SADCC and the Future of Southern African Regionalism

Author(s): Fadzai Gwaradzimba

Source: Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 21, No. 1/2 (1993), pp. 51-59
Published by: African Studies Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1166285
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SADCC AND THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN
Fadzai Gwaradzimba*
Since the 1960s, Southern Africa's regional alliance
patternshave been primarilydeterminedby South Africa's
militaryand economic dominanceof the region. Not surpris-
ingly, divisive and conflict-ridden relations between South
Africa and the less powerful majority-ruledstates character-
ized interstaterelations in the region throughoutthis period.
In the 1970s, the latter's collective and individualopposition
to an apartheid-dominatedregional order gave rise to two
competing regional blocs: the South African-led Pax
Pretoriana and the Frontline States (FLS) informal diplo-
matic alliance, which became the nucleus of the Southern
AfricanDevelopmentCoordinationConference(SADCC).
In February 1991, the South African government an-
nounced its decision to renounce apartheidas the state's or-
ganizing ideology and embarkedon constitutionalnegotia-
tions for a democratic South Africa. This decision, coupled
with the impact of the collapse of the Soviet empire and, no
less important,the tenuousand fragile process of democrati-
zation and national reconciliation in Mozambique and
Angola presage a period of profound changes in Southern
Africa's interstate relations. Until now, regionalism in
Southern Africa has centered around three economic
schemes: the South African-led SouthernAfrican Customs
Union (SACU), [the FLS' anti-apartheideconomic bloc],
the SouthernAfricanDevelopment CoordinationConference
(SADCC), and the PreferentialTrade Area for Eastern and
SouthernAfrican States.1
Redefining Interstate Ties
The nature and form of these unfolding changes and
their likely impact on the future of regionalism in Southern
Africa, in different political and economic circumstances,
challenge both the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) and South Africa.
Focusing on SADCC's first decade, we examine the pattern
of regional alliances within SouthernAfrica to date and ex-
plore future trends. We conclude with an analysis of the
challenges that are likely to confront Southern African
states, as they move from decades of a structurallyimposed
conflict and alliances to a redefinitionof their interstateties
in a profoundlychangedregionaland internationalorder.Not
limited to economic regionalism alone, we also incorporate
the security problematic since the FLS formed the political
and diplomatic nucleus of SADCC. Throughoutthe decade,
SADCC not only became a vehicle for coordinatedself-re-
liance among the ten majority-ruled states of Southern
Africa, but it was also a platform for collective diplomatic
opposition to apartheid.SADCC also served as a vehicle for
VOLUME XXI/1-2 1993
51
AFRICAN REGIONALISM
mobilizing extra-regional support against South Africa's
hegemonic position in the region.
SADCC's Origins
Despite decades of dismal performanceand a checkered
history, the 1980s witnessed a markedresurgenceof interest
in regional economic integrationschemes in Africa. In July
1980, the Organizationof AfricanUnity (OAU) promulgated
the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and signed the Final Act of
Lagos. The LPA envisaged the resuscitationof schemes that
had performeddismally throughoutthe 1970s and the cre-
ation of an African Common Market by the year 2001-a
landmarksubsequentlyextended to 2025 at the Abuja OAU
summit of 1991. Following the ratification of the LPA, in
April 1980, Southern Africa witnessed the formation of
SADCC and, soon after, the establishment of the
PreferentialTrade Area for Eastern and Southern African
States (PTA) in December 1981.
...the 1980s witnessed a marked
resurgence of interest in regional
economic integration schemes in
Africa.
In a majordeparturefrom Africanpolicymakers'preoc-
cupation with trade-basedand market integration schemes,
the foundingmembersof SADCC signed a Memorandumof
Understandingin Lusakaon April 1, 1980, effectively creat-
ing an economic bloc thatreflected the intractableconflictual
relationsbetween South Africa and its independentmembers.
The nine founding members were Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambiaand Zimbabwe, laterjoined by Namibia at its inde-
pendence in 1991. From the outset, the SADCC countries
granted observer status to the liberation movements of
South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a decision that anticipated
eventual membershipof a majority-ruledSouth Africa into
the group.The LusakaDeclarationembracedfour interrelated
objectives:
-the reduction of economic dependence, particularly
but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
-the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable
regionalorganization;
52
-the mobilization of resources to promote the imple-
mentationof national,interstateand regionalpolicies;
-concerted action to secure internationalcooperation
within the framework of (SADCC's) strategy for eco-
nomic liberation.2
At the beginning of the 1980s, Africa's economic
malaise was widely acknowledged and there was growing
pessimism regarding the development strategies that had
been applied in the past. While the World Bank argued for
structuralreforms,privati7ationand export-ledstrategies,the
OAU endorseda dirigistcollective self-relianceapproach.
The primary motive behind the
SADCC initiative was to force a
realignmentof economic relations...
