considering introducing a first nuclear power plant. Thank you to everyone in-
volved in the report.
I would also like to thank Dr. KunMo Chung, a distinguished pioneer in
the Korean nuclear industry, for encouraging the publication of this book. I
would like to thank Dr. ByungKoo Kim, who published the Nuclear Silk Road,
for his valuable advice. I would like to thank Mr. HwanEik Cho, a former
KEPCO CEO, who encouraged me to share Korea’s nuclear experience with the
world. In particular, thanks to Kate for her continued inspiration and encour-
agement to write this book.
Despite my best efforts, the published text may, unfortunately, contain
some errors that remained after it was too late to correct them. If you discover
any additional errors, please inform me at 0603barbi@gmail.com, so that I can
correct them in future editions of the book.
About the Author
Hee Yong Lee graduated with a BA in Nuclear Engineer-

ing from HanYang University and received an MS from
INSTN, Saclay, France. He has worked for Korea Elec-
tric Power Corporation and Korea Hydro & Nuclear
Power. His career has spanned 38 years, throughout
which he has accumulated a wealth of experience in nu-
clear power planning, training, quality assurance in con-
struction, plant operations, technical support, as well as
working in offices at overseas locations. Since 2005, he
has worked in the field of nuclear export, and in 2009 he
was awarded the contract for the construction of nuclear power plants in the
UAE and has been in charge of those projects ever since. In addition to the
UAE, he has conducted a variety of marketing activities for countries that are
planning to introduce nuclear power plants for the first time, as well as for coun-
tries that plan to build additional plants.
vii
Part I
Introduction
1
Historical Events
In 1960, a few years after the end of the Korean War, Korea itself was one of the
poorest countries on Earth, with a small population and few natural resources.
Although Korea is a peninsula, it felt more like an island with its unfriendly
neighbor to the north. Based on the sheer determination of its people, Korea has
evolved from being one of the world’s poorest nations six decades ago to becom-
ing the 12th largest economy on a nominal GDP basis as of 2018. Korean indus-
try is well-established and its brands, including Samsung, LG, and Hyundai have
become global household names.
In addition, Korea has decided to nurture growth in nuclear power genera-
tion, with the ultimate goal of exporting Korean nuclear reactors that can meet
the world’s pressing demand for energy. This effort has led to several commercial
successes, the most significant of which was the award of a $20 billion project to
a consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to con-
struct four nuclear power plant units in the UAE in 2009. Prior to the tsunami
hitting the Fukushima nuclear power station in Japan in 2011, there was a glob-
al need for the construction of over 400 new nuclear power plants by 2030.
Only five countries had ever exported a nuclear power plant, and Korea’s goal
was to claim a larger portion of this work. At present, Korean companies are
involved in the construction of seven domestic nuclear power plants and four
units located overseas. This impressive undertaking has attracted the attention
of the global community.
Time will tell what the long-term effects of the tsunami will have on the
future of the nuclear power industry, however, the energy needs of the world’s
developing and developed countries will not dissipate.
3
4 Nuclear Korea
Korea’s Entry
While Korea has exported its first nuclear power plant, one should not assume
that the country is new to the nuclear game. A member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1957, Korea’s domestic operation of nuclear
power plants goes back to 1978 when Korea’s first plant—Kori 1—came online.
Following the start of commercial operations at Kori 1, eight additional
reactors were under construction by the early 1980s. Korea’s early Pressurized
Water Reactors (PWRs) were based on Westinghouse and Framatome technol-
ogy. Later, the country succeeded in seeing its Korean Standard Nuclear Power
Plant (KSNP) become a recognized design, however, the name has been changed
to OPR1000 (Optimized Power Reactor).
Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear energy, and the development of its
nuclear industry skills, were unique. This is in contrast to the two deadly acci-
dents that occurred in the United States and Europe, namely the Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl disasters.
The 1979 meltdown at Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island power plant led to
a decline in the number of reactors under construction in the United States
every year from 1980 to 1998. After the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl plant
in Ukraine, all new nuclear power plant projects in both Europe and the United
States were shelved.
By 2005, Korea, however, had a total of 20 nuclear power plants that had
come online and the nation had no plans of stopping there. By 2009, the capac-
ity factor for Korean reactors was 91%, the world’s highest, and is a level at
which they remain today. During that same time, the average global capacity
factor was a mere 76%. Further evidence of the capability of the Korean nuclear
power machine was the country’s three-year average unplanned capability loss of
0.6 for the years 2007–2009. As of the end of 2009, the global average un-
planned capability loss was 5.4%, according to the IAEA.
Construction of Korea’s first two home-grown Generation III APR1400
reactors—Shin Kori 3 and 4—was authorized with the first concrete pouring for
the construction of Unit 3 in October 2008. It is the APR1400 that was selected
by the UAE to serve as the basis of the Emirates’ budding nuclear energy pro-
gram. Shin Kori 3 & 4 would serve as the reference plant for the other reactors
under construction in the UAE. The Shin Hanul 1&2 reactors, authorized by
the government for construction in April 2009, were expected to be completed
by 2016. However, these plans were halted due to the ex-nuclear policy of the
Moon Administration.
Historical Events 5
Proven Technology
The APR1400 currently being marketed for export by KEPCO has added sig-
nificant enhancements to its design in regard to safety as well as increased power
capabilities. Based on its predecessor, OPR1000, and Korea’s rich experience
gained from the country’s continuous development of nuclear reactors, the up-
graded APR1400 was designed to utilize the proven technology of the earlier
model while offering significantly more in terms of safety, performance, con-
struction time, operation, and of course, economics.
By adopting advanced design features based on self-reliant technologies as
well as on the technologies of the System 80+ (the design of which was certified
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Korea developed the APR1400 to
meet the Korean Utility Requirement Document (KURD) reflecting the ad-
vanced light-water reactor (ALWR) design requirements. The design require-
ments were developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and
other nuclear power-related bodies.
The lifespan of the APR1400 reactor was also increased to 60 years, which
was 20 years longer than its predecessor OPR1000, a reactor that was developed
as an integral part of Korea’s nuclear power plant standardization program be-
gun in 1984. Hanul Unit 3 was the first OPR1000 to go into operation in 1998;
three years after Korean nuclear power plants had reached a level of 95% indig-
enous technology.
The efforts that were made over three decades to develop Korea’s domestic
nuclear power industry have culminated in two international projects to date.
The first was the KEDO project in North Korea and the second was a project
that was awarded to KEPCO that involved building four nuclear power plant
units in the UAE in December 2009.
The origins of the KEDO project can be traced back to a 1994 agreement
between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Ko-
rea (DPRK) under which the DPRK agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle
its nuclear program if the US agreed to finance and construct two light-water
reactors based on the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant model.
Although racked with issues and disputes, which ultimately led to the project
being abandoned, the decade-long project offered KEPCO valuable experience in
the process of working on a nuclear power plant project through to completion,
including how to negotiate with energy powerhouses such as the US and Japan.
In regard to winning the UAE bid, one of the most important requirements
was to verify that the APR1400 reactor represented third-generation nuclear
6 Nuclear Korea
technology. The KEPCO team verified that the APR1400 met the international
technology standards of the United States and obtained design certification
from the Korean nuclear watchdog in 2002. The differentiation report empha-
sized that the KEPCO team could deliver the power plant on time with KEP-
CO acting as the prime contractor. It also stressed that the Korean government
would provide full support for building a Middle East nuclear hub in the UAE.
The UAE project made Korea the fifth nation in the world to export a nuclear
power plant, following only the United States, France, Russia, and Canada.
Education
Although the accident at Fukushima put a damper on certain countries’ nuclear
ambitions, predictions by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) prior to the
accident expected hundreds of additional nuclear power plant units to be in
operation by 2030, which is well above and beyond the 441 currently in opera-
tion in 30 countries around the world.
To this end, KEPCO and organizations in Korea affiliated with the nuclear
industry, provided a variety of educational programs intended for both domestic
and international personnel. Such training was a part of KEPCO’s drive to pro-
vide training in areas that span the entire operation of a nuclear power plant. From
instruction related to the pre-project stage through to the construction phase, in-
cluding commissioning, operations, and maintenance, KEPCO and other Korean
nuclear power-affiliated organizations offer a full range of education.
The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), the Korea Institute
of Nuclear Safety (KINS), KEPCO subsidiary KHNP, and the Korea Plant Ser-
vice and Engineering Company offer courses throughout the year with topics
ranging from global trends and policies, reactor technology, accident manage-
ment, quality assurance, public acceptance, and project financing. Additional
courses cover more technical aspects of a nuclear power plant, including atomic
energy laws and regulations, project management, and start-up tests during the
commissioning phase.
In addition to academic offerings, site visits to Korea’s power plants and
related facilities and companies can be arranged.
In August 2009, a vote was taken among the leaders of relevant nuclear
power organizations in Korea to establish a nuclear power graduate school that
would be designated as the KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School
(KINGS).
Historical Events 7
The impetus to establish such a facility was to foster and support engineers
so that they would be equipped with the specialized skills and training required
by the industry.
The school admits 200 students (100 for each class, 50% of which will be
Korean and the other 50% will be from overseas) and provides a two-year cur-
riculum with all full-time classes taught in English and focused on industry-
specific knowledge and skills. The school is expected to produce leaders in the
atomic energy field through its nuclear Masters Engineer course and technology
doctorate curriculum.
Localization Strategy
As the events following the Fukushima accident continue to unfold, the long-
term effects on public health and global perceptions of the nuclear power indus-
try remain to be seen.
Despite the setback, however, the accident has served as a reminder of the
importance of guaranteeing the safety of both existing nuclear power plants and
those yet to be built. The accident also served to emphasize that changes must
continue to be made to ensure that nuclear energy will remain a vital part of the
global power grid.
Korea has made tremendous strides over the past 40 years ever since the
country’s first nuclear power plant went operational. The focus remains on de-
veloping technology that allows for the safe and reliable production and distri-
bution of nuclear power into the foreseeable future.
A crisis often provides a meaningful opportunity to re-evaluate existing sys-
tems and levels of preparedness in order to identify areas for improvement. This
type of in-depth analysis is exactly what Korea has undertaken in recent months.
Korea’s nuclear technology is based on more than four decades of continu-
ous development by a cohesive team called “One KEPCO.” The team’s out-
standing performance is proven year after year by the successful export of the
country’s technologically advanced APR1400 reactors to the UAE.
In short, Korean nuclear power plant technology is proven technology. In
this light, KEPCO is actively seeking additional opportunities to share its nu-
clear technology with countries in need of a reliable, economically feasible, and
safe energy option. KEPCO’s goal is to become a lifelong partner to countries
that desire its expertise to develop nuclear policies and regulations, conduct
feasibility studies, perform public consultations and technology evaluations,
8 Nuclear Korea
and offer guidance in the areas of financing, design, construction, commission-

ing, operations, maintenance, fuel, and decommissioning.
US NRC Design Certificate

KEPCO and its subsidiary, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), origi-
nally submitted the design to the NRC in September 2013. They then submit-
ted a revised version of their application in December 2014. The NRC completed
an acceptance check in March 2015 and ruled that the revised application was
sufficiently complete for it to undertake a full design certification review.
The design certification process determines whether a reactor design meets
US safety requirements, independent of any specific site or plan to build. It is a
required step before a reactor design can be built in the United States, as it can
be referenced in the combined construction and operation license applications
for specific reactor projects.
On April 30th of 2019, the NRC announced that it had completed its review
and would issue a rule certifying the APR1400 design. The rule became effective
120 days following publication in the Federal Register. The certificate is valid for 15
years and can be extended for an additional 15 years.
The APR1400 is an evolutionary Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with its
origins in the CE System 80+ model. Principally designed by the Korea Engi-
neering Company, it produces 1400 MWe and has a 60-year design life. It su-
persedes the standardized 1000 MWe OPR1000 design, of which Korea built
12 units. The APR1400 features improvements in operation, safety, mainte-
nance, and affordability that are based on accumulated experience as well as
technological developments. Design certification by the Korean Institute of Nu-
clear Safety was awarded in May 2003.
KEPCO noted that the APR1400 is the first “non-US type” of reactor de-
sign to be certified by the NRC. The US regulator had already certified five
other standard reactor designs: General Electric’s Advanced Boiling Water Reac-
tor (ABWR), Westinghouse’s System 80+, AP600, and AP1000, and GE’s Eco-
nomic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor. The NRC is also reviewing applications
to certify Mitsubishi’s US Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (US-APWR)
and the NuScale small modular reactor. In addition, NRC staff are reviewing
an application to renew the ABWR certification. In October 2017, European
Utility Requirements—a technical advisory group for European utilities regard-
ing nuclear power plants—approved the APR1400 reactor design.
Historical Events 9
Future Prospects for Nuclear Power

According to IAEA information, there are expansion plans in the 30 countries
that currently operate NPPs, of which 13 are either constructing new units or
are in the process of completing previously suspended construction projects.
There are also plans or proposals for new reactors in 16 operating countries.
The countries that have new unit(s) under construction are Argentina, Bra-
zil, China, Finland, France, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, UAE, UK, and the USA. The countries that have new units under
construction with additional units planned/proposed are China, Finland, India,
Japan, Korea, Russian Federation, Pakistan, and the USA. The countries that
have no units under construction but have plans/proposals for building new
unit(s) are Saudi Arabia, Armenia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
Several countries in Africa have moved ahead with their plans after hosting
Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions conducted by the
IAEA. Bangladesh, Turkey, and Egypt have ordered their first NPP and have initi-
ated the site and the construction licensing processes. The national decisions for
whether to adopt nuclear power are still pending, despite political support, in
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Poland, and Sudan.
There are several factors that influence projections for the future growth of
nuclear power in the world. First, the safety performance of nuclear installations
is crucial to the future of nuclear power, as a strong safety record is essential for
its public acceptance. Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there has been a
particular focus on the safety of NPPs during extreme natural events. Focus has
also been placed on the fuel cycle, the management of radioactive waste, and
safety issues related to radiation.
Second, financing nuclear projects is challenging, especially given the highly
capital-intensive nature of such projects, their resulting sensitivity to interest
rates and construction durations, and the nature of uncertainty. A variety of
potential financing models have been developed to address some of these uncer-
tainties, particularly those market risks to which project developers—as well as
finance providers—may be exposed to during the operating phase of a plant’s
life cycle.
Third, acquiring and retaining skilled personnel to ensure a competent
workforce for all phases of the nuclear facility life cycle are among the biggest
challenges for the nuclear community. A particular challenge for new nuclear
build projects is the loss of expertise and human capital, because there are only
10 Nuclear Korea
a few such projects and they often take place many years after the previous one
(with the exception of China, Japan, Korea, and the Russian Federation).
Fourth, public acceptance is a key factor to the successful future of nuclear
power. It largely depends on the public’s perception of the benefits and risks as-
sociated with nuclear power, as well as the benefits and risks of non-nuclear al-
ternatives. In particular, concerns about radiation risks, waste management,
safety, and proliferation remain the areas that most influence public opinion and
subsequent acceptance.
Most importantly, stakeholder involvement in the formulation of nuclear
policy as well as investment decisions, especially in regard to potential safety
implications, has become a central feature in the successful and safe deployment
of nuclear power. Stakeholder involvement is also indispensable for the develop-
ment of a national policy for the first introduction of NPPs, and for determin-
ing the location of new nuclear construction projects and HLW repositories. In
addition, stakeholder involvement helps to build and maintain trust in regula-
tory competence and efficiency.
Why I Am Writing This Book

It is said that we have to learn the old and discover the new. Korea has grown in
the face of many political, diplomatic, military, and economic challenges. Nuclear
development has become a key part of national policy, creating a great foundation
for economic development. However, currently, the ex-nuclear policy of the in-
cumbent administration has shaken the base of the nuclear power industry. The
strong introduction of renewable energy is clearly a challenge to the nuclear power
industry. However, nuclear and renewable energy have the common goal of re-
straining carbon emissions. There are many countries that are attempting to intro-
duce nuclear power plants as carbon-free energy. I would like to share with those
countries how Korea fostered the growth of the nuclear industry until it exported
nuclear power to the UAE. It is intriguing to summarize how Korea, one of the
poorest countries in the world with only limited natural resources, has experienced
the best practice of nuclear industry as a result of economic miracles. So, I would
like to first begin with a newspaper article that was published when it was an-
nounced that KEPCO was selected for the UAE nuclear project. It is very impor-
tant to understand the evolution and growth process of the nuclear industry in
Korea in order to fully realize what an important achievement it is to now be at the
point of exporting a power plant to the UAE.
2
Announcement of the UAE Project
To begin, I would like to quote the full text of an article that appeared in the
Gulf News on December 27, 2009. It serves to showcase the Barakah nuclear
project in the UAE, which is the most rewarding project of my life and a pride
of Korea. After reading this article, you will understand why the UAE selected
KEPCO as the prime contractor. I will always remember these words, and I
hope that my juniors will carve the message deep into their hearts.
Abu Dhabi: A South Korean consortium won a Dh75 billion ($20.4 bil-
lion) contract to build nuclear reactors in the UAE, beating more favored
American and French companies for one of the Middle East’s biggest energy
deals. President His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak attended the signing of a series of
landmark cooperation agreements, WAM reported.
The agreements, signed by Foreign Minister Shaikh Abdullah Bin
Zayed Al Nahyan and South Korean Minister of Knowledge Economy Choi
Kyung-hwan, cover a framework protocol to boost economic partnership to
strengthen cooperation in a number of areas, including the development of
peaceful nuclear energy. Shaikh Abdullah said: “As negotiations between
the UAE and South Korea on peaceful nuclear energy advanced, the two
governments discovered the huge potential for joint cooperation in various
fields.”
11
12 Nuclear Korea
Under the nuclear contract, the group led by Korea Electric Power Cor-
poration (KEPCO) will design, build and help operate four 1,400-mega-
watt civilian nuclear power units, a statement by Emirates Nuclear Energy
Corporation (ENEC) said. “ENEC has determined that the KEPCO team
is best equipped to fulfill the government’s partnership requirements in this
ambitious programme,” ENEC Chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak said in
a statement. Mohammad Al Hammadi, Chief Executive of ENEC, said ten
locations for the plants have been proposed. Al Hammadi said Emiratis will
make up 60 percent of the estimated 2,200 professionals overseeing opera-
tion of the plants. The plants are expected to provide 25 percent of the
country’s power needs by 2020.
Key Points
• The winning consortium includes Korea Electric Power Corp, Hyundai
Engineering and Construction, Samsung C&T Corp and Doosan
Heavy Industries.
• The award is the largest-ever energy contract in the Middle East and
one of the world’s biggest nuclear power plant contracts.
• The first of the four units is scheduled to begin providing electricity to
the grid in 2017, with the three later units being completed by 2020.
“Following a comprehensive and detailed review of three excellent bids from

some of the world’s top nuclear suppliers, operators and construction firms,
ENEC has determined that the KEPCO team is best equipped to fulfill the
government’s partnership requirements in this ambitious program,” said
Khaldoon Al Mubarak, Chairman of ENEC. “The nature of this project
will require a partnership that endures for nearly 100 years. This arrange-
ment has driven us to focus on a very careful assessment of what character-
istics among the competing consortia would translate into the best over-all
fit in a partner for our program.”
ENEC Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Al Hammadi, further ex-
plained the decision, saying: “We were impressed with the KEPCO team’s
world-class safety performance, and its demonstrated ability to meet the UAE
Announcement of the UAE Project 13
program goals. Additionally, KEPCO dedicated a highly experienced team to

our project and has shown a serious commitment to transferring the knowl-
edge gained from Korea’s 30 years of successful nuclear industry operation
into the UAE program. We look forward to a long and productive relation-
ship as we work toward powering the future growth of the UAE with low-
carbon, peaceful nuclear energy,” Al Hammadi said.
The contract calls for the KEPCO team to design, build and help oper-
ate four 1,400-MW civil nuclear power units. The value of the contract for
the construction, commissioning and fuel loads for four units equaled ap-
proximately US$20 billion, with a high percentage of the contract being
offered under a fixed-price arrangement. In addition to the delivery of the
four plants, ENEC and KEPCO have also agreed to key terms under which
Korean investors will have an equity interest in the project. This arrange-
ment will further strengthen the business relationship and powerfully incen-
tivize the partners to ensure that the necessary experience, technology and
skills are available to achieve on-time and on-budget delivery and safe and
reliable operation of the plants.
The contract contains provisions that lower risk to the project and allow
the UAE to model its nuclear industry on that developed by Korea during
the past three decades. The first of the four units is scheduled to begin pro-
viding electricity to the grid in 2017, with the three later units being com-
pleted by 2020.
Given the growth in electricity demand projected for the United Arab
Emirates, it is expected that additional units beyond the original four will
be procured in the future as the UAE expands its fleet of civil nuclear power
plants. The contract also calls for extensive training, human resource devel-
opment, and education programs as the UAE builds the capacity to eventu-
ally staff the vast majority of the nuclear energy program with national
talent and develops the industrial infrastructure and commercial businesses
to serve a thriving nuclear energy industry. Additionally, ENEC and KEP-
CO have agreed to work together on business ventures in the utility and
energy fields outside the boundaries of the UAE project.
“We are extremely pleased to be selected by ENEC as its partner in the
United Arab Emirates civil nuclear power program and it will be our top
priority to devote our resources and efforts towards the successful delivery of
14 Nuclear Korea
the world’s safest, most reliable and cost-efficient nuclear power plants,” said
Mr. Ssang Su Kim, President and CEO of KEPCO.
“We are fully committed to ENEC’s goal of providing electricity to the
UAE using safe and peaceful nuclear energy, and we have begun mobilizing
a team so that we can begin work immediately,” Kim added. Kim empha-
sized the far-reaching nature of the commercial partnership, noting that the
plant to be commissioned in 2017 will remain in operation until at least
2077.
“KEPCO will also provide the UAE with its accumulated know-how
and experience in developing nuclear power plants, and the Korean govern-
ment will provide its full support in various aspects of the program to en-
courage further exchange and collaboration between our two countries,” he
said.
While welcoming the new partnership with the KEPCO-led consorti-
um, ENEC officials were quick to point out that discussions continue with
the other bidders with regard to potential cooperation in areas outside the
scope of the Prime Contract, like long-term fuel supply, joint investments,
training and education, among others.
About KEPCO
KEPCO, a government-owned utility, is the world’s third largest nuclear
energy business with an installed nuclear generation capacity of 17,716MW
as of the end of 2008. KEPCO operates 20 commercial nuclear power units
as of 2009, with eight more units currently under construction and an ad-
ditional 10 units planned to be built by 2030. KEPCO is also recognized
as a world leader in safety and plant reliability and efficiency, as assessed by
the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the international
organization established to maximize the safety and reliability of the opera-
tion of nuclear power plants. KEPCO currently receives among the highest
scores in the WANO Performance Indicator program, which quantifies per-
formance standards for nuclear operators around the world. Importantly,
KEPCO has also developed a strong record for constructing nuclear power
plants that meet stringent industry quality standards and are delivered on
time and on budget.
KEPCO will supply the full scope of works and services for the UAE
Civil Nuclear Power Program including engineering, procurement, con-
struction, nuclear fuel and operations, and maintenance support with the
assistance of other Korean members of the KEPCO team, including Sam-
sung, Hyundai, Doosan Heavy Industries, and KEPCO subsidiaries:
• Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP), which will play
a key role as the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC)
contractor and operator
• Korea Power Engineering Co., Inc. (KEPCO E&C), which will provide
the nuclear power plant design and engineering service
• Korea Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (KNF), which will provide the nuclear
fuel
• Korea Plant Service and Engineering Co., Ltd. (KPS), which will be
involved in plant maintenance
Non-Korean companies involved in the KEPCO team include Westing-

house of the US, and Toshiba of Japan.
The Technology
ENEC has decided to build KEPCO’s APR1400, a Generation III,
1400-Megawatt nuclear power plant with evolutionary improvements in
safety, performance, and environmental impact that meets the highest inter-
national standards for safety and performance. The APR1400 design was
developed by the Korean nuclear industry under the leadership of KEPCO
over a period of 10 years beginning in 1992. A certificate for the standard
design approval was issued for the APR1400 by the Korean regulatory au-
thority in 2002. The APR1400 is similar to, but represents an improvement
over, the System 80+ design, which was previously certified by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States.
The first of the APR1400 units, Shin-Kori units 3 & 4, are now under
construction, having obtained a Construction Permit from the Korean reg-
ulatory authority. Shin-Kori unit 3 will be connected to Korea’s grid by
2013. The first UAE nuclear power plant will be the fifth unit of the
16 Nuclear Korea
APR1400 plants in the world, and Shin-Kori plants will serve as the “refer-
ence plants” for the UAE program. As such, KEPCO will construct plants
that are essentially the same as the “reference plants,” but supplemented
with changes required to adapt to UAE climactic conditions and any spe-
cific requirements of the UAE nuclear safety regulator, the Federal Author-
ity for Nuclear Regulation (FANR).
Enhanced Safety
As a Generation III reactor, the APR1400 has been designed to meet height-
ened safety goals developed in accordance with the latest international safety
standards, which aim to secure an additional margin of safety to protect the
public health. The APR1400 design incorporates more than 30 years of
operational learning and resulting enhancements to safety, reliability and
efficiency.
The APR1400 safety system is designed to prevent or mitigate severe
accidents by ensuring reactor shutdown, removing decay heat, maintaining
the integrity of the containment facility, and preventing radioactive releases.
It is designed to meet the procedural requirements and criteria of the US
NRC regulations, including the post Three Mile Island (TMI) accident re-
quirements for new plants. In addition, the building and structures in the
UAE plants will be designed to fulfill the latest requirements for earthquake
safety and aircraft impact resistance.
By exclusively deploying a third-generation design, the UAE’s future
fleet of nuclear reactors will boast safety levels significantly above those of
existing nuclear fleets that are still dominated by second-generation designs.
ENEC Evaluation Process

ENEC’s year-long prime contractor selection process was designed to identify
the best long-term partner for the UAE as it undertakes its civil nuclear
energy program. The process was guided by the Policy of the United Arab
Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear
Energy, which set strict standards for safety and security, non-proliferation
and sustainability.
Specifically, ENEC focused on five core criteria in reaching its final
decision.
• Safety—All three teams involved in the Prime Contractor

Selection process demonstrated that their technology and safety pro-
grams fully met the latest international standards and that their opera-
tional safety performance was among the world’s highest.
• Having all met that most important criterion, the three teams were
further evaluated against the remaining criteria:
• Deliverability—A demonstrated ability to meet the ENEC program
goals and to begin delivering electricity to the UAE power grid in
2017.
• Contract Compliance—Conformance with ENEC’s proposed “prime
contractor” business structure, which was designed to ensure that ac-
countability for project deliverables would rest with a single prime con-
tractor entity, while appropriately minimizing the contractor integration
and management burden on ENEC.
• Human Resource Development—A commitment to, and detailed
planning for, human resource development in the UAE in support of
the development of a sustainable, domestically sourced nuclear energy
workforce that is dominated by competent national talent.
• Commercial Competitiveness—A commercial proposal that promoted
UAE economic competitiveness via the provision of low-cost electricity
and via the establishment of partnering opportunities to accelerate the
development of the UAE nuclear industry, as well as appropriately as-
signed risk reflecting the long-term nature of the commercial and op-
erational relationship contemplated within the draft prime contract.
A team of 75 dedicated experts evaluated the bids during the last year. Col-
lectively, the team boasted more than 900 years of directly relevant experience
in the nuclear industry. The team was made up of experts in the following
fields: nuclear power plant safety, design and construction; operations and
maintenance; nuclear quality assurance, supply chain management and
procurement; nuclear fuel procurement and management (including safe-
18 Nuclear Korea
guards, non-proliferation and spent fuel management); siting analysis (in-

cluding environmental impact assessment, seismology, geology, meteorology
and hydrology); finance (including generation cost modeling and project fi-
nance); legal and contracting; program management; utility operations; and
communications and community relations. KEPCO is expected to begin mo-
bilizing its team in Abu Dhabi immediately. Hee Yong Lee, one of KEPCO’s
most senior executives, will lead the UAE project. A trained nuclear engineer,
Mr. Lee has worked for KEPCO for more than 30 years in the fields of con-
struction management, quality assurance, long-term power planning, as well
as in training, commissioning and operations at nuclear power plants.
ENEC is currently in the advanced stages of evaluating a number of poten-
tial sites for nuclear power plants throughout all regions of the UAE. A team
of UAE and international experts is conducting detailed scientific studies on
seismology, geology, environmental impact and other factors related to siting.
That study and others will contribute to the final decision on where to build
the units.
Program Background
Energy Demand
The Government of Abu Dhabi established ENEC following an evaluation
of the UAE’s future energy needs that determined the country would need to
substantially increase its generating capacity in order to meet the expected
demand for electricity. The UAE’s evaluation of its energy needs was wide-
ranging and resulted in the following findings:
• That the volume of natural gas that could be made available to the
nation’s electricity sector would be insufficient to meet future demand.
• That the burning of liquids (crude oil and/or diesel) would be logistically
viable however, costly and environmentally harmful.
• That coal-fired power generation, while potentially cheaper, would be
environmentally unacceptable and the supply could be potentially vul-
nerable from a security standpoint.
• And finally, that the deployment of renewable and other alternative

energy supplies, while desirable, would only be able to supply approxi-
mately 6–7% of the required electricity generation needs by 2020.
Four factors supported the decision to initiate the program:
• Economics—Well-run nuclear energy plants are among the most effi-

cient producers of electricity.
• Security of fuel supply—Nuclear power plants have high availability
factors (in excess of 90%) and can operate for 18–24 months on a
single fuel load.
• Environment—Nuclear plants emit no greenhouse gases and represent
an important tool for combating climate change.
• Industrial Development—A sustainable nuclear energy program will
create new service industries and high-value jobs, while enhancing eco-
nomic development throughout the UAE.
• Human Resource Development—Essential to the Program and the Nation
Central to the UAE’s approach to developing a nuclear energy program has

been the importance of building a qualified workforce in the short and long
term.
ENEC has joined with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology
and Research, the Institute of Applied Technology, the Federal Authority for
Nuclear Regulation, other parts of the UAE educational system, as well as
universities internationally to ensure that there will be a reservoir of talent,
both Emirati and expatriate, well into the future. Current estimates are
that the program will need between 2,100 and 2,300 staff by 2020. ENEC
is committed to ensuring that talented Emirati women and men play a
major role in the program—occupying positions of authority and responsi-
bility in all aspects of the nuclear energy industry.
Nuclear Fuel—Strategies Development

ENEC is in the process of developing and implementing a strategy for the
management of all nuclear fuel cycle activities including the procurement,
20 Nuclear Korea
use, and short- and long-term management of nuclear fuel for its nuclear
power plants.
The strategy conforms to guidelines established by the International
Atomic Energy Agency and will be continually updated, taking into ac-
count new information and technological advances from the nuclear indus-
try during the next decades, before the long-term spent fuel management
plan is implemented.
The UAE Policy on Nuclear Energy

The UAE’s comprehensive approach to nuclear energy is detailed in the
Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Devel-
opment of Peaceful Nuclear Energy, a document released in April 2008.
One of the main pillars of the policy is the decision to develop the pro-
gram with safety and non-proliferation as its foundation, and to forgo do-
mestic enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, the two parts of the
nuclear fuel cycle that can most readily be used for non-peaceful purposes.
This policy establishes a new model through which non-nuclear states
may explore and potentially deploy nuclear energy with the full support and
confidence of the international community. International observers and
non-proliferation experts have called the UAE model the “gold standard”
for developing a nuclear energy program. The UAE has now signed or is in
the process of signing agreements for cooperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear energy with numerous countries, including France, Korea, the
United States and others. (By Ahmed A. Namatalla, Staff Reporter, Gulf
News, on December 27, 2009)
Part II
Planning the First NPP
3
Policy Decision for NPP Introduction
In general, the construction process of the NPP takes approximately 10–15 years
from the time of the original decision through to commercial operation. It is a
project that requires a vast amount of investment and may significantly influence
the national economy. Introducing the nuclear energy program requires accept-
ance of the general public. Hearing the opinions and receiving the consensus of
the general public as well as professionals during the initial stage of the decision
making is crucial. In addition, the national infrastructure for the policy develop-
ment, nuclear regulatory system, and manpower training for the construction
and operation of the NPP is required to satisfy the minimal requirements. Let’s
look at the process.
Understanding the Characteristics of Nuclear Energy

In order to understand the requirements for constructing a NPP, it is necessary
to understand the following characteristics of a nuclear power project. The in-
vestment size differs depending on the capacity of the NPP, contract type, con-
struction period, financing terms, etc. But in general, the construction cost for
one unit of 1,000MW NPP requires a US$4–$6 billion investment.
The construction period differs depending on the status of the industrial
infrastructure and the management capability of the introducing country. In
general, it takes approximately 10–15 years from the start of the preparation
phase though to commercial operation. The construction schedule can tend to
fall behind the original schedule due to several different circumstances such as
23
24 Nuclear Korea
unexpected geological conditions, financing difficulties, regulatory action, and

environmental changes. Therefore, the management cost incurred during the
construction period is high and the interest expenses during the construction
period may add up to approximately 30%–40% of the total construction cost.
Cutting-edge and proven technology must be applied to the construction
and operation of the NPP. Many experts are required for the design, construc-
tion, and operation. Furthermore, strong support of the government is essential
for the successful construction and operation of the power plant. The introduc-
tion of the NPP both directly and indirectly stimulates the development of tech-
nology for other industrial sectors.
Safety must be the top priority when designing and operating the NPP be-
cause NPP accidents have significant influence on the opinions of the general
public as well as neighboring countries. In order to achieve this goal, the NPP
design has to adhere strictly to the global standard, and it needs to reflect the
redundancy and in-depth defense concept. In general, large-scale projects such
as a NPP are headed by the government or the public utility and require national
consensus.
Required Infrastructure
If the minimum requirements of the national industrial infrastructure for the
NPP construction and operation are not established, such as policy develop-
ment, regulatory systems development, and human resource development, the
introduction of the NPP faces serious problems.
Nuclear Regulations and Legislation

The primary purpose of laws related to nuclear power are to protect the people,
assets, and environment from human activities related to nuclear energy and
ionized radiation.
Nuclear liability is a hot issue. It should compensate for damage to the ma-
terials and to the public. There is also the international agreement and conven-
tion that assures nuclear liability. Countries are subject to join the convention
and agreement before beginning the construction of a NPP.
In general, the establishment of a perfect legal system requires substantial
time, and it is impossible to satisfy all of the legal requirements necessary to
introduce the NPP during the initial phase. Therefore, structuring the legal
Policy Decision for NPP Introduction 25
system needed for licensing related to the site and the environmental impact
assessment is the first priority.
Ultimately, the responsibility for nuclear power safety related to the opera-
tion of the NPP falls on the owner. The responsibility of the government is to
confirm that the operation and maintenance of the NPP has no impact on the
general public or the environment at a regulatory level. The Atomic Energy Act
provides the legal and structural framework for all nuclear power-related activi-
ties including the safety, security, responsibility, licensing, compensation, regu-
lation, and international cooperation with respect to nuclear power.
Industrial Facilities
In order to construct a national policy for the introduction of a NPP, a compre-
hensive strategy must be developed that evaluates the power demand in relation
to the social and economic development of the country. This will help to facili-
tate an understanding of the feasibility and responsibilities related to nuclear
energy. The unit capacity of the power plant must not exceed 10% of the total
electric network capacity at the time of expected completion with consideration
for the characteristics of the electric network system.
The availability of cooling water is one of the critical aspects when choosing
an appropriate site. 60 m3/sec per one unit at 1,000MW capacity is required
and in order to transport the heavy machines, equipment, and materials, we
have to first construct the wharf. We also need enough space for the storage and
handling of the huge materials that are required during construction.
The presence of an active fault and sufficient distance from the nearest pop-
ulation center are also important factors that should be closely investigated dur-
ing site evaluation.
Installing seismic and meteorological monitoring systems in advance at the
applicable site in order to obtain data in regard to the characteristics of the site’s
geology and climate is a sound business practice.
It is essential to secure the electricity, communications, water, access road,
port, and other construction support facilities for the construction of the site.
The quality of the electricity at the construction site has a direct impact on
the quality of the work. Accordingly, if the national electric power system is
unreliable, a temporary electric power supply facility (diesel generator) should
be installed during the construction period. In the case of port facilities, the
sea depth must be 7m or deeper in order to provide a berth for a 2,000-ton class
ship or larger.
26 Nuclear Korea
Human Resources and Training

The professionals required for the engineering, construction, and operation of
the NPP are similar to other large projects and conventional power plants with
the exception of the nuclear safety and radiation protection area. The NPP re-
quires advanced technology for safety analysis, engineering and construction, as
well as the management system. In general, the engineering work for a NPP re-
quires 700 or more experts and, in addition, the operations organization re-
quires between 100 and 1,000 individuals.
With the construction of the first NPP, the participation of local profession-
als will be limited. Therefore, the transfer of technological knowledge within each
field of engineering must be incorporated into the equipment supply and techni-
cal service contract. For the construction of the first NPP, it is recommended
that the basic human resources in the engineering, construction, commissioning,
and project management fields should be secured during the early stages of the
project. With experienced individuals on board, the construction costs
for subsequent NPPs could be saved and contribute to a faster transition into
localization. However, keep in mind that professional and experienced resources
may be available from the country that is building the NPP or from another
experienced country; whereas local labor should be used for general unskilled
work.
Research Organization and Education Institution

During the planning stage of NPP construction, it is essential to use the profes-
sional groups related to nuclear power, and in general, concentrate on research
institutes and academic institutions. In general, as construction work progresses,
the human resources required for engineering, construction, and operation of
the power plant are developed by the owners. While at the same time, depend-
ence on research organizations and the academic sector gradually declines.
During the initial stage of the power plant operation, the safety study, radia-
tion protection, and other fields that require high-level technology are supported
by outside research institutions and academic sectors. Outside support is gradu-
ally substituted with in-house engineers who are trained for the engineering,
construction, and operation of the plant. The external research organization and
educational institutions need to focus on the fundamental technology develop-
ment, such as the advanced reactor.
Technical Standards
The technical standards applied to the engineering and operation of the NPP is
much more rigorous than the technical standards applied to other industrial fa-
cilities. The technical standards of each country may be different, depending on
the reactor type and licensing requirements. Typically, the technical standards of
the country that developed the reactor technology, or the internationally recog-
nized IAEA standards for licensing requirements are applied. Currently, WANO
is contributing to creating a global standard through peer review and the best
practices of its members.
The critical technical standards for nuclear safety include the structure, plant
system and equipment engineering, environmental assessment requirements,
etc. However, the national regulations and technical standards for nuclear power
should be established in accordance with the progress of the project.
Owner’s Expectations
It is said that the technical and regulatory requirements are the minimum level
of nuclear safety. In addition, based on WANO and other standards, the owner’s
expectations need to be developed prior to commercial operation. The final re-
sponsibility of plant operation is given to the owner. We have to incorporate the
expectations and requirements of the public and level-up the technical standards
following the owner’s expectations.
This should be concrete and quantitative, not abstract. It should be possible
to assess how the requirements are being met. The owner’s expectations should
be clear and executed. But this will only be possible with the strong leadership
of the owner.
Supply Chain
Because of the long lead times for major equipment required by the NPP, most
equipment should be manufactured during the beginning phase of the project.
Most countries make an effort to enhance the localization of the equipment.
However, they are not experienced enough at the initial stage of the NPP intro-
duction to be able to meet the complicated bid requirements. The investment
to enhance the capability of national manufacturers during the early stages of
28 Nuclear Korea
project planning is essential for the improvement of the localization. However,

it is not possible without the support of experienced foreign companies. Efforts
to improve the manufacturing capabilities of local companies should be manda-
tory, and some countries may impose the requirement that it is the suppliers’
obligation to transfer technology to local companies and a certain percentage of
localization ratio as part of the bidding conditions.
Economic Evaluation and Financing

The total required cost and benefit factors should be considered in the NPP’s
economic evaluation, and total costs during the plant’s lifetime should be con-
verted to the present value for assessment. The construction cost (including
financing costs), operation and maintenance costs, fuel cycle costs, decommis-
sioning, spent fuel disposal costs, external costs related to infrastructure im-
provement and impact of the electric network system, employment effect
through the localization and other economic benefits, environmental gains fol-
lowing the decrease of greenhouse gas emission (carbon tax etc.), and economic
gains following the reduction of fuel imports should also be considered.
Financing for the construction of the NPP is classified into financing for pro-
ject development and financing for project implementation. The pre-project cost
means the cost for economic evaluation and planning of the project. It is relatively
small and could be provided for from the company budget.
In general, the construction cost of the NPP is estimated to be between
US$2,000–$3,300/kW(e), although the unit price depends on the capacity,
construction period, financing conditions, and interest rates. The total con-
struction cost for one unit of 1,000MWe NPP requires about a US$ 4–$6 bil-
lion investment. Typically, lenders are reluctant to take on such large financial
risks for a single project in a developing country. Accordingly, the government’s
financing policy should be established in advance in order to reduce the difficul-
ties associated with securing the necessary investment funds.
Construction Delays
It is very disappointing to hear about the delay in nuclear power construction in
Finland, France, the UK, and the USA. Construction delays represent the worst
concern and risk for financing. It also impacts public acceptance. There are
many different reasons for these delays such as the EPC contractor’s capabilities,
supply chain, design change, regulation change, labor management, etc.
The conflicts between the owner and the contractor can be quite severe and
may eventually end up in court. Strict clauses related to liquidated damage apply,
however there are always disputes about the causes and scope of application.
The factors that can be controlled or those that cannot be controlled should
be clearly defined. However, the lenders squeeze out all sorts of risk and seek to
compensate for financial damage and preserve the principal when construction
delays occur. Insurance companies use their imagination to limit their liability
by creating more rigid conditions.
Above all, the project management ability and experience of the EPC contrac-
tor is the most important. Trial and error results from inexperience and lack of
professionalism. A number of subcontracts need to be managed and controlled
effectively and efficiently. Project management is a form of “comprehensive art.”
International Cooperation
International cooperation for the development of the nuclear program is made up
of bilateral and/or multilateral cooperative systems for the peaceful use of nuclear
power such as IAEA, EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute), WANO (World
Association of Nuclear Operators), INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Opera-
tions), etc. In particular, IAEA developed various support programs for member
countries planning NPP construction.
The country that is introducing the NPP is required to sign the following
multilateral treaties for the peaceful use of nuclear power and nuclear safety.
• Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;

• Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear or Radiological
Accident;
• Convention on Nuclear Safety;
• Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management;
• Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amend-
ment thereto;
• Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage;
• Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Damage;
30 Nuclear Korea
• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage;

• Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and
the Paris Convention;
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Public Acceptance
Public acceptance is critical for the construction and operation of the NPP.
Transparency of information in regard to the needs, safety, and other aspects of
the NPP must be provided to the people (local residents and authorities, in par-
ticular,) prior to making decisions regarding the introduction of the NPP. In
some countries, citizens have no objection to the construction of the NPP, how-
ever, most countries have experienced difficulties in obtaining the consent of the
local residents and authorities.
The major concerns of the general public in regard to nuclear power include:
(1) the possibility of an accident occurring like Chernobyl and Fukushima, (2)
wondering if a NPP could explode like a nuclear bomb, and (3) environmental
disruption and deterioration of public health from radioactive releases, thermal
discharges, etc. It is essential to have a plan prepared for the disclosure of infor-
mation over the long term as well as an ongoing publicity campaign during the
initial stage of the NPP construction.
The First Introduction of a Nuclear Power Plant

Preparation Work
After the government decides to introduce the NPP, there are minimal require-
ments that must be met regarding the basic domestic industrial infrastructure,
which include policy development, nuclear regulation systems, human resourc-
es, and others. The NPP project organization develops a reactor selection strat-
egy that is based on the reactor technology that is available in the international
market. The organization must also prepare a basic plan regarding the acquisi-
tion of the site, contract structure, international bidding method, localization
enhancement program, and the financing scheme in accordance with the reactor
selection strategy and national electrical power development plan.
Feasibility Study
On the basis of the forecast for the long-term power demand, the requirements
for the introduction of the NPP must be reviewed, taking into consideration the
economics of nuclear energy, environmental issues in relation to international
agreements, energy source diversification strategy, etc. The international develop-
ment trend of reactor technology, the status of the international nuclear power
market, and the requirements related to the introduction of the NPP must be
considered during the feasibility study.
Upon confirmation of the feasibility and necessity of a NPP, a feasibility study
is implemented. This study includes the site selection, reactor type, and nuclear
infrastructure reviews, such as the environmental impact, CO2 emission reduction
plan, domestic human resources, and the Atomic Energy Act system. Electric net-
work system analysis and assessment of the NPP unit capacity, as well as the nu-
clear policy for the development of technology related to the promotion of the
nuclear industry, are also included in the preliminary feasibility study.
Basic Plan for the Introduction of a NPP

Based on the preliminary feasibility study, the basic plan for the introduction of
the first NPP is prepared using the following guidelines:
• Government and utility organization

• The Atomic Energy Act system and human resource development plan
• Nuclear technology development plan including the reactor-type strategy,
the promotion plan for national industrial infrastructure, the long-term ra-
dioactive waste disposal plan, and the plan for securing nuclear fuel, etc.
To implement the required administrative procedure, the National Assembly

must agree with the final wording of the government policy as recommended by
the NPP Introduction Team.
Preparation for Construction

As the introduction of the NPP is determined, the government needs
to establish an organization that will regulate the NPP licensing and nuclear
32 Nuclear Korea
safety. This government organization will develop the Atomic Energy Act sys-
tem, the human resource training program needed for the introduction of the
NPP, and the promotion program for supporting the industrial infrastructure.
The owner prepares the feasibility study for the NPP construction. This is a
technical review that includes the reactor type, capacity, plant layout, economic
analysis, site selection and site survey, preparation of the construction schedule,
human resource development plan, environmental impact assessment, architect
engineering and equipment supply contract method (turnkey contract or split
contract), ITB (Invitation to Bid) preparation, financing plan, basic NPP con-
struction plan, etc.
The ITB has to be issued in advance to qualified vendors. The lowest bid-
ders must be selected as contractors for the equipment supply and engineering
services in accordance with the result of the evaluation of key elements of the
bid. If necessary, the loan contract can be finalized after the contract with the
equipment supply and engineering services is executed.
Construction and Commercial Operation

The site grading and excavation work is performed according to the early site per-
mit (ESP). However, the construction permit from the regulatory body is manda-
tory for the first concrete pouring and the initial fuel loading and is subject to the
operating license (OL) as well. After obtaining the operating license from the
regulatory body, the initial fuel loading can begin. Plant performance testing is
done to confirm that the plant performs as stipulated in the equipment and engi-
neering services contract. Once complete, the commercial operation can begin.
Feasibility Study Pre. Feasibility Establishment of

on Study on Basic Plan for
Necessity of NPP Introduction of NPP NPP Introduction
Issuance Preparation Gov’t Decision

of for on
Invitation to Bid Construction NPP Introduction
Concluding Construction Commercial

Major Contracts and Start-up Operation
The Korean Experience with a NPP Contract

The history of the introduction of the NPP in Korea is an exemplary case of
achieving technological independence with very limited construction experience
in regard to heavy industrial projects. Government institutions, utilities, re-
search institutions, and domestic industries combined their efforts for the con-
struction of the NPP and it was the ultimate goal of the government to diversify
its energy reources. It was supported by means of technological independence
and localization (Note: nuclear energy is considered “quasi-localization.”) The
history of NPP construction in Korea may be divided into the following catego-
ries: the overseas dependency period, the technology accumulation period, and
the technological independence period.
The plan for Korea’s long-term power development was prepared in 1961.
The total power generating capacity at the time was 367MW and grew to
770MW in 1966. Despite the increase in capacity, the demand for power in-
creased drastically, which served to exacerbate the chronic power shortage situa-
tion. Two units of 500MW-level NPPs were proposed in the 10-year power
development plan, which was established in 1967.
Kori No. 1, the First NPP in Korea

Kori 1 uses a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with a capacity of 587MWe.
The excavation work began in November 1971 and was completed in April
1978 to become the first NPP in Korea. Westinghouse (USA), acting as the
main contractor, was responsible for the primary system and GEC of the UK
supplied the secondary system. Additional contractors were chosen via interna-
tional open bidding. Considering the level of domestic technology, the turnkey
contract method was adopted.
The foreign contractor was responsible for the total project management,
quality control, engineering, equipment supply, construction, and commission-
ing. The owner, KEPCO, was responsible for site grading, incidental building
(warehouse, etc.), and the construction and supply of some of the materials
(sand, aggregate, cement, etc.).
34 Nuclear Korea
Project Structure for Kori No. 1
Owner
(KEPCO)
Main contractor
(Westinghouse)
Westinghouse GEC G. Wimphey Hyundai Co. Dong-a Co.

