Hossein, R - Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in The Middle East - 1990

Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East
Author(s): G. Hossein Razi

Source: The American Political Science Review , Mar., 1990, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Mar., 1990),
pp. 69-91
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963630
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LEGITIMACY, RELIGION,
AND NATIONALISM IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
G. HOSSEIN RAZI
University of Houston
he significance of legitimacy to regime maintenance has been m

neglected in recent investigations of the Third World, particularly by behavior
rational choice theorists. I define legitimacy, discuss factors that may have con
to this neglect, and explore the significance of nationalism and religion as majo
of legitimacy in the Middle East. Both a misunderstanding of the role of highe
and rationality in individuals' relationship to social systems and a faulty pro
applied to the mainsprings of behavior in other cultures have distorted the percept
a number of Western analysts. The relationship between religion and nation
complex. Contrary to the common assumption in the West, Islam in general
erated fairly sophisticated constitutional theories. Islamic fundamentalism in p
has been a major source of innovation and adaptation-as well as of spiritual gr
tion-for the Muslim masses.
V\estern and 1966, 246), Huntington (1968, 265-73)

Marxist analysts of the politics of the
and Johnson (1982, 182) consider a lessen-
Third World have been primarily con- ing of distance between classes and rapid
cerned with economic development, theeconomic development-because they
organized instruments of physical force, create a crisis of the public (old) order-as
bureaucracies, class structures, and sources of instability that contribute to
foreign policy. While these are no doubt revolutions. An interesting hypothesis by
significant and their investigation has sub- Davies (1971) proposes that the optimum
stantially contributed to our understand- condition for social unrest exists when a
ing of the political phenomenon, they are sustained period of improvement in
not sufficient for explaining the level of material conditions is followed by a sud-
political stability because they do not pro- den and sharp reversal. He refers to the
vide adequate insight into why people are role of expectations in the minds of the
willing to sacrifice their lives and their people but does not relate such expecta-
material possessions for or against a tions to legitimacy. Obviously, sharp
regime. Even such propositions as in- reversals do not always result in a revolu-
equality or lack of liberties do not seem tion, as a comparison of the political con-
adequate by themselves. Many systems sequences of the depression of the 1930s in
have had a great deal of poverty, inequal- the United States and those of the consid-
ity, and repression for long periods with- erably less severe economic conditions of
out any revolution (Brinton 1965, 32-33; the last years of the Shah's regime in Iran
Tocqueville 1955, 176-77). In fact, Brin- dearly demonstrates.
ton (1965, 6546), Durkheim ([19511 I propose that the significant missing in-
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 84 NO. 1 MARCH 1990

