State of Gujarat vs. DHIRUBHAI RAVATBHAI DHRANGA

C/SCA/16935/2015 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16935 of 2015
With
With
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
==========================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to YES

see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the NO

judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law NO

as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?
==========================================================
STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
DHIRUBHAI RAVATBHAI DHRANGA & 1 other(s)
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR NIKUNJ KANARA, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER(1) for the
Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS ASHLESHA M PATEL(6127) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED(64) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
Date : 10/01/2020
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. All the petitions since involve identical
questions of law and facts, they are being
decided by this common judgment & order, where
the facts are drawn from Special Civil
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Application No.9523 of 2015 for the purpose of
adjudication.
Brief facts:
2. The petitionerState seeks to challenge the
legality & validity of the judgment and award
dated 15.12.2014 passed in Reference (LCR) No.126
of 2007 by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, Rajkot, whereby the Court has granted the
reinstatement to the workman without back wages
along with the continuity of service within a
period of 30 days.
2.1 The respondentworkman was engaged with the
petitioner department on daily wages between
01.11.1995 to 30.10.1999. Alleging the breach of
Sections 25 F, 25 G & 25 H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (“the I.D.Act” hereinafter),
the respondent approached the Assistant Labour
Commissioner, Rajkot, which then referred the
matter to the Labour Court and accordingly the
Reference No.126 of 2007 came to be lodged. The
statement of claim had been presented by the
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respondent, which had been replied to by the
written statement emphasising that the the
respondent had been engaged on a daily waged
basis. The Labour Court allowed both the sides to
adduce the evidence and eventually, granted the
relief as mentioned hereinabove.
2.2 The challenge is made by the State
essentially on the ground that the judgment and
award is illegal and erroneous as well as
perverse. It has been given without taking into
account the oral as well as documentary evidence.
The respondentworkman was temporarily engaged as
a part time employee by the petitioner for the
period between 01.11.1995 to 30.10.1999 and he
has worked only for 03 hours. He has not even
completed 240 days in any of the preceding years
and therefore, the relief granted by the Court is
impermissible. There are no sanctioned post
moreover, the engagement of the employee was
contrary to the well laid down law on the
subject. Accordingly, the prayers sought for are
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as follow:
“8...
(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow
this petition;
(B) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of

certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, direction or
order for quashing and setting aside the impugned
judgment and award dated 15.12.2014 passed in
Reference (L.C.R.) No.126 of 2007 and by the Learned
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rajkot, in the interest of
justice;
(C) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present
petition, Your Lordship may be pleased to stay the
implementation, execution and operation of the
impugned judgment and award dated 15.12.2014 passed
in Reference (LCR) No.126 of 2007 by the Learned
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rajkot, in the interest of
justice;
(D) Such other and further relief as may be just,

