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JP Morgan Case Questions
JP Morgan Case Questions
JP Morgan Case Questions
JP Morgan’s Concerns:
In 2011 JP Morgan blamed the losses on Basel III. Due to the new regulations of
Basel III the CIO was told to reduce the size of the RWAs, as the CIO was trying to reduce the
model it kept increasing and it started to become more difficult to manage. The VaR model
further created problems for the RWAs done in 2012, as according to this model the RWAs had
to be reduced by 50% in comparison to the old model.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed in 2010
under Obama’s administration. It was a financial reform legislation that was a response to the
2007-2008 crises. This act was to monitor the financial stability of the large firms and to provide
liquidations (Liquidation Fund) and more.
The Volcker Rule under the Dodd- Frank Act restricted banks investment. The CIO of JP
Morgan in London was trading in high risks and the traders did not understand the risk which
eventually ended up in a loss of $2 billion. After this loss JP Morgan was forced to strengthen
the Dodd- Frank Act.
Question: 04:
Risk weighted assets are basically used to determine the lowest sum of money any financial
institution should have to avoid bankruptcy.
In December 2011 CIO was requested to diminish to estimate of ROA because of
usage of Basel 3. The adjustments in Risk management under Basel 3 could expand JP Morgan's
RWAs multiple times which was a disturbing circumstance as increment in RWAs will leave less
cash for their business tasks and there will be a negative effect on the overall business.
Some key actions were taken by the CIO in order to manage the RWAs. Large and
complex positions were taken in order to decrease the size of RWAs which resulted in large
portfolios. This made it more difficult to manage the risk. Furthermore, changes in VaR model in
early 2012 were made which reduced the size of RWAS to 50 %. Although it was beneficial for
JP Morgan but still it didn’t prove to be satisfactory. Then there was a switch for VaR model to a
new method which had been tested and approved by independent model review group. This new
model proved to be more successful as it showed an average daily VaR within the CIO of $67
million compared to the $129 million when using the old model in April 2012.
Question: 05:
Failures in Risk Management:
The management at JP Morgan believed that the ever-changing regulations and
Basel III was the main reason of the losses that resulted. JP Morgan had reduced the size of
RAW in order to accommodate the rules of Basel III. As a result the portfolio increased and it
became difficult for the CIO to monitor, detect and characterize the risks associated. Then, the
size of positions became much larger which led to extreme difficulty in changing them in order
to manage them effectively
Failures in Risk Leadership:
The constant change in the CIO leadership was one of the main reasons of losses of
London Whale. Due to the changing leaders within the unit over the past 5 years, there were
problems that led inefficient outcomes. The issue with risk leadership can also be seen when the
senior management did not bother looking into or properly monitoring the strategies of managing
portfolios and furthermore, the management ignored and overlooked the risks that were taken
because they were overconfident of JP Morgan’s skills and practices.
Question: 06:
In this specific case, their approach, while highly subjective and unsystematic, did
not exceed those thresholds. Unfortunately for JPM as a whole, it should have been noticed that
the CIO VCG had obtained a “Needs improvement” rating from a JPM internal audit on March
30th for using untested risk models and weak justification when setting its allowable pricing
thresholds. Furthermore, as stated in the SCP’s own mandate, the CIO conceded that they were
not experts in derivatives valuation and were thus “price takers” when it came to portfolio
valuation. When the SCP was originally conceived, if there was a pricing discrepancy the CIO
was supposed to defer to the investment bank’s marks, as there was no fundamental reason for a
gross discrepancy to exist. As the CIO began exercising more pricing discretion, however, this
became a source of contention between them and the investment bank’s credit derivatives desk.
Not only was this a blatant internal inconsistency within JPM, but it created an awkward problem
as the CIO and the investment bank now found themselves on opposite side of the same trade.
Any hope of keeping this problem internal vanished on April 4th, when the Wall Street Journal
contacted JPM to inform them that it was writing an article on the CIO’s credit index portfolio.
They were able to name Bruno Iksil as the trader and even to estimate the size of their positions
in the market. A week or so before JPM’s CEO was to discuss preliminary Q1 2012 results, the
financial press was about to shine a very bright light into a dark corner of a bank which had
prided itself on its risk management ability.