1.4. Sec.

7, Art XII, 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE XII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Private Lands
Rules on acquisition
Citizenship Requirement

1. Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No. L-630, November 15, 1947; 79 Phil 461 (Land Titles and
Deeds – Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, an alien bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. in Dec.
1941 and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, the court rendered
judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.

Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held. No. ―Public agricultural lands‖ mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated: ‗Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,‘ and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources
in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides: Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

2. Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994 (Land
Titles and Deeds – Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land located in Fundidor, San Nicolas with an
area consisting of 213 square meters including a one-story house. Respondent contends that she bought
the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale and the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent. Private respondent entrusted the administration
of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondent‘s husband. Petitioner on the
other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by
a photocopy of a deed of sale written in Chinese.

Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in
acquiring private lands.
 3. HALILI vs. CA GR # 113539, MARCH 23, 1998

FACTS: Private respondents, both American Citizens, inherited real properties from Simeon de Guzman,
who died intestate, located in the Philippines. His wife, Helen, executed a deed of quit claim assigning,
transferring and conveying to their son, David Rey, all her rights, titles and interests in and over 6 parcels
of land which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon who himself was an AMCIT. Among the said parcels
of land that is now in litigation, are situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of
6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259
was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.

On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein
private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
130721(M) was issued in the latter's name. David thereafter sold the land to private respondent
Emiliano Cataniag. Petitioners, the adjoining lot‘s owners, questioned the validity and constitutionality
of the 2 conveyances, i.e. from Helen to David and between David and Emiliano. They also claimed
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art.1621, NCC.

Issue: what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino
citizen?

HELD: The SC ruled that although Helen‘s deed of quit claim -in which she assigned, transferred and
conveyed to David all her rights, titles, and interests over the property she had inherited from her
husband collided with Sec.7, Art. XII of the 87 Constitution. Since the disputed land is now owned by
Cataniag, a FILCIT, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served. Non Filipinos can not acquire or hold title
to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. However, if
land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

4. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINIA SANTOS Y CANON

FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-appellant.

Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967)

FACTS: Justina Santos and her sister Lorenzo were owners in common of a piece of land in Manila with
an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at
the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino
Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the
houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time
lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620. Justina died and Lorenzo became
the sole owner of the land.
The parties now entered into the lease contract (in favor of Wong Heng) for 50 years: that ten days
after, they amended the contract so as to make it cover the entire property of Justina Santos; less than a
month after, they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased
premises should his pending petition for naturalization be granted; but then was failed.

Then, after finding that adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted,
the parties entered into two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the
option to buy at 50 years which indubitably demonstrate that each of the contracts in question was
designed to carry out Justina Santos' expressed wish to give the land to Wong and thereby in effect
place its ownership in the hands of Wong.

ISSUES: Whether or not the disputed land can be transferred to Wong.

RULING: No. Aliens cannot acquire ownership of the land as stated in Section 7, Art XII of the 1987
Constitution.

Further, the Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:

[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes.
Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it — rights the
sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the
use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made
up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the
space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril.

The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" is an expression of public policy to conserve lands
for the Filipinos.

FACTS: This is the second motion that the defendant-appellant has filed relative to this Court's decision
of September 12, 1967. Accepting the nullity of the other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7), the defendant-
appellant nevertheless contended that the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) is so separable from the rest of the
contracts that it should be saved from invalidation. In denying the motion, we pointed to the
circumstances — that on November 15, 1957, the parties entered into the lease contract (in favor of
Wong Heng) for 50 years: that ten days after, they amended the contract so as to make it cover the
entire property of Justina Santos; less than a month after, they entered into another contract giving
Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his pending petition for naturalization be
granted; that on November 18, 1958, after failing to secure naturalization and after finding that
adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted, the parties entered into
two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the option to buy at 50
years which indubitably demonstrate that each of the contracts in question was designed to carry out
Justina Santos' expressed wish to give the land to Wong and thereby in effect place its ownership in
alien hands, that "as the lease contract was part of a scheme to violate the Constitution it suffers from
the same infirmity that renders the other contracts void and can no more be saved from illegality than
the rest of the contracts." The present motion is for a new trial and is based on three documents (1
Codicil and 2 wills) executed by Justina Santos which, so it is claimed, constitute newly-discovered
material evidence: Codicil- Justina Santos not only named Tita Yaptinchay LaO the administratrix of her
estate with the right to buy the properties of the estate, but also provided that if the said LaO was
legally disqualified from buying she was to be her sole heir. Wills- Justina Santos enjoined her heirs to
respect the lease contract made, and the conditional option given, in favor of Wong.

