RISK, LEADERSHIP, & GROUP PROCESSES

Peter de Vries

Cubicus C 241
p.w.devries@utwente.nl
Psychology of Conflict, Risk, and Safety
PETER DE VRIES

• Assistant professor at Psychology of Conflict, Risk, & Safety.

• Research interest: Human-Technology Interaction
• Drone acceptance & transparency
• Virtual Reality in Policing
• Sustainability and behaviour change
RISK AND LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE

27 March 1977 - Two Boeing 747 passenger jets, KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight
1736, collided at Los Rodeos Airport (now Tenerife North Airport) on Tenerife, Canary
Islands; 583 people died.

Legacy:
• Crew Resource Management (CRM)
• Greater emphasis was placed on team decision-making by mutual agreement
• Less experienced flight crew members are encouraged to challenge their
captains
• Captains are instructed to listen to their crew and evaluate all decisions in
light of crew concerns.

https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vliegtuigramp_van_Tenerife
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_airport_disaster
RISK AND LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE
• Why Ships Keep Crashing. The Atlantic, March 27, 2021

• “[M]ajor maritime incidents are surprisingly common. According to

the insurer Allianz, 41 large ships were lost in 2019, and 46 in 2018.
Over the past decade, about 100 big vessels have been lost
annually.”

• https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/ever-given-and-
suez-why-ships-keep-crashing/618436/
RISK AND LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE
“Faulty Equipment, Lapsed Training, Repeated Warnings: How a
Preventable Disaster Killed Six Marines” – ProPublica, 30 December,
2019
• “Marine commanders did not act on dozens of pleas for additional
manpower, machinery and time. When a training exercise ended in
death, leadership blamed the very men they had neglected.”
• https://www.propublica.org/article/marines-hornet-squadron-242-
crash-pacific-resilard?
RISK AND LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE
• Costa Concordia, 2012
• Donald Trump, 2016-2020
• Space Shuttle Challenger, 1986
• Abu Ghraib, 2001 - …
THIS LECTURE
• Introduction
• Leadership theories, past to present
• Interaction of leaders, followers, and environment
• Social identity, self-categorization, and leadership

• From Theory to Practice

• Crowd control
• Peace-keeping Unit of the Dutch police
• North Korea
• Troubles at the Dutch police
• …

• Recommended reading, viewing, and listening

• What makes a good/bad leader?
• Can you give an example of good and bad leadership in your
own context?

• 10 minutes!
Leader A FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
• Consulted quack doctors and astrologers, had 2 mistresses, smoked
and drank 8-10 martinis a day

Leader B WINSTON CHURCHILL

• Fired because of arrogance, slept most mornings, used opium in
high school, bad student, started each day with cognac

Leader C ADOLF HITLER

• Decorated hero, did not smoke, disciplined, drank every now and
then, stayed with one woman only, loved animals

Column Paulo Coelho, Happinez

LEADERS, FOLLOWERS, AND CRISES -
STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT (1971)
• http://www.prisonexp.org/
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment
LEADERS, FOLLOWERS, AND CRISES -
STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT (1971)
NB: SPE has been criticized heavily
• Zimbardo instructed (!) the "guards" to exert psychological control
over the "prisoners“
• Some of the participants behaved in a way that would help the
study, so that "the researchers would have something to work with.“
• Variants of the experiment have been performed by other
researchers, but none of these attempts have replicated the results
of the SPE.
• E.g., http://www.prisonexp.org/

• Recommended reading:
• “The Lifespan of a Lie”; https://medium.com/s/trustissues/the-
lifespan-of-a-lie-d869212b1f62
• “The Stanford Prison Experiment was massively influential. We
just learned it was a fraud.”;
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/13/17449118/stanford-prison-
experiment-fraud-psychology-replication
LEADERS, FOLLOWERS, AND CRISES -
MILGRAM’S (1974) OBEDIENCE STUDY
• Inspired by the trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1962
• The “banality of evil” (Hannah Arendt; cf. Haslam & Reicher, 2008)

• Participants followed directions of white-coated

scientist to administer electric shocks in a
“learning task”, even to the point that voltage was
(supposedly) lethal
MILGRAM’S (1974) OBEDIENCE STUDY
Shocking results:

• 65 % proceeded to 450 Volts level, no one stopped before 300 V…

• “The experiment requires you to continue” was sufficient in most
cases (which is not a direct order!)
• Direct orders (“You have no choice, you have to continue”), however,
did NOT work!
• 84 % of participants later reported it to have been a “positive
experience”, 15 % were neutral.
MILGRAM’S (1974) OBEDIENCE STUDY
• Taken to mean that people blindly follow orders from superiors
(“mindless conformance”)

However…
• “People do great wrong, not because they are unaware of what they
are doing but because they consider it to be right. This is possible
because they actively identify with groups whose ideology justifies
and condones the oppression and destruction of others” (Haslam &
Reicher, 2008, p. 19)

• “… tyrannical leaders only thrive by convincing us that we are in

crisis, that we face threat and that we need their strong decisive
action to surmount it” (Haslam & Reicher, 2008, p. 19)
LEADERSHIP - SOME DEFINITIONS
• “Influencing individuals to contribute to group goals and
coordinating the pursuit of those goals” – Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser
(2008; p. 182-183)