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American Political Science Review Vol. 84
gredient in most studies of the politics of tion perceives that the regime is behaving"
the Third World has been an adequate ap- according to, or violating, the above
preciation of the role of legitimacy, pri- norms (Razi 1987, 461-62). As Rustow
marily a psychological-moral phenome- notes in the case of charismatic legitima-
non. The presentation will proceed tion, "a leader's charisma is in the minds
through two steps. The first will offerof a the followers" (1970a, 16). It is thus the
definition of legitimacy and analyze fac- people's "positive or negative judgment of
tors that may have contributed to its what is perceived" about the behavior of
deemphasis or neglect, particularly the regime that must be investigated to
among the behavioral and rational choice know the level of legitimacy (Eckstein and
analysts; and the second will investigate Gurr 1975, 197).2 Furthermore, most of
religion and nationalism in the Middle the norm clusters that have formed the
East in order to demonstrate the signifi- bases for various crises of the Third
cance of legitimacy for regime mainten- World (e.g., Binder et al. 1971) are parts
ance. of legitimacy values, although their disag-
gregation for the purpose of analysis is an
entirely reasonable intellectual enterprise.
Values and Legitimacy: The In other words, when the articulate mem-
Incongruities of Individual and bers of a population are by and large
Collective Rationality satisfied with the government's actions in
the areas of identity, participation, distri-
The term legitimacy has been used in bution, equality, and sovereignty accord-
two different but related ways. The first ing to the norms they believe in (not nec-
refers to a set of norms and values relating essarily those of the Western or Marxist
to politics that are sufficiently shared to regimes), there is no crisis of legitimacy.
make a political system possible. These Consequently, the significant issue is
norms constitute a major component of not so much the existence of inequalities,
what is sometime referred to as "the moral restraints on individual freedoms, and the
basis of authority" (Dekmejian 1985a), a use of force (from which no political sys-
"political culture" (Pye and Verba 1965; tem can escape completely) or even the
Wildavsky 1987), or "a legitimacy style" level of political participation (which
(Binder 1962) and are acquired mainly varies considerably among stable as well
through the mechanisms of socialization. as unstable political systems) as it is
They deal with such matters as the pri- whether the degree to which these features
mary purposes of the government; the exist is considered just or unjust in terms
rights and obligations of the government of the shared values. The propositions
and the governed; and the methods of of relative deprivation (particularly the
selection, change, and accountability of more promising variants of Galtung 1964
the governing personnel. The first task of and Gurr 1970), inadequate participation
research is to find out the content and (e.g., Green 1982, 1984; Nie and Verba
sources of these values in every political 1975), and inequality (e.g., Jabbari 1981;
system, particularly since "institutionali- Muller and Seligson 1987) as causes of in-
zation"-considered essential to political stability and revolution thus become
stability-(e.g., Huntington 1968), is not more relevant and meaningful when
possible in the absence of shared values., placed within this framework. As Brinton
The second meaning, more appropri- noted in 1938, "Revolutions cannot do
ately corresponding to the common usage without the word 'justice' and the senti-
of legitimacy, "refers to the extent to ment it arouses" (1965, 35, 65-66); and
which the relevant portion of the popula- Deutsch stated, "People feel that govern-
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Legitimacy in the Middle East
ment is just or unjust, legitimate or illegi-We've got more men, more money and
timate, not only by how it came to power, more material. There are ten million men
but also-and mainly-by what it does. If in uniform getting killed and a lot more
its actions and omissions violate their are making money and having fun. Let
basic values, they may conclude, as Saintsomebody else get killed.' Major Major
Augustine did in The City of God, that 'a replies, 'But suppose everybody on our
government without justice is a great rob-side felt that way.' Yossarian's answer is
bery' " (1980, 15). Rustow has developed devastatingly to the point: 'Then I'd cer-
the idea further and related it to regime tainly be a damn fool to feel any other
maintenance by proposing the formula way. Wouldn't I?'" (Russett and Starr
political stability = legitimacy of institu- 1985, 507; Heller 1961, 107). In other
tions + personal legitimacy of rulers words, if everyone takes care of his or her
(1967, 157). own interest, the interest of all will not be
Why is it, then, that in spite of its sig- necessarily taken care of. Adam Smith's
nificance to stability-particularly in the natural identity of interest is a chimera,
Third World (Bendix 1978; Binder 1962, particularly in politics.3 This problem is
1971; Hudson 1977; McLellan 1983; Pye usually referred to by the economically
1971)-legitimacy has received so little at- oriented political scientists-who have lit-
tention (see el-Fathaly and Palmer 1980 tle concern with either psychology or the
for an exception) in the behavioral and ra- role of morality-as the "free rider"
tional choice studies of the politics of that dilemma in securing "collective goods." It
region? Pye, who aptly notes the particu- has been fully illustrated by the "tragedy
lar suitability of behavioral studies for "il- of the commons" (Hardin 1968; Pirages
luminating the mystique of legitimacy and and Ehrlich 1974) as well as Rousseau's
the dynamics of authority," considers "stag hunt" and the prisoner's dilemma
their emphasis on microlevel analysis as (Jervis 1978; Snyder 1971). The solution
part of the explanation (1971, 144). The to this tragedy is at least partly provided
following eight factors also seem relevant. by norms and metanorms (Axelrod 1986).
First, a serious problem has emerged Consequently, more emphasis needs to be
from inadequate appreciation of the sig- placed on the functions of such norms and
nificance of higher values to resolving a mechanisms and the processes by which
universal problem for the collectivities, they are internalized and in most cases
namely, the incongruities between the ra- voluntarily obeyed.4
tional search for individual or subunit in- Second, there has been an insufficient
terests on the one hand and ensuring the grasp of the difference between the nature
interests and indeed the survival of the and sources of legitimacy and those of
collectivity on the other. Clearly, the performance (i.e., the production of
higher values are not necessarily rational goods and services and generation of
or functional at the individual level. It is, organized instruments of physical com-
for example, rational for an individual pulsion). Performance factors and their
not to vote at all and to cheat in every in- agents-bureaucracies and technology-
stance he or she can. But if every one be- can obviously be evaluated and improved
comes "rational" in this individual sense, in efficiency by universal rational stan-
the system will collapse. As Russett and dards (within the limits of our existing
Starr note, Yossarian of Heller's Catch-22 level of knowledge), provided there is an
is perfectly rational when he refuses to fly agreement on goals or at least on the ulti-
bombing missions in World War II and mate values justifying the chain of ends-
responds to the suggestion that his coun- means relationships of which the given
try might lost as a result, 'We won't lose. goal is a part. In contrast, the norms of
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legitimacy "are arational and the product not be able to survive and perform as they
of history, tradition and ideologies. They aspire to do.
are sociologically primordial, psycho- Third, the previous problems have been
logically superego related, morally sacred exacerbated by the lack of explicit distinc-
(in contrast to secular interest calcula- tion in the usage of the terms interest and
tions), and operationally inculcated value, particularly since Lasswell 1959.
through political socialization (citizenship Rather, they have been used interchange-
training)" (Razi 1987, 463). People do not ably to refer to material interests and the
as a rule give their lives-let alone their search for power as well as those sacred
material possessions-for a few dollars and superego norms whose function is to
more or (as the realists would have us regulate the gratification of material inter-
believe) for establishing their selfish ests and the behavior of the governing
power over yet another. Perhaps some in-personnel.
dividuals do so, and they project that the Fourth, the previous problems have in
rest of the world is as they are. Without turn interacted with the lack of sufficient
life, however, such matters would have attention to the interdependence of per-
little significance to even minimally "ra-formance and legitimacy. It is clear that
tional" individuals. Whether a U.S. the more legitimate a government, the
soldier, a Japanese kamikaze, or an Ira-more likely its decisions will be imple-
nian youth clearing the minefields by mented voluntarily. Conversely, lack of
committing martyrdom-a person as a legitimacy implies resistance and obstruc-
rule sacrifices life voluntarily for cher- tionism on the part of the people and, if
ished beliefs and values. In other words, present on a large scale, is likely to result
"rationality itself must rest on a ground of in massive challenges to the very survival
values which it can neither produce nor of a regime in order to remedy perceived
discover on its own" (Binder 1971, 40). A injustices. Failure in performance is also
misunderstanding of this phenomenon likely to affect the legitimacy of the
has led to an underemphasis on the role of leaders as the difficulties of the regime of
beliefs and values not only in the concep- Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini in the
tualizations of the behaviorally oriented areas of economics, technology and
and "rational choice" students of compar- foreign policy indicate. Success in per-
ative politics and international relations formance areas, however, does not neces-
in the West but also among political scien- sarily result in an increase in legitimacy,
tists of Marxist persuasion. It has also as the cases of Muhammad Reza Shah in
caused such analysts as Habermas to try Iran, the governing elite in South Korea,
to rationalize the bases of legitimacy on and the royal House in Saudi Arabia
the ground that "every effective belief in demonstrate (see Binder 1962, and Razi
legitimacy is assumed to have an imma- 1981a, 1981b, 1987 on Iran; Hudson 1977
nent relation to the truth .., that can be on Arab states; see also el-Fathaly and
tested and criticized" (1968, 292). In Palmer 1980 on Libya). This is why
Foucault's Nietzschean orientation, the Verba, an exception among behaviorally
misunderstanding results in nihilism. He oriented students of politics, has not only
argues that "for modem thought, no considered the role of legitimacy in his
morality is possible. . . Sade, Nietzsche, studies of Western democracies (e.g., Al-
Artaud, and Bataille have understood this mond and Verba 1963) but has also noted
on behalf of all who tried to ignore it" that the simultaneous existence of a prob-
(1970, 328). The problem is that without lem in legitimacy and a problem in per-
morality, there is no society; and without formance "characterizes most of the
the latter, even Sade and Foucault would 'crises' " of the Third World: "'Successful
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performance in any of the other areas behavior (for synopses, see Harvey and
depends on the legitimacy of the govern-Weary 1984; Kelly and Michela 1980;
ment, and the legitimacy of the govern-Perlmuter and Monty 1979; for empirical
ment depends to some extent upon its per- verification in political science, see, e.g.,
formance in other areas" (Verba 1971, Heradstveit 1979; Jervis 1968, 1976).6
315-16; emphasis added). In fact, Jervis has concluded that beliefs
Fifth, the legacies of Karl Marx and, to are both "necessary and dangerous"-
a lesser extent, of Max Weber have also necessary to the formation of explanatory
exacerbated the previous problems. For theories and dangerous because they tend
Marx morality and legitimacy are simplyto lead scholars and decision makers "to
the product of the economically dominant err by being too wedded to the established
class and its political agent, the state view and too closed to new information"
(Dahrendorf 1959, 14). As parts of the (1968, 459).
superstructure, they are not meaningful Seventh, Western political systems and
variables (for a critique of later Marxist their social and intellectual bases are on
theories, see Binder 1986). Even Weber's the whole more oriented toward rational-
pioneering works do not clearly posit ity and appreciation of performance fac-
force and legitimacy as two interdepen- tors than are those of the Third World.
dent variables at a given time. Instead, Consequently, skewed explanations based
they are primarily concerned with differ- on projection have at times been the
ent modes of legitimation (Weber 1948, result. Furthermore, while there is
1954; for refinement of Weber's typol- nothing wrong on a theoretical basis with
ogies, see Rustow 1967, 149-69; 1970a, such assumptions of rational choice
15-20). Weber's conceptualization of the theorists as "equal rationality" of all ac-
state as "the sole source of the 'right' to tors (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Riker and
use violence" (1948, 78) and "a human Ordeshook 1973; Zagare 1984), reflected
community that (successfully) claims the in the "if-they-can-figure-it-so-can-I-and-
monopoly of the legitimate use of vice-versa" syndrome, or voters who
physical force" (1954, 324-28) led Bendix assign particular utility percentages to dif-
to conclude that "Weber did not use ferent candidates on the basis of salient
authority as a separate technical term, butissues (Downs 1957), serious problems
appeared to think of it as a synonym for emerge when one becomes interested in
'domination' " (1960, 296; on coercion the empirical world. Substantial evidence
and values, see Johnson 1982, 16-40; Par- for variance in rationality has been pro-
sons 1964).5 vided for some time by psychological
Sixth, there has been some failure in studies of politics, buttressed by such
recognizing the significance of beliefs and diverse recent works as Quattrone and
higher values to the actual operation of Tversky 1988 on political candidates and
rationality itself. This has been the case referendum issues in the United States
despite substantial literature on the logic (which demonstrates the inadequacy of
of inquiry (e.g., Lakatos 1973; Kuhn rational choice assumptions) and Razi
1962), on paradigm incommensurability 1988 on the war between Iran and Iraq
(Alker and Biersteker 1984), and on (which suggests that what passes as the
cognitive theory, particularly in percep- "rational choice" may be the North Amer-
tion and attribution research, which ican, or "my rationality," theory). Lest
demonstrates the effects of beliefs, moti- analysts totally dismiss the role of myths
vation, and information not only on each and become too convinced of the perva-
other but also on perceived causes and, siveness of rationality in the U.S. system,
consequently, on expectation and it may be useful to refer not only to recent
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election campaigns and their results but and cultures of the Third World, the diffi-
also to the immense influence of such indi- culties of finding access and carrying on
viduals as the Reverend Josiah Strong, in-depth interviews, and the years of in-
who maintained in 1855 that the United vestment in time and resources required
States represented "the purest form of have resulted-when added to the con-
Christianity" and possessed "peculiarly ceptual problems-in apprehension
aggressive traits calculated to impress its among Western analysts about dealing
institutions upon mankind"; President with legitimacy and have argued per-
McKinley, who stated that his divine in- suasively in favor of economic factors and
structions included a specific directive instruments of coercion (where relevant
from the Lord to take over the Philippines numbers are more readily available) and
in order "to educate the Filipinos, and up- of guessing other peoples' behavior on the
lift and civilize and Christianize them" basis of projection, at times from thou-
(Rainey 1975, 31); and President Ronald sands of miles away.
Reagan, who exclaimed in 1982 "that this To improve our understanding of the
anointed land was set apart in an uncom- politics of the Third World, and indeed
mon way, that a divine plan placed this even of the First and the Second, how-
great continent here between the oceans ever, it is necessary to supplement the
to be found by people from every corner already-impressive accomplishments of
of earth who had a special love of faith Western scholars and analysts by under-
and freedom" (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987, taking further investigation of the clearly
575). This melange of nationalism and more difficult phenomenon of legitimacy.
religion has found even a more unusualWithout such investigation, it would be
expression in President Theodore Roose-difficult to understand fully the instability
velt's "peace of righteousness," which of such regimes as those of the shah in
divides the world into civilized states Iran, Chung Doo-hwan in South Korea,
(centered around a "virile" America) and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and
barbarous states (with which wars were Chiang Kai-shek in China or the inability
"'most regrettable but necessary interna- of superior economic and military
tional police duty which must be per- resources of the United States and the
formed for the sake of the welfare of man- Soviet Union to achieve their objectives in
kind") (Rainey 1975, 35-36). The mode of Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. In
reasoning is not substantially different fact, the issue of "resolve," which is usual-