ISSUE: WON the lease contract executed by Santos is valid.

HELD: This is a misrepresentation of the grossest sort. The documents were known to the defendant-
appellant and her counsel even before the death of Justina Santos. Nor is there anything in the
documents that is likely to alter the result we have already reached in this case. With respect to the
1957 codicil, it is claimed that Justina Santos could not have intended by the 99-year lease to give Wong
the ownership of the land considering that she had earlier devised the property to Tita Yaptinchay LaO.
Without passing on the validity of her testamentary disposition since the issue is one pending before the
probate court, it suffices to state here that even granting that Justina Santos had devised the land in
dispute to LaO, Justina Santos was not thereby barred or precluded from subsequently giving the land to
Wong. The execution of the lease contract which, together with the other contracts, amount to a
transfer of ownership to Wong, constitutes an implied revocation of her codicil, at least insofar as the
disposition of the land is concerned. As for the 1959 wills, it is said that they manifest a desire to abide
by the law, as is evident from the statement therein that Wong's right to buy the land be allowed
"anytime he or his children should be entitled to buy lands in the Philippines (i.e., upon becoming
Filipino citizens)". It seems obvious, however, that this is nothing but a reiteration of the substance of
the lease contract and conditional option to buy which in compensation, as our decision demonstrates,
amount to a conveyance, the protestation of compliance with the law notwithstanding. In cases like the
one at bar, motives are seldom avowed and avowals are not always candid. The problem is not,
however, insuperable, especially as in this case the very witnesses for the defendant-appellant testified
that — Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman,
it is just natural when she said, "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this
contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper, she said — 'you just go ahead, you prepare that, I am
the owner, and if there is illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality.'" The ambition of
the old woman before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these
properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doña Justina told me that she did not
have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her
grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in
Tagalog. She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her
much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is
why we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquired Filipino
citizenship, being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen. The other points raised in the motion for new
trial either have already been disposed of in our decision or are so insubstantial to merit any attention.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for new trial is denied. (lease contract not valid)

5. JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000

FACTS: The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction,
operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard
and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a
shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale.
Through a series of transfers, NIDC‘s rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the
National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be
privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After negotiations, it
was agreed that Kawasaki‘s right of first refusal under the JVA be ―exchanged‖ for the right to top by
five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a
stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead. During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing
bidder. Even so, because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG
Summit‘s bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and,
hence, must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECO‘s capital
stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock.

ISSUE: Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond
40% of PHILSECO‘s stocks

HELD: In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No.
146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a ―shipyard‖ was
not a ―public utility.‖ But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP
Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1
of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands. A shipyard
such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to comply with the 60%-
40% capitalization under the Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an
intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC
opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the
extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The NIDC, on the
other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and
necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even
beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization. Kawasaki
was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of first refusal to 40% of the
total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of
the joint venture on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.
 6. G.R. No. 133250: Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation 09 July 2002,
Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since
the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

NOTES:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

7. G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by
Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

FACTS:
On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels,
denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin,
Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in
Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant
claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.

In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor
General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not
have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for.

Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis of acquisitive
prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown title to the parcels of land being
claimed.

Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in interest, covering a period of
more than 52 years (at least from the date of the survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62
years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth
parcel described in plan PSU-112592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open,
public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a
corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of
this case, that the Roman Catholic Church, as a corporation, is disqualified from owning properties from
the public domain based on Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution and that the registration was
applied after the effectivity of the 1973 constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purpose
of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.

2. Whether or not the lots are part of the public domain.

RULING:

In 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518. No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time,
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. We can
say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy.
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time),
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows: Sec.
113. Acquisition and alienation of property. — Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate
and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive
bequests or gifts for such purposes

8. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. LRC (1957) G.R. No. L-8451 December 20,
1957