• “The process of influencing others in a manner that enhances their

contribution to the realization of group goals” - Haslam, Reicher, &
Platow (2011, p. 247)
KINDS OF LEADERSHIP
• Formal leadership
• Authority given by an organisation
• E.g., professors, managers, politicians, …

• Informal leadership
• exerts influence because of special skills, talents, experience,
…
• E.g., your most experienced colleague
• E.g., diet gurus, vloggers
KINDS OF LEADERSHIP
• Formal versus informal
• Relationship oriented versus task-oriented
• Distributed leadership
• Transactional versus transformational leadership
• Charismatic leadership
• …
RISK AND LEADERSHIP
• Leaders can be:
• Politicians
• Police officers
• Event organisers
• Experts, influencers, opinion leaders
• Team leaders
• Executives, CEOs
• …

• Risks includes:
• Crises
• Emergencies
• Safety (rather, lack thereof)
• …
OLD PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP: FOCUS ON
INDIVIDUALS; BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH
Ernest Shackleton - what is it that made him so great?

Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition

(1914–1917)
OLD PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP
Biographical approach is still popular (but not in scientific literature…)
• E.g., see “The leadership secrets of…” (About 91.100 Google hits!)
• Colin Powel, Genghis Kahn, Santa Claus, Billy Graham, Jesus,
Attila the Hun, …
OLD PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP
• However…
• Little explanatory power
• Different biographies about the same individual lead to different
conclusions
• What about followers? … circumstances?
THE TOXIC TRIANGLE; PADILLA, HOGAN, &
KAISER (2007)
Toxic Triangle (Fig. 1)
THE TOXIC TRIANGLE; PADILLA, HOGAN, &
KAISER (2007)
Castro & Cuba

Castro
• Intelligent, energetic, talent for self-promotion
• Ruthless
• Self-enriching (personalised use of power)
• Narcissistic (infamous for his long speeches)
• Difficult upbringing, illegitimate child, rural
• Hatred for the US
THE TOXIC TRIANGLE; PADILLA, HOGAN, &
KAISER (2007)
Castro & Cuba

Susceptible followers
• Support from inner circle, rural residents and uneducated poor
• Initially support from middle class (who later either fled or wanted to do
so)

Conducive environment
• History of political dysfunction
• Police and legal institution corrupt
• Dismantling social and democratic institutions after revolution
• Powerful police to control dissent
• Perpetuation of insecurity by references to external threats
THE TOXIC TRIANGLE; PADILLA, HOGAN, &
KAISER (2007)
Castro & Cuba

Result:
• Some progress for the poorest (e.g. literacy, education)
• Castro likely owned an estimated 1 billion US$
• Low food production
• Bad phone service
• Electric power below Haitian standards
• …
CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP

• Context & contingency

• The right place at the right time?

• Followers
• Leadership is in the eye of the beholder

• That “special something”

• Transformation, charisma
CONTEXT & CONTINGENCY
• Situational approach
• Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment
• Context determines leadership (NOT what Zimbardo expected…)
• But what about psychology? Agency?
• Outdated in its most extreme form
• “Times theory”: “Cometh the hour, cometh the man”
• Unique needs of the group are met by unique needs of the
individual
• Whoever had been leader, history would not have been very
different (someone like Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, Mandela, …
would have emerged anyhow)
CONTEXT & CONTINGENCY
• Contingency approach: leadership is the result of a “perfect match”
between leaders and the circumstances of their groups

• E.g., Least-Preferred Co-worker Theory (Fiedler, 1964)

• Leaders asked to describe their LPC
• More positive?  Relationship orientation
• More negative?  Task orientation
• Relationship orientation best when features of the situation are
intermediately favourable
• However, little empirical foundation and validity!
FOLLOWERS
• Perceptual approach
• Charisma as something conferred on leaders (rather than
something leaders possess)
• Leadership categorisation theory
• However: fixed stereotypes of followers
FOLLOWERS
• Transactional approach
• More flexible than contingency and perceptual approach
• Quality of relationships between leaders and followers
• Followers are active participants in leadership projects
• Social exchange, give & take
• Leadership is based on satisfactory exchange of resources between
leaders and followers
FOLLOWERS
• Transactional approach
• E.g., Equity theory
• Disequilibrium in relationship causes motivation to reduce it
• An overpaid leader is motivated to work harder, and vice
versa
FOLLOWERS
• Transactional approach
• …
• Costs and benefits are endlessly elastic, however…
• Any behaviour can be explained in terms of costs and
benefits, even behaviour contradicting Equity Theory!
FOLLOWERS
• Power approach
• Power based on: rewards, coercion, expertise, information,
legitimacy, and respect
FOLLOWERS
• Power approach
• Effectiveness of rewards is limited
• “Mercenaries make bad followers. So do slaves.”
(Machiavelli)
• Extrinsic factors may have a demotivating impact
BEYOND MERE TRANSACTIONS
• That “special something”
• Transformational approach
• Not feeling obliged to do something, but wanting to do
something, because it’s right.
• Success on a collective level: “Yes , we can!”
o Who am I?
Good at Drummer
trivia
Beer Band member
brewer
Groninger

Dutch
Environmentally
friendly ME
European
Creative PCRS
member
Progressive Social
psychologist
Hobby
farmer Academic

40
 Individual AND group characteristics!
 Personal Personal
identity achievements

Group
achievements

Group identity Self-esteem

Ingroup
favoritism /
outgroup
derogation
SOCIAL IDENTITY, SELF-CATEGORIZATION, AND
LEADERSHIP
One step further:
• Leadership is not a quality of leaders but of the relationship
between leaders and followers within a social group!

