Development in Practice

ISSN: 0961-4524 (Print) 1364-9213 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdip20

Determinants of return intentions among

internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Marawi City,
Philippines

Zaldy C. Collado

To cite this article: Zaldy C. Collado (2019): Determinants of return intentions among
internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Marawi City, Philippines, Development in Practice, DOI:
10.1080/09614524.2019.1673320

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2019.1673320

Published online: 08 Oct 2019.

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DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE
https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2019.1673320

Determinants of return intentions among internally displaced

persons (IDPs) of Marawi City, Philippines
Zaldy C. Collado

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The article examines the determinants of return intentions among the Received 25 November 2018
Maranao internally displaced persons (IDPs), who had fled the war in Accepted 30 May 2019
Marawi City, Lanao Del Sur, Philippines. The study involved 10 key
KEYWORDS
informant interviewees and 306 survey respondents. The results reveal Conflict and reconstruction –
that an overwhelming majority of the respondents wish to repatriate Forced displacement; Labour
back home. Analysis shows that place attachment, good memories in and livelihoods – Migration;
relation to profit-making, and cultural identity contribute to the firm Aid – Aid effectiveness;
desire to return home. There is also a culturally appropriate response for Development policies; South
their life recovery. Asia

Introduction
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believe that going back home is the
most durable solution for internally displaced persons (IDPs) problems compared to integration
and resettlement somewhere else. IDPs’ eventual successful reintegration into their traditional com-
munities is perceived to be critical to national reconstruction and reconciliation processes, which
leads to the notion that voluntary repatriation is the only effective solution (Tegenbos and Vlassenroot
2018). It seems that IDPs themselves have an instinctive inclination to voluntarily repatriate home
rather than explore other options. For example, in 2014, a return intention survey conducted in
Bangui, Central African Republic found that 80% of IDPs expressed their intent to return (IOM
2014), while in the districts of North Waziristan, Pakistan, 100% of IDPs had the same intention
(GPC 2016). Similar sentiments were also recorded in return intention surveys in Georgia, where
73.4% of IDPs desired returning home (UNHCR 2015) and Maiduguri, Nigeria, where 98.5% of IDPs
said they were returning (IOM 2016). Unsurprisingly, intent to return is considered an important
area of studies in forced migration, mainly because it provides reliable data and analysis for decisions
on appropriate humanitarian responses (Stefanovic, Loizides, and Parsons 2014; REACH 2017). It is
especially so since internal displacement is a complex social issue (Muggah, 2001). Importantly,
IDPs must not be forced to choose one option over the other and their return movements must
not compromise their safety and dignity (IOM and UNHCR 2014).
The Marawi siege in May 2017 in Lanao Del Sur province, Philippines, which last for five months,
has produced 359,680 IDPs (UNHCR-Philippines 2017). Prior to the lengthy and bloody conflict, the
Maute group, which pledged alliance to the Islamic State, and the Abu Sayyaf, another well-known
terror organisation in the Mindanao Island led by Isnilon Hapilon at that time, fought Philippine secur-
ity forces in Butig town of Lanao Del Sur province, where the Maute brothers have deep roots.
Attempts to arrest Hapilon led the authorities to Marawi City, where Maute militants were already
in place in shelters and were ready to engage. As the situation developed, the militants also
started occupying civilian buildings and government facilities. The fierce fighting led thousands of
people to be displaced over the five months until the state forces neutralised militant leaders

