Karayianni - Psaltis - in Press - Tweeting For Peace

Online Information Review
Tweet for Peace: Twitter as a medium for developing a

peace discourse in the hands of the Greek-Cypriot and
On
Turkish-Cypriot leaders
Journal: Online Information Review

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Manuscript ID OIR-03-2022-0161.R1
Manuscript Type: Research Paper

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Twitter, Cyprus problem, Public Sphere, intergroup vicarious and

Keywords:
parasocial contact, intergroup relational identity
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Page 1 of 41 Online Information Review
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3 Tweet for Peace: Twitter as a medium for developing a peace discourse in the hands of
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the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders
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8 Abstract
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11 Purpose- The article examines how the two Cypriot leaders – the Greek-Cypriot community leader Nicos
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13 Anastasiades and the Turkish-Cypriot community leader Mustafa Akinci –have used their Twitter accounts during
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15 the period leading to the intensification of the Cyprus peace process between 30 April 2015– 30 November 2016.
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17 Design/Methodology/Approach- This article presents using descriptive analysis and thematic analysis how the two
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19 leaders have used Twitter in the negotiations’ period.

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22 Findings- The analysis shows that the leaders during the timeframe examined, developed both pro-peace
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discourses around the Cyprus problem as well as parasocial and vicarious intergroup contact that contributed in
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26 what Hogg (2015) defines an intergroup relational identity that is an effective form of “bridging” leadership across
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Originality/Value- The article argues that Twitter is a tool that in the hands of political leaders in segregated public
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32 spheres caused by yet unresolved ethnic conflicts, can become a useful tool for constructing both a positive
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34 meaning around issues concerning the rival sides as well as a tool for transforming opposing social identities in
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36 the formation of an “extended sense of self that includes the collaboration partner” (Hogg 2015, p.191).
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42 Introduction
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45 The media’s approach when framing news about the rival side in conflict-affected societies,
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47 becomes more negative when the peace process is in crisis. On the contrary, sharing media
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49 news across the conflicting lines can be beneficial to the process itself (Wolfsfeld, 2004)
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provided it resembles the conditions for beneficial intergroup contact set down by Allport
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54 (1954). The first, antagonistic framing, seems easier to achieve in places where sharing news
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56 about the peace process is being done separately and completely isolated for each conflicting
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side. This is the case in Cyprus, where the public sphere is segregated due to the different
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3 languages used by the media in the Greek-Cypriot (GC) and Turkish-Cypriot (TC) communities
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and most importantly due to the fact that the two communities live separated for more than 40
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8 years now. During this period of separation, the information about the ongoing peace process
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10 for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem as well as the intergroup contact relied heavily on
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the media that process information separately in the two communities. A way to overcome this
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15 segregation and to provide a more open platform for civic participation is by using a tool for
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17 information sharing that both transcends physical separation and creates a common ground of
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19 communication. Social media are undoubtedly tools that have both the aforementioned
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22 characteristics and whenever they are used for purposes of contact between the two
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communities in Cyprus a more inclusive form of public sphere is developed (Karayianni, 2013).
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27 This article explores the way information about the peace process are shared by the political
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29 protagonists of the process themselves, i.e. the two community leaders in Cyprus the GC leader
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N. Anastasiades and the TC leader M. Akinci, through their use of their Twitter accounts. The
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34 tweets published by the Cypriot leaders from the election of Mr. Akinci in 2015 until end of
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36 October 2016 just before the first Conference on Cyprus held in Mont Pelerin, are gathered and
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analysed aiming to understand how this new form of political diplomacy developed on Twitter
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41 could contribute to the development of intergroup contact that create a conducive environment
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43 for the Cyprus peace process.

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46 This research is relevant to the new directions of journalism, communication and intergroup
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48 contact theory in several different ways. First, the fact that many media organisations are forced
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51 to shut down or at least proceed in decreasing the number of their employees due to the difficult
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53 financial situation in which Cyprus is during the last few years as well as the social restrictions
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55 that the pandemic imposed, make Twitter as even a more significant tool for both information
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source and production. Second, the use of social media for sharing news stories related to the
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60 peace process and/or the other community the time they happen, provides the only platform for
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3 the formation of a public sphere which is inclusive to both communities in Cyprus. Finally, the
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way the two community leaders, choose to share information on these matters, i.e. their choice
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8 of words and the thematic emphasis they give each time they tweet as well as the very act of
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10 sharing their in-between contact or addressing the other community directly through their
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tweets constitutes examples of parasocial intergroup contact that aims in developing what Hogg
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15 calls an intergroup relational identity (2015, p.190). Vicarious contact emerges when one sees
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17 an ingroup member interacting with an outgroup member while parasocial contact is achieved
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19 when ingroup members connect with outgroup members through mediated contact (Banas,
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22 Bessarabova & Massey, 2020).
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25 This article examines (RQ1) how the two Cypriot community leaders, shared information and
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27 constructed meaning around the Cyprus problem on Twitter and (RQ2) how their tweeting
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29 activity achieved parasocial and vicarious intergroup contact tweeting that developed an
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intergroup relational identity for the Cypriots, an identity that could affect positively the peace
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34 process.
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40 Twitter and politics
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43 According to Twiplomacy 2020, “the governments of only four countries do not have a Twitter
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45 presence, namely Laos, North Korea, Sao Tome and Principe and Turkmenistan” (Twiplomacy,
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47 2020). After the departure of Barak Obama, Donald Trump is still the most followed world
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50 leader with 81 million followers, followed by Indian Prime-Minister Narendra Modi with 57.9
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52 million followers and Pope Francis with 51.2 million followers.
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55 It seems that world’s leaders understand the power that Twitter has given them as a channel of
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57 communication with the public. As Broersma and Graham place it “tweeting offers politicians
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the opportunity for a virtual handshake and direct conversation with voters” (2015, p.96).
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3 Scholars, who have recognised the political use of Twitter, have examined the links between
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the leaders’ or politicians’ twitter activity with their political power. Gainous and Wagner
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8 (2014) examined of the way social media’s use by candidates generated votes in US elections
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10 to argue that this can make them win or lose elections. They also suggest that the new
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interactions among people and new relationships that are developed online affect political
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15 engagement and participation (Gainous and Wagner, 2014). Furthermore, the political use of
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17 Twitter has expanded the “hybrid ways in which politics is now mediated” (Chadwick, 2013,
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19 p.102), meaning that the political information cycle is now more unpredictable as it depends on
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22 both elite and non-elite actors who are both involved in the news production process (Chadwick,
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2013).
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27 Researchers who examine the phenomenon of Twiplomacy however, are constantly questioning
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29 as Sykes successfully puts it: “what comes first, the power or the tweet?” (2013, p.3). These
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studies usually compare the communication practices followed by political actors both offline
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34 and online and most of them conclude that the political actors that dominate the offline political
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36 discourse tend to do so in the social media context too (Jürgens & Jungherr, 2011, Jungherr &
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Jürgens 2014; Klinger, 2013). Research has identified exceptions too however, like the Green
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41 Party in Switzerland that dominated the political discussion on Twitter until 2009 (Rauchfleisch
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43 & Metag, 2016) or the Pirate party in Germany which dominated the online political discussion
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45 even before winning any parliament seats (Jungherr, 2014).
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48 Bjola et. al. (2019), in his seminal work on digital diplomacy highlights the significance of the
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51 use of digital technology in public diplomacy. As he places it:
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By going “digital,” the once secretive and exclusive domain of the elite has also gone
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56 public, requiring diplomats to regularly look outside their once closed doors, and
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3 perhaps more importantly, for the first time, allowing citizens to look in (Bjola &
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Cassidy, 2015, p. 10).
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Furthermore, digital diplomacy helps bridging offline and online communities (Bjola et. al.,
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11 2019) as well as enabling agenda-setting, presence-expansion and conversation-generating
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13 (Bjola & Jiang, 2015). Aharony after studying the tweeting activity of three world leaders,
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concludes that they use Twitter as a channel that allows them to convey their own agenda to the
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18 public as what they say stays unfiltered and uncensored by the national and local media (2012,
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20 p.606). Some scholars however, observed that interaction with the public was rare and
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22 concluded that social media are not tools that enhance deliberative discourses (Kim & Park,
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25 2012) while others observed that those users participating in these interactive processes with
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27 politicians are the already established members of the public debate, i.e. popular journalists and
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29 bloggers. However, these studies have also noted that the fact that there is a limited number of
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other users that also participate – many times anonymously – in the public dialogue should not
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34 be underestimated as it shows that in the online context public, discussion remains open to
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36 alternative participation (Asserhofer & Maireder, 2013; Larsson & Moe, 2012).
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39 Retweeting is an important function of Twitter as it allows the followers of a user to share a