from the seventh-century Islamic division ly offered as a post facto explanation for
of the world into dar al-Islam ("the realm such inability (Razi 1985, 53), and "will-
of Islam") and dar al-harb ("the realm of ingness to suffer" (Rosen 1972) also re-
war"), although no Muslim head of state quires an understanding of the role of
in modern times, including the Ayatollah legitimacy (Azar and Moon 1988). Even
Khomeini, has gone so far as Theodore such issues as the United States' ability to
Roosevelt, who also maintained that a compete with Japan and West Germany in
"just war is in the long run far better for a the international market or the creation of
nation's soul than the most prosperous a more orderly and less violence-prone in-
peace obtained by acquiescence in wrong ternational environment are unlikely to
or injustice" (Rainey 1975, 36). be satisfactorily addressed without some
Finally, methodological and operation- attention to the role of the appropriate
al problems have also led to the scarcity values. As Chalmers Johnson has pro-
of behavioral and rational choice studies posed, "the homeostatic capacities of a
of legitimacy in the Third World. Lack of system will be determined by value shar-
adequate familiarity with the languages ing and by the potency of these values
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with respect to a given environment" hand, some ethnic Kurds in Iraq, Turkey,
(1982, 55-56).7 To encourage more atten- and Iran seem to be in the process of
tion to this subject, particularly among forming Kurdish nationalist loyalties, as
students of the Third World, and to facili- did many ethnic groups in the Ottoman
tate its more systematic studies in the empire during the nineteenth and twenti-
future, I offer a preliminary investigation eth centuries.9
of the sources of legitimacy norms and The three great monotheistic religions
values in the Middle East. of the world-Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam-as well as dualistic Zoroastrian-
ism, originated in the Middle East and
Religion and Nationalism as continue to shape its prevailing norms
Sources of Legitimacy and values. There are Christian minorities
in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other
The primary sources of legitimacy countries at present; and Judaism has
norms in the Middle East are traditional been a major factor in the formation of
religions and nationalism. There are, of Israel's political culture. But Islam retains
course, other sources, for instance, liberal its overwhelming predominance. Literally
democracy-constitutionalism; socialism; tons of writings on Islam have been avail-
and Marxism in Soviet, Chinese, and able for a long time in the Middle East and
native varieties-but they are at best the West, which in the larger sense in-
secondary. Religion and nationalism are cludes the USSR and its allies. In view of
also the sources of macroloyalty because the fact that one in every five inhabitants
they generate the widest bonds of com- of our planet is Muslim, recent resurgence
monly held values in the region. By con- of Islamic symbols and behavior on a
trast, the family, clan, section, group, large scale in the Middle East and the fall
association, and occupation constitute of the Shah's regime and establishment of
sources of microloyalty, which in the the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979 have
absence of shared religious or nationalist rekindled Western concern and apprehen-
values may generate destructive discord sion and generated rather rapidly a new
and conflict. The issues of class and eth- corpus of literature under the rubric of
nicity deserve a brief mention. While the "Islamic fundamentalism."''0 While treat-
use of class as a conceptual category has ing this literature and the fine points of
an illustrious intellectual tradition, one Islamic jurisprudence are beyond the
needs to be careful not to engage in reifi- scope of this paper, six points are germane
cation without adequate evidence of rele- to its focus.
vant syntality, particularly in view of the First, Islam has influenced political atti-
influence of the assumptions of Marx and tudes on such matters as collective iden-
Engels. All available evidence on the tity, the concept of justice, the nature of
Third World so far indicates that class af- the legitimate political system, the rights
finity is far weaker as a source of cohesion and obligations of ruler and ruled, and the
and commitment than are religion and na-kind of characteristics decision makers
tionalism.8 Ethnicity, on the other hand, should possess. It has a wider and deeper
can move in either direction. It may domain than nationalism, particularly
become converted to nationalism, but this among the lower and lower middle strata,
is by no means automatic. The ethnic which constitute the overwhelming ma-
Poles and Italians in the United States are jority of the population. Even among the
ardent U.S. nationalists, just as the ethnic more or less Westernized segments, who
Qashqa'i and Azerbaijani Turks are ar- have readily accepted a number of West-
dent Iranian nationalists. On the other ern innovations in the areas of technol-
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ogy, bureaucracy, military organizations, and is entitled only to its share of loyalty
communication and transportation, and no more, even when political author-
resistance and rebellion have not been ity is perceived as legitimate-whereas,
rare when it comes to accepting Western among the Muslims a legitimate political
ideas and behavioral patterns that were ruler is more likely to evoke total devo-
perceived as alien to the core of Islamic tion and supreme sacrifice, since the
culture (see Razi 1981b). In general, bor- source for authority is God. By the same
rowing in the sphere of performance, be-token, a Muslim has a greater obligation
ing more readily subject to universal ra- to disobey and revolt against illegitimate
tional criteria, has encountered consider- rulers and institutions, particularly when
ably less resistance than borrowing in thea legitimate alternative is available and
sphere of values. This is clearly demon- the Islamic society is not threatened by
strated by the wide adoption of tele- prospects of long-term disorder and civil
phones, automobiles, commercial jets and strife.11
even computers in contrast to the persist- Third, the nature of religious legitimacy
ence of traditional Muslim attitudes con- has implied the recurrence of divergence
cerning the status of women, the expecta- between what Dekmejian (1985a) and
tion of piety in political leaders, and the Lewis (1985) characterize as "establish-
family's duty to care for the aged. A simi- ment Islam" on the one hand and "popu-
lar contrast would be characteristic of a lar Islam" on the other (Bill 1984 uses
number of Israeli Jews. "populist Islam"). In an Islamic society,
Second, Islam created a religion and a political leaders have generally found it
state at the same time. Its constitutional wise to profess and sponsor religion
theory stands in sharp contrast to that of regardless of the depth of their own belief
Christianity, which is represented by the and commitment. When the establish-
doctrine of the two swords. The separa- ment version diverges from popular
tion of the spiritual and temporal realms, Islam, there is great potential for insta-
propounded by Saint Augustine and Saint bility and revolution as well as the emer-
Thomas Aquinas, simply provides further gence of such leaders as the Mahdi in the
explication of the Bible's "Render unto Sudan, Hassan al-Banna in Egypt and the
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Western im-
unto God the things that are God's." The perialism, materialism, and secular ways
many centuries of multiple loyalties and have thus been detrimental to many exist-
obligations in Western Christendom pro- ing regimes, particularly when such
vided for a different psychological-moral regimes could not successfully legitimize
orientation to politics and socialized the themselves on the basis of nationalism
individual to the ability to adjust to the either. Consequently, nativistic religious
changing requirements of various roles in, movements that have sought to end the
for example, family, political party, direct and indirect alien sway over the
church, and business or profession. The lands of Islam and to return to an earlier
required adjustment to various roles has, ideal and idealized set of attitudes and in-
of course, not been without its own crea- stitutions have elicited wide emotional
tion of aliention and moral problems. By support since long before the Iranian
integrating political and religious obliga- revolution (see Dekmejian 1980, 1-3;
tions, however, the Islamic culture has 1985a, 9-19 and chaps. 6-10). Of course,
provided less incentive and opportunity when the establishment and popular ver-
for such socialization. Furthermore, these sions converge into one in the eyes of the
differences have meant that political obli- believers, great devotion to the state is the
gation covers a limited realm in the West likely outcome, as the regime of Kho-
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meini, particularly in its first few years, tween Caliph Ali, the cousin and son-in-
has amply demonstrated. law of the Prophet Muhammad and the
Fourth, Islam has not been either com- first imam of the Shiites, and Muawiyya,
pletely monolithic or rigid and static. It the rebellious governor of Syria and
has had different sects and variations in a founder of the Umayyad Dynasty (A.D.
number of religious practices and institu- 661-749), and the failure of subsequent
tions (see al-Baghdadi 1919, 1935; al- attempts at arbitration. The three lines
Shahrastani 1842-46). Rodinson (1978) depart from the constitutional positions
provides sufficient evidence to demon- assumed by the Sunnis (traditionalists),
strate that contrary to the prevailing im-the Kharijutes (seceders, foreigners), and
pression in the West, Islam was not an im- the Shiites (partisans) during the first civil
pediment to capitalism or socialism (and war. The premise that in a state founded
has in fact displayed a good deal of dyna-on religion the rulers should be religious
mism in the area of economics) any morecharacters has led the Sunnis to the glori-
than the existence of traditional rituals fication of the first four caliphs. In order
and religious attitudes among the Jews into reconcile their religious ideals with the
general served as a major impediment to cruel facts of their historical experience,
the emergence of sophisticated commer- some Sunni ulema (religious scholars)
cial and entrepreneurial enterprises or im- have since upheld the duty to obey politi-
pressive scholarship, despite the adversitycal rulers as long as they profess Islam and
of the Diaspora. In fact, the Renaissance, manage to maintain order, a ruling that
the Enlightenment, and the Industrial formed the genesis of "establishment
Revolution in the West owe their intellec- Islam." The resulting identification of the
tual origins and a good deal of their initial ulema with the rulers, exacerbated by
impetus to the works of the Muslims of their lack of independent sources of in-
the medieval period on mathematics, phi- come, accounts for the fact that Sunni
losophy, chemistry, physics, and medi- fundamentalist leaders, in contrast to
cine that were made available to Western those of the Shiites, have been lay reli-
Europe through the conduit of Spain, par- gious writers and activists (for elabora-
ticularly the city of Toledo, in transla- tion, see Dekmejian 1985a, 1985b; Sivan
tions by Jewish scholars. Furthermore, 1985). But pious Sunni religious leaders
Islam has not been opposed to the devel- have always warned the believers against
opment of representative government, as political rulers, a warning that reflects the
the cases of Iran, Kuwait, Turkey, and grounds for "popular Islam."'.2 Conse-
Egypt to varying degrees demonstrate. quently, Sunni constitutional theory has
That the same is true of Judaism is even not, historically, developed a clear and
more evident, given the state of Israel. coherent theory of political obedience.
In any case, politically, the model for On the opposite sides of the Sunni posi-
the Islamic nativists, or fundamentalists, tion have been the Kharijites and the
is usually the constitution of Medina after Shiites. The Kharijites withdrew from the
the hejira (A.D. 622, the beginning of the rank of Ali's supporters during the civil
Islamic calendar). A more broadly con- war and regarded both Ali and Muawiyya
structed model, rejected by the Shiites, in- as violators of the laws of God, motivated
cludes the period of the "first four pious by considerations of personal power.
caliphs," or the golden age of Islam (A.D. They maintained that political leadership
632-61). Islamic constitutional theory, should be vested in the most pious
however, has developed along three dif- Muslim by the free choice of the ummah
ferent lines since that period, particularly (community of believers). From the doc-
after the battle of al-Siffin (A.D. 657) be- trine of free choice and such Qur'anic
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statements as "Verily the most honored of shown some of the same variations and
you before God is the most righteous ofuncertainties as have the Sunnis. But the
you" (al-Hujarat, 13) they also derived commonly accepted legitimacy theory of
the logical, egalitarian conclusion that the Shiites before the advent of the
succession was not limited to any clan or Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic
ethnic group and that a black slave was as Republic in Iran was formulated in a
entitled to leadership as the members of treatise written in 1908 by Na'ini (1979)
the house of the Prophet. In their view, and endorsed in the preface by the
the leader was required to submit to the Ayatollahs Muhammad Kazem Khora-
will of God and strictly conform to His sani and Abdullah Mazandarani, the two
laws, as were the members of the commu- maraje'e taqlid (sg. maria', a mujtahid
nity. If the leader did not fulfill his obliga- selected by the believers for emulation in
tions, he could and should be deposed by matters of religion), existing at the time.13
the community. Those who even contem- Based on such Qur'anic commands as
plated commitment of great sins were sin- "consult them in affairs" before making a
ners and infidels (Goldziher 1920, 160; decision (Al-Imran, 159) and that Godly
Macdonald 1903). and everlasting matters are for those
While the Kharijite position culminated "who (conduct) their affairs by mutual
in puritanical republicanism, the Shiites consultation" (Shura, 36-38), this posi-
developed the doctrine of divine succes- tion maintains that a government based
sion through the house of Ali. Depending on representation and consultation is the
on which of Ali's descendants they have least usurpatory and most legitimate in
since accepted as their imams (spiritual the absence of the imam of the age, while
and legitimate secular, though not neces- dictatorship is the most usurpatory and il-
sarily actual, leaders), the Shiites have legitimate. It is also significant to note
developed additional sects, of which the that a later authoritative book written
Twelve Imamis (Ithna Ashariya) of Iran about rouhaniyyat (spiritual leadership)
are by far the largest and most significant. and the position of maria' (Tabataba'i et
The period of the "historical imamat" al. 1962) did not even consider Khomeini's
ended for the Twelve-Imamis Shiite sect (1971) velayat-e faqih (government by a
with the disappearance, or occultation of theological jurist-in this case himself) as
the Mahda (Messiah) in the ninth cen- a subject for discussion (see also Akhavi
tury. The period of Ghaybat-e Sughra 1980).
(Lesser Concealment), in which the Fifth, Islam has also been characterized
Mahdi was believed to have been rep- by a substantial amount of ossification
resented by agents, lasted for 69 lunar and rigidity, particularly in some of its
years. From 940-41 started the Ghaybat-e laws and rituals. This is particularly im-
Kubra (Greater Concealment), in which portant if a political system based on this
no one has direct access to the hidden religion is to survive and function in the
imam. This is the age in which we are liv-contemporary world. Viability and stabil-
ing. Only the consensus of the muftahids, ity, that is, the management of orderly
the highest-level theologians capable of change (not the maintenance of the status
the practice of ijtihad (fresh religious in- quo, which is often confused with stabil-
terpretation), is supposed to reflect the ity), require sufficient synchronization be-
will of the hidden Twelfth Imam. Until tween the environmental changes of a
the reappearance of the Mahdi all govern-political system and its relevant orders
ment is by definition a usurpation. So farand institutions or at least the ability to
as the duty to obey secular rulers is con- avoid substantial and unsettling incongru-
cerned, the Shiite theory has at times ities. For example, when environmental
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conditions change because of scientific Shiite precepts, any of which would have
and technological discoveries and innova- been regarded as bid'at (religious inven-
tions and when new laws are needed or tion) and subject to charges of infidelity
old ones require modification, persistent and excommunication in ordinary times.
noncongruence poses threats to stability These include his introducing velayat-e
(Johnson 1982, 26-27). Perceptive ana- faqih (partially taking away the well-
lysts of comparative politics have investi- established freedom of the Shiites indi-
gated the problems posed for increase in vidually to select their own maria'e taqlid),
performance by some traditional orienta- forcing them to follow his personal dic-
tions and practices in the Third World tates not only in religious but also in
(e.g., Pye 1971, 138-39). But comparable political matters, and even accepting the
problems exist in the modern or post- title of Imam. When pressed on this issue,
industrial systems as well. The pluralist some of Khomeini's apologists retort that
ethos combined with intense individual what they really mean is imam or na'ib
and group competition on the basis of (agent of the Imam). It would be interest-
parochial interests in the United States, ing to ascertain under what set of circum-
for example-sanctioned by a leap of stances the Mahdi granted Khomeini any
faith in Adam Smith-seem clearly less more than any other mujtahid (who is