– NSSS – T/G system – Supervisor – Construction – Construction
facilities facilities for civil for NSSS for T/G
supply supply works system system
– Initial fuel
The first introduction of a NPP in Korea was planned during the early
1960s in order to solve the limitation of using domestic fuel to generate electric
power and to address the energy dependency on oil. We can trace the decision-
making process as follows:
• Mar. 1959: Promulgation of the Atomic Energy Act

• Oct. 1959: Establishment of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
• Nov. 1962: The NPP implementation committee was established in the
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and surveyed the world-wide sta-
tus of nuclear technology development
• Oct. 1963: IAEA delegation visited Korea three times in 1963, 1965, and
1967 to review the project plan and site survey, and recommended the in-
troduction of two NPPs in 1970
• 1964–1967: Site survey performed on the Kori candidate site (oceanogra-
phy, geology, and meteorology survey)
• Dec. 1965: Established the Review Committee for the nuclear power plan
in the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
• 1966–1967: Delegation was dispatched abroad twice to survey the status of
the world’s nuclear power.
• Aug. 1966: NPP capacity of 300MW was reflected in the long-term power
development plan to be completed by 1974 (long-term electric power de-
velopment plan)
• Feb. 1967: The nuclear power promotion committee was organized in the
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
• Sep. 1967: The long-term power development plan was amended to com-
plete two units of 500MW-level NPPs in 1974 and 1976
• 1968: Nuclear Power Generating Division was newly established in the
Atomic Power Office and the Nuclear Power Generation Promotion Com-
mittee was established in the government
• Apr. 1968: KEPCO was assigned as the owner for the NPP construction
• May 1968: The Kori region was designated as the construction site for the
first NPP
• Jun.–Oct. 1968: Burn & Roe (USA) was selected to perform the feasibility
survey
• Jun. 1968: Invitation to bid (ITB) for Kori NPP unit 1 was issued (US: GE,
W, CE and UK: BNX)
• Jan. 1969: Westinghouse of the US was selected as the successful bidder
• Mar. 1971: Start of construction
• Nov. 1971: Start of site excavation
• Mar. 1978: Completed 100% performance test
Policy Decision Making

Organization for the Introduction of the First NPP
In 1962, the NPP planning committee was established in the Atomic Energy
Office to investigate the status of technology development around the world.
The NPP planning committee was expanded to the NPP plan review committee
for nuclear power generation in 1965. In addition, by the Decree of the
Atomic Energy Office, the Steering Committee of Nuclear Power was estab-
lished in 1967 to review and resolve the basic plans for the NPP construction
and implementation.
In 1968, the Nuclear Generation Division was established in the Atomic
Energy Office. The Steering Committee of Nuclear Power was placed under the
direct control of the Prime Minister for review and to resolve the basic plans for
NPP construction and implementation. Furthermore, the NPP construction
business that had been managed by both the Atomic Energy Office and KEPCO
was unified under the leadership of KEPCO.
36 Nuclear Korea
The Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Regulations

IAEA recommended establishing the legislation system of nuclear power
including nuclear regulations prior to the introduction of a NPP. It is quite rea-
sonable, however, generally very difficult, for the legal and regulatory systems
to match the speed of industrial development in a nation undergoing rapid
industrialization.
When the Korean government finalized the introduction plan of the first
NPP, nuclear regulation activities were mandated to Korea Atomic Energy Re-
search Institute by the Atomic Energy Office. The current legal structure of the
Atomic Energy Act was established in 1982 with full amendment after Kori No.
1 began commercial operation.
Selection of Reactor Technology

Twice during 1966 and 1967, the technical investigation team was dispatched
overseas to survey the development trends of reactor technology and the con-
struction status of the NPPs in the UK, the USA, and Canada. The team re-
ported that the USA and the UK were the leading export countries for the NPP
with Canada as a possible consideration.
In addition, the use of nuclear energy showed a gradual increase in the
world and the nuclear fuel industry was expected to grow significantly. It was
projected that there would be a potential increase in the nuclear fuel price due
to the drastic increase in the demand for nuclear fuel after the 1970s, however,
the nuclear fuel price remained stable because the development of nuclear fuel
technology and the enlargement of the manufacturing facilities reduced the
cost.
On the basis of such a survey result, the ITB for Kori No. 1 was prepared to
issue to GE, W, CE (USA) and BNX (UK). According to the results of the pro-
posal evaluation, the Westinghouse PWR system of the USA and the GEC tur-
bine generator of the UK were ultimately selected.
Feasibility Study
Burn & Roe (USA) was chosen to perform the feasibility review of the first NPP
construction plan because of their experience with NPP feasibility studies.
Financing
The market conditions for the international loans that were required for the
introduction of the NPP at that time were favorable. In the event of an Export
Credit Agency (ECA) loan, many difficulties were expected, including a compli-
cated loan procedure and potential (positive or negative) political influences.
However, the ECA loan proposed by the USA and the UK were selected because
of the low interest rates that were offered with a long-term repayment period.
Unit Capacity
The unit capacity is directly related to plant economics. With the economic and
technical evaluation, the capacity of the first NPP was decided to be above
400MW. The maximum power demand in Korea at the time of commercial
operation in 1976 was expected to be 4,700MW and because the plant’s single
unit capacity had to be within 10% of the maximum power demand, stabiliza-
tion of the electric power network system had to be considered. However, con-
sidering the rapid increase for future power demand, a 600MW class reactor was
finally chosen for the first NPP.
Construction Schedule
The NPP introduction plan was prepared in early 1960 and the first NPP was
expected to be completed in 1974, according to the long-term power develop-
ment plan in 1967. In actuality, the 595MW capacity of Kori No.1 was selected
as a result of bidding and the plant began commercial operation at the end of
December 1975. The construction schedule of the first NPP was delayed due to
various problems, including the owner’s lack of experience, poor national indus-
trial infrastructure, etc. In addition, it was very hard to meet the original con-
struction schedule even with a turnkey contract. Also, various problems such as
the oil crisis in the 1970s contributed to the delay of commercial operation of
Kori Unit 1. In total, the construction was delayed for over 2 years.
Construction of a Single Unit

It was a global practice to construct two NPP units concurrently in order to save on
general management expenses during construction. But during the introduction
38 Nuclear Korea
stage of the NPP, due to economic conditions in Korea, we could not finance the
construction expenses for two units. Thus, only one, Kori No. 1, was constructed.
Industrial Infrastructure
Korea didn’t have experience with large construction projects at the initial stage
of Kori No. 1 construction. There were only several 250MW class thermal pow-
er plants under construction. In addition, most of the construction materials
for Kori No. 1 had to be imported, with the exception of rebar, cement, sand,
aggregate, etc. And like Kori No. 1, Kori No. 2, and Wolsong No. 1 were also
constructed using the turnkey contract method. The turnkey approach had to be
applied because the domestic industrial infrastructure was still at a low level.
However, Kori 3&4 were started with a non-turnkey approach and a con-
tractual obligation for the localization (participation of local companies for
equipment supply and engineering) was included in the contract. The founda-
tion for nuclear technology independence was prepared during the construction
of Kori 3&4.
Technical Standards
The Technical standards of the USAEC (presently NRC) and the British stand-
ard (BS) were applied to the US portion and the UK portion, respectively. The
code and the standard cut-off deadlines were set for the end of 1968, coinciding
with the bid document submission deadline.
Human Resource Development

When the long-term power development plan was finalized in 1966, the domes-
tic human resource needs for the introduction of the NPP were surveyed and
the human resource development plan was prepared by comparing and review-
ing the plans of several foreign countries. The human resource plan focused on
the operation and maintenance aspects of the NPP. In addition, we needed
manpower 1.8 times that of the USA.
When the construction of the first NPP in Korea was planned, there were
two universities that had nuclear engineering departments and the pipeline of
manpower for nuclear power plants was sufficient. A total of 95 engineers had
completed the overseas training for Kori No. 1 and the Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute was in charge of the nuclear theory education for working-
level engineers in Korea.
However, even if the construction was executed with the turnkey contract,
the manpower development plan for the first NPP construction was insufficient
considering that the oversight of the construction work was the owner’s essential
role and the continuous plan of NPP construction had already been prepared.
Lots of technicians and engineers are required during the construction pro-
cess and expatriates might be hired as engineers and special technicians. On the
other hand, unskilled laborers and craft laborers had to be resourced from the
local market. During the initial stage of the first NPP construction in Korea,
there were no big issues associated with mobilizing the necessary manpower be-
cause several petro-chemical plants, including thermal power plants, were under
construction, but the skills training school (ex. welders) was established onsite
and only qualified laborers were placed into construction work. As the quality of
work improved, however, special welders and engineers had to be resourced from
foreign countries.
Feedback on the Experience

When we introduced the first nuclear power plant, the policymakers or utilities
tended to underestimate NPP construction, thinking that they were relatively
simple projects , similar to constructing a thermal power plant. It was essential
for the policymakers to become educated in advance in order to understand the
characteristics of the NPP.
Human resource development for the industrial infrastructure should be
implemented in advance as a top priority and the legal system related to nuclear
power must be established on the same basis. For this purpose, the role between
the utilities and the government agency should be clearly defined in advance.
The NPP introduction plan should be established with sufficient lead time.
The task force team involved in the introduction of the first NPP should be
organized in cooperation with the government and industry–academic–research
sectors. It is recommended that the utilities take the lead role in order to drive
the project forward and expedite the decision-making process.
The first NPP would be constructed with a turnkey base contract, but it is
important to select an overseas company with both experience and technology.
40 Nuclear Korea
It is important to establish a risk-minimization plan to address all potential

problems.
The recording and document management system must be established dur-
ing the construction of the first unit. The document management system that
can compile the experience in a systematic way must be established from the
beginning.
4
A Long-Term Power
Development Plan
The information in this section cannot be applied to many countries because the
electricity market has been restructured and power plant projects are now driven
by the private sector. However, the feedback will be useful to those nations that
are considering introducing a nuclear power plant. In order to establish a long-
term national power development plan, overall factors such as the national econ-
omy, energy and other available resources, industrial and technical capabilities,
future prospects, and environmental impacts, etc. must be carefully reviewed and
studied. Technical features and investments required for the full cycle of genera-
tion, transmission, distribution, and sales must also be reviewed carefully.
Power Industry and Development Plan

To create a long-term power development plan, we first need to develop a power
generation and transmission plan by accurately predicting the growth in de-
mand, selecting a transmission method centered on the demand site, and con-
sidering the demand management that will be achieved by using appropriate
means. The construction of power plants and transmission and distribution dif-
fers depending on the technology selected, but usually there is a long-term plan
with a margin of 5 years or more, and a revised plan is created every 2–3 years to
account for changes in the environment. Many countries without natural re-
sources, such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, import and use fuel from abroad for
41
42 Nuclear Korea
thermal power or nuclear power. In this case, securing long-term stability from
price fluctuations is also important in establishing long-term power plant con-
struction plans. It is an important factor to consider. The selection of the trans-
mission voltage and the distribution voltage are determined by examining the
amount of transport power and line loss.
In the case of power generation, the generation method can be selected ac-
cording to fossil fuel resources such as oil, gas, coal, and hydropower. In the case
of nuclear power generation, even if there is a separate uranium resource, it is
not easy to adopt it due to the difficulty of nuclear power generation technology.
In recent years, the development of renewable energy, such as solar, wind, or
biomass-based power generation, is being actively promoted due to the impact
of thermal power on climate warming and the avoidance of nuclear power.
The size of power generation or transmission facilities depends largely on
the system capacity of the area where the facility will be built. In addition, the
unit capacity should be within 10% of the total system installation capacity. In
the case of nuclear power generation, the initial construction investment cost is
more than twice that of the thermal power generation method, and the econo-
mies of scale according to the unit capacity are large, making it difficult to con-
struct a small capacity power plant (a large capacity increases the economics). In
recent years, however, the development of standardized small- and medium-
sized nuclear power plants has been actively progressing.
To develop the power development plan, the annual and partial load curves
are reviewed. Even though the initial investment costs are somewhat higher, the
power source with a lower fuel cost is selected. However, in order to cover the
peak load, a generation method with speedy maneuverability should be consid-
ered, even though the generation cost is a bit high.
Power Demand and Supply Plan

In order to support the national economic growth and a good quality of life, it
is necessary to supply high-quality electricity. It is also important to maintain
the proper scale of power generation and transmission facilities to meet the
long-term growth in demand and maintain reliability. In planning the expan-
sion of supply facilities, it is necessary to plan for the maximum power demand
in the anticipated year and take into account the appropriate reserve ratio.
The key to the electricity supply and demand plan is how to establish an
optimal facility investment plan in consideration of the appropriate reserve ratio.
A Long-Term Power Development Plan 43
The reserve ratio for maximum demand depends on the size of the system, but it
is advisable to have a margin of 15%–20%. This includes power reserves that re-
spond instantly to power load fluctuations, operational reserves that include
standby reserves that can respond within 10 minutes, standby reserves that can
respond within 20 minutes, and alternative reserves that can respond within 2
hours. The reserve ratio is set in consideration of the transmission line stop and
plant maintenance.
When planning the construction of power plants, in addition to technical
and economic reviews, the environmental impact factors should be assessed and
security considerations relating to the stable supply of fuel sources should be
taken into account. In addition, the equipment and devices of the power gen-
eration or transmission facilities are expensive with advanced technology. There-
fore, a strategy should be formulated along with the technology development
plan that takes into consideration the localization of these facilities or the use of
the local contents. In addition, the electricity supply and demand plan is usually
for a long term of 10–20 years, and it is a good idea to establish a plan that takes
into consideration the development of new technology products that will occur
during that period of time.
Methods for Power Demand and Supply Planning

The electricity supply and demand plan consists of a short-term plan on a daily,
weekly, monthly, and yearly basis, as well as a long-term plan for five to twenty
years in the future. To establish an effective long-term plan, sectoral plans such as
demand forecasting, construction and phase-out of power generation facilities,
system expansion, and demand management should be preceded and include a
financing plan for implementation. Sectoral plans are usually drawn up by small
groups from the power company and experts from academia and research insti-
tutes, including representatives from government and civic groups. After the
creation and final review of the plan by the high commission, the government
will announce it.
Demand Forecast
The expected sales volume is estimated by measuring the demand for electricity
by segmenting it hourly, monthly, and seasonally, with the final demand being
44 Nuclear Korea
forecasted by reflecting the demand management target. The method for fore-
casting sales is as follows:
(1) Prepare the short-term forecast

(2) Compare it to the long-term forecast
(3) Make corrections by using trend analysis and model equation
(4) Create three demand forecasts: base, upper, and lower
(5) Finally, calculate the reference of maximum demand
Demand forecasting is usually broken down into three large sectors: resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial. The demand for housing is usually calcu-
lated by dividing it into household appliances such as TVs, washing machines,
refrigerators, fans, and air conditioners, as well as other housing demands such
as lighting. Forecast other housing demands by forecasting the number of ac-
commodations and changes in home usage, taking into account the number of
households, population, GDP, last year’s demand, and real housing rates.
Commercial demand is estimated in four categories: transport, water, pub-
lic, and service. We estimate transportation demand by considering the road
construction plans and the transport distances in order to improve transporta-
tion. Water demand is estimated by analyzing the previous year’s demand and
the trend of increasing consumption. We estimate the public demand by analyz-
ing the previous year’s performance and GDP growth outlook, and the demand
for service is based on the trend of service sector fluctuations, GDP, real service
charges, and the last year’s demand.
Industrial demand is estimated by subdividing into nine manufacturing
sectors, including food and beverage, textile apparel, paper printing, chemical
petroleum, nonmetallic minerals, primary metals, machinery and electronics,
lumber, and other sectors. For these industrial demand forecasts, self-consump-
tion is also considered, taking into account changes in the industrial structure
reflecting the previous year’s performance by industry, real industrial charges,
and the GDP outlook by industry sector.
Based on the forecasted demand for the residential, commercial, and indus-
trial sectors, the total power sales are calculated and the maximum power for the
year is estimated. Maximum power forecasting takes into account complex fac-
tors such as the change of load curve, on-site power and transmission loss rate,
seasonal index, working day weighting factor, hourly weighting factor, and the
maximum demand forecasting date and weather factor.
Supply Plan
To prepare the facility plan, draft an optimized computer model (WASP, etc.)
that takes into account various factors such as economic feasibility, system oper-
ability, and environment and then prepare a standard power generation facility
plan in consideration of energy policy, optimal power configuration, and reserve
ratio. The power generation plan usually includes the yearly facility construction
plan, the supply and demand outlook, the power generation outlook, the fuel
consumption outlook, and the investment outlook.
To develop a power plant plan, secure a stable supply reliability by consider-
ing the reserve power facilities sufficient to meet the expected maximum de-
mand for the year. Plan the generation mix based on the optimal power mix
taking into consideration the proper allocation of resources.
Major Considerations for Plan Development

Optimum Supply Reliability
In order to maintain a stable electricity system, it is essential to secure minimum
supply reliability, which is closely related to the industrial and living standards
of a country. This is because the demand for high-quality electricity increases in
parallel with the increase of home appliances and the development of precision
industries. The supply reliability standard usually applies the Loss of Load Prob-
ability (LOLP) index, which is the concept of stochastic supply failure. The US
and Canada apply 0.1 days/year and Japan applies 0.3 days/year. Korea applies
0.5 days/year. In order to maintain this LOLP standard, a reserve rate of at least
15%–17% must be secured.
Optimum Energy Mix

In planning the expansion of power facilities, factors such as the economics of
the generation source, convenience of system operation, and environmental
friendliness such as compliance with the Climate Change Convention should be
carefully evaluated when constructing the power source for the target year.
If abundant resources such as hydroelectric or fossil fuels exist in the country,
46 Nuclear Korea
hydroelectric power or thermal power generation should be considered in light

of the use of self-existing resources.
In examining economic feasibility, the cost according to the change of the
energy mix is reviewed by computer model to derive the power composition
ratio that minimizes the cost. In reviewing the system operability, the power
increase/deceleration capability and start/stop characteristics of each power sup-
ply facility are considered, and the peak facility for frequency control is consid-
ered as well. In reviewing the environment, if the target is assigned according to
the international convention, the facility configuration required to meet the
emission source unit is considered.
Hydropower and nuclear power are usually more advantageous than coal
and gas, etc. in terms of securing fuel and maintaining the environment but are
relatively disadvantageous in securing investment resources and selecting con-
struction sites. In the case of nuclear power generation, the initial investment
cost is high, so it is difficult to make the decision to introduce the NPP. How-
ever, the fuel cost is low, and the supply source is diversified, so it is easy to se-
cure raw materials and it does not emit substances that impact the environment
such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur oxide, etc. Due to its low environ-
mental impact, it is appropriate to consider it as a base load facility. Renewable
energy sources such as wind power, solar power, and small hydropower are excel-
lent in that they do not cause environmental hazards. However, they are still
limited due to their small unit capacity, economic inefficiency, location con-
straints, and difficulty in following the load.
In the case of Korea, nuclear power is used as a base load facility because it
has high initial investment and low fuel cost, and it is economical at high avail-
ability. It is a peak load facility for gas power generation with a high fuel cost but
a low investment cost and good maneuverability. In the case of coal power gen-
eration, the initial investment cost is less than nuclear power but higher than
gas, the fuel cost lies between nuclear power and gas, and the market for fuel is
relatively easy, so it is adopted as an intermediate load facility.
Transmission Plan
The transmission and distribution plan is established to build a healthy power
transportation system that supplies electricity to the demand center in a timely
and stable manner according to the long-term supply and demand for power. In
order to establish such a plan, we need to increase the stability and reliability of
the system. This is achieved by establishing a transmission system with flexibility

that takes into consideration the environmental change of the facility as well as
the conditions in the surrounding area, while ensuring the proper completion of
the project with objectivity and transparency. In addition, we will use the new
method of system analysis and make the plan more efficient and economical
while we are increasing the system volume.
Transmission and distribution planning is usually undertaken every two
years in connection with the establishment of a long-term power supply and
demand plan (the target planning period is 15 years).
The transmission plan is based on regional load forecasts that are collected
during demand forecasting and system impact assessment related to power
plant connection according to the power plant construction and abolition
plan. This document should be reviewed, and feedback should be gathered. In
addition, consider alternatives to solve the identified problems, review the
impact, and examine the economic feasibility. To establish such a plan, it
should be reviewed by a specialized system planning committee composed of
academics, research institutes, and related experts. In addition, if a request is
made for access by an independent private power generator or a high-voltage
hydronic customer, it will be revised and reflected through relevant regula-
tions and procedures.
To establish the integrated facility plan, the transmission cost and the gen-
eration cost, including the additional cost to connect the grid to the planned
plants, should be calculated in consideration of the social cost of the environ-
mental impact and public acceptance When supply end loads are calculated,
they exclude on-site power consumption, grid losses, and demand from islands
not connected to the country. In view of the past year, the transmission trans-
former load is forecasted in terms of the random peak demand and the simulta-
neous peak demand of multiple substations, in consideration of the track record
of peak demand. At this time, the natural growth rate of the population along
with new housing development plans such as for new towns and housing sites,
are considered. Simultaneous maximum power is distributed by region from the
top down, based on the nation’s largest power demand forecast. Direct transmis-
sion loads reflect the natural growth trend of existing industrial loads along with
new industrial development plans. The regional load allocation is estimated by
using the regional demand forecasting computer program and dividing the
whole country into load-oriented regions, reflecting regional economic indica-
tors and load growth performance.
48 Nuclear Korea
The following basic guidelines are to be followed when developing trans-

mission plans.
(1) Converge the power supply and demand basic plan to ensure timely expan-
sion of transmission and transmission facilities to secure system reliability
and to ensure supply stability by following the planning process.
(2) Set long-term system composition goals to promote role-sharing by trans-
mission voltage.
(3) Pursue economic feasibility while maintaining proper supply reliability.
This is achieved by securing the necessary performance characteristics of the
power transmission equipment by harmonizing economics with supply
stability.
(4) Establish a customer-oriented facility plan based on the planning criteria in
order to improve the supply method by demand level. In addition, evaluate
the impact on the system according to the location of the power plant.
(5) In order to efficiently promote transmission network connection and rein-
forcement projects, the appropriate transmission network should be secured
while taking the opinions of the transmission network connection custom-
ers into account.
In the transmission plan, the relevant governmental notices and standards, such
as transmission facility standards, power system reliability, electrical quality
maintenance standards, and regulations on the use of transmission facilities, are
to be observed. The transmission facilities are designed for high-voltage such as
100kV, 200kV, and 300kV, as well as 500kV, 700kV, and 1,000kV-class ultra-
high voltage in consideration of the growing system scale and power supply
fluctuations due to regional supply and demand imbalances. As the economic
scale expands, the regional exchange increases, and more higher-voltage trans-
mission facilities are needed.
Harmonization of Economics and Supply Stability

The following are recommendations for how to maintain the reliability of the
power system. We have to maintain “Power Grid Reliability and Electrical Qual-
ity Standards.” In case of a single failure, overload of some facilities is allowed,
however, continuous supply capacity should be secured. In case of redundant
failure, short-time overload and temporary load drop are allowed, however, sys-
tem instability and permanent load drop should be prevented.
The following principles are to be implemented in order to ensure the neces-

sary performance characteristics of the transmission and substation equipment:
(1) In order to ensure the stability of a large power grid, timely expansion of
transmission lines and substations for grid connection of large-capacity
power complexes should be planned. In addition, timely expansion of the
necessary power system stabilization facilities, such as flexible transmission
systems and the stationary reactive power compensator, is planned.
(2) The fault current countermeasures should be prepared and operated in con-
sideration of the effects on economic performance and system reliability, as
well as site conditions.
• Separation of lower transmission line installed between high voltage
substations
• Separating bus bar according to installation and withdrawal change
• Reactor installation
• Breaker replacement
• Short-term system configuration change in consideration of the system
operation aspect
(3) Establish countermeasures for balancing supply and demand for reactive
power. As a countermeasure for reactive power supply in heavy loads, the
construction of decentralized power supply facilities in the load center area
will be expanded, as will the installation of power capacitors. Countermeas-
ures for light loads include partial opening of transmission lines or expan-
sion of shunt reactor installation.
Establishment of an Integrated Financing Plan

In order to realize both the long-term power development plan and system plan,
an enormous amount of funding is required. To secure the necessary funds,
countries may consider direct budget support and the creation of low-interest
funds through the issuance of government bonds. If the size of the electricity
market is large enough and the electricity demand is continuously increasing, the
funding can be covered by the electricity tariff. In theory, financing through elec-
tricity bill collection would be possible. However, in most cases, large-scale funds
are invested in the construction of power facilities over a long period of time, so
it is difficult to expect successful projects to be funded only by financing from the
electricity bill.
50 Nuclear Korea
If funding is not possible with government support or equity capital alone,

external capital must be raised. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to secure
high-quality funds that can reduce the interest rate burden and prolong the re-
payment period. Fortunately, in many cases, suppliers often assist with financ-
ing the construction of new generation or transmission substations. However,
even in the case of financial support from suppliers, the institutions that provide
financial support usually agree to financing only after carefully reviewing the
feasibility of the project and require a government guarantee or a third-party
financial statement from a solid credit institution to ensure debt performance.
Many countries are subject to differential rates based on credit ratings as-
sessed by the rating agencies. Funds for business promotion are usually provided
by public loans with relatively low interest rates and commercial loans with rela-
tively high interest rates. In this case, most financial donor countries are subject
to provide financial support that is less than 85% of the total contract amount
of their supply. In the case of power supply development by an independent
power producer, it is possible to finance through a financial institution. In this
case, the restrictions on the supply line of equipment are lessened.

To establish a long-term power development plan, it is necessary to follow the
mid- to long-term economic development plan or outlook at the national level.
It is important to accurately forecast demand growth and secure supply reliabil-
ity. To do this, it is necessary to utilize a comprehensive predictive computer
program and to have a professional expert to manage it accurately.
Determination of the appropriate reserve ratio and appropriate supply reli-
ability should be preceded by the maximum demand forecast. The appropriate
reserve ratio and supply reliability are determined by considering the size of the
electricity system, the level of electricity quality, and the investment plan for the
project before dispatch.
The proper power composition ratio for nuclear power plants should be
determined not only in terms of power supply capacity but also in combination.
In other words, consideration should be given to the energy security level, the
goal of suppressing carbon dioxide emissions against global warming, depend-
ence on overseas energy, and changes in industrial composition.
Long-term transmission and substation plans must be in parallel with the
power plant construction project. Due to financial difficulties, while power
plants are being constructed, the investment in transmission lines and transmis-
sion facilities can be delayed, which can lead to a loss of supply capacity and
electricity quality. Power plant construction and transmission as well as substa-
tion facilities require a huge financial investment over the long term, so it is
necessary to effectively raise external capital as well as equity capital. Various
regulatory requirements exist by country and region, but most of all, the govern-
ment or government-invested institutions should secure funds under the most
favorable financial conditions.
5
Feasibility Study for
NPP Construction
Planning and construction of a NPP is a complicated process. If a nation has

already adopted nuclear power and has construction experience, it would be
easier to carry out a feasibility study for an additional NPP program. However,
if the country is introducing nuclear power for the first time, being precise and
detailed during the preparation stage is a prerequisite, even though it’ll take
more time and cost more money.
There should be a clear reason for a country or utility to initiate a NPP
construction program. The project is a national program regardless of by whom
the project will be managed; utility or a national institute. In most nations with-
out sufficient hydro or fossil energy resources, there is a heavy reliance on im-
ported fuel sources, which would make it easier to prove the economic benefits
of nuclear power. As renewable energy is being promoted all over the world,
nuclear power has faced severe challenges. However, keep in mind that it is not
recommended to initiate a NPP construction program based solely on the po-
tential economic benefits of nuclear power.
In order to establish a basic plan for the introduction of nuclear power, it is
essential to consider all of the necessary factors: improvement of national energy
security by diversifying fuel supply sources, adopting a national technology and
industry enhancement strategy, and CO2 emission reduction. Following the na-
tional policy decisions, a feasibility study with a detailed technical review and
economic evaluation must be carried out in order to secure financial support.
53
54 Nuclear Korea
Preliminary Feasibility Study for NPP Introduction

Site Selection
To select a nuclear power plant site, the following items should be considered:
geological and seismic features, availability of cooling water, adequate transpor-
tation routes for nuclear materials, major heavy components, and other equip-
ment and materials, consideration in regard to network connection to the
existing grid, the study of demography and available industries to support site
work, meteorological surveys, etc.
For preliminary assessment of geologic and seismic conditions, an initial
boring survey is required to confirm the status of the base rock and a survey on
seismic traces must be performed surrounding the proposed site. Studies, docu-
ments, and data compiled by national institutes or universities must be reviewed
for site conditions in order to check the conformity to NPP design criteria. In
the past, horizontal acceleration of 0.15g was used as a seismic design criterion,
but now most NPP designs will withstand over 0.3g of horizontal acceleration,
allowing for greater resistance to stronger earthquakes.
A study of the cooling water supply requires research into whether a nearby
river, lake, or the sea can supply enough cooling water for the NPP. If a supply
of the required amount of cooling water cannot be attained, a cooling tower
may be built to supplement it. Also, plans to secure a fresh water source neces-
sary for plant commissioning and normal operation must be reviewed at this
time.
To assess the logistics, various studies on transportation routes for special
nuclear materials like nuclear fuels or radioactive waste, major heavy equipment
like the reactor, steam generator, turbine, and generator (which can weigh a few
hundred tons), must be performed. Access roads to deliver equipment and ma-
terials required for construction and operation must also be considered. Topo-
graphical review, both via map and on-site tours, will be necessary in order to
make informed decisions. Foundation design information and design load ca-
pacity for all bridges on every potential rail or road must be carefully studied. If
land transportation proves difficult, other transport measures using sea, river, or
lakes must also be taken into consideration.
A system study on an ultra-high voltage transmission line connection to the
existing national grid for the transportation of power generated from the pro-
posed nuclear plant to the demand center must be carried out in advance.
Also, a study must be carried out on installing a switchyard facility to receive
Feasibility Study for NPP Construction 55
high-voltage electricity onsite in order to secure the necessary power for con-
struction work, commissioning, and normal operation.
A study on industries, population distribution, and residential areas sur-
rounding the proposed site is required and must take into consideration all
postulated accidents that could potentially take place during the operation of a
nuclear plant. An exclusion area of a certain distance from the reactor center is
established in order to limit and minimize any possible damage to the public
from a potential accident. The low population area is also reviewed in considera-
tion of the integrated dose rate. Therefore, it is better to choose a nuclear plant
site away from a population center or an industrial zone.
A meteorological study covering wind direction, speed, and temperature
variations is initially carried out by utilizing data from national institutes, uni-
versities, and research organizations. Be sure to take special care to identify any
population center that is located downwind from the proposed site. Also, be
sure to identify any specific abnormalities that have been reported in the past.
As soon as the proposed site is established, put a meteorological tower at the site
and begin collecting detailed information and data to be used for plant design
and safety analysis.
Nuclear Regulations and International Treaties

In order to introduce a NPP program and implement construction work suc-
cessfully, it is essential to carry out a full study of the regulation framework and
international treaties in order to prevent any undesirable legal disputes that may
surface during different phases of construction. A licensing process to complete-
ly verify the safety of plant operators and the neighboring public is established
for the full cycle of the plant project program, from design to manufacturing,
installation, commissioning and operation, and even for decommissioning.
Also, an international commitment to safeguard the nuclear materials while
transporting and transferring them, along with cooperation in the event of a
severe nuclear accident, must be secured through international treaties.
Depending on the progress of the program and national capabilities, a na-
tion with a nuclear program must consider establishing and operating a proper
licensing system. In the case of Korea, when the nation decided to introduce
nuclear power in the late 1960s, the country was not fully prepared in regard to
laws and regulations or the codes and standards required for nuclear safety li-
censing. Due to its lack of a domestic technical base and industrial skills for
56 Nuclear Korea
starting a nuclear program, Korea had to invite bids on complete turnkey solu-
tions. The primary contractor was given the full responsibility for the design,
supply, construction, and commissioning of the first nuclear plant. Korea also
had to follow the licensing requirements for safety regulation, and codes and
standards applied to the reference plant from the supplying country. As the nu-
clear power plants were being added, the code and standards, the nuclear regula-
tions, and the licensing system were also being improved and reinforced. The
atomic energy law provides the legal basis for safety regulation, non-prolifera-
tion, and control for the peaceful use of atomic energy. A comprehensive licens-
ing system with appropriate regulations must be established to regulate activities
related to the construction and operation of reactors and related facilities, nu-
clear fuel cycle business facilities and production, sales and use of nuclear mate-
rials, radioisotopes, and radiation generation devices, etc. In addition, a
regulatory basis for the licensing and control of decommissioning, disposing,
and transporting activities for these facilities must be prepared in advance.
When a nation introduces its first NPP program but lacks the independent
capability to construct and operate a NPP and also does not have an established
nuclear fuel cycle business, the country supplying the reactor and nuclear materials
will require a bilateral agreement for the peaceful use of atomic energy to be estab-
lished between the supplying country and the introducing (host) country prior to
signing the project contract. The host country is also requested to join the interna-
tional agreement that they will take measures to limit damages in case of a nuclear
accident and to provide appropriate compensation. The country is also asked to
sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
The countries use the framework of bilateral agreement for a new nuclear program.
They are not required to issue international bidding. In the world nuclear market,
Russia is enjoying this scheme by using their political and financial influence. I
have lost opportunities for new nuclear projects because of this trick.
On the contrary, the US is in trouble for signing the 123 Agreement, which
prevents enrichment and reprocessing in order to assure non-proliferation. The
123 Agreement that was signed by the USA and UAE is also called the “Golden
Agreement” however, it is not applicable to Saudi Arabia.
Industrial Infrastructure
Another important study that should be performed prior to the construction of
a NPP is the study of the nation’s industrial infrastructure. A NPP is a complex
technology that requires careful coordination with civil, architectural, mechani-

cal, electrical, instrumentation, and control technologies, along with radiation
control and nuclear fuel handling. Typically, more then a million-man days
of labor is required to complete the construction of a new NPP and hundreds of
individuals are required to operate and maintain the plant. We need a number of
certified operators to meet the regulatory requirements. Installation of piping
and containment vessels requires qualified welders with proper licenses, and well-
trained and skilled technicians must be available for the installation and mainte-
nance of mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, and instrumentation.
A plan for the supply of domestic and import equipment and materials and
related technologies must be carefully developed following a vendor survey.
Non-turnkey contracts for the design, equipment supply, and construction of
the plant may be preferred by countries with a good technical and industrial
base but if not, a turnkey type of contract may be preferred. To promote the
local industry, a step-by-step transfer of major technologies from supplier to lo-
cal companies may be incorporated into the main supply contract.
Reactor Technology
The selection of reactor technology is not just a technical issue. On the technical
side, we are now using third-generation reactor technology. The third-generation
technology is divided into a fully passive reactor and a mixture of active and passive
reactors. There is controversy about the nuclear safety features. However, two de-
sign criteria apply. One is the design standard of the US NRC and the other is the
EUR design standard of Europe. The role of the IAEA became important following
the Fukushima accident. Thus, the IAEA may be mistaken as a regulator. IAEA also
proposes mixed safeguards. In order to facilitate financing and to enhance nuclear
safety, the SMR (Small & Modular Reactor) is also under development. One has
not yet been proven and commercialized, however, it will occur in the near term.
There has been a conflict in the technical requirements. Most countries in-
sist on proven technology in order to assure nuclear safety and performance.
Although the mainstream of reactor technology is now in the third generation,
there has not yet been a new plant in commercial operation. Korea is operating
two units of the APR1400 in Korea and are in the process of constructing two
more units. In addition, four units are under construction in UAE. We are now
able to verify and validate the design and performance of third-generation reac-
tor technology.
58 Nuclear Korea
Preliminary Economic Evaluation

An economic evaluation should be performed between planned nuclear power
and other available power sources, especially renewable energy, when a nation
considers their introduction of a nuclear power program. Although there is a
cost fluctuation depending on the size of the reactor, billions of dollars of capital
investment are usually required to build a NPP. However, nuclear power may
prove economical in the long run for countries that rely on imported fossil fuels
because nuclear fuel is comparatively less expensive.
The primary factors for economic evaluation are the construction costs, fi-
nancing costs, operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs, tariffs and taxes, etc.
The impact of the escalation and fluctuation of the interest rate during the con-
struction period is high because the construction of the first nuclear power plant
may take much longer than originally planned. Therefore, the initial capital
burden may be reduced in cases where there is plenty of retained capital, prices
are stable with minimal escalation, and extremely low interest financing options
are available. It is essential to secure a low interest rate in order to improve pro-
ject economy, especially when capital must be financed from a foreign institu-
tion due to difficulties in securing the necessary funds domestically.
Usually loan arrangements can be made through major suppliers, but some
lenders may be reluctant to extend their financing support for a nuclear pro-
gram. It is essential to raise enough funds internally to cover any shortages be-
cause lending institutions often stipulate that borrowed funds can only be spent
for services and goods originating from the country of the lender and supplier.
Effective bidding management in order to reduce procurement costs, short-
ening the construction schedule, and securing a good financing option are all
important factors to improving the economics of a nuclear project.
Feasibility Study for Nuclear Power

Plant Construction
Nuclear Power Plant Capacity
To initiate a nuclear power construction project, it is essential to incorporate the
timing and the capacity of the unit being considered into the long-term power
development plan. It is better to establish a site development plan for introduc-
ing a nuclear power plant so that the unit capacity does not exceed more than
10% of the total capacity of the electric network system by the completion of
the project. This is to limit any provable system disturbances from the applicable
plant that arise from the loss of power caused by unexpected incidents such as
the sudden failure of the transmission network. I think this recommendation
should be carefully reviewed in terms of the stability of the grid system. There
are many cases where the electricity grid is connected to neighboring countries
and where there is a large number of third-generation reactors over 1000MW of
unit capacity. Unfortunately, we don’t have many choices because SMR is under
development.
The required number of units can be determined by the size and the condi-
tions of the nuclear site. Korea has constructed two units simultaneously at one
nuclear site in consideration of manpower and the mobilization of construction
material. The standard plant design has been developed to use the common fa-
cilities of two units.
Project Management Plan

It usually takes more than 10 years and billions of dollars in capital investment
for a nuclear power project to go from the planning stage to completion. It is
essential to determine whether to adopt a turnkey basis, hiring one contractor to
assume the total responsibility for the project or to adopt a non-turnkey solution
that takes into consideration the localization of technology. It is also important
to set up the implementation plans for the organization, manpower mobiliza-
tion, and training programs that will cover all stages, from planning through
design, procurement, construction, startup, and operation.
Qualified Bidder Selection

It is very important to select qualified bidders. One has to decide on the policy
for the bidding process; whether to invite suppliers of all different reactor types
who have proven records through commercial operation, or to invite only ven-
dors with specific reactor types. If the decision is made to open the bid to all
reactor types, it is advisable to open it to only the appropriate number of bidders
through a prequalification process. Inviting too many bidders may complicate
the bid management process. But care must be taken in the selection of bidders
because the successful vendor must be able to handle such a huge project. The
60 Nuclear Korea
project owner must also carefully study the track records of vendors for design,
fabrication, and supply of major equipment, as well as their ability to provide a
warranty of their overall performance upon the completion of the power plant
construction.
Site Characterization
The site data required to set the design criteria must be collected in advance
through detailed study and must then be forwarded to the vendors that are pre-
paring the construction proposal for the nuclear power plant. The study must
include the collection of detailed seismic and subsoil information required for
setting the plant foundation design criteria. In addition, precise local meteoro-
logical and oceanographic (tsunami) data is required if the plant site is located
on the seashore. Comprehensive study of transportation methods and the avail-
ability of raw materials such as aggregate and fresh water for construction use
must also be conducted and carried out together.
Economic Study
It is quite common to rely on loans from foreign lending institutions for the
mobilization of the capital required for the nuclear power plant construction,
and lending agencies will usually request the results of a detailed economic study
of the proposed project be submitted. The owner must be able to prove the
profitability of the project, with appropriate return on investment, based upon
the generating cost compared to other available power sources.
Nuclear power cost is comprised of capital cost, operation cost, maintenance
cost, and fuel cost. Capital cost is derived by applying the capital carrying charge
rate to the total initial investment capital cost, both directly and indirectly for
planning, design, construction, and commissioning of the plant. Because it usu-
ally takes more than 10 years for the construction of a NPP to be completed, one
must also consider the cost related to price escalation and interest rate fluctuation
during the construction period. While estimating the construction budget, addi-
tional capital must be set aside to cope with unexpected circumstances that may
arise during the extended construction period.
Operation and maintenance cost is composed of common factors such
as manpower cost, cost of materials and consumables for maintenance work,
administration costs at the headquarters as well as on site, taxes, insurance, and

other general expenses that are levied on all forms of power production. In ad-
dition, there are special cost factors that are applied only to the costs associated
with decommissioning and radioactive waste management.
Nuclear fuel cost is composed of raw uranium material cost, conversion
cost, enrichment cost, and fuel fabrication cost. But it is much cheaper than the
thermal power plant fuel cost. Plant capacity factor, refueling interval, capital
carrying charge rate, etc. must also be considered when calculating nuclear
fuel cost.
It is essential to carry out a sensitivity analysis that takes into considera-
tion capital expenditure changes and plant capacity factor variations in order to
cope with any uncertainties during construction and operation. Construction of
the first NPP will take approximately 10 years to complete, but capital expendi-
tures will be heavily concentrated during the first five to six years of the con-
struction period. A key to successfully controlling costs will depend on effective
critical path management for the construction schedule. Although low plant
capacity factor is expected during the period between the start of commercial
operation and stabilization, high capacity factor is usually achievable with base
load operation after stabilization of the plant. The systematic training program
for operations in collaboration with a well-prepared maintenance program are
the key elements for the successful achievement of plant capacity factor
improvement.
Financing
One of the key elements for the success of a nuclear power plant construction
project is the effective mobilization of the financing package. Because construc-
tion would need several billion dollars and takes over 10 years to complete, it is
difficult to find interested investors for a project that spans such a length of time
without any financial return. But in most cases, major equipment vendors ex-
tend supplier credits. However, the owner must prepare another financing plan
to cover the costs for items not eligible under the suppliers’ credit, because use
of supplier credit is usually limited to payment for goods and services originat-
ing from the supplying countries only.
The issue is a government guarantee. If a government guarantee is in place
for a long-term PPA, it can make investors feel more comfortable. However,
many countries are unable to provide either a guarantee from the government or
62 Nuclear Korea
the long-term PPA. The UK has applied the strike price and the contract-for-
difference scheme for the Hinckley Point C project. But it’ll not apply to pro-
jects in the future. A new version of the RAB (Regulated Asset Base) financing
model is under development.
The electricity market structure can’t assure any commitment or guarantee
to make the investors comfortable about the investment into the construction
of nuclear power plants.

For the (preliminary) feasibility study, it is important to select a specialized and
experienced engineering company. It is desirable to promote joint participation
by selecting a professional company from a third country for the introduction
of the first NPP.
The preliminary feasibility study would be structured to limit the range and
reduce the time required for a detailed survey. Major review elements are se-
lected and implemented to meet the situations of the respective country. In
particular, a full comparison must be made for economic feasibility with the
other power sources within the country.
The results of the preliminary feasibility study must be reviewed and ap-
proved with enough time to undertake the feasibility study for the NPP con-
struction. It is desirable for the utility to undertake the preliminary feasibility
survey rather than the government.
In order to determine the project management plan, a review must be made
to meet the future development of national industries from the current infra-
structure. In the event that the infrastructure base is vulnerable, it would be
desirable to plan the contract method, human resources development, and
build-up of technical capability on a step-by-step basis.
Part III
Preparation for the
First NPP
6
Organization Required to
Introduce a NPP
In order to make decisions regarding the introduction of a NPP, opinions of

experts and the general public must be included during the initial stage of the
policy development. In order to introduce the first nuclear power program, a
review of all social and technical issues must be performed. Introducing the
subject of a NPP is a difficult task for a private company. Therefore, before any
utility or investor participation, the government needs to contemplate its nu-
clear energy policy and essential action plans during the early stages and must
also confirm the fundamental industrial infrastructure. It is desirable to organize
a Nuclear Power Implementation Agency (NPIA) to undertake the introduction
of the nuclear power plant as a governmental organization. (Note: The organiza-
tion for the NPP introduction was quoted from IAEA TECDOC. Please refer
to IAEA-TECDOC-1513 “Basic infrastructure for a nuclear power project” on
June 2006.)
The Role of NPIA (Nuclear Power

Implementation Agency)
The goal of the NPIA is to establish the measures necessary to develop the na-
tional nuclear power policies for the government’s consideration prior to imple-
menting the introduction of the nuclear power plant; either by a state electric
65
66 Nuclear Korea
power utility or other private business enterprise. The NPIA conducts the fun-
damental assessments, which include:
• the role of nuclear power in the electricity market and the power generation
mix,
• the economics of nuclear power,
• the legal, regulatory, and legislative aspects of nuclear power,
• the environmental impacts and appropriate sites for nuclear power,
• nuclear power technology,
• the nuclear fuel cycle, including radioactive waste management and
decommissioning,
• the role of the government and the power utilities when undertaking a nu-
clear power program,
• the national industrial base and the status of the human resources that are
required for the development of nuclear power,
• the national policy for securing nuclear fuel,
• and public acceptance.
Approximately 18–20 months are required for the NPIA to prepare and
present the nuclear power introduction plan to the government. Upon comple-
tion of the nuclear power plant introduction plan, the NPIA undertakes the role
of implementation of the national nuclear power policy and monitors the pro-
gress of the nuclear power introduction program. The NPIA is a transitory or-
ganization that should be dissolved after accomplishing its task. In addition, the
responsibility for the further implementation of the nuclear power introduction
policies will transfer to a different organization (regulatory organization or nu-
clear power utility).
The Organization of the NPIA

The NPIA has to be established in the upper level of the governmental hierar-
chy in order to make a direct report to the energy- or economy-related minis-
try. In addition, the assignment of a high-ranking official with a sufficient
budget and human resources to head the NPIA, is highly desirable. The NPIA
is the organization that reviews the various fields that are listed in the follow-
ing chart.
Organization Required to Introduce a NPP 67
Organizational Chart of the NPIA
Director of Nuclear
Power Implementation Agency
Electricity Public Economics Technology

Legal
Market Study Consultations Assessment Assessment
Director
Director Director Director Director
- Market structure - National - Infrastructure - Nuclear site - Nuclear laws

- Utility structure information development - Nuclear plant - International
- Electricity mix program cost construction agreements
- Base load/peak - International - Plant cost - Licensing - Law
load communications - Operation - Operations establishing
- Pricing structure - Public cost - Waste regulatory
- Role of the consultation - Fuel cycle cost management body
government - Transboundary - Industrial - Decommissioning - Environmental
issues benefits laws
- Planning and - Localization - Commercial
consents laws
process
- Environmental
assessment
The NPIA is a temporary organization made up of experts where, depending on

their specialization, one person may be in charge of two to three fields and there
is no need for full-time work. In addition, the size of the NPIA and their review
scope depends on the contract method (turnkey or non-turnkey), national lo-
calization or technological independence policy, and others.
Nuclear Regulatory Organization

The regulatory organization for nuclear power must be a completely independ-
ent organization from the project implementation organization. The regulatory
organization is responsible for the regulatory function, the establishment of
safety requirements and regulations, inspections, and others. The regulatory or-
ganization requires minimal manpower during the early stage of the NPP intro-
duction plan, but as the nuclear power introduction progresses, the organization
must be expanded as required.
68 Nuclear Korea
Nuclear Power Regulatory Organizational Chart
Administrative, Legal Technical Support

Nuclear Regulatory
Records, and Staff, Consultants, and
Body (NRB)
Management Service Advisors
Public Information
Codes and Licensing and Inspection and
and International
Standards Assessment Enforcement
Relations
√ Codes √ Site and √ Quality Assurance

√ Standards Environmental Quality Management
√ Regulations √ Civil Works √ Construction
√ Materials Structure Inspection
√ Accounting √ Systems Design √ Operations
√ Fuel cycle Inspection
√ Components √ Safeguards
Design √ Physical Protection
√ Electrical and
Instrumentation
Systems
√ Reactor
Engineering
√ Radiation
Protection
√ Operation
Licensing
Utility Organization
The implementation stages that involve the introduction of a NPP to the utility
or the power company may be classified into the planning stage, the preparation
stage of the ITB, the assessment stage of bid documents, the contract negotia-
tion stage, and the project implementation stage.
The Planning Stage

According to the long-term power development plan, the planning stage is the
final stage in the establishment of the basic construction plan. In general, the
utilities have an advanced method of grid analysis although they introduced the
first NPP. Therefore, the utility should organize the NPP introduction team
while the NPIA is being organized, in order to provide the technical informa-
tion related to the characteristics of nuclear power and to support government
organizations. The project will be fully implemented by the utility after finaliz-
ing the government’s NPP introduction policy.
Preparation Stage of the ITB

The ITB must clearly define the technical, commercial, and financing require-
ments of the purchaser to enable the participation of as many suppliers as pos-
sible. It must also include the assessment criteria for the bid document. During
the initial introduction of nuclear power, experience with the preparation of
ITB documents will be lacking, and it is desirable to receive the support of an
external organization with substantial experience and expertise. The following
chart is an example of the organizational structure in place for the preparation
of the ITB.
Organizational Structure for Preparing the ITB
Utility Expert Consulting Firm
General Specification Commercial, Risk

Technical Specification
(Output Size, Site Sharing, Financing,
(Plant and Fuel Cycle
Location) and Bonds
and Waste Management)
Specification
Bidders Qualification
Specification of the
Criteria Bid Evaluation Criteria
Scope of Supply of
the Bidder and the (Importance of Technology,
Owner Price, Schedule, Commercial
Terms, Penalties and
Liabilities Financing Cost,
Training, Technology Electricity Cost, Technology
Transfer, and Localization Transfer and Localization)
Requirements
70 Nuclear Korea
Bid Documents Assessment Stage

The assessment of the bid documents has to be carried out in accordance with the
assessment criteria specified on the ITB, and the assessment must be open and fair.
If an external expert organization is used for the preparation of the ITB, it is recom-
mended that the external organization participate in the assessment of the bid
documents. The technical document should be assessed in terms of the technical
acceptability and the economics.
Contract Negotiation Stage

In general, two bidders are chosen for the negotiation stage following the assess-
ment of the proposals. Additional requirements, adjustment of the proposal
contents, price reduction, and others are negotiated with the preferred bidder.
For technical matters, it is desirable to enlist the support of an external expert
organization.
Project Implementation Stage

After entering into the contract, the human resources that participated in the
preparation of the bid document, assessment, and contract negotiation are then
transferred into the project organization group. The following chart is an exam-
ple of the organization operated by KEPCO during the construction of Kori
Unit 1. For better management, headquarter organizations and construction
site organizations are classified into three groups according to the progress of the
project.
Organization of KEPCO’s Head Office for Kori Unit 1
Director of the
Construction Project
Division of Nuclear
Power Construction
Division of
Technology
Development
Division of
Internal
and External
Procurement
Quality
Assurance
Office PM Chief at the Site Overseas Office
Office of
Power Group Office of Office of
Project
Company Construction Engineering
Management
Organization of KEPCO’s Construction Office for Kori Unit 1
Stage 1: Six months prior to site grading—Commence construction of the con-

tainment building.
Site Manager
Executive Site Manager
Quality Assurance Section Project Management Section
General Construction Quality

Engineering
Affairs Management Control
Section
Section Section Section
72 Nuclear Korea
Stage 2: Start on the construction of the containment building—Initial fuel

loading.
Site Manager
Executive Site Manager
Quality Project
Assurance Management
Section Section
Administrative General Quality Mechanical

Office Affairs Control Construction
Section Section Section
Electro- Mechanical General

Planning mechanical Construction Affairs
Section Engineering Section Section
Section
T/G
Civil- Mechanical
General Construction
Architectural Section
Affairs Section
Section Engineering
Section
Electric and I&C
Electric
Construction
Primary Section
Procurement Section
System
Section Engineering
Section Tele-
communication I&C Section
Section
Secondary
Public System
Section Engineering Civil
Engineering
Section Construction
Section
Section
Architect
Generation
Construction
Section
Section
Stage 3: Fuel loading—Completion of construction.
Site Manager
Executive Site
Manager
Quality Project
Assurance Management
Section Section
Administration General Affairs Engineering Quality Control

Section Section Section Section

The introduction of the first NPP requires a team with a powerful driving force.
The government needs to prepare and undertake comprehensive measures. For
this purpose, the team should be led by a person who has a good relationship
with the government and a close relationship with the overseas nuclear
industry.
The introduction organization of the utility should be created during the
early stages of the NPP planning, cooperating with the government and other
authorities. The national policy on the introduction of the NPP, namely, the
technology transfer and localization, promotion of the heavy machinery indus-
try, and development of uranium mining, etc. requires consensus in regard to
the strategy between the government and the utility. They will need to devise a
plan in order to forge an effective synergy.
For a utility to undertake the NPP project, it has to secure and develop ex-
perienced professionals in NPP industries as well as other power generation
sectors in advance. For this purpose, it is required to develop the necessary hu-
man resources through well-organized specialized training programs offered by
the overseas technical advisory company. In addition, the plan to use experi-
enced individuals in thermal power plant construction and organization needs to
be prepared in advance.
74 Nuclear Korea
The nuclear power regulatory organization needs to develop a regulatory

staff during the course of legislation of nuclear power related laws. After the pre-
liminary feasibility survey, it must develop a regulation system that fits the cho-
sen reactor technology. Early on, the most highly qualified individuals are
assembled in the nuclear research institute organization. It is desirable to have a
separate system that divides the organization into R&D and regulatory.
7
Legislation Required for
the Introduction of NPPs
When a country introduces nuclear energy for the first time, it must prepare,
in the early stages, the nuclear regulations and licensing system that will be
required to ensure nuclear safety for the construction, operation, and decom-
missioning of the NPP. The site selection and the environmental impact as-
sessment should be prioritized during the early stages of the process because
developing and finalizing the required legal system can take a substantial
amount of time.
The legislation and structure of the licensing system required for ensuring
NPP safety may be different due to the native characteristics and conditions of
each country. However, relatively detailed standards for protecting the employ-
ees in the power plant, the public, and the environment must be established,
with sufficient lead time, prior to implementing the stages of engineering, con-
struction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning.
National Regulatory Requirements

The licensee is entirely responsible for nuclear safety during the operation
of the NPP. However, the government is responsible for the regulations need-
ed to secure the health and safety of the general public and the environment
from accidents, whatever may occur during the operation and maintenance of
the NPP.
75
76 Nuclear Korea
The Role of Government

The government is responsible for creating comprehensive regulatory require-
ments during the early stages of the NPP introduction. Regulations and legisla-
tion must be finalized long before the start of construction of the NPP. The
main goals of the regulations related to the safe operation of the NPP are shown
below.
(1) To provide the legal basis required to form the regulatory body.
(2) To provide the legal basis to regulate site selection, engineering, construc-
tion, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning in order to protect
employees in the plant, the public, and the environment from exposure to
unnecessary radiation hazards.
(3) To provide reasonable financial compensation measures for any large-scale
damage that may occur in the case of a severe accident at the NPP.
(4) To authorize the regulatory body to prepare and implement regulatory re-
quirements related to nuclear accidents.
(5) To establish a government emergency response plan.
(6) To secure a reasonable budget for the work performed by the regulatory
body.
Responsibilities of the Regulatory Body

The main responsibility of the regulatory authority is to ensure protection from
radiation exposure of the on-site employees, the general public, and the sur-
rounding environment during the operation and maintenance of the NPP. In
order to accomplish this goal, the regulatory body has to develop, establish, and
implement nuclear safety principles and standards that will be used as the basis
for all regulatory activities. The following stages must be included in the safety
principles and standards.
(1) Site selection

(2) Engineering
(3) Construction
(4) Startup operation
(5) Normal operation
(6) Decommissioning
Legislation Required for the Introduction of NPPs 77
The following subjects should be included in the safety principles and

standards required for licensing.
(1) Quality assurance

(2) Emergency preparedness plan
(3) Qualification and training of employees
(4) Inspection, testing, and maintenance
(5) Modification of facilities
(6) Site utilization plan
(7) Radiation protection
(8) Environmental protection
(9) Physical protection
(10) Management and accounting related to the safety of nuclear materials
(11) Handling and transportation of nuclear materials within the authorized
site
The regulatory body is responsible for the following activities in coopera-

tion with the related ministries of the government.
(1) Environmental protection

(2) Emergency preparedness plan and response
(3) Management and disposal of radioactive waste; Provide a plan that address-
es the safety requirements for the treatment, storage, transportation, and
disposal of radioactive wastes.
(4) Public responsibility; Comply with international conventions with respect
to national laws and compensation for nuclear damage to a third party.
If necessary, the regulatory body will need to be responsible for the regula-
tions related to the transportation and safeguarding of nuclear materials,
the physical protection of facilities, and the non-radioactive impacts to the
environment.
Requirements of the Regulatory Body

