Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating The Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

Countering Global
Terrorism and Insurgency
Calculating the Risk of State Failure in

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq
Natasha Underhill
New Security Challenges Series
General Editor: Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security in the
Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick,
UK, and Director of the ESRC’s New Security Challenges Programme.
The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes
and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from
the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy community. In the
past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the
Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international
security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift
in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that
talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security
and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this
pressing political and research agenda.
Titles include:
Natasha Underhill
COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY
Calculating the Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq
Abdul Haqq Baker
EXTREMISTS IN OUR MIDST
Confronting Terror
Robin Cameron
SUBJECTS OF SECURITY
Domestic Effects of Foreign Policy in the War on Terror
Sharyl Cross, Savo Kentera, R. Craig Nation and Radovan Vukadinovic (editors)
SHAPING SOUTH EAST EUROPE’S SECURITY COMMUNITY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Trust, Partnership, Integration
Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides
EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EU LAW AND IR THEORY
Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (editors)
NATO: THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS
Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre
POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND PERILS OF SECURITY
Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations
Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (editors)
PURSUING STRATEGY
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi
Adrian Gallagher
GENOCIDE AND ITS THREAT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster
ANTI-WAR ACTIVISM
New Media and Protest in the Information Age
James Gow and Ivan Zverzhanovski
SECURITY, DEMOCRACY AND WAR CRIMES
Security Sector Transformation in Serbia
Toni Haastrup
CHARTING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH SECURITY
Contemporary EU-Africa Relations
Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Ben Zyla (editors)
NATO BEYOND 9/11
The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance
Carolin Hilpert
STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGE FOR SECURITY POLICY
Germany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan
Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran and Daniel Salisbury (editors)
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
New Approaches and Opportunities
Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht
RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY AFTER CONFLICT
Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone
Janne Haaland Matlary
EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICS
In the New National Interest
Sebastian Mayer (editor)
NATO’s POST-COLD WAR POLITICS
The Changing Provision of Security
Kevork Oskanian
FEAR, WEAKNESS AND POWER IN THE POST-SOVIET SOUTH CAUCASUS
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors)
WHOSE PEACE? CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PEACEBUILDING
Nathan Roger
IMAGE WARFARE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Aglaya Snetkov and Stephen Aris
THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS TO SECURITY
Other Sides of Afghanistan
Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams
GEO-POLITICS OF THE EURO-ASIA ENERGY NEXUS
The European Union, Russia and Turkey
New Security Challenges Series

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Countering Global
Terrorism and Insurgency
Calculating the Risk of State Failure in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq
Natasha Underhill
Lecturer in International Relations, Nottingham Trent University, UK
© Natasha Underhill 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-38370-9
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For my father James Underhill – gone
but never forgotten
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
List of Figures and Tables x

Preface xi
1 Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure 1

The problems of defining terrorism 2
What are the most common types of terrorism? 6
Insurgency 10
The problems of defining insurgency 11
What are the most common types of insurgency? 14
State failure 17
Defining and understanding state failure 17
Assessing and ranking a failed states 22
Summary 27
2 Assessing the Connections between State Failure,

Insurgency, and Terrorism 28
Failed states, terrorism, and insurgency:
what are the connections? 30
State failure = a terrorist/insurgent threat? 34
Summary 35
3 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

in Context – Part 1 37
The pre-Soviet era 38
The Soviet era (1979–1989) 40
The Taliban era (1994–2001) 43
9/11 and beyond 45
State failure in context: Afghanistan a failed state? 47
Government/state weakness 49
Breakdown/decline of social, political, and economic order 51
Safe havens 53
Porous borders 54
Pools of recruits 55
Availability of weapons 57
Government complicity and support 58
vii
viii Contents

Terrorism in Afghanistan 61
Factors influencing terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 64
Part 1: Political factors 64
Part 2: Economic factors 72
Part 3: Social/cultural factors 76
Part 4: External and environmental factors 78
Summary 80
5 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

The creation of a nation-state 84
Pakistan’s rapidly changing leadership 85
Musharraf’s Pakistan 91
Failure in context: Pakistan a failed state? 93
The Pakistani state: connections to terrorism and insurgency 98
Government/state weakness 98
Breakdown and decline of social, political,
and economic order 100
Safe havens 101
Porous borders 101
Pool of recruits 103
Government complicity/support 104

Terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan 109
The origins of state failure, terrorism and
insurgency in Pakistan 112
Summary 129
7 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

The pre-Saddam Hussein era 130
The Saddam Hussein era (1979–2003) 132
US invasion and post-Saddam Iraq 137
Contents ix
Failure in context: Iraq a failed state? 143

The Iraqi state connections to terrorism and insurgency 146
Safe havens 146
Porous borders 147
Pool of recruits 149
Government complicity and support 151
Summary 152
8 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in

Context – Part 2 153
Summary 172
9 Conclusion 174
Main findings of research 179
Concluding observations 186
Notes 189
Bibliography 212
Index 229
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1 Spectrum of state failure 25

1.2 Augmented spectrum of state failure 26
8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2012–2013 169
Tables
1.1 Definitions of terrorism 2

1.2 Definitions of insurgency 14
1.3 Definitions of state failure 19
1.4 Root causes of state failure 22
1.5 Studies and assessments of state failure 24
2.1 Foreign terrorist organisations 31
2.2 Failed states and incidents of terrorism 33
3.1 Afghanistan’s rank in Transparency
International’s annual CPI 48
4.1 Terrorist groups in Afghanistan 63
6.1 Terrorist/insurgent groups in Pakistan 111
7.1 Sanctions regimes in Iraq 136
8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2003–2014 168
9.1 Impact of factors used in case studies 180
9.2 Alternative state failure descriptions of the case studies 182
x
Preface
It has been argued that the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era
in international relations and also the beginning of the modern process
of state failure. The immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse was
that the world was no longer bipolar in its power structure; it was now
a US-led unipolar world. Along with this drastic shift came a change
in the understanding and focus of transnational threats. The issue of
a possible nuclear holocaust was now removed, and replacing it was a
new set of threats, including climate change, disease, poverty, the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and international
organised crime.1 It was also during this time that failed states became
a focus of international security studies. At this early stage, however, the
issue was not seen as one that posed a risk to the international system
or to international security in general. It was instead seen as having
temporary or little significance to the world other than in the arena of
humanitarian aid.2 In this regard, policy debates in the 1990s centred
on a number of core areas, including: humanitarian (through the use
of military) intervention (i.e. whether/when/how to intervene in failed
states); prevention; conflict resolution and peace-building; and policy
responses to particular aspects and/or consequences of state failure (e.g.
migration and disease). These were the key threats assigned to the failed
states of the world and there was little talk about their connections to
the growing trend of transnational terrorism with an Islamic flavour or
with the possible ties to the emergence of insurgencies.
This all changed with the events of September 11th 2001, after which
there emerged a growing number of arguments claiming that there was
a possible or even direct connection between these failed states, ter-
rorism, and insurgent activity. Essentially, state failure was now being
directly linked to this new era of transnational/international ‘Islamic’
terrorism and was seen as somehow being a key element in preventing
further attacks. Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a rapid expansion
of global counterterrorism efforts whose focus has been placed solely
on the prevention of the development of terrorist bases of operations
and terrorist safe havens within these failed states. These attacks, it
seemed, have acted as a much-needed wake-up call for international
leaders, showing them that it was possible for some of the world’s most
neglected states to become centres of global terrorism. This new way
xi
xii Preface
of thinking essentially emerged from the fact that the perpetrators and
planners of these attacks were traced back to one of the world’s poorest
states – Afghanistan. As a result, the supposed threats from these failed
states began to move to the forefront of counter-terrorism policy, espe-
cially that of the US. Since then, this centrality of failed states within
the global terrorist nexus has remained a persistent theme in both
foreign policy development and counterterrorism policy. It has also
now become the mantra of counter-insurgency theorists, who also posit
that the world’s failed states are significant players with regard to the
emergence of violent insurgent activity. In short, there is a widespread
assumption that state failure is central to contemporary global terrorism
and insurgency and therefore that addressing state failure is central to
countering both phenomena.
The overall aim of this book, therefore, is to try to assess whether or
not these types of failed states are more likely to promote terrorism or
to facilitate the emergence of insurgencies than other forms of state, i.e.
strong states. In order to adequately carry out this assessment, this book
aims to answer the following key questions relating to the possible links
or connections between failed states, terrorism and insurgency:
• To what extent do failed states play a role in the proliferation of

terrorism and emergence of insurgent activity?
• Is it possible to trace a pattern of failure that is more susceptible to
attracting or facilitating terrorism and terrorist organisations or to
enabling insurgencies to emerge?
• What are the underlying conditions of state failure that allow the
infiltration of terrorist organisations or insurgents into the territory
of the states concerned?
By addressing these key questions it may be possible to understand

whether or not there are any specific links between state failure,
terrorism, and insurgency. In addition, the possibility of developing
and identifying distinctive patterns of state failure that relate strongly
to terrorism and insurgency will be dealt with. In order to address these
issues, this book is divided into nine chapters. The first two chapters
will focus on understanding terrorism, insurgency and state failure;
and with assessing the connections between state failure, terrorism and
insurgency.
This will be followed by six chapters based on the three case studies
of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. These country studies will focus on
a number of key areas, including the historical background, the current
Preface xiii
levels of state failure, and the domestic and international terrorist threat
associated with each country. In this context the challenges posed
by trying to deal with the problems contained within them, and will
categorise the threats that emanate from these failed states by outlin-
ing, for example, how they are used as bases or safe havens by terrorist
organisations, how they are used as staging grounds for attacks, and
how they can be used to provide financing, recruits, and weapons for
terrorist organisations. The ways, if any, in which they play a role in
the emergence or facilitation of insurgencies, etc. will also be addressed.
As well as that, the existing debates regarding the role played by failed
states in the proliferation of terrorism on a global scale will be examined
and an assessment of the existing approaches and arguments related to
the relationship between state failure and terrorism will be carried out.
The concluding chapter provides an overview and general assessment
of the key points made throughout, providing the reader with a better
understanding of the phenomena of state failure, terrorism, and insur-
gency, as well as how these issues interact with one another.
1
Understanding Terrorism,
Insurgency, and State Failure
What do we think when we hear the word terrorism? What images are
conjured in our minds? Do we see planes crashing into skyscrapers,
bombs exploding in marketplaces, masked men armed with guns and
bombs? The images that the term terrorism creates vary from person
to person. As a concept, terrorism is one of the hardest phenomena to
define. There are hundreds of ways to define terrorism and hundreds
of more ways to outline its characteristics. The problem with this is
that without a solid understanding and definition of the concept, it
can never really be understood in its entirety. The aim of this chapter
is to try to develop a context for understanding terrorism as clearly
as possible. It will begin by trying to define terrorism in the modern
context by providing an overview of some of the most commonly
used definitions used today, and also by trying to develop a working
definition to be used as a basis of understanding for the remainder of
this book. From that, this chapter will then move on to look at the
various different forms of terrorism that affect our world today. The
focus of this section, however, will be on four distinct types of terrorism:
ethno-nationalist or ethno-separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism,
state-sponsored terrorism, and religiously motivated terrorism, in
particular Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Again, this is a monolithic
task in and of itself, but it is a necessary step that needs to be taken if a
complete understanding of terrorism is to be gained. It must be noted
at this early stage, however, that it is not the intention of this book to
try to fully define or explain terrorism or indeed state failure. It instead
seeks to provide the reader with a base from which they are able to
interpret the information, from which they are able to develop their
own understandings and ideas.
1
2 Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency
The problems of defining terrorism
In order to understand fully what terrorism is, a core definition or

understanding is essential. However, there is still no single globally
accepted definition of terrorism, which makes fully understanding
the concept extremely complex. Over the last two decades there have
been approximately 109 active definitions of terrorism used around the
world, which adds to the complexity of fully understanding what ter-
rorism is or what terrorism looks like.1 Table 1.1 contains just a few of
the many listed definitions of terrorism that are in use today. In order to
highlight the massive differences of understanding, the table is divided
Table 1.1 Definitions of terrorism
Organisation
US FBI/Code of The unlawful use of force and violence against

Federal Regulations persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
28CFR Section0.85 government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.2
United Nations Violence against persons or property with the aim of
Draft Convention intimidating a population, to force or prevent action
by a government or institutional organisation.3
US State Terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated
Department violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience.4
US Code Title 22 The term terrorism means premeditated,
Section 2656f(d) politically motivated violence perpetrated against
non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents.5
European Union Intimidation used to force or prevent government
action, to destabilise a state.6
Organisation of the Violence or threat thereof against persons, property,
Islamic Conference environment, resources, stability of state.7
United Nations Violence; provoke terror; intimidation in order
Security Council to force or prevent action by a government or
Resolution 1566 international organisation.8
OECD A terrorist act is an act including, but not limited to,
the use of force or violence, causing serious harm to
human life with the intent to influence or destabilise
any government or public entity and to provoke fear
and insecurity in support of a political, religious,
ethnic, ideological or similar goal.9
(continued)
Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure 3
Table 1.1 Continued
State/country
India An act of terrorism is comparable to a peacetime

war crime. An act of violence carried out by a group
against innocents
US Terrorism involves acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of
any State and that appear to be intended:
1. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population
2. To influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion
3. To affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.10
Australia Violence or threat of violence against persons/
property; Intimidation with the purpose of advancing
a political, religious, or ideological cause. To coerce or
influence a government.11
into two groups of definitions: those used by organisations and those

used by individual states or countries.
It can be seen from these definitions that there are a number of core
concepts or trends that are contained in each definition, but in general
none of the definitions agrees 100% with any of the others. These
discrepancies add to the confusion about how to define terrorism. and
make it difficult to provide a detailed outline of the core characteristics of
terrorism. Also, and making things even more confusing, there exists a
massive literature base which aims to try to create working definitions
and understandings of terrorism. Throughout this literature there is an
ongoing debate as to what the definition of terrorism should be and
what features this definition should contain. Bruce Hoffman, in his
work Inside Terrorism, defines terrorism as being:
The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or

the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change … Terrorism
is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects
beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is
meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target
audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an
entire country, a national government or political party, or public
opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there
is none or to consolidate power where there is very little12
This definition encompasses many of the elements that are seen as

being necessary for an act of violence to become an act of terrorism,
i.e. the use of violence, targeting civilians, political motivations, influ-
ence and the promotion of fear. These are some of the most common
features contained in the literature with regard to the characteristics of
terrorism, as well as to the understanding of the concept of terrorism in
general. There are, however, various differing viewpoints and opinions
on how terrorism should be defined and what features an act of terror-
ism should encompass. It has been argued, for instance, that terrorism
must contain the following characteristics in order for it to be defined
as being a specific act of terrorism: the use of violence; large-scale
destruction; threat of same; creation of a climate of terror; and finally
the use of intimidation, in order to publicise a cause.13 In essence, if
these characteristics are not present, then the act remains an act of
violence, not an act of terrorism. Alternatively, Alex P. Schmid et al.
define terrorism as the use of arbitrary violence which causes anxiety;
the exploitation of emotions; and an act which can be described as
being the peacetime equivalent to war.14 Yet, terrorism has also been
defined as being a collective action and political act taken in the name
of a group based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism, or ideological
orientation with the aim to gain political needs through the use of
violence and intimidation.15
Many definitions, however, tend to focus specifically on the method of
violence used as a tool for creating a working definition, seeing terrorism
as being a set of methods or strategies of combat that involve the
premeditated use of violence against non-combatants in order to achieve
the psychological effect of fear, rather than through the more traditional
understandings of the concept.16 Others try to define terrorism as some-
thing that can be seen as being a strategy of violence that is designed to
promote a desired outcome by instilling fear in the general public that
is being targeted.17 One of the major difficulties, however, that emerge
when trying to define terrorism is the fact that terrorism is itself is not
just an act of violence or a set of identifiable ideologies of a particular
movement; it is a set of strategies of combat. As well as that, acts of
terrorism are undertaken by a whole host of groups and organisations,
each with differing origins, bases, and belief systems, as well as including
a number of tactics of ‘terror’ – for example bombings, hijackings, and
kidnappings. Therefore, it can be argued that the label ‘terrorism’ is used
to describe a wider range of phenomena, not a single act.
If a definition of terrorism is to be created, it needs to avoid being
excessively influenced by any one type of terrorism, but the vast variety
of forms of terrorism that exist also makes it extremely difficult to

create a definition that is all-encompassing.18 Terrorism involves the
use of violence which is, in the majority of cases, targeted at what are
commonly termed ‘non-combatants’ or ‘innocents’, with the purpose of
achieving a psychological effect of fear and destruction – or so the belief
goes. However, this ‘targeting of civilians’ characteristic has come into
question in recent years. There exists much debate about whether or
not the targeting of civilians needs to be included in the definition of
terrorism. The targeting of civilians, being a central feature of terrorism
it is argued, can make the understanding of the concept even more dif-
ficult. For instance, it can be debated whether or not examples such as
the attacks on the marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, which resulted
in the deaths of hundreds of marines, and the attack on the USS Cole,
which killed 17 sailors in Yemen in October 2000, were actually acts of
terrorism. According to that rationale, these should technically not be
classed as being acts of terrorism if one accepts that terrorism cannot
involve targeting armed forces; yet they are routinely offered as exam-
ples of terrorism.19 Along these lines, it has also been argued that if
terrorism is to be defined as attacks against only non-combatant targets,
then any attacks that are carried out by groups against ‘armed’ military
targets should not be included.20 In addition, definitions of terrorism
can also vary as to whether terrorism includes attacks that are carried
out only against ‘non-combatant’ targets or whether it can be classed
as a tactic of warfare which is used by sub-national groups against all
citizens of a state, whether civilian or military, including attacks against
an ‘armed’ military.21 Many experts in the field of terrorism studies
consider the term an ‘essentially contested concept, debatable at its
core, indistinct around its edges, and simultaneously descriptive and
pejorative’.22 Also, at the analytical level, there remains no consensual
definition of terrorism, with the National Research Council (NRC)
noting that there are no ‘precise general definitions of terrorism but
rather a multiplicity of overlapping efforts, some more satisfactory than
others, but none that are analytically sufficient’.23 Having taken all of
the above arguments and details into account, however, for the purpose
of this book terrorism is to be defined as the use, or threat of use, of
violence that is designed to instil fear or terror in order to achieve
political objectives, the type of violence used being that which is usually
beyond the bounds of the normally accepted use of violence (for exam-
ple the use of hijackings and bombings in contrast to the activities of
regular armed forces). It is often, though not always, targeted at civilians
and non-combatants, and is designed more to influence the political
calculations of the government or society concerned, rather than as a

purely military tactic to defeat opponents.
What are the most common types of terrorism?
There are so many forms of terrorism in existence today that it has

