What Consumer Research Is...

Author(s): Bobby J. Calder and Alice M. Tybout

Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jun., 1987), pp. 136-140
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 What Consumer Research Is .
BOBBY J. CALDER
ALICE M. TYBOUT*
R esearchers frequently have explicitly or implicitly
posed the question: What is consumer research?
(Belk 1986; Jacoby 1975; Holbrook 1987). While a for-
mal definition of consumer research may be of little
value, since consumer research will ultimately be de-
fined by what researchers achieve, there is a need for
direction. We begin with the premise that consumer
research, whatever form it might take, seeks to produce
knowledge about consumer behavior. Although simple,
this premise points up the fact that consumer research
is a means to an end. Of course consumer research is
about consumers and about behavior, but this is hardly
limiting or even informative. After all, anything can be
construed as the consumption of something and con-
sumption must entail some kind of behavior. Emphasis
should be on the knowledge produced: What possible
kinds of knowledge could be created by consumer re-
search?
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSUMER
RESEARCH
We suggest that at least three broad types of knowl-
edge can be produced by consumer research. These may
be labeled and briefly described as follows:
Everyday knowledge consists of the shared thoughts peo-
ple have about their own consumer behavior. It is how
they interpret and give social meaning to their behavior
using their own terms and their own frames of reference. constructs of both theories, mineral balance and cog-
Scientific knowledge consists of theories that are capable
of and have been subjected to rigorous empirical testing.
These theories should not be regarded as proven or true;
rather, they have scientific status because of and subject
to attempts to refute them.
Interpretive knowledge uses a system of ideas developed
by a particular group to analyze consumer behavior. It
provides an understanding of behavior in terms of this
system of ideas and from its frame of reference.
*Bobby J. Calder is A. Montgomery Ward Professor of Marketing
and Psychology and Alice M. Tybout is Professor of Marketing, both choanalyst's Freudian account of motivation-is used
at J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern Uni- to provide insight into the eating of dirt. This insight
versity, Evanston, IL 60201.
136
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Each of these distinct types of knowledge has its own
approach to consumer research. Each represents a dif-
ferent path leading to different sorts of knowledge. Be-
fore elaborating on the research methodology implied
by these knowledge types, it may be helpful to illustrate
each type with a simple example.
Suppose a researcher came across some people who
eat large quantities of dirt. These people even sell dirt
to one another. A researcher might well aspire to ev-
eryday knowledge about this consumption, and might
thus ask, What do people think they are doing by buying
and eating dirt? Qualitative research might reveal that
these people believe that the dirt makes them healthier.
They are observed to say to each other, "You are what
you eat, and you must therefore eat basic, natural
things." Eating dirt is thus explained in the people's
own terms and their own frames of reference.
A researcher might alternatively aspire to scientific
knowledge. A physiologist might entertain a theory that
the minerals in the dirt, relative to the people's overall
diet, provide needed nutrition. This theory would be
subjected to empirical testing and either refuted or ac-
cepted pending further testing. Or, a psychologist might
theorize that eating dirt reflects a general principle of,
say, cognitive consistency. If not eating dirt would be
inconsistent with other beliefs that the peoZle hold, then
they will maintain the belief that dirt is healthy in the
absence of any apparent evidence. Such a theory could
also be subjected to empirical testing. Note that the
nitive consistency, are theoretical and not necessarily
accessible to the consumers themselves. Nor are the
constructs "real." They are theoretical concepts that
are accepted subject to subsequent refutation.
A researcher might alternatively aspire to interpretive
knowledge. A historian might look at the habit of eating
dirt as a reflection of practices growing out of food
shortages occurring at an earlier time. Or a psychoan-
alyst might interpret eating dirt as an aggressive impulse.
People say "you are what you eat." But from the his-
torian or psychoanalyst's outside view the people "eat
what they are." The key is that a paiticular set of ideas-
the historian's record of previous practices or the psy-
would not ordinarily be available to the participants
? JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH * Vol. 14 * June 1987
 WHAT CONSUMER
themselves; nor would it necessarily lend itself to sci-
entific empirical testing.
EVERYDAY KNOWLEDGE IMPLIES
QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY
If the researcher's goal is everyday knowledge, then
s/he must focus on the shared thinking of consumers.
Part of any consumer's thinking will be idiosyncratic,
but part also will represent a common way of thinking.
Consumers must after all share a strong reciprocity of
perspectives for consumption to be meaningful to them.
If driving a European car means high status for a group,
the individual must believe not only that the car indi-
cates status but that others will have this perception
too. Above all else, to the members of the group within
which the shared perspective exists, their thinking is
regarded as natural. It is not subject to question. One
simply knows that a car that is European is high-status.