SADCC Distinct
The geopolitical conditions of racial conflict and South
Africa's military and economic dominance of the region,
however, made SADCC distinct from other regional organi-
zations. The primary motive behind the SADCC initiative
was to force a realignmentof economic relationsamong and
between its membersand change theirpatternof asymmetri-
cal economic relationswith South Africa to which they were
historically linked as junior partners. At the 1979 Arusha
Conference on economic cooperationthat preceded the for-
mation of SADCC, Sir Seretse Khama, the late presidentof
Botswana, noted that "what we are trying to achieve is the
ability to exercise some degree of choice which ensures us
against domination by one powerful partner."Clearly, the
SADCC member states sought to translate the political
unity achieved by the FLS over the decolonization of
Zimbabweinto building a regional economic orderdivorced
from South Africa. As Tanzania's President Nyerere, a
foundingmemberof SADCC, noted,
The basic reason for SADCC's strength is the po-
litical commitment that underlines its existence. For
SADCC was created by the FrontlineStates out of their
own felt need; although now it has a somewhat wider
membership, the Frontline States still provide its
core, are still the guardians of its objectives, and are
still its main energizers.3
By the end of the 1970s, the geopolitical map of
SouthernAfrica had undergoneprofoundchanges, and with
these, a decisive shift in strategic visions in both apartheid-
ruled South Africa and in some of the independentstates of
Southern Africa, specifically the FLS core comprising
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. While the
fall of Portugueserule in Angola and Mozambiquein 1974
heraldedthese strategictransformations,the independenceof
Zimbabwepresentedthe FLS with a realistic opportunityfor
partialdisengagementfrom South Africa.
SADCC's Achievements and Relations with
South Africa, 1980-90
From the outset SADCC's regional coordinationstrat-
egy focused on a sectoral division of labor. The 1981 sum-
mit held in Blantyre,Malawi, adopted a Programof Action
for SADCC and assigned nine sectoral responsibilities to
each of the founding states. Transportand communications
was assigned to Mozambique; food security to Zimbabwe;
energy to Angola; agriculturalresearch and animal disease
control, the secretariat and chairmanship of SADCC to
Botswana;soil conservationand land utilization to Lesotho;
fisheries, wild life and forestry to Malawi; manpower to
Swaziland; mining to Zambia and industrial development
and trade to Tanzania. Following Malawi's refusal to ren-
quish fisheries to Namibia, in 1990, SADCC split it into
two; Malawi retainedinlandfisheriesand Namibiawas given
responsibilityfor marinefisheries.
I I
...infrastructure projects coincided
with donors' traditional sectors of
interest.
I
Cognizant of the varying degrees of economic depen-
dence of each state with South Africa, SADCC did not re-
quire its members to renounce theirmembershipin otherre-
gional schemes or their bilateral ties with South Africa.
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) retained their
membership in the South African-dominated Southern
African Customs Union (SACU), while Lesotho and
Swaziland remained in the Rand Monetary Area (RMA).
Zimbabwe retained its Preferential Trade Agreement with
South Africa, while Malawi continued to have formal
diplomaticrelationswith Pretoria.
Transportand communicationwas designateda priority
sector, since wars of liberationhad all but closed the tradi-
tional routes of landlocked states and increased the impor-
tance of South African outlets to the sea. Mozambique was
given the responsibility of coordinating this sector and
SADCC established the Southern African Transport and
Communications Commission (SATCC) to coordinate the
rehabilitation and development of intraregional transport
networks. SATCC's overall strategy regarding the surface
transportnetworks rested upon a corridor approach and it
primarilyfocused on the rehabilitationof the Beira, Maputo,
Nacala, Dar es Salaam and Lobito railways and transport
systems. During SADCC's first decade SATCC became the
center piece of SADCC's entire Programof Action and the
sector most favoredby SADCC's majorWesterndonors.By
1989, SATCC's $4.8 billion project portfolio accounted for
64 percentof the total value of SADCC's entire Programof
Action estimated at just over $7 billion and representedap-
proximately $2.4 million or 63 percent of the funding
pledgedby donors.4
Memberstates aligned theirpolicy decisions and project
selection criteriawith the objectives of coordinatedregional
ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION

development if SADCC's goals converged with their
perceived and immediate priorities and national interests.
This trend was most evident in the transport and
communications sector, where SADCC countries showed a
high level of cooperation and a commitment to coordinated
infrastructuraldevelopment.The corridorapproachnot only
allowed for a prioritizationof projectsbut also for a division
of labor on the basis of nationalinterests.
Two reasons accountedfor the high level of interestand
commitment.First, transportprojects did not entail a loss of
autonomy in key domestic economic policy areas. Coordi-
nated regional transportprojectsmet tangibleand immediate
interests of both coastal states who benefited from capital
investments in railways and port facilities. The landlocked
states were subjected to a dependence on more distant and
vulnerable routes belonging to the hostile neighbor, South
Africa. Second, infrastructural projects coincided with
donors' traditional sectors of interest, thereby assuring
SADCC of critically needed funds and precludingthe possi-
bility of conflict between SADCC's sectoral priorities and
donors' commercialinterests.