CONTACT Zaldy C. Collado zaldy_collado@dlsu.edu.ph

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 Z. C. COLLADO

towards the end. The history of conflict in Mindanao characterised by Muslim resistance can be traced
to as early as sixteenth century (Amnesty International 2017). The Philippines is a predominantly
Christian nation today.
The people of Marawi City (and generally of the Lanao provinces) are called Maranaos, one of the
few ethnic groups in Mindanao, who traditionally inhabit areas around Lake Lanao (most Maranaos
are Muslims). Thus, it is not surprising that the city is called the Islamic City of Marawi. The city is the
centre of livelihood, trade, and commerce among Maranaos living in Lanao Del Sur province. Being a
traditionally vibrant commercial place, the Maranaos are known to be marketplace trade people (Eder
2010). The sight, therefore, of Maranaos in other parts of the country doing business in sidewalks,
markets, and malls is an articulation of the Maranaos’ way of life.
Historically, aside from having had to fight for their lands against foreign invaders, Filipino Muslims
lament being socially, economically, and politically discriminated, and subject to stereotypes such as
being ugly, vicious and treacherous (Majul 2010). Perhaps, the Maranaos’ character as industrious,
traders, and business-minded people (Racman 2015) helps them “pass through” this discrimination
against Filipino Muslims. It is therefore understandable that creating and/or sustaining a common
commercial centre, like Marawi City, where Maranao residents and traders alike can do business or
simply live without fear of discrimination, is a desirable feature of their collective life as a people.
Marawi City is not only a place to source income but also a fortress against the larger discriminating
Filipino society. The researcher’s recent visit to an IDP evacuation camp in Iligan City highlighted this
fear of discrimination, when an adult Maranao, being a Muslim, shared that, on several occasions they
avoided leaving the evacuation camp as outsiders associate Maranaos with terrorists.
These pre-conflict central districts have now gone. After the siege, the sheer physical destruction
dominated the media reports and stories of those who were able to enter the main battlefield. Shel-
ters and buildings that housed families and livelihoods were turned into rubble. The overall security
risks (Orias 2018), blurred divisions of lots (Placido 2018) and unrestored basic services (Chowdhury
2018) continue to be some of the barriers as to why the idea of returning is not currently viable.
However, Maranao IDPs are not precluded from choosing to return home. Though “visitation
hours” are in place, the Philippine government has yet to announce when IDPs are allowed to
return permanently. The war’s economic consequences on households are felt through the loss of
businesses and displacement from places where their traditional livelihood had been carried out.
Theoretically, the desire to return home is enhanced by different factors depending on which
hypothesis is utilised in the analysis. A survey of related literature points to at least four hypotheses
used to gauge the weight of return intentions. Integration hypothesis argues that IDPs are less likely
to return if successful local integration is experienced. The sense of home hypothesis speaks of the
positive pre-conflict memories to one’s place that increase the likelihood of IDPs returning to their
places of origin. Third, the community effort hypothesis states that IDPs’ intent to return is facilitated
by their social capital (relatives, organisations and institutions). As well as influencing the return inten-
tions of IDPs, they may also facilitate a smooth return. Lastly, the security hypothesis puts safety as an
utmost factor in deciding to return (Stefanovic, Loizides, and Parsons 2014). The intent of this article,
however, is not to assess the validity of these hypotheses, but to illustrate the desires of the Maranao
IDPs in terms of their return intentions and how this sits in the context of recovery. Thus, this article is
chiefly interested in investigating factors that shape IDP’s aspirations to go back to their traditional
residence and how they think recovery is possible.

Methodology
The article is based on the narratives of Maranao IDPs living in different villages in Saguiaran town of
the same Lanao province. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted among 10 invisible IDPs
(home-based IDPs) in the town. These IDPs chose to stay with relatives and friends rather than in eva-
cuation camps, which they described as crowded. The terms “visible” and “invisible” (home-based)
IDPs are part of IDP studies, with the former referring to IDPs who have relatively easier access to
 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 3

assistance and are easier targets for assistance as they are in visible places such as evacuation camps;
the latter refers to IDPs who have difficulty accessing assistance or have not been easily identified for
assistance due to being assimilated in the general population, such as those staying the homes of
friends and relatives (Brookings-LSE 2013).
The survey questionnaire was answered by the head of each IDP household. There were 306
respondents in total from different towns (Figure 1), with the researcher assisted by a translator.
The survey was conducted among visible and invisible IDPs from Iligan and Davao Cities, and from
the towns of Saguiaran, Balo-i, and Pantar in the Lanao Provinces. Some IDPs in the evacuation
and temporary shelter sites in Marawi City were also able to participate as respondents. The qualitat-
ive data were then thematically analysed to determine the dominant choices of IDPs in relation to
return intentions and other factors that demonstrate enabling and deterring factors for return. The
quantitative data were subjected to SPSS analysis to test statistical significance of the variables.
The interviews and surveys were conducted in May 2018, a year after the Marawi siege.
Thus, at the time of data gathering with the IDPs, they had been displaced almost exactly a year.
As of today, they remain displaced as the government does not allow return movements in the
area. Access restrictions are also in place for those who wish to visit their respective communities.
Government agencies extend assistance to IDPs in the form of food relief and other material
necessities.

Results
The majority (70%) of those IDPs interviewed expressed the desire to return to Marawi City, seeking to
rebuild their lives in their traditional residence, with only three out of the 10 interviewees stating that
they will try other options.