The knowledge the researcher desires is the knowl-
edge consumers in the group naturally have. It is man-
ifested in their social lives-their verbal communication
and their behavior in daily life. To acquire this knowl-
edge, the researcher must be able to participate in the
group to the extent of being able to share their per-
spective. Close observation, and ideally participant ob-
servation, is thus the best method of acquiring everyday
knowledge of consumers. The researcher must be able
to record and document the experience of being a con-
sumer (Calder 1977).
We believe that the most suitable term for such
methodology is "qualitative." This is not to deny that
such research may be "quantified;" rather, the term re-
flects the sort of qualitative knowing being sought. This
may be explicated via a familiar problem in philosophy,
the inverted spectrum. Suppose that the color spectrum
was shifted so that everything that now appears red ap-
peared green and vice versa. Although quantitatively
this changes nothing, there is still the question of
whether red grass is the same as green grass. Qualitative
methodology deals with such questions of experience.
Although qualitative research can be conducted in
different ways, all qualitative methodology, as here de-
fined, is distinguished by the reflexive use of data rather
than the form of the data per se.1 As illustrated in the
Figure, in qualitative research, people's thoughts about
their consumption, manifested verbally or otherwise,
are both the data and the result of research.
'The fact that qualitative understanding is sought does not deny
issues of reliability and validity. The focus group interview, for in-
stance, is often used for qualitative consumer research and many
reliability and validity issues arise with such usage. Nor is the term
qualitative research intended to imply a single procedure for data
collection. Indeed, in addition to focus group interviews, much survey
research work falls within qualitative research as here defined (Calder
1977; Calder 1986).
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RESEARCH IS ... 137
FIGURE
THE ROLE OF DATA FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Qualitative Sophisticated Critical
Methodology Falsificationist Relativistic
Methodology Methodology
a. Everyday b. Scientific c. Interpretive
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge
The type of everyday knowledge that qualitative
methodology yields can obviously be useful. If one were
selling European cars, for example, knowing that the
cars connoted status would have many marketing im-
plications.
It also has been suggested that scientific theories
should be "grounded" in everyday knowledge (e.g.,
Glaser and Strauss 1967). As will be discussed in the
next section, there is certainly no reason that scientific
theories cannot be stimulated by everyday knowledge.
There is, however, real concern that everyday knowl-
edge not masquerade as scientific knowledge. Only
needless confusion results when everyday ideas are
dressed up as higher-order constructs and presented as
scientific without rigorous empirical testing (see Calder
1977). Qualitative research leads to everyday knowl-
edge, and this is in itself a valuable goal.
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IMPLIES
SOPHISTICATED FALSIFICATJONIST
METHODOLOGY
A common view of science is that empirical data are
used to accumulate evidence for a theory until it is
proven. This view of science is, of course, unacceptable.
No amount of empirical observation allows us to induce
a theory. Observation itself presupposes theory, and in-
ductive proof is logically impossible (see Calder, Phil-
lips, and Tybout 1981). Following the major trend in
the philosophy of science, we must view scientific
knowledge as not proven and scientific progress as not
guaranteed.
The key features of scientific knowledge are that there
have been empirical attempts to refute a theory and
that the theory has performed better than any available
competitors. Refutation necessarily comes from em-
pirical data. And the use of data requires consensus
about its interpretation. Because the consensus about
data can be wrong, it follows that scientific progress is
not inevitable; if researchers make mistakes about data,
we will have only the illusion of progress. Nonetheless,
because the process of testing is never-ending, it will
ideally be self-correcting.
 138 THE JOURNAL OF
The view of science we have sketched implies a
methodology of sophisticated falsificationism (SF;
Lakatos 1970; Popper 1959). Researchers may make
some effort to protect a new theory or to reserve judg-
ment because of the possibility of erroneous interpre-
tation of data. Even so, the goal of research is to expose
a theory to possible refutation to give alternative the-
ories a chance.
The specific ideas of Lakatos regarding SF are sum-
marized by Leong (1985). We use the term more gen-
erally, as it has come to cover the explicit admission
that interpretations of data are potentially fallible and
that the use of data necessarily entails some consensus
among researchers. The logic of science, and the pos-
sibility of scientific progress, rests on the implicationis
of empirical data for theory.
Of course, there are many unresolved issues at the
level of actually conducting empirical studies and judg-
ing tests of theory (see Sternthal, Tybout, and Calder
1987 for a related discussion of such issues.) Our con-
cern here, however, is that several researchers have
challenged sophisticated falsificationism as the general
methodology of science.