become somewhat of a problem when trying to understand terrorism
in its entirety. In today’s world, the label ‘terrorism’ is being attached
to almost every act of violence or crime and includes: narco-terrorism,
eco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, pathological terrorism, issue-oriented
terrorism, quasi-terrorism, and (probably most strangely) artistic
terrorism. Of the existing types of terrorism in the traditional context,
however, there are four that are most significant to the modern era of
terrorism: ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism,
state-sponsored terrorism, and religious terrorism, in particular Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism. There are, of course, many other forms of
terrorism aside from the aforementioned, including revolutionary terror
and left-wing terrorism, which includes a broad range of groups such as
Sendero Luminoso and the Red Brigades; however, for the purpose of
this work the central focus will remain on the four forms of terrorism
listed above.
This section will begin by first looking at the ethno-nationalist/
separatist form of terrorism, which is also often described as being
revolutionary terrorism. Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is seen as
being one of the most dominant forms of terrorism of the 21st century.
This form of terrorism is characterised by violence that is used to
support the idea of establishing a separate state for a specific national/
ethnic group. The main examples of these types of terrorist groups are
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and
the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) group. These types of terrorist
groups see the threat of being oppressed as a legitimisation for the use
of extreme levels of violence, including bombings and kidnappings.
The main targets of terrorist groups are usually symbolic symbols that
are used to place what is seen as being the ‘blame’ for any and all
economic, social, or political injustices that may have occurred in the
society in which they exist. The perpetrators of this type of terrorism
are individuals or groups with strong nationalist ideas and goals. In
the majority of cases they aim to establish an independent state, take
control of a certain region, or overthrow the government in order to
remove the political system and replace it with one that suits their aims.
These types of groups are also classified as being separatist, especially in
cases where the group is attached to a particular area of land that they
see as being their ‘home territory’.24
For the most part, this form of terrorism is carried out by organisa-
tions with a well-defined command and control structure; groups that
have clear political, social, or economic objectives and a comprehensible
ideology or self-interest.25 These types of groups also tend to remain
in their country of origin and rarely cross international borders, but
there are instances where this has occurred (for example the IRA).
These groups also tend to have a narrow appeal, thus limiting their
scope outside of their home country. What makes this form of terrorism
different from other forms is the fact that its selection of targets tends
to be extremely discriminate, for example targeting bankers and govern-
ment officials, rather than civilians or non-combatants. This is not to
say, however, that these groups have not targeted civilians in attacks, as
has been witnessed on numerous occasions with the actions of groups
such as the IRA and ETA.
The second form of terrorism which will be examined here is
right-wing terrorism. Prior to the current trend of ‘Islamic Terrorism’,
right-wing terrorism was one of the most violent and deadly forms of
terrorism, especially in the US. The death rates attributed to right-wing
terrorism reached the hundreds in the 1990s. The groups and individuals
involved in this form of terrorism reject the existing political and social
structures of a particular government or political group. There are two
core forms of right-wing terrorism: right-wing conservative and right-
wing reactionary. Right-wing conservative terrorists seek to preserve
the established order within society or to return to the traditions of the
past, while continuing to support the current government. Right-wing
reactionary terrorists, on the other hand, are groups that seek to over-
throw the current political order, thus returning to a past way of life.
One of the main examples of a modern right-wing terrorist attack was
the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, which resulted in the deaths of
169 people and wounding of over 400 others.26 Other key examples of
right-wing terrorist groups noted throughout the literature include the
Ku Klux Klan, the neo-Nazi movements, and the anti-abortion move-
ments. An example of the acts of terror carried out by European right-
wing terrorists, who are also known as the neo-Nazi movement, took
place in 1999 in Sweden, when they murdered two police officers, assas-
sinated a union leader, planted a car bomb which killed a journalist, and
also sent a letter bomb to the Swedish Minister for Justice. Right-wing
terrorism in general, however, is often neglected in current literature,
due to the fact that it is seen as being somewhat poorly organised, it is
deemed as being less effective than other forms of terrorism, and that
there are not many readily identifiable right-wing terrorist organisa-
tions.27 Events such as the 2011 Norway bombings and subsequent
shooting rampage, carried out by a single individual and resulting in
80 deaths, however, highlight the fact that right-wing terrorism is still
a threat to security.
This brings us to the third form of terrorism which will be outlined
here – state-sponsored terrorism. One of the defining features of this
particular form of terrorism is that a state or government has been
actively engaged in the use of terror against its foreign and domestic
enemies.28 State-sponsored terrorism usually occurs when a state pro-
vides political, military, or economic support to a specific terrorist group
in order to aid them in achieving their goals. It is argued that there
are three specific ways that a state can engage in the use of terrorism,
namely governmental or state terror, state involvement in terrorism,
and/or state sponsorship of terrorism.29 What makes state sponsorship
so attractive from the perspective of the terrorist group is the fact that
it comes with relatively little cost, i.e. all funding, weapons, training,
etc. are provided by the state sponsor. Alternatively, what makes it so
attractive to the state or government doing the sponsoring is that it may
serve to achieve specific foreign policy objectives without any outward
or visible state involvement in the actions. In the modern context, state
sponsorship of terrorism is often tied to the provision of safe havens for
terrorist groups; havens from where they can train members without
fear of disruption from the government or any other outside influence.
State-sponsored terrorism has been applied most violently in the regions
of Northern Africa and the Middle East, where, for example, anti-Israeli
terrorism became state sponsored by the early 1960s. The kidnappings
in Tehran 1979 are seen as being a pivotal case of state-sponsored ter-
rorism, if not the first ‘modern’ case of state-sponsored terrorism.30 On
this occasion, 52 American citizens were taken hostage at US embassy
in Tehran by what were claimed to be students. The hostages were held
for a total of 444 days by the kidnappers, who claimed that their actions
had no ties to any government. However, it was later confirmed that
they received full state backing in return for the media coverage and
interest generated in the incident. The US President, Jimmy Carter, went
on to lose his re-election campaign because of this incident, showing
just how powerful terrorism can be.
The US Department of State lists four countries as being official state
sponsors of terrorism – Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This list is the
most commonly used throughout the literature, but it must be noted
that the list is not static and changes over time. It can also be argued
that it is dependent on the relationships that the US has with specific
countries at specific periods in time.31 Iran it is often claimed is the
most significant and active sponsor of terrorism, its reason for using
this tactic being based on a desire to export the ‘Iranian Revolution’ and
to destroy Israel. Iran continues to support such groups as Hezbollah,
Hamas, PIJ, and the PLFP through providing them with funding, safe
havens, training grounds, and weapons.32 Other examples include
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, which provided not only support but
also a safe haven to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, and also
provided bases, weapons, and protection to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq
(MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian
regime. Syria is also known to provide a safe haven and support for
several terrorist groups, many of which oppose the Middle East peace
negotiations. Sudan has also served as a sponsor of terrorism in relation
to the provision of a safe haven for members of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah,
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the PIJ, and HAMAS.
In South Asia, there has been increased concern about recent reports
of Pakistani support to terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir
as well as support (especially military) for the Taliban and elements of
al-Qaeda.33
This brings us to the final form of terrorism to be discussed here:
religiously motivated terrorism, in particular Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism. It has been argued that the single most important feature
of international terrorism since the end of the Cold War has been
the rise of religiously motivated acts of violence and terrorism. The
re-emergence of religiously motivated terrorism set in motion extreme
changes in the nature, motivations, and capabilities of terrorists.
Essentially, religiously motivated terrorism reflects a fundamental belief
in the justness of the cause and methods used in the act of terrorism,
a justification that emerges from a specific religious belief system. In
order to justify the use of terrorism, the religious terrorist views the act
itself as being a sacramental or divine act that has been carried out in
response to a direct threat to their group’s theological imperative. This
then allows the act of terrorism to assume a transcendental or cosmic
dimension. One of the central driving forces behind the religious
fundamentalists is the fact that they blame all their social and economic
problems on what they see as being corrupt leaders and the ‘nefarious’
external forces that support them.34 It is then through this justification
process that political concerns are likely to continue to be transformed
into religious impulses, which then go on to render them sacred.
This form of terrorism can emanate from any form of religion, for
example Christian fundamentalism or Hindu extremism. However,
the overwhelming majority of terrorism today either occurs in Islamic
countries, or is undertaken by groups and individuals claiming an
Islamic belief system. It must be noted here that this growth in terror-
ism with an Islamic slant does not in any way mean that the religion of
Islam is intrinsically linked to terrorism. The current form of religiously
motivated terrorism did not emerge until the 1980s following the Iranian
revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same
year. This form of terrorism essentially emerged as a consequence of the
violence that had occurred over the previous years in Iran and other
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. In the majority of cases, how-
ever, religion is simply used as a veneer to legitimise political objectives
that would in other cases not justify the use of violence, especially the use
of such tactics as suicide terrorism. Yet there is also a plethora of issues
that exist in relation to this argument revolving around the distinctive
link between Islam and the use of suicide terrorism, and this must also be
taken into consideration. Finally, and possibly most importantly, it must
also be noted that religion cannot be said to be the cause of its terrorism,
even though it would be easy to assume that this is so.
To summarise then, terrorism is usually a tool used by the weaker of
two powers and is seen as being a rational choice when the goals of that
particular weaker group are considered as being otherwise impossible to
attain. It would therefore be beneficial for us to view terrorism not as
being a desperate act by a desperate group of individuals, but instead as
a form of political behaviour that is a result of a deliberate choice made
by a rational actor, i.e. the terrorist organisation.35 Defining terrorism in
a way that will be universally accepted is probably a reality that is never
going to happen, at least not in the near future. At best, we can just hope
to try to gain a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and
the characteristics that the varying forms of terrorism share. Without a
definition, however, one has to argue if we can ever fully understand ter-
rorism. Alternatively, one could argue that even if a universally accepted
definition of terrorism were to be developed, would it really ever be able
to describe all of the varied forms of terrorism that exist today? Having
tried to understand the phenomenon of terrorism, the next section here
will move to trying to understand the concept of insurgency.
Insurgency
In recent decades, specifically in the period post-9/11, the terms ‘terror-

ism’ and ‘insurgency’ have almost become one and the same in terms
of our understanding of them. According to Smith, it is extremely

important for us to differentiate carefully between the two terms,
as, once classified under either heading, a movement or group will
essentially be given a level of treatment (either formally or by general
international consensus) from which it will be difficult for it to extri-
cate itself.36 In other words, labelling a group or organisation ‘terrorist’
versus ‘insurgent’ provides a very different context for understanding
it and addressing it in a global context. One of the central questions
that exist within this field of study is: What is the difference between
terrorism and insurgency and why is it important to distinguish
between them? In order to try to differentiate between terrorist organi-
sations and insurgent groups, this section will aim firstly to analyse
the existing definitions of insurgency and will then move on to assess-
ing the structure of these movements in terms of their organisation
and methods, while finally focusing on the key differences between
insurgency and terrorism in a general context.
The problems of defining insurgency
Defining insurgency in the modern context is as difficult, if not more

so, as defining terrorism, due to the fact that we understand that terror-
ism can exist both as a mode of warfare and as a strategy of insurgency.
How then do we separate the two phenomena and isolate insurgency in
order to create a working definition? Firstly, it is essential to understand
the context of the violence and how it is used. Insurgent violence takes
many forms, including revolution, coup d’état, guerrilla tactics, terror-
ism, and riot. At their most basic level, insurgencies can be understood
as being grassroots uprisings that emerge with the aim of overthrow-
ing an established government or set of societal norms that they feel
threatened by. In doing so, they employ a range of tactics, including,
but not limited to, subversion, guerrilla tactics, and terrorism, and then
use these tactics against the established power of states or against the
conventional military as a way of exerting their own power and influ-
ence. Essentially, it can be argued that an insurgency is not random
violence: it is a campaign of violence that is directed and focused with
the aim of achieving a specific political outcome or objective. It must
be noted here, however, that not all insurgent organisations or groups
use guerrilla tactics or terrorism as a method of action.
According to the Terrorism Research Centre, however, political and
economic advancements, reductions in unemployment and under-
employment, land reforms, transparent governance, and inclusionary
conditions for minority political participation have been successful in
targeting the conditions that lead to insurgencies and its use of both
guerrilla warfare and terrorism.37 In this regard then, defining insur-
gency in the modern context is much different from defining it in the
traditional context. For the purpose of this book, however, the focus
will remain on the modern context of insurgency and its definition.
Gary Bernsten defines an insurgency as being ‘a protracted struggle by
one or more armed groups that employ violence with the goal of over-
throwing an existing political order’.38 In other words, it means that
insurgency can be understood as being a campaign (usually violent)
that is aimed at seizing political power for the specific group carrying
out the insurgency. In this context, the term ‘insurgency’ is applied to a
large contingent of armed fighters who are focused on advancing their
organisation through the use of a common goal or ideology, which then
becomes the motivating factor for that group.
Bernsten also notes that ‘an insurgency is not a fight for strategic tar-
gets, though insurgents may attack such targets. It is also not a fight for
land, though insurgents may seize territory. An insurgency is a fight for
control of the population. Insurgents use raw violence to intimidate the
population into providing support to their effort or at least into remain-
ing neutral’.39 Alternatively, one can define an insurgency as being a
protracted political–military activity directed toward completely or par-
tially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular
military forces and illegal political organisations. Insurgent activity,
therefore in this context, is designed to ‘weaken government control
and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy’.40
When defining insurgency, there are a number of common features that
tie together the numerous insurgent groups that are most active today,
including the following:
• Their desire to control a specific area or territory

• Limit ability of government and enhance capability of insurgents
• Obtain support of critical segments of society
• Isolate government from international diplomatic and material
support and increase support for insurgents
• Increase domestic and international legitimacy of insurgent
organisations at the expense of government
• Reduce or neutralise government coercive power41
An insurgency can also be defined as an organised movement aimed

at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of
subversion or armed conflict.42 Insurgencies (be they classic or con-
temporary) tend to be understood as being protracted conflicts where
the insurgents involved use their limited assets, grassroots support,

and general political will against the target government, which usually
has superior resources and outside support. Rather than conventional
force-on-force operations, opponents in insurgencies fight for the sup-
port of the populace, and this is one of the considerations that need
be applied when defining insurgency. Modern insurgencies can take
various forms, and can be divided according to their ends, ways and
means. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban can be characterised
as a reactionary–traditionalist insurgency, fighting to regain political
power, oust foreign occupiers, and restore its version of Sharia law. In
contrast, a group like Al-Qaeda seeks to regain or maintain sanctuary in
a friendly country, while bleeding the US and its allies.43
Twenty-first century insurgencies are affected by globalisation, the
Internet, and the explosion of global media. They are often referred to
as ‘fourth generation warfare’ or evolved insurgencies.44 Within these,
religion can play the role of ideology, and terrorism against the resist-
ant population has been a constant feature. In this regard, terrorism
and guerrilla action have become commonplace in insurgent activity
throughout the modern duration of warfare. According to the US Army
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the combatant inher-
ently prefers a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory over a long, bloody,
protracted struggle. As insurgent violence has not achieved the level of
revolutionary violence, the availability of weapons to secure territory
and repel state armies in open combat is minimal, forcing the focus
onto nonconventional weapons and tactics. Understanding these dif-
fering features allows easier creation of a definition of insurgency that
is separate from that of terrorism or other forms of irregular violence.
Table 1.2 below outlines some of the most well-known definitions of
insurgency that are in use today.
In addition, to understanding these definitions it is also necessary to
understand the differences that exist between it and the phenomenon of
terrorism in terms of their paradigm differences. According to Kilcullen,
insurgents are regarded as representative of deeper issues or grievance
within society, and are seen as using violence within an integrated politico-
military strategy, and as a whole-of-government problem rather than
a military or law-enforcement issue. In terms of definition, one of the
clearest ways to separate insurgents and terrorists is to focus on the point
that insurgents use ideology to target government, whereas terrorists
target governments (or societies) to advance ideology. However, compli-
cating the matter once again is the fact that a terrorist may also simul-
taneously be an insurgent and a guerrilla. The following outline gives a
clearer breakdown of the differences between insurgents and terrorists:
Table 1.2 Definitions of insurgency
Organisation Definition
Joint Chiefs of Staff The organised use of subversion and violence by

US Government (Joint a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or
Publication (2009) 3–24 force change of a governing authority.
Counterinsurgency
Operations)
US Army Marine Corps An organised movement aimed at the overthrow
Counterinsurgency Field of a constituted government through use of
Manual (FM 3–24) (2006) subversion and armed conflict. Stated another
way, an insurgency is an organised, protracted
politico-military struggle designed to weaken
the control and legitimacy of an established
government, occupying power or other political
authority while increasing insurgent control.
US Government The organised use of subversion and violence to
Counterinsurgency Guide seize, nullify or challenge political control of a
(2009) region.
Department of Defense An organised resistance movement that uses
subversion, sabotage and armed conflict to
achieve its aims.
1. Insurgents
a. Desire to control a particular area and/or group of people
b. Motivations include
i. Political
ii. Economic
iii. Ethnic
iv. Religious
c. Once an insurgency reaches a certain size, the insurgency has a
fair chance of winning
d. Most insurgent groups employ terrorism as a tactic
2. Terrorists
a. Usually small, but fanatical
b. Little likelihood that they can achieve major political goals but
c. They are capable of horrendous acts of violence45
What are the most common types of insurgency?
Having outlined the major definitions of insurgency it is now essential

to differentiate between the different types of insurgency that are active
today. This is extremely difficult, especially in the modern context, as
each insurgency is different and is shaped by conflict-specific factors

(e.g. culture, grievance, history) which make placing a specific insur-
gency into any one particular category a difficult task. Typologies of
insurgency are usually categorised in a number of ways, but there are
two that are most common in terms of the modern context of under-
standing and analysing insurgencies: by the goals of the insurgent
organisation and by the methods and tactics that they use. According to
the CIA, the goals of the majority of insurgent groups can be classified
into the following categories:46
1. Revolutionary: seek to replace the existing political order with a

different system
2. Reformist: do not aim to change existing political order but seek to
compel government to alter policies or implement reforms
3. Separatist: seek independence for a specific region
4. Resistance: seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a
given territory
5. Commercialist: motivated by acquisition of wealth or material
resources
It must be noted, however, that these categories are not rigid in any
way and insurgents may change approaches based on circumstances.
They may also use different approaches at the same time, thus making it
extremely difficult to analyse them in certain situations. Another way to
categorise insurgencies is by their organisation’s structure. In the major-
ity of cases, an insurgency falls into one of the following categories:
political, military, traditional, or urban-cellular.47
A politically organised insurgency is one that has developed through
a complex political structure before or at the same time understanding
military operations against government. This type of insurgency uses a
shadow government rather than military control approach when active.
In this context, the military unit should always be subordinate to the
political structure. Within this type of insurgency there exist extensive
and complex political structures that are developed before military
operations are initiated. This shadow government type structure is cre-
ated to undermine the authority of the existing regime, thus giving
political consolidation to the group, which then precedes the military
consolidation of contested areas. This essentially provides the group
with more legitimacy in the eyes of its members and its target audience.
These types of insurgent group are, however, vulnerable to any real con-
certed effort by the government in power that is aimed at neutralising
their infrastructure. This means that it is seen as being the weakest form
of insurgent structure to adopt.
The second type of insurgency is called the military organised insur-
gency. In this type, the emphasis is placed on the use of military action
against government over the selection of political mobilisation. These
types of insurgencies usually have quite weak and ill-defined political
structures, and are often dominated by extremely powerful military
leaders. They are, in the majority of cases, decentralised in structure,
with the armed insurgents serving essentially as the catalyst for mobilis-
ing opposition. Their overall aim is to become the focus for their target
segment of a specific disaffected population. Once their base of support
has been established, they then aim to destroy the regime in power in
terms of both challenging its legitimacy and using aggressive military
action to gain power and influence.
A traditionally organised insurgency, in contrast, draws on any pre-
existing tribal, clan, ethnic, or religious affiliations that may be present
in a specific region or area. In doing so, they try to establish a set of
social hierarchies which they then aim to put in place as a substitute
to the existing political and military structures. This sets a challenge
to the existing government in terms of their legitimacy, power, and
influence over said element of the population. This type of insurgency
rarely exists on its own accord as it has a limited capacity for absorbing
economic and military punishment. It is often affected by high levels
of leadership conflict, and therefore it is usually found in conjunction
with another type of insurgency.
The final type of insurgency looked at here is the urban-cellular form.
This type of insurgency is usually centred on and developed in urban
areas within a specific town. In terms of organisational structure, it is
generally organised around small, semi-autonomous cells. This has a
negative impact on the success of these types of insurgency, however, as
they often lack hierarchical political and military leadership structures,
making them highly unstable. These types of insurgent groups tend to
rely more heavily on terrorism as a tactic to counter their inherent weak-
ness, which has a negative consequence in terms of limiting their ability
to mobilise popular support. In terms of their range of operations, they
are usually restricted to being active in small areas where there is more
chance of them being captured or targeted by the government or military.
As can be seen from the above breakdown of typologies of insurgency,
there are a number of positives and negatives of a group remaining pure
in form, and we often see a crossover amongst the elements, again mak-
ing insurgent groups harder to define.
Now that both terrorism and insurgency have been assessed, it is

necessary to focus on the concept of state failure and get an understand-
ing of how it is defined and what its main features are.
State failure
‘State failure’ is a term that many may be familiar with, but that few
actually fully understand. It is a relatively new concept, really only
emerging in the modern context following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, ‘state failure’ is a term
that has become tied to the global war against terrorism – the common
understanding being that the failed states of the world are now the key
to preventing terrorism because they are the ones that facilitate terror-
ism. But what do we really know about failed states? What do they look
like? Where are they? How do you know when a state has failed? These
are some of the most common questions surrounding the phenomenon
of state failure. Similar to the phenomenon of terrorism, there is really
no single definition of what constitutes a failed state, which makes fully
understanding it extremely difficult. The aim of this section then is
firstly to try to provide the reader with a general understanding of the
concept of state failure by providing an overview of some of the most
commonly used definitions of state failure that are used today. It will
then move on to look at state failure in the context of how it is actually
measured and understood, which will allow the reader to understand
how a state is actually deemed to have failed in the global context.
From this, the section will move on to providing the reader with a new
interpretation of state failure by focusing on what is called the spectrum
of state failure. This spectrum will first be explained in its current form,
and then the augmented version, which is unique to this work, will be
outlined. The purpose of this new interpretation will fit into the overall
understanding of the relationship between state failure and terrorism,
as well as in understanding the case studies of Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq, which are used in this work in relation to terrorism in the
modern world.
Defining and understanding state failure
The emergence of state failure has had an extremely important impact

on the international system, especially over the last decade, but what
do we actually know about the process? There are numerous differences
between the understandings and definitions of state failure, clouding
our ability to develop a core definition that could be applied universally.

Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the concept of state failure has
evolved over time. A state in its strongest form is essentially character-
ised as being a set of institutions that possess the authority to make
the rules that govern the people in one or more societies, and which
has both internal and external sovereignty over a definite territory.
These states exist mainly to deliver public goods, i.e. security, educa-
tion, healthcare, and political and economic protection. These strong
states control their territories to the maximum possible level and deliver
to their people a complete range of political goods. Strong states also
perform well when assessed under such indicators as GDP per capita,
economic competition, and social pacification. With regard to this
understanding of what a state should be, a strong state can be classified
as that which offers high levels of security from political and criminal
violence, ensures political freedom and civil liberties, and creates envi-
ronments that are conducive to the growth of economic opportunity.48
When a state fails to deliver significantly on any of these elements it is
said to be in the process of failure. If these basic functions of state are
not met, the state can be classed as being, to some degree, a failed state.
State strength in and of itself, however, is a relative concept and there
are a number of different ways to measure the overall strength of a state.
Three of the main ways that allow us to understand whether a state is
heading towards failure are to look at how it functions in the areas of
security, politics, and economics. Through understanding any negative
aspects that may exist in a given state within the context of these three
areas (among others) it becomes easier to ascertain whether or not that
state is in the process of failure. We know what a strong state should be,
but how do we define a failed state? Similar to the phenomenon of terror-
ism, there is no universally accepted definition of a failed state. In basic
terms, a failed state is a state that can no longer perform its basic security
and development functions, essentially having no effective control over
its territory or borders.49 There are many differing ideas as to how a failed
state should be defined. Table 1.3 provides a brief outline of some of the
most well-known definitions of state failure that are in existence today.
Prior to 9/11, the threats seen as emanating from these states were
focused on the humanitarian issues. In the decade following the 9/11
attacks, however, the focus and understanding of failed states and their
role on the international scene shifted towards the issues of terrorism
and the role that they played in spreading it. This changing perception
has resulted in a fluid movement of understanding of the phenom-
enon of state failure, and with this shift has come a change in the
Table 1.3 Definitions of state failure
Source Definition
Institution/organisation
USAID – 2005 Fragile Includes those states that fall along a spectrum of
States Strategy failing, failed, and recovering from crisis – where
the central government does not exert effective
control over territory, is unable or unwilling to
assure provision of vital services, and holds weak
or non-existent legitimacy among its citizens.50
National Security Council States lacking the capacity to fulfil their sovereign
(NSC) – 2003 National responsibilities, lacking law enforcement,
Strategy for Combating intelligence, or military capabilities to assert
Terrorism (NSCT) effective control over their entire territory
Organisation for States lacking either the will or the capacity to
Economic Cooperation engage productively with their citizens to ensure
and Development security, safeguard human rights, and provide
(OECD) the basic function for development, possessing
weak governance, limited administrative capacity,
chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social
tensions, violence, or the legacy of civil war.51
World Bank – Fragile States characterised by poor governance, internal
State’s Index conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions,
weak security, fractured societal relations,
corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and
insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate
power and authority.52
characteristics and definitions contained in the literature. When a state

becomes unable to carry out its duties, it begins to deteriorate through a
spectrum of failure, the first level being state weakness. Weak states can
be understood as being those that have witnessed a significant number
of armed challenges to its central authority, where the government has
difficulty in controlling its borders and territory, and where the govern-
ment has difficulty in providing basic services to its citizens.53 Weak
states may be weak solely due to their geographical location, i.e. an
area of the world that is prone to natural disasters (e.g. Africa); or they
may become weak as a result of physical or fundamental economic con-
straints that are placed on them from either an internal or external actor
(e.g. through sanctions). These states have also been known to harbour
ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other important tensions that may later
be transformed into an all-out conflict between these differing groups.
Following from state weakness are the categories of the failing and
failed state. Failing states appear quite similar to weak states, except that
the issues that the state is facing are at much higher levels. These levels
of state failure are significant, but it is the area of the failed state that
has gained the most publicity in recent years.
What features make a failed state different and possibly more dan-
gerous than these states? The term ‘failed state’ serves as a broad term
or label for a phenomenon that can be interpreted in numerous ways.
There are three specific elements that categorise failed states from both
the legal and political point of view. Firstly, there are geographical
and territorial aspects that depict failed states as being associated with
internal and endogenous problems, even if these problems have cross-
border impacts. Secondly, there is the political aspect, which involves
the internal collapse of law and order. Finally, there is what has been
termed the functional aspect. When describing what a failed state looks
like, it is essentially one that can no longer perform its basic security
and development functions; in which there is no control over territory
or borders; where the machinery of the state, i.e. the institutions, are
unable to function; where the state is incapable of projecting or assert-
ing its power and authority within its borders, thus leaving large areas
of land completely out of the control of the government; where secu-
rity is almost non-existent; and where rising levels of ethnic, religious,
linguistic, and cultural hostilities interfere with daily politics. These
states provide limited, if any, political goods to their citizens, including
a severe lack of education, healthcare, and security. Therefore, it can be
argued that a failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the condi-
tions of its own existence, i.e. it is no longer sovereign and therefore no
longer classified as being a state. There are also high levels of political
and economic disenfranchisement of large sectors of the population.
Failed states are thus characterised by the gaps that they have in three
main crucial areas: where these states are failing to control their borders
and territories; that they are failing to meet the most basic needs of the
citizen’s e.g. healthcare, security and education; and where they are
failing to secure and/or maintain democratic legitimacy. Also, there is
the fact that they are not providing effective or transparent governance.
Aside from these characteristics, state failure can also occur from a
nation’s geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances,
and in many cases the actions of leaders also play a major role in the pro-
cess. There is also the factor of state formation and how this process may
impact on the likelihood of a state failing. In many of the nations of the
world, the history of state formation and the process of state building
in many of the world’s nations has been one of violent suppression of

ethnic or religious identity, forced compliance with national laws and
norms set by distant and unrepresentative elites, and enforced taxation
with few services delivered in return.54 As a result, many of these states
lack any form of expectation of government or any knowledge of strong
statehood. This type of state formation can be seen in many of the
African states, as well as in countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.
State failure does not, however, just occur through geographical loca-
tion, environmental issues, or through external factors. In the major-
ity of cases, failure occurs through an internal process. The decisions
and failures of leaders and governments have often destroyed states
and weakened fragile state polices that already operate on the brink of
failure. Therefore, it seems that in many cases the actions of political
leaders can be the most culpable factor in state failure, with cases such
as that of Sierra Leone (1991) and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(1996) highlighting events that can be traced back to errors in the
actions of the state’s leaders. The reasons for state failure are extremely
complex and multifaceted, and vary greatly in the specific elements of
failure from state to state. In order to gain an insight into this concept,
Table 1.4 highlights the range of factors that increase a state’s vulner-
ability to and/or likelihood of becoming a failed state. The table covers
the four main areas of focus in relation to state failure: the historical
context, social/cultural factors, political/state-related factors, and eco-
nomic factors, all of which are deemed to be the most significant with
regard to predicting state failure.
This leads us to the final level of state failure, which is referred to
as a collapsed state. A fully collapsed state is the most extreme ver-
sion of a failed state and is a rare phenomenon. Collapsed states have
been defined as being mere geographical expressions of a state. These
states may have collapsed internally (e.g. Somalia), but they are still
recognised by other states and international organisations, such as
the United Nations, as being states in the global context. These states
lack functioning internal political, social, and economic institutions,
exhibiting a total vacuum of authority of any kind. Collapsed states
are essentially characterised by a lack of government in any form and
by the complete destruction of the governmental institutional system.
In a collapsed state there is no monopoly on violence – thus warlords,
guerrillas, and other paramilitary groups become a substitute for the
state’s armed forces. The world’s most famous and infamous collapsed
state is Somalia. Lebanon is another example of a once-collapsed state.
Lebanon had reached total collapse just prior to an intervention by Syria
Table 1.4 Root causes of state failure
Historical Social/cultural Political/state Economic
Historical legacy Culture of Structural Rapid urbanisation

violence inequalities
Legacy of Cultural conflicts Favourable Socioeconomic
colonisation geography disruptions
Historical Religion: severe Porous borders Divergent economic
antecedents: divides between conditions
political violence, groups within a
civil war, given territory
dictatorship,
revolution,
occupation
Cultural Types of regime Weak economy
disruptions
Divergent social Declining state Dislocation
conditions authority accompanying rapid
modernisation
Nationalistic Divergent political Poverty
struggles for conditions/focus
autonomy
US foreign policy/
interference
Institutional
capacity (lack of)
Government
weakness
Lack of rule of law
Internal political
divides
Inability to control
territory and/or
monopoly of use of
violence
in 1990, but exists today as a failing state which retains a government

and political institutions that function to the most basic capacity.
Having developed a basic understanding of the categories of state
failure, it is now essential to understand how these states are ranked
and assessed.
Assessing and ranking a failed state
There have been various efforts over the years to try to measure, assess,
and rank the degrees of state failure that exist in the world. Originally,
many of these efforts were focused on humanitarian and aid-related

measurement tools, but the focus has shifted, especially over the last
decade, towards assessing failed states under a number of different areas.
Some of the best known tools used to measure state failure include such
standard indicators as per capita GDP, the UN Human Development
Index (HDI), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index,
and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report. These tools are then
implemented into a large scale ranking system such as that used by
the World Bank or the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index. The World
Bank and the Foreign Policy Failed States Index, which was created and
is maintained by the Fund for Peace (an independent non-profit, non-
partisan research and educational organisation) both use similar scoring
systems to define which category a state falls into, basically giving each
nation a score based on a number of different criteria.55 The underlying
theory behind these sorts of measuring tools is that there is a list of meas-
ures/assessors/rankings of state weakness that exist which can further
assist in the understanding of the process of state weakness and state fail-
ure. Table 1.5 outlines some of the most common measuring, assessing,
and ranking studies and tools that focus specifically on understanding.
The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index is the most commonly
used index throughout both the academic literature and the policy
documents produced by governments across the globe. This index
uses 12 indicators to measure a state’s level strength, which are
contained in the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST).56 This
tool was developed in 1996 by Pauline Baker of the Fund for Peace
specifically in relation to its study on state failure. CAST uses
a 12-category programme with which to score and rank states.58 The
result of the scores assigned to a specific state using all of the above
indicators produces what is called the Failed State Index. This index
ranks states according to their relative strength, weakness, or failure
levels. This index is probably the best-known of all of the measurement
and ranking tools used in the context of state failure. The World Bank,
in its Fragile State Index, opts for a different strategy and ranks states
in order of scores received from indicators such as poverty, government
effectiveness, demography and unemployment, and military and mac-
roeconomic performance, to name but a few.
This study is not too far removed from that of the Failed State Index,
but it does result in some differing rankings and positions of states in
the world. All of these ranking schemes are based on the general idea
of a spectrum of state failure. This was a concept first contained in
Foreign Policy (a global international political magazine created in 1970
by Samuel Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel). This spectrum
Table 1.5 Studies and assessments of state failure
The Political Instability Uses extensive open source date to isolate

Task Force (CIA-funded independent variables generally associated
data tool hosted by the with the onset of severe internal political
Centre for Global Policy crisis, including revolutionary and ethnic wars,
at George Mason politicides, and genocides. Based on rigorous
University) statistical analysis, it has identified three factors
that correlate highly with internal crises: high
infant mortality rate, low trade openness, and low
levels of democracy. Focused on state collapse and
not on full spectrum of failed and weak states.
Belfer Centre’s Program Five-year research published in 2004. Used broad
on Intrastate Conflict, set of economic, political and security indicators
Conflict Prevention, and and distinguished among three categories of weak
Conflict Resolution (a states: collapsed, failed, and weak. Defines state
research association based weakness principally as a function of conflict
in the Harvard Kennedy and human insecurity, but does not rank states
School of Government according to their level of weakness.
Brookings, Institute for Proposed a sovereignty index based on 10 core
State Effectiveness and functions that states should perform, and they
Australian National outline a quantitative framework to assess these
University cooperative core functions in individuals. Their sovereignty
research index uses over 100 indicators to determine how
far short a given state falls in performing its basic
functions. The indicators focus especially on the
economic components of state function.
USAID 2006 Produced an analysis called Measuring State
Failure, which proposed to rank weak states
according to 33 indicators of state effectiveness
and legitimacy in four governance areas: economic,
political, security, and social spheres. This
programme was suspended in 2006 along with the
entire USAID Fragile States agenda/strategy.
Centre for Global Policy This ranks country performance in terms of
at George Mason – State both effectiveness and legitimacy across four
Fragility Index (academic dimensions including economic development,
based research centre) governance, security, and social development.
This resulted in a ranking of 160 developed and
developing countries.
Source: Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.57
is based on a five-point grading scale which begins with the strong

states, progressing on a downward scale to weak states, failing states,
failed states, and finally those states that have completely collapsed.
This five-point spectrum has been most commonly used in the Fund
for Peace’s Failed States Index, which was created in 2005 to monitor
and rank the world’s states according to their levels of relative strength.
This spectrum is a fluid system and states can move up or down on the
spectrum, depending on their situations. Although countries are free to
move both up and down, it is much more difficult for a state to progress
upwards on the spectrum from failed to strong. It is much easier for a
state to move downwards on the spectrum. The five-level spectrum of
state failure has been the standard for a number of years, but it is argued
here, through the analysis of the different variations of state failure that
currently exist, that this spectrum has become too narrowly focused.
Figure 1.1 provides a basic outline of the spectrum of state failure:
It is thus deemed necessary to create a more nuanced spectrum, which
would encompass a wider range of categories of state failure. There are
numerous differing terms and concepts of state failure that are in use in
the modern context, but which are missing from the traditional spec-
trum. In order to try to address this limitation, this book has developed
what is termed here an augmented spectrum of state failure. This aug-
mented spectrum is composed of a number of additional factors, provid-
ing a more in-depth and all-encompassing spectrum from which to assess
the world’s nation states. The development of this augmented spectrum
of state failure has numerous positive applications, not only to the study
of state failure, but also to the study of terrorism. This benefit is mainly
due to its addition of extra categories of state failure. These additional
categories have not been plucked from obscurity, but have actually been
adapted from numerous sources, including academic literature and policy
documents. The first of these new categories, named resilient/enduring
states, was adapted from a section of the OECD’s Concepts and Dilemmas
STRONG STATES
WEAK STATES
FAILING STATES
FAILED STATES
COLLAPSED STATES
Figure 1.1 Spectrum of state failure

of State Building in Fragile Situations report.59 The term ‘resilient state’ has
also been used by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development in Denmark in a report published in 2010.60 Finally, the
term has also been used by the World Bank in the context of African
countries, such as Botswana, which they describe as being extremely
resilient to the long-term threats that they face to their stability.61 Here
the term is used to describe a state that is facing a significant threat to its
stability yet is able to function at almost strong state levels.
The second new category added is the faltering state. This term has
been used in many instances previously, mainly in reference to the refu-
gee crises that emerge from weak states, but the term has been adapted
here to characterise a specific type of state, i.e. one which has had a
number of challenges to the state which have caused it to become slightly
unstable. In these cases, the state loses a level of power and influence in
certain areas, but not enough to cause it to lose influence completely.
The third newly created category is called an endemically weak state.
This term was used in the work of Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown,
who defined the endemically weak state as being a state that is not at
major risk of conflict, but which is characterised by low growth, anae-
mic institutions, and a patrimonial system of political leaderships.62
STRONG STATES
RESILIENT/ENDURING STATES
FALTERING STATES
FRAGILE STATES
ENDEMICALLY WEAK STATES
CRISIS STATES
FAILING STATES
FAILED STATES
Figure 1.2 Augmented spectrum of state failure

Finally, we have the addition of the category of crisis states. This term
was first used as the title of a research organisation that was founded
over a decade ago, called the Crisis Research Centre, based at the
London School of Economics (the name of this group has now changed
to the Crisis States Research Network). This term has been used on a
number of occasions to describe the situation that is currently taking
place in countries such as Pakistan. Here it will be used to define those
states that are in extreme states of crisis, where the government is facing
challenges from a number of significant sources, e.g. economic chal-
lenges, challenges by militia groups, and growing distrust in the govern-
ment. These states are in extremely precarious situations, but have not
yet reached the levels of instability that allows them to be classified as
being completely failed. Figure 1.2 below shows what this new spectrum
of state failure looks like.
Summary
Essentially, there are three main areas of weakness that can be observed
in a given society, country, or governmental system that may lead to
terrorism or insurgency, as ascertained from the above arguments.
Firstly, there is usually acute social, religious, and linguistic diversity
among the people of the society, which leads to heightened tensions.
Secondly, there are large numbers of political parties in the government
that can cause confusion and high levels of tension. Finally, there is the
presence of a number of extremist parties, which will inevitably place
severe strain on the already troubled electoral system, as well as on
the government itself, which again leads to heightened tensions in an
already struggling political system.63 It has become somewhat of a con-
ventional wisdom that the poorly performing states of our world tend
to generate multiple cross-border effects or ‘spillovers’ that include ter-
rorism and insurgency, yet we have been slow to develop any theories
or strategies to analyse these weak states. There seems to be a shortage
of analysis in this area, which could prove to be extremely dangerous
for the future. Aside from the general understanding of state failure as
an independent phenomenon, there currently exists a large debate on
the relationship between state failure and terrorism. These connections
have become a core focus of counter-terrorism policies, especially since
the events of 9/11, and will be discussed in the following chapter.
2
Assessing the Connections between
State Failure, Insurgency, and
Terrorism
Until recently, failed states were not generally viewed as central to the
international security agenda. In the post 9/11 world, however, inter-
national security experts are coming to the consensus that threats to
international security may arise from areas within states or at bounda-
ries between states that, for various reasons, are not controlled by state
authority.1 These states provide favourable demographic and social
conditions, which are key factors in their conduciveness to terrorism
or to the development of an insurgency. According to this view, the
front lines of the war on terrorism and the increasingly difficult fight
against insurgency lie within these failed states. The main argument as
to the relevance and relationship between failed states, insurgency, and
terrorism revolves around the fact that failed states are easier for terrorist
organisations to penetrate and operate from and that they are easier for
insurgencies to develop and thrive within. This logic emerges from the
fact that failed states lack the ability to project power internally and have
incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capacities. It has been long
understood that they provide opportunities for terrorist groups to organ-
ise, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications
centres. In this regard, terrorist groups can essentially develop their own
capabilities with little governmental interference. Building on this is the
argument that failed states offer terrorist groups larger pools of recruits
or potential recruits as they contain larger numbers of disaffected and
alienated citizens, for whom political violence is, in the majority of cases,
an accepted avenue of behaviour. Failed states, through their inherent
incompetence, create political vacuums into which these terrorist
groups step. In doing so terrorist groups provide personal security,
economic assistance, and other special services to the citizens in return
for protection and the time to widen their base of operations.2
28
Assessing State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism 29
As well as that, much of the modern international relations and

terrorism literature focuses on Islamic Fundamentalism as being the
causative factor of the current wave of terrorism, but is this really the
case? In today’s world, over 80 percent of the top 10 failed states in
the world are Islamic ones, which is mainly as a result of history and
not solely due to current political, social, and economic climates.3
The high level of deterioration of socio-economic conditions in many
Middle Eastern societies is said to be the main contributing factor
in the increased levels of terrorism and insurgency witnessed there.4
However, it is extremely doubtful that this is the main reason behind
the occurrence of terrorism, as terrorism and insurgency cannot be
attributed to a single grievance or causative factor. Interestingly,
in recent years a new set of theories and arguments have emerged,
focused on the belief that there is actually no significant causal link
or pronounced correlation between these failed states and the prolif-
eration of terrorism. In fact, these new ideas note that terrorism may
actually be less likely to occur in failed states; rather, the focus should
shift towards the weak states instead.5 In this regard, failed states are
actually, in the majority of cases, undesirable locations for terrorist
groups to base their activities, as the terrorist groups face more
challenges and are more vulnerable to third party interference than in
stronger states.6 This type of argument is still in the minority among
academics and the majority still defend the stance that the world’s
failed states are hotbeds for terrorist activity and the emergence of
insurgency.
Due to the lack of adequate levels of research in the area, however,
the focus of the literature is based on general discussions of state failure
and terrorism rather than on detailed empirical studies of the relation-
ship and connections between the two phenomena. Therefore the
argument that failed states are directly linked to the proliferation of
global terrorism has not been subjected to detailed examination. For
this reason the ‘failed states breed terrorism’ argument cannot, and
should not, be treated as though it were self-evident. One cannot dis-
pute that failed states witness serious internal issues and that they can
pose a significant international problem; however, the danger is that
by using such broad statements, and without having any real statistical
analysis or case study cross-comparison, the unsubstantiated argument
or unquestioned assumption will form the basis for analysis and policy.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to assess what, if any, are the condi-
tions contained in failed states that may attract or cause terrorism and
insurgency?
Failed states, terrorism, and insurgency: what are the

connections?
Failed states are, in most cases, characterised by high levels of internal

turmoil due to such destabilising factors as group grievance, uneven
development, population displacement on a massive scale, lack of
security, and non-existent or extremely sparse public services. These
combine to foster a breeding ground for extreme or radical change
through the use of violence. By using tools such as the Fund for Peace
Failed State Index and comparing each state with the number of Foreign
Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and domestic terrorist groups contained
there, it soon becomes apparent that not all failed states are equal when
it comes to terrorist activity. The US State Department produces its
annual terrorism report, which contains the list of what it designates
FTOs. The designation of a group as an FTO results in the US govern-
ment blocking assets held in US financial institutions, denying its mem-
bers visas, and making it a crime for US citizens or others within US
jurisdiction to provide it with support or resources.7 There are currently
47 groups that are listed as being Foreign Terrorist Organisations, and
these are listed in Table 2.1.
According to the commonly held arguments in the literature, there
should be a direct tie between those states that are at the top of the
Failed States Index and the number of FTOs that they are home to.
However, it soon becomes apparent that there is a significant lack of
correlation between a state’s level of failure and the number of terrorist
groups that are based there. Additionally, the placement or ranking of
a particular state on the Failed State Index does not appear to exhibit
any significant difference with respect to the incidence of terrorism.
In fact, there are significant numbers of FTOs and domestic terrorist
groups present in states with a low level of failure, as well as within
relatively strong democracies. Domestic terrorist organisations, on the
other hand, are those organisations that have developed and work
solely in the country of their origin. These types of groups rarely carry
out acts of terrorism outside of their host country. Often the boundary
or distinction between the two types of terrorist groups is not clear. It is
thus extremely difficult to determine whether certain groups are to be
classified as being domestic or foreign terrorist organisations. This has
been the case for groups such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda
in Iraq. Both of these groups have emerged from the core al-Qaeda
organisation, but have evolved beyond the initial conception of that
31
Table 2.1 Foreign terrorist organisations
Abu Nidal Organisation Abu Sayyaf Group Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

(ANO) (ASG) (AAMB)
Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Al-Shabaab (AS) Ansar al-Islam
Maghreb (AQIM)
Asbat al-Ansar Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party Continuity Irish Gama’a al-Islamiyya
of Philippines/New Republican Army (GI)
People’s (CIRA)
Army (CPP/NPA)
Hamas Harakut ul-Jihad-i-Islami Harakut ul-jihad-i-
(HUJI) Islami/Bangladesh
(HUJI-B)
Harakat ul-Mujahideen Hezbollah Islamic Jihad Union
(HUM) (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Jaish-e-Mohammad Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Uzbekistan (IMU) (JEM)
Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Kurdistan Worker’s Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)
Party
Liberation Tamil Tigers Libyan Islamic Fighting Moroccan Islamic
of Eelam (LTTE) Group (LIFG) Combatant Group
(GICM)
Mujahideen-e Khalq National Liberation Palestine Liberation
Organisation (MEK) Army (ELN) Front – Abu Abbas
Faction (PLF)
Palestine Islamic Jihad – Popular Front for the Popular Front for
Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) Liberation of Palestine the Liberation of
(PFLP) Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC)
Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Revolutionary
Forces of Columbia Organisation 17
(FARC) November (17N)
Revolutionary People’s Revolutionary struggle Shining Path (SL)
Liberation Party/Front (RS)
(DHKP/C)
Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) United Self-Defence
Forces of Columbia (AUC)
organisation into a semi-hybrid organisation. These groups tend to have

characteristics of both foreign and domestic terrorist groups in that they
tend to base themselves in one specific country as a base for operations
and also tend to carry out the majority of their terrorist activity in that
host country.
Aside from the presence of foreign and domestic terrorist organisations
within a given state, the number of terrorist attacks also needs to be
assessed. Table 2.2 outlines the world’s top 20 failed states and the
number of terrorist-related attacks that have taken place in them during
the period 2005–2011.8 The findings of this table are interesting with
regard to their implications for the argument that failed states and
terrorism are intrinsically linked, as there appears to be little terrorist
activity in the majority of these failed states – an extremely interesting
observation. There are essentially only three countries that are signifi-
cantly affected by high levels of terrorist activity/attacks – Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iraq.
One of the most significant issues with the existing hypothesis
on state failure is that there are failed states that do not exhibit any
association with terrorism. It can also be argued that states which are
not classified as failed, and that have relatively stronger economic and
human development scores, also appear to be prone to both containing
terrorist organisations and witnessing the emergence of insurgent
threats. This counter-intuitive finding could possibly suggest that a
relatively more structured and efficient economic base actually favours
the facilitation of terrorist organisations and the emergence of insurgent
situations in a specific area than does complete economic collapse and
failure. If all failed states were directly linked to being breeding grounds
and bases for terrorist organisations or to the emergence of significant
insurgencies, then it would be expected that those states listed at the
top of the Failed State Index would exhibit extremely high numbers
of these incidents but this is not, in the majority of cases, the reality
e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
Therefore, it would be more convincing or realistic to argue that
there are many other factors besides a state’s level of failure that
would make it more likely to produce terrorism or insurgent activity.
In fact, the decision to actually establish a terrorist base in a specific
state does not seem to equate with either the generic quality of state
failure inherently attractive to terrorists nor to the particular attractive-
ness associated with the breakdown of law and order, e.g. lack of rule
of law.10 Also, other states experience failure yet are not targeted by
these groups and have no demonstrable association with terrorism or
Table 2.2 Failed states and incidents of terrorism
Rank FSI 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 Somalia 25 24 391 396 290 343 446