Outdated view on (social) groups: groups consist of people who

become interdependent to satisfy personal interests and mutual needs:
• They like the task or activity
• They like the people
• It may be a means to satisfy needs
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
However, there is something more to group membership…
• A group is not merely a collection of individuals who are in it for
themselves; they’re in it for the group
• Group supersedes individual: people go to war because at group
level it is the right thing to do (or so they feel)

(see “Bomber Boys” by Patrick Bishop)

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
Groundwork for social identity theorizing: minimal group paradigm
(Tajfel, 1970)
• Groups based on superficial criteria, e.g. preference for Klee or
Kandinsky (but in fact random!)
• Donation of points to in-group member > out-group member!
• Also: in-group more similar, more likeable, more trustworthy, …
• Important new insight: Attraction, similarity, trust as outcomes
rather than causes of group formation
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
Social Identity Theory (SIT)
• Comparisons between in-group and relevant out-groups
• E.g., finding out what it means to be Dutch by comparing
Dutchmen to Germans (or to Americans, or to Italians, …)
• Favourable contrast on valued dimensions
• The Dutch believe they are
• … more egalitarian and less formal than Germans; or
• … more liberal than Americans; or
• … less corrupt than Italians, or
• ….
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
Social Identity Theory (SIT) is very much about comparisons
• Earthquake victims in Groningen versus “The Hague” (i.e., the
government)
• Victims of Katrina, Irma, … versus Washington, D.C. (i.e., the
government)
• Pegida, alt-right, … versus Islam
• Alt-right versus liberalism
• Police officers versus society
• Police brutality against African-Americans
• Ethnic profiling discussion in the Netherlands (and elsewhere)
• …
 SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
“Das Volk”, “the People”

“We are the People“

- Pegida

“We are the People“ – “Monday

demonstrations” 1989/1990, GDR
(DDR)

“You are not the People” and “No, WE are the

People“ – Protesters against Pegida
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
“the Elite”
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
Princess Máxima (2007): ‘Dutch national identity? Haven’t found it yet!’

Cabinet Balkenende II: “hand-shaking when greeting, use of Dutch on the

streets, restricting possibility of multiple nationalities, …”
 Identity definition as a response to “problems” with “immigrants”

“…, freedom of opinion, solidarity, active citizenship, respect for laws and
democracy, …”
 Dutch values indeed, but not so different from those of other countries…

http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article1958546.ece/Nederlandse_identiteit_i
s_niet_uniek_in_de_wereld (2008)
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
SIT and power
• “Power over” versus “power through”
• Power achieved by articulating nature of group identity and action in
context
• Power by out-group members experienced more negatively than
by in-group members
• Out-group power seen as interference, conflicts with sense
of control
• In-group power uplifting, motivating, increases cooperation
• In-group members have much greater potential to exert power
through the group
• Being an in-group member, however, is not enough 
prototypicality!
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
• Prototypicality
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION
• Prototypical in-group members are most
influential
• Leaders can influence their
prototypicality
CRAFTING A SENSE OF US
1. Leaders should be representative of the group
2. Leaders should actively present themselves as prototypes
CRAFTING A SENSE OF US
1. Leaders should be representative of the group
2. Leaders should actively present themselves as prototypes
3. Representation will often be challenged
• “Latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving”  ergo, “not us”
BEING ONE OF US
Prototypicality
• Even out-group members can become in-group prototypical 
recategorisation!
MAKING US MATTER
Where should leaders take us?
• Link between social identity and future action
• Who are we and where should we go?
• Are we communal and should we create strong welfare state?
• Are we entrepreneurial and should we strive for as little
regulation as possible?
• Are we traditional and should we be wary of influx of outsiders?
• Are we tolerant and should we welcome outsiders and try to
benefit from them?
MAKING US MATTER
Manipulation of intergroup relations as a means to gain advantages
over rivals within the group
• Picking fights with or being tough on outgroups as a way to
consolidate leadership
• E.g., Joseph McCarthy’s witch hunt for communists
• …
MAKING US MATTER
Witch hunts:
• Claiming to represent group interests
• Discrediting rival leaders
• Demobilizing opposition
• Disciplining followers
CONCLUSIONS
• Leadership cannot be separated from followers and
context/environment
• Social identity approach

• Successful leaders are able to shape or manipulate social identity

• To increase prototypicality, and, thus, influence
• To round up support
• To create a vision of where we should be headed

• Social identity and intergroup relationships can be used AND

abused to consolidate leadership

• This applies to politics as much as the work environment!

• What is the culture in your organizations like?
• What typifies your organization’s identity?
• Are there distinct in- and outgroups, different subgroups? (e.g.,
finance versus tech department)
• How do these interact?
• Does one dominate the other?
• How do you experience influence by management?

• What about safety culture?