Both Anderson (1983; 1986) and Peter and Olson
( 1983) have argued that what is called scientific knowl-
edge is the product of a relativistic methodology. Ba-
sically they contend that because falsification depends
on data and consensus about data, which may be fal-
lible, this methodology is untenable. Accordingly, it is
reasoned that SF must be supplanted by a critical rela-
tivistic view in which theories are "scientific" because
a particular group of researchers at a particular point
in time say that they are. Peter and Olson go so far as
to view science as a matter of marketing, of persuading
a group of scientists that a certain conception of con-
sumer behavior should be accepted by them.
We believe that relativism retreats unnecessarily to
the position that scientific knowledge is based not on
empirical testing but on social agreement. Such a view
undermines the concept of science and rests upon a
clear fallacy. The observation that consensus about data
may be erroneous does not imply that it is preferable
to avoid the use of data and instead rely on consensus
per se. We need not give up the primacy of empirical
data in confronting theory and relegate scientists to the
role of theory peddlers. Indeed, SF, as already noted,
does not contend that empirical data will always lead
to scientific progress. Researchers use empirical data
with no guarantees. But confronting theories with data
does hold the logical possibility of scientific progress
(whereas pure consensus-driven theory selection seems
unlikely to produce such a result). Whether progress is
achieved becomes apparent ultimately only with the
application of theory (see Calder et al. 1981).
Moreover, the relativist's escape from data is illusory.
This becomes evident when one asks: If relativism is
true, then what do scientists persuade each other about?
Might they argue about the usefulness of theory as Peter
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CONSUMER RESEARCH
and Olson (1983, p. 121) claim? But isn't usefulness a
form of empirical data?2 And shouldn't, if possible, the
primary issue for consensus have to be empirical data?
Once we recognize that the need for consensus is a
fact but that this is only in the service of using empirical
data, we are right back to sophisticated falsification-
ism-the logic, once again, being that scientific knowl-
edge comes from the confrontation of theory with data,
but is not proven knowledge, and cannot be guaranteed
in advance of actual research work.
INTERPRETIVE KNOWLEDGE
IMPLIES CRITICAL RELATIVISTIC
METHODOLOGY
There is a strong interest among many consumer re-
searchers in encouraging greater diversity among studies
(Belk 1986; Holbrook 1987; Sherry 1986). It is argued
that disciplines such as history, anthropology, popular
culture, and literary criticism should all be represented
in consumer research. We believe that such diversity
is, on the face of it, laudable. There may be a tendency,
however, to see such disciplines as an alternative to em-
pirical science as we have discussed it-or to what Belk
(1986) loosely refers to as logical positivism-and about
this we are less sanguine.
Perhaps the desire to equate interpretive and scientific
knowledge stems from a belief that empirical science
rejects other disciplines and denies their claim to legit-
imacy. This is not the case. As we have argued, scientific
knowledge implies its own methodology. It does not
claim that other methodologies are inherently bad. The
issue should be posed as: What type of knowledge do
these disciplines seek?
We contend that much of the research-from the dis-
ciplines that consumer researchers are now discovering
aspires to interpretive knowledge.3 The hallmark of this
research is the application of a given conceptualization,
or way of viewing, to consumer behavior. The appli-
cation of this conceptualization may be purely logical
or it may involve empirical data. If it involves data,
however, the relationship between the data and the
conceptual argument is not the same as with scientific
knowledge. As illustrated in the Figure, with scientific
knowledge, data are being used to subject theory to pos-
sible refutation. With interpretive knowledge, the con-
ceptual argument is used to give an account of the
data-an effort is made to show that the conceptual-
2That these data might not be optimal for theory testing is a point
further confused by Olson and Peter (1984). For our view of the
difference between theory testing and application, see Calder et al.
(1981).
3It must be recognized that each of the disciplines we refer to is
itself composed of different approaches. Anthropology, for instance,
certainly includes research aimed at everyday knowledge and research
seeking scientific knowledge.
 WHAT CONSUMER
ization fits the data. Because data may be used selec-
tively and multiple interpretations of them may coexist,
there is no intention of comparing interpretations in
order to choose among them.
The interpretive approach takes many forms. For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that semiotics may be used
to interpret consumer behavior. This approach is no-
where more evident than in Holbrook and Grayson's
(1986) interpretation of the consumption behavior de-
picted by actors in the movie Out of Africa. These be-
haviors are viewed as symbolic of the characters' phil-
osophical perspectives and vulnerabilities. For example,
Karen Blixen's attachment to her worldly possessions
is viewed as indicative of a more pervasive desire for
control and ownership. Likewise, the fragility of those
same possessions is seen as conveying the limits on what
one is able to control in life. This article makes pro-
vocative and entertaining reading because the authors
selectively interpret data to make their points. There is
no pretense of searching for refuting evidence or com-
peting explanations for the same data.