FACTS: Mateo Rodis sold his parcel of land located in Davao City covered by Transfer Certificate No.
2263 to the herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., on Oct. 4,
1954. Herein petitioner is a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws,
with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Upon presentation of the deed of
sale to the Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter required herein petitioner to submit an
affidavit declaring that 60 percent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens pursuant to similar case
where the Carmelite Nuns of Davao registered a deed of donation of a parcel of land in favour of their
congregation. Although willing to submit such affidavit, herein petitioner claimed that the case of the
corporation sole is not similar to that of the Carmelite Nuns because a corporation sole has only one
incorporator as compared to five for the Nuns and the owner of the land would be the Catholic
population of Davao and not the corporation sole or the congregation. The Register of Deeds referred
the matter to The Land Registration Commissioner for resolution. The Commissioner resolved, after
proper hearing, that the herein petitioner corporation was not qualified to acquire private lands in the
Philippines in the absence of that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens,
there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. This
is pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution. After the
motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with the
Supreme Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law the deed of sale is
actually in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the
establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered reversing
and setting aside the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not corporations sole is qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines in view of the
provisions of section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution?

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale • A corporation
sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.

In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters •
corporation sole 1. composed of only one person, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which
is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever 2. only the
administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the
diocese or territory of the corporation sole 3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent
and ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the corporation
sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation
sole. • Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be
composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple) • undeniable proof that
the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly
Filipino citizens o presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully
covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution • fact that the law thus expressly
authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main
source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication
that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against
the revitalization of religious landholdings. • as in respect to the property which they hold for the
corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in
other cases of trust.

1.5. Sec. 8, Art XII, 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE XII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.

Sec 5 of RA 8179
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8179, March 28, 1996
AN ACT TO FURTHER LIBERALIZE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of1991), AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEC. 5. The Foreign Investments Act is further amended by inserting a new section designated as Section
10 to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8
of the Constitution. – Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban
land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other
purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted:
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other
purposes which when added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum
areas herein authorized.

A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be situated in
different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the total land area
thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three
 (3) hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee
who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land and vice
versa.

2. Land Registration
2.1. Past & Present Legislation
2.2. Torrens System of Registration
Background, Purpose, Advantages
Requisites in Bringing Land under the Torrens System

1. CONSUELO LEGARDA v. N. M. SALEEBY, GR No. 8936, 1915-10-02

Facts:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed for a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the... title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included
the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed
the registration of said title... and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant.

They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.

Issues:

who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

Ruling:

The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to
constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that someone else
was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the Torrens system of land registration must fail.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All
the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world
are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the
world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered
title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can
not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part,
comprised in the earlier certificate.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties.

The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.

It would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of
the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises
as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in question in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate...
certificates issued. Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

2. MANUELA GREY ALBA ET AL. v. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, GR No. 5246, 1910-09-16

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey.
The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural
land in Bulacan described as:

A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan,
upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial
area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of
Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo,
Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the
same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream called Sapang
Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.

This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
United States currency.

After hearing, the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that land described in the petition
be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

On June 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for
a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2
parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by
the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, the petitioners deliberately omitted to
include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of
registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state grant for the same and was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April
6, 1895.

He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision
of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in
said motion.

The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence
presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by
excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment, the petitioners appealed.

It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was
occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee
does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that
the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his
name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.

The court (CLR) held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in
their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496,
and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in
violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides
"that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."

Issues: whether or not the appellee was deprived of his property without due process of law.

Ruling: No. The SC resolved that The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the
petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not
notified; but he was made a party defendant by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern."
If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.

Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of
what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South Australia
by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the
presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands,
under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and
other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to
such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole world. This system was evidently
considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the
community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.

At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to
land, because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing,
and there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)

The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted because his
vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the land to a third person. . . The registered
proprietor may feel himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)

The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by Sir Robert
Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied
from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can
transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but
depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence
of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)

The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr.
(afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system
title by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A
 sale of land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is
issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes
indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be
effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the
correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them,
is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy &
Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)

By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with
interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and
certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its
transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that
only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee
of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be, and
the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the
decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

Notes:

The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been the subject
of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert,
56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was copied
substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.

The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those States.

It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it before.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the
res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to
make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were
not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin
vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th
ed., secs. 606, 611.

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although
the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as to
the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to determine the
persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in
rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee
of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

3. Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Sept. 24, 1999

Facts:

A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially
foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a
petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the
proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with
the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole
and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRB’s name without
the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages.
Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled
TRB’s title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and
sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be
considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject
in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its
recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim
over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending
for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages
to Capays.

Issue:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute?

Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:

The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to
real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated
on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title
and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that
the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one
hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not
annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title
upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as
null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as
much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to
purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice.
Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it
to Santiago.

2.3. Nature; Jurisdiction

1. Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz, Sept. 16, 1910

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey.
The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural
land in Bulacan described as:

A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon
which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52
hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the
lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado,
Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the same stream and the lands of
the capellania; and on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz,
Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.

This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
United States currency.

After hearing, the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that land described in the petition
be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

On June 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for
a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2
parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by
the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, the petitioners deliberately omitted to
include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of
registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state grant for the same and was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April
6, 1895.

He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision
of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in
said motion.

The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence
presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by
excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment, the petitioners appealed.

It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was
occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee
does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that
the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his
name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.

The court held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their
petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and
that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the land court commit an error in reopening this case?
2. Whether or not the petitioners obtained the registration by means of fraud.

RULING:

1. Yes. The decree of February 12, 1908 should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the
part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two
small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor
when the original plan was made.

Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case
and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud.

2. No. By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. The same meaning should be given to
the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as
used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would
constitute this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact and circumstances in
each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have determined, is
whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of
February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges, did not rest its judgment as to the
conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to determine the
persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in
rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee
of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be, and
the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the
decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908.

2. Moscoso vs. Court of Appeals, April 24, 1984

Facts: On March 22, 1966, petitioner applied for land registration of a 1,147 square meters residential
lot situated in the población of the municipality of Palo, province of Leyte, bounded and described in the
Survey Plan Psu-54699 of the then General Land Registration Office as verified and approved under date
June 16, 1927. Her application substantially stated that petitioner is the owner in fee simple of the land
and improvements thereon as her acquisition by inheritance from her father, the late Pascual Monge y
Vigera who died on June 9, 1950, and that the same parcel of land is her share in a partial partition of
estate she and her brothers and sisters executed on May 22, 1964.

After due publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing of the petition in the Official Gazette, only the
Highway District Engineer of Leyte as public oppositors, and Concordia Lanuncia, Flaviano L.
Marchadesch, Jr., and herein private respondent Maximina L. Moron as private oppositors appeared for
the initial hearing before the trial court.

The trial court summarily dismissed the opposition of the Highway District Engineer who merely sought
to secure a reservation for a road right-of-way in favor of the national government in view of petitioner's
willingness to annotate the same on the certificate of title which might issue. The opposition of the
private parties thus remained.

The written opposition substantially allege that they, including one Mrs. Apolonia L. Marchadesch who
died in 1963 and survived by her only issue, oppositor Flaviano L. Marchadesch, are the illegitimate
children of the late Zenona Lanuncia and the recognized natural children of the late Pascual Monge,
father of applicant Andrea M. Moscoso.

Upon the termination of the hearing on the merits, the then Presiding Judge of the CFI, Tacloban City,
rendered his decision dated December 22, 1971, directing that the title over the land should not be
registered exclusively in the name of the applicant since "it has been overwhelmingly established by
them (the private oppositors) that they and their sister Apolonia are the children of Zenona Lanuncia
and Pascual Monge.

The trial court gave significant weight to the carbon copy of a power of attorney executed and signed by
the late Pascual Monge on February 11, 1945 in favor of Maximina L. Moron, wherein he stated that
Maximina is his daughter and appointed her as his Attorney-in-Fact to transact with the United States
Armed Forces in the Philippines in his behalf for the collection of rentals and other war damage claims
due and payable to him. The court ruled that the power of attorney was an authentic writing wherein
Maximina Lanuncia was voluntarily recognized as the daughter of Pascual Monge.

Petitioners contend that the power of attorney is not an authentic document to support voluntary
recognition because the words "my daughter" reveals a clear sign of erasure and is a product of
falsification as presented in the rebuttal testimony of her brother Elpidio Monge and that said document
is not even a public document because it was merely acknowledged by the Municipal Mayor of Palo,
Leyte who had no authority to authenticate writings as public documents which could be done only by a
notary public.

Acting upon the motion for reconsideration, the Court modified its decision in the Order dated May 25,
1972 with the judgment of December 22, 1971 amended in the sense that the Court orders the
registration of title over the parcel of land in the name of the co-ownership of (1) Andrea Moscoso for
13/14 share; and (2) Maxima Moron for 1/14 share, subject to the reservation of a road right-of-way in
favor of the government of the Philippines.