• 20 minutes!
BRINGING GROUPS TOGETHER
• Contact hypothesis (Allport,
1954) criteria
• Equal status
• Personal interaction
• Cooperative activities
• Social norms

6
2
BRINGING GROUPS TOGETHER - COMMON INGROUP
IDENTITY MODEL
Common ingroup identity
Us University of Twente

Social identity
Psychology students –
Us / Ingroup Them / OutgroupEngineering students

Individual
identity
Other Other Me Other Other You - others
 FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
• Crowd control & Crowd management
• Introduction
• Peace-Keeping Unit Dutch Police
• Managing crowds at festivals
• Project X Haren

• International (geo-)politics
• North Korea
• Troubles in the Congo

• Groupthink

• Identity-related issues at the Dutch Police

• Work atmosphere
• Ethnic Profiling

• Recommended reading, viewing, and listening

CROWD CONTROL & CROWD MANAGEMENT
Classical “theory”
• Submersion in crowds causes people to forget norms, lose the ablity to
think and reason, etc. (Le Bon, 1895; as cited by Reicher et al., 2004;
Reicher 2004).

• “Mad, Bad, and Dangerous to Know”

• “Masses are irrational”
• Crowd members lose the ability to think and reason (LeBon, 1895)
• Crowd behaviour is abnormal and pathological
• Deindividuation (Festinger, 1952)
• Self-preservation at al cost
 CROWD BEHAVIOUR INTERVENTIONS
Classical view
• Causes crowd members to be blamed in disaster situations
• “This irresponsible and inexcusable behaviour demonstrated a lack
of respect and total disregard for one’s fellow men and women” (as
cited by Sime, 1995, p. 4)

• Crowd behaviour modelled with physics

• Hydraulic models
• Particle models

• Unnecessarily negative and little productive

• Repressive and counterproductive police tactics (Reicher, Spears &
Postmes, 1995)
• Restrictive crowd control measures

By Jonas Naimark - http://www.flickr.com/photos/jonasnaimark/4739841273/, CC BY 3.0,

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11693854
 CROWD BEHAVIOUR INTERVENTIONS
Classical view
• Causes crowd members to be blamed in disaster situations
• “This irresponsible and inexcusable behaviour demonstrated a lack
of respect and total disregard for one’s fellow men and women” (as
cited by Sime, 1995, p. 4)

• Crowd behaviour modelled with physics

• Hydraulic models
• Particle models

• Unnecessarily negative and little productive

• Repressive and counterproductive police tactics (Reicher, Spears &
Postmes, 1995)
• Restrictive crowd control measures

By Jonas Naimark - http://www.flickr.com/photos/jonasnaimark/4739841273/, CC BY 3.0,

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11693854
CROWD CONTROL & CROWD MANAGEMENT
However, self-preservation at all costs is very rare
• Sub groups often stay intact during emergencies
• Affiliative behaviour
• Majority chooses a known route as escape route
 Is that really irrational or unpredictable?

• Even the idea of (mass) panic has been questioned by researchers

• (e.g., see Dezecache, G. (2015). Human collective reactions to
threat. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 6(3),
209-219. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1344)
 CROWD CONTROL & CROWD MANAGEMENT
• Currently, Social identity perspective is seen as THE vision on crowds
and how to handle them (Reicher, 2011, Reicher et al., 2004; cf. Van
Hiel et al., 2007)

• Predicts who influences others to execute behaviour, how others are

perceived, which behaviour is acceptable or normal, etc.

• Indiscriminate riot police action against group members can be

regarded as unjust punishment of all  reactance (Reicher et al.,
2004)

• “Self-policing”

• "Soft" policing strategies at football matches have indeed proved

successful (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007; Gorringe,
Stott, & Rosie, 2012).
 CROWD CONTROL & CROWD MANAGEMENT
On a yearly basis, cities as The Hague and Amsterdam are confronted with
a considerable number of events involving large crowds that pose a risk to
public and public governance

If you were head of police in such a city, what would you do to prevent
escalation?
• Think of verbal and non-verbal communication, strategy, …
• 20 minutes
CASE: PEACE UNIT - COOPERATION WITH
CROWD LEADERS IN PRACTICE
Peace Unit, Peace-keeping Unit (PU; [Du: “Vredeseenheid”]) of the Dutch
Police

Deployment at events that pose a risk to public and public governance

• E.g., political protests, presence of known offenders, counter
demonstrations, or demonstrations with a specific goal
• Victims of Japanese concentration camps (“Jappenkampen”)
• Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS)
• Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank
• Peadophile emancipation: Stichting Martijn (and counter protests)
• Neonazis (and counter protests)
• Euro Summit 1997 in Amsterdam
• …
COOPERATION WITH CROWD LEADERS IN
PRACTICE
Goal: preventing police and riot squad [Du: ME] action by
communicating with participants

Tactics:
• Recognisable and approachable
• Open attitude, engaging in dialogue
• Ooze calmness
• Hold individuals responsible for their behaviour
• Pro-active, quell undesirable behaviour in an early stage (if
necessary)
• “Eyes & ears”
COOPERATION WITH CROWD LEADERS IN
PRACTICE
Specifically:
• Message: “Police presence enables you to exert your fundamental
right to protest”
• Showing interest in and knowledge of reasons, goals, background
 Securing goodwill and cooperation from the crowd