functional to productivity than the dispo- superior in religious knowledge to a jurist)
sition toward cooperation between man- the function of a na'ib, a development
agement, labor, and government in that would change the nature of the
Japan, a legacy of feudal traditions (seeGreater Concealment. Furthermore
Vogel 1979, 27-157; Ward and Rustow whether consciously borrowed or not-
1964, 445-51). In Islam the role of ijtihad some of Khomeini's innovations are clear-
becomes vital in this connection. Ijtihad, ly more akin to the ideas of the Kharijites
however, had been closed to the Sunnis than those traditionally associated with
since the ninth century, after the four the Shiites.
Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Maleki, The culmination of Khomeini's innova-
Shafi'i, Hanafi, and Hanbali) had already tions in Islamic constitutional theory oc-
been established; and the Shiites have curred in 1988 when, through a letter
construed it too narrowly. Viability of written to President Ali Khamene'i and
any Islamic state necessitates a return to widely disseminated by the mass media,
the more liberal usage of ijtihad as neither he overruled the president's reiteration in
fundamental religious tenets nor logic the Friday Prayer at the University of
bestow the ninth century with peculiarly Tehran of the hitherto unchallenged tradi-
divine characteristics. In fact, reopening tion that Islamic "government must act
ijtihad, with occasional supporters among within the framework of God's rules." In-
Sunnis in the past, has recently generated stead, Khomeini asserted that "govem-
a growing interest among the ulema and ment, which is a derivative of the absolute
even Sunni kings (for references, see tutelage of the Prophet of God, God's
Moursi Badr 1987). blessing upon Him and His House, is one
Of course, other methods of bringingof the primary rules of Islam and superior
about change have been available to to all far'iyah [derivatives, secondary
Islam. One method, albeit less institution- rules], even to those concerning prayer,
al and predictable, has been through the fasting and hajj" (Khomeini 1988).14 Con-
rise of such charismatic and popularly sequently, the Islamic "government is
based religious leaders as Khomeini. He authorized unilaterally to abrogate all
has managed to bring about a number of legitimate contracts it has concluded with
changes in the traditionally established the people anytime it judges that they are
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contrary to the welfare of the country oradaptation and innovation in Shiite tradi-
Islam. It can also prevent the occurrencetions by adopting such new laws and
of any matter, whether in the sphere of practices as interest on loans and modem
taxes (instead of the only hitherto legiti-
religion or otherwise, as long as it deems
such matter inexpedient for Islam" (pp. mate religious taxes of zakat and khums)
1-2). He has since personally instituted athat form the basis for the everyday ad-
new Council of Expediency to overrule ministration of a state's affairs. These im-
the constitutional Council of Guardians ply that Shiism in particular and, by the
(vested with the function of ensuring that force of example, Islam in general will
laws passed by the Majlis ["Assembly"], probably never again be quite the same as
do not contravene Islam), personally they were during the last few centuries.
deposed the Ayatollah Hossein Ali Mon- Another important method of bringing
tazeri (elected by the constitutional Coun- about change in Islam has been reform-
al of Experts) as his successor, and has ism. It is represented by such diverse
even been declared by his supporters to be works as those of Jamal al-Din Asadabadi
"above the constitution." These develop- al-Afghani (Keddie 1968, 1970, 1983),
ments are remarkable, if not astonishing, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and al-
when one considers not only the well- Kawakibi (Gibb 1972; Hourani 1962; Kerr
established Shiite theory and practice but 1966), Bazargan (1976, 1982-83) and
also the position taken earlier by Koh- Shariati (1973, 1978, 1979). It has had an
meini himself stating that "no faqih [theo- intermittent but limited success. Never-
logical jurist] has said, nor any [religious] theless, its cumulative effect may prove
book has written that we [faqihsl are more significant in the long run because,
Shahs or that kingship is our right" (Kho- unlike fundamentalism, it seems to have
meini [c. 19441, 186; see Khomeini 1978, recognized and groped for synthesizing
369; for a comprehensive treatment of the the politically requisite but not easily
evolution of his position, see Razi 1988, reconcilable roles of faith and reason.
702-3); that the function of faqih is the ex- Regardless of its long-term utility as a
ecution of the laws (1971, 56-57); and legitimizing myth, however, only Islamic
that a "faqih ... does not possess velayat fundamentalism has so far succeeded in
[tutelage] over other contemporary faqihsproviding an unprecedented level of inno-
or the power to appoint or dismiss them"vation and adaptation and imputing "a
(1971, 57). deep sense of spiritual belonging and
Whether these innovations, particular-brotherhood to millions of alienated
ly the theory of absolute government andMuslims" (Dekmejian 1985a, 176).
velayat-e faqih, are likely to survive Kho- Moreover, despite being a religious
meini and be institutionalized is uncer- leader and substantially unfamiliar with
tain. Whatever the fate of any of Kho- the intricacies of technology, economics,
meini's specific personal innovations, and international relations, Khomeini has
however, the most significant aspect of not refrained from the use of either incen-
the Islamic Republic may well consist (1) tives (when expedient) or a high level of
of changing the thrust of Shiism from coercion against actual or potential chal-
quietism to activism-militancy, mainly by lengers (see Razi 1988). These behavioral
reformulating the role of shihadat ("mar-patterns substantiate the significance of
tyrdom") and combining it with jihad the role of strategy and tactics in the suc-
(crusade to defend and extend the realm cess of Third World leaders, be they
of religion) and abandoning the pessimis-charismatic ideologues like Khomeini and
tic characteristics of Shiite Messianism;15Mao Zedong, organizers and conspirators
and (2) of slowly but surely resorting to like Lenin, or nationalists like Mustafa
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Kemal, the founder of modem Turkey. and its guideposts are the U.S. and French
Consequently, analysts also need to pay revolutions. The latter was more thor-
some attention to the significance of ough in breaking with the traditional pat-
"social action as a contingent process" terns and created a "civil religion" that
(Johnson 1982, 184-86) in order to "guard has since shown a remarkable success in
against two related fallacies. The first is converting the world to its values. It
the view that the leader was indispensable developed the national flag, national an-
to the results achieved.... The second is them, altars to the motherland, and secu-
the opposite view, that the result was in- lar baptisms and funerals as new religious
evitable, that any other leader would symbols and ceremonies to replace those
have had to adopt the very same course" of the old Catholic faith. And national-
(Rustow 1970a, 21). ists-including thoroughly committed
Finally, while until the Iranian revolu- citizen-soldiers who as peasants hid in
tion Western orientalists and analysts of caves to escape serving in the army only a
the Middle East failed to grasp the signifi- few years before-began to spread the
cance of Islam because of their self-cen- new faith with missionary zeal (Hayes
tered orientation to cultural change and 1931). Religious qualities of nationalism
overestimation of the roles of economics in the United States have been investi-
and force (for an exception, see Lewis gated by such analysts as Warner (1962),
1976), they have since deemphasized the Verba (1965), and Cole and Hammond
role of other sources of cohesion and com- (1974), as have those of such millenarian
mitment. To redress this imbalance of movements as Marxism in the Third
perspectives, it is particularly important World (Razi 1987, 463-64). Despite
to reconsider the role of nationalism, decades of socialization to Marxism, na-
which had previously received a great tionalism clearly remains a major source
deal of attention. Some of the sophisti- of cohesion and cleavage even in the
cated definitions of nationalism were pro- Soviet Union, as demonstrated not only
vided as early as the nineteenth century by the recent events in the Soviet Repub-
(Mill 1939, 206; Renan 1882, 27). Fairly lics of the periphery but also by the fact
comprehensive bibliographies (e.g., that the huge statue of the heroine at
Deutsch and Merritt 1970), general anal- Volgagrad (Stalingrad) pointing west,
yses (e.g., Deutsch 1966; Emerson 1960; whence the invading German armies came
Hayes 1931; Rustow 1967) and specific before their back was broken in World
works on Arab nationalism (Antonius War II, reflects the sentiment of patriot-
1961; Carmichael 1967; Dekmejian 1971; ism rather than that of class consciousness
Haim 1961; Nuseibeh 1956), Iranian na- or international communism. In any case,
tionalism (Cottam 1964), Turkish nation- just as the French armies' singing of the
alism (Edib Adivar 1930; Gokalp 1958; "Marseilles" and marching across Europe
Lewis 1961; Rustow 1970b; Ward and converted the European peoples to
Rustow 1964) and Israeli nationalism (Gal nationalism, Western European imperial-
1973; Halpern 1961; Herzl 1970) are also ism in the Middle East served as a catalyst
available. I will limit myself here to the to hasten its own antithesis, nationalism.
following five points, which relate nation- Politically, nationalism's primary goal
alism to religion and the politics of the has been to end foreign domination and
region. to install independent and autonomous
First, although consciousness of similarrulers who could undertake the necessary
identity has existed among some people social and economic reforms for the ad-
for a long time, modem nationalism vancement of the country. But the most
began in Europe of the eighteenth century significant, and least studied, aspect of
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nationalism has been psychological. The Israel, which has not suffered foreign
legacy of years' subjugation to superior dominance since its creation, the legacies
foreign organizations, armies, technol- of Diaspora and holocaust have contrib-
ogies, and agents by peoples of long his- uted to an obsessive concern with secur-
tories and great civilizations-despite the ity. This has in turn contributed to the
usual exaggerations, myths, and historical more-than-isolated instance of what ap-
manipulations-has vested in nationalism pears to the rest of the world as highly ag-
the role of resurrecting the dignity of the gressive uses of military coercion or to
articulate population and eliminating the such perceived causal structures as those
feeling of insecurity and inferiority. The illustrated by Heradstveit's (1979) study
appeal of nationalism, just as of religious of Israeli and Arab subjects, in which each
fundamentalism, in the Middle East is side attributed its own "good" behavior to
thus to a large extent a reflection of the dispositional factors and "bad" behavior
crisis of dignity, that is, of individuals' to situational factors, while using exactly
sense of self-worth, honor and esteem. It opposite attributions for the other side's
is particularly significant to understand behavior, further complicating the poten-
(1) that the territories of many states in tial for conflict resolution. There is, of
the Middle East were created according to course, a good deal of objective and veri-
needs and perceived interests of the Euro- fiable ground for security and economic
peans rather than those of the local popu- concerns and a large measure of calculat-
lations and (2) that the subjugation was ing rationality and purposeful propa-
exercised not only overtly through impe- ganda and distortion involved in pressing
rialism but also covertly through such one's case. But it is untenable to assume
nominally autonomous but actually sub- that diabolically clever plans and ration-
servient elites as Nuri Said in Iraq, Sayyid ally calculated designs form one's own
Zia' Tabatabai and Muhammad Reza subconscious, higher values, and attribu-
Shah in Iran and the sheikhs of the Gulf tions.
states. This has caused such an enduring Second, the relationship between na-
perception of regional leaders' subservi- tionalism and religion in the Middle East
ence to foreign governments, strength- is complex and curvilinear. Both value
ened periodically by the revelations of the structures are to varying extents held by
works of foreign intelligence agencies or an overwhelming majority of the popula-
inadvertent confessions of such rulers as tion and generate at times mutually rein-
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1980), who forcing, and at other times conflicting,
complained about not being given une- patterns of behavior and institution. Reli-
quivocal instruction through the U.S. and gion has been a major contributing factor
British ambassadors about what to do in developing and preserving the national
during the Iranian revolution, that a num- identities of the Arabs, the Iranians, the
ber of educated even in Iran of today seem Israelis, and even the Turks (in Turkey).
quite convinced that the Khomeini regimeNationalism and religion have also in
was installed by the United States.16 Thismany instances served as the basis for
perception also constitutes the main psy-cooperation against foreign incursions.
chological reason for the compelling needThus, the two sets of orientations may not
of even politically autonomous leaders to necessarily clash, but they are not always
go to the extremes to prove to their people easily reconcilable either. An Islamic state
and perhaps to themselves beyond the based on the ummah, like a Jewish state,
shadow of a doubt that they are not sub-is basically multiethnic; and national dif-
servient to great powers.17 It should be ferences are at best secondary, if not irre-
added that in the case of the state of levant. The difficulty of reconciling the
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two bases of state formation is historically wites and despite opposition by the fun-
observable in the breakdown of the Otto- damentalists headed by Muslim Brother-
man Empire and currently in the interper- hood, partly because he is perceived as
sonal and intergroup conflicts among the the only Arab leader capable of standing
more religious and more secular citizens up to Israel and the United States and thus
of Israel as well as the Jewish citizens of resurrecting some measure of Arab dig-
other states. While in the Ottoman in- nity. It is also noteworthy that Nasser and
stance nationalism was the epitaph to a Asad have been more strongly committed
centuries-old religious state, in Israel's to qawmiyyah (Arab nationalism) than to
case religious affiliation set in motion na- wataniyyah (Egyptian or Syrian national-
tionalism, which in turn has in some in- ism). Although at this point the prospects
stances led to conflict between the two for Arab national unity do not appear
sets of affiliations. The case of Lebanon promising, it would be erroneous to
on the other hand reveals how religious underestimate the appeal of Arab nation-
differences, reinforced by vertical confes- alism or dismiss its long-run chances. Just
sional structures and parochial leaders as there is an establishment and a popular
(zu'ama), can drastically hinder the emer- Islam, there is also an establishment Arab
gence of nationalism and disrupt the state nationalism (reflected in the lip service
(see Binder 1966; Azar and Marlin 1987). paid to the concept by pro-Western con-
Third, nationalism has so far shown servative regimes who in fact prefer
more capability to acquire modem tech- wataniyyah) and a popular one (being
nology and science, higher levels of eco- observable particularly among the middle
nomic growth, and advanced means of classes and educated segments who com-
defense. But this by no means presages the prise most of the modern specialists in
future. Islam not only remains more deep- persuasion and organization). Further-
ly rooted, has wider adherence, evokes more, it is clear that such wataniyyah
considerably greater commitment, and allegiance as Saudi Arabian, Jordanian,
seems to be in ascendance but is also at and Moroccan nationalism is not-and is
least potentially capable of directing this unlikely in the foreseeable future to
commitment toward higher performance become-sufficiently robust by itself to
in science, technology, and economics. withstand the onslaught of Arab national-
Fourth, insofar as the ebbs and flows of ism or Islamic fundamentalism. It should
nationalism and Islam are concerned, it also be emphasized in this connection that
should be noted that nationalist Mustafa the defeat of the shah's regime is more sig-
Kemal became supreme in Turkey- nificant for demonstrating the role of legit-
despite religious forces-and Turkish na- imacy than for indicating the comparative
tionalism has so far shown no sign of suc-viability of nationalism and Islam. The
cumbing to religious fundamentalism shah was never perceived as an autono-
(Rustow 1987, 72-83). Reza Khan made a mous ruler by the Iranian nationalists, as
compromise with religious leaders initial- a constitutional leader by the majority of
ly and abandoned efforts to make Iran a the constitutionalists, or even, in the end,
republic but eventually dominated the as a religiously tolerable monarch by a
clergy as a shah on the basis of national- substantial number of Shiite believers. It
ism. Gamal Abd al-Nasser overcame the was primarily the failure of the regime in
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, because these three different but converging
there was little doubt among the people grounds of legitimacy-religion, national-
about his integrity as an Arab nationalist. ism, and constitutionalism-that brought
Hafiz al-Asad has been able to govern the shah and the monarchy down, not its
Syria as a member of the minority Ala- performance in the areas of economics
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technology, administration, organized in- speeches of the leaders of the Islamic

