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The History of Functional Contextualism

Poster · December 2016

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23324.08329

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 The History of Functional Contextualism
Department of Psychology, Radford University
Abstract
Functional Contextualism is a philosophy underlying a modern third-wave
psychotherapy known as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT).
Functional contextualism has roots in behavioral and contextual sciences,
which are the first and second waves of therapy, respectively. This poster
will describe the philosophies and psychotherapeutic traditions that
contributed to functional contextualism and the creation of ACT.
Specifically, the roots of behaviorism as well as pragmatism, which
contributed to contextualism, will be introduced. Finally, future research
directions of functional contextualism will be discussed.
Introduction to Functional Contextualism
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999) is an empirically supported treatment that plays an integral role as
one of the modern “third-wave” psychotherapies. Third-wave
psychotherapies combine traditional behavioral (i.e., classical and operant
conditioning; “first-wave”) and cognitive (i.e., information processing;
“second-wave”) approaches to alleviate psychological symptoms and
improve overall functioning. These approaches place emphasis on the
context and function of psychological processes as opposed to their form
and, as such, tend to incorporate contextual and experiential change
strategies in addition to traditional strategies, which are more direct and
didactic (Hayes, 2004). ACT conceptualizes psychological problems as
rooted in six core processes that depict both the interface between human
language and cognition and the control of human behavior by direct
experience (Hayes et al., 2006). Thus, ACT interventions target each of
these core processes with the general goal of increasing psychological
flexibility, or the ability to fully embrace thoughts, feelings and experiences
in the present moment without avoidance and persisting in or altering
behavior to be consistent with goals and values (Hayes, Luoma, Bond,
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).
ACT is particularly unique among the mindfulness-based interventions
(i.e., the treatment approaches of which third-wave psychotherapies are
comprised) as it is not simply a set of techniques. Rather, ACT is grounded
in a theory called relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001), a post-Skinnerian account of language and cognition, and
the pragmatic philosophy of functional contextualism (Hayes et al., 2006).
Functional contextualism is “a specific variety of contextualism that has as
its goal the prediction and influence of events, with precision, scope and
depth” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 5). Its core components include “(a) focus on
the whole event, (b) sensitivity to the role of context in understanding the
nature and function of an event, (c) emphasis on a pragmatic truth
criterion, and (d) specific scientific goals against which to apply that truth
criterion” (Hayes, 2004, p. 646). The purpose of this review is to describe
the philosophies and psychotherapeutic traditions that contributed to
functional contextualism and thus the creation of ACT. Since ACT is linked
to philosophies of both radical behaviorism and a variant of pragmatism
(i.e., specifically functional contextualism), these two underpinnings of
ACT will be introduced.
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Lara A. Barbir & Alissa L. Goldstein
Philosophy of Radical Behaviorism
Both ACT and RFT were developed out of behavioral analysis, which is
rooted in Skinner’s philosophy of radical behaviorism. Behaviorism was
founded in the early 1900s by psychologist John B. Watson, who
conducted animal psychology research and rejected earlier notions of a
“mind” being relevant to psychology (Heidbreder, 1933). For Watson,
the mind represented something metaphysical, which interfered with
behaviorism’s role in equating psychology to other natural sciences:
“*psychology+ must become materialistic, mechanistic, deterministic,
objective” (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 235). As such, he argued that to
understand psychology as a science meant to systematically study
behavior, particularly by way of conditioning methods (Heidbreder,
1933). Watson asserted that the process of conditioning is not only a
way of studying behavior but is the explanation for behavior, starting
from birth of the organism.
Watson’s explicit focus on observable behavior insinuated that it was
irrelevant to study thoughts, emotions, and other private events, and
thus clinical interventions involved directly targeting (observable)
behavior. Skinner’s radical behaviorism disagreed with this claim,
arguing that the environment not only controls observable behaviors
but also controls internal processes within the organism, including
thinking and feeling, and these internal processes are able to be
empirically studied (Skinner, 1945). However, Skinner believed that
thoughts and feelings were just more behavior to explain (i.e., hence
the term “radical” to suggest that everything an organism does is
behavior) and thus were not needed to understand observable
behavior: “Language and cognition was conceived of as simple operant
behavior and as such it added nothing fundamentally new to the
contingency stream surrounding other behaviors” (Hayes, 2004, p.
642). Radical behaviorism is said to overlap considerably with other
philosophical traditions, particularly one in which functional
contextualism is also rooted: pragmatism (Moxley, 2004).
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Philosophy of Pragmatism
The philosophy of pragmatism originated from Charles Sanders Peirce,
who evaluated beliefs on whether they were verifiable (Green, 2009).
Later pragmatists, such as William James, did not hold Peirce’s view that
truth was absolute (Peirce, 1908). Instead, the latter philosophers
emphasized that truth cannot be understood without context. James
explained that things that are useful in the short-term are not necessarily
true (as cited in Heidbreder, 1933). Pragmatists believe that knowledge is
inferred based on the function of beliefs, and that the world can be
conceptualized in different ways. Rather than attempting to make
objective descriptions of reality, pragmatists attempt to predict or explain
observable circumstances. According to pragmatists, the importance of an
idea cannot be determined without considering the usefulness of the idea
(Heidbreder, 1933). Thoughts that may be common and useful for one
person may have no utility for another. James believed that introspection
was possible as a way to observe one’s own thoughts (Heidbreder, 1933).
Similar to FC, James noted that the language we possess influences the
way we interpret consciousness (Heidbreder, 1933). James’ pragmatism
also has similarities with FC in its interpretation of the self. In both
philosophies, there exists a self that consciously thinks and is not an object
of the thought, having a constant “feeling of ownership from one moment
to the next” (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 180). Functional contextualism expands
on pragmatism in seeking to predict or affect the outcomes of behavioral
conditioning in specific contexts (Hayes et al., 2013).
Future Directions
The philosophies of psychotherapies have long focused on symptom
reduction (Batten, 2011). However, practitioners practicing from a
philosophy of functional contextualism often focus on producing outcomes
that are important to the individual receiving treatment. For instance,
psychologists providing therapy to individuals with substance use disorder
may only discuss reduction of substances in the context of serving the
client’s overall values (Batten, 2011). Future mental health paradigms
might continue to explore the impact of philosophical approaches designed
to meet clients’ contextual needs, rather than achieving subclinical levels of
psychological disorders.
References
Batten, S. (2011). Essentials of acceptance and commitment therapy. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Green, C. D. (2009). Darwinian theory, functionalism, and the first American psychological revolution. American
Psychologist, 64(2), 75-83.
Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavioral and
cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35(4), 639-665.
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (Eds.). (2001). Relational frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of
human language and cognition. New York: Plenum Press.
Hayes, S. C., Levin, M. E., Plumb-Vilardaga, J., Villatte, J. L., & Pistorello, J. (2013). Acceptance and commitment therapy
and contextual behavioral science: Examining the progress of a distinctive model of behavioral and cognitive
therapy. Behavior therapy, 44(2), 180-198.
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and commitment therapy: Model,
processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(1), 1-25.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy: An experiential approach to
behavior change. New York: The Guilford Press.
Heidbreder, E. (1933). Seven psychologies. London: Century.
Moxley, R. A. (2004). Pragmatic selectionism: The philosophy of behavior analysis. The Behavior Analyst Today, 5(1),
108-125.
Peirce, C. S. (1908). A neglected argument for the reality of God. Hibbert Journal, 7, 90-112.
Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review, 52(5), 270-277.