Nuclear e Secur Co 2

Nuclear power,
energy security and CO2 emission
revised draft
Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen

independent consultant
Ceedata, Chaam, May 2012
Note
In this document the references are coded by Q-numbers (e.g. Q6). Each reference has a unique number in
this coding system, which is consistently used throughout all publications by the author. In the list at the
back of the document the references are sorted by Q-number. The resulting sequence is not necessarily
the same order in which the references appear in the text.
NuclearEsecurity&CO2 1
Abstract
This study is a physical assessment of nuclear power with a global perspective and a long time
horizon and comprises an energy analysis based on a comprehensive life cycle assessment of
the full complex of industrial activities and processes needed to generate useful energy from
uranium. The analysis is based on an advanced light-water reactor in the once-through mode,
which may considered to be representative for nuclear power during the next three decades.
Direct plus indirect energy inputs of the full nuclear process chain are quantified, together
with the specific CO2 emission of each process. Empirical data are used where possible and only
proved technology is included in the assessment.
The results enable scientists and policy makers to assess on physical grounds the claims of the
nuclear industry with regard to energy security and the climate footprint of nuclear power. In
addition some conclusions on the future of nuclear power are possible.
The study introduces three novel concepts: energy cliff, CO2 trap and energy debt.
Summary
Nuclear power is claimed to be indispensable for energy security and climate control, as part of
the future world energy supply. Energy security and climate control are physical issues at global
scale. Therefore a physical analysis of the lifetime energy and material balance of the nuclear
energy system is essential to assess these issues.
This study, with a global perspective and a long time horizon, comprises a full life cycle
assessment (LCA) of a nuclear power plant combined with an energy analysis. The LCA charts
the complete sequence of industrial processes needed to generate nuclear power, called the
nuclear energy system or the nuclear process chain, from cradle to grave. The energy analysis
examines all inputs and outputs of materials and energy of the nuclear energy system, applying
a reliable methodology developed in the 1980s by a large international group of scientists and
economists.
The climate footprint of nuclear power encompasses not only the emission of carbon dioxide
CO2, but also the emission of other greenhouse gases. Virtually no data are available on the
emission of greenhouse gases other than CO2 by the nuclear energy system, so this study limits
its scope to the analysis of the emission of CO2.
The nuclear CO2 emission is assumed to be caused by burning fossil fuels and some chemical
reactions (e.g. cement and steel production) in the nuclear chain. The electrical inputs are
assumed to be provided for by the nuclear system itself.
This study is based on a reference Light-Water Reactor (LWR) in the once-through mode, which
may considered a model for the newest currently operating power reactors and a model for vir-
tually all nuclear power plants under constuction or in the planning stage. Closed-cycle reactor
systems (breeders), if ever possible are unlikely to come on line before 2050.
The nuclear process chain comprises three main components, each consisting of a sequence of
separate processes: front end, mid-section and back end. The processes of the front end and
the mid-section may be considered technologically mature.
The back end imposes a heavy burden on the society, due to a unique and dominant feature of
nuclear power: the generation and mobilisation of huge quantities of man-made radioactivity,
inextricably and irreversibly. Each year a 1 GWe nuclear reactor generates as much radioactivity
as 1000 exploded nuclear bombs of 15 kt, about the yield of the Hiroshima bomb.
Radioactivity is extremely dangerous to man and cannot be destroyed nor made harmless, so
it has to be immobilised and isolated from the biosphere forever. The vital processes of the
back end, needed to achieve a safe situation with regard to the man-made radioactivity, are
systematically passed on to the future. No new technologies are needed to finish the nuclear
process chain, just vast amounts of materials and energy. The timescale to finish the back end
of a given nuclear power station is unprecedented: 100 years or more.
The energy analysis in this study quantifies the direct and indirect energy investments, required
to construct and operate the nuclear energy system and for completing the back end: the
definitive storage of the radioactive wastes, including the closed down reactor. The energy
investments of the yet non-existing processes of the back end are approximated by analogy
with similar, existing, processes.
Major findings of the energy analysis are, among other:
• At an operational lifetime of 25 full power years (3-4 FPY more than the current world
average) the mean energy return on energy investments over the cradle-to-grave (c2g) period
is EROEI = 2.01.
• Energy investments for construction and decommissioning plus dismantling are fixed energy
investments, which are assumed not to depend on the operational lifetime of the reactor. Both
quantities cannot be estimated accurately, due substantial uncertainties and spread in the
basic data. This analysis comes to a mean value of 200 PJ ± 80 PJ, about half of the c2g energy
investments of the nuclear power plant.
• The specific energy consumption of the fuel chain (front end + back end) increases with
decreasing grade of the uranium ore feeding the nuclear system and starts rising exponentially
at grades below 0.3% uranium. Consequently the lifetime net energy delivered by the nuclear
power plant to the consumer declines as the average ore grade declines. When fed by uranium
from ores at grades below 0.02% uranium the EROEI of the nuclear system approaches unit,
meaning that the nuclear energy system becomes an energy sink instead of an energy source.
The rapid decline of the net energy production at low grades is called the energy cliff and turns
out to be nearly independent on the height of the fixed energy investments (construction and
dismantling) and independent on the performance of the nuclear energy system as a whole.
• If no new rich uranium resources of significant size are discovered during the next decades,
the nuclear system will fall off the energy cliff in the period 2050-2080, within the lifetime of
new nuclear build, depending on the capacity of the world nuclear capacity.
• The chance of discovering of new rich uranium ore deposits of significant size are unknown.
During the past few decades no significant discoveries have been reported.
• Basically the depletion of uranium resources as source of useful energy is a thermodynamic
notion.
• The specific CO2 emission of the baseline nuclear system in this study is 84 -130 gCO2/kWh,
if supplied by uranium ore at a grade of 0.13% U. At a grade of 0.05% U, about the current world
average, the emission is 98-144 gCO2/kWh.
The large spread in the emission figures is caused by uncertainties in the data used to calculate
the emission. These figures are higher than the results of other studies, due the choice of the
system boundaries: this study includes all processes of the c2g period. No other studies has
done so.
• Note that the unit geqCO2/kWh should not be applied here, because only the nuclear CO2
emission is known, excluding other greenhouse gases. There are reasons to suppose that the
nuclear process chain emits also other greenhouser gases, in view of the large amounts of
fluorine and chlorine and their compounds being used in the nuclear process chain. These
emissions are a well-kept secret of nuclear power. However, ‘no data’ does not equal ‘no
emission’.
• A rising specific energy consumption of the nuclear chain with decreasing ore grades causes
a rising specific CO2 emission per kilowatt.hour. When the nuclear system is fed by uranium from
ores at grades below 0.02% uranium, the specific CO2 emission of nuclear generated electricity
surpasses that of gas-fired and even coal-fired electricity generation. This phenomenon is called
the CO2 trap.
• If no new rich uranium resources of significant size are discovered during the next decades,
the nuclear system will get stuck in the CO2 trap in the period 2050-2080, within the lifetime
of new nuclear build, depending on the capacity of the world nuclear park.
• About half of the c2g energy requirements has not been invested at the moment of closedown
of the reactor, but has irrevocably to be invested in the century thereafter. This ‘mortgage’ is
called the energy debt of the nuclear system. The energy debt refers to the activities to be done
in order to keep the human environment habitable and avoid societal and economic disruption:
final disposal of all radioactive wastes, including the reactor and associated equipment.
Novel notions introduced by this study are: energy cliff, CO2 trap and energy debt.
In addition to the introduction of these novel notions this study is distinct from other studies by
the choice of the system boundaries of the analysis: all processes and activities causally related
to the generation of nuclear power are included. This implies, among other, an exceedingly long
time horizon of 100-150 years. Other studies deleted one or more processes from the process
chain and/or ignored the indirect energy investments. Another distinction is that this study
relies on empirical data where possible and on proven technology, not on concepts only existing
in cyberspace. As a consequence many figures with regard to energy requirements and CO2
emissions are higher than in other studies.
A number of references are dating from the 1970s and 1980s. The concerned technologies have
virtually not been changed since. Besides, the information flow in the open literature from
the nuclear industry on relevant matters has become increasingly meager during the past few
decades.
The cost of nuclear power will rise very likely in the future, due to a combination of several
factors, among other:
• energy will become more expensive
• uranium will become more expensive and its recovery more energy intensive
• materials (construction, auxiliary) will become more energy intensive
• unavoidable deterioration of materials of temporary storage facilities.
Contents
Summary
1 Introduction
Complexity
System boundaries
Major differences with other studies
2 The nuclear energy system

2.1 Reference reactor
2.2 Nuclear process chain
2.3 Cradle to grave: the c2g period
3 Energy analysis, the method

3.1 Usefulness and work
3.2 Energy cost vs monetary cost
3.3 About the method
Process analysis
Fossil fuel and electric inputs separated
3.4 Input/output analysis
Basic concept
3.5 Energy return on energy investment (EROEI)
3.6 CO2 emission of nuclear power
3.7 Emission of other greenhouse gases: a well-kept secret
4 Front end: from uranium ore to nuclear fuel

4.1 Front end processes
4.2 Uranium recovery from ore
Dilution factor
Extraction yield
Specific energy consumption
Coal equivalence
4.3 Uranium resources
Economic view
Known uranium resources
4.4 Thermodynamic quality of uranium resources
5 Nuclear power plant

5.1 Operational lifetime
Full-power year FPY
Load factor
Effective operational lifetime
5.2 Construction
5.3 Operation, maintenance and refurbishments (OMR)
6 Back end: immobilising radioactive waste
6.1 Unique feature of nuclear power
Nuclear bomb equivalents
6.2 Spent fuel
6.3 Mine rehabilitation
Energy consumption
6.4 Decommissioning and dismantling
6.5 Immobilising radioactivity
7 Results
7.1 Contributions to the energy investments
7.2 EROEI
7.3 Climate footprint of nuclear power
Nuclear CO2 emission
Other greenhouse gases
Radioactive emissions
8 World nuclear outlook

8.1 Energy debt
8.2 Depletion of uranium resources: a thermodynamic notion
8.3 Energy security: scenarios
Scenario 1: constant nuclear capacity
Scenario 2: constant nuclear share
8.4 Energy cliff
Energy cliff and other commodities
8.5 CO2 trap
Conclusions
Inadequate information flow to politicians and public
Available reactor technology
Energy security and nuclear power
Energy cliff
Climate control and nuclear power
CO2 trap
System boundaries
Energy debt
Annex A Present state

A.1 World gross energy production
A.2 Nuclear contribution
Annex B Reactor technology

B.1 Reference reactor
LWR with MOX fuel
B.2 Breeders
B.3 Thorium
Thorium breeder scenario
Feasibility
Annex C Uranium extraction

C.1 Yield and entropy
C.2 Mineralogical barrier
Annex D Radioactive heritage of nuclear power

D.1 Mobilisation and generation of radioactivity
Generation of man-made radioactivity
D.2 Radioactivity and health effects
D.3 Immobilising radioactivity
Annex E Monetary cost trends
References
1 Introduction
Widely diverging points of view regarding nuclear power come up in the media and scientific
publications. Some people are advocating nuclear power as the ultimate solution (cheap, clean,
secure and safe) to the energy and climate change challenges the world is facing, others are
vigorously disputing that view.
A number of factors are contributing to the controverses on civil nuclear power, such as: dif-
ferent interests, the complexity of the nuclear energy system and/or the (implicite) choice of
different system boundaries.
Climate control by reducing anthropogenic CO2 emissions is actively pushed by the nuclear in-
dustry as an argument for new nuclear build. This argument is not something like an altruistic
gesture. An as-low-as-possible carbon hallmark is highly important to the nuclear industry, for
it may open the door to large indirect government subsidies.
Complexity
In technical sense the nuclear system is the most complex energy system ever designed by
man. The complexity and opacity of the nuclear system is intensified by military and political
issues and by economic interests. Economic, political and scientific arguments sometimes seem
incompatible. This situation is exacerbated by divergent perceptions of the large technical –
thus social and economic – uncertainties still existing with regard to inevitable consequences
of nuclear power in the future.
safety
energy
climate security
politics economics
health
risks
© Storm
Figure 1
Simplified representation of nuclear power as a societal complex, with different interests and stakeholders
One of the consequences of the complexity, in the technical sense as well as in societal and
economic sense, is that the technical information on nuclear power to the public and politicians
originates almost exclusively from the nuclear industry and from institutes with vested interests
in nuclear power, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Nuclear Association
(WNA), Uranium Information Centre (UIC), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA). Understandably these sources tend to highlight only the favourable aspects.
Transparency of the complex nuclear issue might prove helpful to the public discussion on the
future energy policy, greatly enhancing the democratic character of the decision process.
System boundaries
Apart from its unparalleled complexity, the technical system needed to generate useful energy
from uranium ore encompass widely dispersed activities and has an unprecedently long time
frame of 100-150 years. For a meaningful discussion on nuclear power and its societal and eco-
nomic implications it is highly important to define the boundaries and time horizon of the sys-
tem one is talking about: which processes and activities are included and which are not. Many
controverses with regard to nuclear power turn out to originate from discussions on different
levels and the lack of explicitely defined system boundaries.
This study focuses on the technical and thermodynamical aspects of nuclear power, economic
aspects are left outside of the scope. The system boundaries of this study encompass all indus-
trial processes and activities related to the generation of useful energy from uranium ore: from
cradle to grave.
Major differences with other studies
In addition to the introduction of three novel notions – energy cliff, CO2 trap and energy debt –
this study is distinct from other studies with respect to:
• well-defined system boundaries and time horizon,
• methodology: all material and energy flows, direct and indirect, are accounted for,
• use of empirical data where possible,
• based on proven technology, not on concepts only existing in cyberspace.
2 The nuclear energy system
2.1 Reference reactor
This study is based on a reference Light-Water Reactor (LWR) in the once-through mode, which
may considered a model for the newest currently operating power reactors and which may be
considered representative for the civil power reactors during the next three decades. See An-
nex B for a brief description and Part B of Storm&Smith 2008 [Q6] for a detailed description.
The differences between the Boiling Water Reactor BWR, Pressurized Water Reactor PWR and
the Russian VVER (also a PWR) with respect to the energy analysis are minor. Some 90% of the
operating power reactors in the world are LWR’s. All but a few of the new nuclear power plants
under construction or planned at the moment are also LWRs.
On a global scale MOX-fuelled light-water reactors are playing a negligible role and this role is
not expected to increase during the next decades, the more so after the Fukushima disaster.
For this reason the MOX variant is not included in this study.
Closed-cycle reactors (238U-239Pu breeders) and thorium-fuelled reactors (232Th-233U breeders)
most likely will not be available for commercial application during the next decades, if ever,
and are also left out of this study.
For more explanation see Annex B.
2.2 Nuclear process chain
A nuclear reactor is not a stand-alone system, but part of a system of interconnected industrial
processes, the nuclear process chain. Nuclear fuel is not found in nature but has to be prepared
from uranium bearing rock; this is done in the front end processes of the nuclear chain. In the
nuclear energy system large amounts of radioactivity are mobilised and generated, see Annex
D. The activities needed to immobilise and safely isolate the radioactive waste streams from
the human environment make up the back end of the nuclear process chain.
electricity
nuclear
fuel
uranium front end back end
ore processes processes
man-made isolation from
radioactivity the biosphere
cooking the meal enjoying the meal washing the dishes

rm
© Sto
biosphere
Figure 2
Simplified outline of the nuclear process chain as it ought to be: front end, reactor operation and back
end. This sequence can be compared with a common household sequence: cooking the meal, enjoying the
meal and washing the dishes + cleaning up. All activities related to the generation of nuclear energy occur
within the boundaries of the biosphere.
uranium ore
exploration mining overburden

+ waste
Nuclear process chain
LWR once-through
mill
milling tailings
front end
waste
conversion
emissions
depleted waste
enrichment
uranium
fuel element waste

fabrication
nuclear emissions
power plant
construction
emissions
operation &
maintenance electricity
waste
decommissioning spent fuel reclamation

reconversion
back end & dismantling interim storage mining area
waste waste waste spent fuel

packaging packaging packaging packaging
exploration
exploration construction construction

of repository final final of repository
sequestration sequestration
operation & operation &
maintenance maintenance
© Storm
geologic geologic
green fields
repository repository
Figure 3
Outline of the full nuclear process chain: front end, mid-section and back end. The front end and mid
section comprise mature processes. The processes presented in the yellow boxes with dotted lines are not
operational. The grey arrows represent material flows that should have been established, but still do not
exist. For explanation see text.
Figure 2 represents a greatly simplified outline of the nuclear process chain as it ought to be.
In practice the nuclear chain is still not complete: the back end processes are all but a few
non existent. Note that all activities related to the generation of nuclear energy occur within
the boundaries of the biosphere. This implies that all materials used in the nuclear system are
extracted from the biosphere and that all nuclear wastes and radioactivity end up within the
biosphere, the living environment of humankind.
The full nuclear process chain (see Figure 3) comprises a large number of industrial processes,
divided into three groups:
1 front end: from uranium ore to nuclear fuel (Chapter 4)
2 mid-section: nuclear power plant construction and operation (Chapter 5)
3 back end: radioactive waste handling (Chapter 6).
The various processes of the nuclear chain may take place at widely dispersed locations, often
on different continents, and at very different points in time: sometimes many decades apart.
Sustainability and climate control concern the whole biosphere. For that reason we analysed
the global and permanent effects in the biosphere caused by the nuclear system.
2.3 Cradle to grave: the c2g period
The life cycle assessment (LCA) in this study comprises all processes related to a given nuclear
power plant from cradle to grave, regardless of time and place of the individual processes. The
period involved is here coined the cradle-to-grave period, or the c2g period. In Figure 4 the
c2g periods of a fossil-fuelled power station and a nuclear power station are compared. Each
has three sections: construction, operational lifetime (both 40 years) and back end. The c2g
period of a fossil-fuelled plant is 50 years or less: the construction takes a few years and the
backend, decommissioning, dismantling and site cleanup takes also a few years, at most. The
nuclear c2g period is extremely long: more than 100-150 years or even longer. In Chapter 6 we
return to this topic.
startup closedown
operational lifetime
back end
c2g period
startup closedown
operational lifetime
back end
c2g period
years from now

