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The Shadow of The Gwangju Uprising in The Democratization of Korean Politics
The Shadow of The Gwangju Uprising in The Democratization of Korean Politics
To cite this article: Kim Yong Cheol (2003) The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in
the Democratization of Korean Politics, New Political Science, 25:2, 225-240, DOI:
10.1080/07393140307193
Abstract The political legacies the Gwangju Uprising produced played a pivotal role
in checking military intervention in politics during the democratic transition as well as
in establishing the principle of civilian supremacy during the democratic transition
period. By fostering a counter-ideology against the military regime, by expanding
democratic forces, and by creating a new political structure that limited the choice of the
authoritarian elites and the United States, the Gwangju Uprising had a decisive
influence on democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea.
Introduction
The so-called ‘praetorian problem’ is one of the single major challenges that
“third wave” democracies face.1 Democratic leaders often make radical efforts to
curtail the military’s power and influence. Such measures, however, are likely to
precipitate new democracies into a “sudden death” by antagonizing the military
officers and motivating them to intervene in politics or to reverse the advance
toward democracy via a military coup. In contrast, if democratic elites are
indecisive in regard to the ‘praetorian problem,’ new democracies are likely to
slip into a “slow death” scenario in which there is a progressive diminution of
existing possibilities for the exercise of civilian power and effective liberal
constitutionalism. It is very difficult for democratic elites to accomplish military
reforms in order to consolidate their fledgling democracies.
In this regard, South Korea was very successful. Its process of subordinating
the military to the civil government was relatively smooth and peaceful.2 Behind
Korea’s success, there is the brave, yet sad, story of the Gwangju Massacre of
May 1980, following a 10-day uprising against a military coup. Though it ended
in failure at that time, the political legacies the Gwangju Uprising (GU) pro-
duced played a pivotal role in checking military intervention in politics during
the democratic transition (June 1987–April 1988), as well as in establishing the
principle of civilian supremacy during the democratic transition period. By
1
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions,
Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel
Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in
Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame University Press,
1992), p. 19.
2
Carolina G. Hernandez, “Controlling Asia’s Armed forces,” in Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 66–79.
ISSN 0739-3148 print/ISSN 1469-9931 online/03/020225–16 2003 Caucus for a New Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/0739314032000081586
226 Kim Yong Cheol
Analytical Perspective
The structure–agent debate has long intrigued students of regime change.
Scholars emphasizing structural factors in regime change believe that the likeli-
hood of political change is embedded in the structure of a given system. From
this perspective, democratic transition and consolidation are the political conse-
quences of the social order of modern industrial societies.3 In other words,
socioeconomic preconditions determine the type of social class relations and
political culture, which in turn determine the nature of the polity.
By contrast, scholars emphasizing political agents see political change as a
contingent outcome from a generic process led by human parameters. From this
perspective, democratic change is the consequence of political leaders’ strategic
choices. The human transactions to craft democracy are complex and uncertain
because political choice creates a cascading chain reaction of trade-off, confron-
tation, and compromise among the agents.4 The success, therefore, of crafting
democracy depends on the extent of elite coalescence that makes bargaining and
negotiation easy.5
Both of these perspectives have their own merits. The structure-oriented
approach is useful to explain the long-term change of politics on a macro level,
and it is true that a change of society leads to a change in politics. However, an
obvious insufficiency of structural analysis is that preconditions do not deter-
mine political life in an automatic manner. In this regard, the advantage of an
elite-oriented approach lies in its overcoming the deterministic characteristic of
the structure-oriented approach. Nevertheless, this contingency-based approach
excessively emphasizes voluntarism, ignoring the structural scaffolding that
imparts a motif to political choice and action.
“Structure” can be understood as props that condition, constrain, and induce
perception, choice, and the behavior of the elites (agents) who have a limited
degree of freedom. That is, structural factors, including socioeconomic
configuration and historically inherited conditions, play a significant role in
constraining agents’ actions. In this sense, the model of “critical junctures,”
which places emphasis on the embedded interactions between structure and
agent, seems desirable for the study of political change.