...the pursuit of national interests
and domestic self-sufficiency un-
dermined the emergence of a
coherent regional coordination
strategy..
I I
Undermining Coherence
However, the pursuitof national interestsand domestic
self-sufficiency underminedthe emergence of a coherentre-
gional coordinationstrategyin the industrialand trade,food
security and energy sectors. Within energy, industry and
tradeand food security sectors, SADCC member states em-
braced narrow,nationally based criteriain project selection
and in fact embracedgoals that would in the long term con-
flict with regionalefficiency in these productivesectors.
It was not domestic constraintsalone that preventedall
member states from reconciling their national agricultural
policies and industrialagendas with the SADCC imperative.
SADCC countries' preoccupation with achieving national
self-sufficiency in energy, agricultural and manufactured
goods and their strong aversion to importing these com-
modities, especially strategic commodities such as energy
and staple foods, from their better-endowedneighbors, pre-
vented the emergence of coherentregionalprogramsin these
sectors throughoutthe 1980s. The duplication of industrial
projects among the SADCC countries and the nationalistic
approachwith respect to the productionand supplyof energy
illustratethe difficulties involved in coordinatingproductive
processes of small competitive countries with unequal
endowments but similar production structures and, thus,
similarneeds and constraints.
VOLUME XXI/1-2 1993
53
Each countrywanted to export ratherthan utilize scarce
foreign currencyby importingfood, energy or manufactured
commodities from the better-endowedregional partner.The
need for developing regional strategiesin these areas was of-
ficially recognized, but at the end of the decade, other than
identifiying the problems and spelling out regional sectoral
strategies, SADCC had not made substantial progress in
these critical areas. Significantly, in 1988, the Council of
Ministers orderedthe IndustrialCoordinatingUnit to come
up with "a coherent, rationaland viable programfor the in-
dustrializationof the region, based on the naturalresources
and raw materialendowmentof memberStates, and the need
to reduce the region's imports of capital and consumer
goods."5
...national concerns were a
dominant criterion in SADCC's
decision-making processes where
trade and investment capital was
concerned.
Hobbled Development
Apart from competing national priorities, an excessive
dependenceon externalresourcesand the centralityof South
Africa's economy within the region were also importantfac-
tors that hobbled the development of sustainable intra-
SADCC regional strategies.Despite the diplomaticand ideo-
logical space forged by the FLS and the mutual perception
of South Africa's dominance as undesirable, national con-
cerns were a dominantcriterionin SADCC's decision-mak-
ing processes where trade and investment capital was con-
cerned.Memberstatesnot only retainedbilateralcommercial
links with South Africa, but also continued to deepen their
economic ties with the hegemon. In the wake of disinvest-
ment and sanctionsagainst South Africa, Botswanalaunched
the Sua Pan project with South African firms, while
Lesotho and Swaziland seized the opportunity to invite
South African investment to participate in their own
economies, contrary to SADCC's stated objectives. In this
area, the gains of disengagementand collective self-reliance
within SADCC clearly had less economic appeal.
Member states not only retained
bilateral commercial links with
South Africa, but also continued to
deepen their economic ties...
South Africa's policy of destabilization throughoutthe
1980s severely underminedSADCC's efforts to coordinate
regionaldevelopmentand precipitatedthe still unresolvedna-
tional conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. Unable to woo
54
the SADCC states into a South Africa-led regional security
cordon sanitaire, the Constellation of Southern African
States (CONSAS), South Africa abandonedCONSAS and
opted for a policy of regional destabilizationthroughoutthe
1980s. As Mozambique's case amply demonstratedduring
this period, the level of dependenceon South Africa largely
determinedeach state's capacity to withstandpressuresfrom
the regional hegemon. Where the costs of pursuing
SADCC's disengagement strategy exceeded perceived na-
tional gains, a member state opted for accommodationwith
South Africa or a combinationof both.
South Africa abandoned CONSAS
and opted for a policy of regional
destabilization throughout the
1980s.
Faced with an unenviable security situation,
Mozambique acceded to the Nkomati Accord in 1984 and
simultaneouslypursuedpolitical and economic accommoda-
tion with South Africa while continuing its diplomatic and
security alliance with SADCC. SADCC became a vehicle
for gaining access to extra-regionalsupportas well as receiv-
ing tangible military supportfrom Zimbabwe and Tanzania
to repel the South Africa-backedRENAMO. Lack of capa-
bility to withstand South Africa's military and economic
onslaught (destabilization)and the economic importanceof
transitrevenues from SADCC port users dictated this dou-
ble-prongedand conflictingpolicy.
...preoccupation with equitable
gains and national self-sufficiency
in the industrial and agricultural
sectors severely undermined the
transition...