struments of physical force, or even for- Republic, particularly since the end of the
eign policy (Bill 1982, 1988; Keddie 1981; Iran-Iraq War.18 But the degree to which
Razi 1981a, 1981b, 1987). Furthermore, the peoples of the Middle East measure
the shah was unable to recruit even 10 such genuineness will depend to a great
volunteers who would be willing to give extent on the ability of such regimes to
their lives at his commands despite all the oppose the U.S.-Israeli positions, particu-
wealth at his disposal. Khomeini, on the larly concerning the status of the Palestin-
other hand, has been able to recruit will- ians. The governments of Saudi Arabia,
ing martyrs by hundreds of thousands the Gulf states, Jordan, Tunisia, and even
despite substantial economic reversals Egypt thus appear in trouble on grounds
suffered by the Iranians since the incep- not only of religious revivalism but also
tion of his regime. The difference demon- of Arab nationalism. Some respite for the
strates the potential motivating power of West was provided by the Soviet bungling
beliefs as compared to interests. and military intervention in Afghanistan,
Finally, in light of the appeal of Islamicwhich exacerbated Soviet disadvantages
fundamentalism and Arab nationalism, stemming from the nature of its values
prospects do not appear promising for and weaknesses of its technological and
either the United States' position in the industrial sectors. Conditions in the Mid-
Middle East or the legitimacy of the dle East have for some time been most
friendly Arab regimes, despite a number promising for Japan and Western Europe.
of complementary economic and security A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict,
interests. Several factors are particularly particularly to the Palestinian problem
relevant to this assessment. The first is the and the holy shrines of Jerusalem, will, of
seemingly unconditional support for course, substantially change the nature of
Israel, particularly as manifested in the these equations.
prejudicial definition and policy formula-
tion on such matters as human rights, Conclusion
nuclear nonproliferation, security, terror-
ism, torture, and legal title to land. The Conceptually, the most significant fac-
second consists of support for conserva- tors accounting for the partial or total
tive regimes perceived as subservient to neglect of legitimacy by many contem-
the West and unconcerned with the aspir- porary studdents of politics seem to have
ations of their own population. And the consisted of the absence of adequate ap-
third is the diffusion of U.S. values and preciation for (1) fundamental difference
patterns of behavior perceived as alien to between the nature and sources of legiti-
Islam and detrimental to nationalism and macy and those of performance; (2) the
genuine political autonomy. The first of role of values in overcoming the inevita-
these is by far the most significant, as it ble incongruities that arise between the in-
has been detrimental to the legitimacy of dividual's rational search for interests and
friendly Arab governments and served as the collectivities' survival requirements;
an impetus to "radicalization" of the area. and (3) the interdependence of legitimacy
It is still possible that regimes perceived and performance. Methodologically, pro-
as genuinely nationalist may in the future jection, the assumption of equal rational-
prove more successful than those based ity of all actors, inadequate familiarity
on Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, there with the cultures of the Third World, and
has already been a partial return to such the difficulties of finding access and ad-
symbols of nationalism as millat, rather ministering interviews have been impor-
than unmat, even in the mass media and tant.
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Although Islam has been characterized Britain-is by no means self-evident. Rather, it is

