The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Lenin, "Great Russia," and Ukraine

Author(s): Roman Szporluk
Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1/4, RUS' WRIT LARGE: LANGUAGES,
HISTORIES, CULTURES: Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth
Birthday (2006), pp. 611-626
Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
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HarvardUkrainianStudies28,no. 1-4 (2006): 611-26.

Lenin,"GreatRussia,"and Ukraine
Roman Szporluk

Ave viewing the history ofinternational inthemodernera,"George

affairs
F. Kennanwrotein 1995,"I findit hardto thinkof anyeventmorestrange
and at firstglancemoreinexplicable,
and startling, thanthesuddenand total
and
disintegration disappearance from the international in
scene,primarily
the years1987through1991,of the greatpowerknownsuccessivelyas the
RussianEmpireand thentheSovietUnion."Kennanwas especiallystruckby
the "extremeabruptness,the sharpquick ending,and not least the relative
bloodlessnesswithwhichthegreatSovietEmpirecame to an end."1
In searchofan explanationKennanturnedto theRussianRepublic'sdecla-
rationof"sovereignty" (1990)which,he said,differed fromsimilar
significantly
declarationsbyotherSovietrepublics:

InthecaseoftheRussian Republic, wasfarmoreserious....It

thegesture
rankedtheRussiannation withthevarious
otherperipheral inthe
entities
formerSovietUnion....FortheRussianRepublictoassumethisposition
wastoposea mortal threat ForiftheRussian
totheSovietUnionitself.
nationweretogo aheadanddeclareitsownfullindependence, oreven
ifitwereto becomea member ofsomesortofa federalor confederal
"union"on an equalbasiswithall theothers,
what,beyondthename,
wouldbe leftoftheSovietUnion?Itwouldhavebecomean empty shell,
withoutpeople,without and
territory, withno more thana theoretical
identity.2

In Russia'sactionKennansawthesubversionor rejectionofan assumption

thatuntilthentheworldoutsidehadtakenforgranted:thattheUSSR and Rus-
siaweresynonyms, andthattheRSFSRwas an odd entity on theadministrative
map oftheSoviet Union thatwas notto be confusedwiththerealRussia.While
thispresumably was nottheopinionofethnicallynon-Russiancitizensofthe
USSR,mostethnicRussianswithintheUSSR,likeforeigners, thoughtthatthe
SovietUnionwas anothernameforRussia.Likewise,in thetimeofthetsarist
RussianEmpiretherehad been no acceptedconceptofa Russiathatwas not

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6l2 SZPORLUK

coextensive withtheempire.As theBritishhistorian Geoffrey Hoskingputsit,

"Britainhad an empire,butRussiawas an empire-and perhapsstillis."Unlike
the BritishEmpire,Hoskingcontinued,the "Russianempirewas partofthe
homeland,and the'natives'mixedinextricably withtheRussiansin theirown
markets, streetsand schools- as indeedtheystilldo."3
Hoskingreturned tothisthemeinhismajorbook,Russia:Peopleand Empire
1552-1917, wherehe quoteda remarkthatSergeiWitte,imperialRussia'sformer
prime minister,made in hisdiaryin 1910:"Themistakewe havebeen making
formanydecades is thatwe havestillnotadmittedto ourselvesthatsincethe
timeofPetertheGreatand CatherinetheGreattherehas been no suchthing
as Russia:therehas been onlytheRussianEmpire."4 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, in an
articlefirstpublishedin 1963,quotedthesame passageofWitte(althoughhe
translateditslightly butalso citedWitte'snextsentence,inwhich
differently),
he notedthat35 percentof the populationwereethnicminorities, and that
the Russiansthemselveswere dividedinto GreatRussians,LittleRussians,
and Belorussians.To ignore"thishistoricalfactofcapitalimportance," Witte
concluded,made itimpossibleto engagein an effective politicsin Russia.5
In December 1914,severalyearsafterWitte'spessimisticnote,Vladimir
II 'ich Leninlettheworldknowthathewas notignoring"thishistoricalfactof
capitalimportance." Not onlydid Leninbase hisownpolicyon thefactofthe
empire'smultinational character;he also recognizedthatGreatRussiansand
Ukrainiansweretwo different nations.In an articleof exceptionalhistorical
importance, "On the National Prideof the GreatRussians," whichappeared
in Sotsial-Demokrat, an émigréjournalin Geneva,Leninpresentedan idea
ofa Russia(whichhe called Velikorossiia) thatwas different as a nation,and
potentially as a state,from the "Russia" that everyone in his timeused as a
synonym for the Russian Empire,just as latermany would use "Russia"as a
synonym fortheSovietUnion.In thatarticleLeninspokeabouttheGreat-Rus-
sian democrats'strugglefor"a freeand democraticGreatRussia,"and about
"theproletarian brotherhood ofall thenationsofRussia"intheirjointstruggle
forthecause ofsocialism.
The reasonsforwhichwe considerthisarticleto be importantare rarely,
ifever,recognizedin literature. On thefewoccasionswhen"On theNational
Pride"is referredto in studiesof Lenin'sthoughtor politicsor when it is
includedin Westernanthologiesof Lenin'swritings,it is presentedas "the
apologia of an anti-warRussianradicalforhis position,an attemptto show
how sucha positioncould itselfbe patrioticinsofaras Russia'srevolutionary
traditionwas a legitimate basis fornationalpride."6
Witteand Hoskinghelp us to see how revolutionary Lenin'sdistinctions
were:therewas a GreatRussia,thecountry oftheGreatRussians,andtherewas
a "Russia," whosemanypeoples,includingUkrainians, wereunderGreat-Rus-
sianrule.Lenincondemnedthetsariststate'swaraim to "throttle Polandand