I
While political solidarityexplained Tanzania'smilitary
assistance to Mozambique, the strategic and economic im-
portance of the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala Corridors to
Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively, ensured military sup-
port from both Zimbabwe and Malawi. This coincidence of
interests was vital for keeping SADCC's transportprojects
operational,particularlythe Beira Corridor.Despite the as-
tronomical costs South Africa imposed on wartorn
Mozambique and Angola and the organization throughout
the 1980s, SADCC was able to sustain momentum in this
sector.
Institutional Framework and Assessment
SADCC's institutionalframeworkwas importantin re-
taining the interest of member states. Highly decentralized
and designed to leave the sovereignty and autonomy of the
member states intact, it left choice and implementationof
regional projects to the national entities. Above all,
SADCC's decentralizedinstitutionalframework,where au-
thoritativedecision-makingpower lay in the summit, incor-
porated a safety valve, a tacit exit clause, for disinterested
parties. In line with the tacit access and exit clause, the pa-
rametersfor defending the security of the transportcorridors
were left to bilateralarrangements.SADCC became a forum
for diplomatic appeals to Western donors to assist the
organization.
Whatis the assessmentof SADCC's endeavorsover the
decade? SADCC's achievements were not only maintaining
unity in the face of adversity and sabotage from South
Africa, but also realizing impressive gains in infrastructural
development and setting up institutions and parametersfor
cooperationin the food security sector. However, the major
weaknesses and obstacles arose out of its very institutional
frameworkand from premising its coordinated strategy on
access to foreign aid. Failure to mobilize programresources
internallyreduced the organizationto a preoccupationwith
maintainingdonor interest and limited its bargainingpower
that could have facilitated the direction of external funds to-
wards the region's agenda, particularlyin the industrialand
agriculturalsectors. While foreign assistancehelped to jump
startthe SADCC initiative, clearly this could not be a basis
for the organization'scontinueddynamismgiven the donors'
attitudesduringthe decade. SADCC countries'preoccupation
with equitable gains and national self-sufficiency in the
industrialand agriculturalsectors severely underminedthe
transition from infrastructuraldevelopment to coordinated
regionaldevelopment.
I
...individual EC countries embraced
contradictory policies with respect
to the issue of apartheid.
SADCC's experiencesshowed thateven wherecoordina-
tion could have been possible, without a minimum of har-
monization of some key economic policies in the areas of
industry and trade, regional coordination in these sectors
would face considerabledifficulties. In essence SADCC's in-
stitutional framework provided an entry and exit clause
without substantiallyreconciling the members' competitive
national interests in these areas. SADCC countries' failure
to come up with their own resources severely limited their
capacity to set the terms under which donors could partici-
pate in their regional development initiatives. While the
U. S., for example, largely pursued its global strategic
goals, individual EC countries embraced contradictory
policies with respect to the issue of apartheid.While funding
infrastructuralprojects, some of them continued their eco-
nomic links with South Africa. Only the Nordic countries
showed a clear standagainstapartheid.Througha specialized
region-to-regionrelationshipwith SADCC and dissociation
ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION

from South Africa, they combined political with economic
supportfor SADCC.
Faced with severe economic constraints,duringthe first
decade SADCC countries concentratedon keeping the orga-
nization intact by preventing divisions among themselves
and on mobilizing foreign aid without examining minutely
its long-term effects. Clearly, donors' aid policies embrace
multiple objectives and interests. SADCC's regional strat-
egy of the 1980s, which was largely premised on access to
external funds, found that some of those interests do not al-
ways supportthe long-termgoals of erecting viable regional
productionprocesses.
I signaled the desirability of having
the summit "expressedthe hope that
a democratic South Africa will join
the SADCC family of nations
soon...
Towards the Southern African Development
Community?
Towards the end of the decade, SADCC had become
keenly aware of its limitations, among these, premising its
development strategyon foreign aid and adherenceto a vol-
untaristicinstitutionalframeworkthat permittedthe pursuit
of nationalinterestswithoutdue regardto the need for the ef-
fective coordinationof macro-economic policies to achieve
long-term regional competitiveness in the productive sec-
tors. From 1989-90 an immediate task became the need to
redefine SADCC's objectives in the light of Southern
Africa's changedpoliticalcircumstances.
I orously tackled and improved the infrastructurallinkages
The devastating effects of the cur-
rent drought, escalating debts,
growing unemploymentand various
forms of structural adjustmentpro-
grams now in place throughout the
region have largely wiped out the
gains registered in the 1980s.
In August 1992, SADCC governments signed a treaty
that changes the organizationfrom a loose standingconfer-
ence of 10 states to a formal regional integration scheme,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
that will focus on the harmonizationof trade and monetary
policies and will, by definition, force the states to adhere to
prescribed treaty provisions, as is the case of the market
integration models of the European Community (EC) or
Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS).