The regulatory body has general responsibility for the oversight and control of all
activities related to siting, engineering, construction, commissioning, operation,
78 Nuclear Korea
maintenance, and decommissioning for the NPP. The regulatory body should not
be responsible for the promotion of nuclear industries, and must be independent
from the applicant, licensee, supplier, and other related institutions. When the
regulatory body exists within the central government organization, functional
independence must be secured. Independence must be ensured in order to evalu-
ate the nuclear safety or environmental protection tasks in an unbiased manner.
The regulatory body must be granted legal power and control in order to effec-
tively undertake the following functions:
(1) Engaging in direct communication with government officials who are high-
up in the hierarchy.
(2) Cooperating with the government bodies that govern health and safety, en-
vironmental protection, and safety control.
(3) In the case of delegating their responsibility or duty to a third party, the
delegated party should be another governmental organization. If the re-
sponsibility is delegated to a non-governmental organization, it should be
by a contract.
(4) Documenting the opinions of a public body, private institutions, or indi-
viduals, if required.
(5) Maintaining contact with overseas regulatory organizations and related in-
ternational institutions.
(6) Controlling access to the proposed NPP site zone while it is under licensing
review.
(7) Issuing the binding instructions to the licensee in order to secure nuclear
safety.
When undertaking the duties mentioned above, the government has to take
the necessary action in order to secure appropriate financing for the regulatory
body to exercise its independent functions effectively.
The regulatory body should follow the pertinent laws and regulations and
will not fully rely on the applicant, licensee, or contractors when performing
their evaluation. Therefore, the regulatory body should hire permanent individu-
als to evaluate the assessment of the applicants or the contractors. The same hu-
man resource and technical competency requirements are applied during the
regulatory inspection process. When forming a regulatory body, it is best to
choose individuals who possess broad capabilities and general knowledge in the
following areas: design evaluation, health, physics, and nuclear safety.
The regulatory body should do its best to perform the following functions:
(1) Review and assess the safety-related information submitted by the applicant
(2) Issue, amend, or cancel authorizations, permits, or licenses
(3) Conduct regulatory inspections
(4) Enforce corrective measures under the law following the violation of a
safety requirement
(5) Secure appropriate emergency response capabilities
(6) Secure remedial action in case of a perceived unstable or unsafe situation
(7) Cooperate with and provide information to other responsible governmental
organizations, international institutions, and the public, when necessary
(8) Secure appropriate data related to personal radiation exposure, release of
radioactive material, management of wastes, the occurrence of an abnor-
mal situation, management of the NPP’s nuclear fuel, human resources,
power plant construction, and operation
(9) Set up the legal system and the regulatory guidelines
(10) Oversee the on-site employees who are responsible for the operation of
the plant
(11) Provide international cooperation
Due to factors such as the conditions under the existing constitution, the
authority and experience of existing organizations in the country concerned,
and the need to efficiently utilize national resources, the regulatory body may
perform the following additional functions:
(1) Perform independent radiation monitoring within the NPP site and its sur-
rounding area
(2) Conduct independent tests and quality inspections
(3) Conduct safety-related R&D
(4) Oversee the human resources and provide medical examinations
The regulatory body has to arrange for other governmental bodies, countries,
international organizations, and the public to be provided with the information
about the regulatory philosophy, organization, process, and decision making.
The following should be included herein.
(1) A document that includes the legal basis for the establishment and opera-
tion of the regulatory body
80 Nuclear Korea
(2) A document and notice related to the proposed or in-process licensing and
law enforcement
(3) Periodic information about the overall activities of the regulatory body
The regulatory body needs to make appropriate arrangements for other gov-
ernment bodies, countries, international organizations, and the public to be aware
of events, accidents, and decisions related to site selection, construction, commis-
sioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.
The International Safety System

After the Chernobyl accident, the member countries of the IAEA supported the
establishment of two international agreements. The first was the Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the other was the Convention
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The
purpose of these conventions was to let the IAEA carry out emergency actions
in a timely and effective manner. These conventions stipulate that member
countries are required to notify the IAEA of any nuclear accident and the IAEA
must immediately respond to the member countries’ notification.
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radio-
logical Emergency was prepared to minimize the impact of a nuclear accident or
radiation emergency, and to call for the cooperation between the nations and
between a nation and the IAEA, in order to protect human life, property, and
the environment following the discharge of radioactive materials. Bilateral and
multilateral action for aid are recommended. The IAEA may be called on for aid,
and in some cases, the IAEA assumes the role of mediator when aid is required.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety requires nations to assume the obliga-
tions related to regulation, management, and operation of the nuclear facilities.
In addition, it defines the basic obligation to establish and maintain an efficient
and legal regulatory system. The member states should submit a report of action
programs to comply with the obligations at least once every three years. The ap-
plicable report goes through an in-depth review along with an open discussion
of safety issues and inherent issues.
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was adopted at a Diplomatic
Conference in 1997. The Joint Convention applies to the spent fuel and radio-
active wastes generated in the private reactor and during its application. This
Convention is applied when the spent fuel and radioactive wastes generated by
the military or national defense plan is fully transferred and managed by the
private sector, or when the applicable country to the Convention declares it as
spent fuel and radioactive wastes according to the purpose of the Convention.
This Convention is applied to planning and managing the environmental dis-
charge of liquid or gaseous radioactive wastes from nuclear facilities.
The IAEA provides several peer-review services for member countries. The safety
review services related to regulations are described hereunder.
OSART (Operational Safety Review Team)

The OSART service was established in 1982. It evaluates the NPP management,
operation plan, performance of the plant equipment, and human resources (in
lieu of the appropriateness of the power plant design) following the request of
the member countries. OSART does not evaluate the general safety of the power
plant and does not evaluate plant safety in comparison to other power plants.
Recommendations and proposals for strengthening safety are presented, and
best practices are presented as references for plant operation.
ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team)

The ASSET service began in 1986 to manage the accident prevention policy and
to provide recommendations and support for improved power plant safety of the
member countries. The root cause analysis, decisions about corrective actions,
and others are included in the ASSET service. This service includes the review of
the operation record, a peer review on self-evaluation, a seminar, and others.
IRRT (International Regulatory Review Team)

The IRRT service was established in 1989 to provide recommendations and
support to strengthen and promote the efficiency of the safety regulatory organi-
zation for the member countries in the sense that the member states assume
the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety. The IRRT review includes the
following.
(1) Responsibility for legislative institution and government

(2) Authority, responsibility, and function of the regulatory body
82 Nuclear Korea
(3) System of regulatory organization

(4) Process to exercise authority over procedures
(5) Review and assessment
(6) Inspection and enforcement
(7) Development of regulations and instructions
(8) Emergency action plan
(9) Radioactive wastes management and dismantling
(10) Radiation protection
(11) Transportation safety
Third-Party Liability Compensation System

Nuclear energy provides benefits but it also contains specific radiation hazards.
Chernobyl has shown that a nuclear accident can cause substantial damage to
people, property, and the environment. This implies that just one nuclear acci-
dent could mean massive liability for the nuclear utility and could bankrupt it.
Therefore, in the 1950s, the concern about the destructive responsibility for in-
demnification following a single accident made investment in a potential nuclear
utility impossible and the general suppliers and construction companies were
unable to accept the contractual responsibilities within the legal framework. On
the other hand, the government is responsible to appropriately protect people in
case of a nuclear accident.
A solution to mediate the conflict of interest among economic gain from
nuclear energy development, avoidance of destructive loss, and the necessity of
protecting the public had to be formulated. In other words, the governments of
many advanced nations during the 1950s had to be able to eliminate the con-
cerns of potential nuclear investors while also providing appropriate compensa-
tion for specific nuclear damage.
Because general laws were not appropriate for solving the specific problems
that follow a nuclear accident, a special system for third-party liability in the
case of a nuclear accident was required. Indeed, in the event that the ordinary
law was applied, there might be several parties that would assume liability for
the nuclear accident, and it was very difficult to distinguish the liable party.
Furthermore, even if the liable party was determined, the liable party might
have unlimited liability because the perfect insurance indemnification was not
available. The main purpose of this liability system was to assure that appropri-
ate compensation was given for human casualty and real property losses from a
nuclear accident. At the same time, the owner of the nuclear utility should not
be exposed to excessive liability. Construction companies as well as equipment
suppliers for the construction or operation of the NPP must also be exempt
from liability.
In order to fulfill this need, a special system was created with two aspects for
national and international consideration. Namely, the third-party liability sys-
tem would share the social and economic role in order to provide immediate
and appropriate compensation to the victims of a nuclear accident, on the other
hand, it clarifies the limitation of responsibility of the utility.
One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the Nuclear Liability Act is
that it was introduced along with the nuclear industry. In fact, it was enacted
before the introduction of the nuclear industry. Second, the liability system is
particular. This system is outside of the general law and includes the unique
characteristics and operation conditions of nuclear activities. Lastly, this system
was also applied internationally from the initial stage of the nuclear industry.
Obviously, the first line of defense is the prevention of accidents and the
second is the emergency response. The bottom line is that, in the event of an
accident, preventing damage is impossible, however, the responsible party would
recover the damages and compensate the victims. This is the foundation of the
Nuclear Liability Act.
Basic Principles
In the 1950s, which marked the beginning of the nuclear industry, everyone was
concerned about the risk and the complexity of nuclear power. The member
states enacted the nuclear liability law to account for the unique features of nu-
clear power.
The fundamental purpose underlying the Strict Liability System is that an
individual or the main body responsible for the harmful action should be re-
quired to provide compensation for the damage incurred. It is a moral concept
that includes legitimacy and equality. The theoretical pillar of the law states that
the main body should provide compensation for damages to a third party if the
damage is related to either mistakes or simple causality.
From the initial stage, there is no doubt that the nuclear industry was a perfect
case for the application of strict liability for hazards. Unless the owner assumes full
liability for the damage, the operating license of the NPP would not be issued due
to the magnitude of potential damages related to nuclear activities. This implies
84 Nuclear Korea
that an accident may occur at anytime despite careful action, and the party that
causes the damage has to be liable for the costs.
Accordingly, in all countries other than the USA, the basis of liability has
been the strict liability concept of the risk, and not the basis of negligence itself.
The strict liability concept lessens the burden on the victims of the accident to
prove negligence or neglect on the part of the utility and allows for the demand
of compensation with the simple proof of a relationship between the nuclear
accident and the damages. This is required in order to introduce the strict liabil-
ity concept and to realize justice under the law, because it is practically impossi-
ble for the victims to have a broad knowledge of the accident and the propagation
process of the nuclear accident.
Immunity from liability is limited in the case of war or hostile acts, great
natural disaster, or a mistake of the claimant. In the event that the cause of im-
munity for liability is minimal or absent, the liability may be defined as absolute.
Under the general legal system, utility, equipment suppliers, and construc-
tion companies were afraid of losing the business due to excessive demand for
compensation in the event that they are liable for the accident caused by their
own mistake or negligence. As a result, the legislative concept to revert full com-
pensation to the owner’s responsibility was introduced to enable them to invest
in the nuclear project. Under this system, just the utility would be responsible
for the nuclear damage, and no matter the actual cause of the accident, the
owner is fully responsible for the compensation.
With respect to the transportation of nuclear materials, the owner that
sends the goods is fully liable until the time the ownership rights are transferred
on the applicable goods under transportation and after the acquisition, the ac-
cepting party will become fully liable. It was considered inappropriate for the
transporter with no specialized knowledge about handling and no responsibility
for packing the nuclear materials to have to pay for high-insurance for the nu-
clear responsibility.
According to the agreement, the nuclear liability system should require the
owner to maintain the insurance for the compensation amount or other financ-
ing device to satisfy the compensation for the victim by the owner. In general,
this type of safety device takes the form of a bank guaranty or independent in-
surance while provided in the form of third-party liability insurance. In some
countries, the government provides the guaranty or immunity.
The goal of not interferring with the growth of the peaceful nuclear indus-
try would be accomplished by restricting the liability of the relevant owner and
the time to present the compensation with the financing compensation amount.
Prior to an accident, the government should set the requirements for secur-
ing the financial security tool and take firm action needed for maintaining it.
The legal system of most countries requires the government to bear the remain-
ing compensation amount, if compensation exceeds the owner’s responsibility.
A special compensation liability system for nuclear activities as mentioned
above would be applied to the nuclear power facilities that contain very risky
processes including: a reactor of a NPP, a research reactor, a production plant of
nuclear substances or processing plant, an isotope separation plant for the nu-
clear fuel, and a reprocessing plant among others.
International Convention
As proven by the Chernobyl accident, the results of a severe nuclear accident
provoke concerns beyond the national boundary. Therefore, all third-party com-
pensation systems for nuclear accidents should be internationally agreeable in
nature. The potential hazards involved with the transportation of nuclear mate-
rials should be addressed at the international level, beyond the level of national
interest.
The following Conventions were formulated after a number of conferences
among the international organizations with responsibility for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, but only some of them were put into effect. Among them, there
are two basic international conventions on third-party compensation liability;
the Paris Convention on the Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
(1) Paris Convention: Adopted in 1960, amended in 1963, and validated in

1968
(2) Vienna Convention: Adopted in 1963 and validated in 1977
(3) Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships: Adopted in
1962
(4) Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of
Nuclear Materials: Adopted in 1971
Each Convention regulates a single regulatory jurisdiction, applicable laws

and regulations, and the prohibition of discrimination such as strict and exclu-
sive responsibility, limitation of the amount and time for liability, and financial
guarantee, in addition to generally recognized regulations.
86 Nuclear Korea
The Chernobyl accident triggered a broad recognition regarding the need to

improve protection of the public against a nuclear accident. Chernobyl demon-
strated the limits of the compensation liability system based on the Vienna Con-
vention and the Paris Convention, and ignited a new interest in strengthening
the nuclear compensation liability system. The IAEA sought improvements to
the existing compensation liability system including the amendment of the Vi-
enna Convention first, and, second, focused on developing the comprehensive
international compensation liability system. In the event of the second case, the
focus was on creating an additional compensatory organization through specific
types of governmental intervention and joint protocol.
Legislation of the Atomic Energy Act

The Atomic Energy Act contains several differences from other laws, and the
basic concept of the Act is established with the following principles:
(1) The safety principle (prevention and protection)

(2) The security principle (peaceful use of nuclear power)
(3) The responsibility principle (unlimited responsibility of the owner)
(4) The permission principle (review and authorization by the regulatory
authority)
(5) The continuous control principle (right of inspection and access by the
regulatory body)
(6) The compensation principle (extent of nuclear liability)
(7) The sustainable development principle (protection of the future)
(8) The compliance principle (international and transboundary agreements,
treaties, and conventions)
(9) The independence principle (separation of the regulatory body from nu-
clear implementation organizations)
(10) The transparency principle (clarity of the process and availability of infor-
mation regarding all aspects of nuclear power to the applicants and to the
public)
(11) The international cooperation principle (close relationships with counter-
parts in other states as well as in the relevant international organizations)
Unlimited responsibility for nuclear safety related to the operation of the

NPP is on the owner, and the government has to confirm that the operation and
maintenance of the NPP have no impact on the people and environment at the
regulatory level. The Atomic Energy Act provides the legal and structural re-
sponsibility for nuclear-related activities. It must also include matters of nuclear
safety, security, responsibility, licensing, compensation, safety regulations, and
others.
Nuclear regulations should be established to regulate the development of
nuclear energy, energy production and its use, and to protect the public and the
environment from radiation hazards related to production, possession and use
of radioactive materials, and to operate the regulatory body. Nuclear regulations
and the regulatory body have to meet the global standard in order to comply
with the international obligations for the use of nuclear energy.
The law on nuclear safety is to protect physical nuclear materials that may be
exposed to a safety risk and must be legislated. The law on nuclear safety needs
to be able to prevent the contingent or intentional proliferation for the legiti-
mate use of nuclear materials and technology. The basic concept of nuclear safety
is to protect the health and safety of the public as well as the environment.
The radiation source must be kept safe, without threat of damage or theft,
and must be able to prevent the radiation source from being used in illegal ac-
tivities. The applicable material includes radioactive materials (substance re-
leased by the radiation of the decay) and the equipment (X-ray equipment and
others) designed to generate the radiation.
Even if the best methods for nuclear safety are applied, they cannot com-
pletely prevent the occurrence of a nuclear accident. In addition, in the event of
a nuclear accident, the impact not only affects the originating country, but near-
by countries as well. Because of this, there is an international system in place to
prevent such a nuclear accident.
Therefore, the agreement on the third-party liability in the nuclear energy
field was adopted in Paris in July 1960 and was amended in both 1964 and
1982. The agreement and addendum required the rectifications of the member
states and was incorporated into its nuclear liability law.
Most countries agree that the radioactive wastes have to be disposed within
the country that generates them. In addition, the party that generates the radio-
active wastes is responsible for the disposition of them. Therefore, the countries
that want to operate nuclear energy facilities require the legal system to protect
individuals and the environment from the potential impact of radioactive waste
and spent fuel.
Radioactive waste refers to the waste in liquid, gaseous, and solid state
that is generated from nuclear activities. It includes the radiation and spent fuel
88 Nuclear Korea
used in the medical field, the agricultural field, the industrial field, as well as
in research.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was prepared for the purpose of preventing
the diversion of nuclear materials for manufacturing nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. This Treaty was prepared in 1968 and since then 187
countries have adopted it.
The Atomic Energy Act of Korea

The system of the Atomic Energy Act of Korea is structured based on the Atom-
ic Energy Act, the Enforcement Decree of the Atomic Energy Act, the Enforce-
ment Regulations of the Atomic Energy Act, and the Notification of the Ministry
of Science and Technology.
Define basic and important matters

Atomic about the development and use related
Energy Act to nuclear energy and safety
Define the technical standards and

Enforcement Decree detailed contents needed for the
of the Atomic Energy enforcement of law or delegated by law
Act (Decree of the MOST)
Enforcement Regulation of Define the procedure and document

the Atomic Energy Act matters delegated under law and under
(Decree of the MOST) the Enforcement Decree
Notification
Define the detailed contents for
(Notification of the MOST)
technical construction and instruction
among others
Industrial codes and standards on

Industrial codes and standards
materials, design, testing, and inspec-
(KEPIC, ASME, IEEE, and others)
tion of equipment and materials
The Atomic Energy Act was enacted in March 1958 under the Law Number
483 and has been amended 21 times. In 1958, when the “Atomic Energy Act”
was enacted, Korea did not have a NPP and the contents of the Atomic Energy
Act were only a conceptual framework for the peaceful development and use of
nuclear energy. The Act consisted of 9 Chapters and 33 Articles. However, dur-
ing the 1970s, when the NPP construction was fully undertaken, the role of the
Atomic Energy Act changed from the development to the safety regulations.
Following the expansion of the use and development of nuclear power, the
Act was amended significantly (12 Chapters and 122 Articles) on April 1, 1982
in order to supplement the safety provisions in preparation of the present legal
system. In 1986, the Act was amended to complement the conflicts between the
development of nuclear power and the safety regulations. In 1999, the licensing
procedure for the operation of nuclear facilities was modified in order to induce
self-regulated safety management for the utility and to promote the nuclear in-
dustry. In addition, in order to improve transparency, the national nuclear con-
trol was established in 2005. Thereafter, insufficiencies were continuously
supplemented, and the Enforcement Decree and the Enforcement Rule of the
Atomic Energy Act were also amended for the same purpose.
The Atomic Energy Act has a total of 13 chapters, 122 articles, and supple-
ments. The structure of the Atomic Energy Act is classified as
1) A part related to basic or common matters required to realize the ideology

of national policy for the use and safety of nuclear power
2) A part related to the regulation of the nuclear facility, nuclear materials, and
radioprotection.
3) A supplemental part
CHAPTER I: General Provisions

CHAPTER II: Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Safety
Commission
CHAPTER III: Establishment and Execution of Comprehensive
Nuclear Energy and Research and Development of
Nuclear Energy
CHAPTER IV: Construction and Operation of Nuclear Reactors and
Related Facilities
CHAPTER V: Deleted
CHAPTER VI: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Business and Use of Nuclear

Material
CHAPTER VII: Radiation Isotopes and Radiation Generating Devices
CHAPTER VIII: Disposal and Transportation
CHAPTER IX: Dosimeter Reading Service
CHAPTER X: License and Examination
90 Nuclear Korea
CHAPTER XI: Regulation and Supervision

CHAPTER XII: Supplementary Provisions
CHAPTER XIII: Penal Provisions

The licensing system to ensure nuclear safety differs for each country, and the
responsibility for nuclear safety is placed on the utility. However, the govern-
ment is responsible for the regulations required to secure the health and safety
of the general public as well as the environment in case of a nuclear accident.
The nuclear regulatory authority is required to be legally independent from
the nuclear power utility and other institutions of the government. The nuclear
regulatory body is not responsible for the promotion of the nuclear industries.
However, if required, it may have direct communication with the upper govern-
mental organization. It also needs to have appropriate financial supports and
human resources.
In order to begin a nuclear project, it is critical to subscribe to an
international safety agreement. Because the nuclear power handles the nuclear
materials, it is mandatory for the member states to comply with the interna-
tional regulations.
Countries undertaking a nuclear project have to enact the laws related to
nuclear power prior to the start of the project. It is not possible to devise a per-
fect legal system for nuclear power during the early phase of introducing a nu-
clear project. As in the case of Korea, it is desirable to add supplements to the
legal system in accordance with the advancement of the project.
The nuclear law contains different basic concepts from other laws due to its
unique characteristics. The safety, security, liability, license, compensation, and
safety regulations regarding nuclear power must be included in the nuclear laws.
8
Nuclear Human Resources
Development (HRD)
The purpose of human resource development is to conduct education and train-

ing at domestic and overseas educational institutions in order to secure and
nurture human resources in every field that is fundamental to the success of a
nuclear project. It also seeks to grant institutional licenses to those people who
are capable and qualified.
Because human resource development is a long-term activity, long-term hu-
man resource development programs, such as a five-year plan, should be planned
and carried out on the basis of the country’s human resources and infrastructure.
The plan should consider the following items:
• The organization of national committees for human resource development

• The forecast of the actual demand for manpower required for the first nu-
clear power plant
• National human resource assessment
• The development of nuclear education, including curriculum, laboratory
equipment, and facilities at universities
• Securing instructors, curriculum, training equipment, and facilities in nu-
clear education institutions
• Strengthen the vocational training system in connection with technical
qualifications
• Overseas training
91
92 Nuclear Korea
The country starting a nuclear project should have a strong infrastructure

with a national participation policy. The infrastructure of education and train-
ing in the preparation phase of the nuclear project is the most important part of
the entire workforce development plan. The government, utilities, industry re-
search institutes, and training centers should determine in which areas nuclear
education and training will be offered. In addition, education and training in-
stitutions should have classroom facilities, a full-scale simulator, training equip-
ment and tools, education and training programs, and qualified instructors.
However, I believe that it is difficult to apply a formalized standard model
to the human resource development program. This is because it is necessary to
identify an optimal plan according to various educational systems and the dif-
ferent mix of trainees in terms of education, grade, experience, etc. in each
country. If you understand how Korea has been training people since the begin-
ning, I think it will be a great learning opportunity.
Government Action
Rhee Seung Man, the first President of Korea, and the government were very
active in securing nuclear experts. In 1958, at the State Council, the Minister of
Education reported to the President: “We are currently investigating students in
the US who are studying nuclear engineering, especially if those students will be
leaving school early due to a lack of tuition. Due to the US policy of limiting the
number of scholarships available for the study of nuclear energy, it takes time to
secure nuclear engineers and scientists.”
The President gave the following instructions. “Select qualified young gen-
eration and send them to Germany. You have to invest money in these things. If
it is necessary to enact a law, the State Council members should cooperate and
push for the National Assembly.”
The first President Rhee emphasized several times while at the State Council
the importance of training nuclear experts abroad and instructed them to not
only study theory but to also learn practical technology.
The first action taken by the government after deciding to introduce nuclear
power, was to train specialists in the field of nuclear power. Korea’s first admin-
istrative department for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Department of
Nuclear Energy, was established under the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology. Its first assignment with regard to nuclear
power was in 1956 when two researchers were dispatched through the funding
Nuclear Human Resources Development (HRD) 93
of the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) to US universities and the Ar-

gonne National Laboratory.
In accordance with the Five-Year Plan for Nuclear Power Development, the
government sought to train about 200 nuclear experts in the five years from
1958 to 1962. However, this plan was only halfway successful. The reason is that
it was not enough to retain those experts with the slow speed of domestic nu-
clear energy development, and most of them could not continue the study. As a
result, of the 237 people originally dispatched, by 1964 there were only 150
who came back to work. Some people never returned, and the others returned
after staying abroad for a while.
Because the Institute of Science and Technology was established in 1966 and
the Institute of Radiation Medicine and the Institute of Radiation and Agricul-
tural Research were separated from the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
(KAERI), more nuclear personnel became necessary. From 1968, the govern-
ment devoted itself to attracting overseas Korean scientists and engineers who
had accumulated advanced technological skills and experience. As a result, by the
year 1981, there were 628 who attended domestic universities and research insti-
tutes. Among them, 44 nuclear scientists and engineers were secured.
Kori Unit 1
In December 1965, when the government set up a nuclear power development
council and actively promoted the introduction of nuclear power plants, KEP-
CO established a nuclear power department in December 1966 within its own
organization. After KEPCO decided to become a nuclear power plant operator,
it was reorganized into the Nuclear Power Office in April 1968.
However, only a small number of employees were knowledgeable about
nuclear power, so experienced personnel in the field of thermal power were
forced to take charge of the nuclear business. They were able to acquire the basic
knowledge about nuclear energy through in-house education. Some employees
were sent to the training center of KAERI and completed the basic course. By
1978, there were about 700 people who had completed the training course and
were qualified as nuclear generation staff. The training consisted of 17 essential
basic courses such as nuclear physics, nuclear reactor theory, nuclear fuel, and
hands-on practice through the use of the research reactor TRIGA Mark.
The training center of KAERI, which opened in 1967, expanded its training
courses not only in the basic process of nuclear power generation but also in
94 Nuclear Korea
nondestructive testing technology, which contributed greatly to the develop-

ment of nuclear manpower.
KEPCO’s nuclear training program consisted of six phases:
(1) Learn the basics of thermal power generation through theory and practice
for three months
(2) Complete the basic course of nuclear power generation in three months
(3) Complete six months of onsite training
(4) Complete overseas training in each field for 3–24 months
(5) Complete the training for plant commissioning for 12 months after job
assignment
(6) Complete an advanced course for one week to three months
In 1969, the newcomers completed the first and second phases. The over-
seas training began when the main contractor of Kori Unit 1 was selected.
In 1972, KEPCO first selected 45 people in various fields including opera-
tions, reactor core management, I&C, mechanical design, chemistry, health
physics, and radiation protection. In 1973, the trainees were sent overseas for
training.
Under the training contracts for Kori Unit 1, major technical training, in-
cluding reactor operation, was conducted at Westinghouse. AE training was
conducted at the Gilbert Association and turbine generator training was con-
ducted at GE UK. In addition, KEPCO conducted the overseas training with
its own budget and support from the IAEA.
In particular, the training received by the reactor operators who would be
put in charge of commissioning Kori Unit 1 was difficult at that stage. The Eng-
lish test was essential and with Westinghouse staff in attendance, they carried
out rigorous aptitude tests on their spatial perception ability, improvisation, and
judgment. The 24 operators who passed the aptitude test received the operator
training course at the Zion nuclear training center for six months, including
full-scope simulator practice.
Upon their return, they became the core of the commissioning team of Kori
Unit 1. Unfortunately, but luckily, the completion of Kori No. 1 was delayed
due to a variety of reasons including the world oil price fluctuation. This gave
KEPCO the opportunity to extend the operator training for operational readi-
ness. Without a full-scope simulator at the construction site, the operator train-
ing had to be conducted by using plywood to imitate a control panel and a
display with indicators and monitors.
Nuclear Power Expansion

The Korean government revised the long-term power development plan in 1974
on the basis of the ex-oil policy following the 1973 global oil shock. By 1986,
KEPCO had set a goal of constructing nine nuclear power plants and had final-
ized the contract for the subsequent construction of Kori Unit 2 in October 1974.
As a result, KEPCO was in the process of securing nuclear power and training.
According to the “Manpower forecast of nuclear power generation and
Training plan” announced by KEPCO in September 1974, 1,510 people would
be employed until 1985, 200 people would be recruited annually until 1978,
and 100 people would be recruited annually thereafter. At that time, KEPCO
estimated that they needed 50 employees at its headquarters, 70 employees at
construction sites, and 130 employees at each unit. The average number of em-
ployees required by KEPCO was 187 and the maximum number of employees
required for the operation of one unit was 250.
Long-term technical training is required for the nuclear power program and
the training period for each person takes one to three years depending on the
discipline. Of course, there were many trained and qualified technical personnel
in the thermal power plant. However, if they were transferred to nuclear power
at the same time, there would be a manpower shortage in the generation of
thermal power.
In 1981, the long-term power development plan projected the construction
of the 13th and 14th nuclear power plants. However, by the end of 1980, KEP-
CO had actually acquired 1,173 nuclear personnel, 751 of which were in con-
struction and 422 were in operations. It was estimated that about 2,200 people
would need to be secured by 1983, about 3,100 people secured by 1986, and
about 5,000 people secured by 1991 with an annual average of 500 people. The
estimated manpower had been increased from the original.
In line with the overseas and domestic training for the construction and
operation projects of each plant, KEPCO decided to train the middle manage-
ment and, in 1974, dispatched them to Kansai Electric Power Company in Ja-
pan, which allowed them to acquire practical knowledge about the status of
Japanese nuclear power plants and the solutions to various issues faced in the
construction process.
In 1976, KEPCO executives and government officials attended an early
morning training course from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. for two weeks, where IAEA experts
were invited to instruct on safety, quality control, site selection, bid evaluation,
and nuclear fuel management.
96 Nuclear Korea
The overseas and outsourcing training were not enough to train the neces-
sary manpower for the serial operation of nuclear power plants. The Kori Train-
ing Center was expanded in 1978, followed by the completion of Kori Unit 1.
In 1977, KEPCO designated Sudo Electric High School, which was estab-
lished for the purpose of training electricians, as the “Specialized High School
for Manpower Training” by supporting full scholarships. At that time, 150 of
the 600 graduates were annually selected and placed into the nuclear power
sector.
KEPCO completed the expansion of Kori Training Center as well as the
dormitory, which could accommodate 100 people simultaneously. In 1978, a
total of 236 trainees completed the nuclear training courses. In addition, in July
1979, KEPCO installed the first full-scope simulator.
After introducing the first simulator, Kori Training Center signed an agree-
ment of technical support with NUS in the US to train simulator instructors
and develop educational materials. It also helped to build a systematic training
course for the basic and the continuous training of the operator.
Actually, it was in 1977 when KEPCO began planning the introduction of
a full-scope simulator. In March 1979, when the US TMI nuclear accident oc-
curred, the IAEA and INPO began to recommend simulator training, and at
that time the first simulator was introduced into Korea.
EAI of the USA supplied the full-scope simulator and the reference power
plant that was used was Surry 1 in the USA. However, it was not a newly created
simulator for Kori 1 and 2, because the reactor type was the same but the system
was different from Kori 1 and 2. The computer capacity was limited, and it was
a rudimentary simulator with only a few functions, so there was an urgent need
to introduce a simulator that matched the operation characteristics of actual
nuclear power plants. I can’t understand why we made such a foolish decision at
that time.
Since 1981, the Department of Nuclear Engineering has been established at
Ulsan Technical College. In addition, KEPCO expanded the scholarship for
university students in order to attract excellent manpower. In those days, the
national economy had been dramatically promoted. The competition for the
recruitment of manpower was quite fierce among different industries.
In addition, KEPCO had begun training and securing young engineers in
order to pursue nuclear technological independence. Graduates from a univer-
sity or graduate school were recruited by KEPCO and were sent to KAIST nu-
clear engineering department on a full scholarship, which had been newly
established in 1982 to educate professional engineers.
Accreditation of the Nuclear Training Center

In 1980, Kori Training Center was designated by the Ministry of Science and
Technology as a reactor operator training organization. As a result, Kori Train-
ing Center, which, in the meantime, had been entrusted to KAERI, could con-
duct its own basic training program on nuclear energy and it was possible to
carry out more specialized and systematic education and training.
At that time, the new employees of KEPCO were required to take an intro-
ductory training course at KEPCO training center in Seoul for 3 weeks, fol-
lowed by the nuclear theory and system training for 10 weeks, each at Kori
Training Center. After 16 weeks of OJT in the plant department, they received
their job assignment.
The continuous training course for each discipline had been established to
improve the practice and ensure safe operation after job assignment. All nuclear
operators were required to take continuous training courses for their assignment
in the operation group, twice a year for 4 weeks every year at Kori Training
Center and nuclear power plant.
The initial curriculum of Kori Training Center was organized into basic
courses, development courses, special courses, consignment courses, and ancil-
lary courses. The basic course for new employees was composed of nuclear the-
ory and systems for PWR and PHWR, which lasted for 10 weeks. The
development course was designed for experienced engineers in order to advance
their practice and knowledge. It was composed of a local operator course for
4 weeks, a main control room operator preparation course for 20 weeks, and a
team training course for 2 to 3 weeks.
In the early days of Kori Training Center, KEPCO focused on the operations
group, but it also gradually developed training courses in the technical and main-
tenance fields. A special course was provided to contractors with a basic course
on nuclear energy for 2 to 3 days. The consignment course was customized at the
request of the nuclear-related companies. In the first year of Kori Training Cent-
er in 1978, a total of 236 trainees completed the courses. The following year, the
number of trainees was increased to 424 according to the addition of develop-
ment courses. By 1983, a total of 2,900 trainees completed the courses.
In 1982, four instructors were selected for training in health physics, electri-
cal, mechanical, and I&C maintenance for 6 to 14 months at Westinghouse.
They were placed into the development courses.
The certification system for Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor
Operator (SRO) was enacted in 1970, and only those who were certified as a
98 Nuclear Korea
RO or a SRO were able to operate the reactor. The technical specification re-
quired at least two reactor operators (RO) and one senior reactor operator
(SRO) be assigned at one shift per unit in order to assure the safe operation of
nuclear power plants.
It takes a lot of time and money to train nuclear operators. After completing
the 36-week basic courses, a candidate must have two to three years of local
operator experience and complete the 20-week training course at a full-scope
simulator to be eligible to take the certification examination administered by the
Ministry of Science and Technology.
As a result of this training and job qualification, the certified operators were
obliged to attend an 8-week continuous and requalification training every year,
which would ensure that they continued to improve their ability to respond to
any emergency. This training is required by the Atomic Energy Act.
Since 1983, KEPCO drastically increased the allowance of certified opera-
tors as one of the ways to improve the treatment of employees in the nuclear
field. This systematically compensates for the improvement of the operator qual-
ifications as well as the accumulation of operation skills by keeping them em-
ployed as long as possible.
Expansion of Kori Training Center

In 1984, three nuclear power plants were in operation and six units were under
construction. In Korea, each power plant was responsible for two units. From
1985, one unit was scheduled to be placed into the national grid each year.
Thus, in 1984, the annual number of trainees at Kori Training Center was
1,400 and it was forecasted to increase to over 2,000 in 1990. It was definitely
requested to further train the operations group and the maintenance and engi-
neering group as well in order to improve nuclear safety.
There have been remarkable achievements in operator training, but the en-
gineering fields such as core management, radiation protection, and chemistry,
as well as the maintenance areas such as mechanical, electrical, and I&C were
relatively weak. Therefore, it was necessary to upgrade the facilities and the scale
of education and training for these fields.
In 1984, KEPCO established a basic plan to expand the Kori Training
Center in accordance with the long-term goal of securing nuclear manpower.
The facility had been expanded from 3,623 m2 to 14,631 m2, and introduced an
additional full-scope simulator and training facilities for radiochemistry, health

physics, and refueling, etc.
In 1986 and 1990, the Kori Training Center introduced the second and
third full-scope simulators. Simulator No. 2, which was built as a reference pow-
er plant for Hanbit 1&2, was delivered to the Kori Training Center in 1986
after a 30-month manufacturing process at Westinghouse. It took almost
4 months for on-site installation, acceptance testing, and commissioning.
Unlike Simulator No.1, Simulator No. 2 was identical to the main control
room of Hanbit nuclear power plants, so it could be used to improve the under-
standing of power generation principles and system control as well as improve
the ability of operators to cope with abnormal and emergency operation as well
as normal operation.
In particular, Simulator No. 2 had adopted the improved reactor core
thermo-hydraulic model, such as the formation of non-condensable gas and the
two-phase flow in the abnormal state of the reactor core, to meet the latest regu-
latory requirements of the US NRC at that time.
Simulator No. 3 was supplied by Thomson of France as reference plants of
Hanul 1&2 to train the operations group of Hanul 1&2. In 1990, KEPCO
completed the performance test and used it for training practice for the techni-
cal maintenance personnel as well as for the operators of the Hanul nuclear
power plants.
By using three simulators, the practice time had been increased and it resulted
in the enhancement of nuclear safety and plant availability. In order to operate
nine nuclear power plants, at least 90 certified operators needed to be secured ac-
cording to the technical specifications. By the end of 1991, KEPCO had secured
226 certified reactor operators and 217 certified senior reactor operators, far more
qualified personnel than required by law.
In 1991, Kori Training Center was relocated to a 24,000-square-meter build-
ing on a 250,000-square-meter site about 3 km northeast of the Kori nuclear site.
It was able to accommodate up to 300 trainees at the same time.
The main building is two stories with 17 classrooms, a language lab, two
simulators, a health physics laboratory, a chemistry lab, and an auditorium. The
health physics laboratory has 12 types of health facilities, including gamma nu-
clide analyzers, and 12 chemical chemistry laboratories, including an ion
chromatograph.
The maintenance training facility, with three stories and one basement floor,
is equipped with mechanical, electrical, and I&C training facilities and is the
first nuclear power maintenance training center in Korea. It is equipped with a
100 Nuclear Korea
refueling pool and machines, a steam generator mock-up, reactor coolant

pumps, and so on.
In addition, the maintenance training center provides various training
mock-ups and explanatory diagrams of the main equipment of the Kori 3&4
plants to help improve the visual understanding of the trainees and provide
them with training facilities during the annual outage period or special mainte-
nance periods as well as with periodic training courses. The trainees were also
able to practice in the same working environment. A separate building for prac-
tice was equipped with a lecture room, machine tools, welding equipment, and
non-destructive equipment.
As a result, the Kori Training Center had been reborn as a training center capa-
ble of providing hands-on training for all employees of the nuclear power plant,
away from the operator-centered and lecture-based education.
INPO Peer Review on Training

In 1990, the Kori Training Center received a peer review from the INPO Technol-
ogy Exchange Visiting Team on education and training. Mr. Thomas Reeder, as the
team leader, visited the center with five nuclear training experts and focused on
preventing human error, which was one of the main concerns of KEPCO’s man-
agement. The team reviewed the overall management in terms of training objec-
tives, organization, systems and facilities, curriculum structure of each course, and
enhancement of instructor qualifications.
The peer group tried to understand in detail Korea’s nuclear manpower
training and did this by reviewing textbooks, lectures, lecture aids, and by con-
ducting interviews, and observing classroom and simulator exercises. They con-
cluded that Kori training center was on par in terms of quality with other centers
in the USA in terms of scale, size, training facilities, curriculum, and training
system.
In particular, the criteria used by KEPCO for the evaluation and selection
of instructors was very stringent; even more stringent than at any of the training
institutes in the United States. The evaluation process could even be recom-
mended as a best practice to US utilities. Some of the ways that the center had
improved the caliber of their instructors was by having them attend various aca-
demic conferences, seminars, and case presentations. The training was further
improved and made more effective by developing all of the textbooks in Korean.
There were also recommendations that the self-study of the power plant should
be reviewed so that it would be linked to the training program at the training

center, and the training time for simulator practice should be extended.
The Nuclear Training Center has become a world-class training facility, and
its role and importance as a specialized institution for nuclear power has in-
creased. In 1992, a training center was opened at the Hanul site, followed by a
training center at the Wolsong site and at the Hanbit site in 1995. In addition,
a site-centered training system was set up at each nuclear power plant. The Nu-
clear Training Center developed systematic training programs at each individual
nuclear site, using a full-scope simulator and a customized curriculum devel-
oped specifically for the operators of each site.
In 1996, a CANDU Simulator from CAE (Canada Aviation Electronics)
was installed at the Wolsong training center and an additional simulator was
installed at Hanbit in 1997. The last one was the first localized simulator that
KEPCO Research Institute, Samsung Electronics, and Hyundai Electronics
jointly developed. Prior to this, KEPCO had sent its trainees to the Point Lep-
reau plant in Canada and to the Palo Verde plant in the US.
The first simulator in Korea was shut down in 1997 and replaced with a
local simulator in 1998. It had contributed to the training of almost 3,200 op-
erators since 1979, with a total running time of 12,687 hours, even though the
reference plant was the Surry nuclear power plant in the USA.
As a result, the Nuclear Training Center opened its branch centers at four
different nuclear sites where 18 units were in operation. The branch center had
a full-scope simulator with its reference plants.
In 1991, the maintenance training center was used to improve the quality
of maintenance, which reduced the number of working hours, thereby contrib-
uting to the safety of the maintenance personnel. A total of 47 curriculums had
been developed by 1996, and since 2007, more than 70 curriculums have been
developed.
In parallel, KEPCO had encouraged all operators to acquire certificates in
order to improve their qualifications, enhance the availability of nuclear power
plants, and secure more manpower for the operation. As a result, they had more
certified operators than were required. In addition, since 1997, when the govern-
ment created the “Top Gun Award” for the best operator, it has been awarded
every year for every nuclear power plant in operation, which has increased inter-
est and awareness of nuclear safety.
Since 1991, the Nuclear Training Center has had a regional cooperation
program with the IAEA. As a result of this long-term cooperation, in 1998, the
Minister of Science and Technology as well as the Director General of the IAEA
102 Nuclear Korea
signed a MoU on cooperation in providing the international training program.

The Nuclear Training Center trained a total of 207 foreign trainees in 17 courses
by 1999. After that, based on feedback and reviews, the training program was
upgraded and became more focused on the training needs of foreign countries.
The Nuclear Training Center opened the KEPCO Nuclear Information
System (KONIS) to exchange technical information related to domestic and
overseas nuclear power operation. This came about as the result of a recommen-
dation from the IAEA Safety Inspection Team for Hanbit 1&2 in 1997. At that
time, the government also requested that KEPCO establish countermeasures
against the failure of the Hanbit Unit 2. As a comprehensive measure, KEPCO
set up a nuclear operation information center that carefully collected and man-
aged the feedback from both domestic as well as overseas nuclear operations.
KONIS was established as a computerized system that could be made available
to all employees. The operation and regulatory information issued by the IAEA,
INPO, WANO, NRC, and Owners Group was collected and stored on a daily
basis. The information from domestic nuclear power plants was also uploaded
in real time. We have the ability to perform a search on the operating status of
all nuclear power plants operating worldwide. In addition, the types and causes
of failures in nuclear power plants exist in a searchable database.
Training Offered by KAERI (Korea Atomic

Energy Research Institute)
KAERI was mainly responsible for the manpower training at the initial stage of
the introduction of the nuclear power plant in Korea. I would like to review the
contributions of KAERI in 1983 and 1984 when 3 units were in operation and
4 units were under construction with the non-turnkey basis.
At that time, KAERI’s training courses were divided into lectures by invited
foreign experts and training courses organized by local experts. The courses cov-
ered nuclear power generation, radioisotope, NDT, and the welding field. Inter-
national experts were invited for the IAEA QA Course, Canada AECB Safety
Analysis Course, Westinghouse PWR Technical Course, Earthquake Engineer-
ing & Seismology, and AECL Thermal Hydraulic Course.
The nuclear power generation course consisted of the fundamental, nuclear
system and components, nuclear power technology, nuclear material handling
supervision, certified operator retraining, research reactor license holder retrain-
ing, and practice on a research reactor.
The radioisotopes course consisted of the fundamental, radiation protec-

tion supervision and the medical application of radioisotopes. The NDT and
welding courses included NDT fundamental, radiographic test, ultrasonic
test, welding technology supervision, concrete technology, and in-service
inspection.
KAERI invited IAEA experts to open a quality assurance program over two
weeks in 1980. In order to further expand the program, KAERI conducted a
four-week training program in early 1983. The curriculum was taught by 16
IAEA experts, 9 local instructors, and 11 experts from domestic institutions. In
addition, a total of 46 people from the government, KEPCO, and the nuclear
industry completed the course. The training program included the IAEA QA
Code of Practice and Safety Guides (QA Series), QA activities of major coun-
tries, preparation of the QA plan for design, manufacture, and fuel fabrication,
quality assurance audit, and qualification. The training course also consisted of
classroom lectures, work sessions, and field visits. During the work sessions, the
trainees practiced solving a real-life issue, applying the technical specifications,
and writing the implementation plan.
Korea was operating Westinghouse PWR, AECL PHWR, and Framatome
PWR. In consideration of different reactor technologies, KAERI established a
reactor technology training course for each one. Let’s look at the PWR technol-
ogy course for Westinghouse.
The instructors consisted of 15 Westinghouse reactor technology experts.
The trainees came from KAERI, KEPCO, the nuclear industry, and graduate
schools. A total of 90 trainees participated in the 2-week course. Topics included
licensing issues, radiation protection, I&C, human engineering, fuel burnup,
emergency guidelines and operating instructions, probabilistic risk assessment,
pressurized thermal shock, steam generator issues, operating experience, and ra-
dioactive waste management systems.
In addition to classroom lectures for each topic, they had a daily panel dis-
cussion with trainees, both domestic counterparts and Westinghouse instruc-
tors. The last hour had a separate discussion session between trainees and
domestic counterparts. This approach was very beneficial for all trainees in order
for them to fully understand the contents of the lecture as well as the issues.
Both KAERI and the trainees expected a high level of training materials and
texts because they spent a lot of time on discussion. However, the contents of
the texts from Westinghouse lacked details. The trainees strongly requested
that Westinghouse provide them with the reference materials, however, the re-
quest was refused because of an instruction from Westinghouse’s home office.
104 Nuclear Korea
Westinghouse also requested reimbursement for the materials, so the trainees

were disappointed.
The training course for vendors began in 1981 and was offered once every
year. The course was intended for people from the equipment supplier so that
they could understand the function of the systems and components of the nu-
clear power plant. The main contents of the course consisted of 35 hours on the
nuclear power system, 35 hours on the Codes and Standards for design and
manufacture, quality assurance, and welding technology, and 10 hours on fun-
damentals. Two weeks was insufficient to cover the various parts of nuclear fun-
damentals and the trainees strongly recommended that the course be extended
by four weeks. However, in those days, the nuclear industry lacked an awareness
of the importance of training and KAERI had difficulty securing trainees.
KAERI provided the EPC contractors and subcontractors with 10 training
sessions for two weeks from 1979 to 1981 and 10 training sessions for four
weeks from 1981. This course was an orientation to the nuclear power construc-
tion field. The course contributed to promoting an understanding of the termi-
nology related to nuclear power, understanding the functions of the main
systems and components of nuclear power plants, the basic concepts of nuclear
safety and reliability, including nuclear regulations, codes and standards, and
quality assurance. In particular, this course was aimed at promoting an under-
standing of the construction of nuclear power plants as well as improving the
efficiency of the work prior to the nuclear power plant construction staff being
deployed to the construction site.
As the number of nuclear power plants in Korea gradually increased, KAERI
provided basic knowledge about nuclear power generation principles, reactor
characteristics, and nuclear power plant systems for domestic technical college
professors during their summer vacation period. Because it might contribute to
the development of potential technical manpower, KAERI signed an agreement
with the technical colleges. The agreement consisted of 30 trainees per course.
The content of the course was composed of an introduction to nuclear power,
nuclear power plants, nuclear physics, reactor theory, and radiation theory. Al-
though this course was initially intended for professors of electrical engineering,
it expanded to professors in other departments, including the mechanical engi-
neering department as well as the electrical engineering department.
The training course for university students and graduates, which was initi-
ated in 1982, was designed to provide engineers, undergraduates, and graduate
students who did not major in nuclear engineering with opportunities to ad-
vance into the nuclear industry and institutions, as well as to raise interest in
nuclear power generation at engineering colleges. The selection of students was

limited to those who had higher grades and those who had been recommended
by the head of the department or the dean. The departments were limited to
mechanical, electrical, electronic, instrumentation control, chemical engineer-
ing, metal materials, civil engineering, and architecture. The main curriculum
included an introduction to nuclear engineering, nuclear power plant system
overview, radiation measurement and shielding, and an introduction to indus-
tries. Eight universities and graduate schools participated.
Since the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act began in 1983, the qualifi-
cations to apply for a license to handle radioactive isotopes have been upgraded.
Therefore, this course was developed to improve the technical standards of the
training and professional manpower in preparation for the radioactive isotope
handling license examination. Field work training was required. According to
the qualifications, the trainees were selected from small- and medium-sized
companies that used radioactive isotopes or radiation, and from those who had
worked in the field for more than two years and who wished to engage in nuclear
power. This course was composed of basic knowledge about nuclear radiation,
radioactive isotope and radiation handling, basic knowledge about radiation
protection, nuclear law and regulations, etc. so that people in the industry could
learn the new technology. The training period was four weeks.
The goal of the NDT course was to develop qualified specialists. The train-
ees were selected from those who had worked in quality assurance since 1977.
This course consisted of the radiographic test, ultrasonic test, Eddy Current
Test, and the penetration and magnetic particle test. It was made up of class-
room lectures and laboratory exercises on NDT knowledge related to metal
materials, welding technology, special welding, quality control, and radiation-
related regulations. The training period was four weeks.
The concrete technology and code course was the first, unique technology
course that was first offered in 1983 and has since been developed based on the
USNRC curriculum for Concrete Technology and Codes. The objective of this
course was to acquire concrete skills through theoretical, technical, and labora-
tory exercises on the design of nuclear concrete structures, construction technol-
ogy standards, and concrete test methods, which required strict technical
standards and special construction. The training contents included soil inspec-
tion, concrete production, placement, and concrete inspection. The training
period was two weeks. Experiments lasting for two days were conducted at the
test center of the National Construction Laboratory and the staff of the labora-
tory was appointed as the lecturers.
106 Nuclear Korea

When introducing the nuclear power plant, it is necessary to have a long lead
time in order for the human resources to develop fundamental skills in science
and technology. Engineering colleges are newly establishing their nuclear engi-
neering departments and are recruiting trainees for the technical support pro-
gram from international organizations, such as the IAEA. In addition, scientists
and engineers from overseas are actively encouraged to develop domestic human
resources in science and technology.
For the nuclear power plant construction and operation, the utilities should
lead the way to secure and/or develop the necessary human resources. For the
high-level positions, strong incentives and high salaries are provided in order
to engage outstanding human resources compared with other industries and
power-generation fields. However, in regard to the middle class and skilled
human resources, the mid-term and long-term human resources supply plan has
to be established and secured in a systematic way. In addition, it is important to
secure relatively young human resources so that they have time to accumulate
the technology and experience on a long-term basis in order to develop the next
generation.
For the safe and reliable operation of the nuclear power plant, a systematic
education and training program must be established to develop a sufficient
number of technical human resources by completing all courses ranging from
the fundamental to the specialized. It is recommended to benchmark the utili-
ties, which need to have an outstanding performance at the nuclear power plant.
We can also learn about the systematic training program and the qualifications
of the instructors.
In order to attain international technology standards and a safe operation
level, a human resources exchange program would be critical, and transparent
NPP operations need to be undertaken. Proactive participation in international
organizations, such as the IAEA, INPO, WANO, and others, would be neces-
sary. A sistership or cooperation agreement with overseas utilities or plants
would be helpful for the exchange of experts and experience.
9
Site Selection
Land is one of the basic requirements for a country and is the basis for all living
things and production activities. Land is the fundamental element that deter-
mines the national border and spatial territory. The government has to strive for
balanced development of the country through the reasonable and efficient use
of the land, and all national projects or development projects must make effi-
cient use of the national land. In the case of the NPP site, land is usually difficult
to secure in a timely manner due to the rarity of an appropriate site, competition
with other industrial sites, a tightening of the regulations regarding land devel-
opment due to environmental conservation efforts, and the negative perception
of the public against the NPP, which represents the biggest hurdle. Therefore, it
is important to secure appropriate sites for NPPs in a timely manner in accord-
ance with the long-term power development plan at the national level as quickly
as possible.
Site Selection Criteria

The nuclear power plant site should be located in an area with a ready supply of
massive amounts of cooling water, the ability to berth large ships, as well as
enough land to build the actual plant. In addition, there are other important
elements to consider including no active faults, an appropriate distance from the
population center, etc. These matters should be closely investigated through the
site survey, human investigation, and through other methods.
107
108 Nuclear Korea
The seismic and geological site selection criteria for a NPP is defined in
Appendix A, under the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR Part 100).
The guidelines for the criteria for the Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone,
and Population Center are stipulated in the Federal Regulation (Part 100.11)
and are presented in the following box.
∆ Exclusion Area
In the event of a postulated accident of a nuclear reactor facility, an
exclusion area will be established. Exposure to radiation at the bound-
ary line of the exclusion area in two hours cannot exceed the total
integrated dose (TID) of 0.25 Sv for the whole body and 3 Sv for the
thyroid.
∆ Low Population Zone
An area of low population density is often required around a nuclear
installation before it’s built. The number and density of residents is of
concern in emergency planning so that certain protective measures
(such as notification and instructions to residents) can be accom-
plished in a timely manner.
∆ Population Center
Near a dense population area, a population of 25,000 persons or more,
the reactor facilities have to be located at least 3/4 times further than the
distance for the border of the low population zone.
The factors to consider when choosing the NPP site include: the level of
difficulty in procuring the land, the need for low compensation costs, and the
ability to secure additional land for further construction of nuclear power plants.
Cooling water should be available for 60m3/sec per 1,000MW-level unit, thus
an area near a river or the coast is desirable. In the event that sufficient cooling
water is not available, a cooling tower must be installed.
In addition, the site needs to be in an area with good geological conditions,
safe from earthquake, and be located some distance from populated areas. The
Site Selection 109
area must also be able to accommodate a wharf facility that can handle the dock-
ing of 2,000-ton class vessels or larger.
Nuclear Siting Process

After selecting the potential sites, a site survey is conducted to gather technical
information in regard to geology, oceanography, meteorology, service water
source, aggregate source, and others so that the feasibility of constructing the
NPP may be reviewed and a decision can then be reached. In the event that the
NPP construction is technically feasible, the site boundary is finalized with con-
sideration given to the exclusion area boundary (EAB). The area can then be
designated as the NPP construction site after consultation with the central and
local government. Afterward, land purchasing activities can begin in accordance
with the law.
Because the scale of the power development project is enormous, has an
extended timeline, and is closely related to other national plans, the cooperation
of the relevant governmental agencies is critical. A NPP project is also subject to
many regulations, which may result in delays due to licensing and permitting
activities, leading to substantial losses to the national economy. Some countries
legislate a power development promotion law in order to expedite the construc-
tion process of the power facility.
Preliminary survey ○ Confirm the possibility of NPP construction in

and preliminary relation to the national land-use plan
environmental review ○ Local survey and preliminary geological survey
of the site ○ Survey for oceanography, meteorology, service
water source, aggregate source, and others
○ Review of the basic plan for the NPP (reactor type,
size, arrangement, and others)
○ Survey of the local environment
○ Review of the environmental impact and reduction
plan
110 Nuclear Korea
Site decision ○ Advance consultation with the local government

○ Confirm the site boundaries by considering the
exclusion area
Notice of preliminary ○ Notify the preliminary site area for NPP construction
site area after consulting with the government bodies
○ Possible for the utility to begin the site land
procurement
Detailed survey for the ○ Detailed investigation is undertaken for the technical
site stability of the site
: Acquisition of base data for engineering
: Acquisition of data for the preliminary nuclear safety
analysis
By performing the broad site investigation and the preliminary feasibility

study on the candidate sites, the priority of the development of each candidate
site is determined. The base data for the detailed investigation and feasibility
study is collected during this stage. In general, external experts are invited to
investigate the site and the process takes roughly 8–10 months. The following
are subject to investigation:
• Topography, coast or river depth survey (aerial survey)

• Preliminary geological investigation (drilling, soil investigation, and prepa-
ration of a geological map)
• Human and social, hydrology, and oceanography-related data collection
and analysis
• Service water source (location, potential water availability, piping route,
water intake)
Site Selection 111
• Access road and aggregate source (location, distance, reclamation volume

and quality)
• Compensation record for the site land (shared superficies, fishing rights,
and others)
• Oceanography survey (ebb and flow, tidal flow, wave observation)
• Preliminary structure design and plot plan review (land filling, water intake
and discharge facilities, cooling water route and structures, and others)
• Estimate the construction costs
• Decide on the development priority of the various candidate sites
If the potential sites are technically acceptable for NPP construction accord-
ing to the preliminary survey and preliminary environmental review, the site
boundary is finalized after consultation with the local government that has ju-
risdiction over the site.
After the site, including the exclusion area has been decided on, the prelimi-
nary site area will be designated as the power development project zone. In this
case, the result of the preliminary environmental survey must be reviewed in
advance by the Ministry of Environment.
After assessing the results of the preliminary survey of the candidate sites,
the feasibility of the potential site where the NPP will be constructed is closely
reviewed. This will be used as the base data for the structural design, and the
preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) will be used to obtain the construc-
tion permit from the regulatory authority. As with the preliminary survey, an
external specialized institution is invited to perform the ordinary survey, which
will take approximately 18 months to complete. The flow of the detailed inves-
tigation is shown below.
Geology and seismic base data


survey
 Site survey and test  Chapter 2 of the
 Site geophysical survey Preliminary
 Survey plan ⇒ ⇒
 Marine geophysical survey Safety Analysis
 Adjacent industrial facilities Report (PSAR)
 Meteorology
 Hydrology
112 Nuclear Korea
The purpose of the survey is to define the ground vibration for the Safe
Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). We can also collect the data on the magnitude of
the reaction of the surface fault, which is necessary for NPP design. The site as
well as the surrounding area are assessed in terms of petrology, stratigraphy, hy-
drology and structural geological conditions, history, and the tectonic structure.
Also, the ground vibration and surface fault is assessed in order to determine the
dynamic, static, and engineering nature of the ground (speed of elastic wave,
density, water content rate, porosity, and others). The extension of the active
fault and the relationship between the fault and the regional tectonic structure
body are investigated and examined in order to prepare a table of the historical
earthquakes and to determine the activity of the fault and the safe shutdown
earthquake (SSE). In addition, the effects of both a wave and a Tsunami origi-
nating from either near or far away from the NPP site are investigated. All geo-
logic and seismic data is used to determine the design criteria in response to
possible flooding or a wave.
The relationship between the drilling result and the geologic condition is
confirmed. The feasibility of the characteristics of the site is determined by re-
viewing the existing geologic map, by observing the development status of the
topography, by collecting rock samples, by surveying the geological structure
zone, by assessing the weathering status of the topsoil layer and rock, and the
development status of discontinuous face (fault, ionosphere). In addition, fol-
lowing the survey, a test would be performed that would include: the drilling
test on the site, preparation of the drilling columnar section, a basic ground test
to determine the rock grades, a survey of the stability for slopes, observation of
the underground water status, and site rock deformation tests.
In order to confirm the dynamic characteristics of the lower ground of the
site, a geophysical investigation (seismic prospecting and measurement of the
shear wave speed) is performed with an artificial seismic wave to determine the
types of rocks in the ground and to calculate the shear coefficient and the elastic-
ity coefficient. In addition, the investigation also includes performing the resis-
tivity test.
By simultaneously recording and surveying the underwater geologic struc-
tures and the topographic conditions, the sedimentary rock status, and others
within an 8 km radius, it is able to determine the presence of active faults and
demolition. The aerial photographic survey and water depth survey are per-
formed in order to prepare the comprehensive land map.
The survey and review are performed on the industrial, military, transporta-
tion facilities, transportation route, aircraft facilities, oil pipeline, oil refinery
Site Selection 113
and its storage facilities, missile objects, harmful chemical substance storage fa-
cilities, and others that are considered to be potential external disasters or risk
factors that are expected to occur during the lifetime of the power plant.
General meteorology data for the area around the power plant must use the
reliable data of the national meteorology institution. The meteorological observa-
tion plan for the site must be prepared in such a way as to assess the migration and
dispersion characteristics of radioactive materials that are discharged into the at-
mosphere during normal operation of the plant as well as during a hypothetical
accident. The meteorological observation plan is also used to confirm the meteoro-
logical data used in engineering.
A review of the safety-related structures, supporting facilities, access roads,
etc., needs to be performed to assess the impact related to river flooding, surge,
seiche, tsunami, or a flood caused by a landslide or the collapse of a nearby dam.
Siting Experiences for NPPs in Korea

The first NPP in Korea was the Kori Unit 1 (located in the coastal area of the
southeastern part of Korea, which is currently under the jurisdiction of Busan
City). Subsequently, the Wolsong site (east coast), the Hanbit site (west coast),
and the Hanul site (east coast) were selected during the initial introduction
stage of the NPPs. After selecting several candidate sites, the sites underwent a
process to determine the optimal site through the use of a preliminary survey
and assessment.
The Kori site has six (6) NPPs currently in operation. The Saeul site, located
next to the Kori site, has two (2) NPPs and there are two (2) units under con-
struction. The Wolsong site has six (6) NPPs in operation and there is additional
space available for two (2) more units.The Hanbit site has six (6) NPPs in opera-
tion but there are no additional plans for further construction. The Hanul NPP
site has six (6) NPPs currently in operation and there is an additional construc-
tion plan for four (4) more units at the site, which is already secured. However,
the construction work on two (2) has been stopped because the current admin-
istration does not have a nuclear policy.
The reason behind the prolific construction of NPPs on existing sites is due
to the difficulties that are faced when attempting to secure new sites. The public
has been misled by the environmental groups, instilling the fear that a NPP
could explode like a nuclear bomb. Naturally, due to such fears, local residents
object to any new construction of NPPs. When Korea first began to construct
114 Nuclear Korea
NPPs, it was not difficult to secure appropriate sites. However, as time passed,
the selection of new NPP construction sites became more difficult due to local
residents’ negative opinions, the anti-nuclear sentiment of environmental
groups, and opposition of the local government. Accordingly, countries that are
introducing their first NPP are encouraged to secure the sites during the very
early stages of the process with consideration given for additional NPP con-
struction areas in accordance with the long-term power development plan.