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 613

Ukraine."He unequivocally recognizedUkraineas an equal- and a victim - of

"GreatRussia."Thus,he rejectedtheidea of an "All-Russian nation"thatthe
majorityof leadingpoliticalfiguresof Russiaheld at thattime.7Clearly,for
Lenin"theRussianQuestion," or moreprecisely "theRussiaQuestion," was the
centralnationalityproblem in theRussian Empire. The ideas Leninformulated
inthat1914articleexplainhispoliticsin 1917-22.Decisionsmadethencreated
thepoliticaland intellectual settingforthepoliticaldevelopmentsin thelate
twentieth century thatled to the riseof the statewe have knownsince 1991
as Russia.
Leninbegan "On the NationalPride"by statingthatnationalfeelingwas
notsomethingaliento "class-consciousproletarians," eventhoughtheruling
classes- the landownersand capitalists-of the advancedWesternnations
had invokedthe principleof nationalityto servetheirclass interests."Is a
senseofnationalpridealiento us,Great-Russian class-consciousproletarians?
Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doingour
very utmost to raiseher toiling masses (i.e.,nine-tenths ofherpopulation)to
thelevelofa democraticand socialistconsciousness."
Leninexplainedthatit was a special responsibility of "us, Great-Russian
Social-Democrats...to defineour attitudeto thisideologicaltrend,"thatis,
nationalism:

It wouldbe unseemly forus, representatives

ofa dominant nationin
thefareastofEuropeanda goodlypartofAsia,to forget theimmense
ofthenational
significance ina country
question-especially whichhas
beenrightlycalledthe"prison
ofthepeoples,"andparticularly
ata time
when,in thefareastofEuropeandin Asia,capitalism is awakeningto
lifeandself-consciousness
a number of"new"nations, and
large small;
at a moment whenthetsaristmonarchy hascalledup millionsofGreat
Russiansandnon-Russians,
soasto"solve"a number ofnational
problems
inaccordancewiththeinterestsoftheCounciloftheUnitedNobilityand
oftheGuchkovs, Krestovnikovs,Dolgorukovs,Kutlers
andRodichevs.8

Againsttheserepresentatives ofreactionaryRussiaLenincitedthenames
ofpeopletheGreatRussianscouldbe proudof:theyincludedRadishchev, the
Decembrists,the"revolutionary commoners"ofthe1870s,theGreat-Russian
workerswho had createda mass revolutionary partyin 1905,and theGreat-
Russianpeasantswho had foughtthe clergyand landlordsthen.While he
recalled,withapproval,thatChernyshevsky, "theGreat-Russiandemocrat,"
"
had spokenaboutRussiaas [a] wretchednation,a nationofslaves,fromtop
to bottom-all slaves,"he insistedthatthesituationhad changed:"We arefull
ofnationalpridebecausetheGreat-Russian nation,too,has provedcapableof
providing mankind with great models ofthe struggleforfreedomand social-

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6l4 SZPORLUK

ism,andnotonlywithgreatpogroms,rowsofgallows,dungeons,greatfamines
and greatservility
to priests,tsars,landownersand capitalists."9
TheGreat- Russianopponentsoftsarism, Lenincontinued, oughtto fight
for
theestablishment of"a freeand democraticGreatRussia"thatwouldbecome
one ofthepartsofa new unionoffreepeoplesoftheformertsaristempire.

...Fullofa senseofnationalpride,weGreat- Russianworkerswant,come

whatmay,a freeandindependent, a democratic, republicanandproud
GreatRussia,onethatwillbaseitsrelations withitsneighbours on the
human ofequality,
principle andnotonthefeudalist ofprivilege,
principle
whichisso degrading toa greatnation. Justbecausewewantthat, wesay:
itis impossible,inthetwentieth century and in in
Europe(even thefar
eastofEurope), to"defend thefatherland" otherwisethanbyusingevery
revolutionary meansto combatthemonarchy, thelandowners andthe
capitalistsofone'sownfatherland, the
i.e., worst
enemies ofour country.
WesaythattheGreatRussians cannot"defend thefatherland"
otherwise
thanbydesiring thedefeatoftsarism in anywar,thisas thelesserevil
to nine-tenthsoftheinhabitants ofGreatRussia.Fortsarism notonly
oppresses thosenine-tenthsbutalso demoralizes,degrades,dishonours
andprostitutes thembyteaching themto oppressothernationsandto
coverupthisshamewithhypocritical andquasi-patriotic
phrases.10

Lenindidnotassumethatthevictory oftherevolutionary causewas assured

intheimmediatefuture. On thecontrary, he acknowledged thattsarismmight
be succeeded at firstby "anotherhistoricalforce,"namelyGreat-Russian
capitalism,and thatit was possible to arguethatcapitalismwas "carrying
on progressive workbyeconomicallycentralizing and weldingtogethervast
regions."EventhoughLenindid not acceptthatargument, he admittedthat
Great-Russian capitalismmight - fora time- proveto be successful:"Let us
even assume thathistorywill decide in favourof Great-Russiandominant-
nationcapitalism, and againstthehundredand one smallnations....We do not
advocatepreserving smallnationsat all costs;otherconditionsbeingequal,we
are decidedlyforcentralization and are opposed to thepetty-bourgeois ideal
offederalrelationships."Such a turnofeventsdid notmeanthatthesocialists
shouldacceptit:"itis,firstly,
notourbusiness,or thatofdemocrats(letalone
ofsocialists)to helpRomanov-Bobrinsky-Purishkevich throttletheUkraine,
etc....Secondly,ifhistorywereto decideinfavourofGreat-Russian dominant-
nationcapitalism,itfollowshencethatthesocialistroleoftheGreat-Russian
willbe all thegreater."
proletariat...

The economicprosperityand rapiddevelopmentof GreatRussia...

that
require the be
country liberated
fromGreat-Russian of
oppression
othernations....