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41 post with their own followers. From a flow of information in a network perspective, this means
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44 that retweeting carries the message in more places in a network. It helps the initial author-user
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46 of the message to engage with more people without the need to directly be connected with them
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48 (Boyd et al., 2010, p.1). Apart from the expansion of the network cause that retweeting
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51 facilitates however, the very act of retweeting is significant for more than this. Even though
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53 scholars do not agree of the actual meaning of retweeting, there are findings that argue that
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55 retweeting – with the exception of special groups of users like journalists – indicate the interest,
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trust and agreement of the retweeter to the message and its originator itself (Metaxas et al.,
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60 2015). Such findings become more significant in this current article whenever a user retweets
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3 the message of the leader of the other community. In other words, retweeting in the case of this
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study could be considered here as a prominent example of parasocial intergroup contact.
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Vicarious and parasocial intergoup contact
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The case study of the present article is an example of mediated contact that we see through the
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17 lens of the theory of vicarious and parasocial contact. The communication of the Cypriot leaders
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19 on Twitter is an example of intergroup mediated contact as it takes place on their official

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21 accounts on Twitter that could be followed by anyone at any time. According to Park (2012),
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mediated contact positively distinguishes from direct contact in terms of intergroup anxiety and
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26 that is because it usually takes place in an environment where people feel safe and in control.
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28 This is more than valid in the context of Twitter that allows the users to be part of the contact
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while being in the safety of their personal space. Instances of both vicarious and parasocial
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33 contact can be identified during the Twitter communication in the timeframe studied. Vicarious
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when they share their physical contacts through photos or textual messages on their accounts
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40 as the followers of the leaders are watching an ingroup member interacting with an outgroup
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42 member (Banas, Bessarabova & Massey, 2020; Harwood, Qadar, & Chen, 2016; Joyce &
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44 Harwood, 2014). The contact can be defined as parasocial when the focus of the Twitter user is
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47 not on an in-group member having contact with an out-group member but when the viewer
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49 creates the feeling of a direct connection to outgroup members via Twitter (Banas, Bessarabova
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51 & Massey, 2020; Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2005). In the case of the current research, any
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form of interaction between the twitter user and the leader of the other community is an instance
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56 of parasocial contact with a prototypical member (leader) of the outgroup.
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3 One of the social psychological mechanisms at work in mediated intergroup contact seems to
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be the activation of empathy (Zillman, 1994) which is a key variable in reducing prejudice. The
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8 Banas et al. (2020) meta-analysis suggests that both vicarious and parasocial contact have
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10 Identical effects on prejudice reduction (both r = −.26). However, they suggest that this does
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not necessarily mean that the same processes underlie those effects, although the fact that
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15 parasocial and vicarious contact can happen simultaneously in mediated contexts (Ortiz &
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17 Harwood, 2007) makes disentangling them challenging.
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20 In the case of the leaders’ tweeting there is also an additional social psychological variable that
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22 comes into play and enhances the potentially beneficial effects of contact which is category
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25 salience (i.e., the awareness of a contact person’s group membership) which was found to be a
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27 key moderator of contact effects (Brown & Hewstone, 2005), Paolini et al. (2010). Leaders are
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29 typical or representatives of the groups and in that sense generalisation from the specific
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encounter with the leader to the whole outgroup is facilitated.
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In the case a Twitter user (either GC or TC) witnessing their leaders interacting with each other
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37 on Twitter is thus a prime example of Vicarious Mediated Contact (VMC). This can be positive
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39 or negative. In the period we examine we mostly observe positive contact of that kind since this
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41 was the “honeymoon period” of the leaders (April 2015-October 2016), 1 year and 6 months.
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44 Furthermore, the fact that they are leaders in the case of VMC the element of identification with
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46 the Ingroup member (especially party supporters of the right-wing persuasion in the case of
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48 GCs) could further enhance the positive effects of prejudice reduction (see Harwood et. al.,
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51 2016). This also connects to the “two-step flow of communication” hypothesis elaborated by
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53 Katz (1957) as it highlights the way opinion leaders “bring the group into touch with this
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55 relevant part of its environment through whatever media are appropriate” (p.77).
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3 Finally, although, there is no research that measures the Cypriots’ engagement with the leaders’
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tweets specifically, a study curating the algorithmic and users’ civic attitudes concluded that is
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8 online-civic participation is preferred among the GC youth in contrast to the offline one, as it
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10 offers low-cost, flexible and effortless engagement (Papa & Photiadis, 2021).
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16 Leadership for an intergroup relational identity
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19 Social identity is usually developed through the process of identification with one’s ingroups’
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21 behavioural pattern and norms. This identification however most of the times requires some
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sort of rejection or exclusion of other behavioural patterns and norms that outgroup members
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26 have. It imposes some sort of juxtaposition between ‘me’ – who one is – and ‘the other’ – who
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needs to ostracise others. Therefore, when intergroup communication is in place the members
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33 of each group usually adopt a protective attitude towards their distinct identity (Hogg 2015,
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even aggressive. Leaders are important both in the process of identification and in the process
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40 of intergroup contact because they constitute a prototypical member of one’s group, “the most
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42 significant and reliable source of information about that identity” (Hogg, 2015, p.187). Thus, a
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44 conflictual intergroup contact could be overcome as Hogg suggests through an effective
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47 leadership that would promote (a) “a nonzero-sum superordinate [intergroup] relationship [and]
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49 cooperative interaction and (b) the groups have a prolonged, actual, observed or imagined
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51 contact with one another that is pleasant and cooperative” (2015, p.188-189). Leaders could
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embody this through the development of an intergroup relational identity (Hogg et al., 2012)
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56 which makes the relationship of the group with an outgroup part of the group’s identity (Hogg
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58 2015, p.189). Through an intergroup relational identity, the members of the groups participating
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3 in intergroup contact do not feel that their identity is threatened to lose its distinctiveness or
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uniqueness because they have an extended sense of self which includes the relationship with
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8 this particular other group (Hogg 2015, p.190).
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11 Furthermore, Hogg highlights several strategies that are required for successfully building this
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13 intergroup relational identity. These strategies are significant for the unfolding of the argument
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of this article conveying that the Cypriot leaders’ tweeting activity during the period examined,
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18 could effectively provide a conducive environment to the Cyprus peace process that is why it
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20 is important to list them below.