The exact standard to be used in site selection for a nuclear power plant must be
prepared in advance. Korea follows the USA Code of Federal Regulation (Part
100) Appendix A (Standard of Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant). As
global warming and climate changes worsen, earthquakes have occurred in a
number of regions, which means that it is imperative to perform a precise survey
in order to identify the active faults in the area.
A nuclear power project takes time and is subject to substantial regulatory
oversight. The nuclear power project is also closely related to other key indus-
trial development plans, which require the cooperation of several government
agencies. It is helpful to enact legislation such as the Power Development Pro-
motion Act, which encourages efficient implementation.
A precise and detailed survey of the designated site is performed on the fol-
lowing: geology and earthquake, on-site survey and test, onshore geophysical
survey, offshore geophysical survey, measurement, investigation of adjacent in-
dustrial facilities, meteorology, and hydrology on the basis of the data from the
preliminary survey. Survey data on the designated site would then be used as the
base data for the design of the NPP, which requires the collection of detailed and
accurate data.
The importance of the opinions of the general public and local residents has
played a more significant role in governmental decision making. Therefore, we
must secure the nuclear site as early as possible. It is desirable for the developing
countries to secure sufficient sites for the construction of NPPs considering the
long-term national power development plan at the nuclear power introduction
stage. These are the lessons that have been learned from Korea’s experience, and
it is critical that policymakers establish national policies by forecasting the nu-
clear energy demand and other national changes in the next 10, 20, and 30 years.
Part IV
Project Implementation
10
Contract for NPP Construction
The construction of a NPP requires significant investments in terms of both fi-

nances and schedule. In order to minimize the construction risks, the plan
should be carefully prepared. The structure of both the contract and the project
are key elements to its success.
The main contracts for the NPP construction are classified into equipment
supply, architect engineering, fuel supply, and construction. This chapter will
mostly focus on the main equipment supply contract.
The type of equipment supply contract would be determined depending on
various factors, such as the introducing country’s experience with NPP con-
struction, the industrial infrastructure, the national energy development plan,
the availability of human resources for project management and engineering,
experience with heavy industry, financing plans, etc. Contracts are classified into
plant approach (turnkey contract), split-package approach (island base con-
tract), and multiple-package approach (component base contract).
Turnkey Contract
A Turnkey Contract is a general contract method that should be selected when the
utility has no prior NPP construction experience. The main contractor assumes
full responsibility for the plant’s performance, including engineering, equipment
supply, construction, and commissioning of the project. However, the main con-
tractor does not need to be a single company, instead, it can be a consortium led
117
118 Nuclear Korea
by one company. The strengths and weaknesses of the turnkey contract method are
shown below.
Strengths
• Minimizes the risk of the utility in regard to the overall plant performance
and construction management of the project
• Implements the project regardless of the utility’s capabilities
• Potentially improves the NPP construction management and technical ca-
pability of the utility, which could be utilized for future construction pro-
jects. This improvement is accomplished through the transfer of technology
during the construction period
• Helps to attract foreign investment
Weaknesses
• Difficult to implement the goals of the owner due to the issue of liability
• Somewhat higher construction cost when compared with other contract
methods
• Inadequate effort made by the utility will result in the insufficient accumula-
tion of construction experience during project implementation
Structure of the Turnkey Contract
Utility
Main Contractor
Architect BOP
NSSS Supply T/G Supply Construction Commissioning
Engineering Procurement
Island Base Contract

An Island Base Contract is an intermediate contract type that is between the
turnkey contract and the component base contract methods. Generally, the pro-
ject’s scope of services, such as engineering, equipment supply, commissioning,
and plant performance, is divided into two contracts, one for the primary sys-
tem and one for the secondary system. The utility takes full responsibility for the
Contract for NPP Construction 119
construction, integrated commissioning, and overall plant performance and

controls the interface between the primary system and the secondary system
contractors.
This contract method could have potential problems concerning the inter-
face between the two contactors. If the project experiences difficulties related to
ineffective interfacing, this could become the primary cause of delays in the
construction schedule and cost overrun. Therefore, the contractor for the pri-
mary system is normally delegated with the general responsibility for project
coordination and interface control. For an Island Base Contract, the bidding
process for the secondary system begins after the selection of the contractor for
the primary system. The strengths and weaknesses of the island base contract are
discussed below.
Strengths
• Reduction of risk for the utility in regard to the overall plant performance
and construction schedule
• Possible to procure from two or more suppliers, or two or more countries,
and multiple financing sources
• Better to accumulate project management experience with an increase in
project management responsibility during the construction period
Weaknesses
• Increase of potential risks to the project as the owner’s responsibility
increases
• Increase of interface management between contractors
• Increase of the owner’s responsibility for obtaining proper licensing
Structure of the Island Base Contract
Utility
Primary System Secondary BOP (partial) Start-up

Construction
Supply System Supply Procurement Operation
*Note: The primary and secondary system supplier contractors may be different with each tak-
ing charge of the construction packages for their portion of the project.
120 Nuclear Korea
Component Base Contract

The Component Base Contract method is when the owner procures multiple
equipment supply packages with support from an architect engineer or consult-
ant. Furthermore, the owner is responsible for the overall project management.
It is very difficult for a country to undertake a complicated and large-scale
project such as constructing the first NPP when using this type of contract
method.
With the support of an architect engineer, the owner must manage and
coordinate complicated interface problems among equipment suppliers and
contractors. Each contractor provides a guarantee for only their scope of ser-
vices, and the purchaser takes responsibility for the overall plant performance of
the integrated systems.
In general, the first step in the component base contract method is to select
the architect engineer and equipment suppliers for the primary system (nuclear
steam supply system: NSSS) and turbine generator system (T/G). The owner
procures the balance of the plant equipment (BOP), which is divided into mul-
tiple packages with the support of an architect engineer in accordance with the
construction milestones. The following are the strengths and weaknesses of the
component base contract.
Strengths
• The owner’s intentions are incorporated in both engineering and
construction
• If the owner has substantial experience, it is possible to save on the con-
struction costs
• It is possible to accumulate various types of experience during engineering
and construction
Weaknesses
• As the owner’s project management responsibility increases, the owner’s risk
also increases
• There will be an increase in workload related to managing the interface be-
tween contractors
• The owner’s responsibility for obtaining licenses will increase
Structure of the Component Base Contract
Utility
NSSS T/G Architect BOP Start-up

Construction
Supplier Supplier Engineer Procurement Operation
The Construction Contract for a NPP

The general process of a construction contract for a NPP is shown as follows.
Process of the Main Contract
ITB preparation
- Prepared by utility or Reception of
ITB issue
- Prepared by external proposal
consultant
Negotiation for supply

contract Preparation of assessment
- Technical field report and selection of Assessment of proposal
- Scope of supply contract negotiation - Technical area
- Contract condition counterpart - Commercial area
- Contract price, etc. (1st and 2nd candidate)
Selection of the successful Contract in effect

vendor and signing of the - Issue of advance work
contract instruction
The bidding method for NPP construction is classified into open bidding,
limited open bidding, and single tender bidding. The open bidding process in-
volves inviting vendors with certain qualifications to participate in the bid.
Open bidding is the fairest bidding method to attain the lowest bidding price.
Disadvantages include: the time required for the bidding process and, in addi-
tion, there is no way in advance to exclude disqualified vendors from participat-
ing in the process.
122 Nuclear Korea
With limited open bidding, prequalified vendors are invited for the prelimi-
nary bidding. The bidding process for this method takes a long time, however it
is possible to exclude disqualified vendors in advance, which is another method
to lower the bidding price.
With single tender bidding, the owner selects the equipment supplier
through contract negotiation. This bidding method allows the purchaser to se-
lect the most favorable type of equipment and to save in the bidding process,
however, it is somewhat difficult to attain the lowest bidding price.
Invitation to Bid (ITB)

In order for the owner to prepare the ITB document he is required to have sub-
stantial technical knowledge and experience in NPP construction. The ITB doc-
ument must be very detailed in order to clarify the bidding requirements, the
evaluation criteria, etc. to prevent potential disputes related to the final selection
of the successful bidder and later, when negotiating the contract.
The owner may not receive support when preparing the ITB (in the case of
a turnkey or a island base contract) from the architect engineer. Therefore, the
owner is required to hire an outside expert with substantial experience to pre-
pare the ITB for NPP construction. However, it must be noted that the expert
who prepared the ITB is not eligible to participate in the bid for the main con-
tract. With the component base contract, the architect engineer is first selected
by the purchaser, and then the architect engineer prepares the ITB on behalf of
the purchaser.
Bid requirements, technical descriptions, and evaluation criteria, etc. must
be clearly described in the ITB in order to minimize contractual disputes during
the bidding process. The ITB must include bidding instructions, contractual
terms and conditions, technical requirements, and type of proposal. The main
topics in an ITB are shown below.
I. General matters
1. Summary

The reactor type, capacity, project schedule, scope of supply, and
others.
II. Notes for bidding
1. General matters: Bidding type, language used, bidding price,
bidding withdrawal requirement, and other general matters
2. Bidding procedure: Qualification of vendor, security deposit,
deadline, and others
3. Contents of proposal: Scope of proposal, number of bidding pro-
posals to submit, bidding price guidelines, exceptions, interfer-
ence with ITB, valid period of proposal, alternatives, and others
4. Bidding assessment and contract negotiation
5. Special notes
III. General terms and conditions of the contract
1. General terms and conditions

Definition, contract change, termination, etc. to define the gen-
eral matters for both parties to comply with by law.

2. Supply provision
The scope of supply, delivery schedule, technical standards, etc.
3. Price provision

The bid price, price adjustment, payment conditions, etc.
IV. Technical specifications
1. Scope of supply: Supplier’s supply scope, relationship with other
separate contracts, responsibilities, etc.

2. Design requirements: Design goal, design direction, conditions,
etc.

3. Site requirement: The site characteristics, meteorological condi-
tions, etc., which represent the basic requirements for the design

4. Others: Training, etc.
124 Nuclear Korea
The evaluation of the proposal requires a substantial investment in terms of

both human resources and time. The evaluation method, procedures, and evalu-
ation criteria must be established in advance. The vendor’s proposals are evalu-
ated based on established evaluation guidelines and, generally, support from the
consultant that prepared the ITB will be necessary.
Safety is one of the critical requirements for bid evaluation due to the char-
acteristics of the NPP. The following must be considered:
• Vendor’s experience with supplying the equipment for a NPP

• Safety, reliability, and licensing requirements of the NPP design
• Proposed scope of supply
• Degree of compliance with the ITB requirements
• Price, price adjustment, payment conditions, and loan conditions
• Characteristics of plant operation, performance, and the operation record
of the proposed equipment
• Localization and technology transfer plan
• Expected operation and maintenance costs
• Economics of the power plant
In general, the evaluation process is divided into two stages: technical eval-
uation and commercial evaluation. The bidder separates the technical proposal
and price data; the price data is sealed and not disclosed to others in advance.
As a result of the technical evaluations, the vendor who fails to comply with the
technical requirement should be disqualified and excluded from the commer-
cial evaluation. The evaluation procedure is shown as follows.
The total costs include both direct and indirect costs that are involved with
construction from the beginning through to commercial operation. Total in-
vestment costs, fuel costs, and operation and maintenance costs, etc. are as-
sessed during the commercial evaluation. In general, the total investment cost
includes engineering, equipment procurement, construction, spare parts, con-
tingency, insurance, financing costs, price escalation, etc.
Fuel cycle costs include procurement of yellow cake, conversion, enrich-
ment, fabrication, transportation, spent fuel management, and radioactive man-
agement costs related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Operation and maintenance
costs, such as labor costs, consumables, maintenance costs, taxes, insurance, etc.
are also evaluated during the economics portion of the evaluation.
The Bid Evaluation Process of a Main Contract
Evaluation of technical and contract

conditions
Reception of <Technical evaluation> Opening the bid

proposal : Discrepancy with bid specification price proposal,
: Alternatives economic evaluation,
: Receive prior to : Scope of supply and selection of the
deadline <Commercial evaluation> successful bidder
: Comply to bid : Proposed bid price remains sealed
requirements : Exclude technically disqualified Contract condition,
bidders Proposed price,
<Additional construction cost Economic evaluation
evaluation> including maintenance
: Evaluation for additional cost to and operations cost
comply with bid requirements
(Note: If necessary, hold clarification
meeting with the bidder)
There is no specific method for contract negotiation and the contract nego-
tiation requires various strategies according to the negotiation partner. Once a
vendor is nominated as a preferred bidder for contract negotiation, they gener-
ally gain a stronger position. The contract negotiation requires technical knowl-
edge in various fields in addition to legal knowledge in some areas. Therefore, it
is customary to organize a negotiation team for each field. A lawyer’s assistance
may be required during negotiations in certain fields.
Contract Structure
If the ordering country has a designated contract format, the contract format
and structure could be determined by mutual agreement on the basis defined
above. But in general, the contract consists of general terms and conditions
plus the appendix. An example of the table of contents of a NPP contract is
shown next.
126 Nuclear Korea
Chapter 1 General Clauses

Article 1: Definitions
Article 2: Contract Documents
Article 3: Changes to the Contract
Article 4: Force Majeure
Article 5: Suspension and Termination
Article 6: Termination
Article 7: Insurance
Article 8: Property Rights and Confidentiality
Article 9: Infringement of Patent Rights
Article 10: Interpretation
Article 11: Governing Law
Article 12: Disputes and Arbitration
Article 13: Assignment
Article 14: Subcontract
Article 15: Responsibility
Article 16: Non-waiver of Rights
Article 17: Back Charges
Article 18: Rejection
Article 19: Replacement
Article 20: Expediting
Article 21: Title Passage and Storage
Article 22: Delivery
Article 23: Transportation Documents
Article 24: Packing and Marking
Article 25: Notices
Article 26: Language and Unit
Article 27: Effectiveness of the Contract
Chapter 2 Special Clauses for the Supply

Article 1: Scope of Supply
Article 2: Delivery Schedule
Article 3: Test, Inspection, and Performance Test
Article 4: Guaranty and Compensation
Article 5: Licenses, Authorizations, Codes, Standards, and
Regulations
Article 6: Quality Assurance
Article 7: Technical Support Services
Article 8: Technical Training
Article 9: Project Management
Article 10: Spare Parts
Chapter 3 Financial Clauses

Article 1: Contract Amount
Article 2: Price Adjustment
Article 3: Payment
Article 4: Performance Bond
Article 5: Taxes
Appendix A: Scope of Supply and Division of Responsibilities

Appendix B: Delivery Schedule
Appendix C: Technical Description
Appendix D: QA Program
Appendix E: Drawings and Documents
Appendix F: Technical Support Services
Appendix G: Training
Appendix H: Tests
Appendix I: Codes, Technical Standards, and Regulations
Appendix J: Spare Parts and Consumables
128 Nuclear Korea
Promotion of the Non-Turnkey Basis in Korea

Korea, which had no nuclear power plant construction in the early 1970s, has
faced many challenges through the turnkey basis project such as delayed deliv-
ery of equipment, high price governed by a single supplier, sluggish accumula-
tion of domestic technology, delayed development of nuclear infrastructure, etc.
As a result, KEPCO decided in 1975 to implement a non-turnkey approach
to be led by the project owner and applied to the construction of Kori 3&4.
Also, to reflect the growth in electric power demand due to national economic
development, the unit capacity had been upgraded to 950MW, which is
much larger than the 600MW of the first unit. KEPCO faced a number of chal-
lenges and risks in order to apply a new approach. However, KEPCO had al-
ready established a long-term nuclear development plan and had to eliminate all
of the disadvantages born from the turnkey basis. Decision making was strongly
supported by the government policy of localization of nuclear power plants.
Nuclear energy was deemed a quasi-natural resource if we succeeded in the
localization.
KEPCO’s policy of a non-turnkey approach to be led by the project owner
was in line with the government’s policy. The characteristics of the long-term
power development plan at the time can be summarized as promotion of ex-oil
power generation development, conversion of the contract scheme for nuclear
power plant construction, and promotion of localization.
As a result, Hyundai E&C achieved a localization rate of 95% for the con-
struction, which was a remarkable accomplishment. Equipment localization
was below 10% for the first unit, however, it had been raised up to 30% for the
Kori 3&4 projects.
Following Kori 3&4, the same approach was applied to the Hanbit 1&2
projects. Upon realizing the benefits of repetition and the upgrade of project
management and contract structure, KEPCO expanded the participation of do-
mestic companies in all areas of design, manufacture, and construction. As a
result, 44% of the design sector and 35% of the equipment manufacturing sec-
tor had been successfully localized, laying the groundwork for independence on
nuclear power construction technology.
For the next Hanul 1&2 project, sincere and great efforts were made not
only for localization but also for technological independence. The investment
was not made in vain. KEPCO increased the localization rate of design to 46%
and the localization rate of equipment manufacturing to 40%. KEPCO signed
the construction contract with domestic companies and implemented the
oversight and construction management as the owner. It became a kind of com-

prehensive construction management contract, which led to achieving complete
localization of the construction among the EPC.
Let’s look at the Kori 3&4 construction projects in more detail because
they’ll provide you with a more tangible example. In July 1976, the ITB for the
preliminary stage of the technical support to implement the feasibility study of
the project was issued to five companies. The service included: preparation and
assessment of the purchase order for the main equipment, preparation of the
feasibility study, and support for contract negotiation. The preliminary stage
of the technical service contract was awarded to Bechtel (US) in January 1977.
In May 1978, Bechtel was selected as the architect engineer for the system
engineering work of BOP, offshore procurement services, and owner support
services for the Kori 3&4 because Bechtel was the engineer for Maanshan in
Taiwan, the reference plant for Kori 3&4. In an effort to advance national tech-
nological independence, KOPEC was invited to participate in onsite engineer-
ing work and owner support services as Bechtel’s subcontractor. Korea achieved
a localization engineering rate of 37.0% as a result of the construction work on
Kori 3&4.
The preliminary ITB was issued to 13 companies for NSSS and T/G in
September 1976. Proposals from the preliminary ITB were received from 10
bidders. In May 1977, the ITB for the component approach and the island ap-
proach contracts were issued to seven companies for bids on NSSS, and to eight
companies for bids on T/G supply. After the evaluation process, Westinghouse
was selected as the NSSS and fuel supply contractor and GEC was selected for
the T/G. Supply contracts with both companies were signed in April 1978.
The schedule of milestones for the construction of Kori 3&4 were as
follows:
• May 1975: Establishment of the Kori 3&4 construction plan

• Jul to Oct. 1976: Topography measurement and preliminary geologic site
survey
• Jan 1977: Preliminary stage of the technical service contract with Bechtel
• May 1977: Issue of the ITB for the component base approach for the main
equipment
• Jun 1977: Issue of the ITB for the island base approach for the main
equipment
• Aug 1977: Reception of the proposals for the component base approach for
the main equipment
130 Nuclear Korea
• Sep 1977: Reception of the proposals for the island base approach for the
main equipment
• Jan 1978: Start of site grading
• Apr to May 1978: Contract signing for NSSS, Fuel, T/G, and EPCM
• May 1978: ATP (authorization to proceed) issued to NSSS, T/G, and
EPCM contractors
• Aug 1985: Start of the commercial operation for No. 3 and No. 4 in April
1986
In order to minimize the risks related to the first application of the non-
turnkey basis, KEPCO selected Bechtel as the technology service company
in January 1977 and received technical support for the construction of the nu-
clear power plant in the areas of contract, design, purchase, construction, and
management.
Through international competitive bidding, KEPCO signed a supply agree-
ment with Westinghouse in April 1978 for NSSS and signed a supply agreement
with GEC for T/G in May. In April 1979, KEPCO started the ground excava-
tion of the main building and led the construction project as the owner.
Based on the service agreement with Bechtel, KEPCO made a basic plan
and prepared its policy for site organization, construction tools and machines,
scheduling, transportation, and pre-commissioning, etc. KEPCO and Bechtel
had by then reviewed the basic directions for the overall project, from basic
planning to site organization, construction equipment, process, construction
orders, transportation contracts, and commissioning. Also, in order to manage
the construction effectively, KEPCO organized an integrated management team
that included foreign advisors to provide consultation for each division of the
site organization.
For the sake of technological independence, KEPCO had also established a
platform for acquiring the necessary skills by participating with domestic com-
panies as subcontractors of foreign contractors in the fields of construction,
design, and equipment production.
Construction on previous projects had been fully dependent on the foreign
supplier. For Kori 3&4, the onshore scope of services for the NSSS, T/G, and
EPCM contracts were separated from offshore contracts in order to promote
technology independence. In addition, this separation method encouraged the
participation of local companies.
At this time, many KOPEC engineers were dispatched to the Bechtel
office in Los Angeles to actively participate in engineering projects. The goal of
transferring technological knowledge was achieved through on-the-job training

(OJT) in the Bechtel office. The localization rate of approximately 37% for en-
gineering projects was achieved by the end of the Kori 3&4 projects.
Doosan Heavy Industry was nominated as a sole manufacturer for the local
portion of the main equipment for NSSS and T/G by the government as a part
of its industrial rationalization policy. KEPCO introduced the advantage rule
for domestic suppliers during the bid evaluation process for BOP procurement.
Approximately 40 local companies were allowed to participate in BOP equip-
ment supply, which resulted in an approximately 30% localization rate for
equipment including NSSS and T/G.
Previously, the foreign main contractor had assumed the construction man-
agement responsibility for NPPs on behalf of KEPCO and KEPCO had only
supervised the main contractor’s activities. However, beginning with Kori 3&4,
KEPCO was responsible for plant performance, BOP procurement, start-up
operations, and total project management, including interface control and the
coordination among the various contractors with the architect engineer’s
support.
Comparison of Project Management Systems
Kori 1&2 and Wolsong 1 Kori 3&4
KEPCO KEPCO
Main Contractor
Engineering Procurement Construction Start-up Engineering Procurement Construction Start-up
Hyundai E&C was selected through a competitive bidding process for the
construction of the main facility. In addition, Yoo Yang Nuclear was selected for
non-destructive examination, KOPEC was selected for the basic design field,
KPS was selected for plant maintenance, and Korea Heavy Industries and Hyo-
sung Heavy Industries participated in the equipment localization.
The first concrete pouring for the reactor building began in October
1979. In December 1980, the concrete pouring for the base floor of the reactor
132 Nuclear Korea
building was successfully completed, establishing the record for the fastest con-
struction time in the world. In order to save time, a containment liner plate was
assembled in a round shape at the site and installed with a 60-ton ringer crane.
In addition, the rebars were quickly welded and installed with the CAD welding
method, and a new method for continuously applying concrete was utilized.
Since the Kori 3&4 projects, KEPCO had been focusing on developing
auditors for performing quality surveillance and quality assurance. The QS en-
gineers for the welding, nondestructive examination, civil engineering, con-
struction, electrical, and mechanical areas were dispatched to Bechtel, and after
6 months of training, they were certified in ANSI N45, 2–6.
In 1980, the training of lead auditors was carried out at the Kori site by
inviting external experts. Certificates were given to those who passed the quali-
fication course and they went on to become the quality assurance auditors at the
site. In 1983, KEPCO was in serious trouble. After the first concrete pouring in
October 1979, the completion of the 3rd and 4th units was planned for Sep-
tember 1984 and September 1985 respectively, however, the progress rate was
only at 64%, and there was only one year left to meet the target schedule of the
third unit.
The main causes of the delay in the schedule included a required design up-
grade following the nuclear accident at TMI in the US, which necessitated the
extension of the design period. The schedule was further impacted due to the
delay in the delivery of the localization equipment from the suppliers because of
their lack of design capabilities and inadequate quality control. Finally, the delays
were exacerbated due to the lack of construction experience, and the first of its
kind use of the non-turnkey approach.
KEPCO prepared an emergency response system to overcome these issues.
In order to strengthen the construction management at the site, an integral
management team composed of KEPCO, Bechtel, and other construction
companies was established, and the supervisory staff of the head office was
dispatched to the site. In order to expedite the solution to the problem in the
field design, 10 design people from the Bechtel headquarters were assigned to
the site, and a technical support team was assembled to respond to field re-
quests. In addition, the experienced engineers from the Kori 1&2 projects were
put in charge.
Nevertheless, the initial completion target for construction was not achieved,
however, due to the emergency operations that were implemented, Kori Unit 3
succeeded in loading the nuclear fuel in October 1984, three months ahead of
the target schedule, after the initial threshold in January 1985.
Compared to Kori 3&4, Hanbit 1&2 expanded the participation of domes-

tic engineers in all fields by aggressively accepting and implementing the locali-
zation plan of the government. In addition, by adopting the same specifications
as Kori 3&4, the design cost was significantly reduced, and six units were built
at the Hanbit site, therefore creating the largest power plant in Korea.
In July 1978, KEPCO received bids for NSSS and T/G production from 11
companies through international competitive bidding. In July 1979, Westing-
house was selected as the final preferred bidder. As a technology service provider,
Bechtel was selected, and a service contract was signed in December 1979.
KEPCO directly supervised all phases of the process, from construction
to completion, including design, equipment purchase, construction, and pre-
commissioning. Under the leadership of KEPCO, Doosan Heavy Industry was
responsible for supplying the main equipment, KOPEC was responsible for the
design, and Hyundai E&C was responsible for construction. All the players
strived to incorporate the feedback received from the work on the previous pro-
jects, Kori 3&4.
From the beginning of the project, KEPCO had been concentrating on
finding ways to shorten the schedule, but we faced many challenges. Due to the
lack of design capability and production experience of the domestic suppliers,
KEPCO faced the risk of a delay in delivery of the equipment. Because of the
stagnation of the US nuclear industry, we had experienced a delay in the deliv-
ery of equipment from overseas. Meanwhile, the construction volume had been
increased due to the strengthened nuclear safety standards.
In order to overcome these risks and challenges, it was necessary to expedite
the process. KEPCO stationed staff in the manufacturing plant and instructed
that inspection and corrective measures be taken at the production factory. In
order to procure urgently needed materials, KEPCO operated a purchasing
team at the construction site. The schedule was controlled separately, however,
and in order to integrate the control of the schedule, KEPCO created an inte-
grated control office.
As a result, from August to October of 1985, the hot functional test (HFT)
had been successfully completed. This was an innovative process. Up until then,
the grid connection test of the generator was performed three months after the
fuel load. However, KEPCO tried to complete that process during the HFT and
succeeded in dispatching 700kWh with a maximum 60MW power during the
first trial of electricity transmission.
The Hanul 1&2 construction project represented the third non-turnkey ap-
proach and the direct contract was signed with Framatome for the nuclear is-
134 Nuclear Korea
land. It was in November 1980 when the contracts for the nuclear island supply,
initial fuel, fuel fabrication, and enrichment uranium supply were signed. For
the conventional island, the supply contract was signed with Alstom in February
1982. The advisory service contract for project management was signed with
Ebasco. KOPEC was responsible for the site design, the Korea Inspection
Co. for the non-destructive testing, Dong-A Construction for the civil and ar-
chitecture portions, and Doosan for the electrical and mechanical construction,
respectively. During the previous projects, KEPCO relied on Bechtel to plan the
entire project management. For Hanul 1&2, however, Framatome and Alstom
were responsible for planning their respective fields, and KEPCO was responsi-
ble for planning the overall project management. On the other hand, most do-
mestic companies were familiar with the technical standards of the United States
and were very unfamiliar with the technical standards of France.
Therefore, KEPCO had to pay more attention to the interference between
the primary and secondary systems, and the inadvertent omission of design due
to ambiguous responsibility. For example, Bechtel had provided KEPCO with a
wide range of support based on past experiences, however, the French contrac-
tors had not had sufficient experience in managing these types of projects. Un-
fortunately, KEPCO was not able to acquire sufficient management advice.
The insufficient role of the French contractors also had an impact on the
onsite project management and difficulties arose in the integrated management
of data and management techniques provided by companies with different ex-
periences. The French utilized a unique construction method in which one
company was responsible for the entire process, including design, production,
construction, and commissioning. On the other hand, KEPCO was not fully
integrated with other companies but it was a chance for the contractors who had
little experience to prepare and check the different contract methods. However,
this had become an excuse for demanding excessive technical support from the
French side.
In order to solve the problems of contract management such as the limita-
tion of liability for schedule delays caused by different contractors responsible
for the civil, electrical, and mechanical work, prioritization of the work progress,
and the commercial issues of rework, KEPCO formed and operated an IMT
(Integrated Management Team).
Unlike the previous system, which was divided into major equipment and
BOP, the procurement process was more complicated because of the primary
and secondary equipment supplied by the contractor along with the equipment
purchased directly by KEPCO. KEPCO’s direct purchasing equipment was the

local products.
The biggest problem in promoting localization was the different codes and
standards. Most domestic companies were familiar with ASTM and ASME but
were unfamiliar with AFNOR and the RCC codes of France. Therefore, in
many cases, it was necessary to sign a technology introduction contract with
French companies or invite experts to give a workshop.
Another difficulty occured with communication. France has a strong sense
of self-esteem and had many difficulties communicating in English, a common
language between the two countries. KEPCO faced a lot of difficulties because
Framatome continued to request additional payments. The reason was that the
system design had to be largely modified in order to assure the performance of
the main equipment due to the soft ground of the site. There was a rumor that
Framatome intentionally delayed the schedule and requested additional pay-
ments during other foreign projects. The rumor made the staff nervous as to
whether they could meet the target schedule on time. Framatome had filed for
compensation of about 500 million francs that were lost during the early imple-
mentation stage of the project in 1986. The main loss was due to the increase in
labor and living costs, because a large number of workers had been dispatched
to Seoul during the process of localization pursuant to KEPCO’s request. How-
ever, because Alstom applied the same terms and conditions to the staffing,
KEPCO was tough on the demands of Framatome. Framatome, however, ap-
plied for mediation at the International Chamber of Commerce in 1987 and
reached a consensus, at some level, in 1993.
Among these difficulties, KEPCO had completed a project management
system based on the comprehensive management of design and purchasing and
had raised the total localization rate by more than 40%, especially in the field of
construction, up to 100%.

The power utility has to secure professional experts from each field along with
launching a government NPP introduction team because the power utility must
be the main body in charge of the NPP construction. If securing professional hu-
man resources independently proves to be difficult, hiring a specialized and expe-
rienced engineering company is a viable alternative.
136 Nuclear Korea
The contract approach for NPP construction is classified into the plant ap-
proach (turnkey contract), the split package contract (island base contract), and
the multiple-package contract (component base contract). In Korea, the contract
method has changed according to how independent it is in terms of technology
and construction experience. The turnkey contract approach is recommended
when introducing the first NPP because the utility is inexperienced and lacks
sufficient manpower.
Even if the turnkey approach is adopted for the introduction of the first
NPP, the scope of the utility’s participation has to be considered in regard to the
technological independence of the NPP construction and operation. When ne-
gotiating the contract, fixed portion or reimbursable-based costs for training
and localization must be harmonized through an in-depth review of the reim-
bursable portion
The vendors should be solicited to offer a reasonable price taking into con-
sideration potential price escalation and changes in the currency exchange rate.
In the case of the turnkey base contract approach, it is desirable for the contrac-
tor to take as much risk as possible in the project. Sufficient time must be al-
lowed for contract negotiations in order for the vendors to propose favorable
price conditions.
Limited nominated bidding and open competition bidding could be ap-
plied for the construction of the NPP. When introducing the first NPP, the
limited nominated method offers more advantages. Limited competition bid-
ding with several pre-qualified vendors who are chosen for their technical and
commercial capabilities is recommended when introducing the first NPP.
11
Safety Analysis Report
Before building a NPP at a particular site, an applicant must obtain a construc-

tion permit (CP) from the licensing authority. Nuclear energy activities in Korea
are licensed and regulated by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
under the provisions of the Atomic Law. In the United States, the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) is the government agency corresponding to the
MOST in Korea. The licensing process is divided into two stages, normally re-
ferred to as the CP stage and the OL (operating license) stage. When the appli-
cant files an application with the MOST for the construction permit, he should
submit documents in support of the application as required by the relevant law
and regulations. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) is one of the
documents that should be submitted. The PSAR contains the technical infor-
mation on the safety of the NPP to be built. One of the other major technical
documents to be submitted at the CP stage is the “Radiological Environmental
Effects Evaluation Report,” which is provided as an input to preparing the
PSAR.
After securing the CP, the applicant can begin the plant construction pro-
cess with the basement excavation for the main building. As the detailed designs
of the plant structures, systems, and equipment are completed, the applicant
begins preparing the “Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)” to be submitted to
the MOST for the approval of the Operating License.
137
138 Nuclear Korea
Object and Scope of the Safety Analysis Report

The unique feature of NPPs, as distinct from other power-generating facilities,
is the presence of large amounts of radioactive materials, primarily the nuclear
fission products. The design of a NPP is focused on ensuring that the nuclear
fission products remain safely confined inside the plant in the event of accidents
as well as during normal operations.
To ensure that the goal mentioned above is met, the government has issued
technical standards by its ministerial decrees regarding the locations, structures,
components, performances, operations, and quality assurances of the reactor
and its associated facilities. The regulatory institute has also set forth the safety
review guidelines and applies them in the process of its review activities.
The Safety Analysis Report is a major technical document, quite extensive
in volume, which verifies that the NPP is designed and constructed in compli-
ance with those design criteria, rules, and regulations and the applicable codes
and standards. The required content in the SAR is specified in the “Atomic
Law” and its implementing ordinances. For the United States, it is specified in
10 CFR 50.
The NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70 applies to the format of the Safety Analy-
sis Report. The Safety Analysis Report consists of 18 sections that comprise the
descriptions of the topics such as site, system, and component design, radioac-
tive waste, radiation protection, operation, test and accident analysis, etc. The
titles of the sections are listed in the table.
Once the PSAR is submitted at the CP stage, the regulatory body reviews
the descriptions of the PSAR to determine whether the plant can be constructed
without undue risk to the health and safety of the public and without unaccep-
table environmental impact. If some of the descriptions are found to be unac-
ceptable or unclear, the applicant is required to make the necessary modifications
or clarifications. In Korea, while the government takes the overall lead in the
review of the Safety Analysis Report, the in-depth review is conducted by an
organization called the “Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS),” which is
designated by the government for this purpose.
When the plant construction reaches the stage where the detailed designs of
the plant structures, systems, and equipment are progressed, the applicant be-
gins to prepare the Final Safety Analysis Report. The FSAR references the PSAR
and the FSAR of the proceeding unit with the similar design, and should include
the detailed design of the plant, operational organization, and technical specifi-
cations for operation. Sufficient time should be allocated for the preparation of
Safety Analysis Report 139
the FSAR to take into account the review period of the operating license ap-
proval. It takes about 24 months to get the operating license for the plant of a
new design, whereas it takes 15 months for the plant of a reference design. The
FSAR normally requires about 15 months for its completion.
The Contents of the SAR (Typical)
Section Title
1 Introduction and General Description of the Plant
2 Site Characteristics
3 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems
4 Reactor
5 Reactor Coolant System
6 Engineered Safety Features
7 Instrumentation and Control System
8 Electric Power
9 Auxiliary Systems
10 Steam and Power Conversion System
11 Radioactive Waste Management
12 Radiation Protection
13 Conduct of Operation
14 Initial Tests and Operation
15 Accident Analysis
16 Technical Specifications
17 Quality Assurance
18 Human Factors Engineering

140 Nuclear Korea
Contents of the Safety Analysis Report

The Safety Analysis Report, both the PSAR and the FSAR, contains a tremen-
dous amount of information that covers the NPP construction from design,
manufacturing, and fabrication of the equipment to plant operation. The SAR
consists of 18 volumes. In order to help you understand the concept of the SAR,
a brief summary of the information that should be included in each chapter of
the SAR is presented here, based on the FSAR of Hanbit 3&4 and Hanul 5&6.
CHAPTER 1—Introduction and General Description of the Plant

This chapter provides general information of the plant site: Plant site location and
plant systems; comparison tables with the previous units of similar design; iden-
tification of agents and contractors involved in the project; reference materials.
CHAPTER 2—Site Characteristics

This chapter addresses the site characteristics: Geography and demography, in-
cluding the population distribution in the vicinity of the proposed site; nearby
industrial, transportation, and military facilities; meteorological factors that have
a bearing upon the design including typhoons and storms, snow, wind, and tem-
peratures; hydrologic engineering for protection against flooding caused by tides,
heavy rains or Tsunami, etc., geology, seismology, and geotechnical engineering
with a history of the occurrence of major earthquakes and safe shutdown proce-
dures in the case of an earthquake.
CHAPTER 3—Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems

This chapter addresses the following topics: Conformance of the plant design
with the requirements stated in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design
Criteria; classification of structures, components, and systems into Seismic
Category I, II, III; identification of the transients used in the design and fatigue
analysis of ASME class 1, 2, 3 components; computer codes used in stress
analysis.
CHAPTER 4—Reactor
This chapter addresses the following topics: Design basis of fuel assemblies com-
prised of fuel rods, burnable poison rods, and control element assemblies;
nuclear design including nuclear characteristics of the reactor core; important

nuclear design parameters that affect the performance of the core under steady-
state and transient operations; information on assembly loading pattern, reactor
power distribution, reactivity coefficients, control element assembly patterns,
and reactivity worth; thermal and hydraulic design including steady-state ther-
mal and hydraulic analysis of the reactor core showing that the core can meet
steady-state and transient performance requirements without violating the de-
sign bases; thermal hydraulic analysis methods and the experimental work done
to support the analytical techniques; results of analysis should verify that mini-
mum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) does not occur during
steady-state operation and anticipated transients of moderate frequency.
(Note: DNBR is defined as the calculated ratio of the heat flux needed to cause depar-
ture from nucleate boiling to the actual local heat flux of a fuel rod.)
CHAPTER 5—Reactor Coolant System

This chapter addresses the following topics: Reactor vessel; materials and pro-
cesses used for manufacturing and fabrication of the reactor vessel; non-destruc-
tive examination and fracture toughness test for the reactor vessel; reactor vessel
material surveillance program; component and subsystem design; design basis,
materials, test, and inspection requirements applied to the system equipment
(reactor coolant pump, steam generator, pressurizer, reactor coolant piping,
main steam line flow restrictor and isolation valve); system piping and instru-
ment diagram.
CHAPTER 6—Engineered Safety Features

Engineered safety features (ESF) systems provide protection in the event of an
accidental release of radioactive fission products from the reactor coolant system
(RCS), particularly due to a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This chapter
addresses the function of ESF systems to localize, control, mitigate, and termi-
nate such incidents and to hold exposure levels below applicable limits (e.g.
10 CFR 100).
142 Nuclear Korea
Simplified PWR Plant Schematic Diagram
Primary Systems Secondary Systems
M
Steam Turbine
System
S/G
Rx
CDSR
Reactor Protection &
Auxiliary System TBN GEN
Aux System
Hx
Hx Reactor Coolant
System
Main Feedwater
System Sea Water
Component Cooling System
The safety injection system injects borated water into the RCS and includes
the safety injection tank, and the low and high pressure safety injection pumps.
The containment system contains the released radioactive fission products in-
side the containment building and includes systems for containment isolation,
containment spray, and combustible gas control. ESF system and component
design, testing, and performance evaluation includes the evaluation model and
analysis results for both large and small breaks.
CHAPTER 7—Instrumentation and Control System

The instrumentation and control systems monitor and perform safety-related
functions. This chapter provides a complete description and analysis of these
systems, including the presentation of the design basis and functions of the
reactor protection system (RPS), engineered safety features actuation system
(ESFAS), systems required for safe shutdown, the NSSS measurement channel
block diagram and the control logic functional diagram. Provisions are available
to permit periodic testing of the complete RPS with the reactor operating at
power or when shut down. These tests cover the trip actions from sensor input
through the protective system and the trip switchgear. Individual tests for RPS
are sensor check, trip bi-stable tests, core protection calculator tests, and the
logic matrix test. Analysis should demonstrate that the RCS initiates automatic
protective action as designed in order to ensure that RCS and fuel design limits
are not exceeded during incidents of moderate and sporadic frequency, and to
support the ESF systems in limiting the consequences of severe accidents.
CHAPTER 8—Electric Power

This chapter describes the electrical power supply and distribution systems with-
in the plant: The electric grid in the vicinity of the site; onsite and offsite power
sources and distribution systems; a one-line diagram for the plant electrical sys-
tem is presented.
CHAPTER 9—Auxiliary Systems

This chapter describes auxiliary systems that consist of fuel storage and han-
dling, water systems, process auxiliaries, and HVAC (heating, ventilating, and
air conditioning) systems. Design bases, facility or component description, safe-
ty evaluation, critical safety, seismic classification, tests and inspection, instru-
mentation application, and storage capacities for individual systems are presented
as applicable.
CHAPTER 10—Steam and Power Conversion System

This chapter presents a summary of the important design and performance
characteristics related to the steam and power conversion systems. Included in
the performance characteristics are the main steam pressure and flow rate, tur-
bine-generator output, and condenser pressure. Protective and safety-related
features such as turbine over-speed protection are also addressed.
CHAPTER 11—Radioactive Waste Management

This chapter addresses radioactive source terms and waste management systems:
Source terms; radioactive source terms are the amount of radioactivity that re-
sult from the operation of the plant. They are used in shielding design, calcula-
tion of radioactivity releases from the plant, and accident analysis; liquid,
gaseous, and solid waste management system; the ability of the system to collect
and dispose of radioactive wastes is discussed.
144 Nuclear Korea
CHAPTER 12—Radiation Protection

This chapter describes the following subjects related to radiation protection:
Plant design and operating policies ensuring occupational radiation exposures
are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA); assessment of annual dose to
onsite personnel and exclusion area boundary (EAB); health physics program.
CHAPTER 13—Conduct of Operation

This chapter addresses items related to the conduct of plant operation including:
Organizational structure of the applicant; plant staff training; emergency plan-
ning; review and audit; plant administrative and operating procedures; security.
CHAPTER 14—Initial Tests and Operation

The initial test and operation begins as systems become available for testing dur-
ing the construction phase and ends with the completion of the power ascension
tests. The test is designed to demonstrate that components and systems of the
NSSS operate in accordance with the design requirements and provide verifica-
tion of core physics parameters and baseline performance data for use during
normal plant operation. Major tests included in the testing program include pre-
operational tests, hot functional tests, initial core loading and initial criticality,
low power physics tests, and power ascension tests. This chapter describes: (1) test
organization and staffing, (2) test procedures, and (3) review, evaluation, and ap-
proval of test results.
CHAPTER 15—Accident Analysis

This chapter presents analytical evaluations of the nuclear steam supply system
(NSSS) response to postulated disturbances in process variables and to postu-
lated malfunctions or failures of equipment. The effects of these incidents are
examined to determine their consequences and to evaluate the built-in capabil-
ity of the plant to control or accommodate such failures and situations. Each
initiating event is assigned to one of the following eight categories according to
the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70; Increase in heat removal by the secondary
system; decrease in heat removal by the secondary system; decrease in reactor
coolant flow rate; reactivity and power distribution anomaly; increase in reactor
coolant system inventory; decrease in reactor coolant system inventory; radioac-
tive release from a subsystem or component; anticipated transients without
scram (ATWS); methodologies used for the analysis of the accidents are
presented with their results; mathematical model is used to simulate the NSSS
response to the event; initial conditions including initial values for the principal
process variables; input parameters used in the analysis.
Several of the events such as Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), in which
the reactor coolant piping is double-ended broken, are accompanied by the re-
lease of steam or liquid from the reactor coolant system to the main steam sys-
tem. The methodology and important input parameters used to assess the
radiological consequences of these releases are discussed.
CHAPTER 16—Technical Specifications

This chapter specifies the limits and requirements to be followed in the opera-
tion of the plant. They are grouped into six categories covering: Definitions;
safety limits and limiting safety system settings; limiting conditions for opera-
tion; surveillance period; design features; administrative controls.
CHAPTER 17—Quality Assurance

This chapter describes: The quality assurance program of the parties involved in
the project as it relates to design and construction; the applicant’s quality assur-
ance program during operation.
CHAPTER 18—Human Factors Engineering

This chapter addresses human factors engineering at the plant. The human fac-
tors engineering is intended to assure that the operator–machine interfaces of
the plant are adequate to support safe operations. Covered in this chapter for the
discussion of the compliance of relevant requirements are: Control room; safety
parameter display system; remote shutdown panel.