Eyes and ears to other police units

• Goals of the crowd?
• What type of people?
• Essential information: Brick or lunch?
COOPERATION WITH CROWD LEADERS IN
PRACTICE
Important element: interaction with a crowd’s own leaders!
• Guards, “atmosphere management” [Du: ordedienst, “sfeerbeheer”]
• Often members of organisation, or otherwise closely connected
• Direct control over crowd members: which route to follow, self-
policing, what to shout, ...
• Interface between PU and crowd!
COOPERATION WITH CROWD LEADERS IN
PRACTICE
Ample and timely information exchange between PU and crowd leaders:
• Number of people
• Goals
• Route to follow
• Materials allowed
• Sticks, boards
• Illegal symbols (e.g. swastikas)
• ...

• Very effective strategy

• Mutual trust, even among “hardcore” protesters
• Black Bloc
• Anarchists
• Autonomists
• Squatters
• ...
COOPERATION WITH CROWD LEADERS IN
PRACTICE
Tactics of Dutch police very similar to de-escalating police tactics used
in the UK based on social identity perspective (ESIM)

Power by out-group members experienced more negatively than by in-

group members
• Outgroup power seen as interference, conflicts with sense of
control; Ingroup power uplifting, motivating, increases
cooperation
• In-group members have much greater potential to exert power
through the group

 making use of ingroup members to control crowds is therefore “the

smart thing to do”!
COOPERATION WITH THE CROWD

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/10/02/een-demonstrant-is-geen-vijand-
a2094161
COOPERATION WITH THE CROWD
In the words of one PU member:

“Je moet voorkomen dat er een wij-zijhouding ontstaat […] We maken

daarom onderscheid op basis van gedrag van individuen, niet van de
groep als geheel. Anders creëer je je eigen tegenstander.”

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/10/02/een-demonstrant-is-geen-vijand-
a2094161
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS
Proper visitor behaviour requires extensive preparations (crowd
management) and constant monitoring and intervention (crowd control)

Crucial element: communication

• Event location
• Schedule and schedule changes
• Transportation
• Parking lots
• Prohibited goods
• Food stalls
• Toilets
• Location crowding
• Weather forecasts
• …
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS
Technology may both facilitate and complicate communication with crowds
• Smart phone apps, websites, Facebook and Twitters as crowd
communication means
• However, they may cause visitors disregard organisers’ communication

Very little about crowd communication is formally available, let alone the use
of technology therein

 Use of technology to influence crowds at major events

 Which technologies and how?
 Effectiveness, pittfalls?
 Sources: literature and experts
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: SOCIAL MEDIA
Examples:
• Twitter at Pukkelpop 2011 disaster (Terpstra et al., 2012)
• Social media
• Red River flood
• Tennessee River fly ash spillage
• Oklahoma grass fires

Many major events (e.g., Rock Werchter, Belgium, North Sea Jazz, The
Hague) nowadays routinely use dedicated apps.
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: EXPERT
INTERVIEWS
• N = 16
• 4 – 40 years of experience with large events
• Different stakeholders
• Municipalities
• (Commercial) organisers
• Police organization
• Police Academy
• Consultancy
• ...
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: EXPERT
INTERVIEWS
• ...
• Different events
• Number of visitors
• Urban versus rural
• Short versus long duration
• Large versus small municipalities
• Free versus paid admission
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: EXPERT
INTERVIEWS
Use of technology
• LED-displays, apps, events pages on Facebook, Twitter
accounts, text alerts, websites.
• Communication and monitoring are linked
• When crowding exceeds a certain threshold,
operators will use LED displays to inform crowd
• NB: it is left to the individual to act on this
information
• Overuse of LED displays may reduce effectiveness
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: EXPERT
INTERVIEWS
Social media
• Twitter is often used; Facebook, Whatsapp, ...
• High “reach” – when combined with traditional
media
• Two-way information exchange

However…
• Suitability depends on target group
• Effective before, but also during events?
• Limited reliability of infrastructure
• …
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: EXPERT
INTERVIEWS
Additionally...
• Dilutes organisers’ communication attempts
• Danger to “communicating as one”

Communicating as one - maintaining communication

effectiveness
• Prevention of spreading contradictory
information
• “Practise what you preach”
• Verbal and non-verbal communication,
explicit and implicit
• Adverse effects of riot police in full gear,
deployment of police helicopters and
drones
• Many stakeholders, each with a strong desire
to Tweet…
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: CONCLUSIONS
• Influencing crowds and crowd behaviour by providing information and
advice, rather than using force or restricting movement

• Smart phones and social media offer great potential, and are widely used
(in addition to LED displays, sound systems, …)
• Bi-directional stream of information
• Drawbacks include overloading, clutter, and reduced effectiveness of
information from organisers
• May put “communicating as one”-policy at risk
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: DISCUSSION
How can organisers maintain/increase persuasion effectiveness in the face
of social media omnipresence?
• Verroen, Gutteling, & De Vries (2013): Crisis communication should
include action perspectives; this reduces the need to look for additional
information elsewhere.