Return intentions
Those who wanted to return emphasised the idea that Marawi can still be a good venue for re-estab-
lishing their small businesses despite the devastation that happened in the city.
I’d like to go back to Marawi. Our home is there. Our livelihood is there.

I will return to Marawi. My small business was there before, I had a small store back then and I will continue that
once I am back.

Figure 1. Number of respondents per location.

4 Z. C. COLLADO

For me, I will choose to return to Marawi. Aside from restoring our house, I plea the government to help us finance
our livelihood. We will start our small business again which the war destroyed.

The principal theme in these narratives is highly focused on rebuilding their lives via rebuilding
their lost livelihood. It appears that speaking of returning home also means returning to their tra-
ditional subsistence activities. Home and livelihood appear to have a blurred conceptual boundary
in this context. This highlights their very positive outlook of Marawi City once the communities
start to normalise. However, some IDPs decided to seek other options due to fear and trauma.
I am not returning to Marawi. We’re afraid the same thing might happen again. If it does, then we suffer the same
thing again. We are IDPs now, and if the conflict erupts again there, then we will become IDPs again, the same
situation. It will just be a cycle.

We are no longer going back there; especially the rumour is that another assault in the city is being prepared.

The quantitative data highlight the dominant option desired by IDPs, which supports the majority
of sentiments expressed in the qualitative data (Figure 2).

Specific factors that enable or constrain return

Interviewees were asked about the factors that contribute to their decision to leave (enabling factors
for return) and not to leave (deterrent for return) their present host household/community (Table 1).
Among many other enabling factors, economic reasons were highly consistent, such as the absence
of employment opportunities and financial assistance to start a business. Feelings of security and the
kind of reception received in their current environment are main deterring factors.
If I still can, I would go back to Marawi to continue my lost livelihood. I would again put up a small store.

We would opt to stay here because it is safer here. We are surrounded by our relatives and friendly neighbours.
They do not discriminate us, they understand our situation.

Primary consideration
Consistent with the dominant themes of the push or enabling return factors, respondents expressed
their thoughts about what their principal request to government would be should they return in
Marawi City. Results reveal the IDPs’ major aspirations which speak generally of their desire for econ-
omic sustainability in the form of employment and business capital assistance (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Frequency of IDP choice per option.

 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 5

Table 1. Specific factors that enable or constrain return.

Enabling factors for return
• No employment opportunities in the host community
• If business capital assistance is given
• If payment is made for destroyed properties
• If shelters are built
• If peace and order situation improves
• Host community is far from hospitals
• Difficult access to water services/sources in the host community
• School is far from the host community/household
• If school facilities are restored
• Expensive transportation cost to access markets and hospitals
• Ashamed of being a burden to host household
• Delayed relief in the host households/communities
Deterrent for return
• Peaceful environment in the host community
• Secured feeling in the host community
• Kind reception of the host household
• Easier access to water services/sources in the host community
• Fear of conflict reoccurrence
• Living with relatives
• Able to grow vegetables in small gardens
• Household is near masjid (mosque)
• Accessible roads
• Near in school, market and hospital
• Non-discrimination in the community

I would still choose to go back to Marawi. I just want the government to provide us with financial assistance to
start a business. I lost my livelihood there as my two Xerox [photocopying] machines and laptop were burned in
the war.

To test whether there is a significant relationship between the respondents’ dominant return inten-
tions and their primary considerations, a cross-tabulation and Pearson chi-square test was run. Results
show that there is a statistical relationship between the two variables. The frequency of primary con-
sideration both for economic opportunities and availability of business capital highlights a more likely
mentality of return to their place of origin (Tables 2 and 3).

Main source of income (pre-conflict original residence vs. post-conflict host community,
evacuation sites and resettlement areas)
Respondents were asked about their main source of income during pre-conflict times. The data show
that majority of IDPs were small business owners before the siege. This is consistent with what was
expressed in the interviews; IDPs choosing to return home to rebuild what was once their source of
income – a livelihood or a small business (Figure 4).
To compare IDPs’ main source of income prior to the Marawi siege, respondents were also asked
how they economically or financially support the household during the time of displacement. The
result shows an apparent trend in the subsistence pattern of the Maranao IDPs. Both results reveal

Figure 3. Primary consideration to return in their area of origin.

6 Z. C. COLLADO

Table 2. Intent to return *primary considerations (crosstabulation) count.