The SAR is a technical document that contains vast amounts of data and infor-
mation required to ensure the safety of the plant that the applicant is planning
to build. The applicant receives assistance from architect engineers and equip-
ment suppliers while preparing the SAR, who respond to the questions or com-
ments from the licensing authority following the submission of the SAR.
146 Nuclear Korea
Because the applicant is ultimately responsible for clearing the licensing

authority’s review process for the SAR, it is quite essential for the applicant to
possess its own manpower that can handle those SAR-related issues.
In this regard, it is highly recommended to take action to secure the man-
power that is qualified to handle the SAR in advance before the first NPP con-
struction begins. It is recommended to further develop the manpower through
training at professional institutions.
For the introduction of the initial NPP, guidelines and directions about
safety must be clearly defined and applied during the course of the technical as-
sessment and selection of the reactor type. The NPP can be constructed and
operated only after the safety of the plant is verified through the safety analysis
report. The safety analysis report is submitted to the regulatory body by the ap-
plicant. However, the applicant should get assistance from plant architect engi-
neers and equipment suppliers in order to prepare it.
The safety analysis report is divided into the PSAR and the FSAR. The
PSAR is submitted for the application of the construction permit, and the FSAR
is submitted for the operating license. In order for the owner to prepare and
submit the SAR to the regulatory body and to proceed with the review process,
the owner needs to create a SAR team with individuals that have attended pro-
fessional nuclear training institutes.
12
Environmental Impact Assessment
An environmental impact assessment is the process of forecasting and analyzing

the harmful impact of project implementation on the natural, living, and socio-
economic environment, thereby informing future plans of action. The environ-
mental assessment system is defined by law depending on the specifics of each
country. The general process begins with a utility preparing and submitting an
environmental report (ER) to the government agency for approval. The govern-
ment agency then holds a conference with the organizations in charge of envi-
ronmental affairs prior to approving the project. During this process, the agency
reviews the basic requirements and the contents of the ER, and, if needed, sup-
plemental documents are added to the report. The goal of the environmental
impact assessment is to prevent environmental destruction in advance by pro-
viding sufficient consideration for the conservation of the environment prior to
implementing the project.
The purpose of the environmental impact assessment is to forecast uncer-
tain environmental changes in the future based on the current technology, data,
and experience and it requires sophisticated technology (environment-related
technology, forecasting technology, and others) along with experience. Howev-
er, it is extremely difficult to have all of these elements ready and this leads to a
certain degree of inaccuracy and unreliability in the assessment. In general, the
environmental assessment is classified into a preliminary environmental review
and an environmental impact assessment.
A preliminary environmental review considers the potential impact on the
environment in the early stages of the project. The review considers the feasibil-
ity survey when establishing various industrial development plans, as a way to
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148 Nuclear Korea
incorporate that data into the selection of the power plant site, and to use it as
the base data for a future environmental impact assessment. The items that
should be included in the preliminary environmental review are as follows:
(1) Project plan with purposes, needs, project background, implementation

procedures, etc.
(2) Status of the land use, including the category of the usage area at the subject
site
(3) Distribution status of the ecological and scenic conservation zone within
the subject site
(4) Data involving ecologic characteristics, including the development status of
the area surrounding the site
(5) Status of the current pollution level and pollution sources at the site
(6) Methods for impact reduction and alternative solutions
(7) Map of the subject area, land use plan, and others
The purpose of the environmental impact assessment is to provide pleasant

and safe living conditions for all citizens by creating a sound and sustainable
project development plan, made possible by assessing and reviewing the impact
of the project on the environment prior to implementation.
An environmental impact assessment of the NPP construction project
should be conducted in the following order:
1. Perform an environmental status survey of the area surrounding the site

2. Create an impact forecast
3. Assess the construction and operation of the NPP
4. Review the action plan
5. Recommend alternative ways to reduce the impact on the environment
6. Prepare the draft of the assessment statement
7. Integrate the residents’ opinions about living in the area
8. Prepare the final assessment report that includes the residents’ opinions
When preparing the assessment plan, any factors that may influence the
environment by the execution of the project should be identified by formulating
a determinant sheet using the Matrix method. The procedure for creating an
environmental impact assessment in Korea is shown as follows.
Environmental Impact Assessment 149
Preparation of an environmental Utility

impact assessment draft Establishment of the plan
Upon selecting a proxy agency, select a
substitute assessment agency
Integration of the residents' opinions Head of the applicable local government and
the utility
Utility
Preparation of the final assessment report
(Reflecting opinions presented by the residents and
relevant institutions)
Submission of the assessment report Utility → Project approval institution → Ministry of

and request for consultation Environment
Ministry of Environment → Project approval

Notice of the consultation result
institution → Utility
Executing party: Utility
Execution of the consultation Confirming party: Head of the approving
institution and others
Designation of manager to
Utility → Notify the approving institution
manage consulted items
Post-environmental management 5 years after the completion of the project
The items that should be included in the environmental impact assessment

are as follows:
1. Summary statement
2. Outline of the project
3. Setting the target area of the assessment
4. Regional outline
5. Evaluation category
6. Confirmation of the evaluation category and scope
7. Integration of the residents’ opinions
8. Survey of the environmental status for each evaluation category, forecast,
and assessment; reduction plan and post-project environmental survey
○ Atmospheric environment (atmosphere, air quality, odor)
○ Water environment (water quality, water utilization, marine
environment)
○ Land environment (land use, soil, geography, and topography)
150 Nuclear Korea
○ Ecological environment (land fauna and flora, marine fauna and flora,
natural environmental assets)
○ Living environment (pro-environment resource cycle, noise and vibra-
tion, recreation, scenic view, sanitation, public health, electrowave in-
terference, solar interference)
○ Socioeconomic environment (population, residence, and industry)
9. Plan to reduce the impact on the environment (comprehensive)

10. Inevitable environmental impacts
11. Post-project environmental survey plan
12. Alternative setting and assessment
13. Comprehensive assessment and conclusion
A detailed examination is made by conducting an actual inspection of the

site or of the existing documents that deal with the living environment, socio-
economic aspects, and others related to the location of the project. An in-depth
examination should be conducted on the geography, topography, marine envi-
ronment, water quality, wastes, noise, and vibration in relation to the NPP con-
struction. An extended survey period is desired, but because each category may
have different characteristics during each season, the survey needs to last for a
minimum of one year.
The environmental impact forecast has to be classified into power plant
construction and operation stages and should be executed accordingly based on
each category of the environment status report such as nature, living, and socio-
economic environment. It should give sufficient consideration to the direct,
indirect, and long- and short-term impacts. The impact assessment from the
construction work must incorporate the impacts from road construction, ag-
gregate collection, dredging, reclamation, and so on. The impact from the op-
eration of the power plant must take into account the noise, vibration, thermal
pollution, waste water, industrial wastes, and so on.
After completing the forecast assessment of the impact on the environment,
an action plan to reduce or moderate the degree of the environmental impact
should follow. A reduction plan should be able to present the optimal alterna-
tives based on a comparison and review of the economic effects, strengths, and
weaknesses of each action plan.
All plans, including alternatives to accomplish the project goals, are re-
viewed focusing on the feasibility of the nuclear power plant construction in
terms of the environmental impact. If possible, it is desirable to use a cost–ben-
efit analysis.
Environmental Impact Assessment 151
The environmental impact of radiation is separated from the environmental

impact assessment of the general facilities. The assessment forecasts the environ-
mental impact of radiation from the construction of the NPP. In an effort to
protect the life and property of the citizens, along with preserving and conserv-
ing the pleasant national environment, the survey and assessment of the envi-
ronmental impacts are performed in advance and a standard is set to measure for
environmental changes following the operation of the NPP. The assessment is
also designed to prove that radioactive materials or materials contaminated by
radioactivity do not interfere with the prevention of harm to people, property,
or public health.
In addition to the assessment of the general industrial facilities, nuclear
power-related facilities are carefully evaluated with a focus on radiation-related
systems and facilities. The radiation source that is discharged from the radiation-
related system must also be assessed. In the event that the construction takes
place in the vicinity of a NPP that is currently in operation, the radiation source
from the existing NPP has to be described and the maximum exposure dose and
the integrated exposure dose for the workers must be classified and assessed. In
addition, the assessment evaluates the exposure dose that is delivered through
the air and water resulting from the operation of the NPP and the exposure dose
that is delivered from the nuclear-related facilities. The assessment focuses espe-
cially on the probability of every possible accident that could occur during the
operation of the NPP.
The post-project environmental management system has been strengthened
in many countries around the world, and the pertinent administrative institu-
tions are requiring the utility to provide and report their basic plan for post-
project management on a regular basis in order to examine and confirm the
execution of the final results from the environmental impact assessment.
For areas that are found to be problematic following the environmental
impact assessment, it would be prudent to investigate the trend of changes over
an extended period of time. The utility should establish plans to manage its
environment in regard to the climate, water quality, waste disposal, etc. through-
out the construction period.

The environmental impact assessment is of the most interest to the general pub-
lic and is the area with the most importance to the central government, local
152 Nuclear Korea
governments, and environmental groups. The pertinent impacts following the

construction and operation of a nuclear power plant must be evaluated and
forecasted within a sufficient amount of time.
When the draft of the environmental impact assessment is prepared, public
opinion is gathered in order to include the maximum amount of input from the
local citizens, local organizations, and others. Depending on the situation, there
have been cases where public hearings or sessions for local residents have not
been amicable, and in this situation, the utility is required to provide sufficient
written inquiry and present the facts contained in the final environmental im-
pact assessment report.
The purpose of the environmental impact assessment is to forecast the
unforeseen environmental changes that may occur on the basis of the present
availability of technology, data, and experience, which requires high-quality
technology and experience. For this purpose, the engineering company that
possess specialized experience must be utilized.
Korea is surrounded by the sea, so it follows that sea farming and the fishery
industry have been developed. The expansion of nuclear power raised concerns
about the impact of warm water discharge from NPPs. The methods for reduc-
ing the impact of warm water discharge have been under discussion. Therefore,
it is necessary to find solutions that minimize those impacts from the start of a
project.
Part V
Localization and
Technological
Independence
13
Localization and Technological
Independence
When Korea first began to construct power plants, most of the equipment need-
ed for construction was imported from overseas suppliers, except for some do-
mestic civil construction materials. But as the heavy chemical industry was
revitalized, the need to produce the necessary equipment through localization
(used in building heavy chemical facilities, including power plants) increased.
The government further promoted localization by requiring permits for materi-
als imported at the beginning stages of a project in accordance with the Foreign
Capital Law and the Machinery Industry Advancement Law.
As NPP construction continued, the need for design standardization and
technological independence increased. For 1995, the goal of 95% technological
independence was set by KEPCO at the preliminary stage of Hanbit 3&4 in
1984. In addition, the goal for developing OPR1000 in 1995 and APR1400 by
2001 was set.
As NPP construction projects continued, power plant construction experi-
ence accumulated to form the foundation for technological independence. Re-
duction in foreign dependence in NPP construction techniques led to improved
energy security and savings in foreign currency expenditures, which ultimately
benefited the national economy. Achieving NPP construction independence
also advanced domestic technology. All of the above factors led to a strong push
for localization.
Korea introduced the first NPP during the 1970s and adopted a turnkey
contract during this phase. As experience accumulated in the ‘80s, foreign
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156 Nuclear Korea
vendors were selected as the lead contractors to provide the main equipment,
however, domestic companies could participate as subcontractors. Auxiliary
equipment was purchased separately by the utility with the support of an archi-
tect engineering company. During the 1990s, as local skills matured, Korean
companies became the lead contractors and foreign firms were hired as subcon-
tractors when their expertise was required. This technological independence was
pursued in a step-by-step approach in accordance with the growing experience
that was gained from the construction of NPPs.
The goals for technological independence at the time of the Hanbit 3&4
construction are shown below.
Obtain 95% of the technologies (independent engineering, manufacturing,

and construction) necessary for constructing the same type of NPP as Han-
bit 3&4 within the parameters of schedule and budget.
A Step-by-Step Approach to Localization
1990s
• Technology Independence
• Development of OPR1000
1980s • Development of APR1400
• Accumulation of NPP
Technology Led by Local Contractors
1970s - Local: Prime Contractors
• Component Approach
• Introduction of NPP - Foreign: Subcontractors
• Turnkey Approach Foreign–Local Joint Design,
Joint Manufacturing
- Foreign: Prime Contractors
Foreign Contractors - Local: Subcontractors
Engineering
During the turnkey phase in the 1970s, engineering work for NPP construction
was entirely dependent on foreign companies while domestic design firms par-
ticipated only on a small scale. During the 1980s, the split package contract
(component base contract) was employed. Basic engineering was performed
by foreign architect engineering companies, while both foreign and domestic
Localization and Technological Independence 157
architect engineering companies performed jointly in detailed engineering. For-

eign companies were persuaded to provide the warranty for the overall project.
Construction of Hanbit 3&4 was the first project that actively pursued tech-
nological independence. Basic engineering was performed by both domestic and
foreign engineering firms while detailed engineering was performed by domestic
firms. The technology transfer contract was signed separately from the main en-
gineering service contract for the purpose of transferring technology to the do-
mestic company. After Hanbit 3&4 were completed, construction began on
Hanul 3&4. For the Hanul 3&4 project, both the basic and detailed engineering
was performed by a domestic architect engineering company with foreign ex-
perts brought in only when necessary.
Equipment Manufacturing
With the turnkey contract, equipment is imported from abroad. With the com-
ponent base contract, the foreign company is the main contractor while the
domestic manufacturer participates as a subcontractor for work on assembling
selected main equipment.
Hanbit 3&4 was the first project to actively seek localization and technologi-
cal independence. For Hanbit 3&4, a domestic company was hired as the main
contractor and foreign companies participated as subcontractors. Similar to the
engineering contract, the technology transfer contract was signed separately with
a foreign company that was responsible for transferring technology related to
equipment design. For NPP construction projects occurring after the Hanbit
3&4, a domestic company was selected as the main contractor and foreign com-
panies were hired as subcontractors for equipment that domestic manufacturers
could not produce.
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication

A nuclear fuel fabrication facility of 10 tons per year on heavy water reactor (CAN-
DU) started construction in 1978, which was made possible through both a loan
and technical assistance from France. Because of this, the production capability of
the facility was increased to 100 tons/year in accordance with the localization plan
for nuclear fuel for a heavy water reactor. In order to meet the fuel demands of
Wolsong 2, 3, and 4, Canadian technology was imported to complete a facility
capable of producing 400 tons/year.
158 Nuclear Korea
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) used to fabricate and design
nuclear fuels until Korea Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (KNF) was established in 1982
and fabrication work was transferred to them. KNF and KAERI worked together
implementing technology from Siemens KWU of Germany to complete a 200
ton/year nuclear fuel fabrication facility. They also worked together to implement
technology from COGEMA of France that produced a lower amount of radioac-
tive wastes. Their partnership ended when the responsibility for nuclear fuel de-
sign was transferred to KNF. Currently, both the design and the fabrication of
nuclear fuel are done by KNF.
Government Support
Just as industrialization was taking place during the 1960s, the Korean govern-
ment pursued policies to achieve localization. According to the Korean Machin-
ery Industry Advancement Law (1967), the construction projects for the
industrial facilities were subject to the Korea Association of Machinery Indus-
try’s review to determine the feasibility of localization.
In addition, the Korean government assigned Doosan Heavy Industries and
Construction Co., Ltd. as the supplier of the main equipment for the power
generating facility in accordance with the industrial rationalization policy. Korea
Power Engineering, Inc. (KOPEC) was selected as the architect engineering com-
pany for NPP including the system engineering in order to promote focused
growth in the industry. KOPEC and Doosan played an active role in achieving
technological independence for Hanbit 3&4.
Localization of the Balance of Plant (BOP)

Nuclear power equipment is categorized into the main equipment and the balance
of plant (BOP). With the turnkey method, both the main equipment and the
balance of plant are purchased together. However, with the non-turnkey contract
method, the main equipment is procured first and then the balance of plant is
procured according to the progress of the engineering work. About 200 packages
of BOP, not including materials supplied by the construction contractor, are pre-
pared according to the purchase orders.
The government and the utility may approach localization in different ways.
The utility is conservative in its approach to safety, quality, and economics,
whereas the government’s focus is on the growth of domestic industries and on

reducing foreign expenses. Therefore, a balanced approach is necessary.
In order to improve the localization of heavy and chemical industry equip-
ment, the Machinery Industry Advancement Law required an approval prior to
importing heavy industrial equipment. However, the act has been abolished
since the establishment of the WTO. Sources of equipment procurement are
classified into Case I, Case II, and Case III as shown in the following table
Classification of Procurement Sources
Source of Classification Description

Procurement
Localization Case I Manufacturing and assembling locally
Case II Assembling locally with imported components
Import Case III Importing components from offshore
Approval System for Import
Long-Term Power
Machinery Industry Development Plan
Promotion Act (1967–)
MOCIE / KEPCO
Program for Machinery Submitted of Equipment

Industry Promotion Promotion Sources
MOCIE KEPCO
Design of Promotion Sources

Localization Execution Committee
Items to be localized Items not to be localized

Localization Import
160 Nuclear Korea
During the public bid process for equipment from foreign companies, bid-
ders are required to disclose the scope of localization, which is used in evaluating
the bidder. During the contract negotiations, there is a strong push to manufac-
ture items locally, if possible. Foreign companies agree to localization in order to
save the equipment manufacturing cost by leveraging the low wages in Korea.
The quality of the equipment is maintained through the oversight of local super-
visors as well as QA performed by the foreign supplier.
In order to meet the QA requirements for the equipment design and manu-
facturing, manufacturers must have the ability to operate above a defined stand-
ard. Therefore, the qualified vendor registration system is in place. The utility
takes into consideration the manpower, facilities, the status of the technology
development, and the financial status when awarding the qualification. The
qualification is effective for three years, and when the license expires, they must
follow the renewal process to retain the qualification. The quality grade of the
equipment is determined by the safety (Q) grade, the safety effect (T) grade, and
the reliability (R) grade. Note: The industrial standard (I-S) grade does not re-
quire a license.
Once registered as a qualified vendor, they are allowed to enter bids for
contracts in the areas in which they are qualified. The qualifications for the ven-
dor have been strengthened in order to promote improved quality of the equip-
ment and to limit cutthroat competition among vendors.
In order to promote the localization of NPP equipment, an In-Country
Value for domestic products is in place, which awards additional points for do-
mestic portions in the cost evaluation. If more domestic portions are included
in the proposal, the evaluation results for the particular proposal could poten-
tially be more favorable. On the other hand, with imported equipment, import
fees (tariffs and freight) are also considered when evaluating the bids.
Government subsidies for research and development are provided to small-
and medium-sized businesses. If the government-supported R&D is successful,
the government guarantees the purchase of localized equipment for a set period
of time (2 years). Under this system, the utility provides support in regard to the
technical difficulties that small and medium businesses typically face during the
R&D process. This system also contains provisions that mandate that newly
developed and approved technology must make up at least 20% of the annual
procurement of the certified products.
The NPP design is standardized and the same types of plants are construct-
ed repeatedly in accordance with national policy. The auxiliary equipment man-
ufacturers are able to supply identical equipment for all succeeding projects, but
only if the manufacturers can acquire and apply the proper engineering and
production technology to the first project.
In consideration of the equipment design and procurement schedule, BOP
procurement packages are classified as packages used in the construction of
Shin-Kori 1&2 and are described in the following table.
Status of the BOP Procurement Packages of Shin-Kori 1&2
Field Description No. of Packages Remarks
Architect and Civil Structure, Cement, Painting, etc. 12
Electrical Transformer, Cable, etc. 57

(including telecommunications)
I&C MCB, related instruments, etc. 45
Mechanical Condenser, Heat exchanger, etc. 50
Piping Piping, Valves, etc. 26
Nuclear Nuclear fuel, Spent fuel rack, etc. 22
Total 212
The policies for localization and technological independence (prepared by

the government and by the utility) have been well accepted by domestic manu-
facturers. In order to produce nuclear-grade equipment, the selected domestic
firms either import technology or form a technology partnership with experi-
enced offshore vendors. Auxiliary equipment manufacturers recall that the expe-
rience they gained while meeting the international technology standards and
strict quality assurance process was greatly beneficial when it came to exporting
their products. The localization of NPP equipment and technological independ-
ence coincided with the increase in demand for the export of plant facilities. To
meet this demand, domestic manufacturers made sizeable investments to up-
grade their production facilities and train human resources.
Localization and Technological Independence

Korea’s nuclear power technological independence and localization efforts can
be divided into the following three points. The first point is related to the
162 Nuclear Korea
government and utility initiative. The government and the utility jointly planned
and led the long-term localization initiative to attract domestic manufacturers
to manufacture equipment and materials. The second is related to the standardi-
zation of NPPs. We’ll look at this in more detail in the next chapter. The third
point is related to the implementation of a systematic approach. During the
beginning phase of NPP construction, Korea was dependent on technology
from foreign companies who were experts in the field. As more experience was
accumulated, a foreign company would lead the project, while domestic compa-
nies participated as subcontractors in order to improve their technology. Finally,
when the domestic firms had acquired sufficient knowledge, they were able to
lead the project on their own.
With the exception of a few areas, localization and the pursuit of techno-
logical independence resulted in a steady increase in the sustainable level of
localization in the new nuclear program. The standardization of power plants
has resulted in shorter construction schedules, cost savings, and safer NPPs.

A vast amount of investment is required to achieve technological independence
for the construction of NPPs. This means that the equipment manufacturer is
hesitant to invest in a new project. Therefore, the best option for benefiting the
developing country is for the government, the utility, and the manufacturers to
all work together. A consistent policy is required for NPP construction along
with strong and unwavering support from both the government and the utility
in order to promote technological independence. It is recommended that the
government and/or utility assume responsibility for the development costs in
order to localize the NPP equipment, which will benefit the nation’s future. In
regard to those areas that have insufficient technology, the best solution is to
introduce the required technology from a foreign company that has that specific
expertise or to form a technical partnership with them.
Building a long-term plan for technological independence is mandatory in
accordance with the long-term power development plan. A rapid approach to
technological independence without an advance plan will most likely result
in failure. A step-by-step approach that takes into consideration the industrial
situation of the nation as well as the creation of a long-term power development
plan are desirable.
14
NPP Standardization
Phase I Project (‘83.4–’85.7): Basic Concept

The first year of the project was dedicated to preparing the fundamental survey
and analysis for the implementation plan for the nuclear reactor standardization
project in Korea. It examined the international standardization cases, identified
international trends, investigated the current state of the domestic nuclear pow-
er plant construction as well as nuclear industry technology. By thoroughly re-
viewing the results, it was possible to determine the appropriate reactor type and
capacity for standardization. In addition, we determined the scope and contents
for standardization. The comprehensive site characteristics had been determined
on the basis of the site survey reports of the potential sites for construction.
These efforts resulted in the standardization policy.
We also selected the items to be incorporated into the design of a standard
nuclear power plant, conducted the design optimization study, and created the
general design specifications.
In the second year of the project, we studied the improvements in the
performance of the vulnerable systems of the power plant as well as improve-
ments in the reliability and safety of the system through the use of the PSA
technique. We also searched for a plan to reduce the potential exposure of the
operator and maintenance personnel to radiation. These efforts contributed to
the development of a reliable and economic design for a standardized nuclear
power plant. A quantitative analysis was performed on Hanbit 1&2 in order
to develop a method to optimize the reliability and safety of the standardized
design by using the PSA method.
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164 Nuclear Korea
In order to assess the basic design, the main systems and components were
examined first to determine their effect on the availability of the plant. We then
developed a database to gather information regarding the failure rate and main-
tenance period of various equipment and then proceeded to develop a reliability
block diagram based on this data.
Next, the reliability and safety of the system were examined by using the
PSA technique. The PSA method was applied in order to select the auxiliary
feed water supply system that had the greatest influence on the core melt acci-
dent in the safety system. The reliability using the fault tree analysis method was
analyzed and the factors affecting the inability to use the auxiliary feed water
supply system were identified. The optimization study was divided into two
components: The improvement of plant availability and the enhancement of
reliability and safety.
We developed an optimization method for improving plant availability and
analyzed the importance of the influence of each of the five vulnerable systems,
which were derived from the existing data regarding the utilization of each com-
ponent. This allowed us to find alternatives to the design that would improve
operability and maintenance. We also analyzed the cost/benefit and compared
the existing design to the optimal alternative design taking into consideration
the investment risks versus reality. The methodology for determining the opti-
mal design for improving the reliability and safety of the power plant was estab-
lished, and this was applied to the vulnerable systems. It should be mentioned
that the optimal design was derived after performing quantitative analysis.
A study on how to reduce radiation exposure for operators and maintenance
workers suggested that an optimal exposure reduction plan could be formulated
by comparing the estimate of the exposure reduction against the actual exposure
of the operating plant in terms of both technical and cost effectiveness
Phase II Project (‘85.9–’87.8): Study of

Design Improvements
In order to understand the basic concept of standardization, which was pre-
sented in the first stage of the study, the design improvement items were drawn
and the design guidelines for the standardized nuclear power plant were pre-
pared. The subject areas were divided into NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply Sys-
tem) design field and the AE and BOP system design fields.
NPP Standardization 165
The improvement areas addressed in the NSSS design included: (1) reduc-
tion of the number of unnecessary plant shutdowns by means of set point
changes of trip signals due to a steam generator level and turbine trip, (2) opti-
mization of the fluid system, (3) reduction in the time spent on in-service in-
spections, (4) predicting and diagnosing any abnormal status of the reactor
system, (5) thermal shock prevention, (6) optimization of the I&C system,
(7) increment of thermal power based on the margin, (8) reduction of the com-
missioning period, and (9) simplification of the structure support system.
The scope of the AE and BOP system design fields included the following:
(1) forced plant shutdown, (2) prevention of a power blackout, (3) introduction
of advanced control systems, (4) improvement of the main control room,
(5) improvement of the secondary side water treatment system design, (6) im-
provement of safety through the use of PSA, (7) improvement of post-accident
sampling, (8) emergency response facilities, (9) reduction of radiation exposure
and exposure time, (10) improvement in the convenience of operation and
maintenance, and (11) improvement of the design of the structural support.
Phase III Project (‘89–’91.4): Standard Nuclear

Power Plant Design Requirements and Safety
Analysis Report
The Phase III project consisted of a standardization study to reflect the new
technology and regulatory requirements that were derived from the first and
second steps, as well as to prepare the standard design requirements and safety
analysis report that would be applied to the construction of the next nuclear
power plant. In order to leverage the new technology, we incorporated the re-
quirements of EPRI ALWR URD and the System 80+ / CESSAR-DC and in-
corporated the additional safety requirements of USNRC to address severe
accidents.
At this point, the roles and responsibilities had been defined. KEPCO was
responsible for the project management portion of the project and KAERI was
responsible for the design requirements for the standard nuclear power plant and
the Safety Analysis Report. KOPEC had developed KSRED for the AE field,
which was a standard nuclear plant design requirement. KSRED took into con-
sideration the feedback from the experiences with Hanbit 3&4, which were the
first localized nuclear power plants based on the System 80+, and incorporated
166 Nuclear Korea
the overseas advanced light-water reactor design technology and other proven
new technologies. From the perspective of the utility, we had identified areas for
improvement that would assure the convenience of the operation and mainte-
nance as well as the competitiveness of both safety and economics. In other
words, the Phase III project was to set feasible design targets and specific design
requirements for the main system in order to achieve the established goals, as
well as to present the design improvement requirements for the entire plant,
while also incorporating new trends in technology.
The design improvement plan was applied to the systems of the NSSS
(Nuclear Steam Supply System), the T/G (Turbine Generator), and the BOP
(Balance of Plant), and included a substation connected to the grid. However,
the plan only described the requirements for a single unit and did not include
requirements for connecting with other plants at the same site or to the com-
mon facilities. The requirements for low-level radioactive waste treatment and
spent fuel storage at the site were also included, however, the scope of radioac-
tive waste treatment or disposal outside the site were excluded from the plan.
15
Project Management of NPP
Construction
In the event that the country initiating a NPP project has substantial experience
with large-scale construction projects (although not specifically with NPP con-
struction), a split package method (island base contract) that has less dependen-
cy on foreign contractors may be an alternative. However, this is possible only
when certain infrastructure is available for the project management, and any
method will rely on overseas technology to some degree. Without the support of
overseas technology, the project management will fail and the original objectives
of the NPP construction project will not be met. Consequently, the country
that introduces the NPP for the first time will have to rely on foreign countries
for project management. The following two cases may be referred to for guid-
ance in deciding the best method for project management.
If the NPP construction project is to be performed only once, there is no
other option but to choose the turnkey contract. In the case of multiple con-
struction projects, the project must begin with the turnkey contract and move
step-by-step toward technological independence by inducing the employees to
actively acquire technological skills and experience. In this case, selecting a turn-
key contractor to lead the project management will be key. Even under a turn-
key contract, it is imperative for the owner to have at least a minimal level of
knowledge and experience in regard to project management in order to defend
itself from any risk and become technologically independent as soon as possible.
In addition, the important takeaway in this case is the strong will and driving
force of the owner to achieve technological independence.
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168 Nuclear Korea
Project Management
The following is a definition of project management:
“Pertinent management activities to make the organization and establish
the project plan for the completion of the NPP construction in accordance with
the quality requirements and performed within the construction schedule and
budget.”
The US Project Management Institute (PMI) defines project management
as follows:
“The art of directing and coordinating human and material resources
throughout the life of a project by using modern management techniques to
achieve predetermined objectives of scope, cost, time, quality and participants’
satisfaction.”
In a construction project, the key to project management is controlling the
activities related to the schedule. Failure to control the schedule leads to the
failure of the project. The nature of schedule control may be summarized by the
following three points: status evaluation, forecasting, and leading. The intrinsic
value of the three processes will be the functionality of scheduling work. For the
three functions to run properly, a schedule is essential. Based on the status of the
schedule, an assessment of the progress of the construction activities is possible
and future activities can be planned and scheduled. The project managers can
lead the project by means of the schedule chart. For these types of functions and
correlations, the ability to control the schedule is the key to successful project
management.
Scheduling requires that activities are placed on a timeline in an under-
standable format, and it should incorporate the following three elements. The
“description of the activity,” “the duration,” and “the sequence of work.” It is
very important to mention that these three factors will be greatly influenced
depending on how the tasks are classified and by what method. For example, if
the work packages are classified into a few groups, each package will have a lon-
ger duration. It’ll simplify the progress but will be useless for actual onsite work.
On the contrary, if the number of work packages is increased, the duration of
each will be shortened however, the prioritization of the work packages becomes
more complex. Scheduling needs a high level of knowledge and experience,
which will facilitate the progress at the work site.
NPP construction has a very complex relationship with the work packages.
The schedule of the NPP may be generally divided into four levels, as detailed
in the following table.
Project Management of NPP Construction 169
Chart of Schedules for Each Level
Level Schedule Name Contents User
I Project Milestone Project plan and overall schedule of Executives

Schedule the entire project stages (engineering,
procurement, construction,
commissioning)
Tasks bundled together with
approximately 60–100 activities
II Summary Work packages are classified into Project

Schedule engineering, procurement, construction, managers
and commissioning. It is the highest
level of schedule for each work package,
including the main activities and the
correlation.
III CPM Schedule The schedule that serves as the basis for Schedule
schedule control managers
CPM logic network that integrates the
engineering, procurement, construction,
and commissioning work so that the
relationship between work activities can
be adjusted
IV Working This is the schedule that the person in Working

Schedule charge of the construction prepares and level
operates. There are 8-month schedules,
3-week work schedules, and others.
The intricacies of managing a schedule can be compared to an experienced

worker filling a container that has room to spare, while an inexperienced coun-
terpart requires a second container to fill the same load, in the same way. The
schedule may be built to complete all of the work within a certain period of time
if it’s created by an experienced individual. However, in the hands of an inexpe-
rienced person, the work may not be able to be completed on schedule. Also, the
effective preparation of the schedule that leads to efficiencies may be easier and
more economical than achieving it through hard work onsite by laborers. Con-
sidering this aspect, it is possible to assume how important scheduling is in
170 Nuclear Korea
terms of accomplishing the work within the given period. Consequently, sched-
uling is only as effective as the person who builds the schedule. Efficiencies are
realized only when an experienced individual is able to apply their skills and
experience to the process.
The construction quality of the NPP is key to securing safety and economic
viability during operation. In other words, defects in the quality of the construc-
tion worsens profitability through the increase in costs required for maintenance
and repair. In addition, a quality defect would raise the issue of nuclear safety, the
core value of NPPs. Therefore, ensuring the quality of the construction is a very
important task. Nevertheless, this aspect is overlooked because quality issues are
not immediately obvious, and they can sometimes appear long after the construc-
tion is completed. Therefore, the true nature of the quality control (QC) in con-
struction is in the quality assurance (QA) of the construction. In order to ensure
the quality of NPP construction, it is important to have a QA plan in place for all
construction activities. Also, all records should be signed with a name in order to
further ensure accountability in terms of quality assurance. These records are pre-
served throughout all periods of operation of the NPP.
The definition by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) on
QA is as follows. “The planned and systematic activities to assure that the prod-
uct or service would satisfy the demand.” A NPP does not need to meet the
highest quality for all requirements, equipment, or materials. The quality grade
is decided, however, by the designer after assessing what impact the equipment
or material would have on the safety and operation of the NPP. In Korea, quality
has been classified into four classes. As the class or grade gets higher, the con-
struction costs will increase in parallel.
Q Class (Safety): Items with the potential to incur radiation damage

T Class (Safety impact): Items that influence safety
R Class (Reliability): Items that influence power facilities
S Class (Industrial): Items that are classified under the general industrial
standard
The importance of QC in NPP construction cannot be emphasized enough.

However, QC will be the first to be impacted when the pressure to meet the
schedule becomes more intense. Because of this, lower profitability often begins
in the QC department. This is a significant pitfall in the construction process
and sometimes sacrificing QC seems like an attractive option. That is why proj-
ect management requires the commitment to never sacrifice quality in any
situation. Systems and procedures are no doubt important, however it would be

in everyone’s best interest to establish a “quality-first mindset” that will not
compromise or negotiate quality under any circumstances.
In order to maintain a high degree of quality, executives must exercise a
strong commitment to implementing continuous education and training for the
employees and other relevant people. When quality is sacrificed, meeting dead-
lines or increasing revenue would be meaningless.
The economic principle is “maximum effect at minimum cost.” The method
for realizing the “minimal cost” aspect is to control waste or leakage factors as
much as possible, while achieving “maximum effect,” which means to improve
productivity, where productivity is calculated by effect (output) divided by cost
(input). In the formula, the method of increasing P (productivity) is accom-
plished by lowering the denominator (cost) or raising the numerator (effect).
However, a sophisticated method of management involves increasing the de-
nominator (cost) slightly in order to bring about a substantial increase in the
numerator (effect).
In project management, the primary goal of economic management is to
complete the project without exceeding the total budget that was set for the proj-
ect. Executing outstanding project management in order to achieve the primary
goal is to substantiate the economic principle, namely, control and adjust on bud-
get and expenses, taking into consideration the “time value of money.” To be more
effective, social and cultural conditions in the region need to be considered, while
the control and adjustment functions are implemented on the cash flow. For this
purpose, effective project management requires a business mindset.
The total construction costs consist of the engineering cost, the procure-
ment cost, the construction cost, the owner’s cost, and the interest during con-
struction (IDC). The cost of engineering, procurement, and construction are
pretty much standardized so there is not much room for economic improve-
ment. However, from the total construction cost perspective, the owner’s cost
comprises 10%–20%, and the IDC for construction, taking into consideration
the discount rate, approaches 20%. The sum of the two categories would total
approximately 30%–40% of the total construction costs, therefore, there is a lot
of room for economic improvement. In particular, the amount of interest in-
curred during the construction period may make a substantial difference de-
pending on the investment pattern. The main culprit for burdening the IDC
include work delays and cost leakage, which mainly occurs in the owner’s
expenditure.
172 Nuclear Korea
In order to evaluate the economics, the key parameter is the discount rate
because the discount rate is used for the investors to recover their investment.
Depending on what figures are used, there is a substantial difference in how the
total construction costs are calculated.
To construct a NPP, a multitude of contracts need to be signed. All terms
and conditions of the contracts need to be abided by for the successful comple-
tion of the NPP project. Contracts may be classified into two types: the main
contract and the incidental contract. The main contract maintains the effective-
ness throughout the duration of the project and is directly related to the success
of the business. The incidental contract is temporarily effective and is terminat-
ed after use. The contents of the contracts are documented, and once the con-
tracts are signed and go into effect, the provisions of the contract are enforceable
in accordance with a literal interpretation. It must be noted that a literal inter-
pretation may differ from the agreements prior to signing. All contracts contain
five major categories: scope, delivery date, quality requirements, method of
guaranty, and payment. These matters are to be managed by paying close atten-
tion to the three goals of project management: scheduling, quality, and econom-
ic viability.
A lot of individuals, companies, and organizations participate in the con-
struction of a NPP. It can be said that the project is carried out with the cooper-
ation of all entities involved. Consequently, clear communication is a very
important factor to the success of a project. The most effective and efficient
method of achieving clear communication is to conduct meetings in person.
(Face-to-face interaction is vital to success.) Therefore, it is expected that there
will be many meetings and conferences as the project progresses. However, a
face-to-face meeting can be a double-edged sword. In other words, a meeting is
necessary for effective and clear communication, but it takes time and can even
waste time, which is counterproductive. Running an efficient meeting is the
only way to resolve this issue. In order to be efficient, meetings must to be well
organized, and important meetings must be set in advance with the agenda,
participants, duration, and other items announced officially. It is important to
add that essential meetings should be held regularly. In other words, maximize
the positive aspects and minimize the negative ones.
The Project Review Meeting (PRM) is the most important conference that
is held during the construction of a NPP project. The PRM is generally held
every six months, and the purpose is for all participating organizations or mem-
bers to come to a clear understanding regarding the status of the project and to
resolve any issues. This meeting not only has a positive effect, but in addition, it
has the added benefit of strengthening the team spirit. There are also several
types of group meetings and task force meetings, however, they will not be suc-
cessful without the leadership of the project manager.
Project managers need to be able to lead the meetings efficiently so that the
members can communicate smoothly, build team spirit, and solidarity.
The volume of the construction work expands gradually, peaks, and then
decreases afterward. The site’s organizational chart and the number of personnel
must be adjusted accordingly in order to execute the project flawlessly. During
the NPP construction period, the site office may make several changes. The
timing of the organizational change will affect the ability to mobilize the neces-
sary manpower and project management leadership. The timing of the change
may be the cause of waste in an economic aspect. In the case of manpower mo-
bilization and staffing, the PM should prioritize locating qualified and experi-
enced people.
When we hire expatriates to support project management, we have to pay
attention to how they can best contribute to the project based on their experi-
ence and expertise. During the interview, we have to carefully examine their
ability to communicate as well as assess their personal character because anyone
can submit a well-crafted resume. Most contract workers work hard, however,
some rely on their own analysis of a situation, their experience, and their judg-
ments to negatively impact the overall management of the schedule. In this case,
close communication with the person in charge along with a desire to cooperate
are the keys to resolving these types of issues.
The laws or regulations of the central and regional governments require
different types of licenses and permits from the beginning of the construction
project until it is substantially completed. If the acquisition of a legally binding
license or permit cannot be made in a timely manner, it may put the schedule at
risk. Conflict or friction among personnel and with the organization is inevita-
ble during the construction period. One of the important roles of project man-
agement is to reconcile and resolve conflicts of interest among various
organizations and individuals, including environmental groups, local residents,
local governments, and civic groups.
In other words, when operations that involve interactions with the public
do not go well, energy for the PM would be wasted in a very inappropriate area.
The most appropriate way to handle situations involving the government or the
public is to be prepared. If not, it will be an overwhelming task to prevent great-
er difficulties. Government service and public service are closely linked to the
social and cultural environment of the country or region in which the project is
174 Nuclear Korea
being undertaken. Korea is one of the countries that expends a substantial

amount of energy due to this problem.
The work site can easily turn into a place of disorder without keen oversight
and attention. With excavation work taking place, heavy equipment moving
around, materials being stored, and other risk factors in place, work sites often
have frequent changes or blockages to walkways. Also, there are many narrow
and risky areas, and several thousand laborers are working at the site at the same
time. Under these conditions, cleaning up as well as controlling access to the site
can be very advantageous to the construction process. Also, managing the
health, safety, and environment (HSE) in an effort to prevent any unforeseen
incidents or accidents from happening will help to safeguard the lives of people
as well as the work environment. If there is a large number of workers from
Third Country Nationalities, we have to apply the strict rules of HSE in order
to control the multicultural workplace.
In order to increase the effectiveness and accuracy of project management,
we have to use an integrated software program that is powerful and linked with
specific packages. Computerization of project management offers the following
strengths: First, is the promotion of work efficiency. Gaining speed and accuracy
in the work by applying computer technology significantly upgrades the effi-
ciency. Second is the exchange of information, which should occur on a re-
al-time basis. These advantages are such useful tools for the success of the project
management that they have become an essential part of contemporary project
management. In addition, computerization of the project management tasks
has many incidental merits including human resource reduction, paperless op-
erations, and data storage that takes up virtually no space. Consequently, one of
the facts that cannot be neglected in the NPP construction is that the perfor-
mance level of the construction work depends on how much computerization is
applied. We have developed an integrated software program, NPCMS (Nuclear
Power Plant Construction Management System), for use in many nuclear
projects.
There are also many effective support programs in place. One of them is a
CAP (corrective action program). There will be quite a number of varied and
complex cases occurring in terms of material handling, construction work, ship-
ping and transportation, installation, and testing. The information should be
collected, reviewed, and analyzed in the proper manner. The CAP software pro-
gram can help with these activities and can make people share feedback in order
to prevent the recurrence of similar cases or to improve the performance of work
and HSE.
Technological Independence
Korea is currently operating 24 nuclear power plants, and three more are under
construction. At this time, the first unit, Kori Unit 1, has been shut down and
will be decommissioned. We have continuously developed nuclear power plants
since the late 1960s. As a result, no one can deny that Korea is the world’s best
in regard to the project management of nuclear power plant construction. In
other words, Korea has the most experienced and qualified manpower and the
most updated experience feedback. The Korean model of project management
could be considered the best practice for benchmarking.
Time PM Contents Remarks
‘70s Turnkey - Turnkey contract with foreign Overseas training

contract stage companies for employees
- Foreign engineers lead project
management
- Acquire knowledge of project
management by training
employees overseas
‘80s Split-package - KEPCO leads the project with OJT

contract stage the support of foreign engineers,
or divides the project leadership
by owner and contractor
- Initiating OJT for technology
transfer and undergoing overseas
training
‘90s Multi - KEPCO leads with a few foreign Enter into technol-
split-package engineers participating in ogy transfer con-
contract stage advisory capacities tract
- Very little dependency on foreign
engineers
- KEPCO has qualified human
resources and experience in
project management
176 Nuclear Korea
‘00s Independent - No participation of foreign

construction engineers in the area of project
stage management
- Project management
performed independently
KEPCO signed a turnkey contract with Westinghouse in the United States

at the time of the construction of Kori Unit 1, the first nuclear power plant.
During this time, Westinghouse took the lead in the project and KEPCO fo-
cused on technical training such as commissioning. In the second half of the
project, Westinghouse requested an extra payment due to schedule delays, which
followed the schedule delays occurring because of frequent labor union strikes
in the United States and the United Kingdom. At that time, KEPCO had no
fundamental knowledge of project management, so we did not understand what
Westinghouse was requesting. Westinghouse’s request seemed unreasonable, but
we lacked the ability to make a counterargument, and there was no other alter-
native to getting past the schedule delay. The contract was then ammended and
the additional cost was paid to Westinghouse.
During this process, the executives of KEPCO as well as the staff under-
stood the importance of project management, and realized that KEPCO’s inter-
nal project management capabilities needed to be increased quickly. As a result,
the overseas training program in project management became the priority in
preparation for the next project, which was Wolsong Unit 1. Everyone tried
to learn about project management. It was fortunate that KEPCO recognized
the importance of project management and had a strong desire to increase
its technological independence during the early stages of nuclear power plant
construction.
The lack of project management ability that was experienced during the
construction of Kori Unit 1, was well recognized by both the management and
the staff. As a result, many employees, especially in the fields of schedule con-
trol, software programming, and quality assurance, had the opportunity to train
overseas.
After returning home, they were given the role of teaching their fellow em-
ployees. Their field work served as a means of transferring technological knowl-
edge and skills to others and they were also able to perform oversight of the
contractors. Because personnel had been trained overseas in the early stages of
nuclear power plant construction, KEPCO’s project management capabilities
had grown remarkably quickly and had become the foundation for technologi-
cal independence.
The willingness of KEPCO’s employees to gain experience in project man-
agement was exceptional. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, which had been in a
turnkey basis since Kori Unit 1, the contractor, Atomic Energy of Canada Lim-
ited (AECL), had not arbitrarily decided anything. The reason was that there
was too much interference or intervention by KEPCO staff. Strictly speaking,
this was a kind of violation of a turnkey contract, but looking inside, we were
so eager to learn about project management. As a result, KEPCO successfully
escaped from the constraints of the turnkey contract and progressed to a
non-turnkey contract for Kori 3&4. At that time, there was a lot of debate in
regard to the contractual change because it seemed to be too aggressive and too
much of a challenge in terms of both expertise and experience. However, it was
determined that the strong ownership of KEPCO was the key factor to the suc-
cessful transformation of the contract.
Of course, Kori 3&4 was a non-turnkey contract in appearance, however, it
was supported by a foreign contractor in overall project management, so it may
be more similar to a semi-turnkey contract rather than a non-turnkey contract.
In the following project, Hanbit 1&2 followed the same pattern as the previous
one. In the subsequent project, Hanul 1&2, KEPCO formed an island contract,
which split the primary and secondary systems, gaining additional experience in
project management from the French nuclear industry.
In all areas of the Korean nuclear construction business, technological inde-
pendence began with Hanbit 3&4. The project management sector also demon-
strated an increase in technological independence from the construction of
Hanbit 3&4. Of course, there were support services provided by overseas con-
tractors, but KEPCO led the project management under its own leadership. Of
course, this was only possible through the successive feedback and accumulation
of experience from the construction of the first unit. But above all, it would not
have been possible without the strong motivation and drive for technological
independence.

In the event that construction on multiple nuclear power plants is planned after
the introduction of the initial plant, the project management capabilities of
the utility would determine whether the project is successful regardless of the
178 Nuclear Korea
contract type. At the time of the contract negotiations, priority should be placed
on developing the project management capabilities of the utilities as well as es-
tablish a well-planned system for overseas training in the field.
In order to establish the infrastructure of the NPP, a regulatory authority
tasked with creating nuclear regulations must be established. In addition, a dedi-
cated business organization within the utility must be created during the initial
planning stages. Because the scale of a NPP construction project is vast, system-
atic training programs need to be supported from overseas power or engineering
companies who have rich experience in NPP construction. They will also be able
to provide systematic and practical education and training.
The main goal of project management is “on time and within budget.” It is
a kind of comprehensive art in terms of expertise, manpower, skill, experience,
and mindset. All of the workers and staff need to be aligned toward this
common goal. The key element to success is the level and degree of project
management.
The project owner should focus on where they need to build up their hu-
man capabilities. The enterprise resources, including the contractors, should be
allocated properly according to the project schedule. The actual mobilization of
manpower and machines can deviate from the original plan, however, this must
be closely monitored and forecasted. The requests for additional modifications
and corrective actions should be placed through project management.
During construction, there are a lot of subcontractors and their workers at
the site. Everyday there are continuous deliveries of equipment and tools. Strict-
ly controlling access to the site is imperative in order to prevent any chance of
misconduct or human error. The multinational culture must be well managed.
Subcontractor management and control are two of the key success factors in
project management.
16
Localization of Major Equipment
(Doosan Heavy Industry)
Doosan Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (DHI), a specialty company for power plant
equipment supply, formed the basis for the localization of the NPP equipment
when it began manufacturing components for Hanbit 1&2 followed by Hanul
1&2. However, up until that time, localization was limited to manufacturing a
few components under a subcontract with foreign vendors that prevented the
ability to gain independence in terms of the core technology, including compo-
nent design. The Korean government planned to develop a Korean standard
NPP (KSNP, later named OPR1000) for developing next power generation
technology and for aiming at nuclear export in the long term.
The Korean standard NPP was developed using the ABB-CE system 80+
design as its basis. Its technology and safety had already been proven in the Palo
Verde NPPs in the USA, with the license from the US NRC. The Korean gov-
ernment set the NPP standardization as the national policy project with refer-
ence to the Palo Verde NPP in 1987 and developed the 1,000 MWe-class model
to meet the requirements of the industrial needs of Korea at that time. Doosan
Heavy Industry (DHI) was able to actively participate in the nuclear power
generation project as the main contractor that supplied the NSSS and T/G
equipment for the Hanbit 3&4, which became the reference plants for the
Korean standard NPP. By leveraging the experience and technology that was
accumulated during the Hanbit 3&4 projects, Hanul 3&4 was designed by
179
180 Nuclear Korea
reflecting the Korean industrial situation and became the first Korean standard
NPPs. We were then able to construct a nuclear fleet by using the standardized
designs for Hanbit 5&6 and Hanul 5&6.
The Hanul 3&4 Project (the First Korean Standard NPP)
Location Bugu-ri, Buk-myeon, Ulchin-gun, Gyeongbuk (currently in the

Ulchin Nuclear Power Plant)
Capacity 1,000 MWe × 2 units Reactor Type Pressurized Wa-

ter Reactor
Period of con- # 3: ‘92.5–‘98.8 (Duration: 6 years and 3 months)

struction # 4: ‘92.5–‘99.12 (Duration: 7 years and 7 months)
Construction Total: 3,979,587 million Main equipment Doosan Heavy

costs won supplier Industry
Nuclear fuel Korea Nuclear

Fuel
Loans Bankers Trust Company Plant engineering KEPCO E&C
Contractor Civil: Dong ah Construction, Mechanical & Electro: Doosan

Heavy Industry
The scope of localization included design, manufacturing, procurement, in-

stallation, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning of
the NPP. The technology that needed to be developed included the fundamental
elements that would be standardized and applied repeatedly, improvements to
the safety design, economics, operation and maintenance, and the new technol-
ogy under development. In order to achieve the target and goals, we established
a step-by-step approach and defined the roles and responsibilities of the various
entities. The following figure depicts the localization map for each stage that was
established in order to achieve domestic technological independence.
Localization of Major Equipment (Doosan Heavy Industry) 181
Localization Map for Each Stage
Independent
Improvement and
Self-Development
(Revolution)
Know-why:
Improvement of self-reliance
Safety and Economics New technology
(Evolution) development
Securing Know-how: capability
Construction independent
Capability (95%) Know-why: * Performing
(Replication) self-reliance independent R&D
* Participation in
Know-how: * Repeated construction international joint R&D
independent with improved design
Know-why: - Construction improvement
learning (shortening of construction
period with design
* Separate contracts for
improvement)
Fundamentals technical service
- Convenience improvement
- Technical information
* Existing project of operation and
- Manpower training
participation maintenance
* Joint participation of the
* Operational - Improvement of
Hanbit 3&4 project
feedback productivity with
* Expansion of R&D
* Fundamental design improvement
project and test
R&D and repeated construction
facilities
* Optimization of technical
standards
- Improvement of technology
self-reliance, productivity
and efficiency
* Continuous R&D project
- Support for new technology
and know-why development
1995 2005 2015
Project Improvement of safety and economics International competitiveness

Implementation Introduction of new technology Development of new technology
We defined the objectives so that we could secure the ability to manufacture

the major equipment of NSSS and T/G, based on Hanbit 3&4 as the reference,
within the delivery schedule and the budget while satisfying the quality require-
ments of the client, KEPCO. In terms of design, our goal was to secure the capa-
bilities that would allow us to design the major equipment of NSSS with our
own manpower and facilities on the condition that there would be only limited
182 Nuclear Korea
support from overseas contractors. In terms of equipment manufacturing, our

goal was to secure the capabilities that would allow us to produce the equipment
with our own manpower and facilities, except for the items that should be import-
ed due to economic constraints.
Target of NSSS Localization
(Unit: %)
Year ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95
Localization ratio 45.8 52.6 60.1 70.9 80.3 82.5 84.4 86.6 87.0
* Localization ratio in 1986: 41.4%
Target of T/G Localization
(Unit: %)
Year ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95
Localization ratio 55.4 60.1 73.4 86.7 91.8 97.0 98.0 98.0 98.0
* Localization ratio in 1986: 54.0%
Process
Starting with the construction of Hanbit 3&4, DHI became the supplier for
the main equipment, including the reactor and T/G. Furthermore, through the
contract with ABB-CE (ABB-Combustion Engineering) and GE (General Elec-
tric) for technology transfer, the design data and computer programs of the Palo
Verde NPP had been provided. DHI also completed the technical training ac-
cording to the contracts. This enabled DHI to participate jointly with the tech-
nology affiliated companies to design the major components of actual projects
and to acquire core technologies for the design and manufacturing of nuclear
components. In addition, core technologies for design and fabrication of the
turbine generator were transferred from GE.
To achieve localization, DHI selected trainees who were qualified with prac-
tical experience in applicable fields in order to make education and training
more efficient. Moreover, trainees were provided with technology transfer doc-
uments in each training discipline before beginning the course in order to
maximize the training efforts. DHI executed the preparatory programs to pre-
pare the inquiries and to select the areas for intensive training, provided educa-
tion inside and outside of the company, and gave English proficiency courses.
The trainees that underwent the training course were placed into the Hanbit
3&4 projects to improve the practical capabilities and maximize the newly in-
troduced technology. In particular, trainees in the design field continued to par-
ticipate in that field both at DHI and in joint design work with other engineering
companies to further enhance the effectiveness of the training. A total of 54
engineers completed the plant design course and the component design course
within 857 Man-Months. A total of 17 engineers completed the component
manufacturing course within 32 Man-Months.
The localization of component manufacturing was done through OJT at
ABB-CE in the USA and also through technical consultation at the engineering
company. In 1987, the OJT for the technical training was addressed in produc-
tion control, welding, tooling and fixture, fabrication and assembly, machining,
quality control, and non-destructive examination. The technical consultation for
localization was focused on fabrication, process engineering, welding, schedul-
ing, quality assurance, non-destructive examination, tube expansion, hydro and
leak testing, and disposition of the nonconformance report (NCR).
The localization of the component design was done through the OJT at
ABB-CE and through on-the-job participation in the Hanbit 3&4 project. In
1987, the OJT for technical training was addressed in project engineering, ma-
terial, welding, structural analysis, design engineering, and thermal and hydrau-
lic analysis. From 1987 to 1991, on-the-job participation in the joint component
design was focused on project engineering, material, welding, design engineer-
ing, structural analysis, and thermal and hydraulic analysis.
Localization Experience
DHI achieved technological independence in component design and manufac-
turing through the transfer of technology, pre-work mock-up testing, technical
consultation, and pre-production management and improvement activities uti-
lizing the internal task force teams. The figure below illustrates how DHI per-
formed the overall process to achieve technological independence.
In order to smoothly carry out the production of the NSSS of Hanbit 3&4,
which was the first project that leveraged technological independence, DHI
simulated the actual production work in terms of the exact same shape, size,
184 Nuclear Korea
tools, and working conditions in advance. By doing so, DHI identified various
problems that could potentially occur during manufacturing. In order to com-
pensate for these issues and improve the identified weak points DHI addressed
such issues as determining work methods, supplementing equipment and instal-
lation tools, reviewing the possibility of design changes, improving the ability to
resolve inconsistencies, and training workers.
Hanbit 3&4 was the first project that showcased Korea’s technological inde-
pendence. In order to assure the perfect manufacturing quality of NSSS, DHI
performed a mock-up test for the critical parts and simulated the production
conditions such as shape, size, and working conditions to be consistent with the
actual production.
Process for Achieving Technological Independence
* MFG Drawing
* MFG Procedure
Tech. Documents * JIG & Fixture
Transfer * Inspection Tool
Consultation
Qualified Personnel
* OJT Mock-up Test Preparation
* OJP * Analysis of
Test Result
Equipment * Feedback * Qualification
& to Production of Procedure
Facilities * Qualification
of Worker
Consultation
ASME Code
Delivery Testing Production
Stamping
QA Program
Through this process, potential issues were extrapolated to determine the

best work methods, supplemental equipment and installation tools, review for
possible design changes, improvement in the ability to find solutions to incon-
sistent or unforeseen matters, and the training of workers. Once weaknesses
were identified, they were supplemented and improved. The results from the
various mock-up tests were then used to secure parameters that could be used to
manufacture actual products.
DHI received a technological consultation for the component design in the
following areas: (1) design verification; (2) preparation of the manufacturing
drawings; (3) resolution of non-conformance issues during the manufacturing
process; and (4) preparation of the safety analysis report. The technical consul-
tation for the component manufacturing was provided in the following areas:
(1) preparation of the procedure for the manufacturing and mock-up test;
(2) PQ, WPS, and other support for welding techniques; (3) preparation of the
procedure for inspection and testing; (4) planning of manufacturing facilities,
tools, jig, and fixtures; (5) interpretation of the codes, standards, specifications,
and others; and (6) preparation of mock-up technology.
In order to implement its technological independence, DHI had been op-
erating a task force team from the initial localization stage of Hanbit 3&4 and
the production of the Korean standard project of Hanul 3&4. The key individ-
uals from the design team, the production technology team, the quality assur-
ance team, the production line, and the production management team, etc.
were selected and assigned to an organization to lead the localization. The top
management strongly supported and empowered the localization center much
like a control tower oversees a project.
The main activities were to monitor, control, oversee, troubleshoot, and
perform risk management. The corrective actions should receive feedback with-
in 24 hours.
The major components for localization of the fleet of Korean standard NPPs
(OPR1000) included the reactor vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, primary pip-
ing, reactor internals, the control element drive mechanism (CEDM), support of
the reactor coolant system, and refueling equipment. The plan for the design and
manufacturing for the series of eight units of OPR1000 was established by using
a step-by-step approach. The major components of the localization of the turbine
generator included the turbine casing, diaphragm, bucket, rotor, and exciter, etc.
A similar plan and approach were applied to the primary side.
The key to success in achieving technological independence for the design
of components is to secure highly qualified and experienced manpower. DHI
continued staffing for design work and expanded the design group as the con-
struction projects were going on. The technical data and computer codes for the
primary side of the NPP had also been continuously accumulated. The training
program had been maintained and contributed to the build-up of its design
186 Nuclear Korea
capabilities. As a result, the stress analysis program and the thermal analysis
program have both been upgraded and applied to the standard nuclear fleet.
The design activities were systematically documented through continuous
design improvements. When the design specifications changed, DHI sent de-
sign engineers to ABB-CE for training on the new technology. These efforts
eventually resulted in an increase of the design capabilities and laid the founda-
tion for technological independence. Afterward, DHI developed a special stan-
dard model for steam generator replacement both at home and abroad. For the
T/G system, the design automation system was developed to shorten the design
time in line with design data management. This resulted in experience with
design changes, an understanding of design concepts, and familiarity with price
quotation.
DHI has continually sought to improve its manufacturing processes in or-
der to streamline production. Based on this, the processes for designing and
manufacturing were standardized and computerized. DHI systematically stored
and managed various design improvements and resolutions and had the ability
to proactively manage changes in the manufacturing process due to model mod-
ifications. Technology localization and the advancement of reactor facilities and
turbine generator facilities were supported by the R&D center, acquiring the
necessary quality standards through technical resolutions and process improve-
ments based on the ability to leverage the intensive training and consultation.
The balancing plant was used to solve the mass unbalance of generator, devel-
oped by referencing the test facilities of GE and Kawasaki, which resulted in
both time and cost savings for manufacturing as well as production.