3
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966);
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963).
4
Guillermo O’Donell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986).
5
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990); John Higley and Richard Gunther (ed.), Elites and
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 227
Figure 1
Collier and Collier focus on major watersheds in political life, arguing that a
“critical juncture,” which is defined as a period of significant change, establishes
certain directions of change and forecloses others in a way that shapes politics
for years to come by producing distinct historical legacies.6 The critical juncture
is generated by some kind of social tension or cleavage, which not only creates
new actors (or groups) against the old order, but also raises political issues
against antecedent conditions. Though a cleavage leads up a critical juncture, the
juncture is triggered by abnormal circumstances, such as an economic crisis or
war. Thus, a critical juncture occurs in a limited period of time, while a cleavage
tends to exist for a long time.
Critical junctures may produce dramatic political changes, but such cases are
rare. Even in a revolution, political systems are never completely transformed.
After the occurrence of a critical juncture, continuity and discontinuity usually
coexist for a certain period of time. During this period, legacies that a critical
juncture has produced constrain agents’ choices and actions, while at the same
time, activating social reorientation and political realignment. Consequently,
conflicts between old and new actors take place repeatedly up until the time that
the new order displaces the old one.
Following this structural contingency model, this paper describes the rising
and consolidating of the praetorianism in the 1960s and 1970s as an antecedent
condition, the subsequent development of political tension toward democratiza-
tion as a social cleavage, and the GU of 1980 as a critical juncture, and it analyzes
how the GU played a role as a critical juncture in the Korean process of the
termination of military intervention in politics, by examining some significant
political confrontations between old elites and new actors that occurred in the
process of democratization (see Figure 1).
6
Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Area: Critical Junctures, the
Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1991).
228 Kim Yong Cheol
based upon export-led industrialization. His effort was successful. The overall
growth rate of the Korean GNP during the period between 1963 and 1970
averaged 9.6% per year, and per capita income rose from $100 in 1963 to $243
in 1970. The unemployment rate declined from 8.6% in 1963 to 4.4% in 1970.9
This positive economic performance helped boost Bak’s popularity. In the
presidential election of 1967, Bak was re-elected by a near landslide and in the
subsequent National Assembly elections, his Republican Party also defeated the
opposition party by a wide margin.
Yet the political effect of this economic development did not last long. In the
early 1970s, the side effects of the rapid industrialization began to appear.
Increasing economic disparities between sectors, between regions, and between
classes cultivated a popular feeling of an unfair distribution of wealth and
income. Various negative signals, including growing labor unrest, the increasing
discontent of the urban poor, and the rising popularity of the opposition party,
appeared in the early 1970s. Though these signs of discontent were neither
strong enough nor active enough to threaten the Bak regime, Bak and his ruling
elites needed a preemptive measure for regime stability.
confrontation divided social forces in two: one stressed the efficiency of policies
and security, both domestic and international, while the other valued distri-
bution and democratic values. The division developed into a social cleavage
where the security-developmental coalition, which consisted of the military
authorities, technical bureaucrats, and jaebeols (financial conglomerates), was
confronted by the democratic coalition, composed of opposition parties, intellec-
tuals and religious personages. The confrontation between the two grew more
serious as time went by.10
was not ready to take over because the coup was really just a mutiny by a
faction of officers against the military hierarchy, and the coup leaders needed
time to consolidate their power within the armed forces. The first thing the coup
leaders did was to reform the higher officers and ranks in the barracks. They
removed the senior military officers and filled their positions with participants
in the coup.
While securing military control and preparing for a plan of government,
General Jeon carefully watched the unfolding of the political process and
calculated the best way to enter it. For that purpose, he needed more intelligence
instruments that promised both expertise and maneuverability in the civilian
realm. On April 14, 1980, after applying persuasion and pressure on the interim
government, Jeon was appointed as the acting head of the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency. This enabled him to monopolize virtually all the military
and intelligence powers in Korea.
