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Risk assessment of climate change

impact on railway infrastructure –


Dutch case study
Irina Stipanovic Oslakovic1, Herbert ter Maat2, Andreas Hartmann1, Geert Dewulf1

1 University
of Twente, Construction Management and Engineering Dept.,
Enschede, The Netherlands
2 Wageningen University, Earth System Science and Climate Change Group,

Wageningen, The Netherlands


Monitoring of condition and
Railway infrastructure performance – performance (on-site testing)
relation to climate variable
(e.g. temperature, rainfall, snow)
Modelling of condition and
performance  calibration!
Change to climate variable
(Local climate scenarios, e.g. more hot Correlation between
days, increased precipitation) infrastructure performance
and weather conditions

Impact
Baseline – threshold values
(e.g. increased incidents of washout, flooding
future incidents
and scour new design requirements)

Risk matrix
(classification and quantification of risks)

Adaptation strategies
(e.g. strengthening railway substructure)
2
Performance of the railway

Type of the
railway Age of the Weather Regular
Traffic load
(sub)- railway conditions maintenance
structure

3
Impact on railway infrastructure

• Scouring of the railway bridge, Croatia, 2009

• Ireland, slope failure, 2007 Malahide viaduct, Dublin to Belfast line, 2009 4
Impact on railway infrastructure –
heat waves

 Buckling of the rails

5
CASE STUDY APPROACH

NETWORK LEVEL

REGIONAL LEVEL NETWORK


CS 5 PERFORMANCE
CS 4 CS 3
Case study 1: CS 2
Historical data about
• weather events CONCLUSIONS POLICY
• asset performance STRATEGIES
• asset condition METHODOLOGY
• maintenance costs

6 6
Assessment of the current condition
GPR and drilling measurements

7 7
Soil profiles

8
Description of the SWAPS model
• land surface model which simulates transport of water,
solutes and heat in unsaturated/saturated soils

9
Input data - profiles
Core 2 Km 18,522
80 ballast
Using the ROSETTA program (Schaap
Tensar et al, 2001) a translation has been
91 clay made to correctly parameterize each
101 sand soil layer
116 sand, loam
131 loam M.G. Schaap, F.J. Leij, T. van. Genuchten (2001) ROSETTA: a computer
program for estimating soil hydraulic parameters with hierarchical
146 sand pedotransfer functions. Journal of Hydrology, 163-176
151 loam
216 sand

Core 3 Km 18,513
66 ballast Weather input:
16 Tensar - Local meteorology (temperature,
106 sand wind, humidity, pressure, radiation)
126 loam, sand is extracted from the CESAR
156 sand database (www.cesar-database.nl)
206 loam
216 sand

10
Soil moisture 2012 – profile 2 and 3

ballast
clay
sand
sand, loam
loam
11
Climate scenarios (KNMI ’06)
precipitation
“G” - Dutch word “Gematigd” = moderate,
“W” - “Warm”
"+" change of circulation in winter and
summer

Averaged winter
precipitation for 1976-2005 G 2050 G+ 2050 W 2050 W+ 2050
location:

De Kooy 195 202 208 209 223


Eelde 207 214 221 222 236
De Bilt 220 228 235 236 251
Vlissingen (Ritthem) 193 199 206 206 220
Eindhoven 211 218 225 226 240
Maastricht (Beek) 196 203 209 210 223
12
The KNMI’06 climate scenarios:
change in 2050 relative to 1990

Climate scenarios for 13


The KNMI’06 climate scenarios:
change in 2050 relative to 1990

Extreme precipitation more


likely in a warm climate

Summer

daily precipitaiton exceeded once


in 10 years

Climate scenarios for 14


Threshold values from EWENT project
Temperature Cold spell Rainfall Snowfall Impact
T ≥ 25 ºC ≤ 0 ºC 30 mm / 24 ≥ 1 cm / 24 Adverse impacts to the
hours hours transport system may start to
occur.
T ≥ 32 ºC ≤ -7 ºC 100 mm / 24 ≥ 10 cm / 24 Some adverse impacts are
hours hours likely. Their severity depends on
the resilience of the transport
system.
T ≥ 43 ºC ≤ -20 ºC 150 mm / 24 ≥ 20 cm / 24 Weather phenomenon is so
hours hours severe that it is virtually certain
that some adverse impacts will
occur.