2 Chad 2 8 4 3 – – –
3 Sudan 19 56 37 25 19 11 21
4 DRC 16 29 33 17 18 13 17
5 Haiti 6 1 – – – – –
6 Zimbabwe 1 – – 4 – – –
7 Afghanistan 389 759 896 924 1,481 2,307 1,732
8 CAR – 3 3 2 2 3 1
9 Iraq 2,993 5,580 5,495 3,027 2,360 2,624 1,668
10 Cote d’Ivoire 5 5 3 – – – –
11 Guinea 1 1 – – – – 1
12 Pakistan 408 335 725 1,334 1,410 1,061 1,087
13 Yemen 11 8 4 26 33 159 74
14 Nigeria 11 48 38 56 18 42 126
15 Niger – – 10 2 1 – 1
16 Kenya 10 6 17 3 1 12 11
17 Burundi 38 22 7 14 3 21 13
18 Burma 9 21 63 20 4 15 37
19 Guinea-Bissau 1 1 – – – – 1
20 Ethiopia 6 10 5 7 3 2 3
Source: WITS.9
Note: For the purpose of this study, statistics used above only contain the number of incidents under: Armed Attack, Bombing, Suicide, and
Assassination.
33
insurgents. It is true that certain conditions within failed states may be

conducive to the emergence of terrorist groups or to the development
of an insurgency, but the problem lies in the fact that these particular
problems are not specific to failed states, and democracies also play
host to terrorist groups. In fact, it has been argued that many stable
western democracies actually contain many of the elements that are
more attractive to terrorist organisations (rather than insurgencies) than
do those states that have failed. One of the most often-used examples
is that of Scandinavia’s welfare system and advanced communications
networks, which contrived to make Stockholm and Copenhagen safe
havens for terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Gama’a a-Islamiya in
the mid-1990s.11
State failure = a terrorist/insurgent threat?
Is it fair to say, then, that the majority of failed states pose little if
any significant global security threat and have, in fact, insignificant
connections to the spread of international terrorism? It is more
likely that if terrorism or an insurgency is going to occur in these
states, it will emanate from domestic terrorist groups and not from
FTOs. In fact, these states are more likely to pose security threats
to their own citizens through, for example, threat of death and
injury through civil war, low-level violence; threat of criminality
(rape, robbery, expulsion from villages/homes); threats in terms
of hunger, disease, etc. than they are through terrorist violence or
insurgency. This is similar on an external basis, where failed states
often pose threats in terms of spillover to neighbouring states of
armed groups, ethnic groups, weapons flows, cross-border criminal-
ity, etc. rather than terrorist activity or the development of a full-
blown insurgency. Through this understanding of the typical level
of threats posed by the majority of failed states, it could be argued
that the larger global threat posed by failed states has been exagger-
ated. As mentioned earlier, of the top 10 states listed on the Failed
State Index for 2011, only three (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq)
have any significant levels of terrorist activity, whereas states that
are lower on the index, such as Indonesia (63), Philippines (56) and
Lebanon (45), contain relatively higher numbers of terrorist groups
than the other top 20 failed states listed in the Failed State Index.12
This argument also comes into play in the context of the emergence
of insurgencies. State failure does not automatically mean that a
state is going to be prone to insurgent activity. Once again, as was
Assessing State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism 35
the case with the terrorist activity argument, those states located
in the top 20 positions on the Failed State Index are not witnessing
any form of significant or dangerous insurgency. It seems again that
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq would be the front runners with
regard to the existence of insurgent activity.
Summary
The phrase ‘state failure’ has become something of a blanket term used
to describe any state that is not functioning to the adequate levels
prescribed for a state. As it stands, weak states tend to be categorised
together with those that are failing and failed, thus blurring the lines
between the varying types of state and their position on the failed state
spectrum. Indeed, there has been little attention paid to adequately
defining failed states beyond the current conceptual model.13 Thus the
centrality that is afforded to this blanket-style argument – that failed
states and terrorism or insurgent activity are directly linked – can be
seen as being somewhat exaggerated, and can in fact be misleading.
It cannot be denied that certain failed states have had direct links to
terrorism and insurgency; however, this link is not causal and state
failure, in and of itself, does not attract terrorism or insurgencies. It can
be argued, then, at the basic level here that whether or not a particular
state is attractive to terrorists or conducive to the emergence of insur-
gencies is actually contingent on a combination of variables specific
to that state. Apart from the cases of Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the world’s top 20 failed states in fact do not exhibit unusually
high scores for either number of terrorist groups that are based or are
active there. It could therefore be argued that there is no correlation
between the position of a state on the Failed State Index and the num-
bers of FTOs that it contains within its territory. It can also be argued
that there is little, if any, correlation between a highly failed state
and the number of terrorist groups based or active there. This will be
interesting to assess in a more in-depth manner through the case studies
of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Another problem with the current orthodoxy becomes clear when
looking at the process of state failure itself. State failure as a phenomenon
is caused by a number of variables, issues, and diverse factors. It is,
therefore, this divergence that undermines the accuracy of any broad
extrapolations that can be derived from the existing hypothesis which,
it seems, are based on the premise of a presumed homogeneity among
failed states. Certainly one can argue that some failed states have been
directly associated with international terrorism and the emergence of

significant insurgencies, but this link is not a direct one in the major-
ity of cases. It would be an exaggeration to definitively argue that
failed states never facilitate terrorism, but it must at the same time be
highlighted that the factors that give rise to terrorism are not exclusive
to failed states, and thus they are not the only type of state that may
facilitate terrorism or insurgent action. Despite the prevalent view that
there is a direct link between state failure and terrorism, recent evi-
dence seems to suggest that such a link can no longer be automatically
assumed. One of the main arguments put forward in this chapter is
that state failure itself does not necessarily attract or breed or facilitate
terrorism. Also it must be noted that the attractiveness of a particular
state as a centre for terrorists or insurgents is dependent on a specific
set of variables which are active within that specific state. The aim here,
however, is not to entirely dismiss the idea that intra-state instability
and failure never contribute to the issue of international terrorism or
insurgency. Instead, it is argued that in the majority of cases the motiva-
tions behind the focus on the role of failed states in terrorism or insur-
gency are exaggerated to the point of being dangerous and detrimental
to policy development in the area. The overall aim of this work then is
to develop an in-depth qualitative understanding of which factors play
the most significant role in relation to terrorism and the process of state
failure by using a number of cases. This should then make it clearer that
there is no one factor of state failure or strength that can make a state
the ideal location for terrorist or insurgent activity.
3
Afghanistan: State Failure,
Terrorism, and Insurgency
in Context – Part 1
Afghanistan is one of the world’s most war-torn and impoverished

nations and has been beset by invasion, violence, and internal upheaval
since its creation, having never been a homogeneous ethnic nation,
instead existing as a collection of disparate groups divided along
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial lines and forced together by the
vagaries of geopolitics. A landlocked and mountainous country, it has
suffered from chronic instability and conflict throughout its history,
so much so that its current economy and infrastructure are in ruins.1
By September 11, 2001, Afghanistan was arguably one of the world’s
worst humanitarian emergencies and was also facing a significant crisis
of governance. Afghanistan was ranked at the lowest end of the scale
in global measures of human welfare and illicit activities, such as the
Human Development Index (HDI) and the Failed States Index. Today,
Afghanistan’s population is characterised by deep and multifaceted
cleavages, being divided along ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and
racial lines which make unity an extremely unlikely process. As well as
that, the religious framework within Afghanistan is based on a syncretic
blend of various interpretations of Islamic doctrine combined with local
customs, which mean that there is no one unifying religious element
that ties all citizens together. It also means that there is more likely to be
increased levels of in-fighting and cross-ideological skirmishes, causing
instability within the country.2 The combination of these features has
hampered the emergence of a strong state in Afghanistan.
Ethnicity is probably the most important contextual factor shaping
Afghanistan, and as a result of the internal and extremely volatile ethnic
mixture, there has traditionally been a high propensity for violence and
terrorism, often along, but not limited to, ethnic groups. Contemporary
Afghanistan shares many of the features that political and social
37
scientists have identified as favouring state failure and insurgencies the

world over – rough, mountainous terrain, poverty, popular mistrust of
the state, large family size, foreign support, and cross-border sanctuar-
ies, as well as an easily transportable commodity, in this case opium, for
financing.3 However, even though it may share these characteristics with
many other countries, the case of Afghanistan is nonetheless unique.
Over the last 20 years or more, Afghanistan’s citizens have experienced
six governments and half a dozen presidents; more than one third of
the population has been displaced several times; over one million peo-
ple have been killed; and hundreds more have been handicapped. The
impact of these events has changed the physical nature of not only the
state itself but also the character of its people.4 The seeds of Afghanistan’s
decline had become obvious by the late 1980s, when deepening ethnic
tensions, the rise of extremist Islamist ideology and the entrenching of
a narcotics economy, were slowly becoming the defining characteristics
of the state.5 By 1992 Afghanistan was, according to some, a failing state
whose political institutions were practically non-existent.6 This chapter
aims to provide a brief historical overview of Afghanistan which should
aid in developing an understanding of how and why the Afghanistan of
today is facing the issues that it faces.
The pre-Soviet era
Historically, Afghanistan has been the link between Central Asia, the
Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent. Having been used as a
tactical target by both regional and international powers as a place of
leverage to reach their strategic destinations on numerous occasions, it
has subsequently endured several invasions throughout the course of
its history. It was at the centre of the so-called Great Game in the 19th
Century between Russia and Britain, and also became a key Cold War
battleground following the Soviet Invasion in 1979, which led to a major
confrontation that drew in the US and Afghanistan’s closest neighbours.
These struggles between the Afghan people and external forces have cre-
ated their own psychological, traditional, and socio-political issues for
Afghanistan.7 The Muslim conquest of Afghanistan essentially began
in the seventh century following the creation of several short-lived
Muslim dynasties, but it was not until the early eighteenth century that
a united state covering most of present-day Afghanistan was developed
under Ahmad Shah Durrani, an Afghan tribal leader; this period became
known as the Durrani dynasty. Throughout his reign, Durrani consoli-
dated chieftainships, minor principalities, and fragmented provinces
Afghanistan Context – Part 1 39
into one country. The reign of the Durrani line ended in 1818, yet no
predominant ruler was to emerge until Dost Muhammad became emir
of Afghanistan in 1826.8 The Great Game defines the period of history
and was filled with rivalry and conflict between the British and Russian
Empires, who were both were vying for supremacy in Central Asia, with
a specific focus on Afghanistan. During this time the British tried to
replace Dost Muhammad with a former emir who would be more suited
to their ruling style, but this decision was to be the cause of the first
Afghan War (1838–1842) between the British and the Afghans. Dost was
to remain in power until his death in 1863, however, being succeeded
by his son Sher Ali. The year 1878 marked the beginning of the Second
Afghan War, and just a year later, Sher Ali died and was succeeded by
Yakub Khan, once again shifting the power dynamic in Afghanistan.
In 1880 Abd ar-Raham Khan was officially recognised as emir, but he
died in 1901 and was succeeded by his son Habibullah.9 Habibullah was
assassinated in 1919 and his successor, Amanullah, invaded India in
1919, triggering the Third Afghan War.
The Third Afghan War was ended by the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which
resulted in Afghanistan gaining full control over its foreign relations.
During this time King Amanullah (1919–1929) moved to end his
country’s traditional isolation, establishing relations with numerous
countries and introducing several reforms intended to modernise
Afghanistan. However, even with these progressive ideas, Amanullah
was forced to abdicate in January 1929 and Mohammad Zahir Shah
succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973.10 On July 17,
1973 the Republic of Afghanistan was born following the end of Zahir
Shah’s autocratic rule through a non-violent coup by Mohammad Zahir
Daoud Khan. Daoud had seized power with the help of the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a pro-Moscow communist
party. Daoud’s reign was not a smooth one and his attempts to carry
out the badly needed economic and social reforms were met with lit-
tle success. Relations between Daoud and the PDPA soon became tense
and once his power was consolidated Daoud no longer felt the need
for these allies and ordered a crackdown on the party. This resulted in
a backlash from the PDPA and on April 27, 1978, Mohammad Daoud
was assassinated by a group tied to the PDPA, led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, Babrak Karmal, and Amin Taha, thus overthrowing the regime
in an event which became known as the Saur Revolution. On May 1,
1978 Taraki became President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of
the PDPA, and the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA). The PDPA implemented a liberal and social agenda
during its first 18 months of rule, which ran counter to the deeply
rooted Afghan traditions. By the summer of 1978, a revolt began in
the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and quickly developed into
a countrywide insurgency. This revolt also caused fragmentation and
internal conflicts within the PDPA and weakened the government.
Adding pressure to the already fragile government was the fact that
many military officers and soldiers defected to the mujahideen political
armed groups and joined military operations against the government.
This severe political crisis exhausted the PDPA regime and caused the
Soviets to invade and rescue their friendly regime from a total collapse.11
In September 1979, seeing an opportunity to gain influence,
Hafizullah Amin seized power from Taraki.12 Little changed under
Amin and instability continued to plague his regime. As he moved
against the perceived enemies in the PDPA, several rural areas rose in
armed rebellion against the new government and by December 1979,
party morale was crumbling as the insurgency continued to grow. Also
at this time, the party’s long history of factionalism came to a bloody
head as the more radical wing of the party sought to wipe out the more
moderate wing.13 As the insurgency spread and the Afghan army began
to crumble, the regime’s survival became increasingly dependent upon
Soviet assistance. By October 1979 relations between Afghanistan and
the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet
advice on how to stabilise and consolidate his government.14 The armed
struggle between the regime and its opponents overshadowed the
social, economic, political, and cultural changes within society; violent
interaction became one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the
state.15 With the extreme levels of mass revolt that they witnessed, the
PDPA regime lost control over the mobilisation of society and lost many
territories under its control to the opposition. As a result, it was forced
from an offensive position to a defensive position on the military,
economic, and political fronts.16 Essentially, this combination of
popular resistance and intra-elite antagonism set the scene for the
invasion of Afghanistan by the regime’s Soviet backer. On December 25,
1979, the Soviet army entered Kabul.
The Soviet era (1979–1989)
Upon entering Afghanistan the Soviets killed Hafizullah Amin,

returned Babrak Karmal to Kabul, and installed him as president of
the Revolutionary Council, general secretary of the PDPA, and prime
minister of the new government.17 However, the regime that had been
installed by the Soviets in 1980 faced a completely different situation

than had been encountered by the original revolutionary regime, and the
newly formed Karmal regime, although backed by 120,000 Soviet troops,
was unable to establish its authority outside Kabul. The government
essentially only controlled Kabul and other towns in its immediate
vicinity, while the mujahideen operated freely in most of the country-
side. Almost 80 percent of the countryside, including parts of Herat and
Kandahar, eluded effective government control, and as well as that, an
overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime and
chose, either actively or passively, to support the mujahideen. On several
fronts the mujahideen expanded their influence and control and even-
tually established their own administrations throughout Afghanistan.
The mujahideen made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain
a system of local government outside major urban areas. By mid-1984 a
third of Afghanistan’s population has been uprooted by this instability,
with 3.5 million Afghans having fled to Pakistan and over one million
to Iran, while hundreds of thousands more became internal refugees.18
Adding to the already chaotic situation in Afghanistan, by May 1985,
the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organisations had formed
an alliance to coordinate their political and military operations against
the Soviet occupation.19 Demoralised, and with no clear victory in sight,
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the USSR forces had to
leave Afghanistan. By the time of the Soviet Party Congress of February
1986, being confronted by limited resources at home and continuing
resistance in Afghanistan, Gorbachev was authorised to promote a
political compromise in Afghanistan and to negotiate the withdrawal of
Soviet troops. At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Soviet
leaders decided to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of
1988.20 The withdrawal began on May 15, 1988 and ended on February
15, 1989. The departure left the country in a shambles and Afghan
society with no accepted symbol of political legitimacy.
Following the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops from Afghanistan
a bloody civil war took place that shattered the already war-ruined
country and forced the Afghans into an even more severe process of
fragmentation and instability.21 The people of Afghanistan were left
divided into two main factions: the first was the faction who followed
the Kabul government under Najibullah and the second were those
who supported the numerous mujahideen groups. As a result of this
chaotic situation, the majority of the population fell into the hands of
divided political groups, extremist military factions, and international
organisations.22 Najibullah’s regime, without financial aid and support
from the Soviets, immediately began to fracture and disintegrate. With this
loss of a solid governmental structure came a quest for leadership within
Afghanistan between the various ethnic, religious, and political groups
who were all vying to form the new national government. During this
time, thousands of government military and militia forces aligned
themselves with mujahideen groups who, they felt, had similar ethnic,
linguistic, or religious backgrounds.23 The expansion of the mujahideen
and the increase of their influence in large territories, in particular the
establishment of the National Commanders Shura (NCS), altered the bal-
ance of power in Afghanistan. The situation was made worse by the fight-
ing between the contending forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the founder
and leader of Hezb-I Islami, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the
Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan.
The split between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun elements of Afghan
society became more pronounced, with the majority of the non-
Pashtun elements of the government’s armed forces joining Ahmed
Shah Massoud in the north, while the Pashtun elements joined
Hekmatyar and Mawlawi Haghani in the east and Haji Qadir forces in
Nangarhar. The Northern Alliances, which were headed by Massoud,
Dostam, Sayyed Nader Kyani, and Hezb-e-Wahdat, were able to control
the provinces that extended from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kabul. Herat and its
neighbouring provinces came under the control of joint ex-government
and mujahideen forces led by Ismail Khan. Kandahar was controlled
by a mixture of mujahideen and former government forces headed
by Mullah Nagibullah Akhund. Finally, the east and the southeast
were controlled by the regional ex-military and regional forces led by
Mawlawi Haghani and Haji Abdul Ghadir.24 In order to try to stabilise the
country, the Peshawar Accords of April 26, 1992 attempted to prevent
the complete collapse of Afghanistan by declaring the establishment of
the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), with Sibghatullah Mujadidi, the
founder of the Afghan Liberation Front, becoming the head of state
for two months, followed by Rabbani for four months.25 At the end of
the six months, the plan was that the government would then form a
council to choose an interim government, with the aim of coordinat-
ing forces and preparing the country for general elections. Hekmatyar
did not, however, join the interim government, accusing it of being an
illegitimate institution under the influence of the ex-communists and
demanding that the northern alliance militia under General Dostam
leave Kabul. Soon, Hezb-e-Wahdat joined Hekmatyar in vying for power
against the government forces, and Hekmatyar’s forces were able to get
closer to Kabul. Due to the fact that there was an absence of a central
governing institution, each of these armed groups essentially became

the ruler of their controlled territory. Large-scale fighting erupted across
Kabul and the military and political forces became divided along ethnic
lines: Hekmatyar with the ex-Khalqis Pashtuns; Massoud supported
mostly by the non-Pashtun; Dostam supported by Uzbeks; and Hezb-e-
Wahdat supported by Hazaras.
Later, all these armed ethnic groups divided into two hostile factions:
the government forces dominated by the Shura-e-Nezar (Supervisory
Council) led by Massoud and Rabbani; and the Shura-e-Hamahangi
(Coordinated Council) comprised of Hekmatyar, Dostam, and the
Hezb-e-Wahdat.26 On June 25, 1992, the government forces led by
Massoud attacked the opposition position in Kabul and captured their
headquarters. The result of this assault was the devastation of Kabul,
with more than half a million of Kabul’s population fleeing the city,
over 3,000 people being killed and a further 19,000 wounded.27 While
the struggle for power was taking place in Kabul, the rest of Afghanistan
fell under the control of the various regional powers. In Nangarhar,
the local forces established a Shura and elected Haji Ghadir, a former
mujahideen commander, as governor of this province.28 In the north,
Dostam and Ismaeli Shia commander Sayyed Nader Keyani controlled
Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, parts of Kunduz, and Samangan. In the west,
Ismail Khan disarmed the local mujahideen and militia groups and
controlled Herat, Badghis, Farah, and Ghor.29 Clashes between Dostam
and government forces resulted in an alliance between Dostam and
Hekmatyar against Massoud and Rabbani-led forces. This separation
and division of the country kept it in a constant state of instability and
the cycle of violence and the massive mobilisation of the nation in an
unclear direction with no popular leadership continued.30 Adding to
the already troubled situation in Afghanistan was the eruption of the
civil war between the Hekmatyar ISI-supported forces and those led by
Rabbani, which further reduced the credibility of the Afghan mujahi-
deen leaders. The result of this civil war situation was the emergence
of a group of mujahideen that would leave one of the most lasting and
devastating effects on Afghanistan.31
The Taliban era (1994–2001)
In early 1990 Afghanistan was crumbling and heading towards complete

state failure. The situation soon erupted into a full-fledged civil war and
by 1994 the violence in Kabul had spread through the rest of the coun-
try. The anarchic political and chaotic social environment produced
a political vacuum within Afghanistan, which a group known as the