Not satisfied with the amended judgment, petitioner elevated the case to the defunct Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge
(whether or not the court, in acting in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court, is competent to
determine the right of the oppositor to inherit).

Ruling: Petitioner's contention that the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual
Monge, is untenable. We have a number of cases that answer petitioner's position. Thus, in the case of
Florentino vs. Encarnacion, We ruled:

Petitioner-appellants' third assignment of error is not well taken. Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule
that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and
proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly
litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in
special and exceptional circumstances. From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that
the peculiarity of the exceptions is based not alone on the fact that the Land Registration Courts
are likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the following premises: (1) Mutual
consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting the aforesaid issues for the
determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the
parties in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support
 thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and
adequate for rendering a decision upon these issues.

Upon a scrutiny of the proceedings in the trial court, We find that petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration wherein she assailed the ruling of the trial court that based upon the power of
attorney, the oppositor was an acknowledged natural child of the late Pascual Monge and entitled to a
portion of the land subject of the land registration proceedings. She claimed that the document was not
authentic and not a public document. In effect, petitioner acquiesced in submitting the issue as to the
status of the oppositor as an acknowledged natural child entitled to successional rights and had the full
opportunity to dispute the authenticity of the document in question as in fact, applicant's brother,
Elpidio Monge, gave rebuttal testimony to support petitioner's theory that the document was a product
of a falsification, which the trial court did not believe. Moreover, the court considered and deemed the
evidence already of record sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issue thus raised.
In doing so, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.

In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicity of suits impel Us to hold and
rule that under the facts of the case at bar, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, may
adjudicate the land sought to be registered to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole or
in part, based on evidence submitted to the court showing that the party has proper title for
registration. (Section 37, Act 496.)

In any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo, L-31854, Sept. 9. 1972,
116 SCRA 431, "Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land
Registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question
involving a mode of practice which may be waived." In meeting the issue raised by the oppositor as to
her status as an acknowledged natural child as a result of her voluntary recognition appearing in Exhibit
"2" (power of attorney), the oppositor (now the petitioner herein) had waived the procedural question
and she may not be allowed to raise the same in the present petition.

The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system is an action in rem not in
personam hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction
to deal with and dispose of the res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the
decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated
within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding
in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown.

The decision appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the adjudication of the land subject of the
land registration proceedings shall be in the co-ownership of petitioner-applicant Andrea M. Moscoso
for 12/13 share and to oppositor-private respondent Maximina L. Moron for 1/13 share. In all other
aspects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

3. Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, Sept. 7, 2005

No need to write these in the case digest BARANGAY PIAPI, herein represented by its chairman
ANDRES L. LUGNASIN and LIBERATO LARGO, RITA LARGO, SABAS MONTECALBO, SR., CARLOS ZAMORA,
DONATA SESICAN, DIZAR CASTILLO, ALEJANDOR GICALE, SALVACION SALE, PABLO MORASTIL, JOSE
JAVELOSA, ISIDRA BERNAL, FELIX EGHOT, CORAZON EGHOT, ROSALINA REMONDE, ROA EGHOT,
CEFERINA LAGROSA, MARIO ARANEZ, ALBERTO CAMARILLO, BOBBY DULAOTO, NOEL ZAMORA,
MARTINO MORALLAS, DANILO FAILAGA, MARITA BRAGAT, NATIVIDAD LAGRAMON, RAQUEL
GEROZAGA, SHIRLY CESAR, PIO ZAMORA, ANDRES LUGNASIN, ELPIDIO SESICAN, CRESENTA BORJA,
CARLITO TANEZA, JR., MARCIAL RELLON, JEANILITO SUMALINOG, ALBERTO ZAMORA, and LUISITO
LAGROSA,

FACTS:

On August 28, 1998, petitioners Barangay Piapi filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 18,
Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages for a parcel of land consisting of 3.2
hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davaol del Sur, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a market value of
P15,000. The same land was subdivided into lots consisting of 100 square meters each, where the
individual petitioners built their houses. On the remaining portion were constructed their barangay
center, multi-purpose gym and health center. They alleged that the respondent fraudulently obtained
from the Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in his name and paid the real estate taxes.
Subsequently, respondent threatened to build a barb-wire fence around the land.

Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the land is P6,030. Under Section 33 (3)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
has exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as the total assessed value of the property is
P41,890, as shown by Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued
by the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur, Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr.