UnderliningSADC's desire to have South Africa within
its fold, the summit "expressed the hope that a democratic
VOLUME XXI/1-2 1993
55
South Africa will join the SADCC family of nations soon
in orderto enable all of the region's peoples to join hands in
building a new economic orderin SouthernAfrica based on
balance,equity and mutualbenefit."6The decision to become
a market-basedeconomic community is as much a response
to the shortcomings of the 1980s as it is a tactical move to
pre-empt SADCC's demise in a post-apartheid Southern
Africa.
...the PTA's Secretary General has
South Africa join the PTA when
majorityrule is attained.
I
Challenges to Economic Communities
The formidablechallenges of creating viable economic
tradezones leading to regional economic communitiesin de-
veloping countries, especially Africa, are well documented.
Most analysts have concluded that the African terrainis ill-
suited to economic integrationas that envisaged by the new
regional community, SADC. Among the major problems
are Africa's colonial ties to the metropolitancenters, poor
intra-Africaneconomic and infrastructurallinks, especially
the non-complementarityof their productionstructuresand,
more problematic,theirdependencyand marginalrole within
the global economy. It has been concluded that "no a priori
case exists for integration among developing countries;"it
has also been asserted that integrationtheory is "largely ir-
relevant to the actual purposes, processes and problems of
Third World economic coordination."7While SADCC vig-
among its members, particularlyin transportand telecom-
municationsand agriculturalresearchsectors, the questionof
internationaleconomic dependency, and similar production
structurescharacterizedby export of primarycommodities
has not altered. The devastating effects of the current
drought,escalating debts, growing unemploymentand vari-
ous forms of structuraladjustmentprograms now in place
throughoutthe region have largely wiped out the gains reg-
istered in the 1980s.
How will SADC's new mandateas a community tackle
these well-documentedproblemsand, at a time of "donorfa-
tigue" and competition for aid from former Eastern Bloc
countries,provide sufficient incentives to its membersto as-
sure its competitiveness and viability? More importantly,
how will SADC justify the existence of two regional orga-
nizations, the PTA and SADC, which more or less seek the
same goals and have overlapping memberships? At the
August 1992 summit, SADC's heads of state avoided mak-
ing a decision on their position vis a vis the PTA by com-
missioning a study to examine and recommendhow the two
organizations'agendasmight be rationalized,while leaving a
place for South Africa's membershipin SADC. In turn, the
PTA's secretary general has signaled the desirability of
56
having South Africa join the PTA when majorityrule is at-
tained.
The end of apartheid will mark the
entry of South Africa into the re-
gion as a legitimate and possibly
dominant economic force in sub-
SaharanAfrica.
I ? I I
The Future of Regionalism in a Post-Apartheid
Southern Africa
If the 1980s were a decade of diplomatic assertiveness
and joint action on the part of SADC countries, it is clear
that the unfolding changes in South Africa will make the
1990s and beyond a period of change and realignmentof re-
gional alliances in Southern Africa. The end of apartheid
will mark the entry of South Africa into the region as a le-
gitimate and possibly dominant economic force in sub-
SaharanAfrica. Although this will not end the centralityof
South Africa's economic power within the region, it does
eliminateSADC's political raison d'etreand substantiallyal-
ters the diverse ideological and political considerationsthat
motivatedWesterndonor countriestowardscooperationand
financial supportfor SouthernAfrica's economic union out-
side South Africa's orbit.
I I
...the issue of South Africa's posi-
tion in a post-apartheidregional or-
der has been long anticipated by
SADCC'sarchitects.
I I
In light of these changes in the region's political and
security sphere, three critical questions must be posed. First,
what form will regionalism and SADC take in a post-
apartheidSouthernAfrica? Second, if South Africa becomes
a member,on what termswill cooperationbe forged?Third,
how will the PTA and SACU interactand complement the
efforts of SADC towards the establishment of a Southern
AfricanDevelopment Community?
Three strands of thought have dominated the political
and academicdebateson SADCC's futurein a post-apartheid
SouthernAfrica. The first springs from the raison d'etre of
SADCC, specifically, its objective to reduce economic de-
pendenceon South Africa. This line of argumentemphasizes
that, in a nonracialorder, SADCC countries will not have a
need to reduce their dependenceon South Africa, but will in
fact move to compete for favorable terms of cooperation
with their formerly hostile neighbor. Second is the moral
suasion thesis, which argues that donors will find little rea-
son to financially supporta SADCC no longer threatenedby
apartheid.Thus, given the inability of SADCC to mobilize
local resourcesin its first decade, the motivationfor coopera-
tion among the 10 will wither away. Third, the SADC
countrieshave arguedthatthe economic rationalefor cooper-
ation extends beyond the "commonexternalenemy"impera-
tives. SADC will still seek to achieve more balanced and
equitable economic relations with the hegemon, South
Africa, and among the member states themselves. Clearly,
although SADCC diversified its economic dependence on
Western donors and realized substantialgains in infrastruc-
tural development, it did not appreciably reduce the mem-
bers' historicaldependenceon South Africa. A partialreason
for this continueddependence,especially in the transportand
communicationssector, was a result of deliberate sabotage
and destabilizationby South Africa throughoutthe 1980s.