primarily the product of conventional acceptance
as somehow incongruent with technologi-
and socialization.
cal innovation and the other performance 2. The significance of perception is not limited to
requisites of an economically developed legitimacy. As Thomas and Znaniecki noted long
system because of ossification in its laws ago, "If men define situations as real they are real in
and rituals, it has on the whole been their consequences" (1918-20, 81). Timasheff devel-
oped this theorem further and stated that "behavior
neither monolithic, rigid, and static nor
can be understood only when it is studied within its
an impediment to the development of whole context-the situation not only as exists in
capitalism, socialism, or representative verifiable, objective form, but also as it seems to ex-
government. It has in fact generated an ist to the person himself. The latter subjective factor
must never be discounted in the social analysis"
array of fairly sophisticated constitutional
(1957, 151).
theories as well as the practice of ijtihad, 3. More importantly, politics is very different
which, if fully utilized, is a significant in- from economics: first, because of the role of higher
strument for continuous adaptation. It values and legitimacy in the former; second, because
has also been shown that contrary to the the purpose of political leaders is not to serve self-
interest rationally but to serve collective interest;
prevailing impressions in the West,
and, third, because political power is situational-
Islamic fundamentalism of Iran has pro-relational and nonfungible in contrast to money in
vided a major source for innovation and the economic realm (see Baldwin 1979). Further-
adaptation in Islam and generated a pro-more, there are difficulties involved with the
found sense of spiritual gratification and assumption of rational utility maximizers even in
economics (See Simon 1955, 1985). That actual be-
brotherhood among the masses of alien- havior shows variance in rationality is well known
ated Muslims. to advertisers, firms, and politicians who resort to
The relationship between nationalismpropaganda, paying millions of dollars to well-
and religion is complex and curvilinear. known It actors to cause the target groups to purchase
insurance contracts of clearly dubious value and bil-
may, therefore, be premature to rule out lions of dollars of worthless cold remedies, pur-
the viability of nationalism in favor ofchased not because of their actual utility for the
religious fundamentalism, despite the lat- achievement of the targets' goals but because the
ter's recent achievements. In this connec- targets like and "trust" the employed actors. More-
over, even in the same country the rationality of one
tion, a great deal will depend on the
economist seems substantially different from that of
nature of the decisions made by the another, as the debates about deficits in the U.S.
respective nationalist and religious leadersbudget and balance of trade have amply demon-
and the operation of external factors overstrated. It seems that a study of beliefs, motivations,
which they have little control. and information of the economists provides a more
reliable guide to their preferences than does the
assumption of equal rationality.
4. Otherwise, saints and suckers become identical,
Notes greed becomes contagious, and morality and ethics
(including professional ethics) become synonymous
1. Even the appropriateness of majority rule- with stupidity.
reflected in the superior quality of the candidate 5. Analysts have read Weber's writings on legiti-
receiving 51% over the one receiving 49% or candi- macy differently (see Connolly 1984, 9-12).
dates winning in such single-member-district-plural- 6. The following figure provides a summary of at-
ity-vote electoral systems as the United States and tribution theories.
85