0 50 100 150
© Storm
Figure 4
Time frames (c2g periods) of a fossil-fuelled power plant and of a nuclear power plant, each with a nomi-
nal operational lifetime of 40 years.
3 Energy analysis, the method
3.1 Usefulness and work
The construction of a nuclear power plant requires exceedingly high quality standards with
regard to the materials and the craftwork needed to manufacture the components, e.g. the
reactor vessel. The operational lifetime of a nuclear power plant is determined by the quality of
the reactor vessel and associated components. Many of these components cannot be replaced
anymore, once the reactor has started up.
To achieve a high level of safety and a long lifetime, the properties of the materials and of
the components as a whole have to be predictable to an extremely high degree under stressful
circumstances, such as high pressures and temperatures, neutron radiation and corrosion
processes.
To achieve the required high specifications one has to start from very pure materials and
the fabrication processes have to occur under tightly controlled conditions. The amounts of
rejected materials and components in a production process increase with increasing quality
requirements.
A high predictability of the properties and the behaviour of a piece of equipment under
extreme conditions translates into a low entropy per unit mass: the lower the entropy of a
piece of equipment the higher its usefulness. Lowering of the entropy of a given amount of
matter is possible by applying work: high-quality usable energy, such as mechanical energy
and electricity. The amount of work to be applied per unit mass increases exponentially with
decreasing entropy. Consequently, the production of 1 Mg reactor-grade steel requires much
more useful energy than 1 Mg steel intended for the construction of a garden fence.
More work implies not only more direct energy input, but also a larger infrastructure of skilled
people and facilities to run the process and to perform an adequate quality control.
The minimum amount of work needed to lower the entropy of a given mass to a certain low
level, is determined by the Second Law, one of the basic thermodynamic laws governing all
changes in the observable universe. Advancement of technology only can help coming closer
to the thermodynamic minimum of the required work, but the limit never can be surpassed.
A thermodynamic efficiency of 30% of an industrial process (e.g. aluminium production) is
considered very high, most processes have lower values. An efficiency of 30% means that the
actual work done to perform a given process is over three times as high as the thermodynamic
minimum of that process.
The materials used in the construction of a nuclear reactor and associated energy conversion
components cannot be substituted by other materials without any problem. The materials
are carefully chosen for their specific properties, such as strength at high temperatures and
pressures, corrosion resistance and nuclear properties (e.g. deterioration by neutron radiation,
generation of radionuclides by neutron capture, permeability to tritium).
Above considerations bring the conclusion that the construction of a nuclear power plant
requires more work per unit construction mass than a non-nuclear power plant, which has less
critical requirements than a nuclear power plant.
3.2 Energy cost vs monetary cost
Any industrial activity consumes a certain quantity of useful energy, which does not change
appreciably as long as the involved technology used does not change. Technical improvements
may reduce the energy requirements per unit activity, but there are thermodynamic limits
which cannot be surpassed, but only can be approached, as pointed out in section 3.1. For
example, the production of 1 kg steel from a certain iron ore is a mature industrial process
and its specific energy requirements have a nearly fixed value which may be reduced only
marginally by technical improvements.
Energy is a conserved, unambiguously defined quantity, independent of time, place and culture
and is not prone to inflation, stock rates or other unpredictable economic factors. Energy
analysis is a reliable tool in gaining a clear understanding of long-term prospects of the global
energy supply and the resources of mineral energy resources. By means of a physical energy
analysis it is possible to assess reasonably accurate the specific consumption of materials and
energy of a given industrial activity, even if this activity has to be performed in the future.
Likely the production of steel and concrete in 2050 will consume nearly as much energy per Mg
as today. An important feature of an energy analysis is that its results do not depend on time or
place of the involved activity, contrary to a financial analysis.
Economic calculations are done in monetary units. The price of a service or good is not an
unambiguously defined and conserved quantity: it depends on preferences and a number of
factors, varying in time and from place to place. An example of this feature is the oil price. The
price ofa barrel of oil can vary widely within a short time interval, while its energy content and
the energy requirements for extraction, transport and refining remain unchanged.
3.3 About the method
During the 1970’s and 1980’s the methodology of energy analysis has been developed, maturing
to a useful tool to calculate with reasonable accuracy the energy requirements of a good or
economic activity, see for example IFIAS 1974 [Q99], IFIAS 1975 [Q100], Roberts 1975 [Q101],
Chapman 1975 [Q113], Chapman 1976-1 and 1976-2 [Q104] and [Q106], Roberts PC 1976 [Q105],
Reister 1977 [Q97], Bullard, Penner & Pilati 1978 [Q102], Roberts PC 1982 [Q103], Constanza &
Herendeen 1984 [Q119], Spreng 1988 [Q311]. Application of this methodology to assess the
energy balance of nuclear power has been peer reviewed in 1985 (Storm 1985 [Q2]). The very
same methodology is applied in this study.
Unambiguous definitions of the concepts used in energy analysis are formulated in IFIAS 1974
[Q99] and IFIAS 1976 [Q100]. In the energy analysis the quantity enthalpy ∆H is used, although
free energy ∆G should be used. For fossil fuels and uranium, the numerical differences between
enthalpy and free energy are not large, as shown in IFIAS 1974 [Q99], so all energy analyses
conveniently use ∆H, here called useful energy.
An energy analysis starts with a complete life cycle assessment, also called life cycle analysis
(LCA). An LCA of a product comprises all processes needed to make possible the production of
that product, starting with raw materials, and including the safe management of the wastes
resulting from the production processes. The LCA part of the analysis has been briefly addressed
in section 2.2.
In the second phase of an energy analysis each process of the production chain is analysed
separately: the energy and mass flows are quantified per unit product.
Finally the mass and energy balances are made of the production chain as one system, in this
study the nuclear process chain for production of electricity from uranium ore.
Process analysis
A generic industrial process is outlined in Figure 5. Each process has direct energy inputs and
indirect energy inputs: the direct energy inputs are fossil fuels and/or electricity, the indirect
inputs comprise the energy embodied in materials, equipment and services, including transport.
Human labour and raw materials as found in nature are considered to have zero embodied
energy, according to the generally accepted conventions of the energy analysis method. Process
analysis measures directly the energy consumed in the process plus the energy embodied in
the process chemicals and/or construction materials. This method is suited to relative simple
processes and products, for which the physical flows are easy to trace.
electricity
fossil fuels CO2
gaseous effluents
raw materials
human labour
services process product
processed materials © Storm
capital goods waste heat liquid and solid wastes

embodied energy
Figure 5
Mass flows and energy flows of a generic industrial process. A process has direct energy inputs, electricity
and fossil fuels (e.g. diesel fuel) consumed in the process, and indirect energy inputs, which are embedded
in the other inputs of the process. These flows are to be quantified by the energy analysis of the process.
This simplified diagram is based on the assumption that the wastes released into the biosphere are
relatively harmless.
The process analysis starts with mapping out all inputs of the process per unit product, as shown
in Figure 5, and all output flows. The simplified diagram of Figure 5 is based on the assumption
that the wastes released into the biosphere are relatively harmless. Note that the qualification
‘relatively harmless’ is an economic notion. The harmful waste flows are assumed to be treated
properly within the process. Actually the harmful wastes are the input of a following, separate
process. Usually the waste handling process occurs at another place and at another time than
the production process itself, if ever. The fortunes of the radioactive waste flows from nuclear
power are fully included in this study.
The input of processed materials, such as steel and concrete, are the products of one or more
preceding industrial processes, each of which with their own direct and indirect energy inputs.
The input of capital goods, for example the reactor vessel, pumps and control equipment, are
the products of other industrial processes in the economic system. The process flows of these
fabrication processes have the same generic outline as presented by Figure 5. Obviously a full
process analysis of an entire nuclear power plant becomes rather complicated in this way, so
a simple shortcut would be welcome. The following section addresses briefly the input/output
analysis which is applied in cases of complex industrial activities.
Fossil fuel and electric inputs separated
In this study the electric and thermal energy (fossil fuels) inputs of industrial processes are kept
separated. The total energy input of a process, Eprocess, is defined as the sum of the electric
and thermal inputs, at a given thermal/electric ratio R, which depends on sector or process,
see equation 1. Note that the energy inputs of the nuclear process chain are part of the final
energy consumption of the economic system (see Annex B).
E th
E process = E th + Ee R =
Ee
E process = total energy input of a process [= ] J
E th = thermal energy input (fossil fuels) [=] J
Ee = electric energy input [ =] J
R = thermal/electric ratio
eq 1
In a number of energy analyses, e.g. ISA 2006 [Q325] and Ecoinvent 2003 [Q333], the electric
inputs of the nuclear system are converted into ‘primary energy units’. This method introduces
ambiguities and confusion, due to the application of variables which are not physical constants,
but depend on assumptions, usually implicite, which change by time and other factors.
3.4 Input/output analysis
Estimation of the energy embodied in capital goods and services, sometimes also in processed
materials, needed to run a given process requires the second method, I/O analysis, which is
developed in economics. In this method the embodied energy of a material is approximated by
multiplying the price of a material in year i by the energy intensity in year i of the economic
sector which produced the material. Methodological apects of I/O and process analysis are
discussed in above mentioned publications and for example, in IAEA TecDoc-753 1994 [Q148].
Process analysis, see previous section, leads to a large underestimation of the total construc-
tion energy requirements, when services and supporting activities of the construction are dis-
counted, according to e.g. Rombough & Koen 1978 [Q120] and Bullard, Penner & Pilati 1978
[Q102]. This is the case in a number of energy analyses published in the past. Input/output (I/O)
analysis is well suited to large aggregated activities, like the construction of a nuclear power
plant. Chapman 1975 [Q106] concluded:
“In principle this is an unsatisfactory procedure since the inputs to nuclear systems are likely to be
uncharacteristic products of the sectors documented in the input-output tables. However there are
grounds for believing that, provided a product has a large vector of inputs, i.e. requires inputs from
many other sectors of the economy, then the average energy intensity derived from the input-output
table is fairly reliable.”
The I/O analysis may be simplified by using the general energy/gdp ratio of a particular year in
a particular country to calculate the net energy requirement of a complex activity. The general
energy/gdp ratio (or energy intensity) e is defined as the quotient of the total primary energy
consumption of a country (in joules) and gross domestic product GDP (often in US dollars) of a
given year i. Usually primary energy units are applied, which introduces ambiguities, as pointed
out in the previous section.
In case of the construction of a nuclear power plant, estimation of the construction energy
using the energy intensity e from the monetary costs in the same year, according to equation 2,
does not introduce a large error. The spread in the capital costs of nuclear power plants (in the
USA ±50%) is larger than the uncertainty introduced by this simplification.
Econ = C con (i) • e i
E con = primary energy requirements of construction J

C con (i) = construction cost in year i $i
ei = energy/GDP ratio of year i J/$ i
eq 2
This simplification gives a fairly reliable value of the energy embodied in that activity, inclu-
ding energy costs of craft labour, services, subsidies, etcetera, according to Tyner, Constanza &
Fowler 1988 [Q124]. This conclusion endorses the conclusions of other studies, e.g. Rombough
& Koen 1978 [Q120], Roberts PC 1982 [Q103], Bullard, Penner & Pilati 1978 [Q102], Constanza
& Herendeen 1984 [Q119]. As Constanza & Herendeen put it:
“Embodied energy (calculated the way we suggest) is a good, non-trivial static correlate of the eco-
nomic value of the relatively large aggregates of goods and services that make up the entries in the
I/O tables.”
Certainly, the construction of a nuclear power plant is a large aggregate of goods and services.
Nuclear technology may considered being high-tech, on top of an extensive industrial and
economic infrastructure of other high-tech production processes.
The studies of Rombough & Koen 1975 [Q120] and Bullard, Penner & Pilati 1978 [Q102] showed
that the value calculated via a detailed I/O analysis is somewhat higher than the value found
via the simplified method. Both studies concluded that construction of a (coal-fired) power
plant is more energy-intensive than the average economic activity.
A more accurate estimation of the construction energy can be found by multiplying the
construction costs of a plant (in year i) with the energy/cost ratio (in J/$) of the sector ‘new
construction of utilities’, in the same year i. This can be done by multiplying the result of
equation 2 with a factor a, derived from the publication of Bullard, Penner & Pilati 1978 [Q102].
In this study a constant value of a = 1.16 is assumed (valid for the year 1967), although factor a
is slightly increasing with time and getting more electric energy-intensive. In view of the high-
tech character of the nuclear industry the multiplicator might by higher for nuclear power plant
construction, see section 3.1 Usefulness and work.
Basic concept
The concept of the energy/gdp ratio is based on the notion that in a given year the economy
consumes a measured amount of energy units and produces a measured amount of units of
economic transactions or changes by human action, quantified by the gross domestic product
GDP. The energy input is measured in joules J and the GDP is often measured in USD.
The basic energy input of the economic system (see Figure 6) is the gross energy production, as
represented by Figure A1 in Annex A, consisting of:
• gross electric energy generated by hydro power, nuclear power, wind and solar, plus
• gross thermal energy supplied as fossil fuels and biomass (combustion heat).
The conversion losses and transport- and transmission losses occur within the economic system.
In this study the electric energy input is not converted into ‘primary energy uits’ for reasons
explained in Part A of [Q6].
hydro
nuclear
E e(gross)
wind
solar economic
GDP
system
fossil fuels
Eth(gross)
+ biomass © Storm
Figure 6
The economic system from an energy point of view. The product of the system in given year is an amount
of economic transactions, measured in monetary units, and can be seen as a measure of changes by human
action. Every change involves a certain amount of useful energy.
The average energy intensity of one unit of economic transactions in a given year i is:
E gross (i)
ei =
GDPi
ei = energy/GDP ratio of year i J/$i

Egross (i) = gross energy production in year i J
Egross (i) = Ee (gross) + Eth (gross)
GDP i = gross domestic product of year i $i
eq 3
Activities involving nuclear technology likely require more usable energy per mass unit product
than the average activity, as is explained in section 3.1 Usefulness and work. So, this method
likely does not overestimate the energy invested in the nuclear system.
3.5 Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI)
An often used way to quantify the thermodynamic performance of any energy system, in this
case the nuclear energy system, is by means of the Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI)
of the system. The EROEI can be calculated based on a c2g energy balance of the energy
system, which in turn is the result of an energy analysis of the full process chain of the system.
Four main energy entries, each having an electric and a thermal component, compose the
energy balance of the nuclear energy system:
• Gross electricity production, measured at the connection with the grid.
• Energy investments for the construction of the nuclear power plant.
• Energy investments proportional to the operational lifetime, comprising:
– front end of the process chain, from ore to fuel
– operation, maintenance and refurbishments (OMR)
• Energy investments of complete back end of the process chain, comprising:
– handling and disposal of the operational radioactive and non-radioactive wastes
– decommissioning and dismantling.
The construction energy investments Econ have a fixed value, once the plant is finished, and
occur before the power plant comes online (see chapter 5).
The energy investments of the front end Efront and OMR Eomr are spent during the operational
life of the NPP and are discussed in Chapter 4 respetively in Chapter 5.
The decommissioning and dismantling energy costs Edism rise sharply during the first months
of operation and keep rising slightly with increasing operational lifetime. Roughly Edism can be
considered to have a fixed value, similar to Econ.
The energy costs of the back end of the fuel process chain Eback are proportional to the
operational lifetime of the reactor.
The sum Edism + Eback is also called the energy debt, because these energy quantities have to
be invested after the final closedown of the reactor, when the NPP does not generate profits
anymore. Chapter 6 addresses the back end in more detail. We return to the energy debt in
section 8.1.
The net useful energy production of the system Enet is the balance of the energy output and
inputs. This is the amount of useful energy which becomes available to the consumer for energy
services at will, and is not needed to construct and operate the energy system. The energy
balance comprises fixed and variable entries, each with an electric and thermal component. A
part of the energy investments are done before or during the operational lifetime of the reactor
and a part has to be done after closedown (energy debt).
Enet = energy output – (fixed + variable energy inputs)

Enet = Egrid – Ec+d – Echain eq 4
Egrid = gross electricity production, delivered to the grid
Ec+d = energy investments of construction and dismantling = Econ + Edism
Echain = energy investments of the process chain = Efront + Eomr + Eback
The energy return on energy investment EROEI is defined here as the ratio of the lifetime useful
energy output over the lifetime useful energy input, see equation 5.
useful energy production E grid

EROEI = =
useful energy investment Ec+d + E chain
eq 5
Figure 7 gives a variant of equation 5, in which the denominator equals the sum of the electric
and thermal energy components of the fixed and vaiable inputs jointly during the full c2g
period.
3.6 CO2 emission of nuclear power
This study assumes all electric inputs of the full nuclear chain to be produced by the nuclear
system itself. Consequently the CO2 emissions by the nuclear system solely result from burning
fossil fuel inputs of the process chain (mainly diesel fuel) and from chemical reactions (e.g. in
the cement production), directly related to the operation of the nuclear energy system.
This methodological choice makes the results of the analysis are independent of place, time,
local fuel mix and other, often implicit, assumptions. In practice this convention would corres-
pond with a steady state: a state in which the number of nuclear power plants remains constant
and the number of plants under construction equals the number of plants being decommis-
sioned. The operating plants provide the electrical energy inputs needed for construction of
new plants and for decommissioning of the closed-down plants.
CO2
fossil fuels electric inputs

thermal inputs
E th Ee
uranium ore
nuclear energy
grid
system service
Egrid
© Storm
waste heat Egrid

embodied E in waste EROEI =
E th + E e
Figure 7
Energy flows in the nuclear energy system. The electrical inputs are assumed to be provided by the system
itself (see text). The CO2 emission by the nuclear system comes from the burning of fossil fuels in the
nuclear process chain.
This study assumes the specific CO2 emission (CO2 intensity g) of all thermal energy inputs (fos-
sil fuels) of the nuclear energy system to have a mean value of:
g = 75 g(CO2)/MJth eq 6
Many thermal inputs of the industrial processes of the nuclear system are diesel fuel or similar
fuels. Above value may also be seen as an average of fossil fuels.
The carbon intensity can be found by application of the stoichiometric conversion factor, 44
gram CO2 corresponds with 12 gram C, so:
g(C) = 12/44• g(CO2) eq 7
The specific CO2 emission, also called the CO2 intensity of nuclear power, gsystem, is defined as
the ratio of the total CO2 emission during the c2g period over the gross electricity production
of the nuclear system Egrid according to equation 8:
CO2 emission during c2g period