expedient and proper in the interest of justice.”
3. Affidavitinreply of respondent No.1 denying
all the averments is to an effect that no
interference is desirable. He has worked between
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01.11.1995 to 31.10.1999 as a daily wager at the
Dam site. The delay of 09 years which has been
raised as one of the disputes has also been
answered in various matters. It is also the say
of the respondent that the petitioner had been
directed to produce the muster roll, salary
vouchers and all other relevant materials.
However, it has failed to produce the same and
therefore, at this stage, no new case can be made
out. It is also the say of the respondent that
the adverse inference needs to be drawn against
the employer in whose custody all the documents
are lying and yet, has failed to produce the
same. The workman has already explained the delay
of 09 years in approaching the Labour Court,
which also has been regarded by the Labour Court
and has awarded the continuity without back
wages. The case of the respondent is covered by
the decision of this Court in Special Civil
Application No.20706 of 2018 and other matters.
4. Affidavitinrejoinder is filed by the Deputy
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Executive Engineer, who has not admitted any of
the content of the affidavitinreply. It has
also further stated that he has worked only for a
span of 45 days and has raised the industrial
dispute after a gross delay of 09 years. The
petitioner has also furnished the necessary
details qua the numbers of the day on which the
respondentworkman was present. The Labour Court
passed an order granting reinstatement with
continuity of service, where it ought to have
considered that the period of his working was
merely of 45 days. The gross delay has also
remained unexplained, which has not been dealt
with at all by the court concerned. What has been
explained by the workman that he was not aware of
the legal remedies, and only when he came to know
about the similarly situated workmen residing in
the village getting the favourable orders and
judgments, he filed the impugned proceedings,
which hardly could be the ground to be held
sustainable. Moreover, even for substantiating
this ground nothing has come forth on the record,
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thus it is urged that the Reference is barred by
limitation.
4.1 In relation to the nonproduction of the
documents pertaining to the attendance, it has
been stated that the respondentworkman was
provided with the details of the days for which
he remained present. According to the respondent
workman, each matter will have to be considered
on its own strength & no generalised law can
apply.
Oral Submissions:
5. This Court has heard both the sides
extensively. Learned Assistant Government
Pleader, Mr.Nikunj Kanara, has emphatically
submitted to this Court that the delay of 09
years is a huge delay, which ought not to have
been condoned by the Court below. He has further
submitted that if the person has worked as a
daily wager only for a short period of 45 days in
three years, at the best, the trial Court could
have granted the lumpsum compensation, but, grant
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of reinstatement with continuity of service is
hardly an answer to the issue raised before it.
He has also urged that the engagement of the
workman was for the purpose of the Dam site and
that too, without following the procedure which
has been well laid down for recruitment. The case
of Umadevi vs. Union of India and those which are
followed thereafter, very clearly directed the
authority not to overreach the process by
engaging someone without following the due
process.
5.1 According to the learned Assistant Government
Pleader, permitting any relief to the respondent
would tantamount to defeat the rights of many. He
has further urged that the delay of 09 years is
not at all explained and the explanation which
come forth is not sustainable.
5.2 Reliance is placed on the following
decisions by the learned Assistant Government
Pleader to substantiate his oral version:
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(1) RASHTRASANT TUKDOJI MAHARAJ TECHNICAL
EDUCATION SANSTHA, NAGPUR VS. PRASHANT MANIKRAO
KUBITKAR, reported in AIR 2017 SCC 2482
(2) STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR VS. R.K.ZALPURI
AND OTHERS, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 602
6. Per contra, learned advocate, Ms.Ashlesha
Patel has fervently urged this Court that the
delay has been well explained by the respondent.
The respondentworkmen hails from the kind of
socioeconomic background, where they would not be
aware of the remedies under the law. She has also
urged that the delay of 09 years has been not
only been sufficiently explained, but also has
been accepted by the Labour Court at the time of
adjudicating the disputes of the parties. She has
further urged that this Court in Special Civil
Application No.20706 of 2018 and other matters
has allowed the gross delay when it found the
satisfactory explanation. She has further
requested that as far as possible in a petition
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under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, the Court needs to interfere when the
judgment and award is reflecting perversity or
gross illegality. Heavy reliance is placed on the
various decisions to urge that any new case if is
made out at the time of approaching this Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, the Court need not regard the same. It is
lamented that though directed by the trial Court
to the petitioner, the petitionerauthority has
chosen not to adduce necessary material before
the Labour Court, which could have been regarded
at the relevant point of time & that itself
should be the ground not to believe the version
of the petitioner. It has already misused the
opportunity to adduce the same at an appropriate
juncture.
7. Having thus heard the learned advocates on
both the sides, at the outset, the decisions
sought to be relied upon by the parties deserve
consideration for the purpose of adjudication.
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Scope of Judicial Review:
8. Firstly, taking up the scope of judicial
review, decision in case of ISWARLAL MOHANLAL
THAKKAR VS. PASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LIMITED
AND ANOTHER, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 shall
need consideration. The Apex Court while
considering the scope of judicial review under
Articles 226& 227 of the Constitution of India
with reference to the interference with the
findings of the Labour Court/Tribunal, has held
that only in case of error of jurisdiction or
serious error of law apparent on record or
judgment not based on the evidence, the High
Court would have jurisdiction, otherwise, it is
not for this Court to re appreciate the evidence
to form its own view and record findings on
contentious issues. In a matter before the Apex
Court, it found that the Labour Court's award was
based on proper appreciation of evidence and
cogent reasons. Relevant findings and
observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are
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reproduced as under:
“15. . We find the judgment and award of the labour

court wellreasoned and based on facts and evidence on
record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul
the findings of the labour court in its Award as it is well
settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power
under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate
court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on
the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of
law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent
on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower
court. The Labour Court in the present case has
satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and
properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on
record and given a well reasoned order and answered the
points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High
Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the
Award of the labour court was based on sound and
cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.
16. It is relevant to mention that in the case of Shalini
Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil[1], with
regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49
that
“The power of interference under Art.227 is to be
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kept to a minimum to ensure that the wheel of

justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of
justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to
maintain public confidence in the functioning of the
tribunals and courts subordinate to the High
Court.” It was also held that
“High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise
of its power of superintendence under Art.227 of the
Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals
or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this
power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the
court or tribunal subordinate to it.”
Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise
its power under Article 227 of the Constitution
judiciously and to further the ends of justice.
17. In the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State

