No First Use' - India's Nuclear Doctrine

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‘No First Use’ - India’s

Nuclear Doctrine

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‘No First Use’ - India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Defence Minister recently argued that India's adherence to the principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons
is not unconditional and depends on circumstances.

Nuclear Doctrine
• A nuclear doctrine states how a nuclear weapon state would employ its nuclear weapons both during
peace and war.
• By communicating to the enemy its stated intentions and resolve, nuclear doctrines help states to
establish deterrence vis-à-vis its adversary during peace and once deterrence fails, guides the state’s
response during war.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine


• After the 1998 nuclear test when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state, it also enunciated a
doctrine of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons.
• It was the security environment in the neighbourhood coupled with the pressure brought by the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty forced India to adopt the no-first-use posture.
• India categorically rejected the idea of initiating the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict scenario.
• India’s nuclear doctrine was purely retaliatory in nature. It would avail the nuclear option only in
case it was attacked first.
• However, the doctrine made it clear that India’s nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive
and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
• Also, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or
chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.
• Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the
Nuclear Command Authority.
• The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council.
The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister.
• India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
• India would continue to put strict controls on the export of nuclear and missile related materials
and technologies, participate in the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty negotiations, and continue to
observe the moratorium on nuclear tests.
Since then, for almost two decades, ‘no first use’ has remained a core organizing principle of India’s nuclear
deterrence.
Lately, however, the sanctity of 'no first use' has been called into question not only by strategic analysts but
also high-ranking government officials.

Arguments in Favor of Revocation of the NFU


• It allows Pakistan to take the initiative while restricting India’s options given Pakistan’s low nuclear
thresholds and its policy of using its nuclear umbrella to foment sub-conventional conflict
• Militarily, ‘no first use’ puts India in a disadvantageous position.
• India may have to resort to first use in case it has definitive information on its adversaires intent to
launch first.

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• It can be in favour of India if India tries to review its NFU policy as Pakistan will fear India more
and will refrain from terrorist and secessionist activities in India.
• Given the increasing asymmetry of conventional military power between the India & China, India
should revoke its “no first use’ policy.
• Where India fails to deter China conventionally, it should leverage its nuclear capability.
• NFU policy of India has helped to promote peace in the region in the last decade but it has outlived its
expected time period.

Arguments Against Revocation of NFU


• India’s image as a responsible nuclear power is central to its nuclear diplomacy. Nuclear restraint has
allowed India to get accepted in the global mainstream. It has been accepted in the global nuclear
order and is now a member of most of the technology denial regimes such as the Missile Technology
Control regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
• India is also actively pursuing full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Revoking
the ‘no first use’ pledge would harm India’s nuclear image worldwide.
• Reconsidering NFU policy will affect India’s relationship with neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bhutan as they will start fearing India. They can also go closer to China.
• Nuclear preemption is a costly policy as it requires massive investment not only in weapons and
delivery systems but also intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure.
• If India does opt for first use of nuclear weapons and given that it has two nuclear adversaries,
it would require a far bigger inventory of nuclear weapons.
• Similarly, first use of nuclear weapons would require a massive increase in India’s nuclear delivery
capabilities.
• India is yet to induct the Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) technology in its missiles, which is
fundamental to eliminating hardened nuclear targets.
• India would have to alter significantly its nuclear alerting routine. India’s operational plans for its
nuclear forces involve a four-stage process.
. Nuclear alerting would start at the first hints of a crisis where decision-makers foresee
possible military escalation. This would entail assembly of nuclear warheads and trigger
mechanisms into nuclear weapons.
i. The second stage involves dispersal of weapons and delivery systems to predetermined
launch positions.
ii. The third stage would involve mating of weapons with delivery platforms.
iii. The last and final stage devolves control of nuclear weapons from the scientific enclave to
the military for their eventual use.
• Change in the nuclear policy could upset India’s relations with countries in the West, especially the
U.S. Also, it can adversely affect India’s civil nuclear agreements with various countries including
Japan.

All doctrines need periodic reviews and India’s case is no exception. But, Indian policymakers should
review the nation’s nuclear doctrine, being cognizant of the costs involved in doing so. A sound policy
debate can only ensue if the costs and benefits of a purported policy shift are discussed and debated widely.

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