Unlike the new military, which moved promptly and with unity, the demo-
cratic camp was highly divided. The interim government and political parties
were unable to reach a consensus on a strategy or schedule on how to proceed
with the transition to democracy, though they agreed on the need for democra-
tization. The Choi government did not cooperate with the ruling Democratic
Republican Party that tried to transform itself into a leader of democratic reform.
President Choi wanted the process of democratization to be led by the govern-
ment and to be completed in a gradual manner. With competitive elections
envisioned, the opposition New Democratic Party was divided because of the
factional strife between the two powerful presidential hopefuls, Kim Yong-sam
and Kim Dae-jung. Taking advantage of the liberalized atmosphere, workers
began to stage demonstrations at an unprecedented level. Students took to the
streets, calling for the prompt lifting of martial law and the removal of remnants
of the Yushin regime. On May 14 and 15, 1980, student movements mobilized
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets of major cities.
The new military did not miss their chance. They began actions to seize
political power under the pretext of restoring political stability and social order.
On May 17, the new military, with the consent of the entire military force,
moved to put an end to the transition process. The Choi government, which had
already become a puppet of the military, swiftly sanctioned the decision of the
new military. The military prohibited all political activities, temporarily closed
universities, shut down the National Assembly, banned strikes, and imposed
censorship on the national media. They also arrested major politicians.
12
Sam-sung Lee, Miguk ui Dae-Han Jeongchaek gwa Hanguk Minjokjuui [American Foreign
Policy Toward South Korea and Korean Nationalism] (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1993), pp. 169–176.
The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 233
14
Sung-ik Kim, “Jeon Doo-hwan, Yeoksa reul weehan Yukseong Zeungeon” [Jeon
Doo-hwan’s Real Voice Testimony for History], Wolgan Chosun [Chosun Monthly] (January
1992), pp. 360–377.
The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 235
15
Godo Dakao, Je 5 Gonghwaguk, Gu Gunbu Inmaek [The 5th Republic, Its Military
Connection], (Seoul: Jiyangsa, 1987), p. 224
16
Young-ki Kwon, Dong H. Kim, and Hae B. Jee, “Documentary: Gun Samgae Sandan
eul Tuiphara!” [Documentary: Dispatch Three Army Divisions!], Wolgan Chosun [Chosun
Monthly] (January 1992).
236 Kim Yong Cheol
military government was actually expressed openly during the process of the
presidential election in December 1987. Some military generals warned, “if
candidate Kim Dae-jung wins the election, something unhappy might happen.”17
The defense strategy of the military authoritarian government toward the
June Uprising was successful. After the June 29th Declaration, with the presiden-
tial elections in December ahead of them, the democratization forces became
split along ideological, strategic, and local lines. In the end, this split inside the
democratic forces contributed greatly to Roh Tae-woo, a former military man,
winning the presidential election. As the candidate from the ruling party was
elected to the presidency, no overt military action was undertaken, but the
nation’s expectation for a civilian government, expressed through the June
Uprising, was frustrated.
Although Roh Tae-woo became president through a direct election, it did not
mean that he was free from the shadow of the Gwangju Uprising and the move
toward democratization. Roh’s administration was little different from the prior
one, especially in terms of having the military’s support as its political base. Roh
Tae-woo himself was one of the core members of the military coup from 1979 to
1980, and was deeply involved in the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising. For
these reasons, the Roh administration had to take preemptive political measures
to silence any political criticism related to the Gwangju Uprising in order to
ensure a smooth start for the Sixth Republic. In January 1988, Roh Tae-woo, the
elected presidential candidate, formed the Committee for Promoting National
Reconciliation (CPNR), raised the status of the Gwangju massacre, which had
been described as a “riot” provoked by some impure elements, to the status of
the “Gwangju Uprising,” a democratization movement, and allowed compen-
sation for those killed and injured during the Uprising.
Despite the Roh administration’s lukewarm gesture of the CPNR, the
Gwangju Uprising began once again to amplify the government’s improprieties.