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 615

The proletarianrevolutioncalls for a prolongededucation of the

workersin the spiritof thefullestnationalequalityand brotherhood.
Consequently,theinterestsoftheGreat-Russianproletariatrequirethat
the masses be systematicallyeducated to champion-most resolutely,
boldlyand in a revolutionary
consistently, manner- completeequality
forall the nationsoppressedby the
and the rightto self-determination
Great Russians.The interestsof the Great-Russians'nationalpride...
coincidewiththesocialistinterestsoftheGreatRussians(and all other)
proletarians.
In thesecondhypotheticalcase we haveconsidered,ourhome-grown
Plekhanov,etc.,etc.,willprovetraitors,
socialistchauvinists, notonlyto
theirown country-a freeand democraticGreatRussia,but also to the
proletarianbrotherhoodof all the nationsof Russia,i.e.,to the cause of
socialism.11

Even a briefreferenceto several other articles Lenin wrote in 1914-16 will

provide additional support to the thesis thatby 1917Lenin had concluded that
the Russian question, or Russian nationalism, posed the greatest challenge
to the revolutionarymovement in the Russian Empire. These articles clearly
differin emphasis fromwhat Lenin had stated as late as 1913 in his critique
of Jewishand Ukrainian "nationalist" tendencies in the socialist movement.
There he appeared to treatthose tendencies as being as equally dangerous for
the cause of proletariansolidarityas the Great-Russian nationalisttendencies,
or those of other established, rulingnations in Europe:

Thereare twonationsin everymodernnation- we sayto all nationalist-

socialists.There are two nationalculturesin everynationalculture.
Thereis theGreat-Russian cultureofthePurishkeviches,Guchkovsand
Struves - butthereis also theGreat-Russianculturetypified
inthenames
ofChernyshevsky and Plekhanov.Thereare thesame twoculturesin the
Ukraineas thereare in Germany, in France,in England,amongtheJews,
and so forth.12

It is easy to see how simplisticifnot demagogical was Lenin's 1913statement

thattherewere "thesame two cultures" (Lenin's italics) in Ukraine and among
the Jewsas there were in Germany and in France. Most seriously,Lenin did
not bother to explain to which of the two national cultures the Great-Russian
peasants belonged- or whether they had as yet become "national" at all By
1914,Lenin no longer contrasted the nation of "the Purishkeviches,Guchkovs
and Struves"withthatof "Chernyshevskyand Plekhanov,"as ifthese two were
static givens. In an article titled"The Rightof Nations to Self-Determination"
writtenin the spring of 1914,several months before the outbreak of the war
(and before "On the National Pride"), Lenin admitted that the Great-Russian

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6l6 SZPORLUK

nationality problemwas a verycomplexphenomenon,and because itwas so

complex posed a particularly
it seriousdangerto theproletariancause. Like
othernationalisms, Leninadmitted, Great-Russian nationalism passedandwas
passingthrough "various phases" Before 1905,"we almost exclusively knew
national-reactionaries"; after1905,thereemerged"national-liberals" whose
ideologywas adopted"bythewholeofthepresent-day bourgeoisie." Afterthe
nationalliberals,Lenin predictedthat"Great-Russian national-democrats"
would"inevitably appear lateron." Moreover, thosenational-democrats, Lenin
continued, would to
try appeal to the peasantry- and he did not exclude the
possibilitythattheymightbe successful. As wejustnoted,whenLeninspokein
1913aboutthetwocultures,he did nottalkaboutthepossiblenationalistori-
entationofthepeasantry; nowhe concededthatthepeasants,and notonlythe
bourgeoisie,might embrace nationalism: "Evennow,and probablyfora fairly
longtimeto come,proletariandemocracymustreckonwiththenationalism
oftheGreat-Russian peasants."Leninwarnedthatin response,theproletarian
democracy would refuse to make"concessionsto it,but [would]...combatit"
instead.13
Clearly,of all the nationalismsin the empirethe most dangerousto the
proletariancause was Great-Russian and Leninadmittedthata
nationalism,
popular Great-Russian nationalism mightemerge. thisconnectionitisworth
In
notingthathe thought theGreatRussiansmightfollowthePolesintheirtransi-
tionfromnobility nationalism tobourgeoisnationalism to peasantnationalism:
be
"Thingsmight moving in thesame in
direction Lenindeniedthat
Russia...."14
thiswas a newBolshevikpositionon thepeasantry;theBolshevikshad never
"idealized"thepeasant.On thecontrary, "wealwayshavemadeand alwayswill
makea cleardistinction betweenpeasantintelligence and peasantprejudice,
betweenpeasantstrivings fordemocracyand oppositionto Purishkevich, and
the peasantdesireto make peace withthe priest and the landlord"15 In the
fallof1916,literally monthsbeforetheMarch1917revolution, Leninreturned
to the idea thatthepeasantry'spositionin anyfuturerevolutionshouldnot
be takenforgranted.He remindedhis readersthatwhile"1905"had been a
"bourgeois-democratic revolution," thoseparticipating in itincluded"masses
imbuedwiththecrudestprejudices,withthevaguestand mostfantastic aims
ofstruggle...."Whatmattered, Lenincontinued, was that"objectively, themass
movement was breaking thebackoftsarismandpavingthewayfordemocracy;
forthisreasontheclass-consciousworkersled it."16
Lenin did not specificallyexplainwhether,and in whatway,"theclass-
consciousworkers"had led the popularmovementin which,as he himself
hadjustadmitted, themasseshad pursuedveryvagueand fantastic aims.But
he used the of
memory 1905 to offer a generalview of what social revolution
was and was not:

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 617

To imaginethatsocial revolutionis conceivablewithoutrevoltsbysmall

nationsin the coloniesand in Europe,withoutrevolutionary outbursts
by a sectionof the pettybourgeoisiewithall its prejudices,withouta
movementof the politicallynon-conscious proletarianand semi-
proletarianmasses againstoppressionby the landowners,the church,
and themonarchy, againstnationaloppression,etc.- to imagineall this
is to repudiatesocial revolution.17