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23 The first strategy is a rhetoric that illustrates in pragmatic and imaginary ways the message that
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25 the whole is significantly greater than the parts; second, a boundary spanning that will be
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30 members; third, boundary-spanning leadership coalitions undertaken through the collaboration
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32 of the leaders of different groups themselves; fourth, external leadership appointments and
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transference of intergroup relational identity that will be embodied by the projection of already
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37 established relationship with an outgroup member aiming in developing new ones (Hogg 2015,
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39 pp.193-199).
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42 In this article, we consider the parasocial and vicarious intergroup contact that the two Cypriot
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44 leaders perform through their tweeting activity during the timeframe examined, as attempts of
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47 building an intergroup relational identity for the Cypriots of both communities. That is why
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49 when examining their tweeting activity we will looking for leadership following the above
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51 strategies. Given this reasoning this article examineshow exactly was the “honeymoon period”
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of the Akinci-Anastasiades leadership, that according to other research evidence1 played a
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56 positive role in reducing prejudice levels in both communities, manifested in Twitter use and
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60 1 https://infogram.com/prejudice-levels-of-gcs-towards-tcs-1hzj4o3y9kny34p?live
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3 what is the relationship of this practice with the relevant social psychological theories discusses
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earlier?
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Conflict and Hope in Cyprus
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Antagonistic nationalism between the largest communities in Cyprus, known today as GCs and
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14 TCs persisted despite the island’s proclamation as an independent state in 1960, leading to
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16 conflict that peaked in 1963-1968 with extremists of both communities. A coup organised in
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1974 against the elected president, Makarios, led to the invasion of the island by Turkey
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21 supposedly to protect and restore the rights of the TCs. Since then, the GCs live in the Republic
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23 of Cyprus (RoC) controlled south, and the TCs in the northern part of the island under the
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25 administration of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), recognised
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28 internationally only by Turkey. After 2003, physical contact between GCs and TCs is possible,
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30 under specific measurements, however bicommunal contact is until now rather stigmatised than
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32 normalised.
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35 Regardless of the numerous unsuccessful attempts, the Cypriots of both communities remain
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hopeful of a solution. According to Leshem (2017), hope is composed by two discrete
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40 components, desire and expectation and these components should be measured separately
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42 especially when one examines hope in societies in conflict (Psaltis et al., 2021). In Cyprus’
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44 case, the discourse of hope for a solution undoubtably dominates the public sphere(s) as is being
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47 produced and well established by different social institutions and means. This discourse
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49 however is mostly being expressed as a wish for a solution and not as an expectation often
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51 representing something abstract and impossible. This became evident with the opening of the
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crossing points in 2003 a totally unexpected measure for the GCs, despite the fact that their
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56 wish for solution and the desire to move freely across Cyprus was dominant throughout the
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58 years of separation. The realisation of what the GCs desired was a shocking experience because
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3 both the media and the political elites produced and maintained a discourse of hope which
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constructed the meaning of an abstract wish and not as a feasible expectation (Karayianni,
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8 2017).
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13 Methodological Note
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The leaders’ tweets for the timeframe 30 April 2015 – 31 October 2016 have been downloaded
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18 using the package rtweet in R studio.
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20 The data have been analysed in terms of their characteristics. Specifically, a descriptive analysis
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22 has been conducted to identify the features of the data collected.
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25 Because the interest of the particular research was only about the tweets related to the Cyprus
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27 problem, the total number of 1371 tweets produced by the leaders during the timeframe
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29 examined, have been read by the researchers and the ones related to the topic of interest have
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been selected. This resulted to a number of 668 tweets that they were then read again in an
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34 inducive approach as there were not a priori themes in a coding frame but rather the coding of
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36 data itself generated the main thematical categories and its subcategories. In the case of the GC
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leader, five main themes have been identified while in the TC leader’s case the coding resulted
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41 to six main themes.
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43 A thematic analysis conducted by the authors, generated thirteen subcategories (Table II)
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45 contained within those main themes identified. The aim of this analysis was to further
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48 understand how themes has been constructed within the leaders’ tweets. Thematic analysis has
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50 been chosen because of the flexibility it offers to the researcher as a method of analysis (Braun
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52 & Clarke, 2006, p.78) and because it allows organising data corpus into patterns. Categorizing
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data into thematical patterns helped understanding and comparing the themes for which in the
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57 two leaders’ twitter stream and thereafter to proceed with a discourse analysis to identify the
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59 meaning pursued in leaders’ tweets included in the themes. The categorization involved a
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3 rigorously and systematic and reviewing by the authors in order to ensure reliability. Moreover,
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specific analytical categories were used in the discourse analysis: the language(s) selected to be
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8 used by the leader (Greek, Turkish, English), the emotive language included in the tweets, the
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10 actors as conveyed by the discourse and the use of media (images, video) in the tweets.
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15 In the analysis we were also looking for evidence of parasocial and vicarious contact in the
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17 leaders’ Twitter stream and discourses that constructed an intergroup relational identity (Hogg
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19 2015) for the Cypriots of the two communities that is why there has been a special focus on the
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22 examination of their most retweeted messages and their characteristics.
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26 Findings and Analysis
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31 Table I presents some descriptive details of the leaders’ Twitter accounts. According to the
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33 metrics Anastasiades had more than double the number of Akinci’s followers, during that
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period. Although the number of friends, i.e. the number of people each leader was following is
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38 smaller than the one of their followers in both cases, Akinci appears to follow a larger number
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40 of users than Anastasiades.
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42 The examination of the leaders’ Twitter stream shows that more than half of the tweets (N=437)
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45 that Akinci has produced within this timeframe was related to the Cyprus problem or the other
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47 community while in the case of Anastasiades, the percentage of the Cyprus problem related
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49 tweets has been limited to the 36% (N=246).
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54 As expected each leader tweeted mostly in his native language, i.e. Greek for Anastasiades and
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56 Turkish for Akinci, following by a high number of tweets in English and a much smaller number
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of tweets in the language of the other community.
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[Table I goes here]
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10 Tweet themes
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The Cyprus problem related tweets of the two leaders have been coded according to their theme.
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15 This resulted to the identification of certain themes presented in Table II. In Anastasiades’ case,
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17 five main themes have been observed while in Akinci’s case apart from these same five themes,
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19 the coding process revealed one more. According to the metrics of Table II, the most commonly
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22 found theme (50.64%) in Anastasiades’ tweets is Reporting Contacts while the same theme
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takes the second place (36.15%) in Akinci’s tweets, following with a small difference the
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26 Expressing Feelings/Intentions which is the top theme (37.75%) in Akinci’s tweets. The
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Expressing Feelings/Intentions theme appears to be the second larger (19.48%) found theme in
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31 Anastasiades’ tweets but with quite a large difference from the first one while in the theme
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33 Announcing upcoming events is the third most found theme in both leaders tweets. The last
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common found theme in their tweets is the Sending Wishes one and finally in Akinci’s tweet
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38 an extra theme on Highlighting issues appears with a small percentage (1.83%). The majority
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40 of these themes have been broken down into smaller subcategories that are described separately
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42 for each community leader below.
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45 [Table II goes here]
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48 The leaders’ tweets constitute the outmost example of their communication with the public as
49
50
51 in comparison to all other media they might also have control of, their official social media
52
53 accounts are the ones that represent themselves, the prototypical members of their community.
54
55 Furthermore, what leaders say and do is significant for intergroup contact because “leaders not
56
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58
only set an attitude and behavioral agenda for a group but also convey information about social
59
60 identity” (Hogg 2015, p.187).
13
1
2
3
4
5
6
Reporting contacts
7
8 Scrutinizing the tweets of the Reporting Contacts theme gives us more indications about the
9
10 meaning each leader was trying to communicate.
11
12
13
14
On
15 The fact that Anastasiades mostly reported how he discussed the Cyprus problem during his
16
17 contacts with international officials illustrates Anastasiades’ attempt to enhance the discourse
18
li
19 of the Cyprus problem as an issue that the international community cares about. In the tweet
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20
21
that follows Anastasiades produces the meaning that important international powers as the EU
22
23
or US not only know, but also care about the Cyprus problem and most importantly about the
Inf
24
25
26 GC side’s efforts to find a solution. Meanwhile, this kind of tweets constitute reminders about
27
or
28 the recognised status of the RoC because only an equally international recognised country could
29
30
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31 have such contacts.