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Antecedents Attributions Consequences
Information Behavior
PerceivedMet
Beliefs Caues Affect
MotivationExpectancy
Attribution T
Theories Attb Theories
Source: Kelly and Michela 1980; for a synopsis of the litera
attribution research, see Harvey and Weary 1984. For deba
and Yarkin 1981; Funder 1982.
7. This reflects the significance works in ofthis area,

what see Akhavi 1980; Amir Arjo-
anthropol-
ogist Marvin Harris calls "the mand 1984; Cole and Keddie 1986; Dekmejian
culture/nature inter- 1980,
face." But the following argument seems to mis- 1985a, 1985b, Esposito 1983; al-Gazzali 1953; Hu-
understand the role of social sciences: 'To endow saini 1956; Keddie 1981; Kerr 1966; Khomeini 1971;
the mental superstructure with strategic priority, as Mawdudi 1980; Pipes 1981; M. Qutb 1979; S. Qutb
the cultural idealists advocate, is a bad bet. Nature is 1975, 1980, n.d.; Sivan 1985.
indifferent to whether God is a loving father or a 11. While the Sunnis have accepted the need f
bloodthirsty cannibal. But nature is not indifferent avoiding protracted conflict and civil strife, th
to whether the fallow period in a swidden field is one Shiites have developed the doctrine of taqiyyah
year or ten" (Harris 1979, 57). But reification of <"dissimulation"), which authorizes the believers to
nature is not a good bet either, and, unless there are pretend to other than their true beliefs when threats
social systems, we cannot understand these matters, to their lives and possessions are substantial and the
engage in environmental engineering, or even care. prospects for overthrowing an illegitimate regime
8. In the case of the Iranian revolution, for exam- are inconsequential.
ple, opposition to the Shah cut across all social 12. From the perspective of fundamentalism, the
strata (see Bill 1982; Razi 1987). In fact, in his earlier most important Sunni religious leader has been Ibn-
work, done during the Shah's regime, Bill (1972) Taymiyyah (d. 1328). His neo-Hanbali writings
found that the middle class reflected highly diver- (e.g., Ibn-Taymiyyah 1923-30) have constituted the
gent orientations and ideologies. The findings cer- main source for the inspiration of such authors as
tainly do not sustain the existence of class conscious- Mawdudi (1980), which in turn influenced M. Qutb
ness in any significant way. (1979) and S. Qutb (1975, 1980, n.d.). In fact, the
9. Powerful ethnic affinities may become a major notion of a new jahiliyyah ("barbarism"), was orig-
barrier to the development of nationalism as a legiti- inally used to describe the conditions of Arabia
mizing basis for the formation of viable states, as before the rise of the Prophet Muhammad and now
can be seen in Africa and parts of the Middle East. used by the Sunni fundamentalists (e.g., S. Qutb
Vestiges of ethnic separatism are still observable in n.d., chap. 10) to characterize "the evils of capital-
the Soviet Union, Canada, and even Britain. ism" and "the materialistic, godless communism," is
10. The terms nativism and atavism seem more probably taken from Ibn-Taymiyyah who used it to
appropriate for this purpose. But we have retained describe the Mongol reign in the thirteenth century.
fundamentalism because of its now common usage, 13. Khomeini's supporters have deemphasized this
despite the fact that some of its aspects "are more position and resurrected the writings of Sheikh
reminiscent of liberation theology in Latin America Fazlollah Nuri, who favored authoritarianism and
than they are of Christian fundamentalism in the turned against the Constitution of 1906 once it
United States" (Munson 1988, 3). For a sample of became evident that the latter did not mean the insti-
86