Warehousing Corporation[2], this Court held that,
“20……In view of the above discussion, we hold that the
learned Single Judge of the High Court committed
serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered
with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour
Court with compensation of Rs.87,582 by entertaining a
wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed
in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and
the Regulation.”
18. The power of judicial review of the High Court has
to be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High
Court has erred in setting aside the judgment and order
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of the labour court. In the case of Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. v. State of UP & Ors.[3], this Court referred to the
position held on the power of judicial review in the case
of Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland[4], wherein it is
stated that :
“...Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal
validity of the decision. It does not allow the court of
review to examine the evidence with a view to
forming its own view about the substantial merits of
the case. It may be that the tribunal whose decision
is being challenged has done something which it
had no lawful authority to do. It may have abused
or misused the authority which it had. It may have
departed from the procedures which either by
statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it
ought to have observed.
As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be

perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what
was required. Or the decision may be found to be
erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example,
through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence,
to support it, or through account being taken of
irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to
take account of a relevant matter, or through some
misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision
which the decision maker is required to apply. But while
the evidence may have to be explored in order to see if the
decision is vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is
perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an
ordinary appeal, the court may not set about forming its
own preferred view of evidence.”
9. In case of SYED YAKOOB VS. K.S.RADHAKRISHNAN
& OTHERS, reported in AIR (1964) 477, the Apex
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Court held that the writ of certiorari was issued
for correcting the errors of jurisdiction
committed by the courts or tribunals, in cases
where the trial Court exceeds its jurisdiction or
fail to exercise it or exercise it illegally or
improperly, i.e. where an order is passed without
hearing the party sought to be affected by it or
where the procedure adopted is opposed to the
principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory one and in exercising it, the
court is not entitled to act as a court of
appeal. That necessarily means that the findings
of fact arrived at by the inferior court or
tribunal arc binding. An error of law apparent on
the face of the record can, however, be corrected
by a writ of certiorari, but not an error of fact
however grave it may appear to be.
10. The Apex Court in case of R.M.YELLATI VS.
THE ASST. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER has also reiterated
the very mandate, where the Court held that it is
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trite that th High Court while exercising the
powers of judicial review would not interfere
with the discretion of the tribunal, unless the
same is found to be illegal and irrational.
10.1 Considering the ratio in these
decisions, they very clearly lay down the law as
to how the Court in its jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 shall need to act. It is
made clear that this being a supervisory
jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction
unless the error of law is apparent and there is
outright illegality noticed in the judgment of
the tribunal or the Labour Court or when the
trial court acts without jurisdiction, the power
of judicial review is not to be exercised. These
powers are to be exercised judiciously and to
meet with the ends of justice very sparingly and
curiously.
Issue of Limitation:

11. This issue has been pressed into service by
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the petitioner emphatically relying essentially
on the judgment in a case of AJAIB SINGH VS.
SIRHIND COOP.MARKETINGCUMPROCESSING SERVICE
SOCIETY LTD AND ANR where the service of the
appellant workman was terminated by the
respondentmanagement allegedly without
compliance of the mandatory provisions. The
dispute regarding his termination of services was
referred to the Labour Court by the appropriate
government. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court
to entertain and adjudicate the reference was
also disputed. Not pleaded with the award of the
Labour Court, the management filed a writ
petition in the High Court praying for quashment
of the award of the Labour Court mainly on the
ground of the workman approached the court for
the grant of the relief after a prolonged delay.
12. The learned Single Judge held that the
workman was not entitled to any relief as he was
allegedly shown to have slept over the matter for
7 years and confronted with the management at a
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belated stage when it could be difficult for the
employer to prove the guilt of the workman. This
had been upheld by the Division Bench in the
Appeal.
12.1 When challenged before the Apex Court,
the Court noticed that it is not in dispute that
the service of the respondent was terminated on
16.7.1974 and he had issued the notice of demand
only on 08.12.1981. No plea regarding delay
appeared to have been taken by the management
before the Labour Court. The Apex Court also
acknowledged that Article 137 of the Limitation
Act has not been specifically made applicable to
the proceedings under the Act seeking reference
of industrial disputes to the Labour Court. The
Apex Court, in no case, has so far held that
either Article 137 of the Limitation Act or the
principle incorporated therein is applicable to
the proceedings under the Act. The Court also had
considered as to under what circumstances the act
was enacted and what was the objectives sought to
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be achieved by the said legislation. It held that
the object is to ensure social justice to both
the employers and employees and advance the
progress of industry by bringing about the
existence of harmony and cordial relationship
between the patties. It is a piece of legislation
providing and regulating the service conditions
of the workers and the object of the Act is to
improve the service conditions of industrial
labour so as to provide for them the ordinary
amenities of life. Again, by the process, the
object is to bring about industrial peace which
would in its turn accelerate productive activity
of the country resulting in its prosperity. The
object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour
to weaker sections of the society which is a pre
requisite for a welfare State. To ensure
industrial peace and preempt industrial tension,
the Act further aims at “enhancing the industrial
production which is acknowledged to be lifeblood of a
developing society. The Act provides a machinery for
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investigation and settlement of industrial disputes ignoring the
legal technicalities with a view to avoid delays, by specially
authorised courts which are not supposed to deny the relief on
account of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates
realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation and
adjudication as per the need of the society keeping in view the
fast changing social norms of the developing country like
India...” The Apex Court, therefore, held that the
provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
1963 would not be applicable to the proceedings
under the Act and the relief under it cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the
employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a
merely hypothetical defence. The Court has held
that no reference to the Labour Court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay
alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to
be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board,
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dealing with the case can appropriately mould the
relief by declining to grant back wages to the
workman till the date he raised the demand
regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or
dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate
cases direct the payment of part of the back
wages instead of full back wages. The Court
upheld the award of the Labour Court with
modification.
13. In another decision of the Apex Court
rendered in case of SHAHAJI VS EXECUTIVE
ENGINEER, P.W.D.,reported in (2005) 12 SCC 141
was also on the ground of the delay in making the
reference by the appropriate Government after
several years. Reliance is placed on the decision
of Ajeb Sings (supra).
14. In the matter before the Apex Court there was
no ground of delay urged by the management. The
Court after referring to the decision of Ajeb
Sings (supra) has held that even if there was a
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delay in making the reference to the Labour Court
if it came to the conclusion that the termination
was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the
relief to be granted to the workman in view of
the delay.
15. In case of S.M.NILAJKAR AND ORS VS. TELECOM,
DISTRICT MANAGER, the number of workers were
engaged as casual labourers for the purpose of
expansion of telecom facilities in the District
of Belgaum during the years 198586 and 198687.
The services of these workers were utilized for
digging, laying cables, erecting poles drawing
lines and other connected works and thereafter
services of these workmen were terminated
sometime during the year 1987. Several disputes
were referred for adjudication to the Labour
Court as to whether the termination of the
services of Casual Labourers by the Management of
Telecom District Manager, Belgaum is justified or
not? The Court was also required to answer the
delay in raising the dispute.
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15.1 The Apex Court held that as held in
Shalimar works Limited v. Their Workmen that
merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does
not provide for any period of limitation for
raising the dispute, it does not mean that the
dispute can be raised at any time without regard
to the delay and reasons therefore. There is no
limitation prescribed for reference of disputes
to an industrial tribunal; even so, it is only
reasonable that the disputes should be referred
as soon as possible after they have arisen and
after conciliation proceedings have failed,
particularly so, when disputes relate to
discharge of workmen in wholesale.
15.2 The Court noticed that in Shalimar works
Limited v. Their Workmen delay was of 4 years in
raising the dispute & that too, after even re
employment of the most of the old workmen & that
had been was held to be fatal.
16. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P.
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Madhavankutty and Ors. (supra), delay of 7 years
was held to be fatal and court disentitled the
workmen to any relief.
17. In Ratan chandra Sammanta and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors. (supra), it was held that
a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by
delay itself; lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would
certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and
rendered not available. However, in the matter
before the Apex Court, it did not think that the
delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as
to disentitle the appellants for any relief. The
High Court though has opined that there was a
delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute
before the Tribunal, but factually the Court
found that not correct. The proceedings had been
initiated under the I.D.Act and the Court did not
find it proper to nonsuit the workman on the
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ground of delay without giving the relief of back
wages, it directed the appellant to be
reinstated.
18. This Court in Special Civil Application
No.20706 of 2018, where the ground of delay had
been raised by the employer has not sustained
such a plea and has allowed the petition relying
on the various decisions of the Apex Court.
19. In yet another decision rendered in case
of STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR VS. R.K.ZALPURI AND
OTHERS, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 602, the Apex
Court noticed that the respondent was dismissed
from service in the year 1999 and he chose not to
avail any departmental remedy and approached the
High Court after a lapse of 05 years. The Court
held that the doctrine of delay and latches had
already visited his claim and the claim should
not be adjudicated unless the same causes grave
injustice.
19.1 Relevant findings and observations are
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reproduced as under:
“20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from

City and Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu
Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and Others, wherein this Court while
dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
has expressed thus:-
“30.The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226

is duty- bound to consider whether:
(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex
and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be
satisfactorily resolved;
(b) the petition reveals all material facts;
(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective
remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of
unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by
any valid law; and host of other factors.”
21. In this regard reference to a passage from

Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd Through its Chairman &
Managing Director & Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr
would be apposite:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may
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refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party”.
After so stating the Court after referring to the authority
in State of M.P. v. Nandalal Jaiswal[8] restated the
principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is
to the following effect:
“9...the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay
on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and
if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay,
it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third
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party rights in the meantime is an important factor

which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction”.
22. In State of Maharashtra V Digambar[9] a three

judge bench laid down that:
“19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under

Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its
exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no
controversy. It is for that reason, a person’s entitlement
for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even
if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal
right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy
conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses
to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise
of such power, when he approaches it with unclean
hands or blameworthy conduct.”
23. Recently in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply
and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu[10], it
has been ruled thus: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and
laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court
is required to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind
that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to
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protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is
to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an
aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches
the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would
be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at
a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted,
delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in
most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of
a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms,
namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and
second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a
phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to
the lis”.
24. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the

question of delay and laches in all kinds of cases would
not curb or curtail the power of writ court to exercise the
discretion. In Tukaram Kana Joshi And Ors. Vs.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation &
Ors[11] it has been ruled that:
“12...Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion
to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is
another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial
discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and
Page 29 of 53

circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the
facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute
impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity
of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks
the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the
discretion more so, when no thirdparty interest is
involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the
doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a
constitutional limitation, the cause of action is
continuous and further the situation certainly shocks
judicial conscience”.
And again:
“14. No hardandfast rule can be laid down as to when
the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction
in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay
and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be
exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that
the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable,
delay should be condoned. In other words, where
circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality
which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole
ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other
side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice
being done, because of a nondeliberate delay. The court
should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in
Page 30 of 53

fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports, Collector (LA) v. Katiji, Dehri Rohtas Light
Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, Dayal
Singh v. Union of India and Shankara Coop. Housing
Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar.
25. Be it stated, in the said case the appellants were

deprived of the legitimate dues for decades and the
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation had
handed over the possession of the property belonging to
the appellant to the City Industrial Development
Corporation of Maharashtra without any kind of
acquisition and grant of compensation. This court
granted relief reversing the decision of the High Court
which had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of
delay and nonavailability of certain documents.
Therefore, it is clear that the principle of delay and
laches would not affect the grant of relief in all types of
cases.
26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed
from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail
any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber
to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of
five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and
Page 31 of 53

it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by
the writ court.
27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not
deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay
and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of
death which does not spare anyone even the one who
fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can
sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “Deo
gratias” – ‘thanks to God’.
28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while
deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the
nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the
part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be
adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave
injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did
not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown
overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner
had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and
cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and
forever remain in the realm of constant present.
20. Reliance is also placed by the State on
the decision of the Apex Court rendered in case
of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director Sericulture
Department and ors., reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1.
Page 32 of 53

The reference was of belated industrial dispute
by appropriate Government. The Apex Court held
that the policy of industrial adjudication is to
be kept in mind which is that the very stale
claim should not be generally encouraged or
allowed in as much as unless there is
satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from
the obvious risk to industrial peace from the
entertainment of claim after long laps of time,
it is necessary also to take into account the
unsettling effect which it is likely to have on
the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid
dislocation of an industry. The Apex Court held
that it is a well recognized principle of
jurisprudence that the right not exercised for
the long time is nonexistent. Even where no
limitation period is prescribed by statute,
Courts apply doctrine of delay/ latches/
acquiescence and nonsuit litigants who approach
court belatedly without justifiable explanation.
The doctrine of laches has its applicability in
the maxim of equity that delay defeats equities.
Page 33 of 53

The Court can refuse the relief even when the
petitioner approaches the Court within a period
of limitation where delay on petitioner's part
prejudices respondent. In the matter before the
Apex Court, the petitionerclerk was terminated
in the year 1985. From 1985 to 1999, he did not
approach any judicial/quasi judicial authority
challenging the termination. In somewhere in the
year 1999, he approached the appropriate
Government alleging the illegal termination of
his services in violation of Section 25F of the
I.D.Act and the matter was referred to the Labour
Court which found the termination invalid and
reinstated without back wages. When the petition
was preferred by the Management against the
award, which was dismissed, the Division Bench
allowed the Letters Patent Appeal preferred
against the judgment of the learned single judge,
which was challenged by way of an SLP before the
Apex Court.
20.1 The Apex Court dismissed the SLP by
Page 34 of 53

holding that for a period of fourteen years no
grievance was made by the petitioner qua his
alleged termination. The petitioner explained
that he approached the Management time and again
and was given assurance that he would be taken
back in service. Finding nothing on record to
substantiate the plea, that explanation was also
not accepted by the Labour Court, which had given
emphasised on the facts that the dispute was
raised after a delay of fourteen years. The Court
held that when the appropriate Government makes a
Reference of an industrial dispute for
adjudication, it does not decide any question of
facts or law. It also further held that the law
of limitation does not apply to the proceedings
under the I.D.Act and under the I.D.Act no period
of limitation is prescribed. In some of the
decisions where the reference was made belatedly
and after a lapse of considerable period, the
Court did not set aside the reference, but
moulded the relief by denying back wages fully or
partially, or else granted compensation denying
Page 35 of 53

the reinstatement. The Apex Court held that under
Section 10 of the I.D.Act, the words “at any
time” used in Section 10 would support that there
is no period of limitation in making the
reference at the same time, the appropriate
Government has to keep in mind as to whether the
dispute is still existing or is it a live dispute
and has not become a stale claim and if that is
so, the reference can be refused. Whether the
dispute is alive or it has become stale/non
existent at the time when the workman approaches
the appropriate Government is an aspect which
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case and there cannot be any hardandfast
rule regarding the time for making the order of
reference. The Apex Court held that the words “at
any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of
any limitation in making the order of reference
and the laws of limitation are not applicable to
the proceedings under the I.D.Act, the policy of
industrial adjudication is that the very stale
claims should not be generally encouraged or
Page 36 of 53

allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory
explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious
risk to industrial peace from the entertainment
of claim after long lapse of time, it is
necessary also to take into account the
unsettling effect which it is likely to have on
the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid
dislocation of an industry. In those matters, as
per the say of the Apex Court when it is found
that the dispute still existed, though raised
belatedly, it is always permissible for the Court
to take the aspect of delay into consideration
and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still
open for the Court to either grant reinstatement
without back wages or lesser back wages or grant
compensation instead of reinstatement.The law on
this aspect needs to be applied.
20.2 Relevant findings and observations are
reproduced herein under:
“41. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is
prescribed within which the action is to be brought before
Page 37 of 53

the Court, if the action is not brought within that

prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and
cannot enforce his legal right after the period of
limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no
limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the
aggrieved party does not approach the machinery
provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it
can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground
of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the
presumption that such person has waived his right or
acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above,
these principles as part of equity are based on principles
relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not
exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non
existent.
42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we

summaries the legal position as under:
42.1 An industrial dispute has to be referred by the

appropriate Government for adjudication and the
workman cannot approach the Labour Court or
Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which
are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made
under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the
appropriate Government forms an opinion that “any
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended”. The words
Page 38 of 53

“industrial dispute exists” are of paramount importance,
unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or
the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a
dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be
made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial
dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No
doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a
reference is to be made or not, the appropriate
Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute.
Making of reference is only an administrative function.
At the same time,on the basis of material on record,
satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or
the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary.
Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute,thus,
becomes a condition precedent,though it will be only
subjective satisfaction based on material on record.
Since,we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing
with cases where there is apprehended industrial
dispute, discussion that follows would confine to
existence of an industrial dispute.
42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party
makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It
is held by this Court in a number of cases that before
raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a
necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services
of a workman are terminated and he does not make the
Page 39 of 53

demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful

termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable
time and raises the same after considerable lapse of
period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute
still exists.
42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives
right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly.
However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it
has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists?
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation
does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that
there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to
demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed
and there are laches and delays, such delay has not
resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist.
Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory
explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate
that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive,
delay would not come in his way because of the reason
that law of limitation has no application. On the other
hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains
alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non
existent dispute which cannot be referred.
42.4 Take, for example, a case where the

workman issues notice after his termination, questioning
Page 40 of 53

the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is

able to show that there were discussion from time to time
and the parties were trying to sort out the matter
amicably. Or he is able to show that there were
assurances by the Management to the effect that he
would be taken back in service and because of these
reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by
approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or
did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act.
In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was
live and existing as the workman never abandoned his
right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of
demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive
response or there was specific rejection by the
Management of his demand contained in the notice and
thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years,
it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his
termination and rejection thereof by the Management
and acquiesced into the said rejection.
42.5 Take another example. A workman

approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his
termination which was pending for a number of years
and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the
civil court did no have jurisdiction to enforce the contract
of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement.
At that stage,when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws
Page 41 of 53

that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act,
it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive
as the workman had not accepted the termination but
was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum.
42.6 In contract, in those cases where there was
no agitation by the workman against his termination
and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or
laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he
had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of
termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute
is raised it had become stale and was not an “existing
dispute”. In such circumstances, the appropriate
Government can refuse to make reference. In the
alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also
hold that there is no industrial dispute” within the
meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief
can be granted.
43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where
the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised
belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take
the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the
relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either
grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back
wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement.
We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be
Page 42 of 53

applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters.
44. To summarise, although there is no limitation

prescribed under the Act for making a reference under
Section 10(1) of the I.D.Act, yet it is for the “appropriate
Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to
make the reference. The words “at any time” used in
Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making
an order of refrerence and laws oflimitation are not
applicable to proceedings under the I.D.Act. However, the
policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims
should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch
as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as,
apart from obvious risk to industiral peace from the
entertainment of claims after long lapse of time,it is
necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect
which it is likely to have on the employers' financial
arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry.”
21. In yet another matter before the Apex
Court in case of Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj
Technical Education Sanstha, Nagpur vs. Prashant
Manikrao Kubitkar, reported in AIR(2017)SC 2482,
the Labour Court held the termination of the
respondent workman to be in infraction of Section
25F and 25G of the I.D.Act and awarded
Page 43 of 53