32
33 “I had the opportunity to brief @JunckerEU on the latest developments in the negotiations for
34
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35 a settlement of the #Cyprus Problem”.

36
37 (Anastasiades, 16 July 2015)
38
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39
40
41
42
Akinci tweeted to report mostly something related to the contacts he had with Anastasiades,
ev
43
44 either on the context of negotiations or in a social context. Some other common subcategories
45
iew
46 that appeared within this theme were that of reporting contacts with officials of other countries
47
48
and that of reporting contacts with UN officials. Other tweets within this theme have been
49
50
51 posted by Akinci in order to report contacts and related activities with
52
53 politicians/organisations/bodies while a few others report contacts with EU officials and
54
55 contacts with Turkish officials.
56
57
58
59
60
14
1
2
3 Similarly, the discourse of informing and gaining the support of the international community
4
5
6
has been developed by Akinci’s tweets under this theme. In the following tweet Akinci attempts
7
8 to construct two meanings: 1. That despite the unrecognised international status of the TRNC2,
9
10 the TC community’s efforts for solution are not invisible but supported by significant powers
11
12
in the international community and 2. that the solution to the Cyprus problem will come through
13
14
On
15 EU and this will offer them the European identity that they desire.
16
17
18 “The British Foreign Secretary @PHammondMp just called me and reiterated his support for
li
19
the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem”.
ne
20
21
22
23
(Akinci, 6 June 2016)
Inf
24
25 The lower number of tweets by Akinci that report contact with Turkish officials in comparison
26
27
or
28 to Anastasiades’ tweets that communicate contact with Greek officials is an indication for his
29
30 attempt to promote a TC identity that is detached from Turkey This meaning is being
ma
31
32 constructed in tweets with discourse that describe the contact with the Turkish official as contact
33
34
among equal parts.
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35
36
37
“Received Turkish FM @MevlutCavusoglu. Had a very constructive exchange of opinion on
38
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39
40 #CyprusProblem & #cooperation”.
41
42
ev
(Akinci, 26 November 2015)