γsystem = =
lifetime gross energy output
m (CO2 ) Σ E(th) • 75
= = (g/MJ)
E grid E grid
eq 8
3.7 Emission of other greenhouse gases, a well-kept secret
In 2001 the US enrichment plants alone had a specific GHG (greenhouse gas) emission of 5
grams CO2-equivalents per kilowatt-hour of freon 114 (CFC-114, ClCF2CClF2), as follows from
data from EIA-DOE 2005 [Q316]. Apart from these we found no data in the open literature on
the emissions of fluorine- and chlorine-related chemical compounds by the nuclear industry.
The Vattenfall EPD 2005 [Q152] noticed the absence of data on emission of greenhouse gases by
processes needed to convert uranium ore into nuclear fuel.
Unknown are the GHG emissions of the construction of a nuclear power plant, with its large
mass of high-quality and often exotic materials.
Unknown are the GHG emissions of the maintenance and refurbishments of nuclear power
plants.
Unknown are the GHG emissions of the backend of the nuclear process chain: the handling and
storage of radioactive waste.
In the front end of the process chain there are several potential sources of halocarbon or other
greenhouse gases other than CO2. Large amounts of fluorine, chlorine and compounds of these
elements are used In all front-end processes of the nuclear chain, often in combination with
organic solvents.
• Fluoro-compounds are essential in the front end processes, because enrichment of uranium
requires uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the only gaseous compound of uranium.
• The purification of zirconium to produce Zircalloy consumes large volumes of ultra pure
chlorine (see Part C5 [Q6]).
• Depleted uranium is stored generally as UF6 in special vessels, often in the open air. UF6
is very reactive, so when it leaks into the environment, various fluorine compounds arise. This
way of storage cannot be a permanent one, in view of the unavoidable deterioration and lea-
king of the vessels and increasing chances for accidents or terroristic actions.
The amounts of halocompounds lost into the environment might be far from negligible, due to
unavoidable process losses. No chemical plant is leakproof. From a chemical point of view, it
is conceivable that in several processes potent GHG’s arise or are used. Notably halocarbons
have greenhouse warming potentials (GWP) many thousands of times stronger than carbon
dioxide. For example, the emission of 1 gram sulfur hexafluoride SF6 per kWh corresponds
with 22200 geqCO2/kWh. The cradle-to-grave GHG emissions of other energy systems, such as
photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind turbines, originating from unavoidable releases, are well
known. The relatively significant GHG emission of PV is chiefly due to the emission of SF6 during
the production of the silicon cells.
Emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO2 by nuclear are unknown, as pointed out above. It
should be stressed that the absence of published data does not mean the absence of emissions.
Emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO2 are not quantified in this study, due to the
absence of data. For that reason this study explicitely uses the unit gCO2/kWh and not the
unit gCO2eq/kWh (gram CO2-equivalent per kilowatt-hour). The latter would imply that other
greenhouse gases also are included in the emission figures.
4 Front end: from uranium ore to nuclear fuel
4.1 Front end processes
The front end of the nuclear chain comprises the well-established industrial processes needed
to prepare nuclear fuel from uranium minerals as found in nature.
• Mining uranium ore from the Earth’s crust and extracting the uranium from its ore (milling);
the uranium is delivered as ‘yellow cake’ to the next process.
• Refining of the yellow cake and conversion of it into exceedingly pure uranium hexafluoride
UF6, needed for the enrichment.
• Enrichment: the uranium hexafluoride is separated into two fractions: enriched uranium,
with a higher content of the isotope uranium-235 and depleted uranium, with a lower content
of U-235 than natural uranium.
• Fuel element fabrication. The enriched uranium hexafluoride is converted into uranium
oxide UO2, compressed into tablets and stacked into thin tubes of Zircalloy, an alloy of ex-
ceedingly pure zirconium with a few percents of another metal added, e.g. tin. The tubes are
bundled into fuel elements which can be placed into the reactor.
The consumption of materials and of energy of the first step, mining + milling, depend heavily
on the ore quality: the physical and chemical properties of the uranium ores. Generally the ore
quality of the yet to be exploited resources declines with time, as the highest-quality available
resources are always exploited first, because these offer the highest return on investment.
Therefore the energy requirements of uranium mining + milling are not a constant factor over
time in the nuclear process chain. For reason of the impact of this observation on the energy
balance of the nuclear energy system, the recovery of uranium will be addressed in more detail
in the next section.
The other three processes of the front end of the nuclear chain, refining, enrichment and fuel
fabrication do not depend on the uranium ore quality. Consequently the specific energy con-
sumption of these processes are constant over time.
Table 1
Specific energy consumption of the processes of the front end of the nuclear process chain. Thermal
energy inputs are assumed to be provided by fossil fuels, usually diesel oil.
For more details see Part E of [Q6].
electric thermal
process unit loss source
input input
mining+milling soft ores 0.274 2.056 GJ/Mg ore variable [Q95], [Q109].
mining+milling hard ores 2.13 3,42 GJ/Mg ore variable [Q95], [Q109], [Q116]
refining and conversion 0.0526 1.4254 GJ/kg Unat 0.5% [Q109]
enrichment, diffusion 10.157 0.843 GJ/SWU 0.5% [Q109]
enrichment, ultra centrifuge 0.833 2.267 GJ/SWU 0.5% [Q116]
fuel element fabrication 1.083 2.709 GJ/kg Uenr 1% [Q109]
Enrichment
The fuel for the reference reactor is enriched to 4.2% U-235, requiring a specific separative
work of S = 7.121 SWU/kgUenr (separative work units per kg enriched uranium). The assumed
tails assay is xt = 0.20% U-235 and the feed/product ratio is F/P = 7.84. The direct electricity
consumption of ultra centrifuge (UC) enrichtment is a fraction of that of diffusion enrichment,
but the indirect energy consumption (electric + thermal) of UC is much higher, mainly because
the relative short life of the centrifuges. This study assumed a worldwide mix of 70% UC + 30%
diffusion.
4.2 Uranium recovery from ore
Uranium occurs in many kinds of minerals in the earth’s crust. This study roughly divides the
uranium ores currently exploited into two groups: soft ores, from which uranium is relatively
easily extractable, and hard ores, from which the recovery of uranium is more difficult. ‘More
difficult’ corresponds with a higher specific energy consumption per kg recovered uranium.
This rough assignment is based on empirical information from Orita 1995 [Q23-14], UIC-34 2005
[Q86], WNA-mining 2007 [Q87] and many other publications (see references of Figure 8).
Dilution factor
The ore grade is defined as the uranium content of the uranium-bearing rock, usually given as
mass-% U, or in grams uranium per kg rock. The minimum amount of rock to be mined and mil-
led to obtain 1 kg uranium is inversely proportional to the ore grade. The dilution factor is a
simple mathematical relationship between ore grade and mass of rock to be processed per mass
unit of uranium, and does not depend on recovery technology nor on ore type.
Actually, more ore has to be processed than the mathematical minimum, due to the unavoida-
ble losses of the extraction process (see next section). The blue curve in Figure 9 illustrates the
relationship between the ore grade and the energy consumption per kg recovered uranium. the
exponential rise is the consequence of the dilution factor, enhanced by the declining extraction
yield with decresing grade.
Extraction yield
The extraction yield, also called the recovery yield Y, is the ratio of the mass of uranium actually
extracted over the mass of the uranium present in the processed amount of rock. The extraction
yield never can be unit (or 100%), due to the inherent limitations of separation processes and
due to the unavoidable imperfections of extraction techniques. This will be explained in Annex
C, Uranium extraction. The empirical relationship between ore grade and extraction yield of
the uranium extraction is shown by Figure 8. This graph is based on publications from the 1970s
and 1980s.
These data may seem old and perhaps outdated, but during the past 4-5 decades the extraction
techniques applied in the uranium industry have not changed significantly. The study of Mudd
2011 [Q471] proves the curve of Figure 8 to be at the upper limit of the current practice. In
practice nearly all uranium mines achieve substantially lower extraction yields at a given ore
grade than suggested by the curve of Figure 8.
The curve shows that at ore grades below G = 0.01 m-%U, the yield achievable with the currently
used extraction techniques approaches zero.
1.00 © Storm
Y
extraction
em
piric
yield
0.50
l a
data used in this study
data from Mudd 2011
0
10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001
decreasing ore grade G (m-% U)
Figure 8
The extraction yield of uranium from ore as function of the ore grade. The red dots are empirical values
from the literature, based on actual mining operations. This curve may be see as the upper limit of the
attainable extraction yields using the current extraction technology, as pointed out in the text. The grey
squares are data from Mudd 2011 [Q471].
The data used in this diagram (red dots and bars) have been taken from: Burnham et al. 1974 [Q136],
Franklin et a. 1971 [Q111], GJO-100 1980 [Q141], Huwyler et al. 1975 [Q134], James & Simonson 1978
[Q138], James, Boydell & Simonson 1978 [Q137], Kistemaker 1976 [Q116], Mutschler, Hill & Williams 1976
[Q135], Rombough & Koen 1975 [Q120], Ross & Guglielmin 1968 [Q140], Rotty et al. 1975 [Q95], Simonson,
Boydell & James 1980 [Q139], SRI 1975 Q110].
Technically it is possible to extract uranium from rock with a uranium content lower than G
= 0.01% U, for instance from granites and shales. Processing such low-grade uranium-bearing
material requires the application of more selective and more complex extraction techniques
than the currently used techniques, on which the relationship of Figure 8 is based, and involves
a much higher specific consumption of materials and energy per kilogram extracted uranium.
This observation follows directly from the Second Law of thermodynamics (see also AnnexA).
Specific energy consumption
Mining
The energy consumption of ore mining at a given uranium mine is determined by several vari-
ables, such as:
• overburden ratio or stripping ratio S = mass useless rock to be removed/mass ore. This ratio
may vary from less than 1 to about 60. The overburden ratio is set by the size of the ore body
and its depth below the surface.
• haulage distance: the distance the waste rock and ore has to be transported to the waste
rock dumping site respectively to the ore processing plant. The hauling distance may vary from
about 1 km to more than 200 km.
• thermal conversion efficiency of the diesel engines powering the mining equipment
• specific consumption of explosives (kg explosives per Mg rock)
• hardness of the rock to be mined
• water pumping, to keep the mine dry
• construction of the mine
• transport distance of fuel, auxilary materials and equipment to and from the mine.
• supply of fresh water
Underground mining is appreciably more energy intensive than open pit mining. According to
Mortimer 1977 [Q98] the waste rock ratios of underground mines vary form 1-5. A waste rock
ratio of 5 means that 5 Mg of useless rock has to be removerd for every Mg of ore.
The effect of the rock properties, e.g. sandstone or granite, on the mining energy consumption
is difficult to quantify. Therefore the effect is only roughly included in this study, in spite of the
fact that the variations of rock hardness may cause considerable variations in the specific ener-
gy requirements of mining from mine to mine. Not only the direct energy input will increase
with harder rock, but also the indirect energy input will grow due to an increased consumption
of explosives and more intensive wear of the equipment for drilling, excavating and haulage.
The figures of the specific energy consumption of mining of uranium ore are taken from ERDA-
76-1 [Q109], which derived its figures from Rotty et al. 1975 [Q95], who in turn based their figu-
res on an unpublished survey of US mines by US Bureau of Mines in 1973. The figures represent
the average of 60% open-pit and 40% underground mines, all of which may considered ‘easy’
mines.
Milling
The specific energy consumption of ore processing (milling) strongly depends on:
• ore grade
• hardness of the rock
• mineralogy of the ore: which mineral contains uranium
• acid or alkaline leaching, chemical properties of the host rock
The energy input of each of often forgotten activities or items, such as the ones listed below,
may be of minor importance, but jointly the inputs may significantly contribute to the overall
specific energy consumption.
• fresh water supply
• treatment of process water and pond water
• waste management
• construction of the ore processing facilities.
Mining + milling
This study uses world-averaged figures for mining and milling. Only the grade and the extraction
yield (as function of the grade) are quantified. The ores are roughly divided into two categories:
hard ores and soft ores. As pointed out above, the specific energy consumption, per kg extracted
natural uranium, of mining and milling operations are set by a host of variables, so the actual
energy consumption per kg extracted uranium may vary widely from mine to mine.
Indirect energy inputs, comprising among other the embodied energy of equipment, auxiliary
materials, chemicals and explosives, are of similar magnitude as the direct energy inputs.
The figures of the specific energy consumption of milling of soft uranium ore are taken from
ERDA-76-1 [Q109]. The figures represent the average of soft ores from ‘easy’ mines.
The figures of milling of hard ores are empirical ones derived from Kistemaker 1976 [Q116], who
performed a survey of South African mines milling very low-grade ores.
100
hard ores
world-averaged
grades 2011
energy
consumption of
mining+milling future
soft ores
(GJ/kg U)
50
0 © Storm
100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001

ore grade G (mass-% U)
descending logarithmic scale
Figure 9
Energy consumption of the recovery of uranium from the earth’s crust (mining + milling) as function of the
ore grade, in gigajoule per kg recovered uranium. At present the world-averaged ore grade is in the range
of G = 0,05-0,1%U and the trend is a decreasing grade over time.
Coal equivalence
At an ore grade of about 0.01% U the annual mass of uranium ore to be mined and processed to
fuel one nuclear power plant equals the mass of coal consumed by a coal-fired power plant to
generate the same amount of electricity: the coal equivalence.
For coal-fired electricity generation we assume a heat content of coal of 28 MJ/kg and a
conversion efficiency of 45% (heat to electricity). The ore grade distribution of the known
recoverable uranium resources is given by Figure 10.
4.3 Uranium resources
Economic view
The notion ‘ore’ has an economic definition. An orebody is, by definition, an occurrence of
mineralisation from which a given metal is economically recoverable. The qualification ‘ore’
is therefore relative to both costs of extraction and market prices (WNA-75 2010 [Q85]). The
term ‘reserves’ is usually limited to estimated quantities of mineral materials considered
economically recoverable with existing technology at a given market price. ‘Resources’ are
defined as all naturally occuring uranium concentrations in a given geological environment,
irrespective of economic considerations at a given moment.
The view of the nuclear industry with regard to the outlook of the world uranium resources is
illustrated by the following quote from WNA-75 2010 [Q85]:
‘Of course the resources of the earth are indeed finite, but three observations need to be made:
• first, the limits of the supply are so far away that the truism has no practical meaning.
• Second, many of the resources concerned are either renewable or recyclable (energy minerals
and zinc are the main exceptions, though the recycling potential of many materials is limited in
practice by the energy and other costs involved).
• Third, available reserves of ‘non-renewable’ resources are constantly being renewed, mostly
faster than they are used.’
The concerns raised that the known resources might be insufficient when judged as a multiple
of the present rate of use are designated by the nuclear industry as the ‘Limits to Growth
fallacy’. In their criticism on the views regarding depletion of mineral resources, the nuclear
industry identifies three principal areas where resource depletion predictions would have
faltered [Q85]:
• ‘predictions have not accounted for gains in geological knowledge and understanding of mineral
deposits,
• they have not accounted for technologies utilised to discover, process and use them,
• economic principles have not been taken into account, which means that resources are thought
of only in present terms, not in terms of what will be economic through time, nor with concepts
of substitution in mind.’
The nuclear industry takes the view that a doubling of the price of a mineral from the present
level could be expected to create about a tenfold increase in measured economic resources,
over time, due both to increased exploration and the reclassification of resources regarding
what is economically recoverable [Q85]. Apparently the nuclear industry is convinced that
advancing technology will provide the solutions to currently existing and future recovery
problems and that higher market prices will lead to discovery of new and larger resources.
In part this view may be valid, but it is not the whole story. There is an essential distinction
between the notion of uranium as just a mineral and the notion of uranium as an energy
source; this will be explained in section 4.4.
Substitution of uranium by another mineral is no option, as uranium contains the only fissile
atoms in nature, namely U-235. As pointed out in Annex B, a civil energy system based on the
use of thorium as fertile material to breed uranium-233, which is fissile, is a concept viable
only in cyberspace.
Known uranium resources
According to the ‘Red Book’ 2007 [Q90] the known recoverable uranium resources – ‘Reasonably
Assured Resources (RAR)’ plus ‘Inferred Resources (IR)’ to US$130/kg U – were listed at 5.47 Tg
(1 teragram = 1 million metric tonnes), per 1 January 2007 (per 1 January 2009 RAR + IR were
estimated at 5.40 Tg). In de open literature no physical data could be found of some 0.9 Tg of
these resources. Judging by their locations, the resources of undisclosed grade and mineralogy
likely very low-grade deposits. The Red Book tables are a compilation of submissions from
the uranium producing countries themselves and political arguments may affect the figures.
Summarized, the ore grade of roughly 4.5 Tg of the known resources are disclosed, and these
resources are the basis of the ore grade distribution of the known world uranium resources in
Figure 10. The resources of which the ore grades are not published in de open literature are not
included in the diagram.
The observed uranium ore grade distribution shows a bimodal pattern. A striking feature is the
virtual absence of uranium ores with grades in the range of 1-2% U. If uranium were to exhibit a
log-normal distribution, like most other metals, one could expect significant uranium deposits
to be found with grades in the range of,say, 5-0.5% U.
The near-absence of known recoverable uranium resources below grades of G = 0.02% U may be
not a geologic feature, but a consequence of the economic definition of ‘recoverable resource’,
if such low-grade resources were not profitable. However, geochemical factors cannot be ruled
out. It is possible that uranium at grades below 0.02% U meets its mineralogical barrier (see
Annex C).
2.0
© Storm
soft ores
hard ores
1.5
amount of
uranium
(million tonnes)
1.0
0.5
0
100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001
decreasing ore grade G (mass-% U)