In the general elections of April 1988, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) failed
to maintain a majority in the National Assembly, leading to a new political
situation, one with a smaller ruling party and larger opposition parties. Three
opposition parties, including the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP), the Re-
unification and Democracy Party (RDP), and the New Democratic Republican
Party (NDRP), formed a coalition and began to attack the Roh administration.
During an extraordinary session in June 1988 the National Assembly organized
the “Special Committee for the Investigation of the Truth of the May 18 Gwangju
Democratization Movement.” The Committee began its full operation in Novem-
ber 1988, and hearings on the Gwangju Uprising were held in the National
Assembly. The Gwangju hearings were broadcast live, attracting the entire
nation’s attention. As the hearings proceeded, the true picture of the Gwangju
Uprising became increasingly evident. The democratization forces and student
groups demanded Jeon Doo-hwan’s arrest and punishment for his responsibility
for the Gwangju incident. Some students even organized a group called the
“Arrest Jeon Doo-hwan Band.”
Unable to shake itself free from the Gwangju issue, the Roh Tae-woo
administration held a closed-door negotiation with Jeon Doo-hwan in order to
conclude the Gwangju hearings early. The major contents of the negotiation
17
Godo Dakao, Je 5 Gonghwaguk, Gu Gunbu Inmaek, p. 239.
The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 237
included: Jeon Doo-hwan should make an apology to the nation, donate his
property to the nation, and retire and seclude himself at Baekdam-sa Temple,
while the DJP, the ruling party, should end Jeon’s testimony in the National
Assembly despite the opposition’s demands. As a result, Jeon Doo-hwan issued
a statement of apology to the people on November 23 in 1988, and began his
political exile at the remote Baekdam-sa temple. The Gwangju hearings did not
make any further progress because of the DJP members’ refusal to participate.
Though the Gwangju hearings failed to bring to light the whole truth of the
Gwangju Uprising, they aroused the nation’s interest in the Uprising, and
informed the nation of the truth, to a certain degree. As things turned out,
President Roh Tae-woo could not help but sense an impending crisis, as one of
those responsible for the Gwangju incident. He was not able to predict how the
Gwangju matter would put pressure on him and he became anxious about his
life after retirement. The culmination of this crisis was the “three parties merger”
in January 1990. In order to overcome their numerical inferiority in the National
Assembly, Roh Tae-woo and the DJP merged with Kim Young-sam and the
RDP, who wished to hold Kim Dae-jung and the PDP in check and gain an
advantage over his presidential competitor, and Kim Jong-pil and the NDRP,
who needed to overcome the numerical inferiority of being the fourth party.
With this merger arranged, the Roh administration avoided the politically
sensitive and critical Gwangju issue.
18
Yoo-sung Hwang, “Bihwa Munmin Jeongboo: Sukgun ui Baegyoung” [Hidden Story
of Civil Government: Background of the Purging Military], Dong-a Ilbo [Dong-a Daily] (June
7, 1998)
238 Kim Yong Cheol
Together with the purge of the military, President Kim also tried institutional
reforms of the armed forces with a view toward de-politicization. Distinctive
among his reforms were the consolidation of civilian supremacy over the
military and the reduction of the power of military intelligence. First, the relative
powers of the civiianl government’s defense minister vis-á-vis the active military
chief were greatly strengthened. Second, the Military Security Command, which
had been the most powerful military sector under previous presidents, under-
went a great deal of restructuring and reduction in organization and power.
There were various complex motives in the background of this sudden purge
of the military authorities. First, it was necessary for the Kim Young-sam
administration to establish its difference from former administrations. Kim’s
administration was the first civilian government in 31 years, since the May 16
Coup in 1961. At the same time, it had come into being with the Roh Tae-woo
administration and the “three parties’ merger” as its cradle. Stressing that it was
a “civilian government,” the Kim Young-sam administration had to deal with its
stigma as “a civilian government based on a military regime.” At the beginning,
the Kim Young-sam administration was criticized as a civilian government that
was “in the fetters of its birth from the three parties merger.” For this reason, its
decisive cutting off of the “political” soldiers, who had been instrumental in the
army’s political intervention, was the best opportunity for the administration to
improve its image in one fell swoop.