43
44
45 Moreover, the leaders reported largely their in-between contacts both in the context of
iew
46
47
48
negotiations as well as in social context. They communicated information about the
49
50 environment in which the talks are taking place describing most of the times a positive
51
52 ambience like “[the meeting was] long but in a friendly atmosphere”, “constructive meeting”
53
54
“It has been a very fruitful meeting”, or by sharing media that reflected the atmosphere of the
55
56
57 information shared. These tweets constitute (a) examples of vicarious contact as each
58
59
60
15
1
2
3 community sees their leader to communicate with the outgroup leader and (b) the leaders’
4
5
6
attempt to develop an intergroup relational identity since they appear in both the formal
7
8 negotiations context and in more casual contexts to apply what Hogg calls as strategy of
9
10 “boundary-spanning leadership coalition” (2015, p.195). Such an example are tweets like the
11
12
ones below, in which Akinci shares with the public details and a photograph (Image 2) of the
13
14
On
15 two leaders’ walk in the two sides of the divided Nicosia.
16
17
18 “It was great to walk (together in Arasta, have coffee & ekmek kadayfi3 al the historic Buyuk
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19
Han then walk through Lidras & Onassagorou”.
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20
21
22
23
“We had a good start. Continuing well and concluding well is much more important. We
Inf
24
25 should all work to not cause new disappointments”.
26
27
“I met Mr. @AnastasiadesCY at the Check Point and we had a walk around Arasta.++”
or
28
29
30 (Akinci, 23 May 2015)
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31
32
33
34
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36 Sharing Statements.
37
38
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39 13.85% of Anastasiades’ tweets were about sharing statements related to the ongoing
40
41 negotiations on the Cyprus problem. Several subcategories have emerged from this theme as
42
ev
43
44
Anastasiades tweeted to directly inform the public on the ongoing negotiations process, to share
45
iew
46 his appearances or other kind of media material he published in local and international media
47
48 and lastly to share his own or other people’s speeches on the Cyprus problem. In Akinci’s case,
49
50
the majority of the statements were related to the negotiations process followed by a
51
52
53 subcategory which includes tweets in which he shared media material. The two smallest
54
55 subcategories emerged from tweets in which Akinci shared (a) speeches he gave on several
56
57
58
59
60 3 Traditional Turkish sweet.
16
1
2
3 occasions and (b) third parties’ statements. In this theme the leaders shared instantly statements
4
5
6
that relate to the negotiations process, speeches they had given on several occasions and their
7
8 appearances in international or local media. This allows the leaders to inform the public directly,
9
10 conveying their own agenda while keeping it this way unfiltered and uncensored by the national
11
12
and local media (Aharony 2012, p.606). Similarly, within the Announcing Upcoming Events
13
14
On
15 theme the leaders tend to inform the public about topics they intend to discuss in their meetings,
16
17 about activities/events they plan to participate and about political decisions they took. This
18
li
19 instantaneity “to describe the drama if events unfolding, being recorded and reported online
ne
20
21
22 instantly” (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2012: 8) engages the interest of the public and creates a
23
unique unfiltered relation the leaders and the public. By sharing this kind of information in
Inf
24
25
26 their tweets the leaders are not just newsworthy sources but are becoming themselves producers
27
or
28
29
of the news stories content.
30
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31
32
33
34
Expressing Feelings/Intentions.
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35
36
37
This constitutes the second most commonly found theme in the Anastasiades’ tweets and the
38
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39
40 largest (38.2%) found in Akinci’s tweets. Within this theme the leaders expressed a variety of
41
42 feelings in relation to the Cyprus peace process and/or the other community. The largest
ev
43
44 subcategories identified were that of expressing: (a) warnings and (b) hope/expectation for
45
iew
46
47 solution.
48
49
50 For example, when the negotiations restarted after the election of Akinci in 2015 both leaders
51
52 tweeted to express their feelings of hope. Anastasiades tweeted:
53
54
55 “I hope that today will be the beginning of a bright future for all Cypriots and for our country
56
57 @MustafaAkinci_1 @EspenBarthEide #Cyprus”.
58
59
60 (Anastasiades, 15 May 2015)
17
1
2
3 This discourse of hope for a solution is more intense in the case of the TC leader and differs
4
5
6
slightly in terms of the meaning the two are trying to construct. Akinci seems to separate in his
7
8 tweets what he and his community are wishing for from what he is expecting in terms of a
9
10 solution. The majority of Anastasiades’ tweets in this category express mostly the component
11
12
of desire and not that of expectation. This is indicated by his use of words that represent the
13
14
On
15 meaning of desire of a rather abstract idea of a better future like in the tweet above. On the
16
17 contrary, Akinci moves beyond the limits of expressing a wish for reaching a solution to
18
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19 expresses his expectation rather than simply his desire. Most of the times he avoids the use of
ne
20
21
22 words like “wish”, “hope”, “desire” that denote just desire but he rather constructs his discourse
23
in a way that produces the meaning of expectation to achieve his goal, like in the tweet below:
Inf
24
25
26
27 “The Natural Calendar is 2016 and This Target is the Common Target of All Parties”.
or
28
29
30 (Akinci, 26 September 2016)
ma
31
32
Here, Akinci moves the discourse of hope from the abstract meaning of wish for a solution to
33
34
tio
35 the one of expectation because he uses “expectation indicators” (Leshem, 2017) such as: a date,
36
37 the word “target” and the characterisation “the common goal”.
38
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39
40 Another subcategory within this theme is that of Warnings. Although both leaders made tweets
41
42 that expressed some kind of warning, their recipient differs. The majority of Anastasiades
ev
43
44
45 warning tweets have as receivers either specific circles within the GC community that act in
iew
46
47 ways that are harmful to the peace process or to Turkey that acts in ways that are not acceptable.
48
49 The tweet that follows is a warning to those in the GC community who acted violently to TCs
50
51
52
in certain incidents.
53
54
“The state is not going to tolerate behaviors by people who, by invoking pseudo-patriotism,
55
56
57
aim to divide our country”.
58
59 (Anastasiades, 16 November 2015, originally in Greek)
60
18
1
2
3 Similarly, Anastasiades sends a warning to circles of the GC political elite when he tweets:
4
5
6 “Let the parties take into account the costs they may incur during the dialogue with unfounded
7
8 allegations”.
9
10
11 (Anastasiades, 31 August 2016, originally in Greek)
12
13
14
On
15
16
17 In both examples, Anastasiades condemns GCs’ behavior towards the TCs, setting as the
18
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19 prototypical member of the GC community the “attitudinal and behavioral agenda” (Hogg
ne
20
21
2015, p.187) for his group.
22
23
Inf
24
The warnings that Akinci is expressing through his tweets have as a receiver mainly the GC
25
26
27 community. In most of his tweets he makes the target of the warning explicit. For example:
or
28
29
30 “If the Greek Cypriot side internalizes that the Turkish Cypriot people have as much say in
ma
31
32 these lands as they do, a solution is possible in 2016”.
33
34
(Akinci, 26 September 2016, originally in Turkish)
tio
35
36
37 Through this kind of tweets, he constructs the meaning of a solution that will ensure and secure
38
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39
40 equal power sharing between the two communities. Such a discourse has a similar purpose to
41
42 what Anastasiades is doing with the warnings sent to Turkey and the other side, it offers an
ev
43
44 affirmation to his ingroup that the only solution discussed is that the group’s identity is not
45
iew
46
47
threaten.
48
49
50
Sending wishes/Paying Tribute. Twelve tweets of Anastasiades, have been associated to
51
52 sending wishes on significant days for the two communities.. Again, subcategories have been
53
54 identified within this theme like sending wishes to the public on religious holidays most of
55
56
which were associated to religious holidays of the TC community and a subcategory of sending
57
58
59 religious on national days some of which again addressed both communities. For Akinci was
60
19
1
2
3 the smallest theme found (2.05%), however, interesting subcategories have been revealed. The
4
5
6
largest subcategoryincludes tweets with which Akinci was sending wishes to specific people
7
8 and/oorganisations in the GC community. In the rest of thetweets he sent wishes to either both
9
10 communities or to the GC community on the occasion of religious holidays.
11
12
13 The leaders’ tweets within this theme often took the form of expressing solidarity. The
14
On
15
solidarity is being triggered for two reasons; either because of an incident that occurred to the
16
17
18 other community or because of a special day/occasion/celebration that the other community
li
19
ne
20 has. Anastasiades for example posted four tweets (two in Greek and two in Turkish) on 16
21
22 November 2015 to condemn the attacks against TCs in the south. He also tweeted to send his
23
Inf
24
25 condolences to the families of the accident victims in Pentadaktylos (in the north) on 29
26
27 November 2015. Similarly, Akinci posted six tweets (in Turkish, English and Greek) on 21-22
or
28
29 June 2016 to send a message of sadness about the ecological disaster and his condolences to
30
ma
31
32
the family’s victim of the Troodos fire (in the south).
33
34
It is worth noting the solidarity themed tweets were largely favoured and retweeted by leaders’
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35
36
37 followers from both communities (a detailed discussion follows).
38
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39
40 This discourse can also be identified in the selection of specific words or phrases like
41
42 “together”, “all Cypriots”, “Cypriot people”, “our country”, “we can”, “united”, “solidarity” all
ev
43
44 prominent in the tweets. The solidarity discourse constitutes an example of what Hogg calls the
45
iew
46
47 “rhetoric strategy” for building an intergroup relational identity as the leaders emphasize the
48
49 need for intergroup cooperation and stress the linkage between the two communities in an
50
51 attempt to “transform a largely pragmatic, instrumental, and surface behavioral collaboration
52
53
54
into a self-definition” (Hogg 2015, p.194) for the members of their community.
55
56
57
58
59
60
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 Announcing Upcoming Events.
10
11
12 Four subcategories emerged from this theme as Anastasiades’tweets announced different types
13
14
On
of upcoming activities/events:: (a) the participation of Anastasiades in events, activities both
15
16
17 abroad and in Cyprus and (b) upcoming meetings with Akinci, (c) the issues that would be
18
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19 discussed in the upcoming negotiations meeting with Akinci, and (d) political decisions.
ne
20
21
22 Most of Akinci’s tweets were related to announcing topics to be discussed, future meetings
23
Inf
24 (social or political) and future events. Two much smaller subcategories included tweets in
25
26
27 which Akinci announced political decisions and tweets in which he announced meetings with
or
28
29 third party officials. The tweet that follows is indicative of how such information was
30
ma
31 communicated by the leaders.