Lenin thusridiculedtheview thatit was possibleto excludenationalist

revoltsfromsocial revolutions, thata social revolutionwas possiblein which
one side declared"We are forsocialism"and its oppositesaid "We are for
imperialism" He illustratedhispointbymakinga reference to theIrishuprising
thathad brokenoutearlierthatyear:"Onlythosewhoholdsucha ridiculously
pedanticview could vilifythe Irishrebellionby callingit a 'putsch.'"It was
enoughforLenin thatsuch popular movementschallengedthe systemhe
opposed:"We wouldbe verypoor revolutionaries if,in theproletariat's
great
warofliberationforsocialism,we did notknowhow to utilizeeverypopular
movement againsteverysingledisasterimperialism bringsin orderto intensify
and extendthecrisis."18
Thelastquotationhelpsto see whyitwas so easyforLeninto respondmore
readilythananyotherRussianpoliticalleadersto theemergenceofUkraine
as a major problemafterMarch 1917.It also helps us to see how different
Lenin'ssenseofreality was whenone comparesitwiththatofsomeofhiscon-
temporaries in therevolutionary movement.In 1916,AndreaGraziosiwrites,
GeorgiiPiatakov,EvgeniiaBosh,and NikolaiBukharin"elaborateda platform
ofremarkable historicaland politicalblindness," in whichtheydeclaredthat
"boththe questionof stateand thatof nation,and in particularthatof the
nationalstate,weredead,no longerrelevant,no longeron theagenda."19
Lenindid notmaketheirmistake.In shorttimehe realizedthattheoppo-
sitionto thewar he had advocatedin 1914would not lead to a Europe-wide
socialistrevolutionoftheproletariat. He understood thattheonlyEurope-wide
revolutionactuallytakingplace was therevolutionofnationalities, ofwhich
theIrishuprisingof1916was an example,and thatthetaskoftheproletarian
revolutionaries was to manipulatethoserevolutionsin orderto makethem
servethesocialistcause.Leninwas preparedformorenationalist revolutions
in
EasternEurope,includingtheRussianEmpire,and recognizedthatnationalist
movements wouldmakethetasksofproletarian revolutionaries inRussiamuch
moredifficult.Butratherthanignoringthefactof"thenationalization ofthe
masses" (to cite the titleof a famousbook on Germannationalism),Lenin
askedtheproletarian socialiststo lookforwaysinwhichpopularmovements
could servethe proletariancause. When tsarismsuddenlycollapsedseveral
monthslater,he knewwhatneededto be done.

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6l8 SZPORLUK

Lenin'snew,morerealisticand flexible approachto thenationality question

was fullyconsistentwithhis fundamentalviews on such issues as the role
of professional revolutionaries in the partyor on "scientific socialism"as an
ideology that had to be brought to theproletariat "from outside."(Withoutthe
of
leadership revolutionary the
intellectuals, workers were, best,capableof
at
developingonlya "tradeunionconsciousness.") It was thetaskofthepartyto
raisethe"toilingmasses"to a "democratic and socialistconsciousness"and to
educatetheworkers"inthespiritofthefallestnationalequalityand brother-
hood."Theseeducationalefforts werenecessary because"tsarism. ..demoralizes,
degrades,dishonoursand prostitutes" themasses;withouttherevolutionaries,
tsarismmightsucceedin"teachingthemto oppressothernationsand to cover
up thisshamewithhypocriticaland quasi-patrioticphrases."Thus,Lenin's
"flexibility"did notmeanconcessionsin mattersofprinciple:itwas a call for
education,or,one mightsay,forsophisticatedmanipulation, of the popular
massesand theirmovements.
In March1917,earlierthanLeninhad anticipated, revolutioncame:before
Great-Russian capitalismhad a chanceto replacetsarismas a more"progres-
sive system," beforethe national-liberals or national-democrats managedto
establishthemselves in
firmly power, and before the peasants embraced Great-
Russian nationalism. A "free and democratic Great Russia" having failedto
establishitself,Leninmovedto thenextstage:"theproletarianbrotherhood
ofall thenationsofRussia"shouldassumepowerfor"thecause ofsocialism."
Justas theBolshevikpartywas nota Great-Russian partybutrepresented the
proletariat ofall thenationalities oftheformer empire,so Lenin'sgovernment
did notconsideritselfto be one ofGreatRussia,Indeed,because aftertaking
powerinRussiahe expecteda socialistrevolution to followin othercountries,
and becausehe treatednationsand nationalism as phenomenatheproletarian
revolutionaries could makeuse of in theirstruggleforsocialism,Leninwas
ready to offerdeals to thenationalities thatno otherRussianpoliticianswere
prepared to do. For our topic,the most importantof thesewas in the area
of Russian-Ukrainian relations.In 1917,Lenin'spartyand thengovernment
adoptedhisideas of1914:to quoteSerhiiPlokhy, theBolsheviksaccepted"not
only in theory but also in practice,the division of theall-Russiannationality
intothreeseparatenations:Russian,Ukrainian, and Belarusian." Thisamounted
to "a turningpointin theunmakingofimperialRussia."20
It did nottakemuchtimefortheUkrainiansto discoverwhatLenin'srec-
ognitionofUkraine'sindependenceamountedto in practice:theBolsheviks
were no morepreparedto respectUkraine'sindependencethantheywere
readyto respecttheindependenceofRussia,as theviolentoverthrow ofthe
ProvisionalGovernmentand the subsequentdissolutionof the Constituent
Assemblyshowed.The UkraineLeninwantedto havewas a Sovietrepublic,
formally an equal of Russia,but governedbylocal functionaries of his own