Relatedly, …
• To what extent do apps maintain persuasiveness in the flood of
competing information?
• How should their “competitiveness” be increased?
• …?
MANAGING CROWDS AT FESTIVALS: FULL REPORT
De Vries, Galetzka, & Gutteling (2013). Inzet communicatie bij crowd
management en crowd control. WODC, ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie.
• https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/1970
CASE: PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
An example of ineffective communication by community leaders and
police officials with potential visitors

• What went wrong?

• Where and how did leaders fail?
CASE: PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
What happened?

• Rapidly dispersed birthday invitation on Facebook

• Attempt to defuse: “There will not be a party; police has taken
measures”.
• No gates, low profile police deployment; “Nothing is happening
here”
• Alternative party?
• How many visitors?
• Setting a precedent?
• A crowd gathers at a crossing
• Athmosphere fine until riot police arrives
PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
Contradictions in verbal and non-verbal communication (Adang,
2013, p. 55):

• “There is no party, but an alternative party is considered”;

• “There is no alternative party, but we have a location available
where light poles will be erected.”
• Later that night an inividual will spontaneously attempt to
create a party location here after all (adding to the
confusion);
• “You are not welcome, you will be sent away should you
decide to come to Haren.”
• This does not happen;
• ...
PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
• ...
• “You will be directed to a dedicated location.”
• The organisation is not equiped to do so; those going to the area
turn around when they find out nothing is happening there
• “The Stationsweg is blocked on 21 September.”
• This is incorrect, in fact, it is open until 2 p.m.;
• “You are not allowed to drink alcohol (except at the dedicated
location).”
• This rule is not actively maintained; spotters of the riot police are
also not informed.
PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
Conclusions of the “Commissie Cohen” regarding the role of the
authorities (Adang, 2013, p. 55):

• Major errors in communication aspects of risk management

• No clear planned approach, no detailed scenarios
• Notion of “open communication” not thought through
• Police and municipality unable to develop and implement a
shared communication strategy; as a result, communication was
not clear and hesitant.

• Internal communication
• Briefings inadequate; those involved did not know what was
expected of them
• Signals that the situation turned grim were not recognized
PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
Some recommendations (Adang et al., 2013)
• Communicate in a clear and consistent manner
• Clear instructions to security or police personnel
• Open attitude (but specify what this should entail!)
• What to communicate depends on the people you are dealing
with
• It is of little use pointing adolescents at the negative
consequences or risks of their actions
• Instead clarify norms to them, and point out inacceptability
of certain behaviours
• …
PROJECT X HAREN, 2012
Some conclusions
• …
• Escalation appeared to coincide with arrival of riot police –
coincidence?
• A bored crowd is a dangerous crowd?
• Having a crowd in a location where there is nothing much to do
is a recipe for disaster; better give them something to do or else
they may find a way to entertain themselves!
NORTH KOREA
• In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of
unknown origin, killing 46 on board; an investigation concluded it
North Korea was likely responsible. A few months later, North Korea
fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two
civilians and wounding 19.

• In 2013 North Korea

• nullified the armistice that ended the Korean War (1950 - 1953)
• discontinued the communication hotline with South Korea
• threatened to wipe out South Korea
• pledged all-out war.
NORTH KOREA
NORTH KOREA
NORTH KOREA
• “’You indeed do have a lunatic in North Korea,’ Sen. Marco Rubio
said. Sen. Ted Cruz also called Kim a ‘lunatic,’ as did debate
moderator Chris Wallace.”
• “The image you get of Kim Jong Un is of an unpredictable wild man,
an out of control crazy person, careening around northeast Asia
with nuclear weapons. And I don't mean to pick on Rubio or Cruz;
this is a widespread and bipartisan view.”

• According to Max Fisher on Vox.com, these are “the most common

misconceptions about the hermit kingdom”
NORTH KOREA
1. Gaining a better place at the bargaining table
• “ It's about countering enemies that Kim knows are more powerful
[…] This week, the United Nations Security Council passed some of
the toughest North Korea sanctions in years. Even China supported the
sanctions […], which punish North Korea's nuclear test from this
January and a missile test from February.
When punished like this, North Korea often responds with provocations
much like Thursday's nuclear threat.
It's not that Kim Jong Un actually desires a war with his enemies. His
military, he knows, is antiquated and inferior and would certainly lose.
Rather, what he likely wants to do, at least in part, is to raise tensions in
the region — knowing that the US and North Korea's neighbors will then
look to ratchet them down.

North Korea's provocations [are] somewhat akin to a child throwing a

temper tantrum.”
- Max Fisher on Vox.com
NORTH KOREA
2. Consolidate power among the country's governing elites
• “First, he has launched one of North Korea's most violent political
purges in decades, exiling or executing a number of high-level
officials […] And, second, Kim has conducted a steady series of
military provocations: nuclear development, weapons tests, and
a series of threats, in early 2013, to start World War III. A common
theory among North Korea analysts is that this allows Kim to prove
to military officials that he's a capable leader, and also that it rallies
officials and citizens alike around him.”
- Max Fisher on Vox.com
NORTH KOREA
3. Perpetuating an outside threat

• “It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important

military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish
them.” - Max Fisher in The Washington Post