32
33
34 “Today, we decided to conduct two meetings in both June and July with Mr.
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35
36
37
@AnastasiadesCY. We took steps in a constructive spirit”.
38
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(Akinci, 28 May 2015)
40
41
42
The leaders with these tweets shared exclusive information with the public that would otherwise
ev
43
44
45 remain in the elite domain or it would reach the public only if the media of the two communities
iew
46
47 shed light on them.
48
49
50 Retweeting as a parasocial intergroup contact
51
52
53 Particular focus has been given on the retweeting of the leaders’ messages as we consider
54
55 whenever a user retweets a message of the leader of the other community as a prime example
56
57
58
of parasocial contact. The ten most retweeted (Table III) related to the Cyprus problem tweets
59
60
21
1
2
3 of each leader have been examined further in order to identify the ethnicity of the retweeters4
4
5
6
and other characteristics of these tweets.
7
8
9
The first observation is that only one out of the top ten tweets of each leader does not have
10
11 retweeters from the other community. In four of Anastasiades’ tweets, the TC retweeters are
12
13 more than everyone else. Also, four of his most retweeted messages were written in both Greek
14
On
15
and Turkish, two in Turkish and the other four in English. Three of these tweets include photos
16
17
18 and one of them a video. Like photos (Image 1) showing the leaders crossing together the
li
19
ne
20 barricade that divides Nicosia in two orshowing him high fiving with a citizen (most probably
21
22 a TC) during the leaders’ stroll in the northern part of Nicosia. The video link that is included
23
Inf
24
25 in one of his tweets shows the leaders sharing wishes for the New Year in each other’s language.
26
27 The short video starts with a few backstage scenes in which the leaders are laughing together
or
28
29 after a few failing attempts of Anastasiades to speak Turkish.
30
ma
31
32 [Table III goes here]
33
34
Although Akinci’s top ten tweets have a slightly lower count of retweets, all of them include
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35
36
37 GC retweeters. The GC retweeters are more than anyone else in three of these tweets and six of
38
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39 them are written in English, two of them are in Turkish, one tweet in Greek and one is written
40
41 in both languages. Akinci used media five times in these tweets, one of which is the same video
42
ev
43
44 of New Year’s wishes that Anastasiades has also shared. In the rest four cases he has shared
45
iew
46 photos that mostly showed the leaders together in an informal, friendly atmosphere (Image 2.
47
48
49 [Image 1 goes here].
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58 4Twitter limits the retweeters’ viewing to 30-50 users per tweet so the analysis was based on that number of users
59
only.
60
22
1
2
3 [Image 2 goes here].
4
5
6 The examination of the leaders’ top retweeted messages provides evidences of parasocial
7
8 intergroup contact. We see users of the other community not just following the tweeting activity
9
10
of the leaders and their in between interaction – which are instances of vicarious contact – but
11
12
13 in many occasions we see users interacting with them by amplifying, disseminating and
14
On
15 agreeing with their messages through retweeting. Furthermore, the leaders often choose to
16
17 address the members of the other community directly – and often solely them – by either using
18
li
19
their language (or English) or by sending them wishes on their religious holidays. The tweets
ne
20
21
22 written in the outgroup’s language are perhaps the most obvious examples of parasocial
23
Inf
24 intergroup contact since the leaders are communicating a message directly to the other
25
26
27
community. This effort of engagement with the other community becomes more significant in
or
28
29 this case as its being done by the prototypical member of the other group, the community leader,
30
ma
31 making both the parasocial and vicarious contact as well as the message sent highly effective.
32
33
34 Looking at these leaders’ attempts for vicarious and parasocial contact through the lens of the
tio
35
36
intergroup relative identity theory (Hogg, 2015), we conclude that the leaders use the strategies
37
38
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39 of “boundary spanning” and “boundary-spanning leadership coalition” (ibid). The strategies