reinstatement with continuity of service, but,
without back wages. The Apex Court noticed that
the award of the Labour Court of reinstatement
was after 13 years of the termination. The High
Court in writ petition filed by the appellant
affirmed the said order. When Appeal was made
before the Apex Court, it deemed it appropriate
to modify the relief by granting compensation of
Rs.1 Lakh in lieu of reinstatment without back
wages.
22. Worthwhile here is to refer to the
decision of this Court in Special Civil
Application No.16345 of 2011, which has been
heavily relied upon by the learned advocate for
the respondent, wherein the Labour Court had
directed the petitioner to be reinstated and such
conclusion had not been found faulty nor was it
interfered with by this Court. When the request
was made moulding the relief and award the
compensation in lieu of the reinstatement,
instead of directing the reinstatement of the
Page 44 of 53

workman, the Court held that such plea was not
raised before the Labour Court and if the Court
did not consider the said alternative option it
is difficult to find the fault with the decision
of the Labour Court.
23. It is thus quite clear from the various
decisions which has been discussed on the aspect
of delay that if explained satisfactorily, the
Court can act upon it and the Reference when is
found valid the delay per se cannot be the ground
for rejection of the Reference by the Labour
Court. It is also to be noted that the care needs
to be taken by the Assistant Labour Commissioner
or the authorised officer of the office of Labour
Commissioner while examining the dispute before
it as to whether to make the Reference and while
so doing it, it will have to consider not only
the delay per se, but whether the claim is still
alive and it has not become a stale claim.
24. So far as the issue of the delay is
concerned, the Labour Court as well as this Court
Page 45 of 53

merely on the count of delay cannot deny the
relief, if it is well explained and the Court is
satisfied on the strength of the pleadings as
well as substantiating material that the claim is
alive and has not come stale. Ordinarily, it is
not for this Court to entertain belated claims
and prejudice the rights of opposite parties and
indolent as well as lethargic attitude and
negligent approach are not to be encouraged. However,
in absence of any prescribed period of limitation,
the Court concerned shall regard factual matrix,
apply law and if needed, suitably mould the reliefs
to do the complete justice. In the matter on the
hands, there has been a delay of 09 years. This Court
notices that the explanation which has been given by
the petitioner is that they are illiterate and having
the restricted social interaction and considering their
socio economic background were unaware of the
development in the filed. Other workmen and the
labourers from the village since had preferred
the dispute and the Reference was made, they
also approached the authority under the Labour Law.
This has been considered as one of
Page 46 of 53

the issues by the Labour Court on a fallacious
ground has accepted that delay could not have
been made a ground by the respondent. It held
that the respondent did not adduce sufficient
evidence to substantiate this plea of delay. In
fact, there is a serious error committed by the
Labour Court here, it was when the delay is made
it is to be explained by the person who has
committed the delay and not the respondent. After
nine years the dispute was raised by the
respondent, obviously the petitioner would raise
the dispute of delay, but essentially the
explanation shall have to come forth from the
parties which commit the delay and not the
respondent. Although, it a trite law that the
ignorance of law is not an excuse. The fact still
remains that all the respondents are hailing from
the rural background and having no formal
education to their credit. They worked as
labourers and therefore, the nittygritty of law
if is not within their knowledge and the claim is
still alive, that explanation would still suffice
Page 47 of 53

for the Court to hold that it is a sufficient
explanation. The nine years of the delay could
not have come in their way as no law of
limitation would be applicable in case of the
industrial dispute. What all is required is their
satisfactory explanation and the claim to be not
stale. The respondents have been honest to say
that they did not know about the remedies and it
is only after some people from the very village
had raised the dispute that they have chosen to
approach the Labour Authority, which referred the
dispute to the Labour Court and the Reference was
sustained condoning the delay.
On Merits:
25. Going to the merit of the matters, this
Court notices that the application had been made
seeking the production of the documents like
muster roll, payment register and other necessary
details which would reflect the engaging of the
respondent as a labourer at the Dam site. It
appears that under the Right to Information Act,
Page 48 of 53

what had been provided to the respondents is a
details of their having worked from 1995 to 1999
for totally 45 days. Of course, the original
muster roll, the wage register have not come on
the record. Neither they have been supplied to
the respondents nor they have been produced by
the petitionerState before the Labour Court. The
deposition on the part of the one of the officers
is only in relation to the total numbers of the
engagement of these respondents as daily wager.
The Labour Court, therefore, had rightly held
that when the seniority list is not maintained,
the breach under Sections 25 G & H of the I.D.Act
has been held inevitable. This has been rightly
held to be the infraction of both Sections 25 G
and H. No interference, therefore, is necessary
as not only all the relevant material which was
in possession of the petitioner has been brought
on the record as is required of the petitioner
State as held in by the Apex Court in case of
DIRECTOR, FISHERIES TERMINAL DIVISION VS.
Page 49 of 53