Figure 10
Ore grade distribution of the known recoverable uranium resources. The grade distribution is based on
data from [Q90], [Q212], [Q324] and [Q371]. Not all listed resources are included in this diagram, because
of lack of data, see text for more details. At lower grades uranium ores tend to be harder to mine and to
process, due to more refractory uranium minerals and harder host rocks.
4.4 Thermodynamic quality of uranium resources
The sole mission of the nuclear energy system is to supply the consumer and the economic
system with useful energy to be used at will. That implies the release of the potential
energy in uranium atoms present in the earth’s crust and the conversion of released heat and
radiation into useful energy. Obviously this is a matter of energy conversions and consequently
a thermodynamic issue. Thermodynamics is the science of energy conversions and is at the
basis of all sciences, because each change in the observable universe is coupled with an energy
conversion.
Here we define the thermodynamic quality of a given uranium resource as the degree of
usefullness of that uranium resource for net useful energy production. This notion will be
discussed in more details below.
A simple thermodynamic rule states: the generation of useful energy costs energy. In practice
that means that the conversion of the potential energy embodied in a mineral energy carrier
into useful energy requires investments of useful energy. The nuclear energy system as a whole
is nothing else than a technical means to turn the potential energy in uranium atoms into
electricity. The construction and operation of the nuclear energy system consume high-grade
energy and materials. Useful energy has to be invested to generate useful energy. At issue is
the energy return of energy investments: the EROEI (see section 3.5).
Not enriched uranium is the primary energy source of nuclear power, but the uranium minerals
present in the earth’s crust, from which the enriched uranium has to be prepared. Vital notions
which should not be mixed up are:
• theoretical potential energy embodied in 1 kg of pure uranium,
• electricity delivered by a nuclear power plant to the grid consuming 1 kg of
natural uranium,
• net useful energy generated by the nuclear system as a whole,
that is the electricity delivered to the grid minus the energy needed to construct and
operate the complete nuclear energy system - consuming 1 kg of natural uranium as found
in the earth’s crust.
The energy required to produce pure uranium from the raw resources as found in nature varies
widely, depending on the geological and mineralogical conditions of the deposits. Usually the
ore grade is cited as the most important variable. Other important variables are: depth of the
deposit below the surface, size of the deposit, mineralogy of the ore, transport distances and
the availability of fresh water (uranium mining consumes large volumes of fresh water). High-
grade deposits at great depth and in unstable geologic environment may have a high or even a
prohibitive specific energy consumption (e.g. Cigar Lake in Canada). Unfortunately insufficient
quantitative data are available in de open literature to define a quantitative ranking of
uranium resources according to the ore quality, something like an ‘ore grade-equivalent’ which
takes into account several other important variables in addition to the ore grade.
This study makes distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ ores. Hard ores require substantially
more energy per kg recovered uranium than soft ores. Uranium ores tend to be harder to unlock
at lower grades, physically and chemically (indicated by the color in Figure 10), due to a more
refractory mineralogy of the uranium mineral and of the host rock.
From the laws of thermodynamics follows the observation that the energy investment per kg
uranium from a given uranium deposit increases with declining ore grade. Below a certain grade
the useful energy investment may be as large as or larger than the useful energy generated by
fission of the uranium from a certain deposit, even if other variables are ignored. If so, that
uranium deposit is in effect no longer a net energy source, but an energy sink.
5 Nuclear power plant
5.1 Operational lifetime
To avoid discussions on load factor, capacity factor and availability factor – these factors are
not always consistently defined or used by the nuclear industry – the operational lifetime of a
nuclear power plant in this study is not given in calender years, but in full-power years FPY.
Full-power year FPY
A full-power year is defined as the period in which the reactor produces a fixed quantity of
electricity equalling the production during 1 year continuously at full power. The electricity
produced by a nuclear power plant with a nominal power of Po GWe during one FPY is:
1 FPY = Po GWe.year = Po•8760•106 kWh = Po•31.536 PJ eq 9
Load factor
The load factor L, for a given period, is the ratio of the energy, which the power unit actually
has produced over that period, to the energy it would have produced at its reference power
capacity over that period, according to IAEA 2008 [Q483].
actual energy production E actual

L= =
reference energy production E100
eq10
Eactual = electrical energy produced during the reference period as measured at the unit
outlet terminals.
E100 = electrical energy which would have been supplied to the grid if the unit were
operated continuously at the reference unit power during the whole reference period.
The world nuclear fleet in 2008 delivered 2739 TWh of electricity to the grid (see Annex A), so
the actuel energy production was: Eactual = 2739 TWh = 9.860 EJ
The world nuclear generating capacity in 2008 was 372 GWe, so the reference energy produc-
tion was: E100 = 372•31.536 PJ = 11.73 EJ.
The world-averaged load factor over the year 2008 was:
L = 9.86/11.73 = 0.84 eq11
Generally the lifetime-averaged load factor of an NPP will be lower, for the load factor of
an NPP tends to decline over the years, due to wear, deteriorating materials and increasing
radioactivity of the equipment. During the first years after startup the load factor also tend
to be lower than the lifetime average, due to ‘early life failures’ in the break-in phase of the
installation. In 2008 a relatively large proportion of new NPPs were online at the peak of their
performance (see also WNA 2011 [Q484]).
Effective operational lifetime
In April 2011 the mean age of the 437 nuclear power plants in operation in the world was 26
calender years (Schneider, Froggatt & Thomas 2011 [Q342]). At an assumed world average
load factor at this moment of L = 0.84, the world average full-power time would be about T100
= 21.8 FPY. The world-averaged lifetime load factor, measured over the full lifetime of the
nuclear power plants, is lower, as pointed out above. To be sure not to underrate the average
operational lifetime of the currently operating NPPs we use a figure of T100 = 21 FPY.
The mean age of the 130 permanently shutdown NPPs of the world was 22 calender years, or
a mean operational lifetime of T100 = 18.48 FPY, at a mean load factor of L = 0.84. Most likely
the applied load factor figure is too high and might be close to L = 0.75. Again, to be sure not
to underrate the average operational lifetime of the permanently closed down NPPs we use a
figure of T100 = 18 FPY.
Obviously a number of individual NPPs in the world at the moment reached operational
lifetimes significantly higher than the present world average. For example Borssele NPP in the
Netherlands achieved at the end of 2010 T100 = 31.5 FPY and a lifetime load factor of L = 0.84.
Note that figures on the effective lifetime T100 and load factor L may easily become ambiguous
when an NPP is uprated above its nominal power rating, for instance by increasing the operating
temperature and pressure of the reactor, or formally derated on paper.
According to different sources the currently operating nuclear power plants will reach
operational lifetimes varying from around 30 FPY (ISA 2006 [Q325]) to 34 FPY (ExternE 1998
[Q308] and Vattenfall 2005 [Q152]). Advanced reactor types would some 50 FPY (service life of
60 years at an availability factor of 90-92%), according to the nuclear industry (WNA-08 2011
[Q482]). It should be noted that the availability factor is not the same as the load factor (IAEA
2008 [Q483]). The load factor has a lower value than the availability factor. Assumed a figure
of L = 0.84, the promised operational lifetime of advanced reactors would be T100 = 50.4 FPY.
At this moment it is unknown if the world-averaged operational lifetime of nuclear power

plants could even reach T100 = 25 FPY, the baseline lifetime of the reference reactor in this
study, given that after 60 years of nuclear power the world average is still less than 22 FPY.
To avoid discussion on this issue, the results of this analysis will be presented as function of the
operational lifetime.
5.2 Construction
The energy investments of the contruction of a nuclear power plant can be fairly reliably esti-
mated by means of an input/output analysis, explained in section 3.4, as the construction has
a large vector of inputs, i.e. requires inputs from many sectors of the economy. This method
has several variants, one of them involving the embodied energy in the construction materials
and another involving the relationship between cost per kg product and energy input per kg
product. The variants of the method are addressed in detail in Part F4 of [Q6].
This study based the construction energy estimates on an analysis of US nuclear power plants,
because these form a the largest group of NPPs built under about the same conditions with the
least state intervention.
From the analysis follows that the spread in the construction energy figures following from dif-
ferent methods is substantially smaller than the spread caused by the spread in the input data.
From the study ExternE 1998 [Q308], one of the few published analyses based on an existing
nuclear power plant, follows that the construction of the Sizewell B NPP in the UK required
some 50 PJ thermal energy. The total CO2 emission of the construction of Sizewell B has been
estimated at 3.15 Tg/GWe [Q308].
Nearly all other LCA studies based their estimates on NPP designs from the 1970-1972 era, exis-
ting only on paper, and not on actually constructed NPPs (see also Part F4 of [Q6]).
Table 2
Energy investment and CO2 of the construction of a nuclear power plant of 1 GWe.
For more details see Part F4 and Part G5 on www.stormsmith.nl
item low mean high unit
construction cost 3.5 6.5 9.5 USD (2000)/We

construction mass (1) 0.800 1.000 1.200 million Mg
spread in construction energy estimates (2) 43-71 66-109 79-155 PJ
construction energy investment, baseline (3) 40 80 120 PJ
CO2 production of construction, baseline 2.5 5.0 7.5 Tg
(1) No evidence is known wether a relationship exists between low cost and low construction mass.
(2) Spread caused by different estimation methods and by spread of input data.
(3) Sum of electric and thermal energy inputs, direct + indirect, ratio R = Eth/Ee = 4.8.
Baseline values in this study.
In the past numerous other studies, from 1971 on (see Part F3 [Q6] and Sovacool 2008 [Q372]),
have estimated the energy investments of the construction of a nuclear power plant, with
results ranging from Econstruct = 5.3 - 17 PJ/GW.
There are several reasons why other studies come to substantially lower estimates than this
study, such as:
• not including all indirect energy inputs
• accounting for only the direct energy inputs
• basing on a non-existing model nuclear power plant from 1971,
only a single study used more recent data
• not using empirical data of actual NPPs
• using very low cost estimates (not actual costs) in an input/output analysis.
This study includes all direct and indirect energy inputs, used empirical data from 2000 (pre-
9/11) and applies several methods to estimate the construction energy; see for details Part F4
of Storm & Smith 2008 [Q6]. The spread in the value caused by the spread in available data
turns out significantly larger than the spread caused by different estimation methods.
5.3 Operation, maintenance and refurbishments (OMR)
In addition to the construction of the nuclear power plant the mid-section of the nuclear chain
comprises operation, maintenance and refurbishments of the power plant during its operational
lifetime. At closedown most components of the power plant have been replaced at least once,
except the reactor vessel and the building, for example replacements of steam generators,
control equipment) to extent the operational lifetime of the NPP beyond the first 10-20 years
The specific energy consumption of OMR (sum of electric and thermal energy inputs) derived
in this study is:
Jomr = 3.44 PJ/FPY R = Eth/Ee = 4.8 eq12

1 full-power year (FPY) corresponds with 1 GWe.year of the reference reactor
The specific energy consumption of OMR corresponds with a specific CO2 emission of
g(CO2) = 6.92 GgCO2/PJ = 24.5 gCO2/kWh eq13
A few previous studies include the energy requirements for operation and maintenance, albeit
accounting for only the direct energy inputs. Not a single study included refurbishments each NPP
has to undergo. This study does include direct plus indirect energy inputs and refurbishments;
see for details Part F5 of [Q6]. A matter of system boundaries.
6 Back end: immobilising radioactive waste
6.1 Unique feature of nuclear power
Nuclear power, fission as well as fusion, is in one respect distinct from all other energy sys-
tems, namely, the generation of radioactivity. A nuclear reactor is a generator of heat and
radioactivity, simultaneously, inextricably and irreversibly. This unique feature has far-reaching
consequences.
The flow of radioactivity in the nuclear process chain starts with the mobilization of natural
radioactivity of the uranium ore and multiplies a billionfold by the generation of man-made
radioactivity in the reactor. Unavoidably a part of the mobilized and man-made radioactivity will
be released into the environment. Purpose of the back end of the nuclear chain is minimalize
the discharges of radioactivity into the human environment for unprecented long times (see
also Annex D).
Radioactivity cannot be destroyed, nor be made harmless to man, so the sole means to limit the
harm inflicted to the population by nuclear power is to immobilize the generated and mobilized
radioactivity as soon as possible and as effective as possible.
A safe completion of the nuclear process chain exists still only in cyberspace. We return to this
issue in section 8.1.
Each nuclear reactor of 1 GWe power produces each year an amount of radioactivity roughly
equivalent with 1000 exploded nuclear bombs of 15 kilotonnes, about the yield of the Hiroshima
bomb. A nuclear reactor produces relatively more long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides than
an exploding nuclear bomb, so the radioactivity from a reactor is more dangerous than an
equivalent amount from a nuclear explosion.
10
world
radioactivity
inventory
(millions of
nuclear bomb
equivalents)
© Storm
0
1960 2000
year
Figure 11
Cumulative quantity of the radioactivity generated worldwide by civilian nuclear power, measured in
nuclear bomb equivalents.
Ever since the first nuclear reactors started operation in the 1940s, the definitive solution to
the radioactive waste problem has been postponed to the future. Spills from corroding storage
tanks and waste containers are polluting watersheds, rivers and sea. Systematically underrated
aspects of civilian nuclear power are firstly the enormous size of the radioactive waste inventory
(about 10 million nuclear bomb equivalents at the end of 2010), secondly its steep growth over
time and thirdly its dispersion over an ever growing number of facilities and storage places. In
addition, the situation grows more serious and dangerous with time, due to the unavoidable
deterioration with time of materials and facilities. Some of the temporary storage facilities are
well-maintained, other are almost forgotten and deteriorating in an uncontrolled way.
For reasons explained in Annex D the radioactive heritage of nuclear power should be handled
in the safest possible way, without compromises to short-sighted economic interests. This view
is the basis of the analysis of the back end of the nuclear process chain in this study.
6.2 Spent fuel
By far the largest part of the anthropogenic radioactivity is confined within the spent fuel
elements, containing dozens of different kinds of radionuclides. The highly dangerous spent
nuclear fuel is unloaded from the reactor and transported to cooling ponds, usually on the site
of the nuclear power plant.
The decay of the radioactivity to levels comparable with an uncontaninated environment
takes millons of years (see also Annex D). Because of its heat generation and extremely high
radioactivity spent fuel has to be cooled for decades, in order to avoid melting, hydrogen
explosions and consequently release of its contents, as happened in Fukushima.
After cooling for at least 30 years the spent fuel elements are to be packed in very durable
canisters made of high-grade metals, see for details Part E2 of Storm & Smith 2008 [Q6]. The
canisters are to be placed in a deep geologic repository (Papp-1 1998 [Q37], Papp-2 1998 [Q38],
IAEA-349 1993 [Q43], Thegerstrom 2010 [Q453]). No geologic repository exists today: all spent
fuel ever generated is still stored in temporary, vulnerable facilities (see also Storm 2010 [Q8]).
6.3 Mine rehabilitation
At the uranium mine the metal is extracted from its ore by physical and chemical separation
processes. The decay products of uranium in the ore, most of which are dangerous alpha and
gamma emitters, remain in the tailings (waste stream) of the extraction process. The mill
tailings have the appearance of a watery mud and consist of the ore powder, chemicals and
large volumes of water. The radioactive mud, often tens of millions of tonnes at a single mine,
is stored in large ponds.
A part of the water from the mud evaporates during storage and the other part, including the
dissolved radionuclides, drains into the ground. When the mill tailings go dry, the remaining fine
powder will be easily spread by the wind. This situation occurs when one pond is filled up and
a new one is taken into operation and after the mine has been mined out and is abandoned.
Satellite photo’s show dust from the Sahara desert crossing the Atlantic Ocean under certain
conditions. An indication how far dust, and so radioactive dust, can be transported by the wind.
All radionuclides present in the tailings, which include for instance polonium-210, pose a
serious long-term health risk, all the more so because the radioactive elements are chemi-
cally mobile after the milling process, see for example NRC 1996 [Q16], Andriesse 1994 [Q77],
Lipschutz 1980 [Q54], Blanchard et al. 1982 [Q252], Diehl 2006 [Q343].
Rn-222
uranium ore deposits
pristine
chemicals water uranium oxide
overburden
& waste rock mill
uranium ore mill tailings
mining, current practice

© Storm
Rn-222
overburden
& waste rock
bentonite
mill tailings + immobilizing chemicals
immobilized waste (future?)