• “It's about maintaining the big lie that keeps North Korea running
[…] Kim Jong Il's solution was something called the Songun or
"military first" policy. This policy tells North Koreans that the reason
they are hungry and impoverished and locked in a police state is
because this is all necessary to fund the military and protect the
country from enemies internal and external, so as to keep them safe
from the imperialist Americans who are always just on the verge of
invading.”
- Max Fisher on Vox.com
 NORTH KOREA

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/w
hy-north-korea-loves-to-threaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-
follow-through/

• http://www.vox.com/2016/3/4/11160314/north-korea-nuclear-threat
CASE: TROUBLES IN THE CONGO
An example of identity politics

• Mobutu in power since 1965; starts his “authenticity campaign”: no

more colonialism and influence of Western culture, and a more
centralized and singular national identity.
• Patrice Lumumba becomes national hero (!!!)
• “Congo”  “Zaire”
• “Joseph-Désiré Mobutu”  “Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu
wa Za Bang” ("The all-powerful warrior who, because of his
endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to
conquest, leaving fire in his wake")
CASE: TROUBLES IN THE CONGO
• All citizens required to drop their European names and adopt
African ones
• Western clothing outlawed
• Threaths to Mobutu’s rule eliminated, later bribed
• Nationalization of foreign firms, eviction of European investors
• Personality cult
• Images on evening news, in many public places, and on
government officials’ lapels
• “Father of the Nation”, “Savior of the People”, and “Supreme
Combatant”.
• In 1975, media were forbidden to use any other name than
Mobutu’s
CASE: TROUBLES IN THE CONGO
Results
• Personal fortune US$5 billion, equivalent to the country's foreign
debt at the time
• A fleet of Mercedes-Benz vehicles while roads rotted and many of
his people starved.
• Infrastructure virtually collapsed
• Many public service workers went months without being paid.
• Most of the money went to Mobutu, his family, and top political and
military leaders.

In 1997, Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (but matters

did not improve for the Democratic Republic of Congo).
GROUPTHINK

• A decision-making style
characterized by an excessive
tendency among group members to
seek concurrence

Bay of Pigs, 1961

Able Archer ‘83

Challenger Disaster,January 28, 1986

GROUPTHINK

• Groupthink symptoms:
• Overestimation of the group
• Intolerance for alternative ideas
• High pressure to maintain uniformity
• Inefficient decision making
• E.g, not considering alternatives

117
GROUPTHINK
Likely to happen when…
• Group is highly cohesive (!!!)
• Group structure
• Same backgrounds
• Strong directive leadership
• Stress (Time limits)

118
GROUPTHINK
Solutions:
• Encourage criticism
• Get outsiders involved
• Devil's advocate
• Structure decision-making process

119
Groupthink: Space Shuttle Challenger disaster (1986)

o Publicity offensive: civilians eligible to take part

o Multiple delays, pressure to launch

o However, previous launches revealed problems with O-rings

o Pressure on lead engineer Boisjoly to conform

o NASA: “Take your engineer hat off and put your management
hat on”
o Launch finally set on 28 January, 1986

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger_disaster

“Challenger: The Final Flight” on Netflix (https://www.netflix.com/nl-

en/title/81012137)
WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE
Psychologische veiligheid:
• Een gedeelde overtuiging dat een team een veilige omgeving is om
sociale risico's te nemen (Edmondson, 1999)
• Ideeën aandragen om werkprocessen te verbeteren
• Feedback vragen en geven
• Misstanden aankaarten

• In een psychologisch veilig team voelen teamleden zich geaccepteerd

en gerespecteerd.
WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE
Problemen op de werkvloer
• Roddelen, buitensluiten, harde grappen, collega’s niet aan kunnen
spreken op gedrag en functioneren
• Discriminatie, pesten
• Afwezige leiders, onduidelijkheid
• Reorganisatie
• …

Interventie: Politie Challenge Days

• Doel: Verandering werksfeer en verbetering psychologische
veiligheid
WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE
Reacties van deelnemers
(https://www.challengedaynederland.nl/projecten/politie/):
• “Een boeiende dag die veel heeft teweeggebracht tussen de oren van
veel collega’s gezien de emoties die loskwamen.”
• “Als ik mijn eigen rugzak bekijk en die vergelijk met anderen maakt mij
dat nederig en nog bewuster dan ik een bevoorrecht mens ben.”
• “Beter inzicht in vooroordelen en betere kennis van wat bij anderen kan
leven of leeft.”
• “Bewustwording en begrip voor andere collega’s.”
• “Inspiratie om nog meer aandacht te hebben voor het wel en wee van
mijn personeel en andere dierbaren (privé).”
• “Het inzicht dat iedereen zijn eigen rugzak met zich meedraagt en dat
die van sommigen (ook collega’s die je al heel lang “kent”) gevuld is met
veel meer ellende dan die van jezelf.”
WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE
Andere resultaten:
• Leiders zijn van groot belang
• Desinteresse is funest
• Teveel nadruk op PCD werkt negatief
• Goede voorbeeld geven
 WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/11/24/medewerkers-politie-maken-zwartboek-discriminatie-14215030-a1582552

126
WORK ATMOSPHERE AT THE DUTCH POLICE
o “[…] een leidinggevende kwam
ooit de koffiekamer binnen, ik
zat in de werkkamer ernaast,
met de vraag: ‘Waar is die
neger?’ Ik hoorde gelach van
anderen en voelde me klein
worden van binnen.”