The evolution of a democratic non-
apartheid and ideologically accept-
able South Africa does not obviate
the issue of economic dependence.
Notwithstandingthe absence of a clear articulationof
the specific terms under which South Africa will be admit-
ted, the issue of South Africa's position in a post-apartheid
regionalorderhas been long anticipatedby SADCC's archi-
tects. In 1987, the executive secretary of SADCC, Simba
Makoni,stated,
The basic issue of dependence and domination, al-
though a function of politics, is also very strongly
economic. It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow
when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine
states which constitute SADCC at the moment to be as
dependent on South Africa as they are today. We have
made it clear that the relevance and validity of SADCC
will not end the day that a people's flag is raised in
Pretoria.
This position was reiteratedby the SADCC Council of
Ministers in February 1991, which stated that "the current
dominanceof South Africa over the rest of the region would
both be undesirableand unacceptableeven with a democratic
South Africaas a memberof the organization"and advocated
cooperationbased on the "principlesof equality,balanceand
mutualbenefit."8
Althoughconventional wisdom has assumed that South
Africa will automatically want to be a member of SADC,
three major scenarios must be considered. First is one in
which South Africa will join the community of Southern
African states underthe aegis of SADC and assume its eco-
nomic leadership. Second, the idea of a regional economic
union undera hegemonic South Africa unencumberedby the
political constraintsof the apartheidideology might be more
appealing to Namibia and the BLS states who, though ju-
nior partners,have benefited from their hithertounequaldi-
vision of spoils within a South African-led SACU.
The thirdwould arise from the second scenario, where
SADCC would be left with its core FLS membership.This
ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION

would entail not only a redefinition of goals, but also the
need among membersto reconcile theiroverlappingbilateral
links with South Africa and their membership in the PTA.
SADC would not only have to compete for funds from the
Western countries but would be forced to justify its goals
and programsbeyond simply the desire for equitableregional
development. More fundamentally, SADC would only re-
main competitive if it were able to deliver gains thatare per-
ceived by its members to justify the opportunity costs of
not cooperatingwith South Africa bilaterallyor regionally.
I to manage regional economic and
...if South Africa joins, it will be as
a hegemon within much reformed
CONSAS.
I I I I I and protecttheirpre-eminentposition among the subordinate
In a post-apartheidSouthern Africa, it is reasonable to
assume that the impetus towards regional cooperation
among SADCC countries is bound to stay. The evolution of
a democratic non-apartheid and ideologically acceptable
South Africa does not obviate the issue of economic
dependence on a powerful and hegemonic neighbor or the
impetus for cooperation in the economic sphere in order to
deal with declining national economic fortunes in a world
that is increasingly embracing regional economic trading
blocs, notably, the USA, Canada and Mexico, South East
Asia with Japanand the embattledEuropeanCommunity.
Autarky or Hegemony?
Although there is every likelihood that South Africa
will emerge from its tragic history of racial strife an unri-
valed economic giant and the dominant military regional
power, the magnitude of its domestic social and economic
problems might dictate a policy of regional reconciliation
and accommodation.What might change will be the nature
of SADC, and perhapsits core membership.Developments
in the international economic order, notably, the much
anticipated advent of a single European market by 1992,
although now very much a hostage of the rise of European
nationalism and ethnic conflicts, the collapse of the Soviet
empire and the global trend towards regional economic
blocs, also preclude autarky and unbridled economic
nationalism, even for South Africa. In a region where
political and economic regionalism and negotiated bilateral
trading regimes have been the norm rather than the
exception, it is reasonable to assume that, if South Africa
joins, it will be as a hegemon within a much reformed
CONSAS, borrowing heavily from the ethos of
interdependency and cooperation that SADC has tried to
instill in its membersover the decade.
The successful evolution of such a development will
hinge on several factors, the most importantof which might
be economic recovery in South Africa and the willingness to
provide economic leadership and become the nucleus of a
changing SADC. South Africa would become the regional
hegemon willing to use its resources to underwritethe col-
VOLUME XXI/1-2 1993
57
lective good of regionalcooperationamong unequalpartners.
In the 1980s, South Africa's destabilization was a double-
pronged strategy which sought to brow beat its neighbors
into submission to a Pax Africana regional security order
while retainingthese SADC countries as dependentmarkets
for the hegemon's products.
I
...regional hegemons generally like
security systems.
- -
Even more importantare the dictatesof statecraftand in-
terstaterelations:In orderto guaranteetheir securityinterests
satellites, regional hegemons generally like to manage re-
gional economic and security systems. A more peaceful
SouthernAfrica might not alter these determinantsof state-
craft. Thus what might change are the terms of entry and
exit for both the hegemon and the weaker dependent satel-
lites.