On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction hence this certiorari
petition alleging that Section 19(1) of BP Bilang 129, as amended, gives the RTC jurisdiction over the
complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance.

HELD: No. The contention is bereft of merit. The Supreme Court resolved that the nature of an action is
not determined by the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

Basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.

It can easily be discerned that petitioners' complaint involves title to, or possession of, real property.
However, they failed to allege therein the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what they
stated is the market value of the land at P15,000.00.
Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
thereon, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant. It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the
allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should
have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated
value, which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 33 (3), it is the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

NOTES:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise: (3) Exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

4. Aznar Brothers Realty Co. vs. Aying, May 16, 2005

FACTS:

Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over Lot No. 4399
located in Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on died, so the Cadastral court issued a decision directing
the issuance of a decree of title in the name of her 8 children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano,
Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. However, the certificate was lost
during the war.

All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an extra-judicial partition of real-estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying the lot in issue to the Aznar Brothers Realty Company. The deed was registered
with the ROD of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1994 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing registration of
unregistered land), and since then, the realty company religiously paid the real property taxes on the
property.
Later, Aznar Brothers Realty company filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title since the
original title of the lot was lost during the war. This was granted by the court and the ROD of Lapu-Lapu
was directed to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the Aying Siblings. Thu, OCT No. RO-2856 was
issued.

The Aznar Brothers Realty Company then sent out notices, to vacate the lot to the persons occupying
the property, reasoning that they were the rightful owner. The occupants refused to vacate, hence an
ejectment case was filed against them before the MTC. The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate.
Eventually, this case reached the Supreme Court and a decision was rendered in favor of the realty
company declaring them as the rightful possessor of the land. Meanwhile, persons claiming to be the
descendants of the eight Aying siblings, numbering around 220 persons submitted an amended
complaint &before the RTC and alleged that they are co-owners of the land being the descendants of
the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856; that they had been in actual, peaceful, physical, open,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since
time immemorial; and that the deed pf absolute sale executed in favor of the realty company by the
alleged heirs of Cristina Maloy-on is a fraud and is null and void ab initio because not all co-owners of th
subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-owners who supposedly
signed said document had been dead at the time of the execution thereof; that Aznar Brothers Realty
Company held the land in bad faith, knowing full well that it did not have any right to the land aand used
force, threat and intimidation against them thus suffering moral damages.

Aznar Brothers Realty Company denied that the Ayings are the lawful owners of the land and alleged it
had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of
real property and deed of absolute ale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been paying taxes
thereon religiously. The realty company further alleged that they are barred by prescription to file an
action for recovery of property which should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. It
took the Aying heirs 27 years to fie their action against the realty company.

Issue: w/n the registration of the extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale
conveying the lot in issue to the Aznar Bothers Realty Company with the ROD binding and consequently,
results in the running of the prescriptive period for reconveyance.

Held: No. The sale of registered property recorded in the ROD cannot be considered as registered.
Jurisprudence dictates that the registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order
to affect and bind the land, and thus operate as constructive notice to the world. In this case, the Extra-
judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not
under Act No. 496, therefore the document cannot be deemed registered. As a consequence of non-
registration, the 10-year prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from the date of registration of the
document under Act No. 3344 since no constructive notice to the world was perfected by such
registration. The prescriptive period only began to run from the time the Aying heirs had actual notice of
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale which was not proven by clear and
convincing evidence in this case.

2.4 Land Registration Commission & Registry of Deeds

 1. Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, Dec. 15, 1988

Facts: Petitioners herein applied for the registration of several parcels of land. The court rendered its
decision adjudicating the lots in favor of the petitioners herein and after the finality of the decision has
directed the chief of the general land registration office to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration. The chief submitted a report to the court a quo stating that some of the lots were already
covered by homestead patents and issued a recommendation to set aside the order. Petitioners
contested such action and now the present case.

Issue: WON the action of the chief of the LRA was valid.

Ruling: Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form
for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the
land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land
included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly
indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional
surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court
itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such
duties (Administrative Code, section 177).

Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period
before the court’s decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the
lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.