40
41 are applied whenever they share a photo or a video that illustrates their positive in-between
42
ev
43 interaction and their application is being expanded whenever the leaders are tweeting to address
44
45
iew
46 the other community directly. Both strategies provide an imaginary of an extended sense of
47
48 identity for their ingroup members which includes the collaboration partner (Hogg 2015,
49
50 p.191), in our scope the other community.
51
52
53
54
55
56 Discussion and Conclusion
57
58
59
60
23
1
2
3 World leaders acknowledge that virtual handshakes on Twitter (Broersma and Graham, 2015)
4
5
6
constitute a necessary way of mediating politics in the hybrid media landscape (Chadwick,
7
8 2013) as it can help them win or lose elections (Gainous and Wagner, 2014). This was the first
9
10 time that Cypriot leaders have used Twitter to share information about the Cyprus problem, to
11
12
address the other community or to communicate publicly with each other. The analysis of the
13
14
On
15 leaders’ tweets illustrated how the leaders during that specific timeframe examined, made peace
16
17 efforts an on-going news story becoming themselves a bridge of contact between the two
18
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19 communities. Instantaneity, that characterises the Twitter in combination with the fact that the
ne
20
21
22 information was produced by the most official source – the GC and TC leaders – offered the
23
public stories that not only they aligned “with many of the dominant news values relevance,
Inf
24
25
26 proximity, […] drama and action” (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2012) but also information that did
27
or
28
29
not need to be fact-checked. This is particularly important in Cyprus where the public sphere
30
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31 has been segregated since the separation of the two communities. The leaders have often used
32
33 their tweets to address both communities together or even only the other community by using
34
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the other community’s language or English as a common language. Such occasions are
36
37
38 extremely rare in the public sphere that is facilitated by the media of the island. This study
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39
40 shows though, that digital diplomacy is also useful in conflict-affected societies for contributing
41
42 to the development of a conducive environment to any on-going peace efforts. The findings
ev
43
44
45 indicate that whenever the Cypriot leaders tweeted about the Cyprus problem they were setting
iew
46
47 up a pro-peace digital agenda (Bjola et al. 2019; Aharony, 2012), choosing themes and
48
49 constructing discourses that brought the two communities together in the online domain though
50
51
52
vicarious and parasocial intergroup contact and that consequently developed an intergroup
53
54 relational identity (Hogg, 2015) among the two rival sides, something which is not possible
55
56 within the segregated public sphere of Cyprus. This also underlines that is not enough to
57
58
examine political, media and cultural environments to understand intergroup contact in conflict-
59
60
24
1
2
3 affected societies. Digital diplomacy and the way that intergroup contact is achieved through it
4
5
6
needs to be taken into consideration. The study also demonstrated that, at least during the
7
8 specific timeframe examined, the two community leaders – who were the protagonists of the
9
10 peace negotiations – were supportive towards a solution to the Cyprus problem and through
11
12
their Twitter accounts contributed in building a conducive environment to the peace process
13
14
On
15 despite any negative voices that dominated the media landscapes of the two communities.
16
17
18 This research has also confirmed that “going digital the once secretive and exclusive domain of
li
19
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20 the elite [becomes public] allowing citizens to look in (Bjola & Cassidy, 2015, p. 10). The two
21
22 community leaders have constantly tweeted to report their in-between meetings, to share
23
Inf
24
25 exclusive details about what they have discussed between them behind closed doors and to
26
27 announce relevant upcoming events or meetings. Moreover, Twitter has offered a medium to
or
28
29 the leaders for expressing solidarity towards the other community in an instant and in many
30
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31
32
occasions in a personalised way.
33
34
Research shows that retweeting indicates the interest, trust and agreement of the retweeter with
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36
37 the message and its originator (Metaxas et al. 2015) thus, the retweeting of leader’s tweets by
38
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39 users of the other community constitute intergroup contact that is defined by positive feelings.
40
41 This highlights again that the affordances of the social media constitute important features for
42
ev
43
44 intergroup communication in a segregated public sphere like the Cypriot one.
45
iew
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53 The main contributions of this article are (a) that it inserts into the discussion of conflict
54
55 transformation the role of communication through social media,(b) that social media can be
56
57 more than just tools of diplomacy in the hands of politicians but they could become tools for
58
59
60
building what Hogg (2015) defines as an intergroup relational identity, a necessary social
25
1
2
3 identity for effective intergroup contact and (c) the practical application that the results offer as
4
5
6
they could have an impact on the Cypriot community leaders’ (and their consultants) regarding
7
8 their behaviour on social media especially in periods of intensive negotiations. This article
9
10 showed that in areas of frozen but yet unresolved conflicts, Twitter is a necessary tool for
11
12
mediating politics in the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2015) as it provides the leaders of
13
14
On
15 the rival sides ways for achieving both vicarious and parasocial intergroup contact.
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17 Furthermore, when the themes and discourses developed by the leaders’ tweets are
18
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19 characterised by positive emotions it means that the intergroup vicarious and parasocial contact
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22 takes place in a positive ambience that is conducive to the peace efforts.
23
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25
26
27
or
28 References
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Aharony, N. (2012). Twitter use by three political leaders: An exploratory analysis. Online
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33 Information Review, 36(4), 587-603.
34
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36 Asserhofer, J. & Maireder, A. (2013). National politics on Twitter: Structures and topics of a
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38 networked public sphere. Information, Communication & Society, 16(3), 291-314.
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41 Banas, J.A., Bessarabova, E., Massey, Z.B. (2020). Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and
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43 Prejudice. Human Communication Research, 46(2-3), 120–160.

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45
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46 Boyd, D., Golder, S. & Lotan, G. (2010). Tweet, Tweet, Retweet: Conversational Aspects of
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49 Retweeting on Twitter, 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1-
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51 10). IEEE.
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54 Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research
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56 in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101.
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26
1
2
3 Broersma, M. & Graham, T. (2015). Tipping the Balance of Power Social Media and the
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6
Transformation of Political Journalism. In A. Bruns, E. Gunn, E. Skogerbo, A.O. Larsson
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8 and C. Christensen (Eds), The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics (pp. 89–
9
10 103). Routledge.
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13 Brown, R., & Hewstone, M. (2005). An integrative theory of intergroup contact. In M. P. Zanna
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(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 255–343). Elsevier.
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Bruns, A. & Moe, H. (2014). Structural Layers of Communication on Twitter. In K. Weller, A.