Primary considerations Total
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Intent to return 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 4
1 1 37 12 9 1 8 50 38 75 4 8 1 244
2 6 3 3 0 0 2 8 4 4 0 3 0 33
3 0 8 2 1 0 0 2 6 2 0 4 0 25
Total 7 48 17 11 1 10 60 50 82 4 15 1 306

Table 3. Chi-square tests.

Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-square 81.085a 33 .000
Likelihood Ratio 61.606 33 .002
Linear-by-linear association 4.476 1 .034
No. of valid cases 306
Notes: a34 cells (70.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

that, similar to the pre-conflict scenario, respondents are currently supporting their households
through small business ventures (Figure 5).

Discussion
Most Maranao IDPs are committed to returning to their traditional communities (79.74% expressed
return intentions). Within that intent, their recovery upon return is anchored on the idea of the rees-
tablishment of their traditional livelihood (which ideally assumes that financial assistance from the
government will materialise). Moreover, the same livelihood pattern (running a business) in the
pre- and post-conflict scenarios is justifiably assumed to occur too in the event of return. That is evi-
denced by the narratives and data showing business capital as one of the top desired forms of assist-
ance. This leads to a basic yet vital insight that the government’s financial assistance to support
business ventures can effectively negotiate return among Maranao IDPs. The desire for this

Figure 4. Pre-displacement main source of income.

 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 7

Figure 5. Post-displacement main source of income.

specific kind of assistance is seeming rooted in the traditional cultural identity of the Maranaos being
marketplace, traders and business-minded people.

Place attachment coupled with memories of economic sustenance determine return

intentions
Theories suggeted Stefanovic, Loizides, and Parsons (2014) in relation to return intentions such as
integration, community effort and security hypotheses, with the exception of home hypothesis,
appeared to have been irrelevant in determining what factors are effective in shaping the return
intentions of Maranao IDPs in their current and specific social context. A successful integration, for
example, is irrelevant to test since most respondents are visible IDPs living in crowded spaces, a des-
picable condition that does not favour integration, or in the case of invisible IDPs, host communities
have also few livelihood opportunities and the IDP themselves increasingly feel embarrassed at being
“dependents” in their host households – cases where integration is simply not a desirable option.
While it may be insightful to consider the duration of displacement in relation to IDPs’ preference
to locally integrate or return, the absence of empirical material makes any claims difficult to establish.
Similarly, the community effort hypothesis is not useful in the analysis since whether or not there are
facilitators of return, the fact that the government does not allow (yet) return precludes this possi-
bility. The security hypothesis, on the other hand, seems not to work well in anticipating return inten-
tions of Maranao IDPs, since given the fresh memories of war, IDPs should have thought not to return
for safety or security concerns. But the data reveal a rather brave stance among the IDPs when they
actively entertain thoughts of considering returning. Only the home hypothesis can at least partially
explain the choice to go back to their traditional residence. Since IDPs had good memories of Marawi
owing to their experiences of doing financially-rewarding business there, these memories shape their
positive return intentions. While it is true that to return is not the only option (as there are two others),
the overwhelming will to return may have been rooted in the memories of Marawi City as a place that
had been friendly to economic aspirations of Maranao families.
8 Z. C. COLLADO