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 619

Bolshevikparty.Andyet,in theconfusingdaysofwarsand revolutions, even

thisconcession"brought togetherthe Bolshevik and
authorities theleadersof
theUkrainiannationalmovement." In the1920s,the"cooperationbetweenthe
Bolshevikregimeand theactivistsoftheUkrainiannationalmovement," even
though it was based on an in
"uneasycompromise," Plokhy'swords, allowed
MykhailoHrushevsky to returnto Ukrainein 1924and workthereforseveral
years.21
Whenwe remember whatLeninhad said aboutthe"fantastic"and "uncon-
scious"or"semi-conscious"ideasand actionsof"themasses"helpingthecause
oftherevolution,we can understand whyhe wouldhavebeenwillingto make
deals withtheUkrainianLeft,forexampletheBorotbists, whilepursuinghis
of
strategicgoal defeating his main enemy, the RussianWhites.In theirwar
withthe RussianCounter-Revolution, Bolsheviksneeded "a bloc withthe
Ukrainianpeasantry,"and Lenin's"support"oftheBorotbistsservedthatthat
goal.22
WhatevertheirUkrainian"partners"mayhave thoughttheyhad won, a
majority ofleadingofficials ofthenewregimeregardedtheconcessionsgranted
and in particularMoscow's recognitionof the indepen-
to the nationalities,
dence of Sovietrepublicssuch as Ukraine,as onlytemporary. Fromas early
as 1919theydemandedthata singleSoviet- butRussian- statebe established
withits centerin Moscow. This arrangement was proposedby Stalin,who
already in 1920 wanted all Soviet republicsto be incorporatedin theRSFSR.
OthercentralpartyleaderssupportedStalin,and hisonlyseriousopposition
camefromLenin.Stalinbroughtbackhisplanduringtheintra-party andinter-
republicdiscussionsin 1922.He insistedthatUkraine,Belarus,Armenia,and
otherrepublicsbe includedintheRussianSocialistFederatedSovietRepublic,
as theRSFSR's"autonomous"republics,equal in statusto thatoftheBashkir
and TatarASSRs.23Stalin'sproposalwas opposedbythenationalCommunists
in Ukraineand Georgia,and, most importantly, by Lenin,who wrote:"We
recognize thatwe are equals in law withthe Ukrainian SSR etc.and together
on an equal footingwiththemwe arejoininga new union,a new federation,
'The Union of SovietRepublicsof Europe and Asia.'"24 Fromthe Ukrainian
point of viewthe adoption ofthe Stalinproposal would haveamountedto the
restoration ofimperialRussia,eventhoughitwouldbe a Russiaundera new
management andwitha different ideology.ForLeninin 1922,theconstruction
of socialismin Russiafacednew and unexpectedthreats,and in his speech
at thepartycongressin March 1922,he acknowledgedthateven amongthe
leadingofficialsofthe SovietstatetherewerefewcommittedCommunists,
whereaspro-capitalist attitudeswerewidespread.BythenLeninhad realized
thattherevolutionhad destroyednotonlythelandlordsand bourgeoisiebut
also theproletariat.25
He calledthepartyto developa highersocialistculture
of
capable defeating capitalistculture.The equalityofUkraineand other
the

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Ó2O SZPORLUK

republicswiththeRSFSRwithina new,broaderUnionwas a meansto control

theresurgentGreat-Russian
nationalism.

Conclusions

The breakupof the USSR was a greatsurprise,as Kennanpointsout in the

above-mentioned article.Amongthemanyexplanations givenforthebreakup
oftheUnionis theargumentthatitscollapsewas madepossiblebytheUnion
Treaty(1922)and thesubsequentconstitutional provision(1924) thatrecog-
nized the rightof the republicsfreelyto secede,as agreedupon duringthe
Union'sestablishment. However,this"right" was neverintendedto providea
meansforRussiato leavetheUnion.Thus,theriseofan independentRussia
and Russia'srole in thebreakupwas an even largersurprise.People did not
understandthatthe biggestnationality problemof the RussianEmpireand
itssuccessor,theUSSR,was theRussianproblem,or to be precise,theGreat-
Russianproblem.As we have triedto show,Lenin did knowthis.He knew
thatas of1914-17a Russiannationhad notbeen formed,and todayscholars
agree,as Dominic Lievenwrites,that"evenin 1914the Russianswere not
reallya nation."26
The"RussianQuestion"was notsolvedduringtheSovietperiod.TheAffir-
mativeActionEmpirebyTerryMartincoversthenationalities policiesfrom
1923 to thelate 1930s.David Brandenberger, in his book National Bolshevism,
has writtenabout Russianethnocentrism in Stalin'stime.Amongstudiesof
RussiannationalismafterStalin'sdeath is YitzakBrudny'sReinventing Rus-
sia. JohnB. Dunlop exploresthe Russianquestionas a centralproblemin
Gorbachev'stimein his TheRiseofRussiaand theFall oftheSovietEmpire?1
My "DilemmasofRussianNationalism," publishedin 1989,discussesvarious
currentsorvariantsofRussiannationalism, includingtheone thateventually
prevailed,RSFSR nationalism,although notintheformdefinedinthatarticle.28
Theemergence ofRussiaas a politicalpoweris a majorthemeinJerry F.Hough,
Democratization and Revolution intheUSSR,1985-1991. Houghconcludedthat
"ultimately itwas Russiathatended'theRussianEmpire'bysecedingfromit."29
For,indeed,itwas Russiathatin December1991,togetherwithUkraineand
Belarus,denouncedthe 1922agreementforming the USSR, and thatearlier,
in November1990,duringtheRussianleader'sstatevisitto Kyiv,had signed
a treatywithUkraine.RomanSolchanyk'sUkraineand Russia examinesthe
backgroundand thefirstyearsofUkraineand Russia'sinterstate relationsas
independent states.30
Thus,because theRSFSRbeganto functionas theRussiannation-state in
thelatei98os-early1990s,we can see thatLenin'screationplayeda roleat a
verycriticalmomentin history, makingitpossibleto preventa replicaofthe