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21 Bruns, J. Burgess, M. Mahrt, & C. Puschmann (Eds.), Twitter and society (pp. 15–28).
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23 Peter Lang.
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26 Bjola, C., Cassidy, J., & Manor, I. (2019). Public diplomacy in the digital age. The Hague
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49 2020/
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52 Wolfsfeld, C. (2004). Media and the Path to Peace. Cambridge University Press
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1
2
3 Table I. Descriptive details of the leaders Twitter account
4
5 Nicos Mustafa Akinci
6
Anastasiades
7
8 Followers 103665 41283
9 Friends 171 385
10 Tweets Related 246 437
11 to the Cyprus Problem
12 Tweets in Greek 373 10
13
14
Tweets in Turkish 6 629
On
15 Tweets in English 245 159
16
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18
li
19
ne
20
21
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23
Inf
24
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or
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ma
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tio
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39
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iew
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1
2
3 Table II. Themes identified in the leaders’ tweets that are related to the Cyprus
4
5 problem
6
7 Nicos Anastasiades Mustafa Akinci
8 Number of Tweets % Number of Tweets %
9 Reporting 119 51.51 137 31.35
10 Contacts
11
Sharing 32 13.85 42 9.61
12
13 Statements
14 Sending 12 5.19 9 2.05
On
15 Wishes
16 Expressing 47 20.34 167 38.2
17 Feelings/
18
li
Intentions
19
Announcing 17 7.35 44 10.06
ne
20
21 upcoming
22 events
23 Highlighting 14 3.20
Inf
24 issues
25
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or
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ma
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tio
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39
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ev
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iew
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1
2
3
4
5 Table III. Ten most retweeted tweets of each leader
6
On
7 GC leader
8
lin
9
10
Tweet Date Retweet TC Retweeters Media Language
11
eI
12 Count Count
13
nfo
14 Happy Bayram (translation in English of the original ‘Kurban 24 September 2015 172 16 - Turkish &
15
16
Bayraminizi en icten dileklerimle kutlarim. Χρόνια Πολλά!’) Greek
rm
17
18
Divided by time united by hope (translation in English of the 30 October 2016 168 9 Photo Greek &
ati
19
20
21 original ‘Μας χωρίζει ο χρόνος, μας ενώνει η ελπίδα - Turkish
on
22
23
Zamanla Bolunduk, Umutla Birlestik #UnitedByHope
24
Re
25
26 https://t.co/H3ifCinwZD’)
vie
27
28 The Rep of #Cyprus does not intend to consent to the opening 15 March 2016 117 0 - English
29
w
30 of any Chapters if #Turkey does not fulfill its obligations
31
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46
1
2
3
4
5 Μαζί διαμορφώνουμε το μέλλον @MustafaAkinci_1 23 May 2015 117 11 Photo Greek &
6
On
7 Together we create the future #Cyprus English
8
lin
9
10
http://t.co/QtqU2o3TyM http://t.co/pIXdQz1eDe
11
eI
12 The behavior of unintelligent persons towards our Turkish 16 November 2015 104 20 - Turkish
13
nfo
14 Cypriot citizens is unacceptable and deserves condemnation.
15
16
I express my deep sadness (translation in English of the
rm
17
18
original Akılsız kişilerin Kıbrıslı Türk vatandaşlarımıza karşı
ati
19
20
21 davranış kabul edilemez ve kınamayı hak eder. Derin
on
22
23 üzüntümü ifade ederim).
24
Re
25
26 I hope that the conditions for a substantive dialogue will be 11 May 2015 98 19 - English
vie
27
28 created, which will lead to the reunification of our country
29
w
30 #UnitedCyprus
31
32
33 The state does not tolerate such behavior of individuals or 16 November 2015 95 27 - Turkish
34
35 groups who want the permanent partition of the island on the
36
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39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
1
2
3
4
5 grounds of so-called patriotism. (translation in English of the
6
On
7 original ‘Devlet sözde vatanseverlik gerekçesiyle adanın
8
lin
9
10
kalıcı bölünmesini isteyen bireylerin veya grupların bu tür
11
eI
12 davranışlarına tahammül etmez’)
13
nfo
14 Wishes of friendship and unity (translation in English of the 24 December 2015 95 5 video Greek &
15
16
original ‘Ευχές φιλίας και ενότητας. Χρόνια πολλά! Mutlu Turkish
rm
17
18
Yillar’)
ati
19
20
21 We ought to deliver peace and prosperity @MustafaAkinci_1 23 May 2015 92 5 Photo English
on
22
23 #ReUnited #Cyprus http://t.co/RcqxrF3WLO
24
Re
25
26 I hope that today will be the beginning of a bright future for 15 May 2015 88 2 - English
vie
27
28 all Cypriots and for our country @MustafaAkinci_1
29
w
30 @EspenBarthEide #Cyprus
31
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39
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43
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45
46
1
2
3
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5 TC leader
6
On
7 Tweet Date Retweet GC Retweeters Media Language
8
lin
9
10
Count Count
11
eI
12 I want to send a message of optimism for finding a fair and 30 April 2016 116 13 Photo Greek
13
nfo
14 sustainable solution to the Cyprus problem. Happy
15
16
Resurrection, Happy Easter! (translation in English of the
rm
17
18
original ‘Θέλω να απευθύνω μήνυμα αισιοδοξίας για
ati
19
20
21 εξεύρεση δίκαιης και βιώσιμης λύσης στο Κυπριακό. Καλή
on
22
23 Ανάσταση, καλό Πάσχα!’)
24
Re
25
26 More than being Muslim or Christian, first we need to be 8 September 2015 112 18 - English
vie
27
28 human.
29
w
30 Tonight, we came together with Mr. @AnastasiadesCY, it 11 May 2015 105 20 - English
31
32
33 was a positive meeting, it was a good beginning.
34
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39
40
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46
1
2
3
4
5 Tonight, we came together with Mr. @AnastasiadesCY, it 11 May 2015 62 5 - Turkish
6
On
7 was a positive meeting, it was a good beginning. (translation
8
lin
9
10
in English of the original ‘Sn. @AnastasiadesCY ile bu akşam
11
eI
12 bir araya geldik. Olumlu bir görüşme ve iyi bir başlangıç
13
nfo
14 yaptığımızı düşünüyorum’)
15
16
Today, I met Mr. @AnastasiadesCY at the Check Point and 23 May 2015 59 8 Photo English
rm
17
18
we had a walk around Arasta. ++ http://t.co/WDZcQ08CGP
ati
19
20
21 Had fruitful mtng w/@JunckerEU Stressed the need to 30 June 2015 58 9 Photo English
on
22
23 prepare #TurkishCypriots to the #EU along w/ #Cyprus peace
24
Re
25
26 talks http://t.co/VWmuewbIlS
vie
27
28 In Switzerland on 7-11 Nov our goal will be to solve #CyProb 26 October 2016 57 9 - English
29
w
30 in 2016. Will discuss territory & all other outstanding
31
32
33 issues interdependently
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43
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1
2
3
4
5 We are on the 38th floor of UN Headquarters for the tripartite 25 September 2016 49 3 Photo Turkish
6
On
7 summit. Our goal is solution (translation in English of the
8
lin
9
10
original
11
eI
12 “Üçlü zirve için BM Genel Merkezi 38'inci kattayız.
13
nfo
14 Hedefimiz çözüm. https://t.co/HklVgFFxK0”)
15
16
We watched a play with @AnastasiadesCY and both Turkish 8 June 2015 47 11 Photo English
rm
17
18
and Greek Cypriot friends in Limassol.
ati
19
20
21 http://t.co/ilLHWT9xSa
on
22
23 Friendship and peace message for the New year. Merry 24 December 2015 46 10 Video Turkish &
24
Re
25
26 Christmas (translation in English of the original ‘Yeni yıl için Greek
vie
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28 dostluk ve barış mesajı. Καλά Χριστούγεννα...’)
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Karayianni - Psaltis - in Press - Tweeting For Peace

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Karayianni - Psaltis - in Press - Tweeting For Peace

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Online Information Review

Tweet for Peace: Twitter as a medium for developing a

Journal: Online Information Review

Manuscript Type: Research Paper

Twitter, Cyprus problem, Public Sphere, intergroup vicarious and

19 leaders have used Twitter in the negotiations’ period.

43 for the Cyprus peace process.

39 Retweeting is an important function of Twitter as it allows the followers of a user to share a

19 on Twitter is an example of intergroup mediated contact as it takes place on their official

20 is important to list them below.

31 have such contacts.

35 a settlement of the #Cyprus Problem”.

(Akinci, 26 November 2015)

31 communicated by the leaders.

39 of “boundary spanning” and “boundary-spanning leadership coalition” (ibid). The strategies

43 Prejudice. Human Communication Research, 46(2-3), 120–160.

Bruns, A. & Moe, H. (2014). Structural Layers of Communication on Twitter. In K. Weller, A.

28 Journal of Diplomacy, 14(1-2), 83-101.

28 Review. 32(1), 74-89.

31 during intractable conflicts. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 60, 60 – 66.

28 Twitter. New Media & Society, 18(10), 2413-2431.

39 Politics by Jason Gainous and Kevin M. Wagner. LSE.

46 Twiplomacy. (2020). The Twiplomacy Study. https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-

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