The same optimistic assumptions for the future of Marawi are demonstrated by IDPs’ choices of
primary considerations upon return, namely employment and business (livelihood) capital assistance.
These primary considerations affirm not only the deep-rooted desire to be “home” geographically but
also to be “labourers and income-earners” in the place where they think that money-making activities
are easier and more profitable. Though to begin with, there is already an original intent to return
given the chance, the granting of these requests strengthens and deepens the desire due to their
belief that the city is an economic oasis.
This underscores the fact that Maranao IDPs’ return intention is primarily determined by economic
factors. However, while economic factors may characterise the return intentions of IDPs, these
Maranao IDPs have special reasons that separate them from other IDPs whose movements are deter-
mined also by economic needs. While other IDPs would explore other places where they can start
afresh, most Maranao IDPs refuse to settle elsewhere despite the present physical condition of the
city. Rather, they commit to return where they conceive a better fighting chance for recovery, in a
place where they are known to be “experts” in the field of business (Shahpur n.d). However, such
a choice might also be heavily determined by the fact that as Maranaos, Marawi City is a home to
return to on account of a long history of Maranao people’s settlement in the area, fighting foreign
invaders as early as 1630s (Saber 1979). Delineating which factor predominantly influences the
return intention is an extremely difficult task, especially in this case where their return intention is
conceivably deeply imbedded in the crosscurrents of place, culture and identity. With equal signifi-
cance too, the notion of Marawi City as a fortress against discrimination reinforces a further and
deeper reason why being “home” remains the most desirable of all options. Intending to return, in
the context of Marawi IDPs, not only means having more chances for economic sustenance but
also being in a place of protection from prejudices against Filipino Muslims. The idea that returning
home is a return to a protective enclave further solidifies the “sense of home hypothesis” as a tool to
analyse their intent to return.
This is not to say that safety and security conditions are not important to (not) seriously consider a
return among Maranao IDPs. Table 1 shows that some IDPs thought that the peace and the feeling of
security they experience in their host community holds them back from the idea of an actual return.
In a sense, the security hypothesis operates, albeit very limitedly, in the lived experience of Maranao
IDPs in this community. However, while IDPs recognise that being safe or secure matter, they have
expressed return intentions to fill a physical need, empirically evidenced in the data that show
that income-earning activities have considerable margins versus the need to have a peaceful environ-
ment (Figure 3). Essentially, the case is food over safety. The longer they stay in their present physical
spaces, the more they expose themselves and their families to food hardships and material impover-
ishments. The fact that almost 80% of respondents are returning, despite fragile security conditions,
solidifies these priorities. Therefore, an empty stomach can be a powerful determinant of a return
intention even in context of conflict-induced displacement. Additionally, the continuing presence
of the Philippine security forces and the fact that they were able to win the battle for Marawi may
have played a crucial role in assuring the IDP population that threats no longer exist. With that,
most Maranao IDPs may have developed a strong enough confidence to consider return rather
than staying in their respective host communities or evacuation sites.

Business capital assistance negotiates return as well as life recovery

Looking at the destruction sustained by the city, IDPs would understandably desire a range of
resources to start building up their lives and communities from the ashes of war. Much of these infra-
structure resources are the default responsibilities of the government, such as schools, health centres,
markets, bridges and roads, and water and electric services. Indeed, the normalisation process in
these districts requires the fulfilment of these state obligations. Thus, to facilitate a relatively success-
ful return necessitates a massive response from the government. However, none of these were men-
tioned by respondents as primary considerations for return. The top three primary considerations for
 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 9

return, as the results have shown, are (1) employment opportunities; (2) available business capital
assistance; and (3) financial assistance for housing, none of which necessarily relate to infrastructure
or basic services which the government must provide to initiate normalcy. This is not surprising since
according to Maslow’s Theory of Hierarchy of Needs (Koltko-Rivera 2006), the most basic of which to
be fulfilled in life are survival needs before any other needs. These needs are essentially obtainable
only when primary considerations (1) and (2) are at place. This is also the reason why the identified
intent to return hypotheses, with the exception of sense of home, do not work to explain these IDPs’
principal preference to return. Maslow’s Theory compliments the idea of sense of home hypothesis in
the context of these IDPs. The Maranao IDPs perceive and continue to remember Marawi City as a
home where basic needs in life, mostly physiological, are obtainable. Recognising these consider-
ations is an important step in critically appraising the present conditions and the impacts of displace-
ment in the lives of Maranao IDPs. It also brings to light how rapid life recovery should be understood
in their specific context.
The need to financially assist house construction is understandably among the top considerations,
as shelters are the key infrastructures to allow minimum decent living conditions, but even this is only
the third consideration. The presence of employment opportunities is the first consideration, but this
may be contentious in light of the second-ranking consideration (see Figure 3). Respondents may
have thought that starting a business again is not an immediately possible option since there is
no financial capital. The data support the idea that prior to conflict, the majority of IDPs economically
sustained themselves through business ventures and not through employment. Such thoughts may
have influenced how they ranked their considerations, making business capital only second. In effect,
the topmost consideration may have been the availability of business capital. It is particularly impor-
tant to highlight the special and specific role of business capital assistance in the process of life recov-
ery among the displaced Maranao population.
In other words, the process of “building back better” among Maranao IDPs must involve a restor-
ation of their traditional livelihood. In the context of Marawi, where its central districts used to be a
good place for business, it is not surprising that Maranao IDPs entertain return intentions coupled
heavily with requests for business capital. In addition, acknowledging such assistance as a critical
tool can contribute to our understanding of healing among people who had been used to doing
business as traditional source of income. In a way, Maranao IDPs are taking their chances based
on a positive pre-conflict memory of Marawi City as a place that was conducive to economic oppor-
tunities. This may implicitly validate the sense of home hypothesis in explaining why most Maranao
IDPs are intending to return.
Furthermore, the massive destruction in the city explains why only 8.5% of IDPs have continued
their previous occupation (Figure 5). The destruction of businesses makes it practically impossible
for the IDPs to have the exact same occupation or source of income after the war. In addition,
Figure 5 shows that a cumulative score of 34.96% of the entire respondents are dependent on
either the government or NGOs, or their relatives’ assistance. It is therefore not surprising that
most respondents are intending to go home and attempt to rebuild their previous economic
independence.