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 621

Serbian-Croat war,withDonbas and especiallyCrimeaas likelybattlegrounds

in a warbetweenUkraineand Russia.
WhileLenin'ssolutionoftheRussianQuestion- hisacceptanceofUkraine
as a nationand thushis rejectionoftheall-Russianation- did notcause the
breakupoftheSovietUnion,in retrospect we concludethatithelpedto carry
outthedissolution-whatever causeslaybehindit- peacefully.Lenin'sgovern-
mentwas thefirst government of Russiato recognizeUkraine as Russia'sequal
as an independent state,andtheimportance ofthisadmissionis notdiminished
bythefactthatLenindid notwantUkraineto be anymoreindependentthan
he wantedRussiato be independent, sincebothwereto be undertheruleof
theBolshevikparty.Thereis deep historicalirony-a paradox- inthefactthat
itwas an ideologistofcommunismand proletarianinternationalism, and the
founderofa totalitarian system,who influenced therelationsbetweenRussia
and Ukrainein thewayhe did.
Butto closewiththeprecedingsentenceis to invitequestions.One question
maybe addressedto Lenin'sbiographers, historians,and politicalscientists
interestedin the originsand developmentof his thoughtand in its relation
to his politics.Whereand whendid Leninrejecttheidea ofthe"All-Russian
nation"and concludethattheGreatRussianswerea nationseparatefromthe
Ukrainians-forsurelyhe had not learnedit in school?A studentof Ukrai-
nian history, reading"On the NationalPride,"writtenin 1914,notesthatit
followedthe publication,in 1904,of MykhailoHrushevs'kyi'sarticletitled
"The TraditionalScheme of 'Russian'Historyand the Problemof Rational
OrganizationoftheHistoryofEast Slavs."31 Withoutregardto whetherhe had
readHrushevs'kyi(or learnedabouthisviewsfroma partycomrade,saythe
historian MikhailN. Pokrovskii), wouldone be wrongto concludethatLenin's
politicalpositionon theUkraine-Russia problemwereconsistent with,indeed
followedfrom,Hrushevs'kyi'shistoricalscheme?
Anotherquestion,orperhapsa proposal,mightbe directedto thehistorians
ofUkrainian-Russian relationsinwhoseworks- andtherearemany,including
ones ofhighquality-Lenin'spre-1917 viewofUkraineis ignoredor presented
in a lessthancomprehensive way.ConsideringtheroleLeninplayedin Ukrai-
nianhistoryduringtheperiodfrom1917to 1922,Lenindeservesa closerlook
also byUkrainianand Russianhistorians.32
And finally,thereis theproblemof"GreatRussia."As we noted,writerson
Russiannationalismfocustheirattentionon just one formofit,whatAlexei
Millercalls"theAll-Russian" nationalproject.Butwas Lenintheonlysupporter
of its rival,the"Great-Russian" nationalproject?It would be usefulto learn
about his predecessors.We suggestedthathis most notablefollowersand
successorsplayeda majorrolein theeventsof1990-91,buta comprehensive
and systematic studyofthissubjectwouldbe veryuseful.
AndreasKappeler,inhisstudytitled"GreatRussians"and "Little Russians":

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622 SZPORLUK

Russian-Ukrainian Relationsand Perceptions inHistoricalPerspective,began

his surveythatcloses in 1991withquotationsfromSemen Divovych's1762
poem, "A Talk betweenGreatRussia and LittleRussia,"but noted thatthe
"dialogue"imaginedbyDivovychdid notreflect"therealityofpoliticalinter-
relationsbetweenRussiaandtheUkrainianhetmanate...but, rather,thewishful
thinking ofthe Cossack elite."33
While we agree with thisconclusion,we may
add thata "dialogue"imaginedbyDivovychwas notpossiblein his timeand
muchlater,becauseno GreatRussiaexistedunderthemonarchwhoaccording
to Divovychruledboth LittleRussiaand GreatRussia.Therewas no Great
RussiawithintheRussianEmpire- no entitycomparableto theEnglandthat
survivedthecreationoftheUnitedKingdomorto "Polandproper," theKorona,
withintheCommonwealth evenfollowing theUnionofLublin(1569).So there
was no one forLittleRussiato talkto- no one,thatis,untilLenin.
In thisconnectionletus notethatGeorgeKennanwas notthefirstto point
to theRussianRepublic'ssovereignty as a threatto thesurvivaloftheSoviet
Union.As earlyas October1991- thatis, twomonthsbeforethedissolution
oftheUSSR- AleksandrTsipkochargedthatthoseinvolved"inthestruggle
forthesovereignty oftheRSFSR"failedto understand thata sovereignRSFSR
"wouldinevitably push both Ukraine and Belorussia,not to speakofKazakh-
stan,toward separation from a sovereign RSFSR."34 Criticalexposuresofwhat
he calls "suicidalGreatRussianseparatism"have been a themeof Tsipko's
writingsalso since 1991.In an articlepublishedin 2001,forexample,Tsipko
states:"In our country[u nas],just as on thethresholdoftherevolutionsof
theearly20thcentury, an integratednationalelitedid notexistand does not
exist;thereis no nationin theexactmeaningoftheword"35Tsipkoappears
to be ideallyqualifiedto writea book titledProiskhozhdeniie velikorusskogo
separatizma?6One would hope thatin it Leninwould receivethe attention
he deserves.

Notes

1. GeorgeF.Kennan,"Witness onan Empire:The

to theFall"reviewofAutopsy
AmericanAmbassador'sAccountoftheCollapse oftheSovietUnion,by JackF.
Matlock,Jr., New YorkReviewofBooks,November16,1995,7.
2. Kennan,"Witnessto theFall,"10.
3. Geoffrey Hosking,"TheFreudianFrontier,"
TheTimesLiterary Supplement,March
10,1995,27.
4. (Moscow,1960),3:274-75,quotedin Geoffrey
S. lu. Vitte[Witte],Vospominaniia
Hosking,Russia:Peopleand Empire1552-1917(Cambridge,Mass., 1997),479.
5. IvanL. Rudnytsky, EssaysinModernUkrainianHistory, ed. byPeterL. Rudnytsky
(Cambridge, Mass., 1987),34.