• http://ewent.vtt.fi/

15
Frequency-based probability of daily rainfall exceeding
30 mm (in percent) during the period 1971-2000

16
Total numbers of days with rainfall

• exceeding (A) 100 mm and (B) 150 mm during the


period 1971-2000
17
Multi-model mean, upper- and lower limit of changes in annual
heavy rainfall days from 1971-2000 to 2011-2040 exceeding

• (A) 30 mm

• (B) 100 mm

• (C) 150 mm

based on six RCM


simulations.
(ENSEMBLES
project) 18
KNMI scenarios - precipitation

20
Extreme rainfall in August
2006 – example of future
climate

Threshold values relevant


for Netherlands:

• 30 mm / 24 hours
• 50 mm / 24 hours
• 100 mm / 5 days
21
Soil moisture 2006 – profile 2 and 3

ballast
Extreme rainfall in August 2006 is
clay
sand thought to be an example of future
sand, loam summer rainfall episodes.
loam
22
FMEA procedure
• FMEA – failure modes and effects analysis
Risk Priority Number
(RPN) =
OCCUR*SEV*DETEC

Step 3: Detection Detect a failure


Number (DETEC) mode

Step 2: Severity Step 1: Probability


Number (SEV) Number (OCCUR)

• Ref:
• Kim, J.H. et al. Development of the FMECA process and analysis methodology for railroad systems, 2009
• S.J. Hassankiadeh Failure Analysis of Railway Switches and Crossings for the purpose of Preventive
Maintenance, M.Sc. KTH Stockholm Sweden, 2011
23
Failure Mode Effects Analysis
(FMEA)

24 24
Focus on rainfall
Extreme rainfall
Consequence of
the weather
Leaching Increased runoff High water and cause of the
(river flooding) failure

Slope instability Soil saturation Track under water Failure mode

Loss of bearing Loss of transport Loss of the


capacity function function

No train operation Consequence on


Direct and indirect costs the system 25
ProRail: Identification of vulnerable points

• Identified potential risks to the safety of railway


substructure:
1. Slope shear, especially slopes steeper than 1:1.
2. Softening /weakening of the track and rails:
locations with poor drainage and poor track
geometry.
3. Insufficient load-bearing capacity due to very weak
layers in the subsoil.
4. Failure of underground infrastructure (water
infrastructure, etc.)
26
Risks (scenarios)  Failure modes
Risk Failure modes
A Water problems
A1 Bathtub / drainage Track softening
A2 Extreme precipitation Rail under water
A3 Groundwater level Drainage
A4 High water river and streams High water and high flow velocities
B Embakment stability
B1 Steep slopes > 1:1 Slope stability
B2 Very weak subsoil Track stability
B3 Sand slope - leaching Slope stability
C Load-bearing capacity
C1 Weak subsoil Peat subsoil
C2 Track reconstruction Softening, weakening
D Deformations
D1 Remaining settlements Weak subsoil
D2 Local settlements Peat trenches
D3 Transition track - object (fixed point) Fixed point incidents
27
Risk Priority Number (RPN)
• RPN = reveals the overall risk of a particular
failure mode occurring in the system
• After ranking occurrence, severity and
detectability, RPN is calculated:
RPN = O x S x D
• Categorization of failure modes is now possible
• Highest RPN  Highest priority for preventive
maintenance
28
Step 1: Probability of occurrence
• Probability of failure occurrence based on historical data –
FFD = failure frequency distribution
• Occurrence = assigned value that designates how frequently
that particular failure mode occurs over a time period
• Failure occurrence ranking:

Rating Meaning Range (%)


1 No effect FFD = 0
2 Low (few Failure) 0 < FFD < 5
3 Moderate (occasional Failure) 5 < FFD < 10
4 High (Repeated Failure) 10 < FFD < 20
5 Very high FFD > 20
29
Occurence
Failure No of Frequency
mode occurrence (%) O value
A1 4 13,79 4
• Duration of observation was
A2 1 3,45 2 only 1 year
A3 6 20,69 5 • Only local effects
A4 0 0 1
(immediate effects) are
B1 1 3,45 2
B2 1 3,45 2
stored in the database
B3 1 3,45 2 • Other parameters (than
C1 0 0 1 weather conditions) are not
C2 1 3,45 2
taken into account
D1 7 24,14 5
D2 2 6,89 3 • Cumulative effects and
D3 4 13,79 4 post-effects (deformations)
E 1 3,45 2 could not be detected
29 100,00

30
Occurence of failures
30

25

20
frequency (%)

15

10

31
Step 2: Severity
• Severity = assigned value that indicates the severity of the
effect of a particular failure mode
• Failure effect is defined as the result of a failure mode on the
function of the system
• Failure severity ranking:
Rating Effect Meaning
1 No effect No effect
2 Very minor No immediate effect. Affects system in long period
3 Minor Affects little of system. Bad effects on other components
4 Moderate Causes a less primary function
5 High Causes a loss of primary function
6 Very high Results unsafe operation and possible injuries
32
Step 3: Detection
• Detection = assigned value that indicates how often that
particular mode can be detected
• Assigned detection number measures the risk that the failure will escape
detection (high detection number indicates that the chances are high that
the failure will escape detection or the chances of detection are low)
• Failure detection ranking:
Rating Meaning
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low

33
Risk Priority Number
Occurrence Severity
Risk Failure mode rate rate Detection rate RPN

Transition track - object


(fixed point) Fixed point incidents 4 6 2 48

Remaining settlements Weak subsoil 5 3 3 45

Groundwater level Drainage 5 4 2 40

Extreme precipitation Rail under water 2 6 3 36

Local settlements Peat trenches 3 3 3 27

Bathtub / drainage Track softening 4 5 1 20

Steep slopes > 1:1 Slope stability 2 4 2 16

Very weak subsoil Track stability 2 3 2 12

Sand slope - leaching Sand leaching 2 3 2 12

Track reconstruction Softening, weakening 2 4 1 8

High water river and High water and high


streams flow velocities 0 6 1 0
Weak subsoil Peat subsoil 0 3 3 0
34
Risk matrix
Severity
1 2 3 4 5 6
Likelihood No effect Very minor Minor Moderate High Very high

5 - almost certain Medium Medium High Extreme Extreme Extreme

4 - likely Low Medium Medium High Extreme Extreme

3 - possible Low Medium Medium High High High

2 - unlikely Low Low Medium Medium Medium High

1 - rare Low Low Low Low Low Medium

35
Adaptation strategies
• Based on risk priorities adaptation strategies
are being developed
• Mitigation measures:
– condition monitoring
– improve drainage
– use pumping systems
– strengthening substructure
– flood gates
– etc.
36
Conclusions
• Improvement of the data collection about the
failures of the railway performance
• Database should be in accordance with the
final objective – development of maintenance
and / or adaptation measures
• Only local effects are stored – there are often
effects on other components (next level
effects) and long-term effects
• Calibration of any modelling is necessary!
37
CONSLUCIONS
• Infrastructure managers need quick answers
which are very difficult to be given without
clear image what has happened in the past
• Adaptation strategies involve also human
mind-set adaptation
• This winter strategy was to decrease the traffic
intensity – people were prepared and
accepted that very well!

38
Thank you very much for your
attention!
i.stipanovic@utwente.nl

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