The equipment manufacturer, DHI, began to supply equipment for NPPs with
absolutely no previous manufacturing technology or experience. DHI then ex-
panded its ability to supply equipment for NPPs by subcontracting to foreign
vendors. The Korean government planned for the development of Korean stan-
dard nuclear technology as a national policy project and DHI was selected as the
major equipment supplier. The goal of technological independence for NPP
construction could be achieved through the repeated construction of the same
type of NPPs.
Technological independence in terms of equipment manufacturing requires
a long period of time. A well-planned “road map” with a phase-by-phase
approach is required and should be incorporated into the technology transfer

contract with a technical provider. Equipment manufacturing technology was
developed in the following order: basic technology on the same type of NPPs,
design improvement technology, and new technology. A local manufacturer,
DHI, was solely responsible for supplying the major equipment, and by enter-
ing into a technology transfer contract with the experienced supplier for NPP in
foreign countries, all data and computer programs required for design and man-
ufacturing were secured. The engineers who became qualified by attending
training courses were then placed in work sites at home and abroad to partici-
pate in jointly designing and manufacturing with the technology provider.
It is important to maintain a consistent government policy as well as the
motivating power of the utility to achieve technological independence. Based on
the national policy, along with strong support, the number and types of related
industries should be identified and analyzed. The results of the analysis should
be projected into the targets for localization and the technology transfer pro-
grams. The entire value chain should be considered.
The localization of nuclear technology can only be possible with the full
integration of all sectors. The success in Korea underscores that the knots tied
together at every node of the technology transfer, the mock-up tests prior to
production, the technical consultations for design and manufacturing, and the
operation of a task force. The key node of the design was the qualified manpow-
er, securing the technical data and computer codes through overseas training
and technology development by the R&D center.
17
Technological Independence in
Architect Engineering (KEPCO E&C)
Over the years, the Korean government had attempted to lessen its dependency
on overseas nuclear technology, to achieve global competitiveness with improve-
ments to its nuclear technology, and to promote its nuclear export business.
These efforts served as an incubator that helped to create a subsidiary company
that provided specific discipline and human resources. In 1978, KEPCO formed
a subsidiary company that was responsible for all plant engineering activities.
In 1981, the government restructured the nuclear industry and segmented the
nuclear business into KEPCO E&C for architecture engineering and DHI for
manufacturing. In 1983, KEPCO prepared a plan to achieve localization and
technological independence, which was finally authorized by the government
in 1984.
A technology transfer agreement helped KEPCO E&C to achieve its local-
ization target for Hanbit 3&4 by partnering with a technology provider to per-
form the design work. The following project, Hanul 3&4, paved the way for
KEPCO to apply its newly acquired capabilities in standard nuclear design by
performing the work independently. Finally, in 2005, KEPCO E&C achieved
its localization objective for the independent design of OPR1000.
The key efforts that were targeted by KEPCO E&C included securing the
design documents provided by the technology transfer agreement, obtaining
expertise in critical areas, learning how to advance its project management skills,
and integrating technological feedback.
189
190 Nuclear Korea
Process
In 1975, KEPCO established the Korea Nuclear Engineering Co. (KNE) as the
subsidiary company for architect engineering of nuclear power plants. The name
has been changed to KOPEC and finally to KEPCO E&C. During this time,
KNE signed a consultation agreement with an overseas engineering company
and dispatched trainees to their location so they could learn about design and
engineering as well as take ownership of the design documents. This process
could be classified into four different phases: the Learning Phase in the 1970s,
the Foundation Phase in the early 1980s, the Self-Reliance Phase from the late
1980s to the early 1990s, and the Advanced Phase from the mid-1990s to the
early 2000s. The core elements consisted of learning design technology, review-
ing and analyzing design technology, participating in design work, introducing
advanced technology, pursuing independence in design and engineering work,
standardizing designs, and enhancing the economics.
Learning Phase (1970–1977)

The construction project was led by the prime contractor of the turnkey con-
tract. Project management, architect engineering, system design, procurement,
construction, and commissioning were subject to following the prime contrac-
tor’s lead. Local construction companies participated in the construction work
as subcontractors. The scope of work was limited for local companies in the ar-
eas of construction management and commissioning, and foreign companies
hired only a minimal number of local engineers.
Foundation Phase (1978–1985)

Different from the learning phase, the contractual structure was changed into a
non-turnkey approach. Under the leadership of KEPCO as the project owner,
architect engineering and major equipment manufacturing were assigned to for-
eign contractors while the construction was assigned to a local construction
company. However, KEPCO was in charge of commissioning.
Skilled manpower for the design and architecture engineering work was
developed through overseas training, which was mandated in the contract in
order for trainees to learn the necessary skills by working on a project from
Technological Independence in Architect Engineering (KEPCO E&C) 191
scratch. For the second half of the construction project, KEPCO E&C engi-
neers jointly conducted the detailed site design work with overseas contractors.
However, the scope and responsibility of the local staff was limited and scat-
tered. The localization ratio of design and architect engineering was between
37% and 46% for the construction of six units in series. As a result, the technol-
ogy transfer of this area was not sufficient.
Self-Reliance Phase (1986–1995)

The change to the structure of the contract expedited the process of technology
transfer. During this phase, the local companies led all of the work related to
project management, major equipment supply, architect engineering, procure-
ment, construction, and commissioning. Foreign contractors had a leading role
during the initial stage of the project as subcontractors. The localization of de-
sign and architect engineering had been completed, which was made possible by
the technology transfer contract, utilizing the benefits of feedback, the design
documents, the computer codes, and the design management program.
Advanced Phase with the Korean

Standard Design (1990–1995)
This phase belongs to the Hanul 3&4, Hanbit 5&6, Hanul 5&6, and KEDO
(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) projects (2 units of
OPR1000). The outcome of the diplomatic efforts to establish harmony with
North Korea was the creation of a special organization, KEDO, which was
tasked with building two nuclear units. The role of prime contractor for this
project was assigned to KEPCO. However, due to political action by North
Korea, the project was discontinued, KEPCO was expelled, and all remaining
machines, equipment, and tools had to remain at the site. In any event, the re-
actor type was the OPR1000.
In contrast to previous projects, local companies assumed the roles and re-
sponsibilities related to the construction project from design through to com-
missioning. The overseas contractors provided consultation in specific areas.
While KEPCO constructed the standard nuclear fleet, KEPCO E&C had driv-
en the design improvements for nuclear safety, plant economics, and availability
based on feedback on the design, construction, and operation.
192 Nuclear Korea
The Hanbit 3&4 project was a turning point for local companies and it
gave KEPCO E&C the capabilities required to be an architect engineer of a
nuclear power plant. The change to the contractual structure became a powerful
driver for localization based on the accumulation of technology, expertise, and
feedback.
The overseas contractors that had previously led the construction projects
now assumed the role of subcontractors for local companies and helped to pro-
vide support to local contractors. The localization target for architect engineer-
ing was to raise it up to 95%, from a starting point of 60%. The localization
of architect engineering was planned using a step-by-step approach that lead
from joint participation, technology introduction, technology application, all
the way to technological independence.
The nomination of KEPCO E&C as the main contractor for architect en-
gineering triggered the leadership and the localization. At the basic design phase,
according to the technology transfer agreement, KEPCO E&C collaborated
with consultants from overseas contractors. It also developed its own design
management system based on experience and technological education. The local
staff could jointly implement the design and architect engineering work with
foreign contractors. These evolutions became the basis of technological inde-
pendence. KEPCO E&C could then master the design data and computer pro-
grams that were provided by the overseas contractors.
A technology transfer contract, which differed from the architect engineer-
ing service contract of Hanbit 3&4, was signed in order to introduce various
technical codes and standards, technical specifications, design documents, and
computer programs. In addition, approximately 90 training courses were pro-
vided to enhance the transfer of technology.
Technology Applications
The design documents, technical specifications, and computer programs provid-
ed by the contractors had been transformed into the property of KEPCO E&C
according to the process, the procedures, and the organizational chart. The com-
puter programs were passed through acceptance tests and the transferred technol-
ogy was funneled directly into the training courses. The design products were
then thoroughly validated and verified.
KEPCO E&C had invested approximately 8%–10% of the value of its annual
revenue into technology development. The budget had been set to allow for
the purchase of a 3D CAD system, to advance the application programs, to
develop software programs for specific systems and structure design, and to pre-
pare standard codes and specifications, etc. As of the end of 1996, a total of 768
tasks had been completed, which became the cornerstone of technological
independence.
Targets and Achievement of Technological Independence in Design
(Unit: %)
Year ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95
Target 63.54 70.78 77.44 82.74 87.14 90.47 92.58 94.13 95.34
Actual 63.31 70.06 77.02 82.76 87.17 90.36 92.54 94.13 95.34
* The rate of independence at the end of 1986: 59.94%
Evaluation of Technological Independence

In order to evaluate whether technological independence had been achieved, an
independent group of experts was formed by the government in 1995. The group
performed a peer review and concluded that the technological independence in
terms of design and engineering was satisfactory. Even if the target has been met,
there should always be continuous investment into the development of qualified
manpower and design tools.
Standardization and Advancement

The design of the OPR1000 for standard nuclear technology had been inde-
pendently developed using all of the experience and expertise that had been
gained from working on the Hanbit 3&4. The OPR1000 had been developed to
comply with the requirements of the US NRC. Furthermore, besides the safety
features in general, the safety design and functions that had been implemented
194 Nuclear Korea
were far more advanced because a depressurization system designed to prevent

the core meltdown as well as a cavity flooding system to enhance the cooling
effect of the reactor in case of an accident had been incorporated. A forecasting
function had been added to prevent steam leakage in case of a steam piping
rupture (over 25.4 cm diameter). The concept of human-factor engineering had
been applied to the plant control systems, resulting in the reduction of human
error and the enhancement of operational convenience. In comparison with the
reference plants, OPR1000 was far more advanced in terms of safety, reliability,
operations, and maintenance.
However, during this time, the context of the world nuclear market had
changed. Korea faced the challenges of the Uruguay Round and the KEDO
projects. We could survive only if we were able to incorporate the varied techni-
cal requirements of the owner, the different site and environmental conditions,
and be flexible in regard to design changes. Our sincere efforts paid off in many
ways and included: improvements in the quality of transferred technology, a
reduction in the volume of materials, manpower, and the construction period;
breakthroughs in nuclear safety; as well as global competitiveness.
Let’s take a look at the advancements in design and engineering technology
between 1996 and 2002. The following objectives were identified and pursued:
the internal absorption of transferred technology and the advancement of tech-
nology needed for applications and modifications, improvements in nuclear
safety and economics, and the development of next-generation nuclear tech-
nology. The topic actions were: justification of theory and process through em-
pirical tests, technology development and technical consultation to improve
areas of weakness, expertise and training of qualified manpower, systematic
methods for gathering feedback, design automation by using an integrated
software program, performance improvement in the operation of a nuclear
power plant, and active involvement in the development of next-generation
nuclear technology.
Furthermore, KEPCO E&C actively pursued the development of new
technology. The objective was to acquire technical competitiveness in prepara-
tion for new technology needs, along with the development of strategic technol-
ogy according to the diversification of the business. The following actions were
implemented to achieve these goals: developing the next generation of nuclear
technology, extending the life of the plant, decommissioning, developing auto-
matic control systems, and solving the issue of how to dispose of radioactive
wastes.

Prior to the establishment of technological independence, KEPCO E&C experts
worked with foreign engineers on the detailed design work, however, their partic-
ipation was quite limited and incomplete, which made it very difficult to acquire
the necessary overall NPP architect engineering technology. The participation
stood at 46% for Hanul 1&2 and steadily grew to 59.94% when the plan for
technological independence was established.
Achieving the goal of technological independence was made possible due to
the government’s continued support for the construction of NPPs. In addition,
the policies for technological independence combined with the plant architect
engineering company’s drive and powerful leadership, strong ownership, and
active pursuit of the goals, contributed to technological independence.
In addition, KEPCO E&C was not satisfied with merely owning the design
data and computer programs obtained from the foreign companies. Instead, it
has invested 8%–10% of its annual revenue in order to finance continuous im-
provement, comprehensive computerization, and ongoing development of inde-
pendent technologies. In addition, through continuous education and training
both at home and abroad, the company has strived to continue to develop ad-
vanced technology.
18
in Nuclear Fuel
Procuring Nuclear Fuel

Fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, discharge industrial waste, fly ash,
and air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide into the environ-
ment when burned. Unfortunately, this waste cannot be recycled. However,
spent nuclear fuel that is discharged from the reactor can be reprocessed to ex-
tract unburned uranium and plutonium, which is produced in the reactor when
U-238 absorbs neutrons. The recovered uranium and plutonium can then be
used as nuclear fuel.
Generally, uranium ore is found in the earth in oxide form. The amount of
uranium in the earth’s crust is about 100 times more than that of gold and about
10 times more than that of silver. The first step in locating uranium reserves
involves exploring a wide area using airplanes and automobiles. If abnormal
signs of radioactivity are detected, a detailed exploration and boring are per-
formed to confirm the existence of uranium reserves. The amount of uranium
contained in uranium ore determines its grade, while the ratio of the uranium
isotopes U-235 and U-238 present in the uranium determines its level of en-
richment. The enrichment level of natural uranium is 0.0711w/o.
The reserves, the dispersion, and the grade of uranium ore are thoroughly
reviewed in order to select the most feasible mining method—either open pit
mining or underground mining. In the United States, low grade uranium ore
197
198 Nuclear Korea
(around 0.1%) is mined through the in-situ leach (ISL) method. If uranium ore
is located near the surface of the earth, an open pit mining method is adopted.
The ISL method places two pipes down to the point where the uranium ore
is located. Acid is poured into one hole, and the uranium is dissolved into sol-
vent and then pumped up through the second pipe. Mined uranium ore is
crushed, melted in the acid, and then the uranium is extracted through calcina-
tion. This is the refining process. The average grade of refined uranium concen-
trates traded in the commercial market is approximately 75%. The chemical
symbol of uranium concentrates is U3O8 and is usually yellow in color, thus it
is also known as the “yellow cake.” In order to use uranium concentrates as nu-
clear fuel, the grade of the uranium needs to be over 99.9%. In order to remove
foreign substances from uranium concentrates, a chemical process called the
conversion process is adopted. U3O8 is converted to UF6 for light water reactor
(LWR) fuel.
Because natural uranium is used as fuel for heavy water reactors (HWR),
uranium concentrates are directly converted to UO₂ powder, which is the feed
material for fabrication. However, LWRs use 2%–5% low enriched uranium for
fuel, so uranium concentrates are converted to UF6 for the enrichment process.
UF6 maintains a solid state at temperatures below 56.6°C. Above that tempera-
ture it turns into a vapor state. UF6 is chosen as feed material for the enrichment
process because it has only one isotope. The enrichment process heightens the
concentration of U-235 in uranium. Currently, gas diffusion or centrifugal
methods are utilized in the industry.
Today, there is no chemical method that is able to separate and enrich
U-235 from uranium. The two methods mentioned above utilize the mass dif-
ference between U-235 and U-238. When UF6 gas passes through a thin mem-
brane, the lighter isotope, U-235, penetrates more easily than the heavier
isotope, U-238. The gas diffusion method utilizes this principle. The USA and
EURODIF (a joint venture by France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain) adopted the
gas diffusion method for enrichment. When UF6 gas is placed in a rotating cyl-
inder and then spun at high speeds, the heavier U-238 isotope gathers on the
outside of the cylinder while U-235, the lighter isotope, gathers at the center.
The centrifugal method utilizes this principle, and Russia, China, URENCO (a
joint venture by the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany), and Japan use this
method for enrichment.
The USA adopted the gas diffusion technique for producing highly
enriched uranium for production of the atomic bomb during World War II.
Because the diffusion factor of the gas diffusion method is too low, in order to
Technological Independence in Nuclear Fuel 199
obtain enriched uranium of the desired enrichment levels, the UF6 gas must be
passed through thousands of cascade stages, which requires a vast amount of
energy. For example, in order to supply electricity to the EURODIF facilities,
France built four NPP units of 900MWe-class near its enrichment facility. The
energy consumption of the centrifugal method is about 10% of that of the gas
diffusion method, but it has higher operating costs because it uses an extremely
high-speed rotating machine. Recently, the USA and EURODIF decided to
replace their gas diffusion facilities with gas centrifugal facilities.
Uranium enriched 20% or higher is called highly enriched uranium (HEU).
HEU with above 90% enrichment is used in building atomic bombs. In order
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, strict international control is
followed in the development and possession of enrichment technology. A SWU
(Separative Work Unit) is a unit of enrichment work that represents energy re-
quirements on a logarithmic scale. The depleted uranium disposed after the
enrichment process is referred to as “tail materials” and the degree of enrichment
as “tail assay.” Commercial contracts usually grant rights to utility companies to
select tail assay between the range of 0.2%–0.3%. The converted natural UO₂
for HWR or low enriched uranium for LWR is transported to the fabrication
facilities.
The low enriched UF6 is converted into UO₂ powder through a chemical
process, which is referred to as “reconversion.” The UO₂ powder is made into a
cylindrical form through a compressing process. It is sintered for approximately
24 hours in the sintering furnace at temperatures of about 1,700°C and is then
made into ceramic pellets.
The fuel rod is created by welding one side of the cladding tube with the end
plug, then the plenum spring and pellet are inserted into the cladding tube,
pre-pressured with helium gas, and then the other side of the cladding tube is
welded. This fuel rod is put into the grid to make the fuel assembly. The fuel
assembly is loaded into a specially designed container for transportation to the
NPP. The whole process of making the nuclear fuel assembly is referred to as
“fabrication.”
Pressing UO2 powder into cylindrical form, sintering, and manufacturing
the fuel rod and fuel bundle are the processes involved in manufacturing HWR
fuel. HWR fuel remains in the reactor for about a year, while LWR fuel is used
for about 4 to 5 years before being discharged from the reactor. LWR spent
nuclear fuel consists of about 94% of unburned uranium, about 1% of plutoni-
um, and about 4% of fission fragments, which are high-level radioactive mate-
rials. Uranium and plutonium are separated from the spent fuel through a
200 Nuclear Korea
chemical reprocessing process. Recovered uranium can be enriched and reused

as LWR fuel. Mixed oxide fuel (MOX) is made of recovered plutonium mixed
with natural uranium or depleted uranium. High-level radioactive material is
vitrified and disposed of in deep underground repositories. As plutonium can be
used as material for an atomic bomb, international restriction is vested on the
R&D or transfer of the reprocessing technology.
Purchasing uranium, conversion, enrichment, and manufacturing fuel as-
semblies takes about two years. Nuclear fuel loaded in a reactor burns for about
4 to 5 years and it takes 3 to 4 years to use the recovered uranium and plutonium
as nuclear fuel. The whole cycle from production to recycling is called the “nu-
clear fuel cycle.” The purchase of uranium concentrates through to the fabrica-
tion process is called the “front fuel cycle” and the reprocessing of spent fuel and
reuse of recovered uranium and plutonium is called the “back-end fuel cycle.”
Some countries, in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear arsenals, adopted
policies that require direct disposal of spent fuel. A fuel cycle of reprocessing
spent fuel and reusing recovered nuclear material is called the “closed fuel cycle”
while the fuel cycle of disposing spent fuel directly to the ground is called the
“open fuel cycle.”
Cycle for PWR Nuclear Fuel
Uranium Concentrate Conversion Enrichment Fabrication

Refining
Ore U3O8 UF6 UF6 UO2
REACTOR
U Pu
4-5 Yrs
Spent Fuel
Reprocessing
UO2
High-Level Permanent
Waste Disposal
Estimating the Demand for Nuclear Fuel

In order to create a master plan for securing nuclear fuel or a procurement pro-
gram, nuclear fuel demand should be estimated in advance. It is calculated based
on mass flow data provided by a fabricator to a utility company. NPP construc-
tion and operation plans are also factors to be considered. Mass flow data in-
cludes the number and enrichment level of the new fuel assemblies for each
region, weight per assembly, estimated discharge burnup, weight of uranium,
and enrichment level of spent nuclear fuel. The mass flow data attached as an
appendix is part of a fabrication contract. For a NPP under planning, a cycle
scheme for the same size and type of NPP should be utilized in calculating nu-
clear fuel demand.
Nuclear fuel demand can be evaluated based on a long-term power develop-
ment plan, which is normally established by the government. Because a stable
and economic supply of nuclear fuel is subject to safe operation of a NPP, a
nuclear fuel supply plan is established simultaneously with a NPP construction
plan. The nuclear fuel supply plan, which is the basis for the procurement pro-
gram, is modified periodically to meet changing conditions such as the change
in the market, actual construction schedules, and the operation plan of the NPP.
The nuclear fuel securing plan includes the following:
First of all, what would be the localization program? Is there any plan for
exploration, exploitation, and development of local uranium reserves? Which
part(s) of the fuel cycle components will be localized, and what’s the localization
plan? Any R&D programs in progress?
Next, we need to consider the share of procurement from a long-term con-
tract and the spot market, and in combination with the domestic and overseas
scope. In consideration of these factors, we should make a plan for securing
conversion, enrichment, fabrication services, and transportation of nuclear ma-
terial. A strategy to diversify supply sources and inventory is also needed.
Nuclear Fuel Procurement Plan

Nuclear fuel is purchased and supplied on a regular basis in order to meet the
actual need. The mid- to long-term plan to secure nuclear fuel is the fundamen-
tal basis. The utility needs separate contracts for purchasing uranium concen-
trates, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication services. Utilities sometimes
purchase converted or enriched uranium, if market conditions and commercial
202 Nuclear Korea
terms are favorable to do so. In rare cases, utilities procure finished products and
fuel assemblies. Market condition is the most important factor to be considered
when a nuclear fuel procurement plan is established.
Since the operation of the world’s first commercial NPP in 1954, the nucle-
ar fuel market has constantly shifted back and forth between a buyer’s market
and a seller’s market. The terms and conditions of the contracts, including pric-
ing terms, have changed drastically in accordance with the market situation. As
utilities are able to negotiate more favorable terms and conditions in a buyer’s
market, it is recommended to initiate nuclear fuel procurement during such a
market. Therefore, the nuclear fuel manager of a utility company should track
market changes at all times in order to choose the proper time for initiating a
contract. In contrast to fossil fuels, nuclear fuel is accounted as capital assets.
When establishing the procurement plan, funding sources and internal reserves
or loans, should be reviewed.
Nuclear Fuel Supply and Demand

A utility generally purchases uranium concentrates through a direct contract
with uranium miners, however, sometimes it is purchased from the inventory of
a non-producer, or through second-hand brokers. Conversion, enrichment, and
fabrication services provide direct contracts with suppliers. In general, the re-
sponsibility for the transportation of nuclear materials is as follows: the supplier
of uranium concentrates is responsible for delivering the concentrates to the
converter, then the converter to the enricher, and the fabricator takes the en-
riched uranium to its facilities. The fabricator normally delivers the final prod-
ucts and fuel assemblies to the NPP, but sometimes utilities take the final
products from the fabrication facilities and transports them to the plant them-
selves. The delivery conditions of nuclear materials are defined in the contracts.
The contract for purchasing uranium concentrates is a contract for buying
materials. However, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication contracts are con-
tracts for services. Suppliers of the services receive the buyer’s nuclear material
and provide services by changing the form of the material. There are virtually no
differences in the specifications of uranium concentrates, converted uranium,
and enriched uranium, between suppliers. Therefore, alternative sources can
be found in case of a supply disruption, or they can be purchased from the in-
ventory of other utilities or purchased in the spot market. However, fuel assem-
blies are designed and manufactured specifically for each NPP, so it is almost
impossible to replace their supply in a short period of time through alternate

supply sources. It may sometimes lead to the shutdown of the NPP.
As the quality of nuclear fuel is directly linked to the safe operation of the
NPP, strict qualification criteria for nuclear fuel are defined in the contract.
Flexibility in the quantity of nuclear material to be delivered is one of the key
issues during the contract negotiation, because there is about a 20% difference
in delivery quantity depending on the selection of the tail assay from the lower
0.2 % to the upper 0.3%.
The utility oversees the delivery schedule and the quantity of nuclear mate-
rials between uranium supplier(s), converter(s), enricher(s), and fabricator(s). In
the case where a utility operates several NPPs and receives delivery from numer-
ous suppliers, cautious oversight of delivery schedules is necessary because fail-
ure in on-time delivery of nuclear materials can lead to delays in the production
of fuel assemblies, which can lead to a shutdown of a NPP.
As nuclear materials have the potential to be used in building nuclear weap-
ons, changes to its form, transportation, and storage are subject to international
monitoring. Utility companies and suppliers of nuclear material have obligations
to report such changes in accordance with the full scope of a safeguard agreement
between the government and the IAEA. The utility and supplier(s) should accept
the inspection and surveillance systems installed by the IAEA. Such obligations
are also defined in the contract.
The Contract
A utility may have a separate contract for each component of the nuclear fuel
cycle through open bidding or private contract. Upon the utility’s decision to
purchase nuclear material or services through open bidding, an ITB is prepared.
The ITB includes the quantity of nuclear material to be delivered or the
amount of services to be provided by the supplier each year, the delivery sched-
ules, the technical specifications, the guarantee conditions, the bid due date and
submission location, the number of documents to be submitted, the method of
submission, and the bidding evaluation criteria, etc. The bidding documents are
normally composed of three parts: general information, technical information,
and price information. The bidder is requested to submit price quotations in a
sealed envelope. The ITB issuance and submission procedures are similar to the
bidding of the NPP. The following describes the specific items and bid evalua-
tion criteria applied in nuclear fuel cycle purchasing.
204 Nuclear Korea
• Uranium concentrates: limitation of responsibility of transportation, how

to handle materials under specifications, and price terms. In the long-term
contract, it is difficult to forecast price changes during the contract period,
therefore several protective measures, such as a price ceiling or floor, are
included in the contract. Such preventive measures are reviewed when the
bid is evaluated.
• Conversion and enrichment: responsibility for transportation, how to han-
dle materials under specifications, and price mechanism for the long-term
contract.
• Fabrication: scope and responsibility of nuclear fuel design, responsibility of
transportation of fuel assemblies, irrevocable loss during the fabrication
process, warranty conditions (thermal output, cycle length, compatibility of
new fuel with the reactor and existing nuclear fuel, nuclear fuel cycle cost,
etc.)
The bid evaluation is made simultaneously with the technological and eco-
nomic aspects of the nuclear fuel. In the case of fabrication, when an economic
aspect is evaluated, not only the bid price of the cost of fuel fabrication but the
fuel cycle cost should be considered as well. The nuclear fuel cycle cost, which
reflects the technical superiority of a nuclear fuel design and the workmanship
of a fabricator, is a factor to be considered. If a fabricator is not able to meet the
warranty conditions, the supplier must remedy the deficiency.
After a contract goes into effect, the utility should oversee the delivery
schedule, quality, and quantity of the nuclear material delivered, payment, etc.
Such activity should be done by one or more separate organizations within the
company. The utility should confirm whether a fabricator does its best to pro-
vide an optimum design for nuclear fuel, which includes designs such as loading
patterns and safety analyses. To perform such work, the utility should have ex-
perts capable of undertaking the task.
Localization of Nuclear Fuel Technology

The localization plan for nuclear fuel cycle technology began with the construc-
tion of Korea’s first NPP in the late 1960s. A contract for the construction of
reprocessing facilities was signed with SGN, a French company, in April 1975.
The French government provided the loan for the facilities. However, the con-
tract was terminated because of the international political restrictions. After the
termination of the reprocessing contract, the French introduced uranium ore

refining, conversion, and fabrication facilities as alternative projects. The devel-
opment of the nuclear fuel cycle technology began with the utilization of those
facilities.
Uranium explorations in Korea were undertaken in the later part of the
1950s by the Geologic Survey of Korea. Low grade uranium reserves at 0.04%
in average grade, are located at the Okcheon and Goesan areas. Construction of
a refinery capable of processing 3 tons of ore per day was completed by KAERI
in 1982. These facilities were constructed using French technology and loans
provided by France in 1977. The facilities were in operation until 1984 and
succeeded in extracting uranium concentrates with a purity above 95%. How-
ever, the scope of research was reduced in 1985 and the operation ended until
1993. Youngnam Chemical Co. Ltd., in cooperation with KIST, developed a
method to extract uranium from a fertilizer mineral, phosphoric rock, but the
project ended due to the low price of uranium concentrates in the 1980s.
The ADU (Ammonium Diuranate) conversion technology, or wet method,
was introduced to KAERI by the French loan. KAERI undertook the R&D
along with the AUC (Ammonium Uranyl Carbonate) technology, which was
commercialized in Germany. In 1981, the Ministry of Science and Technology
established a localization policy for nuclear fuel for Wolsong No. 1. KAERI
performed vigorous R&D on the AUC process, constructed a 10 MTU per year
capacity facility in 1983, and expanded the capacity to 25 MTU per year in
1985. KAERI started construction on 200 MTU per year capacity facilities in
1986, completed the construction in 1987 and operated it for two years before
shutting it down because it failed to find any economic feasibility in comparison
to imported products.
In 1978, KAERI, using technology transferred from CERCA, a French
company, used loans from France to construct fabrication facilities capable of
producing 10 tons of fuel per year. The Korean government, in accordance with
its plan to localize nuclear fuel for Wolsong No. 1, increased the capacity of the
facilities to 100 tons per year in 1984. The facilities completed construction in
1986 and began supplying nuclear fuel for Wolsong No. 1.
In order to meet the increased demand of Wolsong No. 2, 3, and 4, in 1998,
the Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd., completed construction of a fabrication facil-
ity capable of producing 400 MTU per year using technology introduced by
CGE, a Canadian company. The new facility began supplying nuclear fuel to
four PHWR reactors in Korea and as a result, KAERI’s PHWR fabrication facil-
ity was shut down.
206 Nuclear Korea
PWR Nuclear Fuel

The Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd. (KNFC) was established in November 1982
to supply nuclear fuel fabrication services. In 1984, after many ups and downs,
the government decided to hand a part of KNFC’s scope, nuclear fuel design
and safety analysis, over to KAERI. In 1985, Siemens KWU of Germany was
selected as the technology transferor, and two technology transfer contracts,
manufacturing with KNFC, design and safety analysis with KAREI, were exe-
cuted. A reconversion facility with a capacity of 200 MTU per annum was
constructed using KAERI’s technology instead of foreign technology. In Sep-
tember 1989, the KNFC completed the construction of fabrication facilities for
PWR fuel with a capacity of 200 MTU per annum and began to supply all
PWR nuclear fuel in Korea.
In order to meet the increased demand for nuclear fuel of new NPPs, the
KNFC added new facilities with a capacity of 200 MTU per year in 1998. The
new facilities were constructed by local engineers using localized technology
originally introduced by Siemens KWU. The KNFC replaced the existing AUC
reconversion facilities with dry conversion, introduced from the French compa-
ny COGEMA. The existing AUC facilities were closed. Loading nuclear fuel by
KWU technology into Westinghouse reactors led to years of technical issues. In
order to resolve this issue, KNFC adapted Westinghouse’s nuclear fuel design in
the early 1990s, which is still in use today. In 1995, design works performed by
KAERI were handed over to the KNFC.
As Hanbit 3&4 with ABB-CE-type reactors were introduced in Korea, the
KNFC modified a part of the existing facilities to manufacture nuclear fuel for
ABB-CE type reactors. The technology for nuclear fuel design from ABB-CE
was adapted separately and is still in use. In order to meet the additional require-
ments for Saeul, Sin-Wolsong and the other new reactors after 2010, a new 200
MTU per annum capacity DC reconversion facility was completed. Technology
was introduced from COGEMA. Components of fuel assemblies have been
gradually localized based on the mid-term plan. The result being that compo-
nents, such as top and bottom nozzles, grids, etc., have been exported to West-
inghouse and other countries. Facilities for manufacturing zircaloy cladding
tube with a capacity for 1,400 km per annum, which was not yet localized, was
completed in December 2008.
Technology Development
As the supply capacity of the world’s nuclear fuel fabrication facilities is much
larger than the actual demand, there is fierce competition to secure the market
share. In order to survive in the market, fabricators have invested large amounts
of funds in R&D for the development of safer and more economic nuclear fuel.
Major areas of R&D include modifying the mechanical design of grids and
other components to enhance safety margins and increasing discharge burnup
to improve the economics of nuclear fuel. The KNFC invests about 10% or
more of its annual budget in R&D. It is also developing technology in joint
ventures with foreign vendors.
An advanced nuclear fuel for OPR1000 and APR1400, the PLUS7, had
been jointly developed by the KNFC and Westinghouse from 1999, and began
commercial supply in 2006. The PLUS7 reduced the diameter of the nuclear
fuel rod from 9.7mm to 9.5mm, the same size as the 17x7 type Westinghouse
fuel. The average region discharge burnup was increased from 45,000 MWD/
MTU of existing fuel to 55,000 MWD/MTU in order to improve the econom-
ics. The safety margin was also enhanced by improving the design of springs and
modifying the design of the grid by attaching mixing vanes.
ACE7 for 16x16 type fuel has been developed jointly by the KNFC, West-
inghouse, and INB (Brazil). Four lead assemblies were loaded in the Kori No. 2
reactor for in-file tests. The commercial supply of ACE7 16x16 type fuel began
in 2008. KNFC and Westinghouse had jointly developed the ACE7 17x17 type
fuel. Four lead assemblies were loaded into Kori No. 3 for in-file tests, and com-
mercial supply started in 2009. To improve the economics, discharge burnup
was increased to 55,000 MWD/MTU, and to enhance safety, not only the de-
sign of the grid was improved but two additional grids with mixing vanes were
added.
In 2005, the KNFC established an R&D program for the development of
an original design for nuclear fuel technology by 2015, and successfully achieved
this goal.
19
Quality Assurance for Nuclear Power
US Quality Assurance System

In 1970, the United States enacted the world’s first nuclear law and applied a
quality assurance program to safety-related items in nuclear power plants. The
USNRC enacted the “10CFR50 App. B” under the heading “Quality Assurance
Standards for Nuclear and Spent Fuel Reprocessing Processes” to enhance the
safety of nuclear power plants by applying a quality assurance system to all nucle-
ar power plant construction and operations. As a result, the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Vessel Code (ASME), a representative reference
code for the US nuclear industry, improved the quality assurance standards in
1971, in line with the 10CFR.
In 1968, Kori Unit 1 was contracted to comply with US laws and regula-
tions, and the quality sector was to apply the 1968 ASME Code. At the time,
US laws and regulations did not force KEPCO and Westinghouse to apply the
new US quality assurance system, but Westinghouse decided to apply the en-
hanced quality assurance system to Kori Unit 1. As a result, KEPCO decided to
apply the quality assurance system in 1972 when it first encountered the
10CFR50 App. B. At that time, KEPCO had no experience or knowledge about
quality assurance because Kori Unit 1 was the first NPP in Korea.
New Quality Assurance Organization

In 1972, KEPCO decided to introduce the quality assurance system so that the
schedule control team would also be responsible for quality control. The work
209
210 Nuclear Korea
that should have been performed independently was instead combined with the
conflicting work of schedule control. At that time, the government also had no
organization or system for regulating nuclear power. Although the Nuclear Safe-
ty Advisory Committee was the advisory body of the Minister of Science and
Technology, it was a non-permanent organization and was not an organization
that was capable of assuming technical responsibility for quality regulation.
However, in 1973, at the request of the Korean government, an IAEA ex-
pert was appointed. Although not a quality expert, he emphasized the impor-
tance of quality assurance as a member of the USNRC and strongly recommended
that the Korean government should establish an independent quality assurance
system. Accordingly, the Korean government mandated by law that a quality
assurance plan, which needed to be incorporated within the safety analysis re-
port, had to be submitted when applying for a construction and operation per-
mit for nuclear power plants. KEPCO also established an independent quality
organization in 1974 and formed a quality assurance group at the construction
site of Kori Unit 1.
Quality Assurance Service

In 1974, the first quality assurance audit of a nuclear power project was con-
ducted by KEPCO on a four-day schedule at Kori Unit 1, following the intro-
duction of the US quality assurance system. Because Kori Unit 1 was a turnkey
contract, quality assurance also fell under the responsibility of Westinghouse.
However, the Korean government requested KEPCO, as the owner, to do it by
itself. The first QA audit that was performed was just to confirm that the imple-
mentation of Westinghouse’s quality control guidelines was consistent with the
quality control requirements, but KEPCO identified some urgent actions that
needed to be conducted in order to ensure quality control.
At that time, however, KEPCO’s quality management organization was un-
able to achieve its intended purpose. Even KEPCO, which had had to study the
concept of quality control and quality assurance in the initial stages required
improvements including, strengthening the quality management organization
and staffing the appropriate number of qualified individuals. Despite the diffi-
cult environment, KEPCO carried out its own quality assurance activities and
signed a quality control service contract with a US quality company for 25
months, expiring in 1976.
Quality Assurance for Nuclear Power 211
The most distinctive feature of the Nuclear Quality Assurance System is that
the activities of all operations are documented as plans, procedures, instructions,
or guidelines. Because the establishment and implementation of a systematic
quality assurance plan is important, not only the owner but also the contractors
for design, construction, equipment, and service should prepare a quality assur-
ance plan as well. In addition, after the quality assurance plan is drawn up, all
procedures for implementing the plan should be prepared and applied in a de-
tailed and comprehensive manner. Routine quality assurance activities and peri-
odic quality assurance audits were conducted to ensure that all work was carried
out in accordance with the quality assurance plan and procedures.
KEPCO defined four quality classes according to the importance and func-
tion of each structure, system, and piece of equipment related to nuclear safety.
The areas directly related to safety such as nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel were
classified as Q grades, the areas that affected safety-related items if they ceased to
function were classified as safety impact items (T) grades. Items important to
plant reliability, such as turbines and generators, were classified as reliability
items (R) grades, and other general items were classified as S grades.
Quality Management of the Construction of the

First Nuclear Power Plant
Hyundai E&C, which was in charge of the construction of the Q-class reactor
system, was the company that suffered the most severe difficulty due to the ini-
tial quality assurance of nuclear power plant construction in Korea, including
Kori Unit 1. It was a very difficult task to construct a nuclear power plant for the
first time and to prepare the documents and records in English according to the
quality requirements. The procedures were revised and supplemented until
Westinghouse was satisfied, the construction work adhered to the approved pro-
cedures and requirements of Westinghouse, and the construction quality had
been closely inspected.
KEPCO also adhered to the principle of first priority above Westinghouse.
For example, within a few hours of the first concrete pouring at the reactor con-
tainment, there was a blast test in the vicinity. Unfortunately, the cast concrete
suffered an out-of-regulation wave, requiring a two-way alternative to air com-
pliance and quality construction. However, KEPCO instructed Hyundai E&C
to crush the poured concrete because of the quality requirements for construc-
tion and rework the job.
212 Nuclear Korea
Welding, as well as concrete construction, is one of the areas that must be

thoroughly controlled and inspected. However, at that time, the quality manag-
ers didn’t know how to perform proper welding quality control. Westinghouse
issued and adopted a license only for welders who passed and tested various
methods in the presence of KEPCO. Hyundai E&C tried to cultivate qualified
welders by placing a container house at the Kori site. However, at that time,
about 60 skilled welders were trained for about a month, but they still failed the
test. Eventually, Hyundai mobilized the welders from the Hyundai Shipyard
because they had the best skills and made them pass the exam.
In addition, quality control was insufficient for turbine generator machin-
ery. KEPCO pointed out that the quality mindset and performance of General
Electric, a supplier of turbine generators in the UK, was inferior to that of West-
inghouse. At that time, there was a huge difference in the level of quality and the
perception between foreign companies, KEPCO, and domestic companies. For
example: The water intake pipe to the intermediate connection point between
the intake and the plant was installed by a local subcontractor under the super-
vision of KEPCO. The other side was installed by the same local subcontractor
under the supervision of EEW UK. But the quality levels were completely
different.
The reason was that EEW completed its work with reasonable labor costs
and robust quality control, however, KEPCO did not. KEPCO and the other
local companies began to slowly learn from the foreign contractors what quality
assurance actually was and how to manage quality with the construction of Kori
Unit 1.
The First Nuclear Power Plant Inspection

At the end of the construction of Kori Unit 1, KEPCO faced a challenge with a
new and important quality control task: Pre-Service Inspection (PSI). It should
be noted that this did not exist at the time of the contract and KEPCO was late
to realize that they should conduct pre-operation inspections under the ASME
Section XI requirements during quality activities. Pre-operational inspection is
an important process for diagnosing the reliability and safety of nuclear power
plants. It is a thorough and accurate non-destructive inspection of the major
equipment such as reactors, steam generators, pressurizers, and piping.
Automatic inspection equipment must be available for pre-operation in-
spection. At that time, only the USA and Japan owned this equipment. The US
company, which had hoped to bid, offered twice the cost expected by KEPCO.
However, KEPCO negotiated with Japan’s MHI who offered a reasonable price
and possessed the required expertise, signed a service agreement with them
in 1976, and then conducted the pre-operation inspection. Since then, pre-
operation inspections and in-service inspections have been carried out in con-
tracts with foreign specialized companies under the condition of technology
transfer. The pre-operation inspection of Kori Unit 2 was made by KAERI as the
main contractor and subcontracted by a foreign company, which was selected by
the South West Research Institute (SWRI) of the United States. In-service in-
spections were also entrusted to SWRI for the operation of Kori Unit 1 under
the condition of technology transfer.
Quality Assurance Organization and Legislation

From the construction of Kori 3&4, which was a non-turnkey contract, KEPCO
had to carry out the inspection and auditing responsibilities by strengthening the
function of the quality assurance activities. To this end, KEPCO expanded the
quality assurance organization in regard to construction at the site. Also, KEP-
CO dispatched QA staff to the overseas office including Pittsburgh, which was
where Westinghouse was located, in order to conduct independent oversight
of the overseas vendors. In 1978, the government enacted the “Regulation on
Nuclear Reactor Construction and Operation Management” under the Atomic
Energy Act, which required operators to prepare and submit construction and
operation quality assurance plans. In 1982, the government revised the Atomic
Energy Act, requiring that quality assurance plans also be submitted by the man-
ufacturers. In 1983, the government announced the “standards for technical
competence and quality assurance plans related to permits.” As a result, only 11
years after the introduction of the quality assurance system, which had been ap-
plied to the regulations of overseas suppliers, the basic system of construction,
operation, and production was established under the Korean Atomic Energy Act.
Quality Assurance Plan and Guidelines

From Kori No. 2, the code and standard according to 10CFR50 App B, which
became the nuclear power plant quality guarantee, was applied, and the contract
stated that Kori No. 2 complied with the 1976 ASME Code and Kori 3&4 with
214 Nuclear Korea
the 1977 ASME Code. In the case of Wolsong No.1, the Canadian Standards
Association (CSA) code was also designed to meet the Canadian supplier’s re-
quirements based on 10CFR50.
At the end of the construction of Kori No.1, KEPCO began drafting a
quality assurance plan for each unit. The QA manual for operation was in effect
with the commercial operation of Kori No.1 in 1978. By applying the feedback
from the experience, the QA guidance of Kori No.1 became the reference for
updating the other units. In particular, in 1981, Hanbit 1&2 prepared the
Quality Assurance Guidelines in Korean and English, and the nuclear quality
assurance activities were distributed to local vendors.
Quality Inspection and Auditor Training

KEPCO staffed foreign experts who were specialists in quality control at the
Kori No. 2 and Wolsong No. 1 construction sites. In addition, KEPCO signed
a service contract with a foreign company to perform quality control. The prob-
lem occurred in Kori Units 3&4, a non-turnkey contract. The overall quality
assurance was performed in collaboration with Bechtel. However, one of the
tasks that KEPCO, the project owner, had to carry out was the quality inspec-
tion, but KEPCO did not have enough manpower to perform this task.
To address this issue, KEPCO decided to cultivate its own human resources
from Kori 3&4 and committed itself to securing qualified staff to perform the
quality control activities. In 1981, quality inspectors for welding, non-destruc-
tive testing, civil engineering, construction, machinery, and electrical were
selected to be ANSI certified after a six-month training course at Bechtel. The
construction site also opened a training program for quality inspectors. In
the evening after work and after finishing OJT, they tried to get qualified in a
short period of time by receiving intensive professional training from Bechtel
technicians.
In various activities, including consignment education, seminars, and guest
lectures with relevant domestic organizations, KEPCO tried to train qualified
and skilled manpower for quality control. Efforts had been made to prevent
delays in the construction schedule due to the deterioration in quality and to
conduct systematic quality inspections to improve the safety and reliability of
nuclear power plants. KEPCO conducted extensive training for its employees as
well as all contractors and vendors working onsite to convey the importance of
quality assurance to all workers at the nuclear plant construction site.
Quality Assurance System

The non-turnkey contract for Kori 3&4 contributed to the dramatic increase in
the localization and quality activities of local vendors. The application of the
nuclear quality assurance system was extended beyond the safety-related items
to include both the safety-impact and reliability-related items. KEPCO, which
had strived to upgrade the technical knowledge of local vendors and contractors
by introducing the quality assurance system, encouraged and supported local
companies to prepare the necessary procedures to meet the requirements of the
quality assurance guidelines, and to strictly follow them.
In particular, KEPCO strongly recommended that construction contractors
and vendors be qualified with the nuclear quality assurance (NQA) system and
they complied with the guidance. Accordingly, local vendors also made an effort
to acquire ASME certification to participate in nuclear power plant projects.
The first company to acquire the ASME N & NPT stamp was Hyundai Heavy
Industries in 1981. Westinghouse, an NSSS supplier for Kori 3&4, requested
Hyundai Heavy Industries, a domestic partner, to acquire the ASME N stamp,
a prerequisite for manufacturing equipment.
Following Hyundai Heavy Industries’ lead, local vendors began to pay a lot
of attention to the ASME certificate. In 1981, Korea Heavy Industries, the pre-
decessor of Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, acquired ASME N &
NPT stamps. Contractors such as Daewoo E&C, Hyundai E&C, and Dong-A
E&C obtained the ASME N stamp in 1982, followed by many other construc-
tion companies.
Quality Inspection Technology Transfer

According to the turnkey contract for Kori 1&2 and Wolsong No.1, most of the
equipment was supplied by foreign vendors, therefore, the quality control activ-
ities also depended on the foreign contractors. Accordingly, it was only from
Kori 3&4 that KEPCO stipulated quality control oversight in the process of
manufacturing and constructing nuclear equipment.
For Kori 2, 3, and 4 and Hanbit 1&2, KEPCO hired inspectors from
Moody, an American inspection company, and operated as a joint inspection
system under the condition that KEPCO E&C would receive the technology
transfer. After Kori 3&4, KEPCO E&C was designated as a quality inspection
agency, and from then on, performed the quality inspections of localized
216 Nuclear Korea
equipment. In addition, KEPCO E&C independently performed the quality

inspection for Hanul 1&2.
KEPCO used third-party inspection for the items that local vendors pro-
duced according to the ASME Section III code and standard. An Authorized
Inspection is an inspection that objectively verifies that the production of safe-
ty-related equipment and installation is properly performed in accordance with
the quality requirements of the industrial codes and the standards of the original
country of the main contractor.
In the case of Kori Units 3&4, Moody Korea, a Korean joint venture with
Moody, was in charge of the construction of the reactor system and the pipes
produced by Daewoo E&C. The Authorized inspections for the NSSS items of
Hanbit 1&2 were conducted by HSB (Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and
Insurance Company) and KEPCO E&C participated in the technology trans-
fer. In 1985, KEPCO E&C was designated as an official inspection agency by
the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Bureau Veritas assumed the responsibility for the Authorized inspection of
the NSSS equipment production and installation of Hanul 1&2 in accordance
with the French codes and standards. However, the nuclear safety center of
KAERI performed the Authorized inspection of the construction and the local
pipe production. Since the center became an independent safety authority, the
scope of the Authorized inspection has been widely applied to production, con-
struction, and in-service inspection of all items of ASME Section III.
ASME Certificate for Design Management

KEPCO E&C has established a foundation for quality assurance by means of a
quality audit, providing technical support for quality audits of design, welding,
heat treatment, and non-destructive inspections, as well as specific quality in-
spection services since the beginning of the company. As nuclear technological
independence was being achieved, KEPCO E&C signed a consultation agree-
ment in 1983 with a US service company in order to become ASME certified
and organized a task force. The special training required for design quality was
conducted at the US service company. The trainees received instruction on de-
sign document preparation, including Class I piping design.
In 1984, KEPCO E&C prepared for and acquired the ASME N stamp
within just one year. The quality certification acquired by KEPCO E&C covers
all items of ASME Section III Division 1 including reactor vessel and pressure
resistant equipment, and it was the first engineering company in Asia to receive
this certificate. KEPCO E&C has built a quality assurance system as the main
contractor for architect engineering of nuclear power plants. It has contributed
to the expansion of the nuclear quality assurance system as the company
has provided the local vendors with the necessary technical consultation and
inspection.
Expanding QC Items
In 1986, KEPCO found that the root cause of most unplanned shutdowns of
NPPs was the failure of the turbine generator system. The countermeasure that
was taken was to upgrade the quality control activities for the turbine generator
system in order for it to be identical with NSSS. KEPCO modified the proce-
dures and guides and further raised awareness of the importance of quality as-
surance in regard to the turbine generator system. KEPCO also tightened the
quality oversight for the plant maintenance vendors and conducted QA audits.
It was remarkable that 27 vendors were selected as the approved vendors of
KEPCO.
Hanbit 3&4 provided the technical foundation for introducing nuclear
power plant quality assurance for nuclear safety and reliability. This policy was
applied to the turbine generator system, which was classified as an R class but was
overseen as a Q class. In 1987, KEPCO instituted a basic standard for quality
assurance for Hanbit 3&4 and promoted independent quality assurance activi-
ties through training, process standardization, quality surveillance, and audit.
Settlement of the Quality Assurance System

KEPCO established the enterprise quality assurance office in 1985 as a way to
improve the quality of electricity by integrating the nuclear quality assurance
system that followed the introduction of nuclear power plants. KEPCO initiat-
ed the enterprise quality campaign and motivated the staff to adopt this mind-
set. With feedback from the nuclear sector, KEPCO opened the quality assurance
office for the hydro and thermal power division in 1986 and for the transmis-
sion and distribution sector in 1989.
In order to promote KEPCO’s corporate philosophy and management pol-
icies, it introduced the Management Vitality (MV) program in 1987, which
218 Nuclear Korea
campaigned to instill the importance of quality improvement into its workforce.