© Storm
Figure 12
Outline of uranium mining, the first step of the nuclear process chain. The area directly disturbed by
the mining operations of a large uranium mine may come to some 100 km2. The indirectly disturbed
area, by wind-blown dust and contaminated groundwater, may run into hundreds of thousands of square
kilometers. When the ore is exhausted, the dangerous mill tailings should be immobilised and the mine
and its surrounding area should be restored to the original situation, a process called mine rehabilitation
or reclamation. The ground water table remains contaminated permanently.
This study adopted the following concept for the immobilisation and isolation from the biosphere
of the radioactive wastes of the mining activities (see also Figure 12).
• Rendering the radioactive and other toxic elements insoluble by mixing the tailings with
appropiate chemicals, for example sodium phosphate.
• Returning the mill tailing into the mine between thick layers (several meters) of bentonite.
Bentonite is a clay mineral that swells by absorption of water and so forms a poorly permeable
mass, closing gaps and fissures. Ion migration through bentonite is very slow and in this way the
mineral effectively isolates the unwanted elements from the environment for long periods.
• Replacing the non-radioactive overburden and waste rock into the mining pit (open pit
mining) or galeries (underground mining).
• Restoring the top soil and vegetation.
Although the concentration of radionuclides (the radioactive decay daughters of uranium and
possibly also of thorium) in the tailing decreases with the grade, more ore has to be processed
per kg uranium. Per kg recovered uranium the amounts of radioactive elements remaining in
the tailings increases when using lower grade ores, due to a declining extraction yield with
decreasing grades (see section 4.2).The amounts of mill tailings grow with falling ore grades, so
the amounts of radioactive dust blown away by the wind and dissolved radionuclides draining
into the ground water grow faster than inversely proportionally with falling ore grades. This
study assumes an inversely proportional relationship between ore grade and the quantities of
materials and useful energy required to achieve immobilisation and isolation of the mining
wastes.
In one respect the above mining waste immobilisation concept does not comply with any
sustainability criterium: an adequate treatment of the waste water flows of the uranium mine
is missing. As illustrated by Figure 12, the ground water table will remain contaminated with
radionuclides and other toxic elements forever, to an ever increasing extent. Avoiding this
consequence of the current uranium mining operations would require the introduction of
greatly revised mining techniques.
Mine rehabilitation should be included in the nuclear process chain, if the nuclear industry were
to claim nuclear power is ‘clean’. This study is the first to include mine rehabilitation in the
energy analysis of the nuclear system (see also Storm 2010 [Q8]). The ISA 2006 study [Q325]
admitted the need for mine rehabilitation, but left it out of its analysis, for it was classified
‘outside of the scope of the study’.
Noteworthy is the following statement of the nuclear industry (WNA-04 2011 [Q271]):
‘Strictly speaking these (mining and milling wastes, JWSvL) are not classified as radioactive wastes’.
Energy consumption
The energy consumption of the rehabilitation of the uranium mine area is proportional to the
ore grade, due to the dilution factor and the decreasing recovery yield as the ore grade is fal-
ling, similarly to the energy consumption of mining + milling. This energy consumption will
increase when the easily accessible uranium ore deposits become depleted and deposits at
greater depths have to be mined. Other factors determining the rehabilitation energy are the
local geologic conditions and the the transport distances of the materials needed to immobilise
adequately the radioactive mine wastes (tailings). As a result of the widely different conditions
from mine to mine, the spread in the rehabilitation energy figures may be substantial.
6.4 Decommissioning and dismantling
Essentially none of the previously published LCA’s and energy analyses did include the energy
investments of decommissioning plus dismantling of the nuclear power plant after closedown.
This observation is understandable to the extent that empirical data are still not available.
Nowhere in the world a commercial nuclear power has been decommissioned and dismantled
with safe storage of the resulting radioactive waste. As a consequence all energy analyses
of nuclear power lacking decommissioning plus dismantling are incomplete and may greatly
underestimate the cradle-to-grave energy investments of nuclear power. There are, however,
sufficient indications to roughly approximate the energy investments, see Part F of Storm &
Smith 2008 [Q6].
Decommissioning and dismantling of conventional, non-nuclear, facilities generally takes a

minor fraction of the energy and monetary cost needed for construction. In principle almost
all materials could be recycled. Therefore decommissioning and dismantling of conventional
facilities are usually ignored in energy analyses, or included in the construction investments.
Decommissioning and dismantling of a nuclear power plant after a nominal operational life
is a completely different matter. The nuclear reactor and its surrounding appendages and
constructions have become highly radioactive by the neutron radiation during the operation
of the reactor, an irreversible process. The radioactive parts of the nuclear power plant have
to cool down for three decades or longer, before the actual demolition can begin. Due to the
high radiation levels, even after a long cooling period, the demolition has to be performed by
robotic equipment. The radioactive debris and scrap cannot be recycled and must be packed in
concrete and steel containers and stored in a geologic repository, to keep it out of the human
environment definitively. The materials, a significant part of which are high-grade metals, are
lost for the economic system forever.
The activities related to the decommissioning and dismantling of a nuclear power plant may
take a period of a 100 years or even more and can be divided into four stages, known under
different names in the nuclear literature:
• plant cleanout, decontamination or decommissioning
• safe-guarded cooling period, safe enclosure or ‘safestor’
• dismantling, that is, demolition of the structures
• site clearance, including packing of the debris and scrap, followed by removal and definitive
storage of the containers in a repository.
The mass and volume of the decommissioning and dismantling waste of one nuclear power plant
are substantial: tens of thousands of cubic meters and many tens of thousands of tonnes. The
average specific radioactivity may be in de order of 10 GBq/kg, a significant part of which is
caused by long-lived radioisotopes.
The radioactive debris and scrap have to be isolated from the biosphere permanently and
immediately, to avoid uncontrolled trade and reuse in the non-nuclear economy and consequently
exposure of the public to chronic radioactive contamination.
Illegal trade of radioactive materials is already a growing problem today. This little known but
serious problem is worsened by several factors, such as:
• many dangerous radionuclides potentially present in illegal traded materials are not
detectable with the commonly used detectors,
• relaxation for economic reasons of the contamination standards for classifying materials as
‘radioactive materials’,
• lack of sufficient check points and lack of qualified personel.
6.5 Immobilising radioactivity
Annex D explains the reasons why the radioactive waste which is mobilised and generated by
the nuclear system should be effectively isolated from the biosphere, to keep large and densily
populated areas habitable. The next Chernobyl or Fukushima disaster might happen in the USA
or in Western Europe.
There is only one survival strategy to deal with the human-made radioactivity plus the
mobilised natural radioactivity: all radioactivity has be kept out of the human environment for
at least a million of years, as pointed out in section 6.1. Such a achievement would require the
construction of geologic repositories. Annex D addresses this issue in more detail.
The construction of a geologic repository is anything but a simple task. A repository with a
capacity of 20000 tonnes of spent fuel, about the current world annual production, should
comprise some 100 kilometers of galleries and tunnels at a depth of about 500 meter below
surface. Each year the world would need a new repository of this capacity.
The crucial steps towards a safe immobilisation and isolation of the radioactive waste from
nuclear power are still existing only in cyberspace. This observation contrasts sharply with the
statement of the nuclear industry (WNA-04 2011 [Q271]):
‘Nuclear power is the only large-scale energy-producing technology which takes full responsibility for
all its wastes and fully costs this into the product.’
Apparently the nuclear industry has problems with the distinction between empirically verifiable
facts and concepts from cyberspace. In daily life such a statement could easily be classified as
a lie.
This study assumes that all radioactive waste streams, obviously except the intentional and
accidental releases into the environment, are packed in durable containers and definitively
stored in geologic repositories, as soon as possible following the generation of the waste. The
necessary industrial activities to achieve an as safe as possible back end of the nuclear chain
are conceived in this study by analogy with existing similar industrial processes. For details see
Part D6, Part E2 and Part F6 of [Q6] and Storm 2010 [Q8].
7 Results
7.1 Contributions to the energy investments
The total useful energy inputs of the nuclear energy system during its c2g period include energy
investments which are little or not dependent on the operational lifetime of the reactor and
energy investments which are. The former category comprises the energy requirements for
construction and for its decommissioning and dismantling. The latter category includes two
groups:
• investments proportional only to the operational lifetime, comprising:
– operation, maintenance and refurbishments (OMR)
– front end processes of the fuel chain: conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
– back end processes of the fuel chain: handling and disposal of the operational
radioactive wastes
• investments proportional to the operational lifetime and additionally dependent on the
uranium ore properties(e.g grade G), comprising:
– uranium mining + milling
– uranium mine rehabilitation.
The process data and specific energy consumptions of the processes of the nuclear chain (see
Figure 3) are briefly described in Part E of Storm & Smith 2008 [Q6]. The recovery of uranium
from its ore and mine reclamation are addressed in detail in Part D of [Q6]. A comprehensive
explanation of the energy investments of contruction, dismantling and OMR (operation +
maintenance + refurbishments) is given in Part F of [Q6].
The applied technology of enrichment, diffusion or ultracentrifuge (UC), turns out to be of

minor importance for the total energy input. This study assumed 30% diffusion, 70% UC. If all
enrichment would be done by means of UC, the c2g energy input of the fuel chain (baseline
case) would decrease by about 6%. Larger contributions to the total energy investments come
from construction and dismantling of the nuclear power plant. In adition, the spread in the value
of the sum of these energy investments (200±80 PJ), due to uncertainties in the basic data,
is by far larger than the spread caused by the differences between enrichment by diffusion,
ultracentrifuge or a mix of both.
7.2 EROEI
The energy return on energy investment EROEI of the nuclear energy system has been defined
in section 3.5, equation 5, and covers its full cradle-to-grave (c2g) period. This implies that the
system boundaries include all energy investments related to a given NPP, regardless place and
time, even if occurring many decades from now.
This study presents the results of the energy analysis as function of three quantitatively
important variables of the nuclear system:
• energy investments of construction of the NPP and its decommissioning + dismantling +
site clearance after closedown, Ec+d
• operational lifetime, T100
• uranium ore grade, G
Figure 14 shows the relationship between the EROEI of the nuclear system and the quantity
‘fixed energy input Ec+d’ at fixed values of the operational lifetime and of the ore grade. Even
if construction and dismantling are ignored, the EROEI is just slightly higher than 4. The spread
in the figures of the energy investments of construction and dismantling are large: this study
found a minimum of some 120 PJ and a maximum of about 280 PJ. The baseline value adopted
in this study is Ec+d = 200 PJ. The sensitivity of the EROEI to the fixed energy investments
Ec+d turn out to be substantial at the baseline conditions, T100 = 25 FPY and G = 0.13% U. The
sensitivity of the EROEI to the other variables are addressed below.
t100 = 25 FPY
G = 0.13%U
4 soft ores
uncertainty spread
3
baseline
EROEI
© Storm
1
100 200 300
fixed energy input Ec+d
(PJ)
Figure 14
EROEI of the nuclear energy system as function of the fixed energy consumption Ec+d (construction +
dismantling) in the baseline situation: operational lifetime T100 = 25 full-power years and the average
uranium ore grade G = 0.13% uranium, soft ores. At present the world-averaged ore grade is 0.1-0.05% U.
G = 0.13%U
soft ores
4
3
50 FPY, promised
EROEI
25 FPY, baseline
2
21 FPY, current practice

© Storm
1
100 200 300
fixed energy input Ec+d (PJ)
Figure 15
EROEI of the nuclear energy system as function of the fixed energy consumption Ec+d (construction +
dismantling), with indication of the sensitivity to variation in operational lifetime. Average uranium ore
grade G = 0.13% uranium, soft ores. At present the world-averaged ore grade is 0.1-0.05% U.
Figure 15 represents the spread in the relationship EROEI vs Ec+d at three operational lifetimes:
the current practice (21 FPY), the baseline case (25 FPY) and the high value promised by the
nuclear industry (50 FPY).
The relationship between EROEI and the operational lifetime of the reactor T100 is given by
Figure 16 at three values of the fixed energy investments Ec+d. Even at unrealistic high values
of operational lifetime and at low fixed energy investments, the EROEI will hardly reach a value
of 3. The diagram also shows that the current practice is far from favourable. This situation
likely will not improve in the future, even if the average operational lifetime of new reactors
increases significantly, due to the deteriorating thermodyamic quality of the uranium ores, see
below.
4
G = 0.13% U
closed-down reactors operating reactors soft ores
world average 2011 world average 2011
(c+d)
3 low E
E (c+d)
EROEI line
base )
E(c+d
high
2
operational lifetime (full-power years)

1
10 20 30 40 50
© Storm energy sink
Figure 16
EROEI of the nuclear energy system as function of the full-power lifetime of the reactor, with indication of
the sensitivity to variation in the energy consumption of construction plus dismantling. Average uranium
ore grade G = 0.13% uranium, soft ores. At present the world-averaged ore grade is 0.1-0.05% U.
The value of the EROEI depends heavily on the thermodynamic quality of the uranium ore
feeding the nuclear system at grades below 0.1% U, as shown by Figure 17. The distinction
between soft ores and hard ores becomes significant at ore grades below G = 0.1% U. Note that
at EROEI < 1 the nuclear system becomes an energy sink in stead of an energy generator. This
happens at ore grades G < 0.02%U. This phenomenon is named the energy cliff. Figure 18 shows
that the operational lifetime does not affect the critical ore grade of the energy cliff.
4 © Storm
T100 = 25 FPY
Ec+d = 200 PJ
soft ores
hard ores
3
EROEI
1
energy sink
100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001

Figure 17
The energy cliff. EROEI of the nuclear energy system as function of the uranium ore grade of soft ores
and hard ores, under baseline conditions. In the background the grade distribution of the known uranium
resources is represented by the bar graph (see Figure 10).
4 © Storm
world-averaged
grades 2011
baseline
Ec+d = 200 PJ
50 FPY, promised future
3 soft ores
EROEI 25 FPY, baseline
2
21 FPY, current practice
1
energy sink
100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001

Figure 18
Energy cliff: the EROEI of the nuclear energy system as function of the uranium ore grade (soft ores), with
indication of the sensitivity to variation in operational lifetime. At present the world-averaged ore grade
is 0.1-0.05% U.
7.3 Climate footprint of nuclear power
Nuclear CO2 emission
Figure 19 illustrates the contributions of the various components of the nuclear process chain
to the CO2 emission of the nuclear system, as calculated according to the conventions explained
in section 3.6. The diagram is valid for the reference reactor at an assumed uranium ore grade
of G = 0.05% U. It turns out the back end of the nuclear chain plus decommissioning of the
reactor will emit about als much CO2 as the remaining components jointly. As the back end
and decommissioning of all reactors have been passed on to the future, the emissions of these
activities have yet to happen and actually comprise a kind of CO2 debt. We return to this issue
in section 8.1.
Like the EROEI the specific CO2 emission of the nuclear system depends on the same main
variables: the operational lifetime T100 and grade G of the uranium ore feeding the nuclear
system. Judging by the large emission contributions of construction and decommissioning (see
diagram of Figure 19), the value of the total specific CO2 emission is also sensitive to the energy
requirements of these two activities.
LWR, 25 FPY
soft ores
operation G = 0.05% U
construction maintenance Σ 121 gCO2/kWh
refurbishments
front end
decommissioning
& dismantling mining + milling
back end
mine rehabilitation
© Storm
Figure 19
Contributions to the c2g CO2 emissions of the nuclear energy system based on the reference LWR with
an operational lifetime of T100 = 25 FPY, using soft uranium ores at an ore grade G = 0.05% U (about the
present world average). Two CO2 emission contributions increase with decreasing ore grade: uranium
mining + milling and uranium mine reclamation. For more explanation, see text.
200
G = 0.05%U
soft ores
ce
cti
pra
e nt
150 curr
Y,
FP line
21 b ase
PY,
25F
gCO2/kWh
m ised
100 Y, pro
50 FP
50
0 © Storm
100 200 300
fixed energy input Ec+d (PJ)
Figure 20
Sensitivity of the nuclear CO2 emission to the fixed energy investments voor construction and dismantling
Ec+d, at three different operational lifetimes. Average grade of the uranium ore (soft ores) feeding the
nuclear system G = 0.05% U.
world-averaged
grades 2011
300 baseline
Ec+d = 200 PJ
soft ores
25 FPY
gCO2/kWh
200
100
future
100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001

Figure 21
Nuclear CO2 emission of the baseline nuclear system as function of the uranium ore grade. At present the
world-averaged ore grade is 0.1-0.05% U.
The energy requirements of mining + milling and mine rehabilitation depend on the ore grade,
as has been explained in sections 4.2 and 6.3 respectively. Consequently the CO2 emissions of
these two processes are also ore grade dependent. The contributions to the total CO2 emission
by mining +milling and mine rehabilitation turn out to be almost negligible at grades higher than
G = 1% U, as Figure 21 shows. At grades G < 1% U the CO2 emission of the nuclear system starts
rise exponentially. This points to an increasingly dominating contribution of mining +milling and
mine rehabilitation to the total emission with decreasing ore grade.
Other greenhouse gases
The climate footprint of nuclear power encompasses not only the carbon footprint (the specific
emission of carbon dioxide CO2), but also the emission of other greenhouse gases (GHGs). It
should be stressed that with regard to nuclear power the emission unit geqCO2/kWh should be
avoided, for this unit would imply that greenhouse gases other than CO2 are included. Emissions
of other greenhouse gases by nuclear are unknown, but might be substantial, as pointed out in
section 3.7.
Absence of published data does not mean absence of emissions of other greenhouse gases.
Radioactive emissions
Contamination of the environment with radioactive materials, for instance radioactive noble
gases, from civil nuclear power is extensive (Storm 2010 [Q8]). Routinely the nuclear system
discharges vast amounts of radioactive materials, such as tritium (radioactive hydrogen) and
carbon-14 (radioactive carbon), in addition to fission products and actinides. Virtually nothing
is known of the effects of radioactive gases in the atmosphere on the climate. However, this
observation is unrelated to the biological and health effects of the radioactive releases by the
nuclear system. Radioactive contamination and its environmental effects are left outside the
scope of this study.
8 World nuclear outlook
8.1 Energy debt
Chapter 6 and Annex D briefly discuss the purpose of the back end of the nuclear process chain:
the immobilization of all radioactive wastes from the chain and isolation of the human-made
radioactivity from the biosphere forever. All radioactive waste generated in the nuclear era
since the 1940s is still stored in temporary, vulnerable facilities, if not dumped in the oceans
and at other, unknown, places. Only a handful of small radioactive facilities is ever dismantled,
and still partially, so all permanently shutdown NPPs are waiting for dismantling. No geologic
repository in the world is operational, yet these facilities are unavoidable.
Energy is a conserved quantity, contrary to monetary quantities. An energy debt cannot be

discounted, nor written off as uncollectable. Essentially, it makes no difference for an energy
accounting to calculate the energy balance of a system in steady state or when its processes
take place many years apart and at geographically widely separated locations. To attribute
all energy flows in the nuclear chain to the operation of each particular reactor which causes
that flows, all energy inputs and outputs of future processes are ‘capitalized’ during the actual
operation of the power plant.
The energy consumption of the back end processes are based on the present state of technology.
No new techniques will be required, contrary to claims of the nuclear industry: the future will
offer better techniques. This view points to an ‘après nous le déluge’ attitude.
cradle-to-grave
production of
n
tio
useful energy
uc
od
pr
gy
er
en
cumulative
ive
at
energy
ul
m
production
cu
startup closedown
time
construction during
front end operational
bui + OMR lifetime cradle-to-grave
cumulative ldu investments of
pe
energy ner dismantling energy
gy useful energy
deb + back end debt
investment
© Storm
Figure 22
Dynamic energy balance of a nuclear electricity generating system. The diagram is at scale for the base-
line case: T100 = 25 FPY and the fised energy investments Ec+d = 200 PJ. The energy debt comprises the
energy investment needed for decommissioning and dismantling the nuclear power plant and for the im-
mobilisation of all radioactive wastes generated by the nuclear energy system. The EROEI equals the ratio
of the c2g energy investments (long orange-red bar) over the c2g production of useful energy (blue bar).
The unavoidable processes of dismantling, waste management and final disposal after final
shutdown will consume a great deal of energy: this amount in effect constitutes an ‘energy
debt’, for it is not accounted for, nor stored in any conceivable form. The energy debt should be
paid, sooner or later, if our society wants to keep the human environment habitable and avoid
permanent disruption of our society and economy (see also Storm 2010 [Q8]).
In Figure 22 the energy debt is assumed to remain constant for a period of 60 or more years
after final shutdown of the reactor. In practice the energy debt per reactor will rise with
time after closedown, due to the unavoidable deterioration of the shielding materials, causing
leakages, accidents and dispersal of radioactive materials at an increasing rate.
8.2 Depletion of uranium resources: a thermodynamic notion
Section 4.4. introduced the thermodynamic quality of uranium resources as a measure of