o “Kort na mijn indiensttreding

werd ik trots voorgesteld als
‘de eerste zwarte’.”

o "Je kunt niet 26 keer

volhouden dat iets een uniek,
persoonlijk geval is”
POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

2016 - Rapper
Typhoon stopped by
the police because https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ex
plainers/ethnic-profiling-what-it-and-why-it-
“his car didn’t match must-end
his profile”

https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-
elsewhere-37543066
POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

In sum:
• Police is being accused of adopting ethnic profiling.
• Decisions who to stop and ask for ID, question,
search and arrest.
• Does not yield better results

• Detrimental to police work

• Embarrassment, humiliation, loss of confidence in
the police
• Results in tensions between police and groups in
society
BASES FOR PROFILING

1. Behaviour
Behaviour fitting an MO, and deviant behavior in traffic
provide justifiable grounds for a stop

 Good: someone walking past cars and looking inside

 Bad: someone turns head away from police
BASES FOR PROFILING

2. Information
Recent and specific information regarding locations,
times, objects and/or persons provides a justifiable
ground for a stop

 Good: shutting down a bar after relevant criminal

intelligence
 Bad: using statistics to stop Eastern European cars to
check for DUI
BASES FOR PROFILING

3. Appearance
Skin colour, tattoos, dressing style, etc. in and of
themselves are never a justifiable ground for stops

 Good: someone fitting a specific description

 Bad: young guys in training suits driving expensive
cars.
POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

Despite these guidelines, over 60% of police officers

indicate that they operate on “gut feeling” most of the time!
CASE: POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

How to interpret this in the context of course

content?

Contrasts (ingroups versus outgroups)

• Police versus society
• Police versus minorities
• Groups within the police against each other

….
CASE: POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

How to interpret this in the context of course

content?

….

Police identity
• Catching bad guys versus building bridges,
relationship oriëntation
• Old breed versus greenhorns

…
CASE: POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

How to interpret this in the context of course

content?

….

Allegations evoke strong defensive reactions

• Denial
• Rationalisation (e.g., overrepresentation of
certain groups in crime statistics)
• …
• Cf. Fischer et al. (2010)!
POLICE ETHNIC PROFILING

Many officers take the EP discussion personal

• Talking about and reflecting on EP is hard
• Training programs so far have been largely
ineffective

What if we would use VR as a platform for an anti-

EP training?
• WOW-factor
• VR makes content more persuasive
VR surveillance - project with Bas Boeing (Amsterdam Police)
http://www.vr-surveillance.com/
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• Evolutionary perspective: Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B.
(2008). Leadership, Followership, and Evolution: Some Lessons
From the Past. American Psychologist, 63(3), 182-196. doi:
10.1037/0003-066x.63.3.182

• TED talk primatologist Frans de Waal

“What makes an "alpha male?" Primatologist Frans de Waal says we
often get it wrong. His research shows that alpha males possess
leadership traits like generosity, peacekeeping, and empathy.”
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/16/751492970/frans-de-waal-what-
qualities-make-a-good-leader-in-
chimpanzees?fbclid=IwAR3ytVyuX0zHR0T5cY7d_nQ0vajQKJGTUbmNu
srydG8e6K0BpGK-66hE0eo&t=1567752380903
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• The Dropout - https://abcaudio.com/podcasts/the-dropout/
“By 2015, Forbes named [Elizabeth] Holmes the youngest and
wealthiest self-made female billionaire in America on the basis of a
$9 billion valuation of her company. Yet within a year, following
revelations of potential fraud about its claims, Forbes revised her
net worth to zero dollars, and Fortune named Holmes one of the
‘World's Most Disappointing Leaders’.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Holmes
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• Challenger: The Final Flight - Netflix
“Engineers, officials and the crew members' families provide their
perspective on the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and its
aftermath.”
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• “Remembering Allan McDonald: He Refused To Approve Challenger
Launch, Exposed Cover-Up”;
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/07/974534021/remembering-allan-mcdonald-
he-refused-to-approve-challenger-launch-exposed-cover
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
Until the late ‘90s a museum in Catalonia
displayed the stuffed body of an African man.
After considerable political turmoil he was finally
laid to rest in Southern Africa.

• Example of how outgroup influence results in

adverse effects

• Interesting parallels with the “Black Pete

issue” in the Netherlands
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• "Jagten" by Thomas Vinterberg is
about a kindergarten teacher who is
unjustly accused of sexual abuse by
one of his pupils. As a result he
becomes an outcast in his small local
community.
• All about group formation, group
processes, informal leadership (if you
look closely), prototypicality, etc.
RECOMMENDED READING, VIEWING, AND
LISTENING
• “People do great wrong, not because they are unaware of what they
are doing but because they consider it to be right. This is possible
because they actively identify with groups whose ideology justifies
and condones the oppression and destruction of others” (Haslam &
Reicher, 2008, p. 19)

• “The Push”, by Derren Brown (full version to be found on Netflix!)

 VRAGEN?

Peter de Vries
Psychology of Conflict, Risk, & Safety
University of Twente
p.w.devries@utwente.nl