Beginning in 1988, the MV competition at the enterprise level was held annu-
ally and the best practices were presented.
Quality Assurance Policy

Since 1990, KEPCO has faced a lot of challenges in terms of the electricity
market as well as the structure of the industry. The debate and discussion regard-
ing restructuring the electricity market had begun and it became difficult to
maintain the role of the sole vendor to address the public’s needs as the number
of private individual power producers was increasing. There were many requests
for compensation for the damage from the electricity cutoff. In addition, the
public interest in nuclear safety and the quality of electricity was increasing.
KEPCO restructured its quality assurance organization in 1993 and 1994.
The organization at the home office was reinforced but each division was also
modified and empowered. The role and responsibilities of the home office and
the local office were clearly differentiated. The home office was responsible for
developing the policies related to the quality and performance evaluations at the
enterprise level. The local offices followed their own plan by taking the local
conditions into consideration.
In 1995, KEPCO declared its quality assurance policy and announced the
enterprise QA system, which was based on ISO 9000.
Korea Electric Power Industry Code (KEPIC)

In 1996, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced the application of
KEPIC into the nuclear sector. The codes and standards are the technical re-
quirements for material, design, production, construction, test, and inspection
in order to ensure the safety, reliability, and quality of the systems and compo-
nents. It was a form of original technology to advance technological indepen-
dence and development.
Traditionally, Korea had used the codes and standards of the origin country
and did not have its own. However, it became increasingly clear that Korea
would need to develop its own codes and standards. The attempts to develop the
technical standards for the nuclear industry go back to the end of 1970. The
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, under the supervision of the Korea
Atomic Energy Agency, tried to standardize the Korean standards based on the
1974 edition of the ASME Section III Nuclear Power Plant Component. How-
ever, it was never used properly due to various reasons.
In 1987, in accordance with the government’s nuclear technology indepen-
dence policy, the Ministry of Science and Technology decided that KEPCO
would develop the technical standards with its development budget. KEPCO
went through the first phase of basic research in 1989, reviewed the options for
establishing the technical standards and the implementation plan, and then de-
cided on the development direction for each phase. During the second phase of
the project, which began in 1992, the technical standards were developed and
consisted of 12,332 pages in 66 categories in five areas including quality assur-
ance, mechanical, electrical, civil engineering, and fire prevention. The stan-
dards were finalized in 1995.
In 1992, a total of 300 experts from academia, industry, and research par-
ticipated in the development of the nuclear power industry technology stan-
dard, which was first developed over the course of four years and required
considerable resources. The draft was composed by qualified experts from both
government and industry, consisting of the Nuclear Technology Standards
Committee, with four specialized committees and 12 specialized subcommittees
under the umbrella.
In the third phase of the project, which was implemented from 1995 to
2000, the technical standards for 15 sectors covering the entire field of electric
power facilities were expanded to include the nuclear power plant, radiation
management, radioactive waste management, and technical standards for nucle-
ar power, radiation management, and radioactive waste management.
The development of the codes and standards resulted in the promotion of
the localization of nuclear technology. The application of the codes and stan-
dards has raised the quality and reliability as well as enhanced nuclear safety. In
addition, the establishment of licensing standards can improve power plant uti-
lization by resolving disputes in interpretation, applying the same standards re-
peatedly, reducing investment in other power generation facilities, improving
the efficiency of operational maintenance, and interoperability of spare parts.
20
Commissioning, Operation,
and Maintenance
This chapter describes the overall operation of a NPP. In particular, it focuses on

commissioning, startup, and maintenance activities after construction. The
commissioning, a critical element of safe and reliable operation, must be planned
and performed perfectly for substantial completion of the nuclear power plant
construction. The results have to be proven to see if they satisfy the design re-
quirements, intents, and contents described in the safety analysis report. In ad-
dition, the report has to specify the initial characteristics of both the system and
the equipment and provide the source values on the periodic operational tests.
Therefore, the utility has to actively participate in the commissioning. After the
successful completion of commissioning and performance acceptance testing,
the NPP begins commercial operation (normal operation). During normal
operation, the performance output should be demonstrated according to the
original designs, on the basis of safe and reliable operation. For this purpose, the
entire management system of the NPP has to keep the performance indicators
at the highest level. Robust maintenance support is paramount to achieving
smooth NPP operation as well as a trouble-free plant. Technical support activi-
ties are also important in supporting this goal. The commissioning organization
undertakes the system package, the areas, and the buildings, and has the right of
jurisdiction. Also, the punch list for construction must be resolved prior to com-
mercial operation. Depending on the result of the performance acceptance tests,
the contract can be closed.
221
222 Nuclear Korea
Commissioning
The ultimate goal of the NPP is to operate safely and reliably while producing
the maximum power to supply economical and carbon-free electricity. Upon the
completion of construction, the construction team turns over all of the systems
and components to the commissioning team.
The purposes of commissioning are to conduct all tests in order to validate
the design described on the FSAR, such as the design criteria, specifications of
the equipment, configuration, verification of the operating condition, adjust-
ment, etc., in order to validate set-points of the safety systems. During this very
important period, the operations and maintenance groups learn about the sys-
tems and components through a series of performance tests, which represent the
best opportunity to gain expertise. We have to organize the commissioning team
in advance, mixing it with experienced staff and experts, and prepare the test
procedures and guidance, based on feedback and data collection. The operator
training and certified operators are a prerequisite to operation readiness. The
maintenance team should also be prepared and ready to work with the opera-
tions group.
Korea’s Experience with the First Unit

Because of the turnkey contract, the main contractor took total responsibility
for all activities. Under the leadership of the main contractor, both the overall
and detailed commissioning plans were prepared. The commissioning period
was set at the standard length of time for the main contractor, which is 1.5 years,
and the testing category was determined in accordance with the USA Regulato-
ry Guide, RG 1.68 (initial test programs for water-cooled nuclear power plants).
Tests on the secondary systems were performed using the construction testing
method by the vendors during the commissioning period. The secondary sys-
tems were not the subject of the safety regulations.
The commissioning group consisted of 24 operators who completed the
overseas training as provided by the main contractor. In addition, the mainte-
nance and technical support engineers, including new employees, were trained
overseas as well. The training team was sent to Zion NPP in the USA and sub-
sequently they taught what they had learned to the newcomers. This approach
contributed to the development of qualified, in-house manpower. The 24 oper-
ators also prepared the procedures for the commissioning test and operation
Commissioning, Operation, and Maintenance 223
while the vendors provided the base data to be used for writing the procedures.
In Korea, this practice has been a standard process and it is still the best chance
for the operators to learn the local field and increase their practical knowledge
and skill. However, spare parts for commissioning and normal operations were
not secured in sufficient quantities and the materials management system was
also a problem. I think we didn’t have enough budget to procure spare parts and
used the parts much sooner than was estimated.
The operational technology support activities (core management, radiation
management, and chemical management) were also led by the overseas trained
staff that completed the vendor training courses. Mechanical and electrical
maintenance work was performed by the employees who had worked for the
thermal power plant, but the instrumentation control maintenance was done by
the employees who had trained overseas.
After commissioning and the performance acceptance test, the O&M sup-
port service contract was made with the supplier and a few experts were then
placed on staff. Since the commercial operation, fundamental design problems
have been discovered. Being rushed during turn over, commissioning, and inap-
propriate operation of the management system resulted in the plant frequently
being shut down. The operation record during that period of time illustrated
this terrible trend. This unusual case was the first and the last to occur in the
Korean nuclear industry. The following sections discuss the experiences of the
utility during Kori No. 1, the first NPP in Korea.
Best Practices
The commissioning staff was challenged positively for commissioning works
armed with strong ownership. The plant operation documents were prepared
onsite in the Korean language. The commissioning power plant was considered
to be the training facility that was used to increase the capacity and experience
with operation and maintenance. Mistakes in the original plant drawings were
corrected internally (e.g. the Piping and Instrument Diagram: P&ID). The de-
sign deficiencies of the facilities were being continuously improved.
Challenges
There were many fundamental problems in the design of the NSSS and turbine
generator facilities, which created numerous issues during commissioning and
224 Nuclear Korea
operation. The corrective actions were continued for over 10 years. Only the
construction test (and not the commissioning test) was performed on the sec-
ondary systems. This resulted in numerous shutdowns during the commission-
ing and operation period. About 70%–80% of the plant shutdowns occurred in
the secondary system. The unreasonable push to pressure the vendors for com-
missioning resulted in many problems in both the primary and secondary sys-
tems. For example, the sea water leakage from the main condenser severely
impacted the steam generator tubes. Because the power plant was supplied with
such poor-quality components and materials, spare parts, and consumables the
resulting problems necessitated corrective maintenance. The operation proce-
dures and technical specifications that the power plant required in order to ob-
tain an operating license were poorly prepared by an independent source.
Turn-over, care and custody of the system for commissioning, and operation
spare parts were not clearly defined, which caused both commercial and techni-
cal problems. Insufficient spare parts resulted in substandard maintenance.
The vendor data and data generated during the construction stage were not
smoothly transferred to the commissioning group and power plant from the
construction group. The unproven facilities and equipment created substantial
difficulties during operation and maintenance. Equipment was supplied that was
inconsistent with the procurement order. Vendor training programs for the elec-
trical and mechanical fields were not available to the maintenance technicians
and skilled workers, which led to some issues in the quality of maintenance. The
NPP construction was a turnkey base contract, and the owner depended too
heavily on the commissioning and initial operation of the contractor.
The Experience of Korean Standard (OPR1000)

Standard NPPs have put the utility in charge of the overall project management
responsibilities to oversee all construction activities. The comprehensive plan for
commissioning consists of five-stages of planning, which begins 55 months prior
to commercial operation. In addition, construction must be completed 15
months in advance of taking the test in accordance with the sequence of commis-
sioning. More information is available by referring to the Comprehensive Sched-
ule for NPP Commissioning.
Comprehensive Schedule for NPP Commissioning
30 P Plan (Year) (–5) year (–4) year (–3) year (–2) year (–1) year (+1) year
Major Activities 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4
Milestone Commercial Operation

Energizing
Unit #1 Rx Install Energizing HFT
HFT
400 P
Unit #2
200 P Fuel Loading
Rx Install
Organization and
Manpower Est. SU Team Est. SU Team
Selection RCS Hydro Test Fuel Loading
Organize SU Team 40 P RCS Hydro Test Commercial
- Owner 30 P
Operation
- Tech. Support 100 P 600 P 500 P
• Domestic Est. SU Team 10 P Start Up
20 P 200 P 20 P
400
20 P
• Overseas 100 200 300 200 250 10 P
150 600 500
Commissioning, Operation, and Maintenance
- Contractor 50 150 100 10 P

3P
• Testing
• Maintenance 40
500 400 100
• Training Mech/Elect/I&C/Fuel/Computer 30
300
- Overseas 250 150
System Training / Const.Test / CFT / HFT / Fuel load / Power Ascension tests / Simulation
- Domestic (Power Ascension)
(Const. Test/Flush) (CFT/HFT)
Procedure preparation
System Training / Const.Test / CFT / HFT / Fuel load / Power Ascension tests / Simulation
- Preparation
Est. SU Team Selection Test Test
- Startup
RO/SRO FSAR Prep & Submit
FSAR Licensing Application
Operating Licensing Tech. Spec Preparation
Tech. Spec Radiation Emergency Plan Preparation
Emergency Plan
225
Note: PWR 1000MWe × 2Unit for commissioning (1-year interval)

226 Nuclear Korea
Organization and Manpower

The commissioning organization made up of qualified personnel was launched,
operated, and expanded four years ahead of commercial operation. The organi-
zational chart is updated stage by stage along with the construction progress,
and the manpower is supplemented by the nuclear training center under the
human resource development plan. The commissioning organization consisted
of the professional engineer group (reactor core, radiation, and chemistry), the
test group (operation), and the equipment maintenance support group. Refer to
the typical organization of OPR1000.
The system functional tests that are performed during commissioning are
conducted by the test group in collaboration with the operations group. Quali-
fied staff with specific experience led the tests and oversaw the test group.
Organizational Update
Note: 1000MWe × 2 units basis

Stage Period Personnel Function Remark
(months)
I Unit #1 100 Reactor, turbine, Commissioning
COD operation preparation team
–48months (3 sections with
11 subsections)
II Unit #1 200 Engineering, reactor, Commissioning
COD turbine, electro- set-up
–36 months mechanics, engineering (6 sections with
support, operation 26 subsections)
III Unit #1 400 Commissioning: Commissioning
COD (commissioning: commissioning team
–24months 200 engineering support, Set-up of power
power plant: 200) reactor, turbine, plant organization
electro-mechanics, (19 sections with
operation, engineering 46 subsections)
Power plant: operation
and shift work,
engineering, engineering
support, mechanical,
electric, computer,
chemical, I&C, quality
IV Unit #1 600 Same as above Expansion of

COD (commissioning: plant organization
–12 months 200 (20 sections with
power plant: 59 subsections)
400)
V Unit #1 500 Commissioning Unit #2: fuel

COD (commissioning: function with reduced loading
+6 months 100 manpower
Unit #2 power plant: Plant organization and
COD 400) manpower: same as
–6 months above
In order to mobilize the manpower of the plant, it’s not necessary, but it is
recommended based on our experience, to create a mix of staff with different
educational backgrounds and experience. For reference, the manpower used for
Hanbit 3&4 was composed of the following disciplines: 30% mechanical, 30%
electrical and electronics, 20% nuclear engineering, 10% chemical, and 10%
others including computer engineering. The educational level of the group was
composed of the following: 40% university graduates and 60% high school
graduates and the experience level of the group was a mix of 40% with experi-
ence and 60% without experience.
The Atomic Energy Act required that at least one certified senior reactor
operator (SRO) and one certified reactor operator (RO) work on each shift prior
to the initial core loading. The operations group is composed of six teams work-
ing three shifts on a daily basis. An SRO is responsible for each shift, in addition
to the reactor operator (RO) and the turbine operator (TO).
The commissioning manpower was selected from employees that completed
their education and training four years prior to commercial operation in accor-
dance with the human resource development plan. In addition, the commis-
sioning team prepared and conducted the training. The commissioning staff is
qualified in accordance with the administrative control guidelines. (Reference:
ANSI/ASME NQA-1)
After the completion of construction, systems and equipment are turned
over to the commissioning team for commissioning testing. The test program
was based on RG 1.68, and in the case of OPR1000, the total number of sys-
tems was 512 (for 2 units). Tests were divided into five (5) phases; Phase I for
228 Nuclear Korea
the construction/system acceptance test (CAT), Phase II for the Cold Function-
al tests (CFT) and the Hot Functional tests (HFT), Phase III for Core loading
and post-core loading tests, Phase IV for the Initial criticality and Low power
physics tests, and Phase V for the Power ascension tests (PAT) and the Perfor-
mance Acceptance Test (ASME PTC 6.0).
The commissioning tests and the power plant operating procedures were
required to be completed approximately 3 months prior to the start of commis-
sioning. In particular, the operation procedures were mandatory in order to
obtain the operating license from the regulatory authority prior to core loading.
The procedures (based on 2 units) for OPR1000, were 36 for commissioning
administrative instructions, 292 for construction acceptance testing, 110 for
system flushing, 311 for commissioning testing, and 922 for operations, which
totaled 1,671 procedures that needed to be prepared.
The procedures were prepared by a taskforce composed of approximately 70
to 80 staff members who were empowered to test the applicable systems and
components. During that time, the power plant operating procedures had to be
verified and validated. In particular, the emergency operating procedures re-
quired approval from the regulatory authority; their effectiveness had to be
proven through verification and validation of the full-scope simulator
The NPP construction was permitted as a condition of the PSAR, and for
the first loading of fuel, the FSAR had to be approved by the regulatory authority,
after which the operating license was issued. Therefore, the FSAR must include
the complete as-built configuration data from construction.
Normal Operation
For the safe and reliable operation of the NPP, the systematic operation of all
technical fields, including the organization and human resource management,
operation, maintenance, core management, radiation management, chemical
management, and others are important.
The organization may be classified into the following groups: the operations
group, which is in charge of operations and technical supporting activities; the
engineering group; the quality assurance department; the education and train-
ing department; the maintenance department in charge of the maintenance
work of the facilities (outsourced if possible); and the administrative depart-
ment. The utility should set a maintenance policy in terms of the scope of work.
KEPCO had been in charge of maintenance planning and work of the safety
related I&C because those activities belonged to the inherent scope of utility in
order to assure the safe operation and maintenance of the nuclear power plant.
Maintenance for Commissioning

A lot of technical staff from thermal power plants were placed into the mainte-
nance (mechanical and electric field) organization for the first NPP. The I&C
maintenance organization consisted of personnel who had completed the over-
seas training for specific disciplines, in consideration of safe operation and
maintenance.
During the construction period, the main contractor was responsible for the
maintenance, and the utility was responsible for overseeing the care and custody
until system turn-over. In the case of preventive maintenance work for key sys-
tems and components, the commissioning crew was also in attendance. After the
construction tests had been completed and the systems were turned over to the
commissioning team, the commissioning maintenance staff took full responsi-
bility for the care and custody.
All procedures for maintenance and tests were prepared by the commission-
ing staff during the commissioning period. Spare parts for commissioning and
power generation were both procured in advance. The spare parts to cover the
operations of the plant for two years were selected from the spare part lists and
were recommended by a vendor.
In particular, the refueling work was performed by the supplier for several
cycles in order to maintain safety and provide for the insufficient experience of
the owner. The OJT training was provided during the refueling services, and
once qualified, the trained plant crews were able to perform the refueling work
independently.
Maintenance During Normal Operation

In Korea, the maintenance organization of a utility generally consists of three
maintenance sections (mechanical, electric and instrumentation, and control)
and two engineering sections (systems and programs). The suborganizations are
further divided into 20 subsections. Their roles and responsibilities include the
development and review of maintenance procedures, preparation of various
maintenance plans and implementations, refueling work, design changes and
230 Nuclear Korea
configuration management, work control and data management, maintenance

program evaluation, and instrument calibration. The maintenance program
monitors structures, systems, and components (SSC) for performance degrada-
tion. In addition, this program includes the administrative and technical aspects
for all preventive and improvement measures required to recover the design
functions to the allowable level for the degraded or failed SSC.
This type of maintenance work is divided into preventive maintenance and
corrective maintenance. Preventive maintenance is again divided into planned
preventive maintenance, periodic maintenance, and predictive maintenance.
Corrective maintenance is divided into work order maintenance, forced outage
maintenance, and interim maintenance (short-period outage maintenance after
the approval for the outage of the plant). The software program for maintenance
work management has various functions for equipment information, mainte-
nance information, maintenance work control, materials management, equip-
ment records, design changes, surveillance and periodic inspections, maintenance
process, maintenance procedures, and drawing management.
Spare parts consumables for two years of operation were purchased on the
basis of vendor instruction. The items and quantity for spare parts procurement
were decided independently by the utility. When necessary, owner groups’ sup-
port (e.g. CEOG, WOG, etc.) was requested.

Commissioning and Operation
Even when commissioning with the turnkey contract method, the owner is re-
quired to take ownership of the commissioning initiative. The commissioning
test of the secondary systems should be implemented with the same level of im-
portance as with the primary systems in order to prevent unexpected problems
during normal operation. The complete power plant commissioning and opera-
tion procedures should be prepared independently or through outsourcing. It is
recommended that the commissioning staff participate in the major equipment
installation process in order to utilize their experience in operations.
The training by using a full-scope simulator and field walk-down training
are equally placed to operators. The operation and maintenance experience pro-
vided by WANO, INPO, Owner’s Groups, and others should be reviewed and
trained for in order to prevent a recurrence. The preliminary education and
training for the commissioning tests should be completed in advance. When

needed, OJP training programs need to be arranged during the commissioning
of other power plants under construction.
Maintenance and Materials Management

The education and training of maintenance technicians and skilled workers
needs to be included in the training courses such as, refueling, reactor coolant
pump maintenance, turbine generator overhaul, and others. Maintenance crews
need to participate in the installation and maintenance of critical equipment
during the construction work in order to gain sufficient experience and data
acquisition.
The “on-call based contract” needs to be in place for emergency mainte-
nance services for general or major components. Software programs for materi-
als management should be prepared and the warehouse should be set up early in
the process. Sufficient spare parts need to have been procured for commission-
ing and normal operation. In general, the vendor provides a spare parts list with
recommended quantities, and enough spare parts for two years of operation are
purchased. Usually, 1.0%–1.5% of the total construction expenses of the power
plant are spent on spare parts procurement.
The maintenance equipment needs to be purchased by reviewing the equip-
ment list recommended by the contractor, and the “one-time” equipment has to
be rented. In addition, special tools must also be secured. The maintenance of
the power plant should be approached with the life cycle management concept
in mind; mid- to long-term plans have to be established and maintained. The
spare parts for normal operation and commissioning have to be managed and
stored separately from the construction equipment and materials.
Miscellaneous
When purchasing electrical equipment, be sure to check the technical specifica-
tions because the voltage and frequency (for example: 50Hz vs 60Hz) for each
supply region may be different. All plans for construction, commissioning, and
operations have to be established early and implemented throughout. All data
and records generated from construction and the supplier-provided data have to
be turned over to the commissioning organization in good condition.
232 Nuclear Korea
In order to prevent equipment failure, clean and environment-proof condi-

tions must be maintained. (e.g. dust, temperature, humidity, onshore wind, and
others). The engineering organization needs to be available in order to manage
the modification of the power plant and keep the configuration management at
the home office and at the site simultaneously. (For example: Design changes,
improvements, FSAR revisions, revision of procedures, and others.) With respect
to their grade, precision instrumental equipment must be periodically calibrated
by the national certification institution. The DDCC (Data and Document Con-
trol Center), the commissioning or power plant data room, and the QA Vault
must be kept clean and be managed properly.
21
Development of the Gen III
Reactor Technology (APR1400)
The local technology platform for nuclear plant construction was significantly
upgraded with the introduction of foreign technology, and with such an effort
being made to achieve technological independence, 95% of the targeted level
was achieved by 1995. Prior to the start of development of a next generation
reactor, R&D institutions conducted several feasibility studies on reactor tech-
nology that were currently under development.
In 1988, KEPCO, in collaboration with the IAEA, KAERI, and KEPCO
E&C performed a world-wide study on the status of the development of next
generation reactors. They subsequently proposed an R&D plan on a selected
new reactor technology that applied the design concept of passive safety. The
Korean government and KAERI went on to conduct a feasibility study on the
new reactor technology in 1990, which included a comparison analysis of differ-
ent technologies and safety, evaluation of design characteristics by system, iden-
tification of items that should be incorporated into the design, utilization of
domestic technology, feasibility of the development of a Korean reactor, and
potential design goals.
In the following year, KAERI undertook a separate feasibility study that
covered the basic development direction and the major design characteristics of
new reactor technology, the design methodologies for nuclear fuel and the reac-
tor core, design requirements and characteristics of the cooling system, and
analysis methodologies.
233
234 Nuclear Korea
Needs for Advancement

Because the next generation PWR technology is based on the existing PWR de-
sign technology, approximately 70% of the technology is the same or similar to
that of the existing PWR design and approximately 30% is newly developed
technology based on verified existing technology. The following is a comparison
of the design features of Korea’s key technologies and that of foreign technology.
Nuclear fuel and reactor core design technology: The Korean nuclear industry has
accumulated sufficient relevant technology through its experience in jointly and
independently designing the reload cores of existing PWRs in Korea and design-
ing the initial core of Hanul 3&4. However, for areas with complex interfaces
such as protective system control, control rod design life extension, and fuel
thermal margin increase, additional research and development is required.
Reactor vessel and lifetime extension technology: The Korean nuclear industry en-
hanced its reactor vessel design capabilities through the joint design process of
Hanul 3&4, however, additional technological development and increased over-
seas technology collaboration are necessary to enhance its technology regarding
flounce reduction, brittle fracture toughness, thermal shock, welding and resto-
ration, vessel life, and leakage.
Safety system optimization technology: The Korean nuclear industry possessed rel-
evant technology by standardizing nuclear power plants and various research
initiatives to enhance safety. However, technology development is needed on the
passive safety system design, which utilizes gravity or natural convection, direct
vessel injection of emergency core coolant into the reactor vessel, canned motor
pump design, etc., which all represent key features of the next generation safety
system.
Containment vessel design technology: The Korean nuclear industry has secured
the overall design technology, however, additional technology advancement on
the passive containment system such as the passive heat removal system, radio-
active material within the containment vessel, passive removal system, passive
spray system, and cavity design is required.
Reactor coolant system (RCS) technology: Because the design concept of the next
generation PWR is not significantly different, current technology is expected to
Development of the Gen III Reactor Technology (APR1400) 235
be implemented, however, technology development is required in regard to re-

sidual heat removal using natural convection, pressurizer-related technology,
and coolant pump technology.
System and component simplification technology: Because such technology is criti-

cal, from an economic perspective, to the next generation PWR, significant ef-
fort must be made in order to secure this technology.
Man–Machine Interface optimization technology: This related technology is es-

sential for the reliability and operation of a reactor. The Korean nuclear industry
has achieved a significant level of technology related to new I&C advancements,
however, additional development of optimized technology as well as technology
cooperation/joint development with foreign partners, are required.
Modularization and standardization: The Korean nuclear industry lacks experi-

ence particularly in modularization for the development of domestic PWR tech-
nology. Thus, increased effort is required to enhance the level of technology in
terms of the economics of the next generation PWR.
Technology Development Phase 1 (1991–1994)

Basic Requirements
The reactor technology and capacity are two very important categories because
they need to take into overall account the level of technology, energy policies,
the direction of technology development of a country, and conduct assessments
of public acceptance, regulations and licenses, safety, and economics.
The reactor technology must be selected not only considering the R&D
environment and constant incorporation of research results, but also in regard
to the trends in global development as well as the incorporation of new develop-
ments in foreign technology.
The unit capacity of a reactor is increasing as a worldwide trend, and this is
a result that stems from taking into consideration the compatibility along with
existing reactor capacities, grid acceptance, national energy demand, and supply
policies of nuclear developing countries. In order to determine the reactor tech-
nology to be developed along with its capacity, a “big picture” needs to be drawn
that considers various factors including the national energy demand and supply
236 Nuclear Korea
plan, the energy independence plan, grid acceptance, nuclear power plant site
issues, standardization plans, and the construction plan for succeeding nuclear
power plants.
For each reactor technology, consider the connection between the goal of
technological independence and the domestic level of base technology that can
be utilized. It is then possible to assess the reactor type and capacity from the
viewpoint of aligning with the reactor technology policy. The status of technol-
ogy developments and worldwide trends also need to be considered. In deter-
mining the unit capacity, the national energy supply and demand policies, the
power source development plan, sites, and grid capacity all need to be taken into
consideration.
Concept of the Safety System

The concept of the safety system should be considered from the perspective of
nuclear safety, which guarantees the safety of the public and the plant workers
along with the investment of the project owner. The safety system should be the
method with the greatest potential for improving nuclear safety to prevent the
occurrence of accidents and core damage as well as to mitigate the consequences
of accidents. Thus, the safety system, which keeps the safety of a reactor, should
have design requirements that guarantee the highest level of safety during nor-
mal operation. In addition, it needs to be a maximum deterrent against acci-
dents, have the necessary equipment and procedures in place to prevent core
damage in preparation for the possibility of accidents, and have additional acci-
dent mitigation facilities in case emergency systems cease to operate during an
accident.
First of all, the potential to simplify the safety system needs to be reviewed.
In order to accomplish this, the related systems, valves, pumps, I&C equip-
ment, and mechanical equipment need to be optimized, plant operation needs
to be simplified, and the protection logic and operation of the safety system
need to be simplified as well.
The performance of the residual heat removal system, safety injection system,
containment vessel cooling system, safety depressurization system, and the pow-
er-operated relief valves of the pressurizer need to be reviewed in order to improve
the function of the safety system.
The performance of the residual heat removal system in removing residual
heat within the RCS, safety class cooling, removing core decay heat during
shutdown cooling, and the cooling capability through manual maneuvering

by the operator need to be reviewed in the event the steam generator is
inoperable.
The performance of the safety injection system needs to be reviewed to en-
sure that the supply of cooling water to the RCS during a Loss of Coolant Acci-
dent (LOCA) is enough to maintain a sufficient amount of RCS coolant, which
is required for core cooling. Its performance also needs to be reviewed to ensure
that the system is capable of injecting a sufficient amount of boron into the RCS
for safe shutdown, can inject boron into the RCS to control reactivity when a
main steam line breaks, and is able to prevent the excess concentration of boron
in the RCS during an extended LOCA.
The function of the containment cooling system is to maintain the pressure
below the design pressure during a design basis accident. It also lowers the pres-
sure and the temperature inside the containment vessel during a LOCA or a
main steam line break accident as well as maintains the temperature and pres-
sure below the limit. The residual heat removal system also combines the con-
tainment cooling system. The design features of the containment cooling system
should be carefully reviewed.
For the safety depressurization system and pressurizer power-operated relief
valves, discharging gas from inside the reactor and the depressurization func-
tions need to be reviewed.
Plant Design Life

A plant design life must be determined by factoring in various technical ele-
ments such as fatigue, corrosion, the aging of equipment, material degradation
due to radiation exposure, estimated replacement period of major equipment,
replacement technology, the level of economic improvement stemming from
plant life extension, and licensing regulatory requirements.
The US and others have conducted studies to confirm that extending the life
of existing reactors results in greater economic return than building new ones,
which require a tremendous amount of investment, including rising construction
costs, as safety regulations continue to be strengthened, demanding reinforced
safety measures, and the high risk of delays in construction still exist.
The study found that the equipment that had the most impact on a plant
design life was the reactor pressure vessel. The life expectancy of a reactor pressure
vessel can be extended with current technology, and as the technology for extend-
238 Nuclear Korea
ing and repairing/replacing major equipment has been developed, a plant design
life can be extended with a relatively modest additional investment. The plant
design life of existing reactors is 30–40 years, however, the economics of a nuclear
plant that is operated for a long period of time has been shown to increase. EPRI
Utility Requirement Documents defined a 60-year design life as a requirement
for the next-generation reactor. Actually, when extending the life of a 40-year
design plant by one year, about 2.5% of the initial investment cost is saved, and
it is also very beneficial in terms of maximizing site usage as the demand for new
builds decreases. The economic evaluation of a 60-year design life is assessed
based on the unit generation cost of Korean nuclear power plants and should take
into consideration the economic impact on other domestic industries.
In terms of the fatigue failure of material, the fatigue analysis results for the
reactor vessels of the Korean nuclear plants need to be reviewed and the forecasted
fatigue and evaluation data of the major components of the NSSS need to be
analyzed. Damage to the reactor vessel and the internal structure caused by neu-
tron irradiation can be confirmed by analyzing the reactor vessel’s radiation expo-
sure, RTndt (Reference Temperature of Nill Ductility Temperature) changes, and
curve changes following plant operation.
In regard to equipment design data, the equipment installation and system
configuration method, taking into consideration equipment replacement and
testing, monitoring functions of major factors that impact the life of the equip-
ment, and system designs and configurations that minimize the thermal-
hydraulic transient of equipment need to be analyzed.
Accident Resistance
When summarizing the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of American re-
actors, the causes of core meltdown include system transient, Anticipated Tran-
sient Without Scram (ATWS), and LOCA. The results of the PSA show that
because the reactors were designed to be compact in order to increase the eco-
nomics, they are overly sensitive to transients and require additional measures
designed to increase thermal inertia as well as enhance the reliability of the reac-
tor trip system because of the possibility of ATWS. The reliability of the residual
heat removal system must also be increased to be prepared against LOCA. Thus,
systems need to be simplified, the operation margin needs to be improved, and
the reliability of the reactor trip system and residual heat removal system need
to be raised in order to achieve better accident resistance.
Design simplification needs to be reviewed first. Taking the capabilities of

the operators into consideration, minimize the installation of systems, valves,
pumps, and instrumentation equipment, and adopt the Man–Machine Inter-
face System (MMIS) in order to simplify operations. The operation procedures
required for normal, abnormal, and emergency operations need to be optimized
as well as simplifying the equipment and structure designs. Also, it is important
to simplify the plant protection and control systems, extend their functions, and
standardize them in order to increase operability and conservativeness.
In order to increase the design margin, the following items need to be
reviewed: (1) the reactor vessel outlet temperature should be optimized,
(2) the capacities of the steam generator and pressurizer as well as the coolant
inventory should be increased, and (3) the reactor should be designed to
maintain negative reactivity under all operating conditions.
To ensure the reliability of the systems and components, it is important to
review the following items: (1) Optimize the material and water chemistry of
the NSSS, (2) Improve the I&C system to reduce errors during normal opera-
tion and to enable quick diagnosis of any anomalies during abnormal operation,
and (3) develop the latest monitoring technology and equipment to reduce fail-
ure of the rotating equipment and pressurized systems by monitoring for leaks
and vibration.
Core Damage Frequency

In order to prevent core damage, it’s important to adopt adequate safety systems
and equipment so that damage to the reactor core can be prevented in the initial
stage of an accident. The frequency of core damage is evaluated through a PSA
and serves as a yardstick for nuclear safety.
The US requests through NRC Generic Letter 88–20 that Individual Plant
Examination be performed on all operating reactors and that a high-level PSA
be conducted on new reactors. Also, the NRC Policy Statements request that
the frequency of massive release of radioactive materials be maintained at 1.0E-6
per year or lower. Because a PSA must be performed to demonstrate reactor
safety, an appropriate level and frequency of core damage should be determined
as a design requirement.
Accident analysis data from local and overseas research institutes are used to
determine the limit of core damage frequency. Fault trees are developed for each
system and accident sequence that depict how the core damage is analyzed. The
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accident sequence, from the beginning until core damage occurs, is analyzed.
Also, an analysis of human reliability is performed to measure the probability of
human error.
LOCA Protection
Based on the results of studies on nuclear safety, the safety systems of all operating
reactors must maintain sufficient core cooling capability to satisfy all regulatory
requirements regarding design basis accidents. However, when a safety-related
component or system failure occur concurrently with human errors, transient
events, or LOCA, they could develop into severe accidents.
Deterministic PSA results show that small LOCA is more fatal to core dam-
age than large LOCA. Therefore, to prevent the development of small LOCA
into core damage accidents for Gen III reactors, LOCA protection requirements
were established. The US ALWR Utility Requirements require that core damage
does not occur assuming an instantaneous break of the reactor coolant system
for up to a maximum of six inches.
The design of the RCS, the connected piping, and LOCA analysis results of
operating nuclear power plants need to be reviewed. The small LOCA analysis
results conducted by the best estimate method to confirm the safety margin of
major safety variables needs to be reviewed and the core damage prevention re-
quirements within the fixed break area need to be reviewed as well. An overall
review of how much impact LOCA has on the frequency of core damage is
needed, which can be based on the PSA results.
Station Blackout (SBO)

An SBO event refers to an accident where all alternative current power sources
supplied through all switchgear buses within a nuclear power plant are com-
pletely lost. Together with turbine shutdown, offsite power loss also occurs. In
the case of operating reactors, because safety systems are operated by AC power
sources in order to remove residual heat from within the reactor during an acci-
dent, the performance of residual heat removal is significantly affected by an
SBO event. Thus, there is a high probability that such an event could develop
into a severe accident that is accompanied by core melt.
There have been cases where an offsite power loss accident occurred at an
operating plant and where a diesel generator, the emergency AC power source,
failed to operate. According to reactor safety study results and PSA results, an
SBO event represents a major portion of the potential risks that face nuclear
power plants. To prepare for SBO events, the reliability of the emergency diesel
generator must be maintained in order to reduce the possibility of the loss of the
AC power source. Also, a nuclear plant must have the capability to cope with an
SBO event without an AC power source for a specific period of time. The re-
dundancy and reliability of an emergency AC power source, the frequency and
duration of offsite power loss accidents, the existence of a passive residual heat
removal system, and the inherent safety of the reactor should be considered
when determining the operator action time.
The frequency of SBO events is estimated by reviewing the possibility of
plant-centered faults, the frequency of utility grid blackouts, and offsite power
loss accidents caused by harsh weather conditions.
The redundancy and reliability of the onsite emergency AC power source
system should be reviewed. The review items include: the redundancy of the AC
power sources, the reliability of the electrical grid, the emergency electricity
supply to the auxiliary cooling system and the control system. In addition, the
common cause of failures due to design, operation, and environmental factors
should also be reviewed.
To determine the recovery capability from an SBO event, we need to con-
sider the possibility of an accident occurring with the equipment required to
resolve an SBO event, operability and reliability, accessibility and habitability of
areas requiring access by operators, operator training, and operating procedures
for accidents involving power loss.
When deciding the heat removal capabilities of the residual heat removal
systems, the operating reliability of the systems required to maintain the RCS
coolant inventory and remove residual heat, and the performance and capaci-
ties of the heat removal system and auxiliary system, need to be reviewed. The
design concept of the residual heat removal system should be determined based
on the capability to reach cold shutdown from normal operating temperatures,
redundancy of equipment and facilities, and leak monitoring and isolation
functions.
The Consequences of Severe Accidents

The ultimate objective of securing the safety of a nuclear power plant is to min-
imize the radiation exposure of residents living nearby a plant during normal
242 Nuclear Korea
operation as well as during accidents. The nuclear regulator defines by law the
permissible exposure dose for residents living nearby reactors and strictly regu-
lates it.
The safety regulations have become more stringent in order to limit the
offsite radiation exposure caused by a core damage accident. The regulations
regarding the probability of radiation leakage in the case of a severe accident is
used as the criteria to protect the public. Therefore, the safety regulations have
an impact on nuclear legislation, design requirements, and public acceptance.
The following items need to be reviewed for the development of the design:
the probability of a large radioactive release, the radioactivity source terms, the
environmental and site characteristics, the transfer of radioactive nuclides, and
the results of a risk analysis.
Containment Design
The containment vessel is an engineered piece of safety equipment and serves
as the final radiation shield during reactor operation and accidents. It deters
the radiation exposure of nuclear plant personnel and nearby residents and
protects safety related systems including the NSSS from missiles and other
outside impact.
The design of the containment vessel is a significant element for securing
integrity, following the plant lifetime extension, and shortening the construc-
tion period. The design concept for the containment vessel is an essential ele-
ment to be considered in regard to reactor safety and economics.
The licensing requirements regarding the containment vessel are conserva-
tively applied in terms of maintaining the hermeticity of the containment vessel
during accidents and maintaining integrity under temperatures and pressure
conditions that would be expected during accidents. Therefore, these items
should be reviewed for Gen III reactors.
First, the design base accident analysis results need to be reviewed. Liquid
film behavior, the natural circulation of air, and the P/T analysis of containment
are considered when determining the containment cooling mechanism. Source-
term evaluation and the effectiveness of the containment spray are reviewed in
order to decide which method to use for retaining fission products. In addition,
the pre-stressed concrete containment vessel, the reinforced concrete contain-
ment vessel, and the double containment concept are considered for determin-
ing the design concept for the containment building.
Design Philosophy
The design philosophy should be defined in the early development stages of
the Gen III reactor along with other basic matters such as reactor technolo-
gy and capacity. It is a design approach that is a basic element for achieving
the objective of developing a Gen III reactor; it determines the detailed
reactor design requirements and it is an element that has a fundamental
impact on the design.
The design simplification is reviewed in terms of the design of the systems
and components, improvements in operations and maintenance, as well as in
construction. The design margin is reviewed by analyzing the design technology
of the systems and components as well as their reliability. To determine the
impact of human factors, we need to consider the application of the latest
I&C technology, as well as the testing and the maintenance technologies. The
design optimization of the safety system is reviewed for enhancements to nucle-
ar safety. The design and the analyses of both the systems and components, the
O&M technology, construction technology, and the use of material need to
be verified.
Containment Margin
It is essential that the containment vessel be designed to maintain a maximum
level of tightness and integrity even during severe accidents. The Gen III reac-
tor design is being improved in terms of the prevention and mitigation mea-
sures in order to be prepared against severe accidents including direct
containment heating, steam explosion, hydrogen burning, and core–concrete
interaction. Also, the accident mitigation systems and passive containment
systems are being installed.
Therefore, in determining the Gen III reactor’s ability to cope with severe
accidents, a containment building design concept should be defined based on the
technical resolutions and analysis results of basic phenomena, the results of the
evaluation of accident prevention and mitigation equipment, and a comprehen-
sive safety assessment performed through a PSA.
The containment vessel cooling system and the severe accident mitigation
systems as accident mitigation equipment need to be considered. Also, the con-
tainment vessel break types and break characteristics through a PSA Level II are
subject to review.
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Operator Response Time

As the equipment and systems of the PWR become compact, prompt action by
operators is needed during transient events and LOCA events. However, if the
reactor were to be designed so that its safety systems could respond to such
events and prevent core damage for a certain period of time without operator
intervention, the operator would be given sufficient time to properly address an
accident, which would raise the overall safety of the reactor.
The emergency core coolant inventory and dry-out time of the steam gen-
erator need to be checked. In regard to the operator response time during tran-
sient events and accidents, the following items need to be reviewed:
• the response time to the low-level alarm of the level of volume in the control
tank
• the response time to the low-level alarm of the pressurizer
• the response time to shutting down the automatic depressurization system
in the event of a steam generator tube break
• the response time to the flow control of the emergency feed water after
startup
• the response time to recharge the emergency feed water tank.
Meanwhile, emergency accidents must be considered including the total

loss of feed water, inadvertent deboration, a single RCP rotor seizure with loop,
an uncontrolled rod withdrawal from a subcritical or low-power operation,
a single full-strength control rod drop, the inadvertent loading of the fuel
assembly into the improper position, and a control rod ejection. In addition
to the above, the capacities and the performance of various components that
impact operator response time, along with the operator response measures,
and the sequence logic of the operator response during accidents need to be
reviewed.
Radiation Source Term

The nuclear power plant site criteria, the engineered safety design criteria, and
other regulations are established to regulate the impact of radioactivity that is
released from the nuclear power plant on surrounding areas. The US NRC and
its nuclear industry have developed analysis models and codes to resolve source
term issues, set up source term analysis technology criteria, as well as defined
areas of significant uncertainty. Also, research to evaluate the source terms of
operating reactors based on existing technology and knowledge is currently un-
derway, and this will be the basis for analyzing the overall risks of nuclear power
plants. The results of such analyses show that if realistic source terms are applied
to new reactor designs and licensing, design requirements can be eased com-
pared to the existing requirements, which were conservatively applied and can
raise the design margins.
Based on the criteria of TID-14844, the application of the source term
calculation was reviewed in regard to conservatism of the source term and radi-
ation dose rate, the hypothesis of the source term, and the impact on safety re-
lated to changes in the design requirements. Also, the attenuation method for
released radioactive material needs to be reviewed.
Hydrogen Generation
One major hazard to the containment vessel, other than the temperature and
pressure of the containment vessel’s atmosphere during an accident, is the pos-
sibility of a hydrogen explosion that could occur mainly due to the oxidation of
nuclear fuel cladding. When the concentration of hydrogen in the containment
vessel’s atmosphere reaches a certain level, hydrogen combustion occurs causing
an instantaneous explosion of hydrogen, which could damage the containment
vessel. Therefore, in order to prevent hydrogen combustion, a hydrogen recom-
biner and hydrogen igniters are installed to lower the level of hydrogen concen-
tration according to the licensing requirements for operating reactors. For the
Gen III reactor, hydrogen concentration is assessed according to the best esti-
mate method and the design of the containment vessel system is performed to
control the concentration level.
In consideration of the structural layout and air mixing inside the contain-
ment, the hydrogen behavior is reviewed. From the perspective of system perfor-
mance and reliability, the hydrogen control system design also needs to be
reviewed. The consequences of severe accidents developing into oxidation of the
nuclear fuel cladding and increasing the amount of hydrogen inside and outside
the vessel also need to be considered.
246 Nuclear Korea
Emergency Planning
A nuclear power plant owner must establish a radiation emergency response
plan in order to minimize the exposure of plant workers and nearby residents
and they must submit the plan when applying for the operating license. The
plan should define the organization and the facilities, as well as the procedures
required to properly respond to radiation exposure during accidents to mini-
mize the impact. In the process of developing the Gen III reactor, the existing
radiation emergency response plan was simplified through an enhanced safety
design so as to reduce the burden of the concerned organization and the re-
quired facilities/equipment. This is because the plume exposure pathway can
sufficiently reduce the offsite exposure dose.
The containment vessel design leakage rate and body exposure dose when
considering radioactive source terms need to be reviewed. A Level 3 PSA is used
to review the transfer of radioactive nuclides and the offsite exposure dose. The
radiation emergency response plan needs to review the background of the plan
and the emergency plan zones.
Refueling Cycle
Operating reactors were designed to have a refueling cycle of 12 months, but
with the advancement of design technology, increased burnup of the mechanical
limit that maintains nuclear fuel integrity, and higher capacity factors, the cycle
is changing to 18 or 24 months. The refueling cycle of reactors operating in
Korea have also been extended from 12 months to 15 months and is expected
to be changed to 18 months. A 12-month refueling cycle requires more frequent
fuel replacements compared to longer cycles and thus, sees higher O&M costs
and lower capacity factors, ultimately lowering the economics.
Longer refueling cycles achieved through improved machinery perfor-
mance, higher burnup, and higher capacity factors can further enhance reactor
safety, advance related technology, and maintain the integrity of nuclear fuel. In
order to determine the refueling cycle, diverse factors including the mainte-
nance of fuel integrity, design technology to maintain core safety, economics of
energy generation, the capacity factor, and the plant operation plan need to be
comprehensively reviewed.
There are several items to review: the nuclear fuel enrichment, the quantity
of the replacement fuel assemblies, the core design and the major safety design
variables when determining the core design related to maintaining fuel integrity.
For the core safety, the core safety design variables and the fuel integrity need to
be reviewed. When assessing the impacts of changing the refueling cycle on
equipment repair and replacement, we need to review the reactor coolant pump
seal design, the coolant chemistry, and the flow rates of the auxiliary equipment.
The other elements to review when assessing the economics include: the maxi-
mum allowable enrichment rate and the purification capability when determin-
ing the nuclear fuel storage facility capacity, the nuclear fuel cycle cost, the
generation cost, and the maintenance cost.
Production of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Material

The radioactive waste treatment systems are composed of systems to treat liquid,
gaseous, and solid radioactive wastes. The EPRI ALWR Utility Requirements
document requires that such systems are designed in compliance with the Good
Neighbor Policy. In other words, the amount of radiation released offsite should
be reduced and the amount of radiation coming from solid radioactive waste
should be minimized. In order to reduce the radiation amount released offsite,
the method of collecting liquid radioactive waste and radioactive waste removal
technology must be improved. Such technologies contribute to the reduction in
the amount of radioactive waste.
Solid radioactive waste generally produced from a nuclear power plant is
low-level radioactive waste. This includes solidified radioactive waste and dry
radioactive waste that is generated during O&M work, which are temporarily
stored within the radioactive waste building then transferred to an interim stor-
age facility or offsite final disposal facility. In reality, however, the introduction
of such facilities is difficult because they are closely related to the degree of pub-
lic acceptance. In addition, with the reinforcement of radioactive waste receiv-
ing standards for disposal facilities, environmental monitoring requirements,
and the demand for higher economics by the utilities, efforts to minimize the
amount of low-level radioactive waste are essential.
The reduction of radioactive waste can increase the effective use of land and
increase the economics of a nuclear power plant as it will reduce costs for waste
transportation and storage. Therefore, a review is needed on the disposal meth-
od when designing the radioactive waste treatment systems. Also, technologies
to reduce the amount of radiation released offsite and the radiation exposure of
248 Nuclear Korea
plant operators and maintenance workers must be evaluated in terms of the

public’s acceptance toward nuclear facilities.
The review elements include: the optimal designs of the solid, gaseous, and
liquid radioactive waste treatment facilities, the waste volume reduction tech-
niques of solidification, compression, and incineration along with radioactive
material removal technology.
Capability of Wet Storage of Spent Fuel

The management of spent fuel is greatly determined based on the nuclear poli-
cies of the host country. Normally, spent fuel is reprocessed after being tempo-
rarily stored to be used again as nuclear fuel or to go through a once-through
cycle. Korea has selected a centralized interim storage method until the back-
end cycle policy has been decided. As with low-level radioactive waste, the big-
gest problem for spent fuel storage is the site acquisition issue. When reviewing
a spent fuel storage facility, the spent fuel pool capacity should be adequately
determined, and the construction of a dry storage facility for fuel spent should
be considered.
In order to determine the storage capacity, the review items that should be
considered include the nuclear fuel cooling and purification technologies, criti-
cality analysis results, and the spent fuel rack design improvements, along with
the economics. The possibility of storage capacity expansion should consider the
heat removal capability, criticality, and the licensing requirements.
I&C Technology
In order to reduce the frequency of an unnecessary reactor trip, I&C technology
should be replaced from analogue to digital technology in order to raise the re-
liability of the I&C equipment and the capacity factor. The distributed process-
ing method should be applied to process extensive amounts of information at
high speeds and provide timely reports to operators who need the information.
In addition, if the fault tolerance method is adopted, this could also help control
the number of human errors.
In order to mitigate accidents during emergency operations, prompt and
accurate actions are required. If a distributed processing method with high reli-
ability and expandability is applied, large quantities of data can be processed at
high speeds and be provided to the operator. Equipment to help operators take
action during nuclear accidents should be developed to mitigate the negative
consequences of the accident.
Because it is necessary to reduce the number of extensive inspections and
testing of the I&C systems, functions for early fault detection and self-diagnosis
should be introduced to prevent tripping. Also, the areas of artificial intelligence
and other advanced technology should be reviewed for possible application to
nuclear plants.
The repair and replacement of the I&C equipment during operation should
be made convenient with a sufficient level of adaptability and expandability in
case design changes are necessary. It is also important to maintain a high level of
equipment reliability to prevent malfunctioning.
The criteria for determining I&C equipment are standardization, modular-
ization, simplification, and licensability. The latest electronic technology and
signal multiplexing to monitoring, control, and protection functions should be
applied, and the system functions that should be separated to prevent noise need
to be reviewed.
The major review items are the event tree development and the instruction
methods to determine the priority for annunciating the alarm, the review of the
automatic and manual operation methods of safety-related functions, the oper-
ating information to be provided to operators, the alarm priority, a schematized
operating procedure, and the main control room conditions (illumination, air
handling, noise, coloring, visibility, access, communications, etc.). The mainte-
nance and reparability of the communications system and the I&C equipment
of the main control room and overall plant need to be reviewed as well.
Design for Operation

The reason behind the continuous efforts to improve the operability of reactors
is that it directly affects the plant capacity factor. Plant shutdowns caused by an
operator error during normal operation reduces the capacity factor, which ulti-
mately lowers the economics. However, an operator error that occurs during
abnormal conditions can lead to accidents resulting in core damage such as the
Three Mile Island accident.
The nuclear regulator is also implementing various criteria and guidelines to
secure operability, but because it is impossible to completely exclude human
errors by operators, the plant needs to be designed to minimize the possibility of
250 Nuclear Korea
operator error. Therefore, the Gen III reactor should secure operability while
taking into consideration the human factor when designing systems and com-
ponents and should also be able to reduce the frequency of plant trips due to
insufficient design margins.
The main review items are (1) to what extent will digital technology be ap-
plied to I&C equipment, (2) the design margins considering the design technol-
ogy of systems and components as well as system reliability, and (3) the possibility
of applying automotive I&C technology to the MMIS design.
Design for Maintenance

Along with operability, reparability also influences the plant capacity factor, that
is, the plant economics. Because shortening the duration of the fuel reloading
process and the duration of the annual outage through higher reparability can
increase the plant capacity factor, this must be critically considered for the Gen
III reactor. Design requirements must take into consideration various technolo-
gy areas including systems and components designed that consider human fac-
tors engineering, repair work conditions, in-service inspection and testing,
maintenance technology, and the maintenance experience of the operating reac-
tors all serve as an excellent database.
To develop a systems and components design concept for minimizing main-
tenance, we need to review simplified designs, component remodeling, compo-
nent standardization, materials, and automatic diagnosis and testing. We also need
to review “as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA),” temperature, lighting, ro-
botic technology, and also the maintenance experience data of operating reactors
to determine maintenance work conditions.
Equipment Access and Replacement

The main factors to improving repairability, meaning minimizing maintenance
work and raising work efficiency, are equipment access and replacement. The
requirements for replacing parts or small components can be fulfilled depending
on the requirements for design, for maintenance, and equipment access, but in
order to replace the steam generator or other major large equipment, require-
ments distinctive to such equipment need to be incorporated into the design.
Experience from operating plants shows that the maintenance of the steam
generator is the most significant issue. Performance degradation of a steam gen-
erator occurs due to corrosion of the tube caused by sludge. Although a sufficient
design margin is provided, as this issue is considered in the steam generator de-
sign, this is insufficient to maintain the design life of the steam generator. Several
steam generators have been replaced in operating reactors worldwide. But be-
cause such replacement was not considered in the nuclear power plant design,
there were numerous challenges in the replacement process. Thus, the replace-
ment of the steam generator must be considered in the design phase of the Gen
III reactor, so that replacement work time can be shortened in order to increase
economics.
Lifting equipment for equipment transportation, workspace to perform the
replacement, crane capacity taking into consideration the equipment load, and
containment vessel inlet/outlet design (leak tightness, structural analysis) need to
be reviewed. Also, consider piping, passages, and manways to determine the most
optimal general arrangement for maintenance work. A review of the application
of human factors engineering technology and decontamination technology needs
to be performed as well.
Simplicity of Operations
A main control room design with advanced I&C technology and operator-con-
sidered human factors engineering is a common feature of Gen III reactors that
are in development. The area of the modified main control room is much small-
er than that of operating reactors because the former uses the centralized data
display function and an expanded automation scope. This enables the operation
of the plant to be performed by a smaller group of personnel and increase the
efficiency of plant operation accordingly.
We need to review the control panel design from the aspects of instructing,
controlling, and alerting. Also, review to what extent the plant computer will be
used and how much mimic panel designing will be incorporated.
Application of MMI (Man–Machine Interface)