usefulness of uranium-bearing rock to be applied as a net energy source. The thermodynamic
quality is set by a number of geologic and geochemical variables, of which the ore grade is
often the most important one. To describe in broad outline the possibilities in the future of
net energy from uranium, which are determined by the thermodynamic quality of the uranium
resources, we are confining to the ore grade.
The ore grade distribution of the known uranium resources of the world exhibits a common
geologic phenomenon: ore deposits at lower grades are more frequent in the earth’s crust
and are larger than higher-grade deposits. Consequently the lower grade, the larger are the
uranium resources. Figure 10 represents the ore grade distribution of the known recoverable
uranium resources, as far as published in the open literature.
Usually the richest and easiest discoverable and exploitable uranium resources become depleted
first, because these offer the highest returns on investments for the mining companies. Low-
hanging fruit is harvested first. As the easiest available uranium resources are exploited first,
the world-averaged ore quality decreases with time. This phenomenon is not typical for uranium
ores, but applies to all mineral ores, see e.g. Mudd 2009 [Q391], Mudd 2011 [Q471].
Not all potential uranium resources are known today, of course. During the past two decades
virtually no new discoveries have been made of uranium ore bodies of significant size and/
or quality, apart from extensions of already known deposits. More intensive exploration may
lead to new discoveries. The chances of finding new major deposits, easily accessible and of
favourable size and properties, are unknown, but seem not great.
Likely the yet to be discovered deposits will be of low thermodynamic quality: low grade, great
depth, unfavourable mineralogy, remote location, or a combination of these factors. Antartica,
for instance, may host high-grade uranium deposits, nobody knows. Investments of materials
and energy for exploitation of those deposits, if found anyway, below kilometers of ice might
turn out of prohibitive proportions, assumed it would be technically possible. Even if rich
deposits would be found near the surface of the ice-free dry valleys of Antartica, the transport
of equipment, chemicals and products to and from the mining area – tens of thousands of
tonnes a year over distances of tens of thousands of kilometers –, would be an exceedingly
energy-intensive challenge.
Similar thermodynamic arguments apply to the proposed recovery of uranium from seawater.
In seawater uranium has a state of extremely high entropy, maybe the highest attainable for
uranium on earth. Although the total mass of uranium in the oceans is huge, its recovery from
seawater would require prohibitive amounts of useful energy and high-quality materials. This
observation follows directly from the Second Law.
Depletion of uranium resources is not in the first place a matter of quantity, but of thermodynamic
quality: how much useful energy, direct energy input and energy embodied in equipment and
materials, has to be invested to obtain one unit of useful energy extractable from the recovered
uranium?
Not just the quantity, but the thermodynamic quality of the world uranium resources might be
the determining factor for nuclear power in the future.
The thermodynamic quality of the known uranium resources has a profound effect on the
energy security and CO2 emission of nuclear power in the future. To illustrate some possible
consequences, we introduce two scenarios: Scenario 1 with a constant nuclear generating ca-
pacity and Scenario 2 with a constant share of nuclear in the global energy mix.
In both scenarios we assume no significant discoveries of new uranium resources of high ther-
modynamic quality, beyond the currently known resources.
8.3 Energy security: scenarios
Scenario 1, constant nuclear capacity
The world nuclear generating capacity remains constant at the present level of P = 372 GWe
during the next century. All currently operating nuclear power plants but a few will reach the
end of their technical lifetime by 2050 and are to be closed down. To keep the the world nu-
clear capacity constant, practically the whole fleet of nuclear power plants has to be replaced
by 2050: almost 10 GWe of new nuclear build has to come online per year during the next four
decades. Today some 3-4 GW of new nuclear generating capacity is coming on line world wide.
Due to the growth in the world energy demand, estimated at 2-3% per year, the nuclear share
of the world energy supply in Scenario 1 would decline from the present 2% to 0.9-0.6% by 2050.
A constant nuclear capacity would imply a constant consumption of about 68000 Mg/year of na-
tural uranium. The uranium demand may decrease somewhat by 2050, probably to about 62000
Mg/yr, when the currently operating reactors would be replaced by more advanced reactors,
with a lower specific uranium consumption of the fuel cycle. Because of the many uncertainties
we assume a constant demand throughout the next decades.
Scenario 2, constant nuclear share
In Scenario 2 the world nuclear capacity is assumed to contribute a constant share of 2% to the
world energy supply, the level in 2010. For reason of the growth in the world energy demand,
the nuclear capacity has to grow at an equal rate. To keep pace with the world energy demand
the nuclear capacity has to grow to some 821 GWe by 2050, at an assumed growth rate of 2%/
yr, or 1001 GWe by 2060. This is lower than the WNA scenario Low (WNA Outlook 2011 [Q485]),
which assumes a nuclear capacity of 1140 GWe by the year 2060. At a growth rate of 3% per year
the nuclear capacity would be 1213 GWe by 2050, or 1631 GWe by 2060. This would be higher
than WNA scenario Low, but lower than WNA scenario High (3688 GWe by 2060).
Scenario 2 would imply new nuclear build coming online at an average rate of 20 GWe per year
at 2%/yr growth, to 30 GWe/yr at 3%/yr growth, continuously during the next four decades.
The world uranium demand in Scenario 2 would rise from the present level of 68000 Mg/yr to
about 150000 Mg/yr at 2% growth, or to about 220000 Mg/yr at 3% growth, by the year 2050.
A rough impression of the quality decline is given by Figure 23, which is based on the assumption
that the uranium mining shifts to a resource of lower grade, when the resources of hgher grades
have been depleted. In practice the decrease of the world-averaged ore grade is gradual.
The currently known world uranium resources would become depleted between 2050 and 2075
depending on the scenario, within the lifetime of new nuclear build (see below).
100
© Storm
10
ore grade G
(mass-% U)
1
0.1
0.01
scenario 2 scenario 1
constant nuclear share constant nuclear
2% world E capacity 372 GW
0.001
2010 2030 2050 2070
year
Figure 23
Depletion of the currently known recoverable uranium resources in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 (2% growth).
In Scenario 2 based on 3% growth, the depletion would occur by about 2043 . The scenarios are based
on the assumption that no major new resources will be discovered during the next decades and that the
richest available resources are exploited first. This figure is based on the ore grade distribution of the
known uranium resources as presented in Figure 10.
8.4 Energy cliff
The specific energy consumption of the recovery of uranium from the earth’s crust depends
heavily on the ore grade, as is discussed in section 4.2. From Figure 8 follows that the extraction
yield starts to decline exponentially with decreasing ore grade from about G = 0.3% U. As a
consequence the recovery energy consumption rises faster than linearly when ore grades fall
below that value.
The specific energy consumption of mine rehabilitation rises also with declining ore grade, as
pointed out in section 6.3. Consequently the energy investments of the front end and back end
of the nuclear fuel chain increase with decreasing ore grade. The gross energy production of
the nuclear power plant per kg natural uranium remains constant, regardless of the origin of
the uranium feeding the nuclear energy system, so the net energy production of the nuclear
system as a whole declines with falling ore grades.
Figure 24 presents the relationship between the c2g EROEI of the nuclear energy system and
the uranium ore grade. Two cases are presented: a system based on an energy investment for
construction and dismantling of Ec+d = 200 PJ (baseline) and of Ec+d = 120 PJ (lowest estimate).
The net energy from the nuclear system turns out to fall to zero at ore grades of about G =
0.01% U, regardless the type of ore and the height of the construction costs and energy debt.
For that reason the diagram of Figure 24 is called the energy cliff.
3
© Storm
T100 = 25 FPY
Ec+d = 120 PJ
EROEI
Ec+d = 200 PJ
1
energy sink
2010 2030 2050 2070 2090

year
Figure 24
The energy cliff over time: the EROEI of nuclear power as function of time. LWR in the baseline case, with
a world average operational lifetime of t100 = 25 FPY. Assumed that no major new uranium resources of
high quality (high grade, low depth) are found and that the world nuclear capacity remains at the present
level of about 370 GWe. The coloured bands indicate the spread in the ore grade figures on which these
graphs have been based.
Very little uranium resources at grades below G = 0.02% U have been reported by the uranium
industry, an indication that resources at such low grades are economically not viable. The cur-
rent world averaged ore grade is in the range of G = 0.1-0.05% U. The energy consumption of
uranium mining rises increasingly steeply below G = 0.1% U and becomes a dominant factor for
the EROEI of the nuclear energy system at low grades, see also Figures 17 and 18.
Combination of Figures 18 and 23 result in the energy cliff over time, as represented by Figure
24. In the scenario of Figure 24 nuclear power becomes an energy sink by the year 2075.The
diagram shows that the energy consumption of the construction and dismantling (Ec+d), as
accounted for in the energy analysis, does not alter the year of falling off the energy cliff.
The same holds true for operational lifetimes longer than the baseline value of T100 = 25 FPY.
Nuclear systems with operational lifetimes of T100 = 50 FPY start at a higher EROEI in 2010 but
will fall off the energy cliff in the same period as the baseline system.
Obviously the energy cliff will be reached sooner if the nuclear generating capacity increases
during the coming years beyond the present level of 370 GWe.
Energy cliff and other commodities
The basic mechanism causing the energy cliff of uranium resources applies also to other
commodities, for example tar sands and unconventional gas. The energy investments to recover
fossil fuels from unconventional resources may consume an appreciable part of the energy
content of the recovered fuels. An energy cliff with regard to fossil fuels is conceivable.
A declining average ore grade and increasing specific energy consumption is to be expected with
respect to every metal or mineral, as the richest and easiest exploitable deposits are always
depleted first (see for example Mudd 2009 [Q391]). As a consequence the energy intensity of
metals and minerals will rise with time.
This phenomenon acts as a positive feedback mechanism. The recovery of any mineral requires
materials, equipment and energy. The consumed materials and equipment become more
energy-intensive with time, so the indirect energy consumption of the recovery of a mineral
increases with time. This comes on top of the rising direct specific energy consumption of the
recovery of the mineral, due to decreasing ore quality.
8.5 CO2 trap
As a consequence of the steep rising specific energy consumption of uranium mining & milling
and mine rehabilitation with declining uranium ore grade, the specific CO2 emission of the front
end and back end of the nuclear chain will rise with time also. Figure 25, which is deduced from
Figure 23, shows the rising trend and the nearly vertical rise when nuclear power becomes de-
pendent on very poor ores. If no new rich uranium ore deposits are discovered during the next
decades, the nuclear CO2 emission will surpass the specific CO2 emission of gas-fired stations,
and even coal-fired stations, within the lifetime of new nuclear build.
gas-fired power plant

400
scenario 2
CO2 emission constant nuclear share
2% world E
(g/kWh)
scenario 1
constant nuclear
capacity 372 GW
© Storm
2010 2030 2050 2070 2090

year
Figure 25
The CO2 trap: the nuclear CO2 emission over time, baseline case (T100 = 25 FPY, Ec+d = 200 PJ). The specific
CO2 emission of nuclear power rises with time due to decreasing thermodynamic quality of the uranium
ores. Within the lifetime of new nuclear build the specific CO2 emission surpasses that of fossil-fuelled
electricity generation. The colored bands represent the uncertainty ranges regarding ore quality, mainly
the difference between soft ores and hard ores.
Figure 25 is only meant to give just a rough impression of the CO2 trap rather than a prediction.
Very likely the average uranium ore quality will decline in the future and consequently the
specific CO2 emission by the nuclear energy system will rise over time. The rate of increase is
uncertain for a number of reasons: uncertainties about operational lifetime T100, fixed energy
investments Ec+d, development of the global nuclear generating capacity, new uranium resource
discoveries, reactor technology, etcetera.
Note that year of depletion, when the curve starts rising nearly vertically and the specific nu-
clear CO2 emission surpasses that of fossil fuels, is not affected by variables as T100 and Ec+d but
is determined by the amounts of new discoveries of high-quality uranium resources. Sooner or
later the nuclear energy system will run aground in the CO2 trap.
Conclusions
Inadequate information flow to politicans and public
The opacity of the nuclear system to the public and its decision makers, due to its complexity,
is exacerbated by other factors, such as:
• Vital data on the nuclear system, required for a balanced comparison with other energy
systems, are scarce or lacking in the open literature.
• The technical information on nuclear power originates almost exclusively from the nuclear
industry and from institutes with vested interests in nuclear power, such as International Ato-
mic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Nuclear Association (WNA), Uranium Information Centre (UIC),
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Understandably these sources
tend to highlight only the favourable aspects.
• The information to the public is generally characterized by a technical optimism, which is
not always founded on empirical facts. Unproved technical concepts are often presented as if
it were mature processes, just waiting on the shelf until the society asks for their large-scale
implementation.
Available reactor technology
Nuclear power during the next decades will depend on thermal reactor technology, mainly
light-water reactor (LWR), in the once-through mode.
• Plutonium recycling in LWRs likely will play a negligible role during the next decades.
• Application of reactors in the closed-cycle, the uranium-plutonium breeder, will not play a
significant role before 2050, if ever.
• Application of the thorium-232/uranium-233 technology for civil energy generation is even
more remote than the uranium-plutonium breeder.
Energy security and nuclear power
The contribution of nuclear power to the energy security is not determined only by economic
and political factors, but primarily by the thermodynamic quality of the world uranium resour-
ces.
• The economic view is based on the market mechanism and uranium prices. From an econo-
mic viewpoint no problems are foreseen for the future uranium supply.
• The thermodynamic quality corresponds with the net energy extractable per tonne ore in
situ, and is set by the physical and chemical properties of the uranium-bearing rocks in the
earth’s crust.
Because the thermodynamic quality goes down over time, it will play an increasingly important
role in the future, affecting the energy security.
• If the world nuclear generating capacity remains constant in the future at the present level
of some 370 GWe (scenario 1), the currently known uranium resources will be depleted by
about 2075.
• If the share of the world nuclear generating capacity remains constant in the future at the
present level of 2% of the world gross energy production (scenario 2), the currently known ura-
nium resources will be depleted by about 2050, well within the lifetime of new nuclear build.
It is a misconception to think that every uranium atom in the earth’s crust can be recovered.
It is a misconception to think that every uranium atom recovered from the crust represents
the same amount of net energy potentially available to the economic system, that means not
needed to build and sustain the nuclear energy system itself.
Energy cliff
The energy requirements of the recovery of one mass unit of uranium from the earth’s crust
increase exponentially with decreasing ore grade. Below a certain grade these energy require-
ments are larger than the amount of useful energy which can potentially extracted from that
mass unit of uranium. This phenomenon is called the energy cliff. Below the critical grade the
nuclear system falls off the energy cliff and becomes an energy sink instead of an energy ge-
nerator.
The energy cliff hardly depends on the technical performance of the nuclear energy system,
but is determined by the physical and chemical properties of the uranium ore.
Depletion of uranium resources as source of net useful energy is a thermodynamic notion.
The chances of discovery of new major uranium deposits of similar thermodynamic quality as
the currently exploited uranium deposits are unknown, but seem not great.
Climate control and nuclear power
The nuclear reactor itself is only part of the nuclear energy system which nearly free of CO2
emission. All other parts of the chain are conventional industrial processes, which consume fos-
sil fuels and emit CO2 and likely also other greenhouse gases.
The emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO2 by the nuclear process chain never have been
published and probaby never have been investigated.
Absence of data is does not equal absence of emissions.
It is impossible at this moment to compare nuclear power with renewable energy systems on
equal basis. The reported greenhouse gas emissions of the renewable energy systems do include
other greenhouse gases, contrary to the nuclear energy system.
The specific CO2 emission of nuclear power found in this study is in the range of 84-130 gCO2/
kWh, for the baseline case at an average uranium ore grade (soft ores) of 0.11% U. The spread
is caused by the uncertainties of the CO2 emission of construction plus dismantling. At an ore
grade of 0.05% U, which is more near the current world average, the specific CO2 emission of
nuclear power is in the range of 98-144 gCO2/kWh.
A substantial spread in the numerical values of the nuclear CO2 emission is inevitable, because
of the large uncertainties in the data needed to calculate the emission, therefore presenting
a single value is incomplete and misleading. In addition the emission figures strongly depend
on the grade of the uranium ore.
Even if nuclear power would emit no greenhouse gases at all, its contribution to the global
climate control could not become much more than 2%, even not in the most optimistic scenario
of the nuclear industry.
CO2 trap
The specific CO2 emission of nuclear power will rise in the future and may surpass that of fossil-
fuelled electricity generation, due to the declining thermodynamis quality of the exploitable
uranium ores with time.
The critical grade of the CO2 trap hardly depends on the technical performance of the nuclear
energy system, but is determined by the physical and chemical properties of the uranium ore.
If no high-quality uranium resources are discovered during the next decades, the nuclear
energy system will run aground in the CO2 trap within the lifetime of new nuclear build: by
about 2075 in Scenario 1 and 2050 in Scenario 2.
System boundaries
Many controverses with regard to nuclear power turn out to originate applying different system
boundaries and time horizon: which processes and activities are included in the system and are
which not. Often the system boundaries are not explicitely defined.
Some claims of the nuclear industry are based on ill-defined system boundaries, for example
nuclear power is carbon-free, or on concepts existing only in cyberspace, for example the avai-
lability of closed-cycle nuclear energy systems (U/Pu, Th/U).
Energy debt
Once it has started a nuclear reactor, society is committed to a long sequence of causally re-
lated and very demanding industrial activities, completion of which may take 100-150 years.
• The full sequence never has been completed for any nuclear power plant in the world.
• Probably the most demanding activities are the dismantling of the nuclear power plant
after final closedown and the safe isolation of all radioactive wastes from the biosphere. The
activities certainly will consume large amounts of materials and energy.
• By postponing these activities to the future, the nuclear industry is building up an ever
increasing energy debt, coupled with a CO2 emission debt.
Solution of the nuclear waste problem is not a matter of waiting for new technologies, but a
matter of effort and dedication of massive amounts of materials and energy.
Annex A
Present state
A.1 World gross energy production
In 2008 the world gross energy production mounted to about 491 EJ, the sum of the combustion
heat of fossil fuels and biomass plus the electricity generated by hydropower, nuclear power
and modern renewables. The total world energy production is not exactly known, for the
energy consumption of traditional biomass (wood, dung, straw, peat) in a number of developing
countries can only be roughly estimated. In most official energy statististics, such as BP [Q91],
only traded energy flows are listed: fossil fuels, hydro power and nuclear power.
Usually the energy flows are given in million tonnes oil equivalent (1 MTOE = 42 GJ). In most
statistical energy publications, e.g. BP 2009 [Q91] and IEA 2006 [Q274], the electricity genera-
ted by nuclear and hydro (not from PV , wind or CSP) is converted into ‘primary energy’ units,
by multiplying with a certain factor, as if the electricity has been generated from fossil fuels.
This statistical manipulation introduces ambiguities into the energy statistics, because virtual
energy units are added to actually delivered energy units. You cannot add quality to quantity.
This study presents all energy quantities of the world energy flows in exajoules (EJ), as shown
in Table A1.
Table A1
Energy actually made available in 2008 to society and the economic system. Sources: BP 2009 [Q91] and
IEA 2006 [Q274].
energy source electricity combustibles EJ fraction

TWh MTOE (%)
1 nuclear 2739 9.86 2.0

2 hydro 3171 11.42 2.3
3 oil 3928 164.97 33.6
4 natural gas 2726 114.50 23.3
5 coal 3304 138.76 28.2
6 sum fossil fuels (3+4+5) 418.23 85.1
7 sum traded energy units (1+2+6) 9958 439.51
8 traditional biomass * 1172 49.23 10.0
9 modern renewables ** 760 2.74 0.6
10 world total (7+8+9) 11130 491.47 100.0
* From IEA 2006 [Q274], assumed growth rate 0%/a.