Business capital assistance: a glimpse of Maranaos’ cultural identity

The continuity of livelihood upon return reinforces the pattern of traditional subsistence activities
among Maranaos. Their future livelihood plans and current sources of income for daily sustenance
are a continuation of previous profitable activities. While there is no empirical data to explain their
non-inclination to employment, the present analysis shows that their business capital aspirations
reflect the familiar cultural identity of Maranaos being business-minded residents.
Maranaos’ engagement in business not only highlights their traditional economic activity but also
embodies their very identity as people of the same cultural heritage. Thus, the aspiration to obtain
business capital is not separated from the collective personality of the Maranaos. While in almost
10 Z. C. COLLADO

all contexts IDPs would need cash, Maranao IDPs apparently differ because their aspiration for
financial aid not only proceeds from displacement-induced poverty but arises out of their shared cul-
tural characteristics.

Conclusion
The general experience of peace and security, together with the fear of conflict reoccurring, contrib-
ute to the intention of a small minority of Maranao IDPs not to leave host households. If a home
deserves to be returned to, this inclination not to return is understandable since not all those who
were forced to leave really consider their places of origin “home” (Stefanovic, Loizides, and
Parsons 2014). Nonetheless, far more respondents expressed the intention to return despite the
peace that their current hosts offer. For the most part, this is because the economic enabling
factors outweigh the deterring factors. IDPs’ economic conditions tend to get worse than better in
post-displacement scenarios (IOM 2014). As a logical result, Maranao IDPs desiring business capital
assistance dominate the desired government aid. This implies that IDPs’ fear of conflict reoccurring
can be negated or outweighed by their desire to rebuild the economic infrastructures which sus-
tained them before. That desire coincides with Maranao identity.
Interestingly, the level of willingness to return among these IDPs shows a positive outlook for the
future of the city. Their dominant choice to return is their seemingly conscious and subconscious
desire to be at home both culturally and geographically. Culturally because Marawi City is home
to the same ethnic-linguistic group, and geographically since the city has always been the traditional
physical space of the Maranao people.
If the Maranao IDPs choose to return and if the government finds it the most durable solution, it is
incumbent upon the latter to provide assistance that allows a decent living condition, not only at the
household level but also in those communities shattered by war. Though return, not merely as an
event, but as a process is characterised by many challenges (Tegenbos and Vlassenroot 2018), a
very good start is for the government to be willing to help this specific group of IDPs through a cul-
turally appropriate response. In the light of the Maranao IDPs’ own considerations, meaningful assist-
ance must include a business capital package. Similar recommendations have also been made in
favour of other IDPs in parts of Africa (REACH 2017b). Financial assistance to start small businesses
and capacity building training to sustain their chosen livelihood would not only encourage return
intentions but also reduce vulnerabilities among IDPs.
After appropriate investment in income-generating programmes, an even better and bolder
move is for government to proceed towards crafting laws which protect the IDPs and their interests,
which is currently lacking in Philippine legislation. In Iraq, which experienced a much longer and
deeper conflict across broad areas, the same policy recommendations were pushed (Constantini
and Palani 2018). If we are to believe that repatriation is the “only effective solution”, as the UN
suggests, then the return-restraining obstacles must be negated accordingly, which must involve
the enactment of protective national laws and related policies as well as providing culturally
sound assistance so that it is increasingly possible for IDPs to consider and develop intentions to
return.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This research was supported in part by grants from the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Innovation (OVCRI)
of De la Salle University – Manila, Philippines.
 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 11

Notes on contributor
Zaldy C. Collado is a PhD student in the Sociology Programme of the Behavioural Sciences Department, College of Liberal
Arts, De La Salle University, Manila. Collado is currently a research apprentice at Social Development Research Center
(SDRC) in De La Salle University, Manila.

ORCID
Zaldy C. Collado http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5929-0992

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