The point is not that the search for such interpretive
knowledge conflicts with empirical science, but that it
simply implies its own methodology. That methodology
is critical relativism. In employing this methodology, a
group of researchers sharing a particular conceptual-
ization agrees that an argument based on the concep-
tualization does indeed give additional meaning and
insight into a particular consumer behavior. It is rec-
ognized that this insight is subjective and relative to a
particular time, setting, and group of researchers. The
process by which researchers agree and persuade each
other of an interpretation is of primary rather than sec-
ondary importance. Empirical data do not play a self-
correcting role. Debate concerns reasoned opinions as
to whether the conceptualization yields new under-
standing, and, again, this is relative to the researchers
involved. The immediate goal is support and confir-
mation of the conceptualization. Other conceptualiza-
tions are viewed as providing their own insight and not
as competitors.
Several points related to interpretive knowledge and
critical relativistic methodology must be made. First,
there is no reason that the conceptualizations of inter-
pretative knowledge cannot be submitted to sophisti-
cated falsificationist methodology; they may, in fact, be
a good source of scientifically testable hypotheses. But
unless such testing in fact occurs, such conceptualiza-
tions should not be equated with scientific knowledge.
Critical relativism is not the methodology of scientific
knowledge. Again, however, this does not mean that
interpretive knowledge is of little value in its own right.
Next, it may be that much work now purporting to
be scientific is in fact interpretive. This has, for instance, behavior, but each is distinct, as reflected in the treat-
long been a criticism of psychoanalytic work (Schafer
1976). Freudian ideas are embraced by analysts without
a serious attempt at empirical refutation and are then
used to interpret behavior. Such work is bogus from
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RESEARCH IS - - - 139
the standpoint of scientific knowledge and, to the extent
that it masquerades as scientific, may result in poorer
interpretive knowledge than avowedly relativist re-
search. The consensus of researchers may result more
from dogmatic acceptance than critical debate and
agreement.
Finally, the distinction between everyday knowledge
and interpretive knowledge requires close attention.
Consumers have everyday knowledge but they need not,
indeed typically would not, have access to an interpre-
tivist's view of their world. Conversely, when a re-
searcher imposes an interpretive structure on data, the
resulting knowledge cannot be viewed as everyday.
Thus, several anthropologists have expressed a concern
that much of field research may not yield everyday
knowledge so much as relativistic interpretation by a
particular group of anthropologists (Shweder 1986).
While both types of knowledge are valuable, their dif-
ferences should be recognized and maintained.
Thus, we concur with Holbrook's (1987) view that
the broadening of consumer research to encompass ef-
forts aimed at interpretive knowledge has the potential
to enhance the ways in which we understand consumer
behavior. At the same time, it should be recognized
that the relativist methodology of interpretive knowl-
edge poses a considerable challenge. In an extreme form
it could lead to anarchy. If construed as the "anything
goes" and "why not call it science" of a Feyerabend,
there is little to stop researchers from indulging in any-
thing that suits their fancy in the name of scientific
knowledge. Expressiveness could become the order of
the day. Studies could be valued for their "weirdness"
rather than for the knowledge they yield. Differences
in research methodology could be taken for a matter of
"style" and not for differences in the nature of knowl-
edge they produce. As a consequence, the field could
lose any coherence.
Anarchy and paroxysms of self-expression need not
be consequences of relativistic methodology. It is up to
researchers seeking interpretive knowledge to discipline
their work within a community of scholars. Although
Anderson (1986) provides a conceptual framework for
critical relativism, specific criteria for critical relativism
as a methodology are yet to be presented. These are
sorely needed.
CONCLUSION
It is our view that consumer research is best under-
stood by examining the various types of knowledge it
can provide about consumer behavior. We have iden-
tified three types of knowledge: everyday, scientific, and
interpretive. Each can provide insight into consumers'
ment of data associated with each type's implied meth-
odology. When everyday knowledge is sought, the data
are the end, the goal. When scientific knowledge is
sought, the data are the means of exposing a theory to
 140 THE JOURNAL OF
refutation, of choosing between competing theories.
When interpretive knowledge is sought, the data are
selectively used to build a persuasive argument for the
view being espoused.
We contend that each type of knowledge has value
and may be helpful in solving practical problems. But
only scientific knowledge rests on a methodology that
offers the possibility of scientific progress. It is important
to recognize that unless subjected to the rules of em- Lakatos, Imre (1970), "Falsification and the Methodology of
pirical science, everyday and interpretive knowledge
must stand apart from science, each on its own merits.
[Received February 1987.]
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