Second, the Kim Young-sam administration also had to eliminate any poten-
tial resistance from the military authorities that could become a threat. Right
after its inauguration, the Kim administration advocated a no-holds-barred
“reformative politics,” insisting on “clean politics” and “correcting history.” The
practice of the “reformative politics,” however, was expected to confront strong
resistance from forces with vested interests from the Fifth and Sixth Republics.
Among the opponents of the new administration’s reforms, the most threatening
group was the Hanahoe of the military authorities, whose organized resistance
could bring about tremendous political turmoil. Accordingly, the administration
tried to prevent Hanahoe’s organized resistance against the reforms, by eliminat-
ing the Hanahoe generals in a decisive manner.
President Kim Young-sam’s Hanahoe purge and the reform of the military
were closely related to the historical events of the Gwangju Uprising. As
Gwangju’s tragic incident was now widely understood throughout the nation as
an unforgivable crime of the New Military Authorities, led by Jeon Doo-hwan
and Roh Tae-woo, it was quite clear that the administration’s establishment on
the basis of the Fifth and Sixth Republic could have a negative effect on the
civilian government both politically and morally.
19
Hankyeoreh, October 28, 1995.
240 Kim Yong Cheol
policy on legal retribution upside down on November 24, 1995. He ordered his
ruling party to enact a special law to unearth the truth about the bloody
suppression in Gwangju in 1980 and to bring those responsible for the incident
before justice. In response to President Kim’s decision, the National Assembly
passed two special laws on December 19, 1995,20 and prosecutors reopened the
case. After about 15 months of investigation and deliberation, the Supreme
Court announced its judgment concerning Jeon and Roh on April 17, 1997.
According to the judgment, the December 12 incident of 1979 was “a military
revolt” and the Gwangju incident was “an insurrection and murder for the
insurrection.”21 Jeon was sentenced to penal servitude for life, Roh to 17 years of
imprisonment, and others concerned from three-and-half years to 8 years of
imprisonment. This judicial judgment effectively blocked the possibility of
intervention by the military in the politics of South Korea by setting a precedent
that “even a successful coup is punishable.”
Conclusion
The Gwangju Uprising has continued to influence the process of democratiza-
tion and the stabilization of Korean politics. Its historical influences are as
follows: (1) it provided the democratization of Korean politics with a new
ideology, (2) it has been the source of new agents for the nation’s democratiza-
tion movement, and (3) it also created a new political structure that limited the
choices of the authoritarian elites and the United States. In terms of the
“praetorian problem” that a newly born democracy often has to face, the
Gwangju Uprising has helped to restrain and reduce the possibility of the
military’s political intervention in the process of Korean democratization. That
is, through their self-sacrifice, the citizens of the Gwangju Uprising have con-
tributed to the organization of the democratization movement of the civil
society, disclosed the violence and immorality of the military authorities, and
expanded the ideology of resistance against the military authorities. The direct
outcome of the Gwangju Uprising was the June Uprising in 1987. Since the
transition to democracy in Korea, the inheritance of the Gwangju Uprising
restrained and dissipated continuous attempts by the Roh Tae-woo administra-
tion and the military elites to retain their vested rights and to stay in power. The
Uprising’s inheritance, finally, brought about a juridical precedent that “a
successful coup d’etat can be punished,” and completely excluded the possibility
of the military’s intervention in Korean politics. Seeing all that it accomplished,
the Gwangju Uprising should not be seen as merely a simple 10-day-long
democratization outburst that took place in May 1980, but should be evaluated
as a historical force and a critical juncture that stabilized civil democracy and
helped greatly to realize the possibility of “civilian-first” politics in the nation of
Korea.
20
They are the Act on Non-Applicability of Status of Limitation to Crimes Destructive
of the Constitutional Order and the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement.
21
Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], April 18, 1997.