The Politics and Philosophy of Nationalism

Lecture 6

National Solidarity

What is solidarity?

Solidarity could exist both ‘with’ and ‘among’ people. The former is not necessarily reciprocal, but
the latter is. This is the kind of solidarity that is relevant to nationalism. It is that kind of solidarity
which encourages people to display partiality towards their co-nationals, provided that it is the case
that partiality should be shown to co-nationals.

Some theorists divide solidarity into three different types:

 Civic: being tolerant and non-prejudicial

 Democratic: commitment to upholding democracy, to collective responsibility, and to equal
political rights
 Economic: support for redistribution and the provision of public goods

Against solidarity

Jacob Levy argues that national solidarity is impossible. This, he says, is primarily for three reasons.
For one, solidarity requires mutual identification among co-nationals. He says that this position is
impossible to justify, because any such identification is exclusionary and irrational – it is based on
artificial construction. Secondly, he argues that the creation of a mutual identity requires policing,
which undermines the inclusive politics that was desirable in the first place. It also potentially places
outsiders outside the realm of justice, which could be problematic for rights. Thirdly, he argues that
it is unnecessary. He argues that the regulation of disagreement produced by pluralist democracy
produces a remarkable degree of stability that does not require any notion of mutual connection.

Addressing the objections

To the first point, every social identity is to some extent based on artificial construction. They have
to be, because they have to account for the internal diversity of the group around which they are
created. The construction of such an identity is probably more attractive than trying to go through
life with the knowledge that you are truly connected to no one.

To the second, the policing of identity is not always problematic. How problematic it is depends on
the content of the identity, the context in which it arises, and how the policing occurs. No policing at
all would be irresponsible, as it would legitimise all sorts of unjustifiably harmful identities.

To the third, this only works when parties respect the rules of democracy, and when minorities judge
their interests to be better promoted via the status quo. Especially today, this does not necessarily
hold all the time.

Sources of solidarity

One view of solidarity says that it arises between people who agree on a set of a basic political
values. This means that anyone, anywhere, who shares these values, should feel solidarity toward
one another. Evidently, this is not true – solidarity is still bounded, even if people do share a base set
of values. One could respond to this by saying that, where values are shared, those who share them
have a collective responsibility to try to implement them, which thus provides a sense of solidarity.
This, though, begs the question. There must be something else that enables the maintenance of the
necessary attitudes for solidarity.
The Politics and Philosophy of Nationalism
Lecture 6

Another view says that solidarity comes from the active participation by people in a specific set of
democratic procedures which entrenches political values, but which also has a particular history and
mode of operation. One objection to this is that political participation is often antagonistic, and
serves to divide people more than bring them together. To respond to this, one could say that even
this requires some kind of collective thinking, as it fosters a shared political culture and history.

Another objection is that not enough people are politically involved for this to be important. One
could respond to this by saying that political participation should be encouraged, as it brings people
closer together. To respond to this, once could concede, but argue that this is incredibly difficult and
requires participants to already be committed to some basic values.

The final view of solidarity comes from nationalism itself. One might argue that solidarity arises
between people who share a political or cultural or ethnic identity. This presents an immediate
dilemma – how do you construct a national identity that is neither too thin as to be unable to
motivate solidarity, nor too thick as to be too exclusive? One might argue that thicker forms of
nationalism open up multiple routes to inclusion, but this difficulty is genuine.

Another dilemma comes from the inherent differences between nations. Solidarity-inducing
conditions in one country may undermine solidarity in another. This is probably fine, though, as long
as a pragmatic approach is taken.