Taliban was only too willing to fill. Led by Mullah Omar, the Taliban
initially emerged in the Kandahar province in 1994 as a local response
to the resistance and militia forces. Between their emergence in 1994
and their capture of Kabul just two years later, the rise of the Taliban
movement marked the most dramatic shift of forces in Afghanistan’s
recent history.32 In the context of Afghan history, however, the rise of
the Taliban is not surprising; the civil war was ravaging Afghanistan
and Afghans were desperate for a stabilising counterforce that would
put an end to the violence. The speed at which the Taliban were able
to take over southern Afghanistan spoke volumes of the high level of
political bankruptcy of the mujahideen factions and the exhaustion of
the people, who were looking for stability and peace at any cost.33 Even
though the people saw the Taliban as being their saviours, their rise was
actually more of a military enterprise that aimed to reunite the deeply
fragmented Afghanistan, rather than a social or political movement. On
November 3, 1994 the Taliban forces began to move on Kandahar, and
after only two days of fighting, the group had captured the second larg-
est city in Afghanistan.34 Over the next three months, the Taliban seized
12 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces. The levels of bloodshed involved
were minimal, as Afghans, who were eager for change in their war-torn
country, offered little resistance and welcomed what they saw as Taliban
liberation. Over 20,000 madrassas students, many between the ages
of 14 to 24, joined the Taliban and marched through Afghanistan. By
February 1995, just outside Kabul, the Taliban overran the headquarters
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the two feuding mujahideen leaders
still controlling the area; the other, Ahmad Shah Massoud, remained
entrenched in Kabul. In the spring of 1996, the Taliban laid siege to
Kabul, devastating the city.35
As the civil war continued to devastate the country, Massoud and
President Rabbani sought the help of Osama bin Laden, who at this
time was situated in Sudan. On May 18, 1996 bin Laden arrived in
Jalalabad, but instead of helping the cause of Massoud and Rabbani, bin
Laden instead chose to lend his support to the Taliban.36 The Taliban
were now backed with money, arms, and supplies from bin Laden,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. On September 26, 1996 the Taliban entered
Kabul for the second time and this time instead of staying to fight the
onslaught Massoud’s forces retreated with the intention of developing
a stronger resistance movement in the northern parts of Afghanistan.
Upon entering Kabul, the Taliban killed Najibullah and sent a clear mes-
sage to the citizens that there was a new and violent power in control
in Afghanistan. Once in power, the Taliban delivered on their promise

to bring security to the country, but security came at the cost of per-
sonal freedom and approximately 400,000 people were displaced by the
Taliban at this time in Afghanistan.37 Even though the Taliban were able
to reunite most of Afghanistan they were still unable to completely end
the civil war, which continued to take its toll on the country. In a small
sliver of northern Afghanistan territory not under Taliban control, the
resistance movement began to form around Massoud. When people in
Afghanistan realised the reality of Taliban rule, the resistance found itself
getting more powerful.38 On May 26, 1998, as the Taliban battled the
Northern Alliance for control of Afghanistan, bin Laden called a press
conference in Khost, declaring war against the US. This announcement
came at a time when the Taliban were struggling to gain international
recognition. Following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and
Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998, the US began to surmise that the
Taliban and al-Qaeda had become inextricably linked.39 Saudi Arabia
eventually withdrew financial support for the Taliban, leaving Pakistan
as Omar’s only external supporter.
Meanwhile, al-Qaeda began to use its base in Afghanistan to mount
ever bolder attacks, for example, the attack on the USS Cole on October
12, 2000, which resulted in the deaths of 17 servicemen and which
wounded a further 39.40 On September 9, 2001, a terrorist attack took
place along the Afghan–Tajikistan border, foreshadowing the history-
making violence and terrorism to come. Two militants posing as Arab
journalists travelled to the Northern Alliance headquarters to interview
Massoud and managed to detonate a bomb which was hidden in the
video camera, mortally wounding Massoud, who died shortly after in
a hospital in Tajikistan.41 In his last days, Massoud had travelled across
Europe warning world leaders that the partnership between the Taliban
and al-Qaeda was a threat, not just to Afghanistan, but to the world, but
these warnings would come too late and fall on deaf ears.42 Many felt that
with Massoud’s death Afghanistan had lost its real leader and that the
country was now going to fall further into chaos and instability.
9/11 and beyond
With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, bin Laden and the
Taliban came into the crosshairs of a deeply wounded superpower that
was looking for revenge. On September 20, 2001, President Bush issued
Mullah Omar with an ultimatum – deliver all leaders of al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan to the US or be seen as their allies and thus a target of
reprisals. Omar hesitated to turn over the al-Qaeda leader to the US

without clear proof of his crime, which is a trait of the traditional culture
of Pashtunwali, the social code that is strictly followed and that dictates
if a Pashtun receives a guest they are then bound by honour to protect
that guest with their life.43 As a result of this hesitancy, on October
7, 2001, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom, a military
campaign aimed to depose the Taliban regime, destroy al-Qaeda, and
capture or kill bin Laden and Mullah Omar. With the introduction of
elite US forces and unrivalled air power, the Northern Alliance moved
swiftly through the countryside, hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda
positions. Mazir-i-Sharif was the first city to fall, and shortly afterwards
the Northern Alliance and US forces liberated the cities of Herat and
Kabul in quick succession. Less than a month later, US forces overtook
Kandahar, Omar’s headquarters – the final Taliban holdout. In 2004,
Afghanistan held triumphant national elections and Hamid Karzai was
voted President. Initially, Karzai was welcomed by the Afghan citizens,
but his popular support quickly began to fade as Afghans became espe-
cially angry with the composition of his Parliament, which included
several notorious figures from Afghanistan’s past, including former
communists from the days of the brutal Soviet occupation, notorious
mujahideen warlords, and even ex-Taliban members.44 Karzai struggled
to extend the reach of his government beyond Kabul and very quickly
many of the country’s same old problems resurfaced: for example drug
smuggling, gun running, and warlordism.
The US-led coalition tried to keep the peace, but only managed to
slow Afghanistan’s descent into chaos, and as Afghanistan became
more and more unstable, the Taliban quietly waited for new orders
from Mullah Omar, who was located in the dusty swath of land that
makes up the tribal belt that straddles Afghanistan and Pakistan.45 The
Presidents in Kabul and Islamabad were both loathe to send their secu-
rity forces into this dangerous region, so as a result the Taliban operated
there as a parallel government. From this base, the Taliban mounted
an increasingly successful effort to retake Afghanistan. By 2006 the
Taliban were strong enough to seize several southern provinces, and
the Afghan government had to call in US air power to regain control.
As 2006 came to a close, the new Taliban proved to be a deadlier and
more brutal organisation than the one the US and allied forces had
dominated only five years earlier. The new Taliban terror campaign
had turned Afghanistan into one of the world’s most dangerous war
zones, with international forces from a combined 37 nations remaining
unable to stabilise the country. The Taliban insurgency has now gained
momentum to the point that foreign forces in Afghanistan are dealing

with ‘an industrial-strength insurgency’.46
Despite their removal from power in Kabul, the Taliban continue to
be the most powerful indigenous force in Afghanistan. This dominance
comes from the fact that foreigners have never been able to impose an
externally led political order on the country and that these indigenous
groups are experts at playing on this fact. The situation in Afghanistan
remains extremely fluid and increasingly the more extreme elements
of the Taliban are bringing the fighting and destruction into the cities,
which has further demoralised the Afghans. As it stands, virtually no
part of the nation is safe from the group’s penetration.47 Never a strong
state to begin with, Afghanistan was weakened to the point of failure
by the three-decade long period of war. The combined effects of the
bloody and chaotic formation of the state, the anti-Soviet insurgency,
followed by the inter-ethnic civil war, Taliban rule, US-led invasion, and
subsequent re-emergence of the Taliban, have collectively contributed
to causing massive levels of instability and devastation in Afghanistan.
Having addressed the historical background of Afghanistan, an analysis
of the country in relation to terrorism now needs to be carried out.
State failure in context: Afghanistan a failed state?
Afghanistan is ranked the fourth most war-torn, fifth most corrupt,

seventh most fragile, and sixth weakest state in the world. The pro-
cess of state failure in Afghanistan is characterised by weak govern-
ance, rampant corruption, lawlessness, ineffective counter-insurgency
efforts, uncontrolled organised crime/drug trafficking, and failure to
deliver basic services. According to such indicator tools as the Fund
for Peace, the CIA World Factbook, the Rural Poverty Portal, and the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, almost all
of Afghanistan’s social, economic, and political indicators worsened
significantly and quite rapidly in the period 2009–2010. Afghanistan
has a high population growth rate of 2.69 percent; and with this comes
an extremely high level of youth bulge, with 44.6 percent of the popu-
lation being under the age of 15. It also has one of the highest infant
mortality rates in the world, with 152 deaths per 1,000 live births.48 The
indicator for refugees and displaced persons, according to the Fund for
Peace, shows that Afghanistan is still critical in relation to this strain
on the country, even though more than 3.7 million Afghan refugees
have returned to their homes over the past six years.49 Several mil-
lion more Afghani citizens remain in Pakistan and Iran.50 This refugee
crisis is ongoing and there have been thousands more Afghans who
have been made homeless through the once-again increasing levels of
violence being witnessed in the country. This has been one of the most
detrimental factors to the country’s improvement, as many of those
who have chosen to leave have been from the professional classes, thus
causing a massive brain drain within the country.
One of the key factors in keeping the violence and terrorist activity
alive has been the growing number of group grievances within
Afghanistan, which have been a cause of many of the erupting social
struggles and violent skirmishes over the past decade. Almost all of
Afghanistan’s political and military indicators worsened significantly
in 2011, with the legitimacy of the state being particularly hard
hit in 2010/2011, due to the considerable drop in support for the
Karzai regime. This loss of support came as a direct result of the
government’s inability to combat corruption, the growing levels
of military violence, and drug trafficking. Many of Karzai’s govern-
ment members were seen as being highly corrupt and operating with
impunity, and while Karzai had always taken a hard-line approach
to combating corruption, his policies did not. This increase in cor-
rupt behaviour has had a significant impact on Afghanistan which
is evident when looking at the Corruption Perceptions Index scores
for 2009, which place Afghanistan 179th out of 180 countries in the
world (Table 3.1).51
The capacity of the Afghan government to promote its influence at the
national, provincial, and district levels remains limited and Afghanistan
still faces significant nation-building issues, including combating the
Taliban, widespread poppy cultivation, and the deterioration of many
state institutions. Each of these elements results in more chronic pat-
terns of violent extremism, corruption, dependence on the illicit drug
Table 3.1 Afghanistan’s rank in Transparency International’s

annual CPI
Year Rank Number of countries surveyed
2009 179 180

2008 176 180
2007 172 180
2006 No data 163
2005 117 159
Source: Transparency International Annual CPI reports (2012)

http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
trade, and socioeconomic instability that will continue to undermine

Afghanistan’s ability to strengthen state capacity. Although having
been classified as a failed state, the reality of the situation is entirely
more complex to comprehend within Afghanistan. The US National
Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 notes that Afghanistan will
face continued instability and remain a failed state unless employment
conditions improve considerably. It predicts that for the next 15 years
tribal and sectarian disputes will probably continue to rise, be fought
out, and shift constantly in Afghanistan as the various players realign
themselves.52 However, while there is every possibility that violence,
levels of instability, and levels of terrorism will increase, it is highly
unlikely that the country will fail completely or collapse.
It is a fact that Afghanistan is nowhere near the status of being a
strong state and probably never will be, but the label of ‘failed state’
does not adequately describe it either. Through the examination of
the state in both its historical and modern context, it is argued here
that Afghanistan is best suited to be categorised as a crisis/failing
state and not a failed state, even though it does periodically display
many of the distinctive features of a failed state. This is due to the
fact that Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war for the last
three decades, yet has managed to survive and continue to function,
although at low levels, throughout. It does show some characteristics
of state failure, but not across its entire territory, and the government
has been able to extend its influence into regions outside of Kabul
and its surrounding towns. The level of crisis in Afghanistan may
remain high, but the state is seemingly able to function; therefore
to term it failed (it is argued here) is incorrect and misleading to the
understanding of the situation in Afghanistan today. Tied to the list
of factors in the previous chapter, there are usually several structural
and historical factors that contribute to an environment that is con-
ducive to and that enables terrorism and state failure to occur, the
convergence of which creates an environment necessary for terrorist
groups to flourish.
Government/state weakness
Due to Afghanistan’s heterogeneous social structure, there has never

been a leader who has been able to achieve complete rule in every cor-
ner of the country. The idea then of state/government weakness must
be modified to fit this unique situation. Essentially, the understanding
of a state in the classical Weberian sense cannot directly be applied
to the Afghan case. The process of state failure in Afghanistan can be

characterised by weak governance, rampant corruption, lawlessness,
ineffective counter-insurgency efforts, uncontrolled organised crime/
drug trafficking, and failure to deliver basic services. The anarchy of the
post-Soviet withdrawal, coupled with the repressive Taliban rule, left
Afghanistan bereft of political, social, and economic institutions and
with a system of centralised authority that the Karzai government has
been unable to resuscitate.53 The instability facing Afghanistan today
is not based solely on the continuation of some ancient condition; it
is the direct result of decades of international dismantling of the tradi-
tional structures which have left extremists with an opening to fill the
gap and get a foothold in the country. The insurgency in Afghanistan
can be divided into three specific zones of strength. The first are those
places where the insurgency is now dominant, specifically the south-
ern and eastern provinces and a few districts in the North. The second
are those places where the insurgency, due to ethnic/social structures,
will not be able to make significant gains; i.e. the Hazara-populated
areas and Panjshir. Finally, there are those places where the insurgency
is growing but has not yet developed into a fully fledged insurgency.
These areas include the Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghor, Takhar, Faryab, Jawjan,
Samangan, and Badakhshan provinces. As well as that, the Taliban
have become the dominant political force in numerous regions of
Afghanistan, including Pashtun-majority provinces in the East and
South: Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Wardak,
Logar, Helmand, Farah, Kunar, and Laghman. The insurgents control
the countryside and have a strong presence even inside cities like
Kandahar and Ghazni, and the Afghan administration is non-existent
outside the major cities.54 The Afghan government has prevented the
Taliban from seizing control of any significant district centre or town,
but the Taliban have a strong presence in the countryside, especially in
southern and eastern areas along the border with Pakistan, which has
proved to be extremely detrimental to the success of the US-led mission
in Afghanistan.
The overall situation with regard to government/state weakness in
Afghanistan does not look like it is going to improve in the immediate
future. Without an Afghan government that is representative, efficient,
effective, and accountable, and that has domestic and international
legitimacy, it is going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
create a climate of security, establish a rule of law, or create an environ-
ment for the economy to flourish.55 As a result of this nascent weakness,
the resurgent extremist forces were able to re-emerge with ease. This
means that there are still large swathes of the country that are without
central government influence or the presence of international forces.
This low level of central government presence outside of Kabul can be
attributed to three main factors. The first is related to the provincial
and local leaders, whose activities do not support the central govern-
ment. Second is the fact that there was no comprehensive vision for
incorporating provincial government workers as agents of the central
government. Finally, there is the internal political and social discord,
which has been compounded by the levels and methods of interna-
tional aid to the central government in Kabul.56 Each of these issues,
taken on an individual basis, is cause enough for state weakness, but the
Afghan state is dealing with these all at once, which is slowly killing the
fledgling government and destroying any semblance of stability that
might emerge. Recommendations from numerous academics and policy
makers focus on the fact that the international community must remain
engaged in Afghanistan until it has developed its own institutions
that can deal with matters of state security and governance. Without
assistance, Afghanistan’s fragile institutions will crumble, repeating the
history of the early 1990s, when the country was a hub of international
terrorism and drug production.57
Breakdown/decline of social, political, and economic order
The requirements for the state to succeed include creating a broad-based

and all-encompassing national government, establishing a functioning
security apparatus, and reconstructing the devastated economy, but this
has not been a successful process in Afghanistan. The construction of
new political, social, and economic institutions in Afghanistan began
after the Soviet intervention, but, having largely developed through
funding by foreign powers, the state had created hardly any institutions
for interacting with society. The key to the development of democracy
and prosperity in Afghanistan therefore is to build a viable and capa-
ble state with a robust economy, integrated political system, and a
universal social system.58 Yet, even though Afghanistan has enjoyed
some economic, political, and social growth over the past decade, the
country’s recovery remains extremely fragile. In the social sphere, the
state remains unable to provide basic public services to its citizens,
be they education and health or water and sanitation. This inadequacy
has triggered deep-seated frustration and resentment among the popu-
lation, especially in the rural areas of Afghanistan, where the govern-
ment’s reach and influence are almost non-existent. The nexus between
instability and insecurity within the country, coupled with the central
government’s lack of ability to provide functioning basic services for its
citizens, undermines the legitimacy of central government institutions
in the eyes of the population. This then fuels the vicious cycle of weak
institutions, deteriorating security, minimal opportunities for social and
economic advancement, and the rising narcotics economy which keeps
the country unstable.59
Afghanistan is not faring any better in the political and economic
spheres. Political order and governance in Afghanistan have always
largely rested on a mixture of personalised, clientelistic politics, elite
alliance, and elite settlement, and as a result the Afghan people lose
trust and support for the government, who they see as not doing any-
thing to change the situation for the better. By playing upon the local
grievances of the people against the ill-performing government and the
foreign forces within Afghanistan, the insurgents have succeeded in
gaining sympathy and even a significant degree of political legitimacy
among the people.60 The Afghan economy is facing the same problems
that every state faces when trying to rebuild itself after a period of
war, including significant levels of resistance to change from a state-
controlled system; the dearth of human capital; corruption; insecurity;
and inequalities created by the market system itself.61 The problem with
Afghanistan, however, is that it has faced a 30-year long war which
shows no signs of slowing down any time soon. Adding to this is the
current economic climate, which has put even more pressure on the
already fragile government to try to sustain itself and to try to develop
a flourishing economy.
Institutional incapacity has become the norm in Afghanistan and
in the places where institutions actually exist they are either corrupt
or barely functioning. The Afghan government has been working on
trying to rebuild its state institutions, but there remain critical infra-
structural issues that have not been addressed, such as the lack roads
and access to electricity. Up until now it has been the international
donors who have almost completely financed the country’s develop-
ment budget, a fact that the extremists use as ammunition against the
Afghan government, who they portray as being a puppet of foreign
forces.62 Even though significant progress has been made in many areas
of Afghan society over the last decade, there still remains a significant
level of breakdown on social, political, and economic order within the
country, which has proved to be a threat to both security and stability
and needs to be addressed in order to prevent further violence and the
breakdown of the state.
Safe havens
One of the main facets of the current counterterrorist objective in

Afghanistan is to prevent terrorist groups from re-establishing safe
havens within its border. The goal of preventing Afghanistan from
further becoming a terrorist haven rests on a number of elements: the
Afghan security apparatus and whether it will be able to deal with the
terrorist attacks; the booming drug trade that underpins its financial
resources; the international community’s commitment to the cause of
Afghanistan; the coalition forces’ ability to apply political means rather
than military power vis-à-vis heavy-handed tactics, and the role of exter-
nal actors.63 Historically, the explanations offered to account for the rise
of foreign-led terrorist networks active in Afghanistan have variously
focused on the political vacuum opened up by the Soviet withdrawal in
1989, interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan’s internal affairs,
the failure of Afghanistan to produce a strong state because of ethnic
factionalism, and an internal moral incoherence inherent to the Afghan
culture.64 However, none of these elements individually can explain
why Afghanistan has become such a target for terrorist and extremist
groups. One of the most prevalent arguments as to why Afghanistan has
become such an active safe haven is its close proximity to Pakistan. As
the Afghan–Pakistani border is essentially wide open to the Taliban and
al-Qaeda elements, it provides them with the ability to traverse between
the two countries with ease.
With regard to access to these safe havens, there are three major
routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan which are not very different
from the ones used by the mujahideen in the 1980s.65 The first is the
Parachinar way toward the south of Kabul. The Taliban have made
serious gains in the Azrah district in the Logar province, a strategic
gateway into the south of Kabul. The second is the road through Zabul
province toward the south, west, and north. This road is a critical
passageway for moving insurgent fighters to the North (Ghazni, Logar,
and Wardak), as well as to Kandahar province and through Uruzgan
province to the west (Helmand, Herat, and Badghris). The final route
is the road through Kunar province and north of the Kabul–Jalalabad
road. Without adequate levels of government presence, influence, and
control, the situation in Afghanistan will not change in the near future.
Until these safe havens and pockets of extreme weakness are addressed
there will always be the possibility of Afghanistan’s territory being used
as a safe haven for terrorists and other extremist and fundamentalist
groups, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Directly linked to the issue of
safe havens is the extremely porous border that Afghanistan shares with
Pakistan, which has acted as a passageway for extremists to pass freely
between the two countries.
Porous borders
Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but it is the border that
it shares with Pakistan – the 1,500 mile-long Durand Line – that is the
most significant and dangerous.66 Over the course of the current US/
NATO mission in Afghanistan, much attention has been paid to the
Afghan–Pakistani border, a very porous demarcation line transited at
many points by hundreds, if not thousands, of people every day.67
The border itself is poorly defined, cutting through mountain chains
and ungoverned territory, essentially being out of the writ of both
governments in Islamabad and Kabul. The porous nature of the border
means that members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters have created
a fluid battle space from where they are able to conduct increasingly
coordinated attacks in both countries. The apparent ease of use that
the Taliban and other terrorist groups show in their ability to traverse
Pakistan’s tribal areas into Afghanistan in order to launch cross-border
attacks has become possibly the most contentious issue between the
US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Having being driven from power in
Afghanistan by Western forces at the beginning of the invasion, the
Taliban took refuge in the Pakistani tribal areas and it has been this
ability to maintain a foothold in Pakistan that has been instrumental
to their success in sustaining a cross-border insurgency against Afghan
and international forces.
Due to the freedom of movement across the border regions, the
Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda are now present in almost every
Afghan and Pakistani province along the fluid border areas between the
two countries. On the Afghan side, the northern border area is defined
by difficult-to-access mountain ranges that have made this area almost
impossible for any kind of central government control. Conversely, the
southern border is a plateau, made up of the province of Baluchistan
on the Pakistani side and Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces
on the Afghan side. It is interesting to note that the Afghan Taliban in
southern Afghanistan, adjacent to Baluchistan, does not rely as much
on the border area as much as Taliban elements to the north do. Taliban
activity is concentrated closer to the border in the north, as the border
has less strategic value for the Taliban in the south. The reason for
this is in part because the insurgents continue to control the southern
territory that Western military forces have been unable to wrest away.68
Moreover, the Taliban’s territorial control in southern Afghanistan does
not extend to the border, as it does in the north.
The insurgents have expanded the war to the central, northern, and
western parts of the country. In 2003 the Taliban controlled 38 out of 364
districts in Afghanistan, but by the end of 2008 they expanded their con-
trol to 164 districts, and between October 2008 and April 2009 Taliban
attacks increased by 60 percent.69 This could not have been achieved
without the availability of the safe havens of the border regions within
both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Success in defeating the insurgency in
Afghanistan and stabilising the country will be largely determined by
events taking place along the Pakistan–Afghan border. There are no
short-term solutions to the challenge posed to the Karzai government by
the presence of safe havens for the Taliban and other mujahideen across
the border in Pakistan. Both the Afghan and Pakistani states are weak,
and, as of now, incapable of engaging in effective counter-insurgency in
Pashtun areas, let alone coordinating a complex and draining counter-
insurgency campaign. Thus the use of the border by the terrorist groups
will not realistically cease in the near future.70
Pool of recruits
The people of Afghanistan are some of the world’s most disenfran-