BHIKUBHAI MEGHAJIBHAI CHAVDA where it has been a
mandate of the Apex Court that based on the
pleadings and evidence on record, the Court would
conclude in relation to the service of the
employees and also would decide as to whether the
juniors to the labourers whether should continue
after once having terminated their services. This
material is required to be adduced by the State.
The labourer would always have difficulty in
accessing to all the official documents, muster
rolls etc. in connection with his service. The
burden of proof would shift to the employer to
prove that he did not complete 240 days of
service in the requisite period to continue the
service and production of the document would
always be the responsibility if once initial
burden is discharged by the labourer.
26. Here also the petitioner has failed to
produce the complete record and muster roll
despite the direction of the Labour Court to
produce the same and therefore, there is no
Page 50 of 53

reason why the Court needs to interfere with the
findings of the Labour Court so far as the breach
of Sections 25G and 25H of the I.D.Act is
concerned.
27. The question therefore at the end that
arises for the Court's consideration is as to
whether to continue the relief of granting the
reinstatement with continuity without back wages
or whether the lumpsum compensation is the
solution to this, bearing in mind delayed claim
so also the law on the subject of suitably
moulding the reliefs. As discussed in detailed
hereinabove the Apex Court has been categorical
that in the event of acceptance of the
explanation of the delay which has been caused in
preferring the Reference, the Court shall have to
regard as to in what manner the relief can be
moulded. It could be also without the back wages,
reinstatement by way of lumpsum compensation.
27.1 In the instant case, the Reference (LCR)
No.5 of 1996 preferred by one Rambhai Raidhanbhai
Page 51 of 53

is brought to the notice of this Court where
there was no delay in taking recourse to the
authority of the Labour Court for the dispute
raised by the labourer. He was terminated on
01.01.1994 and soon thereafter within 90 days he
had raised the dispute leaving aside the aspect
of the delay also which even if considered to be
explained sufficiently for the Court to entertain
the Reference.
28. The Court also notices that in case of
all the three respondents, they have their own
agricultural land. One of them in the cross
examination had also admitted of having five
Bighas of land. According to the respondent
workman, since he was unable to get sufficient
produce, he has chosen to go as a labourer at the
Dam site. Without entering into the merit of that
aspect, suffice to note that these are the
labourers, who have their own agricultural land
in the very village, which is stipulated near the
Dam site. As their termination has been held to
Page 52 of 53

be illegal instead of endorsing the relief of
reinstatement with continuity of service, the
Court deems it appropriate to mould the relief of
granting lumpsum compensation to these persons as
per the decision of Prabhakar (supra) and
RASHTRASANT TUKDOJI MAHARAJ TECHNICAL EDUCATION
SANSTHA, NAGPUR (supra).
Operative Order:
29. Resultantly, all these petitions are
partly allowed. Each of the respondents shall be
paid the lumpsum compensation of the amount of
Rs.4 Lakh by the State within a period of 12
weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this
judgment. Direct Service is permitted.
Sd/-
(MS SONIA GOKANI, J)
M.M.MIRZA
Page 53 of 53

State of Gujarat vs. DHIRUBHAI RAVATBHAI DHRANGA

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State of Gujarat vs. DHIRUBHAI RAVATBHAI DHRANGA

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C/SCA/16935/2015 JUDGMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to YES

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES

3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the NO

4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law NO

1. All the petitions since involve identical

questions of law and facts, they are being

decided by this common judgment & order, where

the facts are drawn from Special Civil

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Application No.9523 of 2015 for the purpose of

2. The petitioner­State seeks to challenge the

legality & validity of the judgment and award

reinstatement to the workman without back wages

along with the continuity of service within a

2.1 The respondent­workman was engaged with the

petitioner department on daily wages between

Sections 25 F, 25 G & 25 H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (“the I.D.Act” hereinafter),

the respondent approached the Assistant Labour

Commissioner, Rajkot, which then referred the

matter to the Labour Court and accordingly the

statement of claim had been presented by the

Downloaded on : Mon Oct 03 16:37:01 IST 2022

respondent, which had been replied to by the

written statement emphasising that the the

respondent had been engaged on a daily waged

adduce the evidence and eventually, granted the

2.2 The challenge is made by the State

essentially on the ground that the judgment and

award is illegal and erroneous as well as

perverse. It has been given without taking into

a part time employee by the petitioner for the

period between 01.11.1995 to 30.10.1999 and he

has worked only for 03 hours. He has not even

impermissible. There are no sanctioned post

moreover, the engagement of the employee was

contrary to the well laid down law on the

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(B) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of

(D) Such other and further relief as may be just,

all the averments is to an effect that no

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Dam site. The delay of 09 years which has been

raised as one of the disputes has also been

of the respondent that the petitioner had been

directed to produce the muster roll, salary

vouchers and all other relevant materials.

However, it has failed to produce the same and

out. It is also the say of the respondent that

the adverse inference needs to be drawn against

the employer in whose custody all the documents

are lying and yet, has failed to produce the

of 09 years in approaching the Labour Court,

and has awarded the continuity without back

2. The petitionerState seeks to challenge the

2.1 The respondentworkman was engaged with the

the content of the affidavitinreply. It has

4.1 In relation to the nonproduction of the

been stated that the respondentworkman was

The respondentworkmen hails from the kind of

to the petitioner, the petitionerauthority has