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tution of shariah (religious rules of behavior). 17. The Chinese government's ideological alterca-
14. The Shiite popular religious beliefs and prac- tion with the Soviet Union in 1957-60, which
tices are divided into usul (fundamentals) and forum' resulted in the latter's withdrawal of its aid and
(derivatives). Usul consist of belief in (1) tawhid (a technicians, provides another illustration of this
unitary God), (2) adl (God's justice), (3) nabowwat phenomenon. This behavior cannot be fully under-
(prophets and Muhammad as the last messenger of stood without taking into account the legacies of the
God), (4) imamat, (the Twelve Imams), and (5) Opium War, the Boxer Rebellion, the mutilation of
ma'ad (resurrection and the hereafter). The SunniChinese territory, Western imperialism, and the per-
imans (primary beliefs) do not as a rule include adl ception that even during the republican period the
and imamat. The Shiite forum' consist of (1) prayer, country's leaders were subservient to foreign powers
(2) fasting, (3) khums (an annual tax of one-fifth of (see Pye 1962, chap. 3; Pye 1972).
net increase in certain items of property to maintain18. Reemergence of nationalist symbols occurred
the ordinary descendants of imams, orphans, and in the second half of 1988 in Friday prayers and ser-
the needy), (4) zakat (a tax to be paid to the Muslim mons at the University of Tehran, in the mass
treasury for the needy, those in debt, and travelers- media, and even in Khomeini's own pronounce-
which in practice was the clergy during the period ments. It seems to reflect Iran's setbacks in the war.
prior to the Islamic Republic), (5) amr-e be ma'ruf A parallel development occurred after the Iraqi inva-
(urging to good deeds), (6) nahy-e az munkin (in- sion of Iran in 1980 but was halted and reversed by
junction against bad deeds), (7) haj (pilgrimage to Khomeini as Iran's military position improved.
Mecca-by those who can afford it-to visit the
holy stone of Ka'ba at a particular time of the year),
and (8) jihad (holy war to defend or extend the realm
of faith). The Sunni ibadat (devotional duties) in-
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G. Hossein Razi is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Houston,

Houston, TX 77204-3474.
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Hossein, R - Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in The Middle East - 1990

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Hossein, R - Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in The Middle East - 1990

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Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East

Author(s): G. Hossein Razi

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963630

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he significance of legitimacy to regime maintenance has been m

V\estern and 1966, 246), Huntington (1968, 265-73)

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

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technology, administration, organized in- speeches of the leaders of the Islamic

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Although Islam has been characterized Britain-is by no means self-evident. Rather, it is

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Antecedents Attributions Consequences

7. This reflects the significance works in ofthis area,

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mentary 61:39-49. University Press.

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G. Hossein Razi is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Houston,

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