chised, poor, abused, neglected, unsecure, and uneducated. The social,
economic, and political problems in Afghanistan have merged over time
to create an environment where people feel, in many cases, that they
have no alternative but to join terrorist groups. In addition, Afghanistan
has an extremely high level of youth bulge, which is significant to the
situation as, according to a study by Population Action International
(PAI), there is a strong correlation between countries that are prone to
civil conflicts and those that have a high youth bulge.71 Youth bulges
are mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia, the Middle East,
and the Pacific islands, and there are currently 62 countries which are
considered to be ‘very young’ (meaning that two-thirds of their popu-
lations are under the age of 30). These include Pakistan, Nigeria, and
Afghanistan. In the Muslim world, large populations of idle youth are
especially prone to virulent strands of Islam as an alternative force for
social mobility.72 Of the 27 largest youth bulge societies in the world,
13 are Muslim. However, demographers are quick to stress that youth
bulges do not solely explain these civil conflicts; other underlying issues
such as corruption, poverty, ethno-religious tensions, and poor political
institutions also play a significant contributing role. Nor do they rule

out as coincidence the predilection toward social unrest among states
with large youth bulges.73
The theory contends that societies that have rapidly growing young
populations often end up with rampant unemployment and large pools
of disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel
or terrorist groups.74 Countries that contain weak political institutions
are seen as being the most vulnerable to youth bulge-related terrorism
and social unrest. In Afghanistan, with a population of over 28.3 million
people, almost 14.6 million are male, of which almost 6.4 million fall into
the age bracket of 15–65 and a further 6.3 million are between the ages of
0–14. With a median age of just 17.6 years, Afghanistan is an extremely
youth-centred country. In the case of Afghanistan, this high level of youth
bulge is significant and has direct ties to the structure of education provi-
sion, in that many of Afghanistan’s youths have little or no access to any
form of education and are left with little choice but to join these forms
of extremist and terrorist groups. The development of state education in
Afghanistan represents a good point of departure for understanding the
availability of significant levels of recruits within Afghanistan. From 1978
onwards, a series of continuous wars have inflicted significant damage
on the educational sector. Under the Rabbani and Taliban governments
(1992–2001) there was complete neglect of the education system and a
reintroduction of the policy of re-Islamising education by, for example,
teaching extreme versions of the Koran and extremist and fundamental-
ist ideals of Islam, which had dire effects on the youth of Afghanistan.75
The lack of a decent education system has been one of the main driving
factors behind the Taliban’s ability to recruit so many young Afghan men.
The Taliban set up madrassas, or religious schools, across Afghanistan and
Pakistan and have provided not only education, but housing, healthcare,
and food to those who are the most in need.76 In the post-Taliban era,
the Afghan people had high hopes for state education and the Afghan
government developed an ambitious position on promoting state-run
education to all areas of Afghanistan.
The period 2002–2003 offered an unprecedented opportunity for a deci-
sive push in nation-building by the new government, yet once again this
opportunity was not taken advantage of and the people of Afghanistan
were left to fend for themselves. As a result of this disappointment with
the quality of state education, the pendulum began to swing back towards
madrassas. This opening was not missed by the Taliban, who used this
opportunity to re-establish their madrassas systems and engage the youth
of Afghanistan with their cause once again. With schools being one of
the very few manifestations of state presence in many villages and towns
across Afghanistan, the Afghan government needs to understand how
significant providing education is to its citizens, as well as in preventing
the spread of the Taliban and stabilising the country. The Afghan state
and its flawed political, social, and educational systems are, however, not
the only contributing factors to such high levels of pools of recruits. The
effects of foreign occupation and the rising level of civilian casualties
related to this have begun to cause a backlash against the US and NATO
forces and have, in many instances, pushed many Afghans towards sup-
porting the Taliban and other extremist groups.
The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan escalated in 2010
and in the first six months of the year civilian casualties had increased
by 31 percent over the same period in 2009. Three-quarters of all civilian
casualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase
of 53 percent from 2009, while at the same time, civilian casualties attrib-
uted to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), decreased by 30 percent compared
to the first half of 2009.77 Between January 1 and June 30, 2010, UNAMA
HR documented 3,268 casualties, including 1,271 deaths of 2,477 civil-
ians, or 76 percent of the total number of civilian casualties for this
period.78 The steady increase in civilian casualties is acting against the
efforts of the US/NATO forces and, as noted by General Petraeus ‘every
Afghan death diminishes our cause’ and potentially provides another
recruit to the terrorists.79 Unfortunately Afghanistan remains a melting
pot of the necessary elements to create a pool of recruits to be used by
terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and it appears that for
the near future at least the situation will remain much the same.
Availability of weapons
In those areas of the world where structural violence and terrorism are
already severe, the proliferation of weapons and ammunition acceler-
ates any existing trends of societal dysfunction, political anarchy, and
the undermining of state authority, thus causing the disintegration
of the government and creating an environment of state weakness.80
While it has become apparent that there is a correlation between small
arms and light weapons proliferation, societal violence, and the general
weakening of the social fabric, being able to identify the exact nature
of the relationship in a universal fashion is extremely problematic.
This proliferation and use of light weapons and small arms within
societies around the world can actually be seen as a symptom of deeper
problems within the fabric of these societies.81 Insurgent groups have
been able to utilise available light weaponry, much of which is based on

technologies dating back to the 1970s in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan,
the problem of small arms proliferation and their misuse is not a new
phenomenon. Afghanistan has, for decades now, been the recipient of
a ready supply of arms and ammunition, which has had the effect of
allowing even the most minor of personal or political disagreements to
escalate into an all-out armed conflict. What is striking in Afghanistan’s
post-Taliban era, however, is the magnitude of weapons holdings and
the level of their penetration into political and economic life. Estimates
as to how many uncontrolled small arms and light weapons are held in
Afghanistan vary from a few million to more than ten million, or up to
one gun for every three citizens in the country.82
For over three decades now a vast supply of weapons has flooded
the country, becoming a driver of insecurity and political instability
which in turn has fed into the insurgency. This widespread availability
of weapons in Afghanistan is a major contributor to the growing levels
of insecurity, violent crime, and poverty being witnessed there today.
The presence of these weapons inhibits access by civilians to basic
services and key infrastructures such as health clinics and education.
Although weapons themselves do not cause conflict, easy access to
weapons increases the lethality and duration of terrorist violence and
conflict, undermines peace, and significantly hampers development.83
In essence, where states are unable to provide a secure environment
for their citizens or meet the prerequisite demands of basic human
needs, the proliferation of weaponry is both a principal consequence
of, and a key contributor to, weak and ineffective governance.84 Social
disintegration, linked to gun culture, is more clearly reflected in areas
most severely affected by militarisation, such as Afghanistan and it
is this militarisation of the civilian population, and most specifically
the youth, that makes the rejuvenation of societies an even greater
task to achieve. Unfortunately, it appears that Afghanistan is going to
remain in its current situation unless a newly formed Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme is implemented.
Until then it will never be able to truly emerge from ‘under the gun’.
Government complicity and support
The Afghan state has taken a more definitive stance against the prolifera-
tion of terrorism and against the extremist groups who operate within
its borders. However, by promoting a culture of corruption and a lack of
transparency, and by allowing certain extremist groups to exist without
state interference, the Afghan government has played its own role in
the proliferation of terrorism and the increase in state weakness. In a
post-war situation, and especially in a case as unique as Afghanistan,
the political leaders are of particular importance to overall levels of
stability, as institutionally it is these political leaders that will eventually
determine the fate of reconstruction efforts.85 Unfortunately, as is the
case in many post-conflict countries, the Afghan government has yet
to formulate its set of national interests and has instead become driven
by the interests of the aid-providing countries, such as the US. Lack
of determination and decisiveness can easily be highlighted as one of
the main weaknesses, and unfortunately Afghanistan’s political leader-
ship lacks a common vision and is only unified by one thing: political
survival. As well as that, the recent talks to end the war in Afghanistan
between the Afghan government, NATO officials, and Taliban elements
have been seen by many as highly controversial. These talks involve face-
to-face discussions with Taliban commanders from the highest levels of
the group’s leadership, most of whom are using Pakistan as a sanctuary.
Afghan leaders have also been holding discussions with the leaders of
the Haqqani network, who are considered to be one of the most hard-
line guerrilla factions fighting in Afghanistan today. Another group who
were involved are the Peshawar Shura, who base themselves in eastern
Afghanistan. There have been numerous criticisms about these meetings,
focusing on the point that in the end the Afghan government is simply
implementing a policy of appeasement to these groups, which will result
in further violence and fighting for dominance.
Even though there have been many negative arguments put forward
with regard to these talks, the fact remains that they appear to represent
the most substantive effort to date to try to negotiate the end of the
almost decade-long war. Many American and Afghan officials believe
that the Taliban is vulnerable to being split, with potentially large chunks
of the movement possibly even defecting to the Afghan government.
However, this is not a definitive outcome, and, as mentioned earlier, the
Afghan government’s support of these discussions may be providing
the Taliban and other groups with a way into the system, giving them
the steps necessary to mount another political takeover. Essentially, the
Afghan government lacks credibility across a host of fields, includ-
ing delivering justice; its patronage of the corrupt and the discredited
politicians and political groups; its failure to deliver on economic
growth; and its perceived lack of inclusiveness, which has allowed the
insurgency to create instability in the country.86 It is the responsibility
of the leadership to facilitate the emergence of a common purpose in
a society through creating reciprocal and equitable relationships among

community participants.87 This will in turn increase levels of support
for the government by the Afghans, which would then decrease the
support received by extremist groups, such as the Taliban. However,
in Afghanistan such a situation has not yet prevailed and moreover it
may never happen, since the leadership is almost totally disconnected
from the society and incapable of understanding this crucial reality and
working towards it.88 Along with the current discussion and meetings
with the Taliban and other extremist elements, the Afghan government
may in fact be playing right into the hands of the terrorists. Continuing
on this focus, the next chapter will focus in a more in-depth manner on
terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan.
4
Afghanistan: State Failure,
Terrorism in Afghanistan
Defining violence in Afghanistan as being terrorism-related is quite a

recent phenomenon, and really only emerged during the period of the
end of the Taliban rule. Prior to these events, violence in Afghanistan
was usually described as taking the form of rebellions, revolts, militia
movements, or acts of tribal warfare or insurgency. The year 1979
marked the beginning of a key turning point in relation to terrorism in
Afghanistan. The 1979 Soviet invasion triggered the rise and expansion
of post-jihad militant and religious extremist groups. However, it must
be noted that at that time these groups were not described as being
terrorist in nature, and were instead referred to as being freedom fight-
ers. Freedom fighters are seen as being part of a resistance movement,
usually against an oppressive government or outside force, compared to
a terrorist who uses violence to promote fear (see Table 2.1). This differ-
ence of definition may have emerged from the type of tactics used by
the mujahideen at that time. The mujahideen tended to use guerrilla
warfare tactics in their campaigns against the Soviets and the targets
of this warfare were usually military in nature and not civilian or non-
combatant. This would have prevented them being classified as a ter-
rorist group according to the most well-known definitions of terrorism.
A shift occurred, however, in the period immediately following the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, whereby the mujahideen were now left
to fend for themselves. These unstable mujahideen factions triggered
a power struggle and it was at this time that the now-splintered
mujahideen factions saw the use of civilian targets in violent political
campaigns as being a valid political tool for the first time.
61
In the years preceding Taliban rule, the violence witnessed in

Afghanistan was mainly ethnic, sectarian, or intra-tribal based and was
also used in the context of the political realm, i.e. opposition political
groups using violence against each other. When the Taliban came to
power in late 1994, their aim was to establish an Islamic government
in Afghanistan, and with this shift in political focus emerged a change
in the patterns and use of violence within the country. The Taliban ini-
tially began to use violence as a means of systematically eliminating all
other political factions, thus ensuring their complete dominance within
Afghanistan. As well as this, Afghanistan has been home to a number of
terrorist groups over recent years, for example Jaish-e-Mohammad and
the Abu Sayyaf Group. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the terrorist
groups that are active in Afghanistan.
A significant change in the scope of violence in Afghanistan took
place after the 9/11 attacks, when almost all acts of violence within
Afghanistan became automatically defined as being ‘terrorist’ in nature.
Therefore terrorism in the context of Afghanistan can be divided into
two specific eras: pre-9/11 and post-9/11. In the Afghan jihad campaigns
of the 1980s, the most extreme and fundamentalist of the Afghan muja-
hideen factions led by Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar did not
deploy suicide bombers.2 In fact, the Afghan mujahideen uniformly
denounced suicide attack proposals as being against their religion,
and at that time it was only Arab volunteers who advocated the use of
suicide attacks.3 The acts of terrorism in the second era involved the use
of kidnapping, assassination, and (on rare occasions) explosives. The
use of suicide bombing as a tactic in the jihad of Afghanistan is a new
concept and represents a massive ideological and strategic shift of the
Afghan insurgents which was really only observed following the US-led
invasion in 2001. In the few short years since, Afghanistan has managed
to rank second only to Iraq in the sheer volume of these types of attacks.
Since the events of 9/11, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan
by US-led forces, the instances of terrorism have increased dramatically.
Interestingly, it was not until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that
the levels of terrorism and terrorist-related deaths in Afghanistan really
hit their peak.
Following the invasion by US forces in 2001 and the beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom, the initial counter-attack by the Taliban
took the form of a traditional insurgency and not a terrorist campaign.
Essentially the Taliban were fighting a conventional guerrilla war using
such tools as mortars, AK-47s, improvised Soviet-era landmines, rocket-
propelled grenades, and PK machine guns.4 There were two attempted
63
Table 4.1 Terrorist groups in Afghanistan
DHKP/C Aden Abyan Islamic al-Intiqami al-Pakistani

Army (AAIA)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Kumpulan Mujahidin Saif-ul-Muslimeen
Malaysia (KMM)
East Turkistan Liberation Totally Anti-War Abu Sayyaf Group
Organization Group (ATAG) (ASG)
Mujahideen Message Front for Defenders of Hizb-I-Islami
Islam
al-Zulfikar Moroccan Islamic Eastern Turkistan
Combatant Group Islamic Movement
(ETIM)
Tunisian Combatant Jaish-ul-Muslimin Taliban
Group (TCG)
Islamic Jihad Group Hikmatul Zihad Jund al-Sham
(Uzbekistan)
Baloch Liberation al-Qaeda in the Yemen Islamic Jihad
Army (BLA) Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
Egyptian Islamic Harakat ul-Mujahidin Jagrata Muslim Janata
Jihad (EIJ) (HuM) Bangladesh
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Black December
Laskar Jihad al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Muslims Against
(GAI) Global Oppression
(MAGO)
Shurafa al-Urdun al-Qaeda United Tajik
Opposition (UTO)
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin Islamic Movement of Lashkar-I-Omar
(HIG) Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic International Harakat ul-Jihad-i- Abu Nayaf al-Afghani
Peacekeeping Brigade Islami (HUJI)
(IIPB)
al-Badr People’s Revolutionary Special Purpose Islamic
Party of Kangleipak Regiment (SPIR)
(PREPAK)
Hezb-e Azadi-ye Secret Organization of Afghan Taliban
Afghanistan al-Qaeda in Europe
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan Armed Islamic Group Al-Jihad
(TTP)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) Maktab al-Khadamat Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi
Islamic Jihad Union Hizb-i-Khalis Iranian Revolutionary
(IJU) Guards
Source: International Crisis Group & National Counter Terrorism Centre.1

suicide bombings in Kabul in mid-2002, but these were carried out

by foreign jihadists with links to al-Qaeda and they had no affiliation
with the Taliban. In fact, by the end of 2003 there was still no indig-
enous Afghan suicide bomber and the tactic had yet to be used by the
Taliban. This all changed on January 27, 2004, when Afghanistan had
its first suicide bombing at the hands of a young Afghan citizen. The
number of suicide bombings began to increase at a rapid pace follow-
ing that event, and by 2005 it became apparent that the majority of
these attacks were now being carried out by indigenous Afghans, as
well as Pakistani Pashtuns. The 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of
Afghanistan were essentially the triggers for the increase in terrorist
activity in Afghanistan, but interestingly the rates of terrorist attacks
really only increased at an incredibly rapid pace after the US-led inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. The US-troop withdrawal from Iraq has already
had a spillover effect on the levels of terrorism in Afghanistan, and the
projected 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may see yet
another increase in the levels of violence and terrorism. Having assessed
terrorism in Afghanistan, the next section of this study will focus on
Afghanistan in relation to its level of state failure and will explore how
this impacts on the levels of terrorism and insurgency within the state.
Factors influencing terrorism and insurgency

in Afghanistan
There are a large number of possible combinations of risk factors that

can occur in a given case that will increase the likelihood of terrorism
or insurgency.5 Terrorism is never easy to quantify and it is even harder
still to try to analyse what possible risk factors exist which increase the
likelihood of terrorism occurring in a particular country.6 In order to
try to assess the causes and consequences of terrorism in Afghanistan,
this section will try to provide an overview of the most oft-mentioned
causative factors in order to discover what combination of factors
contribute to the current situation taking place through the use of a
set of sub-headings, all of which involve a different aspect of Afghani
political, social, and economic life.
Part 1: Political factors

In the case of Afghanistan, it is extremely important not to overlook
the country’s political history in relation to its regime type and over-
all political development, as this demonstrates that legitimacy of
governance in Afghanistan has historically been extremely weak. Max
Weber argues that governments draw their legitimacy from three basic
sources: the traditional, the religious, and the legal (‘legal’ meaning in
this instance Western-style democracies based on popular representa-
tion and the rule of law).7 Weber’s first two sources, traditional and
religious, are specifically important to Afghanistan.8 Legitimacy was
usually reinforced by other means, i.e. through coercion and brutality,
for example, the rule of the Taliban, from 1996 to 2001. This legitimacy
was predicated on an accepted source of legitimacy of governance, i.e.
religion, but was reinforced by totalitarian methods.9 In other words,
in Afghanistan having the authority to rule is quite distinct from being
a popular ruling force. Afghanistan’s current political system is that
of an Islamic republic. This particular form of government is adopted
by many Muslim states. This means that although such a state is, in
theory, a theocracy (in that it remains a republic), its laws are required
to be compatible with the laws of Islam. Systems of government nor-
mally grow from existing traditions, but in Afghanistan they were
imposed externally, which may explain why representative democracy
cannot, at this time, be seen as a source of legitimacy in the country’s
development.10 Although Afghanistan currently has the institutional
veneer of a democratic state, its parliamentary and judicial processes
mean little to the vast majority of the country.
One of the main problems with the governments of Afghanistan
has been that they have usually been composed mainly of expatriate
Afghans who have long divorced themselves from the Afghan people
and culture and thus do not fully understand the needs of the country.11
This explains in no small measure why a religious source of legitimacy
in the form of the Taliban is making such a powerful comeback. Daoud
Sultanzoy highlighted this fact when he noted that ‘in the 262 years of
our modern history we have never been governed. We have been ruled-
or misruled’, adding that ‘it is not the strength of the Taliban; it is the
weakness of this government that has driven the people away from the
government’.12 It appears then that there is little likelihood of estab-
lishing a strong central government in Kabul, which will be genuinely
viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people, and which has sig-
nificant public support across the country’s ethno-sectarian divides. Thus
the extremist elements contained in the country, such as the Taliban and
al-Qaeda, have a higher probability of taking control over the country
once the US and NATO forces withdraw. The impact of regime type has
also had a direct effect on the institutional capacity of the state.
Additionally, the establishment of effective governance is a critical
enabler for improving development and security in Afghanistan, yet
while improving the security situation is a vital first step, progress

made to improve the security environment cannot be sustained
without parallel improvements in governance and development.13
The state apparatus of Afghanistan and its centre and periphery
institutions remain essentially independent of each other, the conse-
quence of which means that the structure of government is unitary.
Also all political authority is vested in the government in Kabul, thus
the powers and responsibilities of the provincial and district adminis-
trations are determined by central government.14 Within Afghanistan
a lack of any real governance structures or political institutional
stability is creating a breeding ground for conflict, further instability,
violence and terrorism. This ‘bad’ governance is not merely a weakness
but a threat to stable and legitimate order, which the population can
identify and use to move towards the insurgency.15 The continued war
in Afghanistan has produced national fragmentation, disintegration,
and a nation where the social and political institutions have been
destroyed or irrevocably altered, especially governmental institutions,
the armed forces, and political organisations.16 There is also little
centripetal social and economic movement in Afghanistan. which
means that in order to achieve success in counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency, an effective Afghan state needs to be built.17 It can
be argued then, that the most crucial issue in deciding the future of
Afghanistan is the performance of the state. Having largely developed
on the basis of funding by foreign powers interested in the potential
of Afghanistan as a political and military buffer, the state had created
hardly any institutions for interacting with society. There was no state
legal framework, little police presence and no nationwide political
parties.18
The institutional weakness in Afghanistan is caused by several factors:
the scarcity of qualified and competent human resources; the dominant
patron–client tradition (which has negative effects both on recruit-
ment of civil servants and the manner in which political agreements
are made); the fact that warlords and local commanders continue to
exert considerable power (and are part and parcel of the ruling elite);
the absence of authoritative and independent mechanisms for finan-
cial control and accountability (which together with the significant
illicit economy is one of the main causes contributing to the growth
of corruption); and the feeble and chaotic conditions which character-
ise local governance, to mention a few of the most important.19 The
Afghan government’s capacity is also limited because of inadequately
educated, trained, and paid staff. Therefore, building good governance
and effective institutions has proven extremely challenging. The Afghan