** Approximate, extrapolation from IEA 2006 [Q274], assumed growth rate 20%/a.
A part of the fossil fuels is used to produce asphalt, solvents, lubricants and chemical feedstock.
In 2000 this non-energy use of fossil fuels amounted to 22 EJ, some 6% of the fossil fuel
production, according to Weiss et al. 2009 [Q423]. At an assumed growth rate of 2% per annum,
this would correspond with some 27 EJ in 2008.
There are three kinds of energy losses in the world energy system:
• Upstream fossil fuel losses. The recovery from the earth (production), refining and transport
of the fossil fuels consumes some 23% of the energy content of the fuels. This loss fraction will
increase with time, as the easiest recoverable resources available are exploited first and will
be depleted first. The remaining resources are less easy to exploit ens will consume more useful
energy per unit extracted fuel.
• Conversion losses. In 2008 average conversion efficiency of fossil fuels into electricity was
about 38% [Q91], so 62% of the energy content of the fossil fuels are lost into the environment.
• The average transmission losses of electricity are estimated at about 6%.
The final energy consumption of the world, that is the gross energy production minus above
mentioned losses, mounted to about 311 EJ in 2008. Figure A1 represents the various energy
flows.
traditional non-energy use 27

49
biomass
49
193 166
322
fossil fuels 418 73 69
311
129 final energy
49
©Storm
consumption
96 80
hydropower 11 4
modern 3
renewables
uranium 10
upstream loss conversion loss transmission loss

491
gross energy production
World energy 2008 physical flows
Figure A1
World energy flows in 2008, measured in exajoules (EJ). This diagram is based on Table 1, with rounded
figures. Not accurately known are the amount of energy embodied in traditional biomass and the upstream
losses of the fossil fuels. Therefore the world final energy consumption, here presented as Efinal = 311
EJ, has an uncertainty range. The upstream losses are increasing over time, as the easily recoverable
resources are depleted first.
A.2 Nuclear contribution
From Table A1 and the diagram of Figure A1 follows that the nuclear share of the world gross
energy production in 2008 was 10 EJ out of 491 EJ, or 2% . Even if nuclear power were carbon
free (which it is not), the nuclear contribution to the abatement of the world CO2 emission
would be no more than 2%.
Annex B
Reactor technology
B.1 Reference reactor
Basic parameters of the reference reactor of this study are summarised in Table B1. The dif-
ferences in the burnup of the first core, last core and reload charges during steady state of the
reactor are ignored. For simplification we assume that the reactor consumes one reload charge
per reload period during its full operational lifetime. This assumption causes a slight underra-
ting of the energy and uranium consumption of the reactor during its lifetime.
Table B1
quantity symbol value unit
power, electric (at grid connection) Pe 1.000 GW

power, thermal Pth 3.125 GW
nominal average burnup B 46 GW.day/Mg
core mass, enriched uranium m0 81.20 Mg
fraction of core replaced at reloading – 0.25 –
reload period D 0.82 GW.year
tails assay of enrichment process xt 0.20 % U-235
gross electricity production per reload period Ee 25.86 PJ/D
reload charge, mass mrel 20.30 Mg
reload charge, enrichment assay xp 4.2 % U-235
reload charge, natural uranium feed mnat 162.4 Mg
LWR with MOX fuel
MOX fuel (MixedOXide) is composed of depleted uranium and plutonium. A limited number of
the currently operating LWRs in Europe and Japan are using MOX fuel, replacing up to 30% of the
conventional nuclear fuel. There are LWRs being modified to use up to 100% MOX fuel instead of
enriched uranium. Even with 100% MOX the operating mode cannot be considered to be really
a closed-cycle mode, because the spent MOX fuel cannot be reprocessed again and has to be
disposed of.
In this semi-closed cycle mode 10% less natural uranium is required to generate a given amount
of heat in the nuclear power plant compared with the true once-through mode. On the other
hand, the recovery of the plutonium from spent fuel is a very costly process and consumes sub-
stantial amounts of energy, materials and equipment. In addition the fabrication of MOX fuel
consumes substantially more energy than an equivalent amount of conventional nuclear fuel of
enriched uranium. The specific energy consumption of reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication
are not known. However, it seems doubtful if the energy balance of MOX fuel is favourable com-
pared with conventional nuclear fuel. This observation is apart from the high risks of terrorism
posed by MOX fuel (Barnaby 2005a, 2005b, 2006 [Q339, Q340, Q341).
On a global scale MOX-fuelled light-water reactors are playing a negligible role and this role is
not expected to increase during the next decades, the more so after the Fukushima disaster.
For above reasons the MOX variant is not included in this study.
B.2 Breeders
The reference LWR reactor in this study achieves a lifetime uranium utilization of nearly 0.6%.
This implies that no more than 6 grams of each kilogram natural uranium as delivered by the
mine, actually are fissioned. The remaining 994 grams leave the nuclear energy system as waste
(depleted uranium and spent fuel).
Higher utilization fractions – the nuclear industry claims 60% to be possible – are promised by
closed-cycle reactors, also called uranium-plutonium breeders. The high fissionable fraction
of natural uranium theoretically achievable by the breeder reactor is the source of the old
nuclear dreams from the 1950s: ‘all nuclear society’, ‘too cheap to meter’ and ‘burning the
rocks’. Today these unproven figures still give rise to the technical dreams of untold quantities
of cheap, clean nuclear energy for all mankind for the next centuries.
However, there are serious obstacles on the road to the materialization of these technical
dreams, two of them are:
• the technical unfeasibility of the breeder system
• the uncontrollable and high risk of plutonium terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear
technology.
Both factors may be considered prohibitive.
What is called a closed-cycle reactor or breeder is not just a reactor type or a stand-alone sys-
tem. To exploit fully the promised potential of natural uranium, a complex breeder cycle is a
prerequisite, comprising three components: a breeder reactor, a spent fuel reprocessing facility
and a fuel fabrication plant (see Figure B1).
Important parameters of the breeder system are, among other:

• initial inventory of plutonium in Mg/GW, should be as low as possible
• breeding ratio, this factor should be as high as possible
• full-power operating time of the reactor, should be as long as possible
• out-of-pile time of the plutonium, should be as short as possible
• plutonium losses in the cycle, should be as low as possible.
The first three are reactor parameters, the latter two are determined by two of the other com-
ponents of the cycle: reprocessing and fuel fabrication.
All three components of the breeder cycle must operate flawlessly, continuously and exactly
tuned to the other two components, in order to let the system actually breed more fissile ma-
terial from non-fissile uranium-238 than it consumes. If one component fails, the whole system
fails. In fact, none of the three components have ever demonstrated operation as required, let
alone the three components together as one integrated continuously operating system.
The breeder concept is based on a 100% recovery and recycling of plutonium. This is, how-
ever, a fallacy by reason of the Second Law of thermodynamics.
breeder electricity
reactor
fres el
h fu discharges nt fu
U + Pu el spe U + Pu
+ actinides
+ fission products
+ activation products
U nat Udepl
fuel
reprocessing Pu
Pu
fabrication
initial charge
U + Pu
discharges discharges fission products + activation products

actinides
U + Pu loss U + Pu loss © Storm
Figure B1
Outline of the breeder system in steady state. By repeatedly recycling spent fuel, it would be theoreti-
cally possible to fission the main part of natural uranium. If all goes well, the cycle produces during its
operational life a plutonium gain, large enough to start up two new breeders: one to replace the closed
down unit, and one additional breeder. The cycle represents the mass flows of uranium and the nuclides
originating from the nuclear processes in the reactor (fission, activation and decay). The initial plutonium
charge to start up the breeder reactor is about 3 Mg fissile Pu for a 1 GW(e) FBR.
Breeders exist only on paper. Fifty years of intensive research in seven countries (USA, UK,
France, Germany, former USSR now Russia, Japan and India) and investments of more than
a 100 billion dollars have failed to deliver an operable breeder cycle, due to insurmountable
technical hurdles. The development has not been halted because of economic reasons, but on
the contrary, the breeder concept became uneconomic because it turned out to be technically
unfeasible.
No technical breakthroughs have been reported contradicting the technical unfeasibility of the
breeder cycle.
Problems of the breeder system are discussed in more detail by, among others, UNIPEDE/CEC
1981 [Q58] and Lidsky & Miller 1998 [Q301]. These authors concluded that the breeder system
is not feasible, not only due to the technical hurdles, but also because the system cannot meet
the requirements of safety, proliferation and economy.
However, the breeder cycle turned out to be technically not feasible, despite of intensive
research during the past 60 years, costing more than a 100 billions of dollars in Europe and
the USA alone. According to MIT 2003/2009 [Q280] closed-cycle systems could not come online
before 2050, if ever.
B.3 Thorium
Thorium is a radioactive metal, more abundant in the Earth’s crust than uranium. The concept
of the thorium breeder is based on the conversion by neutron capture of non-fissile thorium-232
into uranium-233, which is as fissile as plutonium-239. The feasibility of the thorium breeder is
even more remote than that of the U-Pu breeder.
Problems include:
• the high radioactivity of U-233, which is always contaminated with traces of U-232,
• similar problems in recycling thorium due to the highly radioactive Th-228, a decay product
of both Th-232 and U-232
• technical problems, not yet satisfactorily solved, in reprocessing.
• the use of U-233 as fuel requires specially developed reactors.
• by recycling of U-233 its isotopic composition deteriorates, and so its usefulness, by the
increasing generation of the unfavourable isotopes U-232, U-234 and U-236 (ORNL-5388 1978
[Q376] p.3-7).
Research and development on the thorium cycle has been less intensive than on the U-Pu cycle
and never reached the prototype phase, like the U-Pu cycle with the French Superphénix.
Among a number of other countries, the USA conducted Th-232/U-233 research in the 1960s
and 1970s (e.g. in the Shippingport reactor). For unclear reasons the research has not been
continued. U-233 has been envisioned as fuel in very compact military reactors for special ap-
plications, e.g. in spacecraft. Although U-233 reportedly would have about the same properties
as plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, no such weapons seem to have been developed. Ap-
parently there exist good reasons not to use U-233 in military reactors and weapons and not to
continue the research towards the thorium power reactor.
India seems to be the only country at this moment still conducting some research on Th-
232/U-233 fuel cycle.
With regard to the cost of U-233 ORNL-6952 1999 [Q377] reports on p.xvii:
“It is estimated that the original production costs of high-quality 233U were $2 to 4 million/kg. Low
quality material is much less expensive since it can be produced in a light-water reactor (LWR).
Irradiation service costs (excluding target fabrication and chemical separation costs) to produce 233U
today using the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) in Idaho are estimated at about $30 million/kg. Because
of the shutdown of facilities, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) production capability is limited.
The ATR, which is the largest DOE reactor currently operating, could produce only about 0.3 kg/year.
Only India has a current capability to produce significant quantities of high-quality 233U. Newer pro-
duction techniques using heavy-water reactors may lower this cost.”
Several power reactor concepts using thorium have been proposed, including once-through and
breeder recycle modes. In the once-through mode thorium would replace uranium-238 in the
fuel. A small part of the thorium would be transformed into uranium-233, which would contri-
bute to the fission process. In this way less uranium would be required to generate a set amount
of energy. The conservation of the uranium consumption would be minor. If the fuel would be
enriched with U-233 a reprocessing stage would be required. This mode resembles the use of
plutonium in LWRs.
Thorium breeder scenario
Only small quantities of U-233 exist in the world at this moment, the USA has 1710 kg of it in
storage, 905 kg of which still contained in spent fuel. Of the U-233 stored in separated form
608 kg have the high isotopic quality necessary for reactors and weapons. The U-233 stocks in
other countries are unknown.
To generate sufficiently pure U-233, special reactors are required, likely not appropiate for use
as power reactors. It would take decades to construct these reactors and to generate sufficient
U-233 to start up the first operating Th-232/U-233 breeder system. Then it would take 9 dou-
bling times to attain a thorium breeder capacity equalling the current nuclear capacity (370
GWe). Even assuming an unrealistically short doubling time of 20 years, 9 doubling times would
mean a period of two centuries.
In this scenario a perfectly operating breeding cycle is assumed, including the separation pro-
cesses of the spent fuel and the fuel element fabrication. The high radioactivity of U-233
demand remote operations of the material throughout all steps of the fuel handling. The mone-
tary costs, but also the energy requirements of the fuel cycle will be high.
Feasibility
The feasibility of the thorium-U-233 breeder cycle is questionable, for several reasons:
• the separation processes needed to recycle fissionable material are inherently incomplete,
so significant losses are unavoidable
• the recycling of Th-232/U-233 fuel has yet to be demonstrated
• assumed the recycling would be technically feasible, it is still unknown if the cycle would
produce sufficient U-233 to expand the Th-232/U-233 capacity, or even to maintain itself
• the radioactivity of the spent fuel and recycled U-233 increases with every cycle, while its
isotopic quality decreases, consequently its usefulness as fissile material decreases
• due to the increasing radioactivity the separation processes deteriorate and the separation
will get even more incomplete
• due to the increasing radioactivity the fuel handling and fresh fuel fabrication becomes
increasingly difficult.
Similar problems arise with the uranium-plutonium breeder cycle, causing it to be unfeasible.
Some people believe that thorium could be completely fissioned. In their view thorium reactors
would open a limitless energy source for mankind, reviving the nuclear dreams from the early
1960s, which were based on the U-Pu breeder concept. These optimistic stories entirely pass
over above mentioned inherent difficulties and particularly the Second Law of thermodynamics.
Annex C
Uranium extraction
C.1 Yield and entropy
From a thermodynamic point of view is the recovery of a given mass of uranium from the earth’s
crust a matter of lowering the entropy of that mass. As present in its host rock, 1 kg uranium
has a very high entropy: ita atoms are dispersed in a matrix of atoms of a number of other
chemical elements. By contrast 1 kg pure uranium has a greatly lower entropy. The dominant
component of the entropy of a given mass of uranium in its host rock is the mixing entropy,
due to the fact that the uranium atoms in the rock are mixed up with many other atoms, and
importantly, by many other kinds of atoms. The mixing entropy of 1 kg uranium in its host rock
is larger when:
• the concentration of the uranium atoms in the matrix is lower,
• the number of kinds of other chemical species present in the matrix is larger,
• the concentrations of other chemical species in the mixture are higher.
The entropy reduction of a certain quantity of matter is possible only by the input of dedicated
work and high-grade usable energy. This follows from the Second Law. The larger the entropy
difference between uranium in its host rock and uranium in pure form, the more useful energy
(e.g. electricity) and ordened matter (equipment and chemicals) are needed to achieve that
entropy reduction.
Recovery of uranium from ore and the purification of uranium are a matter of chemical and
physical separation processes. Separation processes involve dynamic equilibria and therefore
never go to completion. For that reason it is impossible to separate a mix of n species into n
fractions each consisting of one species at 100% purity. This observation also follows from the
Second Law.
The lower limit of the work required to perform a certain separation process is governed by
the basic laws of thermodynamics, not by technology. Technology is a means to approach
the thermodynamic limits of a process as close as possible, but it cannot circumvent the
thermodynamic laws.
In the sequence of the mining and milling processes, the uranium ions from the host rock are
brought into solution, from which they are selectively extracted by means of special chemicals.
A higher mixing entropy of uranium in the host rock inevitably means a higher mixing entropy
in the pregnant solution from which the uranium ions are to be extracted. The separation
processes, which involve chemical equilibria, become less efficient with lower concentration
and increasing entropy of the uranium ions in the pregnant solution. As a consequence the
fraction of the uranium ions lost in the waste streams increases and the extraction yield Y goes
down.
C.2 Mineralogical barrier
In rocks with a content of a given metal (symbol: Me) below the so-called substitution limit, no
Me-mineral grains are present. The metal cations (Men+) are dispersed, instead, in the lattices
of the bulk minerals (usually silicates) of the host rock, replacing other cations. This limiting
concentration is the coined the mineralogical barrier (Skinner 1979 [Q322] and 2001 [388]).
The condition of dispersion of the observed metal Me on atomic scale is called a solid solution.
Solid solutions are not amenable to selective physical and chemical extraction. To recover a
metal from such a rock type, the complete mass of minerals of the host rock has to be brought
into solution.
For each chemical element, and for each mineral, there is a separate substitution limit.
Copper for instance has its mineralogical barrier at a grade of about 0.1% by weight of copper.
Generalizing we can say that for the conditions attained in the crust, most of the substitution
limits probably fall between 0.1- 0.01% by weight of the element, according to Skinner 2001
[Q388]. When the limit is exceeded, a new mineral will form with the element under discussion
as a major constituent. Below the limit no separate minerals of the element are formed.
If uranium does have its substitution limit (mineralogical barrier) at uranium contents at 0.02 -
0.01% U, it would be pointless to search for uranium minerals in deposits at grades below 0.02%
U. Obviously there are geologic occurences present in the earth’s crust containing uranium at
grades lower than 0.02 or 0.01% U, some known examples being black shales and phosphorite
deposits. However extraction of uranium from these occurrences requires chemical processing
of the complete mass of the rock, consuming much more auxiliary materials and energy per kg
recovered uranium than from conventional ores.
Annex D
Radioactive heritage of nuclear power
D.1 Mobilisation and generation of radioactivity
In one respect is nuclear power, fission as well as fusion, distinct from all other energy
systems, namely, the generation of radioactivity. A nuclear reactor is a generator of heat and
radioactivity, simultaneously, inextricably and irreversibly. This unique feature has far-reaching
consequences.
The heat and radioactivity are generated by nuclear fission of a metal with unique properties,
uranium, which has to undergo a number of physical and chemical processes before being
suitable as nuclear fuel. Analysis of these processes gives the clues on the energy cliff, the coal
equivalence and the CO2 trap. These issues will be assessed in the analysis of the front end of
the nuclear process chain.
This study addresses also a second question: what happens to the man-made radioactivity?
Analysis of the back end processes of the nuclear chain point to the energy debt and CO2 debt.
front end back end
© Storm
immobile mobilization multiplication mobile to be