Notwithstanding the formal inauguration of binding
treatyprovisions, SADC countries have had a decade of in-
stitutionalizinga process that incorporatesflexible terms of
entry and exit and this might in the short term be preferable
to a South Africa beset with difficult internalchallenges. In
a nutshell, SADC will provide a reformedSouth Africa with
a ready and politically congenial market. These potential
benefits are not likely to be dismissed by a regional power
whose history has been premisedon regional economic pre-
eminence.
III
SADC does not seem ready to
wither away with the advent of a
political settlement in South Africa.
I I I I I
Renegotiating Arrangements
From the official pronouncementsof SADCC member
countries and the formal inauguration of a community,
SADC does not seem ready to wither away with the advent
of a political settlement in South Africa. What is most
likely to happen is that SADC member countries, especially
those more dependenton South Africa, might try to renego-
tiate more favorable bilateral economic relations, without
abandoningSADC.
In the 1990s, the organization's preoccupations with
strengtheninginternal cohesion, establishing a charterand
creatingan institutionaland enabling environmentfor better
coordinatedregionalproductionprocesses would indicatethat
SADC is gearing itself for the long haul.
58
...the political rhetoric attending
formal treaties and accession to
protocols have had very little to do
with the actual practices of states
and the complex process of re-
gionalism.
The end of apartheidand the Cold Warpresage a period
of peace and reduced intrusivenessfrom externalpowers. It
also allows for the shift of the spotlight from foreign policy
concerns to the domestic terrain,notably the issue of human
rights and political democratization. The challenges for
SADC, and indeed other regional organizations in the re-
gion, perhaps, are not so much what to become in a post-
apartheid Southern Africa, but to forcefully address the
shortcomingsevident in the 1980s: less dependence on for-
eign aid, rationalizingthe concept of nationalinterestso that
it mirrorsa more meaningful definition of regional coopera-
tion and creating a new organizing ideology to replace the
opposition to apartheid.Even more importantis the issue of
erecting durable democratic rule at the national levels.
Regionalism retains its powerful pull. Within an interna-
tional economic order where Africa's declining fortunes,its
increasing poverty and economic marginalizationare more
prominent than was the case 30 years ago, regionalism
promisesbetterpay-offs thannationalself-sufficiency.
SACU, a reformed SADCC and
trade-based PTA all have to find
mutually reinforcing and comple-
mentary roles.
Democracy and Transparency
A word of caution. To achieve progress in regionalism,
Southern African countries will have to tackle one of the
most importantprerequisites for viable interstate coopera-
tion-inauguration of durabledemocracyand transparentpo-
litical rule. While democracy alone will not guarantee the
success of regionalism, it does eliminate the major cause of
domestic sociopolitical instability and allows for the effec-
tive harnessing of Southern Africa's human resources, the
most importantinput in any development process. It would
not be a cliche to state that the tragedy of Africa has been
the ubiquitouspenchantfor its successive leaders to veer to-
wards dictorial rule, thereby robbing the continent of its
most valuable asset and, needless to state, the potentialben-
efits of 40 years of international technical assistance-its
trainedindigenous expertise. Africangovernmentswill have
to invest in stable, predictable and healthy working envi-
ronmentsbefore they can engage themselves and the popu-
lations at large in interstatecooperation. While democracy
by itself is not a guaranteefor successful forms of regional-
ism, it sets the parametersfor meaningfuldialogue and long-
term cooperationacross bordersand does make the process
less of an exercise in political rhetoric-a measure that has
been a hallmarkof regionalism in Africa to date. The fact
that the future of regionalism in Southern Africa hinges on
peaceful democratictransitionsand nationalreconciliationin
SouthAfrica,Mozambiqueand Angola and the emergenceof
stable political orders in these countries is eloquent testi-
mony to inescapablelinkages between nationaland individ-
ual security,developmentand cooperationacrossborders.
The end of apartheidin South Africa, if accomplished
with less social upheavalthan that witnessed to date, will al-
low the region to focus on domestic and regional develop-
ment. The issues before SADC and the futureof regionalism
in SouthernAfrica have already been put on the agenda by
SADCC's own formal transformationinto a regional eco-
nomic community.However, the political rhetoricattending
formal treatiesand accession to protocols has had very little
to do with the actualpracticesof states and the complex pro-
cess of regionalism. The challenge that remains is for
SouthernAfrica to forge a communitycapableof reconciling
the diverse interests among its own ranks and to avoid the
unnecessaryduplicationof tasks and mandatesamong the ex-
isting regional entities.
Rational Division of Labor
The last few years have witnessed major political
changes that will have a considerableimpacton the futureof
regionalismin SouthernAfrica. At the core of these changes
are the imminence of a nonracial and hopefully democratic
rule in South Africa, the normalizationof relations with its
neighbors, and plans for national reconciliation in Angola
andMozambique.