2. Laburada vs. Land Regstration Authority, March 11, 1998

3. Abrigo vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 154409, June 21, 2004

Facts:

On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Pangasinan and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. On December 7, 1993, the RTC,
Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the
parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise
Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in
favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
voluntarily vacate the premises without the need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the
house and lot, so the vendees declared the lot in their name. Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on
March 15, 1988, as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on canceled by TCT
No. 212598 on April 11, 1996. On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the
house and lot to the petitioners, Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo. On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania
sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera who registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No.
22515 was issued in her name.

Issue:

Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question.

Ruling:

The registered owner of the said property is the respondent, Romana de Vera. According to Art. 1544 of
the NCC provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. The registration under De Vera prevails given that it was registered under the Land
Registration Act and therefore has a Torrens Title as compared to the petitioners who registered it theirs
under Act 3344. This is not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

4. Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals & Bayona, G.R. No. 101115, Aug. 22, 2002

Facts:

The Government alleges that the Original Certificate of Title No. 275 (7431) of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila which was issued to Abundia Romero, did not exist in the records of the Bureau of Lands or in
the Bureau of Building and Real Property Management. The lot did not bear the latter’s signature but
only the words ‘(Sgd.) Raf. R. Alunan’. Additionally, Abundia Romero’s status appeared to be that of a
`widow’ on the title, but on her death certificate, her status was stated as ‘single’. Then, a certain
Ruperto Sepe claimed to be Abundia Romero’s surviving husband and administrator of her intestate
estate. And the defendant-appellees surnamed Sepe, executed an extrajudicial partition, adjudicating to
themselves the lot in question; subdividing the Lot into Lots Nos. 179-A, 179-B & 179-C. The defendant-
appellees Maxima Sepe and her six children sold Lots 179-A and 179-B to defendant-appellee Emilio
Bayona, to whom TCT Nos. 16327 and 16328 were issued. The Government asked the court to annul
Sales Patent No. 481 and OCT No. 275 (7431) in the name of Abundia Romero, TCT Nos. 16327 and
16328 in the name of Emilio Bayona, and TCT No. 16326 in the name of the Sepes; Subdivision Plan Psd-
137612; and all transactions concerning the land in question and to order the reversion of the land to
the public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title No. 275 (7431) was legally issued to Abundia Romero.

Ruling:
Yes, it was legally issued to Abundia Romero. It is declared that OCT No. 275 (7431) is valid despite the
absence therein of the signature of Rafael Alunan, the then Commissioner of Agriculture and Natural
Resource. Since OCT No. 275 (7431) is valid, it follows that Sales Patent No. 481 under IGPSA No. 1794
validly existed among the records of the Bureau of Lands in the name of Abundia Romero. There then
appears to be a valid and regular succession of rights and interests, as the respondents Sepes are
confirmed owners of the subject lot by virtue of their inheritance. Consequently, they had the right to
sell portions of the extra-judicially partitioned property to any person and in this case to the buyer in
good faith, respondent Emilio Bayona.

5. Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486, March 20, 1968

Facts:

Petitioner bought from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land covered by an original certificate of title in the
name of “Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo.” He sought to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. However, the Register of Deeds refused such
registration on the grounds that the property is a conjugal property, hence, it needs the signature of
both spouses. The Register of Deeds contended that since the wife has already died when the sale was
made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without first liquidating and
transferring the property to the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not the Register of Deeds can refuse registration.

Ruling: No. The validity or invalidity of the documents is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 4 of Republic Act 1151 precludes
a register of deeds from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. Under the
aforementioned section, when the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do
is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice
and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

6. Balbin v. Register of Deeds Ilocos SurG.R. No. 20611, May 8, 1969

1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED LAND; PRESENTATION OF

OWNER’S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT; ONLY
ONE DUPLICATE COPY OF TITLE IS SURRENDERED. — Section 55 of Act 496 obviously assumes that there
is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such
that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from
him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTER OF DEEDS’ REFUSAL TO ANNOTATE DONATION PROPER WHERE THERE WERE
THREE OTHER COPIES OF TITLE. — Where, when the petitioner presented to the register of deeds a
duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation for annotation, three
other copies of the title were in existence, the register of deeds was correct in denying the requested
annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." As correctly observed by the
Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners’ claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized
or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how
their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on
one copy and not on the others.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEED OF DONATION SIGNED BY HUSBAND DISPOSING OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY CANNOT
BE REGISTERED. — Where the deed of donation executed by the surviving husband bears on its face an
infirmity, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of the conjugal property which he donated was
more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
portions of the same land to three other parties, the denial of the registration of the said deed of
donation was justified.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT OVER A REGISTERED LAND MAY BE
SUSPENDED. — Where there is a case pending wherein the civil status of the donor and the character of
the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him,
the matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the
meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis
pendens.