government has control of roughly 32 percent of the country and even
at that, the control that it does have in the green zones is minimal at
best in some of the provinces. Given the current unstable conditions
in the country, further political and economic fragmentation looms for
Afghanistan. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that there is
a risk that Afghanistan’s deteriorating situation could soon become irre-
versible, noting that a controversial election, a weak government, and a
drastic rise in violence and terrorism have caused a backlash of the peo-
ple against the government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been rocked
by rising levels of terrorist violence and political turmoil once again in
recent months and, describing this period as a critical juncture, Mr Ban
Ki-moon said that the situation cannot continue if the country’s allies
want to beat back the Taliban and stabilise the current government.20
This is an extremely dangerous situation, as it is not the strength of the
Taliban but the failure of the government to govern that has led to the
current crisis. Therefore this ongoing lack of institutional capacity means
that the situation is not going to improve in the near future until the
issue is effectively addressed.21
The combination of excessive political marginalisation (especially of
minority groups), high levels of political discontent, and political griev-
ances can be catastrophic to a country, especially one as weak and as
divided as Afghanistan. In the majority of cases it is the minority groups
within a particular country that experience the highest instances of
marginalisation, which then leads to an increase in the levels of violent
activity. This is due mainly to the fact that these marginalised groups feel
that the only way they can make an impact on the repressive regime is to
challenge them by violent means. Since 2001, the Afghan government
has taken limited steps to increase religious freedom, but serious prob-
lems still remain – the result of more than 30 years of continuous war
and ongoing insurgency. The residual effects of years of jihad against the
Soviet Union, civil strife, Taliban rule, and the still-weak democratic insti-
tutions remain obstacles to stability in Afghanistan.22 With the end of
the Cold War, and the Soviet withdrawal, dissent among various factions
within Afghanistan was translated into an open civil war, and as a result
the Taliban were able to consolidate their hold over Afghanistan with
little concerted international opposition.23 The return of Afghan refugees
in 2002/2003 intensified Afghanistan’s current problems significantly,
as the already fragile government had been unable to address the needs
of the people. Intolerance in Afghanistan has manifested itself through
harassment and violence against religious minorities. The Centre for
American Progress has developed the following list of what is deems to

be the most significant grievances in Afghanistan:
– Religious/cultural grievances
– Objections to the presence of foreigners
– Tensions between village values and city values
– Afghan political decision-making and issue of sovereignty
– The inclusion factor on both the national and local scale, more specif-
ically at the local level where people have been forced out of politics
– Conflicts over resources and money with certain people being
excluded from such things as contracting businesses
– Impunity with which nefarious individuals are supported by
foreigners and allowed to continue what they are doing, usually
without challenge
– Warlordism24
According to various reports there is continuing societal

discrimination against minorities in Afghanistan, which includes
restrictions on religious freedoms. However, there is limited informa-
tion about the overall number of victims of the violence and definitive
levels of human rights abuses taking place in Afghanistan. With
regard to ethnic and religious affiliations, it can be concluded without
much doubt that Afghanistan’s minorities are still being significantly
affected by the ongoing terrorist violence, particularly where warlords
and militia leaders are in control. In terms of relations between the
different ethnic groups within Afghanistan, historically the Pashtuns
have largely dominated Afghan politics, though other ethnic groups,
notably the Tajiks, have, at times, also maintained a strong political
influence. This is where much of the antagonism between the ethnic
groups stems from. It is the Hazara ethnic group, however, that has
been the most harassed and targeted group in Afghanistan. Recent
reports also suggest that ethnic tensions are on the rise across the most
volatile parts of the country, especially in the Wardak and Baluchistan
provinces in relation to these ethnic minorities. The current drive to
strike a deal with Taliban leaders, along with the policy of trying to
integrate them into the political process, is also causing deep unease
within Afghanistan’s minority groups. The leaders of the country’s
Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities, which make up close to half of
Afghanistan’s population, are vowing to resist, and if necessary fight,
any deal that involves bringing members of the Taliban insurgency
into a power-sharing arrangement with the government.25 There is a
deepening estrangement of Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun communities
taking place, which is becoming a significant problem, and the fact

that this dispute is once again emerging along lines formed during the
final years of the Afghan civil war makes the situation even more
serious. The fact that these groups, with their bloody histories of fight-
ing the Taliban, could arm themselves extremely quickly shows that
these are issues not to be taken lightly and will no doubt add to the
instability and levels of terrorist violence that is destroying the country.
Within Afghanistan, ideological cleavages, especially in relation to
democracy and Islam have also been at the centre of much of the ter-
rorist violence over the past decade. There is no relationship, whether
political, economic, or social, that is not validated by religion and Islamic
ideology in Afghan society today.26 In a country divided by tribal, eth-
nic, and religious differences, traditional Islam has always been heralded
as bridging the gap between the different ethnic groups. Historically,
the struggle between the state’s desire for centralised political control
and local communities’ desire to maintain their autonomy has taken an
Islamic form because it is easier to gain the cooperation of rival tribes
under the banners of religion and ideology.27 Yet, even in these circum-
stances, ideology of any type has rarely been the key to political stability
in Afghanistan. Issues such as local questions of power, resources, and
individual or community advantage are actually much more important in
Afghanistan. Yet even though Islam connects almost everybody in
Afghanistan, the country remains significantly divided along both
ethnic and tribal lines. Since the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan’s
internal politics has shifted from an ideological party system to a system
of ethno-nationalism; thus many of Afghanistan’s political parties have
been created based on a biased representation of certain ethnic inter-
ests rather than on ideological common ground. In basic terms, there
are two main areas in Afghan politics that have been misunderstood
by the international community in relation to the role of ideology.
Firstly, the idea that the political realm in Afghanistan has been shaped
by the behaviour of individual politics resulting from the long civil war,
has not been fully grasped. As a result, the shape of Afghan politics
has been transformed to ethnic-nationalism. Secondly, the birth of the
Taliban regime has made it more difficult for pro-democratic Afghans to
fight against foreign fundamentalists, who have been operating within
Afghan society.28 These elements have not been taken into account
when trying to assess Afghanistan’s inner issues, thus causing more
separation between what the Afghan people want and what the interna-
tional community thinks that they want in terms of political ideologies.
Even though Afghanistan has made significant progress towards
becoming a fully fledged democratic nation, while at the same time
reconstructing the country’s political, social, and security institutions,

there are still many stages the government needs to pass through before
the democratic system is fully operative. In ideological terms, then, one
needs to ascertain what the democratic ideal in Afghanistan is. This
question has not been asked enough in the context of Afghanistan, and
rather than pushing toward the benchmarks of democracy founded on
Western values and concepts, an Afghan model of democracy needs to be
developed which would, in theory, focus on such elements as protecting
human rights, including religious freedoms, addressing the core political
needs of the Afghan citizens, etc. Without doing so, democracy will just
be a tool forced upon the country by outsiders and will thus never be
fully accepted. If too much change is demanded too quickly from the
Afghan culture then it is highly likely that rejection will occur, provid-
ing an ideological ground for the Taliban’s further re-emergence. In
order to identify the Afghan democratic ideal, then, it is essential to
separate democracy as a mode of governing from democracy as a value.
In other words, the concept of the democratic political system needs to
be separated from its association with Western liberal values. In such
a situation, where the society has become fragmented, where cultural
identity is under threat, and where there is no all-encompassing ideo-
logical system in place, radical Islamist ideologies tend to emerge. A lot
more needs to be done before Afghanistan can claim to be approaching
the status of an absolutely consolidated democracy. Unfortunately, the
ideological cleavages within Afghanistan are not going to be diminished
in the immediate future, and it seems, if anything, that they may in fact
be exacerbating the already volatile situation, thus providing an opening
for the Taliban to re-emerge and take over the nation once again.
As well as that, corruption is generally considered to be a symptom
and outcome of weak governance. Defined loosely as the abuse of
public position for private gain, corruption is a very significant and dan-
gerous issue affecting any country. In Afghanistan, corruption reflects
the legacy of a continuous period of war, the erosion of state institu-
tions, growing tensions among ethnic and tribal groups, and the growth
of illicit economic activities, specifically the opium trade.29 Public
perceptions of widespread corruption in particular can be extremely
significant, as they often result in disenchantment with the govern-
ment and hinder efforts to strengthen the government’s credibility
and legitimacy, and more generally the overall state-building agenda.30
Afghan perceptions of corruption, the inability of the government to
provide essential services, and the general exploitative behaviour of
some government officials are all examples of the type of factors that
are contributing to the success of the insurgents’ campaign.31 One of

the more unusual features of corruption in Afghanistan is that it is
highly dependent on the drug economy, with drug-financed corruption
significantly undermining the state and political system as a whole. The
Afghan government’s limited writ and widespread corruption are also
seen as being two of the main factors helping to sustain the insurgency
in Afghanistan.32 A national survey completed in March 2010 indicated
that more than 83 percent of Afghans reported that corruption affects
their daily life. Although the commitment by the Afghan government to
prevent and address its corruption issues is often questioned, it has
nonetheless been open in discussing its concerns and addressing its
commitment to fight against it. However, the reality stands that the
progress that has been made to date pales against the difficult challenges
that Afghanistan faces in its fight against terrorism.
As well as the issue of the extremely high level of corruption,
Afghanistan is faced with the issue of an almost complete lack of the
rule of law. The rule of law in Afghanistan has never been strong, but
after almost 30 years of continuous war, violence, and terrorism, it has
been lost almost completely and replaced by the rule of the gun or the
rule of the mullah. Over the years, the discontinuity of regime types has
resulted in a patchwork of differing and in many ways overlapping laws,
elements of different types of legal systems, and an incoherent set of
law enforcement and military structures; all of which combine to make
Afghanistan’s rule of law extremely incoherent and weak.33 The devel-
opment of the rule of law system in Afghanistan post-Taliban has been
a lengthy process and still shows no signs of completion or success. One
of the main roadblocks with regard to building a new rule of law system
is the fact that outside of the major cities, village councils or tribal elders
have played the predominant role in resolving disputes and meting out
justice, not the central government.34 Afghanistan’s judiciary remains
so weak that Afghans increasingly turn to a shadow Taliban court
system, especially in rural areas, where people lack access to judicial
processes.35 Afghanistan’s weak judicial system, with the independent
judicial branches having no proper funding, education, or training to
function at an adequate level, has made any possible improvements in
security and rule of law almost impossible.
Due to this fragility the government essentially has no real effective
nationwide legal system in place, which in turn feeds into the hands
of groups such as the Taliban, who offer their version of the rule of
law through their Sharia courts. The civil service within Afghanistan
is also extremely weak, inefficient, and corrupt, and the many years of
brain drain have left it with few skilled, competent, or professional civil
servants in the new government.36 Unfortunately, the situation does not
appear likely to change in the near future. The Afghan citizens, who are
desperately longing for improvement, have once again begun to turn
their backs on the Afghan government. This is an extremely dangerous
position to be in, because, as happened in 1996 following the mujahi-
deen rule, the people will have no choice but to turn to the Taliban or
a similar type of group once again to provide the countrywide security
necessary within the framework of an archaic and repressive system.
Realistically, it is impossible to completely eliminate corruption, espe-
cially in low-income developing countries, such as Afghanistan, that are
suffering from conflict, insecurity, lack of rule of law, ethnic or other
fragmentation among their population, weak institutions, fragile states,
etc.37 Therefore, re-establishing the rule of law and ending the prevalent
corruption must be prerequisites for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Part 2: Economic factors

Poverty in Afghanistan is widespread, with the government estimat-
ing that 42 percent of the country’s total population lives below the
national poverty line. As well as that, estimates show that another
20 percent of the people barely live above the line, being highly
vulnerable to the risk of falling into poverty.38 The incidence of poverty
is obviously more severe in the rural areas, where about 45 percent of
the people are classified as poor, compared to 27 percent of the urban
population.39 By May 2010, as many as 18 million Afghans were living
on less than $2 per day and almost 5.5 million lived below the poverty
line.40 Afghanistan’s economic situation has, however, also showed
some signs of improvement. Even though this looks like a sign of hope
for Afghanistan, it still suffers from an unemployment rate of just over
40 percent, has an $8.5 billion external debt, and a GDP per capita
of just $800.41 There has been a reduction in the level of poverty in
Afghanistan, but the situation on the ground does not appear to have
become any less intolerable for the Afghan citizens. Afghanistan is con-
sistently ranked as one of the poorest and least-developed nations in
the world. The UNHCR report also directly links poverty to the steadily
growing levels of conflict in Afghanistan and notes that the following
key determinants of poverty are witnessed across Afghanistan:
– Ineffective institutions: including the disabling economic environ-

ment; weak regional governance, service delivery and corruption;
weak social protection programming; social inequalities
– Vulnerability to: conflict; natural disasters; decreasing rule of law;

increasing basic costs; increasing population; food insecurity
– Diverse livelihoods42
Poverty varies significantly between the provinces, with it being most

severe in the Northeast, Central Highlands, and parts of the Southeast.
The provinces of Daikundi, Badakhstan, Zabul, and Paktika represent
the largest pockets of poverty in Afghanistan. As well as that, up to 70
percent of Afghans are still food insecure and high global food prices
have recently pushed millions more Afghans into high-risk food inse-
curity.43 It is interesting to note that the provinces that are by far the
most violent of all of Afghanistan’s provinces (such as Helmand and
Kandahar) are by no means the poorest. In fact, those provinces that
are classified as being the most severely poverty-stricken, including
Logar and Balkh, are not significantly affected by terrorism and ter-
rorist activity. This is interesting due to the fact that poverty may be
an underlying reason why an individual joins or supports a terrorist
group, but usually these groups, such as was the case with the Taliban,
are formed in the more affluent provinces and use the poorer provinces
as targets for recruitment. Poverty plays an extremely important part
in the instability in Afghanistan, but it is not the sole factor behind
the increase in terrorist activity there. Poverty is only one element in a
vast range of issues facing Afghanistan, and without addressing its root
causes it will remain an active cause of political and social unrest which
feeds into the insurgency. There have, however, been improvements in
poverty reduction processes in Afghanistan. For example, 55 percent of
Afghans now say that they have electricity, up almost 15 points from
2007; 56 percent now report new or rebuilt roads in their area; and
while access to medical care remains a problem, half now report new or
rebuilt health clinics, which is obviously a step in the right direction.44
Yet until the issue of poverty is adequately addressed, the poor of
Afghanistan will continue to suffer, as will stability and the process of
democratisation.
Increasing economic insecurity is jeopardising progress in
Afghanistan. The fragile economic situation, coupled with the treach-
erous security situation, has posed a serious threat to the stability of the
Afghan state. Without economic stability, the situation in Afghanistan
cannot be improved. One of the most damaging economic effects in
Afghanistan is the uneven distribution of wealth, which has worsened
significantly over recent years. Uneven distribution of wealth plays a
major role in the attitudes of the Afghan people, especially when it
relates to the distribution of international aid. Aid effectiveness affects

the levels of peace and stability in a country, as poorly delivered aid
fails to mitigate the conditions of extreme poverty, thus becoming a
significant factor in the spread of insecurity. The overall lack of eco-
nomic opportunity and the extreme discrepancies in such areas as
aid allocation have caused growing levels of resentment among the
Afghans. Although the Afghan government’s domestic revenues are
increasing, they remain extremely low, at just over 8 percent of GDP,
which accounts for 66 percent of government operating expenditures
and just 28 percent of total government spending.45 Foreign assis-
tance to Afghanistan accounts for almost half of the licit economy
and around 90 percent of all public expenditure, which includes both
donor and government spending.46 Therefore how aid is spent has an
enormous impact on reconstruction and development as well as on the
lives of ordinary Afghan citizens.47
Since 2002 international donors have provided over $25 billion
of security-related assistance, compared to just $15 billion for civil
reconstruction and development. This paucity of aid is reflected in
the comparative per capita figures, which, it is estimated, amount to
Afghanistan receiving $57 per capita, whereas Bosnia and East Timor
received $679 and $233 per capita respectively.48 The reason for this
difference is that a large proportion of aid to Afghanistan has been
prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responsive
to Afghan needs. This aid has tended to reflect expectations in donor
countries rather than what Afghan communities want and need.49
Aid also tends to be centralised, focusing on Kabul and other urban
city centres rather on the more rural areas of Afghanistan. This is also
the case in relation to government spending, with over 70 percent of
the national operation and maintenance budget being spent in Kabul
alone.50 Afghanistan’s mostly destitute villages have perhaps seen the
least amount of the billions of dollars in foreign aid that have been
pumped into the country since the fall of the Taliban government. This
absence of funding and resources in many of the provinces has created
a favourable situation for the Taliban, where they take advantage of the
population’s dissatisfaction with the government and with the foreign
presence in the country.51 Insurgent and criminal activity is statistically
more likely to spread to areas where there is persistent poverty. It is for
these reasons, then, that uneven distribution of wealth is such a seri-
ous issue and if not addressed those provinces that are currently being
neglected may witness a spread of insecurity and thus terrorism and
insurgency.
Over the decades, Afghanistan’s economy has undergone several

rounds of destruction and development, but the economic situation
there is still extremely fragile, with an estimated 42 percent of its
citizens living below the poverty line.52 Since 2001 the country has
made remarkable advances, with legal GDP growing by almost 80
percent.53 On January 26, 2010 the Afghan government received $1.6
billion in debt relief from the World Bank’s International Development
Association and the IMF under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
Initiative. It was also agreed on March 17, 2010 that the Paris Club
would cancel the $1.026 billion debt owed to it by Afghanistan.54
However, this economic recovery process is inherently fragile, especially
if foreign assistance flows continue to decrease as they have over the
past two years. From 2003 to 2008, economic growth was more than
10 percent, but that level dropped due to the global economic crisis and
in 2009 reached just 3.4 percent.55 Recovery is inherently fragile and
may not be sustainable without prolonged international assistance,
and the 2014 deadline for withdrawal of US troops is adding to
the increasing possibility of economic stagnation and collapse. Despite
the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan remains an extremely
poor country, one that is highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture,
and trade with neighbouring countries.56 Adding to this economic pres-
sure is the fact that the issue of opium has become such an integral
part of the Afghan economy that the challenge of tackling the opium
economy is now central to the challenge of building a modern and
stable Afghan state and economy. Drug production and drug trafficking
remain serious problems in Afghanistan, with the funds gained from
the opium trade continuing to be a significant source of funding for
insurgents, as well as a source of government corruption. Profits from
the drug trade are not only financing local warlords and the political
elite, but also sustain the livelihoods of many quite poor people, with
an estimated over two million people, or 8 percent of the population,
being involved in heroin production.57 There is a strong correlation
between insurgency and poppy cultivation and the UNODC Winter
Rapid Assessment Survey highlighted this fact when it indicated
that almost 80 percent of villages with very poor security conditions
grew large numbers of poppies, whereas poppies were grown in only
7 percent of villages unaffected by terrorist-related violence.58
The majority of Afghan opium cultivation remains in southern and
south-western Afghanistan, where the insurgency and the Taliban pres-
ence are at their highest. Interestingly, some provinces that were previ-
ously major producers of opium, such as Nangarhar and Badakhshan,
have greatly reduced their production, whereas others, such as Kandahar,

Nimroz, Balkh, and Farah, have greatly increased opium production,
(a fact that may be linked to the movement of Taliban and al-Qaeda
who are now more active in these southern regions).59 Within
Afghanistan, the cultivation of poppies is concentrated in the south
and west of the country, with Helmand province alone accounting for
more than half of Afghanistan’s total production. Interestingly, these
are also the regions of the country where Afghan government control is
the weakest and Taliban control is the strongest.60 This nexus between
the narcotics trade and the insurgency has been recognised by both the
Afghan government and the US-led forces. It is estimated that each year
the insurgency benefits from between $100 and 200 million from the
narcotics trade; which also fuels corruption, undermines the rule of law,
and jeopardises the prospects of long-term economic growth.61 There is
also analytical evidence to prove that there is a direct link between the
descent into terrorist violence, an increase in levels of state weakness,
and decreased security levels and the upsurge in the production of pop-
pies.62 General John B. Craddock, Allied Commander Europe, sums up
the situation, noting that ‘the money from the narcotics trade is feeding
the insurgency. It buys weapons and pays fighters … it is a cancer fuel-
ling the insurgency, contributing to corruption, impeding legitimate
commerce and undermining governance’.63 Much of the population
continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity,
medical care, and jobs. Without economic development, the legitimacy
of the government is undermined. More worryingly, incentives increase
for young men to associate themselves with predatory militias that
provide them and their families with income and security. Essentially
then, for the case of Afghanistan, economic development is only one
of several interconnected pillars on which the state is built.64 Economic
development is dependent upon the establishment of the rule of law,
which in turn depends on effective government and thus cannot be a
reason for the increase in terrorist activity in and of itself. There need to
be additional factors which enable terrorism to take root.
Part 3: Social/cultural factors

The Afghan population has nearly quadrupled over the past 60 years,
resulting in a very youthful country, with 43 percent of the current
population being under the age of 14. Demographically, Afghanistan’s
age structure is quite skewed towards the 0–14 year olds, which make
up 43.6 percent of the population, which is high when compared to
countries such as Ireland (19.7)65, Australia (18.8 percent)66, and Saudi
Arabia (26.3 percent)67. Overall, less than 2.5 percent of the population
are over the age of 65. In terms of links to terrorism and insurgency,
these statistics are extremely significant, as it is the 0–14 and 15–30
year-olds that are the main targets for groups such as the Taliban and
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In many cases, given the poor level of educa-
tion provided by the government and the downturn in the economy,
the people within these age groups are left with no alternative but to
join militant and extremist groups. An analysis of the breakdown of the
population captures the extreme nature of the population imbalance.
Such imbalances have exacerbated the already significant unemploy-
ment levels, leading to social and political dissatisfaction. Where the
educational system and labour force cannot handle such an imbalanced
population, the Taliban offers a viable alternative through, for example,
financial incentives and familial security. Also, the extremely high
level of youth bulge helps to explain why the Taliban encounters little
difficulty in attracting new recruits to their cause. The success of the
reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan relies largely on the support
of the Afghan people, so building that support base despite these trou-
bling demographics is an inherently long-term problem that requires a
long-term solution.
Prolonged war leads to fatigue and indifference, which leads to
violence becoming a way of life, resulting in a culture of violence
maturing.68 As a result, the use of coercion and violence as a means
of projecting power and dominance becomes commonplace and the
citizens come to expect solutions to problems to be found through
violence. Violence has for the most part been a constant feature of
Afghanistan’s history and it is therefore unsurprising that a culture
of violence has emerged in the country. Afghanistan has not always
been this way; for example, the 1960s were relatively peaceful times in
Afghanistan and became known as the ‘decade of liberalism and mod-
ernisation’. It was not until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973,
and again after the 1978 coup of President Daoud, that the conflict
in Afghanistan began to escalate significantly. This had an extremely
negative effect on the people of Afghanistan, especially among those
aged between 5 and 15 years, as they would have grown up in a violent
environment and therefore would been more susceptible to developing
immunity to violence, as opposed to the older generations of Afghans
who would have seen Afghanistan during more stable and peaceful
times. Many of those Afghans now see violence as being something that
is part of Afghanistan’s culture.69 This has become especially apparent
with the rise in attacks against American troops in recent years, which
have come to be seen as retaliation for the civilian deaths caused

by allied troops. Many Afghan people see these acts as being wholly
justified, with the underlying mentality of ‘an eye for an eye’ playing
a major role in Afghani culture. Therefore this embedded culture of
violence has significantly hindered the recovery process in Afghanistan,
and unless dealt with soon any future hopes for a stable Afghanistan
will quickly be dashed.
Part 4: External and environmental factors