The significance of securing operating efficiency at the main control room was
acknowledged after the Three Mile Island accident. Since then, regulators and
252 Nuclear Korea
nuclear vendors have sought to enhance such operating efficiency. The applica-
tion of advanced I&C technology, a main control room design incorporating
human factors engineering of operators, and efficient operator training not only
help prevent human errors, but are also vital elements to increasing operation
reliability, securing safety, and improving economics through higher capacity
factors.
We need to review the facility configuration and arrangement, the work-
space considering human factors engineering, accessibility, and mobility for the
layout of the main control room and additional facilities. In regard to the con-
trol panel design, particular focus should be placed on reviewing the panel struc-
ture, the instrument forms for control, instruction, alert, and the equipment
layout. Utilize a simulator for the panel design and review the main control
room communications system as well.
Construction Period
Cost savings on a project are directly connected to the construction schedule of
a nuclear power plant. Therefore, the schedule, from the time the project is
awarded through to commercial operation, and particularly, from the first con-
crete pouring until commercial operation, is very important. The design con-
cept of the Gen III reactor will focus on shortening the duration of the overall
schedule from the time the project is awarded to commercial operation along
with all of the detailed schedules from the first concrete pouring to commercial
operation in order to increase the economics of the project.
We need to review the standard design technology from the design stan-
dardization perspective and the design progress analysis from the construction
viewpoint. Review the application of new construction methods including
modularization and the use of large equipment. Analyze the schedule using
schedule analysis programs and by performing critical path analysis, and ulti-
mately, analyze the economics.
Degree of Design Completion Before the

Start of Construction
Detailed design should be performed as much as possible in order to proceed
smoothly with construction work according to the construction schedule. By
doing so, schedule delays due to design changes can be prevented by increasing
the degree of design completion at the start of construction, construction-relat-
ed issues can be reviewed and adjusted in advance, and equipment and material
can be manufactured in a timely way and reviewed in advanced. Also, by suffi-
ciently reviewing the transport and installation of equipment and material, any
requirements can be identified in advance and action can be taken, thereby
contributing to shortening the duration of the construction schedule.
We need to select the design to be done in advance and review its impact on
the construction schedule. Review the design schedule to check if the design
progress rate has been properly set and consider to what extent standardized
designs will be reflected.
Design Schedule
Shortening the design period and efficient management are major elements to
shortening the construction schedule and can be achieved through the system-
atic management of design work. The development of a systematic design con-
trol system enables an overall coordination of design work, systematization of
work performance, and the efficient exchange of design documents and infor-
mation so that consistent and integrated work can be performed throughout
design, construction, and operations work.
In regard to designing work, we need to consider a dedicated team for per-
formance and review a method for systemizing design review from design to
construction. Review the establishment of a configuration management pro-
gram system, a design basis document management system, and a design results
verification system. Also, review the computerization of design data and infor-
mation management.
Plant Siting Envelope

The goals of developing a Gen III reactor are to develop a standard design to be
certified by the regulator, as well as to enhance the plant economics. To stan-
dardize a reactor design, the design of the nuclear power plant’s structure and
systems first need to be standardized and the one design variable that has the
greatest impact on this is the site characterization. Therefore, in order to stan-
dardize a reactor design, site characterization review values, which are design
inputs regarding the anticipated site, need to be determined.
254 Nuclear Korea
We need to review the seismic analysis and design of structures and equip-
ment for determining the seismic design. The review of the temperature and tide
level as part of the site characterization review values should also be performed.
Load Follow
Load follow operation of nuclear power plants is required when the proportion
of nuclear power generation increases from the perspective of a national power
supply. Load follow operation of nuclear plants enables the adequate response to
changes in electricity demand and aims for the efficient operation of the power
grid and provision of quality electricity. Countries such as France and Belgium,
where nuclear takes up a major proportion of power generation, have already
been performing load follow operation of nuclear plants and this is a feature
commonly considered in the design concept of Gen III reactors.
The decision to conduct load follow operations of nuclear power plants is
determined from both a technical and a policy viewpoint as to whether nuclear
plants will be used as base load plants.
We need to review the limiting conditions, the response control capability,
and the axial power distribution changes when determining the control method.
When deciding on the operation method, we need to review an optimized
design for core reactivity control and operation limiting conditions. Also, a re-
view of the NSSS thermal-hydraulic behavior and core behavior needs to be
performed
Load Rejection
For a plant to be able to cut back on power without operating its safety valves or
going into a reactor trip when experiencing a sudden load rejection such as a
turbine trip, is a major element to increasing a nuclear plant’s capacity factor.
Such a function helps shorten the recovery time to get from a reactor cold shut-
down to normal output conditions.
In regard to fallback plans that are incorporated into the design, we need to
review the reactor control and turbine bypass system design. When determining
design technology for coping with load rejection, review the turbine bypass
valve capacity and controllability, the safety and non-safety onsite distribution
system designs, and the off-site power system design. Also, review the nuclear
fuel performance and safety when determining the safety of the transient condi-
tion and also review the mechanical integrity of the equipment.
Occupational Radiation Dose

Shortening the maintenance period is directly linked to the periods of annual
outage, forced shutdown, and grand overhaul, and is a major element for in-
creasing a plant’s capacity factor. One of the basic conditions to this is minimiz-
ing the occupational radiation dose. According to the NRC’s 10 CFR 20, the
maximum permissible dose is defined as a level not harmful enough to impact
the human body, but adopts the ALARA concept to nuclear designs, construc-
tion, and operation.
In order to reduce the source of the radiation exposure, we need to review
the water treatment of the primary system, the decontamination, as well as the
materials. When determining the measures to use to reduce the exposure time,
review operability and conservativeness, the reduction of radiation sources, and
the remote control.
Technology Development Phase 2 (1995–1998):

Toward Gen III Reactor Design
The results obtained from Phase 1 are supplemented in Phase 2. Design technol-
ogy analysis of overseas Gen III reactors, research results on design technology
and resolving design methodology issues, R&D results on core technology, and
verification test results are incorporated to develop design technology and a
computerized engineering system for the Korean Gen III reactor. Certain special
technologies were acquired through joint research with foreign partners, devel-
opment participation, technology collaboration or technology introduction.
The design technology necessary for the development of a Gen III reactor are
design basis, design process, and design methodologies as described below.
The Design Criteria are as follows:
• Nuclear fuel and core design: Mechanical design of the fuel assembly, the
core design, and the thermo-hydraulic design
• NSSS design: Integrity of the RCS pressure boundary, reactor vessel, com-
ponents and subsystem, safety system, fluidic system, I&C system
256 Nuclear Korea
• Containment system design: Heat removal system, spray system, isolation

system, burnable gas control system
• Safety analysis and evaluation: Design basis accident, total loss of electricity,
severe accident, PSA
• Radiation protection design: ALARA design, radiation dose evaluation
• Auxiliary system design: Component cooling water system, service water
system, feed water system, HVAC
• Piping design
• Electrical system design: Main and auxiliary electrical systems, electrical de-
sign of main components and BOP components
• I&C design
• Civil design: Seismic design, structural analysis
Design Process and Methodology

Based on the results from Phase 1 and Phase 2, research results on new design
concepts, research results on core technology, test results, and verified foreign
technology are incorporated into the Gen III reactor design to establish the de-
sign procedures and the design methodologies. The design process and design
methodologies mainly refer to the design criteria system mentioned above.
Development of the Gen III Reactor Design

To develop a Gen III reactor design, the design requirements and the design
objectives need to be set and the plant system design basis, operational design
basis, and equipment design basis for each of the design requirements need to
be decided. Therefore, the design basis for each area needs to be decided before
beginning the design work. When the design work is performed accordingly, the
functions and performance of each concept are reviewed through a feasibility
assessment. R&D work is performed on the following during the technology
development of Phase 2.
First of all, we join other Gen III reactor development projects. This will
allow us to learn new technology and apply it to our development work. We
conduct an in-depth study of the license requirements and regulations for oper-
ating a newly built plant, standard reactor design requirements, and the design
information of other Gen III reactors. Based on the design features of the Gen
III reactor, the general design requirements as well as the safety design criteria
and objectives, need be to developed for the comprehensive design require-
ments, such as the EPRI URD.
Next, we need to analyze the performance of each system in order to opti-
mize the system design, conduct safety analysis of the designs, and perform
verification tests on the new design concepts.
Verification Testing
We need to develop a verification testing plan on the key technologies that are
to be verified according to the design concept of the Gen III reactor. Following
the test plan, we have to conduct verification testing on components and sys-
tems and build a comprehensive mockup facility to perform a thermo-hydraulic
test for evaluating reactor operating behavior, transients, and response charac-
teristics during accidents.
Let’s review the examples of key items to be verified for each sector. In the
case of the core design, there are the fluidic test and the seismic test of radial
reflector, the integrity of the fuel rod and assembly caused by flow-induced vi-
bration, and the integrity of the internal structure caused by seismic test. In re-
gard to core design at low power density, there are the hydraulic characteristics
of the core structure and the criticality test. For the load follow and use of the
grey control rod for power maneuvering, there are the hydraulic behavior and
mechanical integrity of the control rod and guide tubes, the performance and
endurance of the control rod drive mechanism, and the verification of the reac-
tor scram function through the control rod drop test.
In the case of NSSS design, the improvement of the steam generator tube
material and the tube sheet should be verified. The reactor coolant pump needs
the performance test of the high inertia pump, the flow test of the steam gener-
ator channel head, and the flow induced vibration. RCS piping systems need the
fatigue test of the zone affected by welding heat.
We also have the conceptual verification and performance test of the safety
system. The performance test of the reactor makeup tank includes the safety
injection test of the reactor makeup tank by the gravity drain and the perfor-
mance test of water injection from the reactor makeup tank to be activated by
the depressurization system. The residual heat removal system test includes the
performance test of the residual heat removal heat exchanger and the flow char-
acteristics and hydraulic performance of IRWST (In-containment refueling
258 Nuclear Korea
water storage tank). The containment cooling system test includes the contain-
ment heat removal capacity by natural circulation and the containment outside
cooling capacity. The thermo-hydraulic test of the steam generator includes the
heat transfer mechanism and the verification test of transient conditions. The
verification test of the direct safety injection into the reactor vessel includes the
safety injection test of the emergency core cooling coolant. The critical heat flux
test of nuclear fuel is also required.
Mockup Test
We need to build a comprehensive mockup facility that includes the major safety
systems selected from the design development process of the Gen III reactor and
analyze the Gen III reactor’s performance by conducting mockup tests on the
performance of each system. The mockup test is used to get the test results by
means of a scaling factor analysis at a laboratory size. After construction of the
mockup test facilities, there are thermo-hydraulic behavior tests in transient con-
ditions and design basis accidents as well. We can produce the technical informa-
tion on the detailed system design.
The verification and validation tests include a mockup test of design basis
accidents and transient conditions, a performance test of systems and compo-
nents, and validation of the emergency operation procedures. The verification
test of the I&C system design includes the prototype system, dynamic mockup,
and the integration test by using a simulator.
Technology Development Phase 3 (1999–2001)

We complete the development of the Gen III reactor design and pursue the
detailed design of the standard reactor except the portions related to site charac-
terization, based on design certificate engineering, verification test results, and
the regulatory requirements of licensing.
Design basis and design requirement supplementations are to incorporate
the basis design results and problem resolutions, the verification test results, the
in-depth analysis results of the related technical information, the licensing re-
quirements and supplementary requirements, and the detailed design require-
ment supplementations.
First-of-a-Kind Engineering (FOKE)

FOKE engineering on the Gen III reactor is conducted by incorporating design
certificate engineering, the verification test results, and the safety analysis re-
sults. The major work includes the system structure design, the complete bill of
materials, the pipe cable routing, the procurement specifications, the limited
seismic stress analysis, the detailed guidelines for operation, and the detailed
construction program.
Epilogue:
My Life at KEPCO
I joined KEPCO in December 1977. At that time, KEPCO was the largest
public corporation in Korea, but it required a lot of technical personnel to con-
struct and operate nuclear power plants. In order to select employees of the
highest quality, KEPCO instituted a unique recruiting process: only four engi-
neering colleges were given English exams and interviews for students graduat-
ing from university who were not subject to military service.
At that time, the CEO of KEPCO was the former Minister of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry. The new nuclear build program was implemented
through his great passion and efforts. A new organization inside KEPCO was
established, and young engineers were recruited. In a conference room in the
basement of KEPCO’s headquarters, we were so impressed by the CEO’s pas-
sion and vision. In particular, he emphasized the fact that the nuclear business
promised a great future and he would send all of the staff that was present to
study abroad.
The day after Christmas, we packed our belongings and gathered at Seoul
Station. Kori Unit 1, the first nuclear power plant, was in the final stages of
construction, and we were on our way to the Kori Training Center. The training
dormitory was set up like a guesthouse with six beds in one room, which was
strange to us and the quality of the food in the cafeteria was quite poor. (Foods
from the southern part of Korea, in particular, are salty and spicy and very irri-
tating to the stomach.)
261
262 Nuclear Korea
The instructors were all young and full of enthusiasm. They were very famil-
iar with every corner of the power plant site. They had memorized the power
plant drawings and explained them to us on the board, from the reactor coolant
system to the turbine generator system. When we looked at their lecture prepa-
ration materials, we admired and respected how much they studied the field.
After dinner, we spent various amounts of time in each room. Playing cards,
drinking, singing, and watching TV. There were some people who preferred to
study hard alone. The time we spent at the Kori Training Center and dormitory
will be a fond memory for us forever.
After completing the basic courses at the Kori Training Center, we were as-
signed to different positions in all sites including the home office. Sixty new
employees were scattered among the home office and the various sites. I was
assigned to the nuclear power planning department of the home office in Seoul.
This department was in charge of establishing a basic plan for each project while
establishing a long-term nuclear power plant construction plan and conducting
a site survey.
In 1978, Kori Unit 1, the first nuclear power plant in Korea, was complet-
ed. I was very proud that I had started working in KEPCO in that significant
year of nuclear power generation. This pride has been the spiritual force that has
sustained me throughout my career. Our department established a basic plan for
nuclear power plant construction according to the long-term power develop-
ment plan. At that time, a feasibility study report by KAERI (Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute) suggested that 46 nuclear power plants should be
constructed in order to supply stable and cost-effective electricity based on the
forecast of macro-economic growth and electricity demand. Once our depart-
ment established a basic plan, the new nuclear build team issued an interna-
tional bidding and the financing team worked hard to secure the overseas
investors and loan.
KEPCO was in charge of power generation, as well as transmission and
distribution. In such a large organization, each division of generation, construc-
tion, transmission, and distribution had a different organizational culture. KEP-
CO was a public corporation as well as a large organization, and thus it was very
bureaucratic and the ability to move up in the company was stagnant.
However, with the introduction of nuclear power, the nuclear division had
a completely different organizational culture within KEPCO. While working
mainly with foreign companies, English had become a common language. Many
young people were hired. It was a new organization and new businesses were
lined up, so promotions happened quickly. In other fields, a person had to be in
Epilogue: My Life at KEPCO 263
his mid-50s to become a VP, while in the nuclear industry he could be in his
mid-40s. As a result, the nuclear family was envied by other divisions within
KEPCO.
All of the employees within the nuclear division were overworked and
stressed out. At lunchtime, however, they would all sit on the sofa after the meal
and play chess. Naturally, the onlookers became more excited than the players,
but the players enjoyed the game while remaining calm. At the end of the day
we gathered at a tavern in the back alley of the market. We ended a day with a
lot of complaints about our boss and also spent time comforting each other.
An example of one of the hard yet rewarding events comes to mind. Al-
though it was time to complete the first nuclear power plant, we were consider-
ing the introduction of the fast breeder reactor at that time. In order to operate
46 nuclear power plants sequentially, research and development on a fast breed-
er for spent fuel recycling was undertaken. Having just recently graduated from
the university, I had no knowledge of the fast breeder. However, I was still tasked
with publishing a booklet on the fast breeder as well as establishing a basic plan.
I put considerable effort into reading the various brochures and documents I
could locate in order to gain a better understanding. Fortunately, I was able to
complete the book just before I left for military service.
At that same time, I also established a basic plan for the introduction of a
fast breeder reactor in Korea. Two teams would be formed, and we would send
one team to the United States and the other to France to conduct a feasibility
study of a fast breeder. In addition, both teams planned to study at an engineer-
ing college and receive training from an engineering company.
I then joined the army on May 19, 1980. After the military regime in Korea
began, a severe democratic protest began on May 18 in Gwangju city. Behind
the great political whirlpool, I finished the basic military training and moved
into a deep valley of Gangwon Province, near the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone),
where I could forget the turmoil going on in the world. It was like living in a
medieval dark age.
Upon my return to KEPCO after my military service, I was assigned to the
construction offices of Hanbit 1&2 to implement nuclear quality assurance as
well as experience the construction work. The site’s mission was to build two
Westinghouse 900MW units. Since that time, I have twice spent six years at
this site.
Bechtel employees were also assigned to the construction site. Most were
retirees over 60 years old. There was also one employee who was assigned to the
quality assurance sector. He was a large man who walked slowly, but I followed
264 Nuclear Korea
him and learned the practical knowledge related to quality assurance, from
welding to the installation of equipment. Whenever I asked him a question, he
smiled patiently, and kindly explained it to me.
There were many younger employees at the site because KEPCO supported
a full scholarship at a professional high school and would select students from
the school who were good students but who were not in a good economic situ-
ation. As soon as they graduated from high school, they got a job at KEPCO
and were exempt from their military service obligation.
In the office and in the dorms, I was like a much older brother, having
worked at the home office as well as having completed my military service. I be-
came their mentor. At the end of a day, I had them gather in my room. We made
a simple dinner together and studied English. I enjoyed helping my brothers.
I then received a letter announcing that the company would be sending a
training group to France to learn about fast breeder reactors. The first group had
already been to the United States and would now be dispatched to France. I im-
mediately applied. I found out later that my boss didn’t want me to apply but
allowed me to do so anyway.
Later than originally scheduled, I took my first overseas flight in July 1983.
Our team was composed of four people. It was in the town of Vichy in the south
of France where we undressed! Vichy is famous for its spa and is a resort town
for the elderly, with many language education institutions for foreigners. My
exotic life in France gave me various experiences. I was only in Vichy for three
short months, however, it was a very precious experience for me.
At the time, we were in the process of introducing Hanul 1&2 from France,
and many institutions, including KEPCO, came to France to take various train-
ing courses. As Koreans gathered, they influenced many small cities. In Korea,
beef tail dishes were expensive. When I came to France, cow tails that were sold
at the supermarket were inexpensive. As Koreans continued to buy them, natural
shortages occurred, and the prices increased. As an aside, we found that beef
tongue paired very well with wine!
Although the language course was short, I went to Paris with some confi-
dence and entered INSTN in Saclay. Saclay had a CEA headquarters and a large
nuclear complex, including research reactors. INSTN is a professional engineer-
ing school, rather than an academic master’s program. The only foreigners were
us, as well as students from Tunisia and Argentina, but they had no language
problems at all. The French made good use of the blackboard at school at that
time and the students took meticulous notes. This helped me a lot and I often
borrowed the class notes from friends.
At Sceaux, the last stop on the RER B line near Paris, I began living in a
rented second-floor room. A grandmother in her 80s was the owner and she was
strict. She would correct my French pronunciation, but the topic of conversa-
tion was always World War II. She was kind, but in the end, her grandson de-
cided to move into the home with his lover, so the freedom of using the entire
second floor vanished. I hope to go there again someday.
At the end of the course, we prepared a thesis as we gained practical experi-
ence at NOVATOME. At that time, NOVATOME was an engineering firm
that developed designs for fast breeder reactors. We coauthored a paper on the
feasibility study regarding the introduction of a fast breeder reactor in Korea.
During this time, we had the opportunity to visit several nuclear facilities in
France. The La Hague reprocessing plant and the Cadarash Center were very
impressive. Currently, fusion scientists from around the world gather at the
Cadarash Center to work on building ITER. Unfortunately, Super Phoenix, a
demonstration of our fast breeder, was noticed at the time, but was eventually
discontinued.
I returned from France and was assigned to be an instructor at the Kori
Training Center. I taught nuclear reactor theory, lectured on the technology of
the fast breeder reactor, and developed new teaching materials. I’m proud to still
see my materials in the documentation room of the center.
As a training instructor, I strongly felt the need to be an operation shift
supervisor at nuclear power plants. At the time, I was encouraged by my col-
leagues who had experienced commissioning and shift work and also acted
as instructors in the training center. In the meantime, contract negotiations
for the introduction of the Hanul 1&2 simulator had begun, and I led the ne-
gotiations based on my experience of studying in France and as a training
instructor.
The French love of the French language is exceptional. The contract nego-
tiations were quite boring and required a lot of patience. The French team
strongly adhered to the position that EDF training courses should be in French
rather than in English. As I learned later, we had to complete a French course
in order to receive training in France to build Hanul 1&2. Will they still hold
this position when France exports nuclear power plants?
As France insisted on training in French, I was selected as the team leader
and was sent to France for the second time in order to be the simulator instruc-
tor, and to perform the factory acceptance test of a full-scope simulator. Five
instructors were dispatched to the Bugey Training Center at EDF, and the hard-
ware and software teams were sent to Thomson CSF, a supplier.
266 Nuclear Korea
It was a challenge for me to see a French instructor writing down the nu-
clear theory on a large blackboard from the top left corner to the bottom right
corner in chalk. His teaching style was very impressive to me. I was also im-
pressed by the electrical instructor, who spoke so quickly that it was even diffi-
cult for the French to understand him. Before beginning the simulator practice,
we imagined and discussed the power plant situation and operations, dividing
into the primary side and the secondary side, and developed the scenarios. In
addition, the trainees were divided into a practicing group and an observing
group, and each group was alternately evaluated. I thought this was a best prac-
tice and after returning to Korea I applied the same method in my training
classes and the reaction from the students was good.
For two weeks during the training period, we were put into the operations
group of the Bugey nuclear power plant. We had noticed a lot of differences in
lifestyles, working styles, and organizational cultures. Whenever I raised an is-
sue, it was impressive to learn how they understood it, analyzed it, and found a
solution. Whenever I asked why the solution to the issues was so complicated, I
was told that it was because of the French way of thinking. When we had break-
fast at the dormitory cafeteria after a night shift, we found all the wine bottles
on the table and enjoyed. Good memories.
During the factory acceptance test at Thomson CSF, the operating proce-
dures were thoroughly studied. All of our teams worked hard to make sure that
no one was making mistakes. This teamwork was maintained during the final
acceptance test after the installation at the Hanul site. Something that was un-
fortunate was that one day a long-time director of software was so angry that he
even ruined the office desks and chairs. Some of the malfunctions of the simula-
tor made him crazy. Because I was the head of the acceptance test, I had no
choice but to send him back home.
The Hanul 1&2 simulator was successfully completed, followed by the crea-
tion of a site training center. I was very busy developing training programs,
publishing textbooks, and writing teaching materials. During this time, I suc-
ceeded in getting an SRO certificate. In order to teach the operators, a license
was needed first. However, for me, who had no actual experience with opera-
tions, the operator training was always burdensome. It was then that I made up
my mind to someday work at the operations group.
The Hanul site was the most disliked place among the four nuclear sites in
Korea. It was a difficult assignment for employees because the Korean culture is
so family-oriented and the site was so far away from family and society/people.
It was a very difficult place for all of our employees to come out and get away.
Even with a special preferential policy given to us, it was always insufficient to
meet our cultural needs. On the other hand, the natural conditions were very
good. The pine forests and valleys were magnificent, there were excellent sulfur
hot springs, and you could enjoy natural mushrooms and fresh raw fish.
I have always lived with my family. The company provided a housing com-
plex with kindergartens and various ammenities such as a fitness center and a
swimming pool. At that time, however, construction was underway, so many
container houses were used temporarily. Still, the children were able to play in
the clear air.
During this period, the Kori Training Center received the first INPO tech-
nical visit. The inspection team came to conduct an overall peer review, from the
training programs to evaluation. The Kori Training Center tried to obtain inter-
national accreditation through this opportunity. I was selected as a support
agent, completed the inspection and peer review materials, and published a
training program booklet. During the inspection, the coordinator was asked to
provide truthful answers and data. The results were very satisfactory.
My next term was to work at the KEPCO office in Paris. Based on my two
previous experiences in France, I was selected as a representative for the Paris
office. My mission was to inspect the equipment manufactured in Europe,
expedite the delivery, and collect market intelligence. Although there were
four employees in total, I was the only person in charge of nuclear power, and I
remember that these two and a half years were the busiest time of my life at
KEPCO.
Before the arrival of luggage from Seoul, the Korean Broadcasting System’s
(KBS) special report team had visited nuclear power plants, institutions, and
organizations in both France and the United Kingdom for about four weeks,
interviewed the local residents, and produced a special program that was de-
signed to promote the public’s acceptance of domestic nuclear power. It was
extremely hard work, but it was very important to me because it was a good
chance for me to visit the important facilities and institutions within a single
trip. The program producer was very serious, and he always worked hard to craft
a clear message that he tailored to each specific audience. It was quite impressive.
The special television program, which had been seen in Japan, France, and the
United Kingdom, played a major role in promoting nuclear power at that time.
The KEPCO main office collected information requests from all divisions.
Everyone wanted to collect information and compare their plan or achievement
with the others. The contact with EDF (Electricite de France) was not easy.
My job was focused on nuclear power generation and I contributed to the
268 Nuclear Korea
organization of the Framatome Owners’ Group, which was called FROG.

Like the Westinghouse Owners’ Group (WOG), Framatome collaborated with
KEPCO, EDF, ESKOM, and Electrabel in order to share information and pro-
vide technical support. I also participated in many meetings of the OECD
NEA. There was only one researcher dispatched from KAERI, however, it was
the first time that a KEPCO representative had joined those meetings. In order
to promote the technical and information exchange, I succeeded in creating a
sistership cooperation agreement between Hanul 1&2 and Gravelines.
Thanks to my hard work, I was honored with a promotion while I was at the
Paris office, which made many people jealous of me. I returned with my family
to the Hanbit Units 1&2 as the operations manager where I participated in the
construction. I had extensive overseas experience, so I thought that I could cre-
ate an opportunity for the operations group to visit several foreign nuclear pow-
er plants. My idea and recommendation were accepted by the home office. Each
nuclear power plant had the opportunity to conduct a benchmarking of overseas
nuclear power plants. So, I selected 10 operators to travel with me to the
Ringhals nuclear power plant in Sweden and the Sizewell B plant in the UK.
The goal of the trip was to give our operators a chance to experience European
culture. Communicating in English was difficult, but we tried our best to un-
derstand each other. The Ringhals staff, in particular, were very friendly. I had
never met them before, so I asked if they would provide a cultural experience for
us during our visit. They took us to a sauna by the sea and served fine meals at
an old castle. Apart from the official schedule, I suggested that my team take a
trip to Paris because we had a free weekend. For those who had only performed
shift work since they began working for KEPCO, this trip gave them both a
tremendous experience as well as culture shock!
The shift workers had a unique sense of victim mentality. Their biorhythms
were never stable, and they had difficulty sustaining a social life and a daily life
with their families.
They had some advantages in terms of salary and promotion, but it was not
enough to compensate for their victim mentality. On the third day of working
on the night shift, in general, I also quickly felt tired and so could understand
how they felt. Therefore, it made sense that after working in operations for a
certain period of time, everyone wanted to move to a different job assignment
where they could work during the daytime. It was very hard for the operations
managers to lift morale and motivate their staff.
Due to the issues with motivation, I decided that increasing morale would
be one of my main missions. Team building events were frequently held and
cultural events were organized as well. I even rented a ballroom at a hotel in

Gwangju city and invited the couples to the year-end event. We went hiking,
skiing, and golfing. (It’s interesting to note that the ski club is still in operation!)
In order to learn about operations from the overseas experience, we reviewed the
documents that had been published by WOG and WANO and applied the
knowledge we gained to the power plant. I also often spoke about my overseas
life, and one of my staff is now working at the WANO Tokyo Center after he
had completed his IAEA presence.
I believe that leaders should lead by example. I didn’t just instruct my em-
ployees to study, I also set an example by taking time to study on my own. In
doing so, I prepared for the Westinghouse SRO certificate exam and the Profes-
sional Engineer certificate. I already had a Framatome SRO certificate, so it was
much easier to get qualified. Fortunately, I succeeded in passing the PE exam.
This kind of leadership through “doing” gave me a sense of satisfaction and ac-
complishment rather than just showing it off to others.
After two years of experience as an operations manager, I moved to the
home office in Seoul. The new department’s mission was to establish the long-
term power development plan including nuclear thermal, hydro, and renewable.
I was in charge of the nuclear planning. I was very surprised that unlike in the
past, the economics of nuclear power were seriously challenged by thermal pow-
er. At that time, the nuclear power plant was a 1000MW standard, but as the
unit capacity of the thermal power plant increased, the economics of the
1000MW nuclear power plant were no longer maintained. After reporting the
results of my economic evaluation, it was decided that it would make more
sense in the long run to discontinue building a standard 1000MW and, instead,
build a standard 1400MW plant.
However, we also faced a very serious challenge. Four CANDUs were in
operation at the Wolsong site. New nuclear power plants had to be built next to
the Wolsong site and it needed to be decided whether to choose CANDU or
the standard 1000MW PWR. I decided to implement a feasibility study with
KEPCO E&C for a strict and fair evaluation. The government also requested
an analysis of the potential ripple effect to the national economy. Of course,
Canada was optimistic that CANDU would be selected because there were
many advocates within KEPCO as well as in the government. In the process
of constructing a series of standard nuclear power plants, it became a very im-
portant moment in Korea’s nuclear reactor policy because we discontinued the
construction of CANDU. The feasibility study took approximately one year to
complete.
270 Nuclear Korea
AECL proposed the 900MW CANDU-9 in order to improve economics

and technology. It was a conceptual design. Without any advanced technology,
it looked like it was simply a concept that increased the capacity by adding a
number of nuclear fuel bundles. At that time, there were many people inside
KEPCO who preferred CANDU. Installing the same reactor type at the same
site would have several operational advantages. CANDU had unique operating
characteristics and AECL had been applying pressure through several routes.
However, when comparing the technical advantages and the economic effi-
ciency to the standard 1000MW PWR, a lot of differences were found. It had
also been a long time since CANDU was built. There was no reason to discon-
tinue construction of the standard 1000MW PWR and change over to CANDU
at the Wolsong site. But it was not my decision. I decided to gather the opinions
of the in-house personnel. Large-scale presentations of the feasibility study as
well as discussions were held by dividing up the management and the working
groups. As expected, the opinions were divided and tough. For AECL, the con-
struction of four units would be automatically confirmed at the end of the feasi-
bility study. In particular, I concentrated on the negotiation of the construction
costs in order to improve the economic efficiency of CANDU. After comparing
the advantages and disadvantages of both types, the report was submitted to the
government without a conclusion. Two detailed reports were given to the Min-
ister. I reported that negotiations with AECL were not satisfactory and that the
technical and economic viability of the standard 1000MW PWR was superior.
In other words, 1000MW PWR was strongly recommended. And that conclu-
sion was approved. AECL’s Seoul office was then closed and was later withdrawn
from Seoul. Personally, I was sorry, however, I think it was a good decision that
was made in the nation’s best interest.
At this point, my body and mind were exhausted. I needed to recharge. I
wanted to experience more of the world, so I applied to the New York office. I
was blamed because I tried to go out again although I had already worked in the
Paris office. My children were also very good students and were learning English
in the elementary and junior grades. I ended up being selected through a 10:1
race. It was 1997. That year, Korea entered the IMF bailout system. At that
time, the salary for employees in the overseas office had been paid in dollars. As
the exchange rate fluctuated, the actual salary was cut in half when compared to
the salary in the past. As in the Paris office, my tasks included manufacturing
quality inspection, expediting delivery, and collecting market information.
At that time, the New York office was KEPCO’s largest overseas office. It had
more than 20 employees, including local hires. While at the New York office, I
reinforced the oversight mission for the quality inspection and the delivery. The
office was located in the “Korea town” section of Tenafly, New Jersey and it was
like living in Seoul. As a result, I almost lost the opportunity to speak English!
But I had a totally different challenge.
The CEO of KEPCO had been newly appointed. He was a professor
at New York State University, and he needed to set an example by making
improvements (changes) in the management structure after he started his job.
Unfortunately, his best target became the New York office. Due to his restruc-
turing plan, most of the staff in the New York office were required to return
home as soon as possible.
Only two staff and I remained behind, where we were then tasked with clos-
ing the New York office and moving it to the ABB-CE headquarters in Windsor,
Connecticut. At the time, there was only one manager who was the liaison be-
tween Seoul and Windsor. The sudden move was difficult for our young chil-
dren because they had to leave their friends behind. It had been nine months
since I had been appointed to the job.
We had a difficult time because we only had four employees to do the job
of 20. We worked very late every night. One administrative staff member suf-
fered rapid weight loss from the stress and his waist was reduced almost in half.
Although we worked endless hours, we gradually adapted to our new reality.
ABB-CE was selected as the main supplier for the development of Korea’s stand-
ard nuclear power plants and many engineers came to the US for technology
transfer. It was somewhat inconvenient to go on a business trip, but we were able
to lead a stable life in our own way. But again came the crisis.
The CEO of KEPCO was suddenly replaced for many reasons. The new
CEO decided that we should again leave Windsor and open a new office in New
Jersey. The reason was simple: ABB-CE was a contractor; how could we operate
an office there? Within nine months, the family had to move again. The children
had to transfer to a new school and make new friends. We had to go through a
tricky office opening procedure. No one since has had to move twice during his
27-month career. Still, I am grateful for the employees who worked diligently
and unwaveringly.
I returned to the Hanbit site again, which was the third time that I would
work there. From that point on, I had to stay at the site alone because the chil-
dren were having difficulty moving so often and I wanted them to have stability
in terms of home and school. This is because in Korea, all of the social infra-
structure is concentrated in Seoul. Couples who only see each other on the
weekends have their own advantages and disadvantages.
272 Nuclear Korea
I was in charge of the quality control of Habit 5&6. At the end of the con-
struction phase, it was time to transfer from construction to commissioning.
Managing the finishing work and the system turn-over along with the quality
documentation needed to be properly implemented. The daily meetings were
held at the construction office and the commissioning office separately. There
were continuous debates and discussion about how to meet the target schedule
and performance level. Everyone was busy but worked as one team under the
strong leadership of the site manager. The feedback from the experience at the
previous plants was valuable and was updated by adding new experiences and
practices. We had to manage the lack of manpower for commissioning and
operations. The key factors for the success of commissioning included bringing
in experienced people, as well as tools and machines, from other nuclear sites, as
well as combining newcomers with experienced personnel. There should be no
errors in the approval and documentation of the test procedure. The construc-
tion office, the commissioning office, and the power plant would sometimes
fight with each other and yet at other times they would cooperate. The close
cooperation of the middle-class managers was crucial to their practical knowl-
edge and experiences. Everyone was working day and night to faithfully carry
out the mission.
My next position was as the technical support manager of Hanbit 1&2. I
completed the commissioning and returned to where I used to be an operations
manager. I was in charge of the power plant organization and budget, the plant
oversight, and the report to the regulatory body and the IAEA inspection.
All departments were centered around their directors, ensuring teamwork and
leadership. However, the focus and attention should always be on the plants
themselves. I spent half of my time while working patrolling, overseeing, and
observing in the moment.
During this time, I had the most painful experience. While Unit 1 was in its
annual outage, Unit 2 had an unplanned shutdown. The reactor shut down due
to a failure of the steam generator level control. An investigation into the cause
revealed that the I&C department had changed the main feedwater pump con-
trol logic, however, the turbine operator of that shift was not aware of this
change. In the event of rapid output fluctuations, the turbine operator con-
ducted an immediate operator action. However, it did not fit the changed con-
trol logic. The incident investigation team came down from headquarters. The
operations group and the I&C group blamed each other and insisted they were
not wrong. The importance of configuration management had been ignored.
Training was very important whenever design changes occurred. Design changes
were taught during continuous training, but in this case, these particular chang-
es had not been communicated to all shift operators. In the process of identify-
ing the root cause, it was found that they were not innocent; but they just
blamed each other.
It was at this time that the operation of Units 1&2 was stopped, and the
degree of tension and fatigue that was felt by all of the employees was very high.
The executives from headquarters declared a temporary holiday in order to allow
employees to take a one-day break.
After 5 years at the Hanbit site, I took over the management of the overseas
business team. At that time, the nuclear overseas business was carried out by
KEPCO, its parent company. However, in 2001, KEPCO divested its power
generation business into subsidiaries. KHNP was in charge of nuclear power
and hydropower. Thermal power was divided into five power generation compa-
nies designated by region. Nuclear and hydro were tied together because they
are at base load and have a strong public function. The nuclear overseas project
was later transferred from KEPCO to KHNP. At that time, we made a lot of
effort to export nuclear power plants to China. Many Chinese people were in-
vited to visit the nuclear facilities in Korea. They received a lot of data and infor-
mation, and numerous seminars and workshops were held. After all of these
efforts had been made, the final result was returned in 2004 with a memoran-
dum that we did not have original technology and were excluded from the new
nuclear power deal. China then began negotiations with Westinghouse and
Areva. The employees of the two companies were completely exhausted.
When I started the overseas nuclear business in 2005, I was in charge of
China and Vietnam. In China, the company tried to build long-term coopera-
tive relations with the power companies that led the nuclear business while mar-
keting service projects. The Korea–China Ministerial Cooperation Meeting was
held for the first time with the support of both governments. We guided the
delegation to visit the Ulsan Industrial Complex and nuclear power plants. At
that time, the Chinese minister was from the shipbuilding field and was inter-
ested in the Korean shipbuilding industry. When he visited the Hyundai ship-
yard, he found that Korea was ahead of him, so he bowed to the Hyundai
shipyard management to serve as his elder brother. Since 2005, I have been en-
gaged in nuclear projects overseas. In 2009, I moved from KHNP to KEPCO
for overseas projects. KEPCO joined the international bidding ordered by the
UAE and was awarded the contract for the construction of four APR1400s. It
was an historic event. In the future, I would like the chance to share my overseas
nuclear business experience with other potential opportunities.
Notes
Chapter 1
1. Hee Yong Lee, “Seoul’s nuclear solution”, Gulf News, Feb. 8, 2012
2. WNN, “Korean reactor design certified for use in USA”, Aug. 27, 2019
3. LinkedIn, “South Korea has a strong vibrant nuclear industry”, Sep. 24, 2018
Chapter 2
1. Ahmed A. Namatalla, Staff Reporter, Gulf News, December 27, 2009
Chapter 3
1. Nuclear Power White Paper, MOCIE, ROK
2. Nuclear Power Yearbook, KAIF
3. Basic infrastructure for a nuclear power project, IAEA-TECDOC-1513, Vienna
(2006), IAEA
4. Nuclear power programme planning: An integrated approach, IAEA-TECDOC-
1259, Vienna (2001), IAEA
5. Nuclear Power and Sustainable Development, Vienna (2006), IAEA
6. Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme, Vienna (2007), IAEA
7. Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities, Safety
Standards Series No. GS-G-1.1, Vienna (2002), IAEA
8. Nuclear Power Project: Policy and Korean Experience, (2002), KAERI
275
276 Nuclear Korea
Chapter 4
1. Long Term Power Development Plan, MOCIE, ROK
Chapter 5
1. Long Term Power Development Plan, MOCIE, ROK
2. Long Term Power Development Plan, KEPCO
Chapter 6
1. Basic infrastructure for a nuclear power project, IAEA-TECDOC-1513,
Vienna (2006)
2. Potential for sharing nuclear power infrastructure between countries, IAEA-TEC-
DOC-1522, Vienna (2006)
1259, Vienna (2001)
4. Handbook on Nuclear Law, IAEA (2003)
5. Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA (2007)
Standards Series No. GS-G-1.1, Vienna (2002), IAEA
7. Handbook for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Works, KHNP
Chapter 7
(2006)
2. Potential for sharing nuclear power infrastructure between countries, IAEA-TEC-
DOC-1522, Vienna (2006)
1259, Vienna (2001)
4. Handbook on Nuclear Law, IAEA (2003)
5. Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA (2007)
6. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3,
IAEA (2003)
Notes 277
Standards Series No. GS-G-1.1, IAEA (2002)
8. Nuclear Power Project: Policy and Korean Experience, KAERI (2002)
9. Handbook for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Works, KHNP
Chapter 8
1. Korea Nuclear Power 30 Year History, KHNP (2008)
3. The Road to a Great Company, KEPCO (2011)
Chapter 9
1. Korea-Vietnam Joint Study Report on Nuclear Power Development in Vietnam,
MOTIE (2004)
2. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3,
IAEA (2003)
3. Handbook for Site Securing Affairs, KHNP (2003)
4. Handbook of Licensing for NPP Construction, KHNP (2006)
Chapter 10
1. Basic infrastructure for a nuclear power project, IAEA-TECDOC-1513, Vienna,
IAEA (2006)
2. Construction Records for Kori No.1, KEPCO
3. Construction Records for Kori 3&4, KEPCO
4. Contract Experiences for Hanbit 3&4, KEPCO
5. Contract for Hanbit 3&4 Plant Construction, KEPCO
Chapter 11
1. Final Safety Analysis Report for Hanbit 3&4
2. Final Safety Analysis Report for Hanul 5&6
3. US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70
278 Nuclear Korea
Chapter 12
(2006)
1259, Vienna (2001)
3. Handbook of Licensing for NPP Construction, KHNP (2006)
Chapter 13
1. Korea-Vietnam Joint Study Report on Nuclear Power Development in Vietnam,
MOCIE (2003)
2. Construction Records for Hanbit 3&4, KEPCO (1996)
3. Final Progress Report for Self-Reliance of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Tech-
nology, KEPCO (1996)
Chapters 14–21
1. Korea Nuclear Power 30 Year History, KHNP (2008)
2. Korea Nuclear 50 Year History, Korea Nuclear Society (2010)
3. Global Leader in Power & Water, 50th Anniversary, DHI (2012)
4. The Road to a Great Company, KEPCO (2011)
5. History of 50 Years, Korea Electric Association (2015)
7. Final Progress Report for Self-Reliance of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Tech-
nology, KEPCO (1996)
Index
A commissioning 6, 8, 13, 18, 26, 33, 54–56,

Abu Dhabi 11, 18 60, 75–77, 80, 94, 99, 117–119, 130,
ABWR 8 133–134, 165, 169, 176, 180, 190–191,
accreditation 97 221–232
ACE7 207 component base contract 117–118, 120,
active fault 25, 112 122, 135, 156, 157
ALARA 144, 250, 255, 256 construction contract 121, 128
Al Hammadi 12, 13 construction delays 28
Al Mubarak 12 construction schedule 23, 32, 37, 58, 61,
ALWR 5, 165, 240, 247 119, 162, 201
American National Standards Institute containment building 71–72, 142, 242–243
(ANSI) 170 containment margin 243
Ammonium Diuranate (ADU) 205 contract negotiation 68, 70, 122–123, 125,
Anticipated Transient Without Scram 238 129, 136, 160, 178
AP600 8 contract structure 30, 125, 128
AP1000 8 conversion 61, 124, 128, 139, 143, 198,
APR1400 4–8, 15–16, 57, 155, 207, 233 200, 201–202, 204–206
architect engineering 32, 117, 156–158, core damage frequency 239
189–192, 195, 217 corrective action program 174
ASME N stamp 215–216
asset 62 D
ASSET 81 demand forecast 43, 47, 50
Atomic Energy Act 25, 31–32, 34, 36, design certificate 8, 258–259
86–89, 98, 105, 213, 227 design completion 252–253
design improvement 164, 166, 186, 191,
B 248
Balance of Plant (BOP) 158 design philosophy 243
Doosan Heavy Industry 131, 179–180
C
CERCA 205 E
certified reactor operator 227 economic evaluation 28, 53, 58
COGEMA 158, 206 Eddy Current Test 105
Cold Functional Tests (CFT) 228 emergency planning 108, 144, 246
279
280 Index
ENEC 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 IRRT 81

energy mix 45–46 island base contract 117–119, 122, 135
EPC 15, 29, 104, 129 ITB 32, 35–36, 68–70, 122–124, 129, 203
EPRI 5, 29, 165, 238, 247, 257
evaluation process 16, 100, 124, 129, 131 J
exclusion area 55, 108–111, 144 Joint Convention 29, 80
experience feedback 175
K
F KAERI 6, 93, 97, 102–104, 158, 165, 205–
fatigue 140, 237– 238, 257, 273 206, 213, 216, 233, 262, 268, 276–277
feasibility study 31–32, 36, 53–54, 58, 62, KEDO 5, 191, 194
110, 129, 233, 262–263, 265, 269–270 KEPCO 3, 5–8, 10–6, 18, 33, 35, 70–71,
financing 6, 8, 9, 23–24, 28, 30, 32, 37, 43, 9–103, 128, 130–135, 155, 165, 175–
49–50, 57–58, 61–62, 69, 78, 84, 117, 177, 180–181, 189–195, 209–219, 228,
119, 124, 262 233, 261–264, 267– 271, 273, 276–278
FOKE 259 KEPIC 218
fuel fabrication 61, 103, 134, 157–158, 204, KHNP 6, 8, 15, 273, 276–278
206–207 KINS 6, 138
fuel loading 32, 72–73 KNF 15, 158
Kori No.1 37, 94, 214, 277
G Kori Training Center 96–100, 261, 262, 265,
Gen III Reactor Technology 233 267
government action 92 KPS 15, 131
KSNP 4, 179
H KURD 5
harmonization 48 KWU 158, 206
Hee Yong Lee vii,18
highly enriched uranium 199 L
HLW 10 legislation 24, 36, 74, 75, 76, 86, 114, 213,
hot functional test 133, 144, 228 242
human resource 13, 17, 19, 24, 26, 30–32, load follow 254, 257
38, 62, 66, 70, 73, 78–79, 81, 90–92, load rejection 254
106, 117, 124, 135, 161, 174–175, 189, localization 7, 26–28, 30, 33, 38, 43, 59, 67,
214, 226–228 73, 124, 128–129, 131, 133, 135–136,
hydrogen generation 245 153, 155, 157–162, 179–180, 182–183,
Hyundai E&C 128, 131, 133, 211–212, 215 185–187, 189, 191–192, 201, 204–205,
215, 219
I Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) 145, 237
IAEA 4, 9, 27, 29, 34, 36, 57, 65, 80–81, Low Population Zone 108
86, 94–96, 101–103, 106, 203, 210, 233,
269, 272, 275–278 M
infrastructure 9, 13, 23–24, 28, 30–32, 37– maintenance 6, 8, 15, 17, 25, 28, 38, 43, 48,
39, 56, 62, 65, 91–92, 117, 128, 167, 57–58, 61, 75–78, 80, 87, 97–101, 124,
178, 271, 275, 276, 277, 278 131, 163–166, 170, 180, 194, 217, 219,
INPO 29, 96, 100, 102, 106, 230, 267 221–224, 226, 228–231, 243, 246–251,
INSTN vii, 264 255
integrated financing plan 49 meteorology data 113
international cooperation 25, 29, 79, 86, 93 MMIS 239, 250
Index 281
mockup test 258 Q

Q class 170, 217
N qualified bidder selection 59
NDT 102, 103, 105 qualified vendors 32, 136
non-turnkey contract 57, 158, 177, 213–215
normal operation 54, 55, 76, 99, 113, 221, R
223, 228–230, 231, 236, 239, 241, 249 radiation source term 244
NOVATOME 265 reactor technology 6, 27, 30, 31, 36, 57, 74,
NPCMS 174 103, 233, 235–236, 243
NPIA 65–67, 69 refueling cycle 246–247
NRC 8, 15, 16, 38, 57, 99, 102, 137–138, regulatory body 32, 76–81, 86, 87, 90, 138,
144, 179, 193, 239, 244, 255, 278 146, 272, 275–277
nuclear fuel 5, 15, 17, 19–20, 31, 36, 54,
56–58, 61, 66, 79, 85, 89, 93, 95, 124, S
132, 157–158, 161, 180, 197–207, 211, Saclay vii, 264
233–234, 245–248, 254–255, 258, 270 safe shutdown earthquake 112
nuclear power expansion 95 severe accident 16, 76, 143, 241–243, 245,
nuclear regulation 16, 19, 24, 30, 36, 55–56, 256
75, 87, 104, 178 Shin Kori 4
nuclear training center 94, 97, 101, 102, 226 single unit 37, 166
site characterization 60, 253, 254, 258
O site conditions 49, 54
occupational radiation dose 255 site selection 31, 32, 54, 75–76, 80, 95,
operator response time 244 107–108, 114
OPR1000 4, 5, 8, 155, 179, 185, 189, 191, South West Research Institute (SWRI) 213
193–194, 207, 224, 226–228 spent fuel 18, 20, 28–29, 80–81, 87, 124,
OSART 81 166, 199, 200, 209, 248, 263
owner’s expectations 27 Ssang Su Kim 14
Stakeholder 10
P standardization 5, 155, 162–165, 179, 193,
peer review 27, 81, 100, 193, 267 217, 235–236, 249–250, 252
planning stage 26, 59, 68, 178 Station Blackout (SBO) 240
plant design life 237, 238 supply chain 17, 27, 29
policy decision 23, 35, 53 supply plan 42, 45, 106, 201, 235
population center 25, 55, 107–108 system 80+ 5, 8, 15, 165, 179
power demand and supply 42, 43 system reliability 48–49, 250
Pre-Service Inspection (PSI) 212
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 238 T
project management 6, 26, 29, 33, 59, 62, tail assay 199, 203
117, 119, 120, 127–128, 131, 134–135, technical specification 98–99, 103, 138–139,
151, 165, 167–168, 170–178, 189–191, 145, 192, 203, 224, 231
224 technical standard 27, 38, 105, 123, 127,
Project Review Meeting (PRM) 172 134, 138, 218, 219
protocol 11, 29, 30, 86 TMI 16, 96, 132
public acceptance 6, 9, 10, 28, 30, 47, 66, training vii, 6, 7, 13–14, 18, 23, 26, 32, 39,
235, 242, 247 59, 61, 73, 77, 91–106, 123, 127, 131–
PWR 8, 33, 36, 97, 102–103, 206, 225, 132, 136, 144, 146, 171, 175–176, 178,
234–235, 244, 269, 270 182–187, 190, 192, 194–195, 214, 216–
282 Index
217, 222–224, 226–231, 241, 252, 261– unit capacity 31, 37, 42, 46, 59, 128, 235–
267, 272–273 236, 269
transmission plan 41, 46–48
turnkey contract 32–33, 37–39, 117–118, V
135–136, 155, 157–158, 167, 175–177, verification testing 257
190, 210, 213–215, 222, 230 Vienna convention 29, 30, 85, 86
U W
UAE vii, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9–20, 56–57, 273 WANO 14, 27, 29, 102, 106, 230, 269
UAE Policy 20 WNA 6

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PART II Planning the First NPP 21

PART III Preparation for the First NPP 63

PART IV Project Implementation 115

PART V Localization and Technological Independence 153

Epilogue: My Life at KEPCO261

Hee Yong Lee graduated with a BA in Nuclear Engineer-

and offer guidance in the areas of financing, design, construction, commission-

US NRC Design Certificate

Future Prospects for Nuclear Power

Why I Am Writing This Book

“Following a comprehensive and detailed review of three excellent bids from

program goals. Additionally, KEPCO dedicated a highly experienced team to

Non-Korean companies involved in the KEPCO team include Westing-

ENEC Evaluation Process

• Safety—All three teams involved in the Prime Contractor

guards, non-proliferation and spent fuel management); siting analysis (in-

• And finally, that the deployment of renewable and other alternative

Four factors supported the decision to initiate the program:

• Economics—Well-run nuclear energy plants are among the most effi-

Central to the UAE’s approach to developing a nuclear energy program has

Nuclear Fuel—Strategies Development

The UAE Policy on Nuclear Energy

Understanding the Characteristics of Nuclear Energy

unexpected geological conditions, financing difficulties, regulatory action, and

Nuclear Regulations and Legislation

Human Resources and Training

Research Organization and Education Institution

project planning is essential for the improvement of the localization. However,

Economic Evaluation and Financing

• Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;

• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage;

The First Introduction of a Nuclear Power Plant

Basic Plan for the Introduction of a NPP

• Government and utility organization

To implement the required administrative procedure, the National Assembly

Preparation for Construction

Construction and Commercial Operation

Feasibility Study Pre. Feasibility Establishment of

Issuance Preparation Gov’t Decision

Concluding Construction Commercial

The Korean Experience with a NPP Contract

Kori No. 1, the First NPP in Korea

Project Structure for Kori No. 1

Westinghouse GEC G. Wimphey Hyundai Co. Dong-a Co.

• Mar. 1959: Promulgation of the Atomic Energy Act

Policy Decision Making

The Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Regulations

Selection of Reactor Technology

Construction of a Single Unit

Human Resource Development

Feedback on the Experience

It is important to establish a risk-minimization plan to address all potential

Power Industry and Development Plan

Power Demand and Supply Plan

Methods for Power Demand and Supply Planning

(1) Prepare the short-term forecast

Major Considerations for Plan Development

Optimum Energy Mix

hydroelectric power or thermal power generation should be considered in light

the system. This is achieved by establishing a transmission system with flexibility

The following basic guidelines are to be followed when developing trans-

PART II Planning the First NPP 21

PART III Preparation for the First NPP 63

PART IV Project Implementation 115

PART V Localization and Technological Independence 153

Epilogue: My Life at KEPCO261