5. ID.; OWNER’S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; IMPORTANCE THEREOF. — The law itself refers to
every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If
this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of
Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

Facts: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate
copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the
latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-
vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum
of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of
Florentino Gabaya, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s duplicate
CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the
register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

Issue: W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper.

Ruling: YES. There being several copies of the same title inexistence, their integrity may be affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different
copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available. Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property
of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the
partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of
the property, the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration,
namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share,
not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other
parties. Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status, character of land and
validity of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed
by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and
in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis
pendens.

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

Facts: Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 on June 13, 1913 which
reserved some square meters of land in Barrio Naga, Albay for provincial park purposes. On December 9,
1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by E.O. No. 40 to Diego
Palomo. Two months before his death, Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heir, Ignacion
Palomo and Carmen Palomo which was allegedly covered by an Original Certificate of Title. President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into ―Tiwi
Hot Spring National Parks and Wildlife. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion
of public domain and therefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The Palomos,
however continued in possession of the property and paid real estate taxes and introduced
improvements by planting banana, pandan and coconuts. On May 7, 1974 petitioners filed a civil case
against private respondents who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered
their land and cut down bamboos. The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the
annulment and cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. RTC ad CA ruled
against the Palomos.

Issue: Whether or not the lands claimed by the Palomos are alienable lands of the public domain which
may be acquired by adverse possession?

Held: No. The lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. There was no proof
that the petitioners‘ predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The ―decisions‖ of
the CFI were not signed by the judge but merely certified true copies of notification to Diego Palomo
bearing the signature of the clerk of court. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof no matter
how lengthly, cannot be converted into private property unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. CA‘s decision was affirmed. SPOUSES PALOMO v. CA (G.R. No.
95608, Jan. 21, 1997) Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Lands/ Adverse Possession/Grant of Title: The adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only
to alienable lands of the public domain. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were
not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by
petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no
justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

Palomo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95608, 21 January 1997, Second Division, J. Romero.

The adverse possession which may be the basis for the grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. Forest land is not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it to private property, unless such lands are reclassified
and considered disposable and alienable. The principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the acts of its agents.

ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M. ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
respondents. G.R. No. 85322. April 30, 1991.*

FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in Barrio
Pampangin, Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539. It was originally owned and
possessed by EmilianoAlmeda, father of the petitioners, by virtue of an ―Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial‖ executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his brother Adriano, wherein they attested
the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents, VedastoAlmeda and Josefa C.
Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (great-grandparents of herein
petitioners). After Emiliano‘s death on May 1, 1948, his wife, Ana Menguito, and their children received
the produce of the land and rented out to third persons portions of the property where Emiliano had
three houses built. Upon Ana‘s death on April 3, 1950, her children with Emiliano inherited the property
and the lessees moved out. On June 9, 1980, the brothers Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto executed an
extrajudicial partition adjudicating the land to themselves. The Almeda brothers applied for the
registration of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI.

ISSUE: Whether or not applicants‘ possession of the disputed land prior to January 3, 1968 was valid for
purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

RULING: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still
inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on
January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation
of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of
Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al.,
178 SCRA 708, that: ―Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.‖ The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12 March 1998, First Division, J. Panganiban.

Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is deemed cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. If the rationale of the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who subsequently become Filipino
citizens by naturalization, or the transfer to Filipino citizens.

PALOMO v. CA G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997

FACTS: Diego Palomo ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in
his name on December 9, 1916; December 28, 1916; and January 17, 1917. Diego Palomo donated these
parcels of land consisting of 74,872square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates
of Title Nos. 513,169, 176 and 173 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost
during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.[7] The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913and 3914 sometime in October 1953. On July 10, 1954 President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the
"Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The
area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is
neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registerable
Alpha Bonifacio. Cherry Chao. Myra Chavez. Harriett Gutierrez. Jose Sotelo. KimVillanueva Case Digest –
Land, Titles & DeedsIntroduction & Modes of Acquiring Ownershipunder the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496). The Palomos, however, continued inpossession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon
and introducedimprovements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8,
1971,petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascualmortgaged
the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 toguarantee a loan of P200,000 from the
Bank of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE: Are the natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons?

HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not register able and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest
zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by
petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no
justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.