x 1 billion immobilized
Figure D1
Symbolic presentation of the radioactivity flow through the nuclear system. The flow starts with the
mobilization of natural radioactivity and multiplies a billionfold by generation of radioactivity in the
reactor. Unavoidably a part of the mobilized radioactivity will be released into the environment. A safe
immobilized end of the nuclear chain exists still only in cyberspace.
Uranium is a radioactive metal found in nature in various minerals present in a number of rock
types. In uranium-bearing strata, uranium and its many radioactive decay daughters are bound
in chemically stable minerals. This is not to say uranium-bearing rock is harmless to man, not
at all. When uranium ores are disturbed to extract the uranium, uranium and its daughters are
brought out of their geologic confinement into the environment and are chemically mobilized.
The uranium isotopes are chemically separated from their decay daughters and converted into
nuclear fuel. The separated radioactive daughters of uranium (containing about 85% of the ra-
dioactivity in uranium ore) are dumped as uranium mill tailings in huge ponds and spoil heaps.
From then on the radioactivity from the uranium ore is mobile.
Generation of man-made radioactivity
1 000 000
Radioactive decay of LWR spent fuel 33 GW(e).day/Mg
100 000
10 000
acti
nid
e
1000
to
la
ta
ct
100 ivi
ty
10
specific 1
radioactivity fission products
GBq/kg
0.1
0.01
0.001
lethal
0.000 1
0.000 01
natural
specific radioactivity
0.000 001
of the human body
las
Se
fir
firs
co
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Fir Wor
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tw
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0.000 000 1
st
© Storm
Mo
rit
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Wo d Wa
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leo
pie
b
ri
ler
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ns
0.000 000 01
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10 000 100 000 1 000 000 10 000 000
years from now
Figure D2
The specific radioactivity of spent fuel, in gigabecquerel per kilogram (GBq/kg, 1 Bq = 1 desintegration per
second). The contributions of tritium, carbon-14 and activation products are not included in these curves.
Note that both axes have logarithmic scales, each scale division denotes a factor ten. On the horizontal
axis a reverse historic timescale is indicated, to give an idea of the time frames involved; with a linear
time scale this axis would be about 100 kilometers long.
The numbers on the vertical scale have little meaning without a reference value. The obvious standard
is the human body itself, which has a natural specfic radioactivity of about 143 Bq/kg, mainly due to
potassium-40 and carbon-14. The average lethal amount of radioactivity in the human body is roughly
25000 times its natural activity [Q300], but this figure depends on the types of radionuclides.
Sources: Hollocher 1975 [Q262], JPL77-69 1977 [Q263], Bell 1973 [Q264], Charpak&Garwin 2002 [Q300].
Human-made radionuclides come into being during the fission process in the reactor. Three dif-
ferent groups of artificial radionuclides are commonly distinguished, according to their origin:
• Fission products: the light atoms originating from the fission of the heavy uranium and plu-
tonium atoms. Atoms of nearly all chemical elements are present in the mix and a part of the
fission products are highly radioactive.
• Transuranic actinides: atoms heavier than uranium, which are formed from uranium atoms
by neutron capture. These elements, for example plutonium and americium, do not occur in
nature and are highly radioactive and highly toxic.
• Activation products. All non-radioactive materials exposed to neutron radiation from the
fission process become radioactive by neutron capture; examples are the nuclear fuel cladding
and the reactor vessel itself.
During the fission process the radioactivity of the nuclear fuel increases a factor billion. The
generation of of these immense quantities of radioactivity is irreversible.
Each nuclear reactor of 1 GWe power produces each year an amount of radioactivity roughly
equivalent with 1000 exploded nuclear bombs of 15 kilotonnes, about the yield of the Hiroshima
bomb. A nuclear reactor produces relatively more long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides than
an exploding nuclear bomb, so the radioactivity from a reactor is more dangerous than an
equivalent amount from a nuclear explosion.
Ever since the first nuclear reactors started operation in the 1940s, the definitive solution
to the radioactive waste problem has been postponed to the future. Spills from corroding
storage tanks and waste containers are polluting watersheds, rivers and sea. A systematically
underrated aspect of civilian nuclear power is the enormous size of the radioactive waste
inventory and its steep growth over time (see Figure D3).
10
world
radioactivity
inventory
(millions of
nuclear bomb
equivalents)
© Storm
0
1960 2000
year
Figure D3
Cumulative quantity of the radioactivity generated worldwide by civilian nuclear power, measured in
nuclear bomb equivalents.
D.2 Radioactivity and health effects
Radioactivity cannot be destroyed nor can be made harmless to man. Radioactivity only decreases
by natural decay, a process which cannot be controlled by man. The radiation emitted by
radioactive substances is hazardous to man, especially when the radionuclides enter the body,
via ingestion (food, water) or via inhalation (gases, dust). Not only the amount of radioactivity
produced (meaured in becquerels Bq) but also the physical and biological characteristis of the
produced radionuclides are determining the potential heath effects to man. Another important
aspect is
There are many unknowns with regard to the mechanisms of radiation and adverse health effects
in the human body. The official dose-effect standards, which are conceived by the nuclear
industry, relies on models fraught by opaqueness, inherent limitations and uncertainties (see
for example Fairlie 2009 [Q413], Sternglass 2009 [Q439], CERRIE 2004 [Q414], Storm 2010 [Q8].
During the past decade strong evidence has been published on hitherto unknown or neglected
adverse health effects of radioactivity, for instance by: Collins 2003 [Q270], Fairlie 2008 [Q443],
Fairlie 2010 [Q440], Morgan & Sowa 2005 [Q441], Mothersill & Seymour 2006 [Q442].
Operational releases of radioactivity by nominally functioning nuclear power plants prove to
cause significant increase of child cancers (KiKK 2007 [Q392]) in the vicinity of the NPP’s. The
adverse health effects of the Chernobyl disaster turn out to be by far worse than the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) and WHO (World Health Organization) want the public
to believe, see Yablokov et al. 2010 [Q419], IPPNW 2011 [Q452]. As a matter of fact, the WHO
cannot function independently of the IAEA on nuclear matters (www.tschernobyl-folgen.de).
The IAEA has vested interests in nuclear power and tends to downplay the health effects
of radioactive contamination. This can easily be done due to the long time delays between
radioactive contamination and its adverse health effects. Often it is difficult to prove the direct
relationship between contamination and effects many years later.
Another problem is that a number of biologically very active and dangerous radionuclides are
difficult to detect. The detectors used after the Fukushima disaster, for example, can only
detect hard gamma-emitters, such as cesium-137, but not tritium, carbon-14, iodine-129 and
several highly dangerous alpha-emitters. (see also Storm 2010 [Q8]).
A severe accident, like Chernobyl or Fukushima, in the densely populated Western Europe
would kill millions of people and would wreck the entire European society and economy forever
(IPPNW 2011 [Q452]).
For above reasons the radioactive heritage of nuclear power should be handled in the safest
possible way, without compromises to short-sighted economic interests. This view is the basis
of the analysis of the back end of the nuclear process chain in this study.
D.3 Immobilising radioactivity
Annex B explains the reasons why the radioactive waste which is mobilised and generated by
the nuclear system should be effectively isolated from the biosphere, to keep large and densily
populated areas habitable. The next Chernobyl or Fukushima disaster might happen in the USA
or in Western Europe.
There is only one survival strategy to deal with the human-made radioactivity plus the mobilised
natural radioactivity: all radioactivity has be kept out of the human environment for at least a
million of years. In other words: the radioactive waste of the nuclear process chain has to be
physically immobilised and isolated permanently from the biosphere. No facility is available
anywhere in the world, nor for high-level waste (spent fuel and reprocessing waste) nor for
other radioactive wastes. This implies that all radioactivity ever generated by man since the
first controlled fission in the 1940s, is effectively still in mobile state present in the human
environment. The massive backlog in the handling of radioactive waste creates a huge and
mounting debt in terms of economic effort, materials and energy (see section 8.1 energy debt)
and poses a growing threat to peace and societal stability.
The crucial steps towards a safe immobilisation and isolation of the radioactive waste from
nuclear power are still existing only in cyberspace. This observation contrasts sharply with the
statement of the nuclear industry (WNA-04 2011 [Q271]):
‘Nuclear power is the only large-scale energy-producing technology which takes full responsibility for
all its wastes and fully costs this into the product.’
Appararently the nuclear industry has problems with the distinction between empirically
verifiable facts and concepts from cyberspace. In daily life such a statement could easily be
classified as a lie.
Seven radioactive waste streams of the nuclear energy system can be distinguished:
• spent fuel
• operational waste (process losses, contaminated materials and equipment)
• depleted uranium
• mining waste (mill tailings)
• decommissioning waste
• intentional (‘operational’) releases into the environment
• accidental releases into the environment.
These waste streams are addressed in detail in Storm 2010 [Q8].
The first four waste streams are proportional to the operational lifetime of the reactor. The
fourth stream, mining waste, is additionally dependent on the grade of the uranium ore. The
amount of radioactive decommissioning wastes jumps from near zero to a high level within the
first year of operation of the reactor and continues to rise from then on during the operational
lifetime of the reactor, due to the progressing contamination of equipment and activation of
materials by neutron capture.
The last two waste streams, the intentional and accidental releases, are lifetime-dependent
and rise per generated kWh during the operational lifetime for two reasons:
• increasing wear and ageing of equipment and pipes,
• continuing relaxation of the release standards for economic reasons.
The next step is the permanent disposal of the waste containers. In view of the geologic
timescales (millions of years) during which the waste has to be isolated, the final storage
facility should be embedded in a geologically very stable formation, a geologic repository.
Probably the farthest developed design of a geologic repository is the Swedish KBS-3 concept
for permanent storage of spent fuel has already been described in the early 1990s, see Papp
1998a [Q37], Papp 1998b [Q38], IAEA-349 1993 [Q43] and Thegerstrom 2010 [Q453]. Little has
changed during the years following the first publications. Still no such facility exist.
This concept is envisioned as a system of galleries in a granitic formation some 500 meters
below the surface. The spent fuel elements would be packed in containers of cast iron, clad
by a thick layer of very pure copper. The designers assume this combination of materials to be
resistant to (sea)water for thousands of years.
The spent fuel in the containers generates heat for long periods after removal from the reactor,
so each spent fuel container has to be placed into a separate hole in the floor of a gallery to
avoid melting and cracking. Each hole is filled up with bentonite. When the holes of one gallery
are occupied, which has to be done with robotic equipment because of the high radiation fields,
the gallery itself is back filled with bentonite and permanently closed. Corrosion proceeds fast
at elevated temperatures in the presence of water and of nuclear radiation. The bentonite is
for retarding the migration of radionuclides leaking from corroded containers.
The construction of a geologic repository is anything but a simple task. A repository with a
capacity of some 20000 tonnes of spent fuel consists of about 100 kilometers of galleries and
tunnels at a depth of about 500 meter below surface. Every two years the world would need a
new repository of this capacity.
A similar underground storage facility could be envisioned for categories of radioactive waste
that do not produce heat at an appreciable rate. As there are no melting risks, these wastes can
be stacked in large quantities in underground caverns. As the waste containers contain equally
hazardous radionuclides as spent fuel, albeit in lower concentrations, the caverns should also
be backfilled with bentonite.
The immobilisation and isolation concept is discussed in more detail in Storm 2010 [Q8] and in
Part D6 and Part E2 of [Q6].
This study assumes that all radioactive waste streams, obviously except the intentional and
accidental releases into the environment, are packed in durable containers and are stored
definitively in geologic repositories, as soon as possible following the generation of the waste.
The necessary industrial activities to achieve an as safe as possible back end of the nuclear
chain are conceived in this study by analogy with existing similar industrial processes. For
details see Part E2 and Part F6 of [Q6] and Storm 2010 [Q8].
Annex E
Monetary cost trends
Although this study is a physical analysis, not from an economic point of view, some conclusions
on cost trends may be possible. A rough estimate may be made as follows.
During its lifetime of 25 FPY the reference reactor produces 215 billion kWh. Assumed the costs
in €(2010) are proportional to the energy investments and the construction cost of the power
plant is €5bn, we come to Table E1.
Likely the construction cost of €5bn is a low estimate, so are the figures in Table E1, which all
are based on this assumption, may be substantially higher in practice. The costs of the various
parts of the nuclear chain will rise in the future almost certainly, due to several factors:
• energy will become more expensive, for reasons explained in the section on the energy cliff
• the construction of nuclear power plants tends to consume more materials per GWe
• the energy intensity of materials will increase, as pointed out above
• maintenance and security of the temporary storage facilities, for example the spent fuel
cooling ponds, will become more expensive, due to the unavoidable deterioration of materials
and the increasing chance of major accidents
• the production cost or uranium will rise when nuclear power becomes dependent on less
easy uranium ores.
The figures in Table E1 are little more than a rough indication.
Table E1
Cradle-to-grave cost estimate of nuclear electricity, based on the energy analysis of the nuclear chain,
assuming a constant ratio of monetary cost per unit energy, €/PJ, and construction cost of €5bn/GWe.
This table is valid for the baseline case of this study: T100 = 25 FPY, Ec+d = 200 PJ, average uranium ore
grade G = 0.13% U.
lifetime cost lifetime cost

part of the nuclear system
bn €(2010) €/Kwh
reactor construction 5.000 0.0232

reactor clean-up + dismantling 7.500 0.0348
sum fixed investments 12.500 0.0580
uranium mining + milling 0.599 0.00278
remainder front end 2.101 0.00975
sum cost front end: from ore to fuel 2.700 0.0125
operation, maintenance & refurbishments 5.288 0.0245
operational waste handling and sequestering 1.359 0.00631
spent fuel handling and sequestering 1.199 0.00556
uranium mine reclamation 1.079 0.00501
sum cost back end 3.637 0.0169
c2g cost fuel chain 11.624 0.0539
sum c2g cost 24.124 0.1120
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Nuclear power,

energy security and CO2 emission

Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen

2 The nuclear energy system

3 Energy analysis, the method

4 Front end: from uranium ore to nuclear fuel

5 Nuclear power plant

8 World nuclear outlook

Annex A Present state

Annex B Reactor technology

Annex C Uranium extraction

Annex D Radioactive heritage of nuclear power

Annex E Monetary cost trends

Major differences with other studies

2.1 Reference reactor

2.2 Nuclear process chain

cooking the meal enjoying the meal washing the dishes

exploration mining overburden

fuel element waste

decommissioning spent fuel reclamation

waste waste waste spent fuel

exploration construction construction

2.3 Cradle to grave: the c2g period

years from now

3.1 Usefulness and work

3.3 About the method

services process product

processed materials © Storm

capital goods waste heat liquid and solid wastes

Fossil fuel and electric inputs separated

3.4 Input/output analysis

Econ = C con (i) • e i

E con = primary energy requirements of construction J

ei = energy/GDP ratio of year i J/$i

3.5 Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI)

Enet = energy output – (fixed + variable energy inputs)

useful energy production E grid

3.6 CO2 emission of nuclear power

fossil fuels electric inputs

waste heat Egrid

CO2 emission during c2g period

4.1 Front end processes

4.2 Uranium recovery from ore

decreasing ore grade G (m-% U)

Specific energy consumption

100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001

4.3 Uranium resources

Known uranium resources

decreasing ore grade G (mass-% U)

4.4 Thermodynamic quality of uranium resources

5.1 Operational lifetime

Full-power year FPY

1 FPY = Po GWe.year = Po•8760•106 kWh = Po•31.536 PJ eq 9

actual energy production E actual

Effective operational lifetime

At this moment it is unknown if the world-averaged operational lifetime of nuclear power

item low mean high unit

construction cost 3.5 6.5 9.5 USD (2000)/We

5.3 Operation, maintenance and refurbishments (OMR)