I I
An even greater need for national
sacrifice in the interests of collec-
tive action will be required if re-
gionalism is to survive and build on
the gains of the 1980s.
I
SADCC has geared itself for the long haul and has pre-
emptedits demise by changing its mandatefrom a coordinat-
ing body to a formal economic community. The centralrole
of South Africa's economy will have a decisive impact on
the form of regionalism and future alliances the states of
SouthernAfrica might opt for. SACU, a reformed SADCC
and the trade-basedPTA all have to find mutuallyreinforcing
and complementaryroles. In the absence of such a rational
division of labor, there is a strong argumentfor phasing out
some of the regional schemes and building a single entity
that embraces both sectoral coordination, trade and harmo-
nization of monetarypolicies.
ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION

I 1
It might very well be that SADC
will have to be reformed to reflect
the new power aligments.
II
Antagonistic Competition
Although regionalism has often been perceived as what
states do outside their borders, the form and content of re-
gionalism and the capacity of the member states to defer to
the collective will are a function of both internaland exter-
nal political dynamics, specifically, the logic of national in-
terests and the regional organization's capability to forge a
programof action and resource mobilization strategies that,
by and large, meet with the economic and foreign policy
goals of participatingstates and, no less important,that of
major donors. The main conclusion is that loss of national
autonomy in decision making that the creationof a commu-
nity entails, escalating region-wide economic problems, the
absence of a common political external enemy (apartheid
South Africa) and lower levels of externalresourcesfrom the
organization'straditionaldonors, might usher in a period of
antagonistic competition among SADC states. Throughout
its first decade, SADCC capitalized on a voluntary institu-
tional frameworkto retainmembers'cohesiveness and moral
suasion to generate substantial external resources for its
Programof Action, particularlywithin the transportsector.
An even greaterneed for nationalsacrifice in the interestsof
collective action will be requiredif regionalismis to survive
and build on the gains of the 1980s. The fact that SADC has
assumed South Africa's membershipand has deferredits de-
cisions on futurerelations with the PTA leads to the conclu-
sion that the outcome of South Africa's political negotia-
tions and its position on regional cooperation will have a
decisive impact on the relevance and dynamism of SADC
and the futureof regionalism in SouthernAfrica as a whole.
It might very well be that SADC will have to be reformed
to reflect the new power alignmentsand to accommodatethe
needs of its powerful neighbor. Even more important, the
futureof regionalism would also depend on the ability of the
national entities to democratize and install stable and dy-
namic economic and political systems-a process that has
largely been neglected in Africa's long quest for regional
VOLUME XXI/1-2 1993
59
competitivenessand economic relevance in an ever-changing
world.*
Notes
1. On August 18, 1992, the Windhoeksummitmeeting of
SADCCsigneda treatywhich changedthe organizationfroma
developmentcoordinatingconferenceto a regionalintegration
community,the SouthernAfrican Development Community
(SADC).Both nameswill be used in the appropriatesectionsof
the text. For origins of SADCC, see Amon J. Nsekela, ed.,
SouthernAfrica: TowardEconomicLiberation,London,Rex
Collings, 1981; Arne Tostensen,Dependence and Collective
SelfReliancein SouthernAfrica:The Case of SADCC,Research
ReportNo. 62, Uppsala,The ScandinavianInstitutefor African
Studies, 1987.
2. SADCC,LusakaDeclaration,Lusaka,1980; Nsekela,op.
cit., pp. xv-7.
3. Interview,TheDaily News, (Tanzania)June8, 1986,p. 1.
4. JosephHanlon,"SADCCin the 1990s-Development on
the Frontline," Special Report No. 1158, The Economist
IntelligenceUnit, September,1989, pp. 9- 77. SADCC,Annual
ProgressReports,1981-1990, esp. SADCC,Annual Progress
Report,July 1987-August1988, p.17.
5. SADCC,AnnualProgressReport,July 1987-August1988,
p.28.
6. SADCC,Communique
of the SADCCSummit,Windhoek,
Republicof Namibia,August18, 1992.
7. For a comprehensivereview of regionalismin Africa,see
PeterRobson,The Economicsof RegionalIntegration,London,
Allen and Unwin, 1981, p.147; ReginaldHerboldGreen,"The
EastAfricanCommunity:A ValedictionForbiddingMourning,"
TheAfricanReview,[Dares Salaam],vol.8, no. 2, 1978, p.11.
8. Cited in Simba Makoni, "SADCC's New Strategies,"
Interview,Africa Report,vol. 33, no. 3, 1987, pp. 1-2.
* Fadzai Gwaradzimbadid her Ph.D. thesis on SADCCat
Johns Hopkins University, Maryland. Originally from
Zimbabwe,she now works in the Sahel Office of the UN
DevelopmentProgramin New York.