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 623

6. See RobertC. Tucker,ed., lhe LeninAnthology (New York,1975),196. The text

of the articleappearson 196-99. "Revolutionary defeatism" was indeed one of
themessagesof"On theNationalPride,"but itsnoveltyand realimportancelay
elsewhere.
7. AlexeiMiller,TheUkrainianQuestion:TheRussianEmpireand Nationalismin
theNineteenth Century, trans.Olga Poato (Budapestand New York,2003), and
originally publishedas "Ukrainskii
vopros"vpolitikevlasteii russkom obshchestven-
nommnenii(vtoraiapolovinaXIX v.) (St. Petersburg, 2000), is a studyofwhat
Millercalls the "All-Russia"nationalproject.He makesno references to Lenin's
ideas aboutRussiannationalidentity.
8. V. I. Lenin,"On theNationalPrideoftheGreatRussians," in V. I. Lenin,Selected
Works, 3 vols.(NewYork,1967), 1:664-65. Forthe nationalist anti-minority official
and popularcampaignin 1914,see EricLohr,NationalizingtheRussianEmpire:
TheCampaignagainstEnemyAliensduringWorldWarI (Cambridge,Mass, and
London,2003).
9. Lenin,"On theNationalPride,"665. (Italicsin theoriginal.)
10. Lenin,"On the NationalPride,"p. 666. (Italicsin the original.)In the Russian
originalLeninplacedRussiain"far-eastern Europe"- v dal 'nevostochnoi
Evrope-
whichat thetimewhenhe wroteconveyeda messagethatis lostin thetranslated
version,"inthefareast ofEurope."See V. I. Lenin,Polnoesobraniesochinenii,5th
ed.,vol.26 (Moscow,1961),108.
11. Lenin,"On the NationalPride,"666-67. As the second partof the last quoted
sentencemakesclear,LeninconsideredtheGreat-Russians'"owncountry"to be
GreatRussia,andwhenhe spokeabout"Russia"he meantthemultinational tsarist
empirein whichthe GreatRussianswere one of manynations.It is important
to rememberLenin'spointbecause his references to "Russia"in 1917have been
ofteninterpretedas meaningthathe consideredall oftheempireto be Russianin
a nationalsense.As Leninhad made clearin "On theNationalPride,"he thought
of GreatRussiaas a nationthatwas just one of the nationswithinthe Russian
Empire.
12. V. I. Lenin,"CriticalRemarkson the NationalQuestion,"in V. I. Lenin,Critical
Remarkson theNational Question.TheRightofNations to Self-Determination
(Moscow,1974),20. (Italicsin the original.)At timesLenindid qualifyhis "two
cultures"statementbyadmitting thatbourgeoisnationalismand whathe called
"Black-Hundrednationalism" GreatRussiawerenotidentical(p. 20), butmore
in
oftenthannothe placedthemunderone rubricin oppositionto proletariancul-
ture.See,forexample,p. 13:"Ourtaskis tofight thedominant, Black-Hundred and
bourgeois nationalcultureofthe GreatRussians.... Fightyour own Great-Russian
landlordsand thebourgeoisie,fighttheir'culture'in the name of international-
ism...."
13. V. I. Lenin,"TheRightofNationsto Self-Determination," in V. I. Lenin,Selected
Works, 3 vols. (New York,1967),1:651.(Italicsin theoriginal.)

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624 SZPORLUK

14. Lenin,"TheRightofNationsto Self-Determination," 651n.

15. Lenin,"TheRightofNationsto Self-Determination," 651.
16. V. I. Lenin,"TheDiscussionofSelf-Determination SummedUp,"inLenin,Critical
Remarks, 146.
17. Lenin,"TheDiscussionofSelf-Determination SummedUp,"146.
18. Lenin,"TheDiscussionofSelf-Determination SummedUp,"148.
19. AndreaGraziosi,A New,PeculiarState:ExplorationsinSovietHistory, 1917-1937
(Westport, Conn.,and London, 2000), 4-5.
20. SerhiiPlokhy,Unmaking ImperialRussia:MykhailoHrushevsky and theWriting
ofUkrainianHistory(Toronto,Buffalo, and London,2005), 213.
21. Plokhy,UnmakingImperialRussia, 214. For a fullerreviewof the Ukrainian-
Bolshevikconfrontation in 1917-20, see JohnS. Reshetar,Jr.,"Ukrainianand
RussianPerceptionsoftheUkrainianRevolution," in Ukraineand Russiain Their
HistoricalEncounter, ed. PeterJ.Potichnyj, Marc RaefF,
JaroslawPelenski,Gleb
N. Zekulin,140-63 (Edmonton,1992),especially144-48 and 156-59.
22. Jeremy Smith,TheBolsheviks and theNationalQuestion, 1917-23(Basingstoke and
London,1999),120-21. Leninunderstoodtheimplications oftheUkrainianLeft's
successin theelectionsof1917and mayhaveseen in it a signthattheUkrainian
peasantswere becoming"national"followingthe Polish model. In 1919 Lenin
proposeda temporarybloc withthe Borotbists,whileconcurrently "launching
a propagandacampaignforthe completemerger[ofUkraine]withthe RSFSR."
At thesame time,however,he advocated"greatest cautionregarding nationalist
traditions, observanceofequalityoftheUkrainianlanguageand culture,
strictest
all officials
tobe requiredto studytheUkrainianlanguage,and so on and so forth."
RichardPipes, ed., withthe assistanceof David Brandenberger, TheUnknown
Lenin:FromtheSecretArchive(New Havenand London,1996),76. FortheUkrai-
niansthiswas morethantheotherRussianswerepreparedto do at thatcritical
time.We mayadd thatit was owingto Lenin'spressurethatthe UkrainianSSR
was allowedto embracepractically theentireterritorythatUkraineheldbetween
MarchandDecember1918whenitwas independent ofMoscow.Defying Bolshevik
activistsin Kharkiv,
Odesa, Kryvyi Rih,and Donbas, butin order to accommodate
theUkrainianleftists(some ofwhomjoined theBolshevikparty),Lenininsisted
on attachingthe southand southeastof today'sUkraineto the UkrainianSSR.
See YaroslavBilinsky,"TheCommunistTake-overoftheUkraine," in TheUkraine,
1917-1921:A StudyinRevolution, ed. TarasHunczak,104-27 (Cambridge,Mass.,
1977),especially127.
23. See RobertService,TheIronRing,vol. 3 ofLenin:A PoliticalLife(Bloomington
and Indianapolis,1995),93-96, forpartypoliciesregarding thestatusofUkraine
between1919and 1922.
24. Smith,TheBolsheviks and theNationalQuestion,185-86. Itmightbe pointedout
thattheRSFSR,evenwithoutUkraineand other"independent" republics,didnot
becomea Great-Russian Sovietrepublicbutremainedan heiroftheempireinthat

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 LENIN, "GREAT RUSSIA," AND UKRAINE 625

itincludedVolgaTatars,Bashkirs, thepeoplesofNorthCaucasus,as wellas those

ofCentralAsia (thelatteruntiltheirelevationto theUnion-republic statuslater
on). Thepost-SovietRussiainheritedthispartofimperiallegacywhenitbecame
independent, as thecurrentprotestsbysome russkiiewho saytheydo notwant
to be calledrossiianeshow.
25. Moshe Lewin,Lenin'sLast Struggle,trans.A. M. SheridanSmith(Ann Arbor,
Mich.,2005), 6.
26. Dominic Lieven,Empire:TheRussian Empireand Its Rivals (London, 2000),
384.
27. TerryMartin,TheAffirmative ActionEmpire:Nationsand NationalismintheSoviet
Union,1923-1939(Ithaca,N.Y.,2001);DavidBrandenberger, NationalBolshevism:
StalinistMass Cultureand theFormationofModernRussianNational Identity,
1931-1956(Cambridge,Mass.,2002); YitzakM. Brudny, ReinventingRussia:Rus-
sian Nationalismand theSovietState,1953-1991(Cambridge,Mass.,1998);John
B. Dunlop,TheRiseofRussiaand theFall oftheSovietEmpire(Princeton,1993).
RomanSzporluk,"Nationalities and theRussianProblemin theUSSR: A Histori-
cal Outline,"originally publishedin 1973 and reprintedin Russia,Ukraine,and
theBreakupoftheSovietUnion(Stanford, 2000), 1-27, arguedthattheRussian
problem was the most important problemin theUSSR.
nationality
28. RomanSzporluk, "DilemmasofRussianNationalism," inRussia,Ukraine,
reprinted
and theBreakupoftheSovietUnion,182-228.
29. Jerry F.Hough,Democratizationand Revolutionin theUSSR,1985-1991 (Wash-
ington,D.C., 1997),374.
30. RomanSolchanyk, Ukraineand Russia: ThePost-Soviet Transition(Lanham,Md.,
2001).
31. Hrushevs'kyi'sarticlefirstappearedinEnglishinAnnalsoftheUkrainianAcademy
ofArtsand Sciencesin theUS. 2, no. 2 (1952):355-64; reprinted in FromKievan
'
Rus toModernUkraine:FormationoftheUkrainianNation(Cambridge,Mass.,
1984); an Englishtranslation is also in LubomyrR. Wynar, MykhailoHrushevsky:
Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation inHistoriography (New York,1988),35-42.
32. See forexample,PeterJ.Potichnyj, Marc Raeff,JaroslawPelenski,Gleb 2ekulin,
eds,Ukraineand Russiain TheirHistoricalEncounter(Edmonton,1992);Andreas
Kappeler,Zenon E. Kohut,FrankE. Sysyn,and Markvon Hagen,eds., Culture,
Nation,and Identity: TheUkrainian-Russian Encounter(1600-1945) (Edmonton,
1992); and A. I. Miller,V. F. Reprintsev, and B. N. Floriia,eds.,Rossiia-Ukraina:
istoriiavzaimootnoshenii (Moscow,1997).
33. AndreasKappeler,"GreatRussians"and "LittleRussians":Russian-Ukrainian
Relationsand Perceptions inHistoricalPerspective, Donald W. TreadgoldPapers
in Russian,EastEuropeanand CentralAsianStudies(Seattle,2003), 78. Divovych
neverexplainedwhetherGreatRussiaembracedtheentirearea ofthestateother
thanLittleRussia:did he thinkthatKazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia,or theBaltic
provinces, were partsof Great Russia? For a discussionofDivovych'sworkin its

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626 SZPORLUK

Ukrainianpoliticaland intellectual
contextsee SerhiiPlokhy, Ukraineand Russia:
Representations ofthePast (Toronto,2008), 5-6 and especially36-40.
34. AleksandrTsipko,"Dramarossiiskogovybora," Izvestiia,1 October1991,5, cited
in Dunlop,TheRiseofRussiaand theFall oftheSovietEmpire,61.
35. AleksandrTsipko,"Oslepleniiei nakazaniie," Literaturnaiiagazeta, 23-29 May
2001,1 and 3 (translation
mine).
36. Thatis something comparableto N. I. Ulianov,Proiskhozhdenie sepa-
ukrainskogo
ratizma(Moscow,1996), originally published in New York in 1966.

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