This ‘modern’ era of foreign occupation is the latest in a long line of
interventions that can be traced back to the British foundation and
consolidation of the modern Afghan state. However, the American
intervention in Afghanistan and the rapid collapse of the Taliban has
introduced an unprecedented Western military presence into central Asia
which has had completely unforeseen consequences for its peoples.70
Afghanistan’s long years of unrest have produced a new generation of
Islamic militants who are reinforcing the Taliban’s re-emergence. The
presence of thousands of western troops in Afghanistan has helped
these leaders recruit a new generation of fighters to fight what they
call ‘the occupation of their Islamic land by infidels’.71 The insurgents
fighting against the US-backed government of President Karzai are a
combination of old and new Taliban, where the leaders remain the same
but the foot soldiers are new recruits who have joined the Taliban battle
against the international forces occupying their land. There is a direct
link between the level of foreign troops and the level of security risk in
any given province in Afghanistan in terms of troop levels and threat
levels across all of Afghanistan’s provinces. In this regard, Helmand,
Kandahar, Paktia, and Paktika are prime examples, with over 97,000
foreign troops from a number of different countries, such as the US and
the UK being stationed there. Each of these provinces is characterised as
being an extreme security risk, with the highest incidences of terrorist
activity taking place there.
Many now feel that, almost a decade after the US occupation of
Afghanistan, security is worse than it has ever been, with a growing
number of civilian victims and a much higher level of terrorist attacks
taking place against foreign troops. The resistance movement is on
the rise once again and the influence of the Taliban is growing, spe-
cifically in the south and southeast regions of the country where they
have created alliances with other tribal forces against the occupation.72
Unfortunately, peace-building in these areas is lacking and Afghanistan
appears to be setting in for a long war, with or without the presence of
foreign troops. In ideological terms, the foreign military occupation is

giving a boost to religious rhetoric and fundamentalism in Afghanistan,
which is being used to the utmost levels of benefit to the Taliban
through recruitment of the resentful, disgruntled, and angry youth.73
The inherent hatred of foreign occupiers means that the insurgency
in Afghanistan can never realistically be defeated by maintaining
such a high international troop presence in the country.74 In fact, the
presence of foreign forces does not actually even discourage militant
attacks; instead, the status of foreign troops as occupiers only fuels the
insurgency in Afghanistan and affirms their role as legitimate targets
for nationalistic, religious, local political, and self-interested purposes.75
However, to pull out completely, as is the current plan of President
Obama who has set the withdrawal date in Afghanistan for 2014
(a process which began in 2011), would mean that the more extreme
elements of the Taliban, along with other extremist and terrorist groups,
would once again be free to take over the country.
Adding to this is the fact that Afghanistan has long suffered from
interference by and conflict with its neighbouring states, but no other
country has been as significant in this realm as Pakistan. One of the
main underlying reasons for this conflict and interference specifically
with Pakistan has been that there has been a long history of offering
sanctuary to the other’s opponents, and this has created bitterness
and mistrust between the two neighbouring states. This underlying
policy of intrusion remains in place to this day and ongoing claims
and counterclaims of sheltering each other’s opponents indicate that
the same strategies may be continuing.76 Since the emergence of the
new political regime in Afghanistan, relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan have been overshadowed by the complex and difficult past
between the two countries, notably Pakistan’s support of the Taliban.
The post-9/11 era has created a new regional and international environ-
ment that required Kabul and Islamabad to cooperate closely to defeat
militancy and terrorism. Pakistan has been quite consistent, since the
US-led invasion, in supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan and
in cooperating with the international coalition. However, Afghanistan
and Pakistan have yet to fully overcome the difficulties of the past and
shape a new strategic relationship to meet the challenges of the Taliban
and al-Qaeda.
In fact, Afghanistan’s political leaders have often looked to external
factors, especially outside influences, as an explanation for the cur-
rent crisis. They tend to lay the blame on ‘foreign conspiracies’ against
Afghanistan for the country’s internal political chaos.77 Both Kabul
and Washington have often expressed the view that Pakistan has not
done as much as it could have to counter the cross-border insurgency,
which these two governments believe is responsible for keeping adja-
cent Afghan provinces unstable. They believe that Pakistan can and
must do more than it has so far.78 In this regard, Pakistan has faced
the problem of credibility as militants from Pakistan have been cross-
ing over into Afghanistan and joining the Taliban. Pakistan also faces
problems in convincing post-Taliban Afghan leaders of its sincerity,
with Afghanistan continuing to accuse Pakistan of intervention and of
the use of the Afghan Taliban as an instrument of Pakistani regional
policy.79 In essence it is the nature of these ties between Afghanistan and
Pakistan that is critical to defeating terrorism, and thus the prospects for
stability in Afghanistan and peace in the entire region will largely be a
function of how well the two countries can maintain good relations and
meaningful cooperation with the international coalition.80
Summary
Afghanistan is and will remain one of the world’s most active terrorist
states. The current democratically elected government has managed to
make some general improvements to the stability of Afghanistan, but
the situation there remains volatile and balanced on a knife-edge. The
overall lack of adequate progress being made by the Afghan govern-
ment, especially in the area of security, means that the country may be
poised for a return to its pre-9/11 ways. The more extreme elements of
the Taliban, along with other extremist and terrorist organisations, have
once again emerged and are expanding their influence across the least
controlled areas of Afghanistan. The levels of terrorist attacks are also
once again on the rise and have begun to take place in areas where the
US and other allied troops are in plentiful number and in areas which
were once deemed to be the safest in Afghanistan. The US-led invasion
of and subsequent war in Afghanistan is now over a decade old, yet the
situation in Afghanistan remains extremely unstable. Within this situ-
ation, successful counterinsurgency programmes are highly dependent
not only on the stability of the central government, but also on the
quality of local government and governance, both of which remain
extremely poor. With the approach of the complete US troop with-
drawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the Afghan army needs to be able to
hold its own against the Taliban in major combat missions for years to
come. In effect, the US army plans to maintain military pressure on the
Taliban until 2014, until such a time that all of the country’s security
responsibilities can be transferred to the Afghan army. This does not

look like a likely outcome, however, with the Afghan army remaining
highly dependent on the US. Without this support from foreign troops,
and especially from the US, it is predicted that the Afghan military
would be rapidly defeated by Taliban forces and the country could
return to the situation it faced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It
seems inevitable at this point that once the US and foreign forces pull
out of the south-eastern Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan, the
Taliban will rapidly move in and once again take over these areas.
There exists a combination of two critical problems that are threaten-
ing to undermine the mission of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan.
The first is the overall failure of the counter-insurgency strategy to
meet its aims, and second is the disconnect that exists between the
political objectives and military operations within Afghanistan.81 Until
these issues are dealt with, the transition could end up providing a
considerable boost to the insurgency. The role of the Afghan army
remains extremely problematic for many reasons, including the ethnic
imbalance of recruits, large turnover, weak training, and Taliban
infiltration. In the current situation, there appears to be little to indicate
that the Afghan army will be able to act autonomously over a large part
of the country’s territory by 2014.82 As it stands, the operations carried
out by the coalition forces are based mainly in the southern provinces
of Afghanistan, but this is highly problematic as jihadist groups do not
really exist in these regions, thus highlighting the flawed nature of the
counter-terrorism programmes in Afghanistan. Insurgents move more
or less freely between Pakistan and areas near Kabul; border security
is not guaranteed and will not be in the foreseeable future. Also, the
territories under the control of insurgents form a sanctuary not only for
the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, but also for transnational jihadist move-
ments such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tabia. After over a decade of war,
Nuristan is the first province almost totally under the control of armed
opposition and is once again becoming a sanctuary for transnational
jihadist groups. The provinces of Kapisa, Laghman, Nuristan, Kunar,
Nangarhar, Surobi, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, and Ghazni are the areas
where the most aggressive players, the various Taliban networks, such
as those of Haqqani, Mansur, and Hezb-e-Islami, and various transna-
tional groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tabia, are operating.83
This growing autonomy of local powers and insurgents, the weakness
of democratic institutions, and a diminishing ability to serve the popu-
lation all point to the continuation of the Afghan state’s progressive
deterioration. It may be that the only way to contain the threat posed
by these transnational jihadist groups is to politically reintegrate

them into a coalition government in order to isolate the most radical
groups, but questions remain as to how effective this could be. Without
strengthening the fledgling government institutions this integration
process could never work and may lead to deeper fragmentation and
disintegration of the country.84
Overall, the case of Afghanistan has been extremely interesting both
in terms of the process of state failure and the issue of terrorism, pro-
viding an insight into how a state formed through violent means and
developed through violent politics can remain functioning even though
its stability levels are extremely fragile. The role of outside influences
on Afghanistan has been a strong one since its creation and continues
to cause massive instability within the country. However, the role of
the Afghan government over the years has also been detrimental to the
stability of the country and has pushed it towards failure on numerous
occasions. With regard to the issue of terrorism in Afghanistan, the
role of internal actors coupled with outside influences has once again
been extremely significant. The domestic extremist and fundamentalist
groups as well as the international and foreign terrorist organisations
which have made Afghanistan their base over the years have had the
benefit of elements such as large pools of recruits and the existence of
a porous border to enable them to take root within the country. The
effects that terrorism have had on Afghanistan, especially since the
9/11 terrorist attacks, have been one of the most destabilising factors
on the state.
5
Pakistan: State Failure,
Pakistan is a nation of contradictions: it is one of the front-line allies in

the global war on terrorism, yet it is home to some of the most active
and dangerous terrorist organisations in the world today. It contains
all of the elements necessary for state failure and terrorism to occur:
religious fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, a
history of military dictatorship, and a crumbling society and political
infrastructure.1 It is a complicated country, one of religious and political
diversity, fractured by class and ethnicity. In its short history it has had
three constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973); it has never had a successive
elected government; and it has witnessed the resignation of four presi-
dents.2 Having also faced the struggle of uniting a population divided
by language, culture, and ethnicity, it sadly has the distinction of being
both the first state to be created and, in 1971, the first state to break up
in the post-Second World War period.3
Dubbed a quintessential ‘failed state’ by global academics and
policymakers, it has become a focus of numerous studies on inter-
national terrorism and state failure.4 However, the majority of these
studies have not delved far enough into Pakistan’s history, nor have
they traced the reasons why it has become such a hotbed of terrorist
activity. Instead, it is often automatically classified as being a failed
state. This chapter will begin with a historical overview of the state,
focusing on the creation of the state from 1947 onwards, and will
include all major events, both political and social, that have shaped
the country since then. The next section of the case study will focus
on the phenomenon of state failure in the Pakistani context. This will
involve carrying out an in-depth analysis of the Pakistani state as a
whole, assessing the level of state failure that is occurring there. The
final two sections will deal with the background causes and conditions
83
of terrorism in Pakistan and the internal state connections to terrorism

and insurgency.
The creation of a nation-state
On August 14, 1947, the state known as Pakistan was officially created
but this newly formed state was weak from the outset and faced numer-
ous challenges, both internally and externally, as well as a complete
lack of social, cultural, and political harmony.5 Structurally, Pakistan
was divided into two distinct areas: East and West Pakistan, with 1,600
miles of Indian Territory acting as a division between them.6 The initial
11 year period of independence was an essential time in shaping and
moulding Pakistan’s political and administrative profile. Pakistan was
envisioned to be a state that all Muslims could call a home. However,
when Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Pakistani state and
leader of the Muslim League, died in 1948, so too did this idea of what
Pakistan was meant to be. Since then the country’s leaders and the mili-
tary have ignored this view of Pakistan and have instead turned towards
Islam as a means to stabilise the country and have pushed for Pakistan
to be a strictly Islamic state. Due to Pakistan’s inability to forge for itself
a national identity, there was an intensification of the already simmer-
ing ethnic, linguistic, regional, and nationalist issues which essentially
went on to fragment further the already weak country.
By 1948 Pakistan had taken part in its first war with India, suffering
major losses, not only of land but also of confidence and stature, while
internally the country was falling apart. To compensate for its lack of
structure, Pakistan developed into a national security state, one in which
the military has monopolised power.7 This resulted in national interests
and foreign policy being pushed to the forefront of politics and state-
building. As a result, such necessary areas as developing political institu-
tions, creating a constitution, introducing democracy, and developing
a prospering economy became considered a secondary element of the
state’s evolution. The leaders of Pakistan over the years have played the
largest role in shaping Pakistan into the country of conflict and terror
that it has become today. They have, over the decades, left an indelible
scar on its political and social stability and structure; beginning with
Muhammad Ali Jinnah through to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto,
and Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan has been on a rollercoaster ride of
trials and tribulations. Each leader has left their mark on Pakistan and
their actions have turned Pakistan into what it has become today; one
of the world’s most dangerous states.8 However, it was the 11 year rule
Pakistan Context – Part 1 85
of General Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988) that was to have the longest and
most damaging legacy of any other leader on Pakistan.
Pakistan’s rapidly changing leadership
Pakistan has been severely wounded by military rule, religious funda-

mentalism, the rising tide of Islamism, terrorism, and sectarianism,
a collapsing economy, and a jihadi mentality. Within Pakistan there
have been two relationships that have dominated the political scene.
The first is the relationship between the military and civil society, and
the other is between Islam and the state. Pakistan’s tumultuous history
began with the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah on September 11, 1948,
having ruled the country for less than 13 months at the time.9 Jinnah,
also known as Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), was held in the highest
esteem by the people of Pakistan.10 Although he managed to sustain
the country in its early stages and encourage its growth, he also had
a negative legacy that would influence the Pakistan of the future. His
ruling style was highly rigid and self-serving, which resulted in other
members of government almost always being seen as subordinate to
him. Pakistan began its independence as a democratic entity with a
parliamentary system, in which the representative aspects of democ-
racy were almost destroyed under Jinnah’s domineering position.11 In
effect, what resulted was a situation in Pakistan where the Parliament
and members of the governing cabinet were given a subordinate and
extremely limited role within the state, thus triggering the legacy of
domination by political leaders of the entire government structure of
Pakistan. Following Jinnah’s sudden death there was a power vacuum
created which was hard to fill. Khwaja Nazimuddin was called upon to
take over as Governor-General.12
Nazimuddin took the role in a superficial manner, allowing Liaquat
Khan to rule through the title of Prime Minister. Liaquat was eager to
give the new nation a constitution, but before he could do so he was
assassinated in Rawalpindi in October 1951.13 With the the office of
Prime Minister going to Nazimuddin the country was now to have an
extremely weak head of government, leading to severe riots took place
in 1953 in the Punjab area for which Nazimuddin was held responsi-
ble. By 1955 the remnants of the Muslim League combined the four
provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit and Ghulam
Mohammad was forced to relinquish his office of governor general of
Pakistan. He was succeeded by Iskander Mirza.14 Mirza’s constitution of
1956 embodied numerous objectives in relation to religion and politics,
the one with the most serious and long-lasting effect being that which
declared the country an Islamic republic. Mirza formed an alliance of
sorts with the Republican Party and the East Pakistan Awami League
and appointed Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy as Prime Minister. The
alliance which was short-lived and Suhrawardy suffered a similar fate to
his predecessors and was soon ousted from office.15 Thus, unable either
to sustain alliances or to govern in accordance to the constitution, the
government of Pakistan resembled the chaotic provinces where nobody
really held power. Due to increasing rumblings of dissent in East
Pakistan and in the NWFP (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Mirza,
on October 7, 1958, proclaimed the 1956 constitution to be abrogated
and closed both the national and provincial assemblies. He also banned
all political party activity, declaring that the country was now under
martial law.
General Mohammad Ayub Khan was made chief martial-law adminis-
trator, but he had already had his sights set on an even higher position,
and on October 27, 1958 issued Mirza with the ultimatum of either
permanent exile from Pakistan or execution. Mirza chose exile and
Ayub Khan assumed the role of President. A period of martial law was
declared which lasted for 44 months, and it was during this time that
many army officers were given posts in the civil service and numerous
politicians were excluded from public life under what was called the
Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order.16 In 1962 Ayub Khan devel-
oped another constitution, this time one more focused on presidential
rather than parliamentary rule. This constitution was based on a sys-
tem where an indirectly elected president together with a reinforced
centralised political system would emphasise the country’s vice regal
stance. Ayub Khan remained president through the results of a biased
January 1965 election but trouble was on the horizon with regard
to the Kashmir issue, with major hostilities emerging between India
and Pakistan in September 1965.17 Once again Pakistan faced defeat,
and Ayub Kahn’s popularity and influence were at an all-time low. It
was then that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto saw an opportunity to emerge from
behind Khan’s shadow. Bhutto soon joined the opposition and formed
his own political party, called the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).18
By 1969 Ayub Khan knew that he had lost control and influence, and
in March of that year announced his retirement. He named General
Mohammad Yahya Khan as his successor, which meant that, once again,
the country was under martial law. Yahya Khan immediately abolished
Ayub Khan’s basic democratic system and abrogated the 1962 constitu-
tion. He also issued a Legal Framework Order which reconstituted the
single unit of West Pakistan into the original four provinces of Punjab,
Sindh, North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan.19 Election results
were contested from these regions, causing mass riots, the result of
which was the emergence of the state of Bangladesh in 1971 – once
again Pakistan had lost a princely slice of its territory. On December
20, 1971, Yahya Khan resigned the presidency; however, this time the
army was not first in line for the position. Instead it went to Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto.20 Bhutto immediately pledged to give Pakistan a new constitu-
tion and a new style of government. The 1973 constitution, created by
Bhutto, was adopted, restoring parliamentary government to Pakistan.
Bhutto then stepped down as President and assumed the role of Prime
Minister. National elections were scheduled in 1977 which resulted in
Bhutto and his party winning by a massive majority.21 The army, on
the other hand, had other ideas about the future of the country and,
ignoring the results of the election, arrested Bhutto and dissolved his
government. On July 5, 1977, General Zia ul-Haq took over leadership
of the government, claiming that Bhutto was involved in corruption
and a plot to assassinate a political rival, and had him sentenced to
death by hanging on April 4, 1979.22 Zia ul-Haq immediately began to
mould Pakistan into a strict Islamic state. Almost all of the major issues
affecting Pakistan to this day – the militancy of the religious parties,
the radical madrassas system, the extremist groups, the drug and gun
culture, and the severe increases in sectarian violence – were developed
on Zia’s watch.23
Following Bhutto’s death, Zia set his sights on redesigning the politi-
cal system of Pakistan, with Islam and strict Islamic principles being
his focus. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the
Iranian Revolution of that same year, Zia was able to push Islamism to
the forefront of his programme for political overhaul and the process of
directly assisting the mujahideen. It was also during this period that the
US became a player in the future of Pakistan. The Iranian revolution and
the invasion of Afghanistan gave Zia the chance he needed to promote
a political system that was guided by Islamic principles and traditions.
The Islamisation of Pakistan continued to be a central role in Zia’s policy
development for Pakistan. Ronald Reagan became president of the US
in 1981 and soon after Pakistan became the third largest recipient of US
aid. US intelligence services also encouraged Pakistan’s relations with
the radical religious movements in Afghanistan, who they felt could be
used as a tool to force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.24 In 1985,
following accusations by his opponents of dictatorial tactics, Zia opened
elections which once again resulted in Zia remaining leader of Pakistan.
Zia personally chose Muhammad Khan Junejo to be the country’s new

Prime Minister. In December 1985 martial law was officially lifted and
the once banned political parties took the opportunity to immediately
re-establish themselves. Benazir Bhutto also took this opportunity to
return from exile and become leader of the Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP).25 It so happened that the lifting of martial law coincided with
intensified levels of conflict between the country’s ethnic groups,
and the long simmering tensions between the Sindhi natives and the
Muslim immigrants from India, as well as the formation of the Mujahir
Quami Movement (MQM) in the 1980s, now became serious causes for
concern, as well as causes of the violence that was being directed at the
immigrant community.26
Yet another issue that would be of great importance to the develop-
ment of Pakistan involved the narcotics and weapons trade, which
initially took root in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Due to the increasing
levels of violence in Karachi, as well as in Hyderabad and Quetta, Zia
announced in May 1988 that he was once again dissolving the national
and provincial parliaments and assemblies, and that he was dismissing
the Junejo government. On August 17, 1988 Zia was killed in a plane
crash, ending his reign over Pakistan.27 Ghulam Ishaq Khan became
acting president and his first act was to declare that elections would
take place in November 1988. The results of that election showed that
Benazir Bhutto’s PPP had won less than half of the seats in the legisla-
ture.28 The PPP did well in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it
was able to form provincial governments. Punjab, however, was won
by Nawaz Sharif and the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori
Itihad [IJI]). In December of that year Ishaq Khan was formally elected
President and Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan’s first female Prime
Minister. Bhutto faced numerous challenges once she took over the
position of Prime Minister. Although the Soviet Union had withdrawn
from Afghanistan, an Afghan communist regime was still in power and
more than three million Afghan refugees were still living on Pakistani
soil.29 In order to remain in close relations with the army, Bhutto agreed
to allow them to sustain the proxy fight against the communist regime
in Kabul. She also used the military in her law-and-order campaign in
Karachi, where the levels of ethnic unrest were on the increase. As the
issues in Sindh remained unresolved, her supporters there began to be
annoyed. To show her dominance, Bhutto tried to force Nawaz Sharif
to give up his position as the chief minister of Punjab. The problems
kept mounting for Bhutto, and soon after her government was charged
with corruption. In August 1990, following demands for her removal,
President Ishaq Khan ruled that the PPP administration had lost the
confidence of the people and dismissed the Bhutto administration.
Bhutto was succeeded by Nawaz Sharif, who chose to adopt the
Islamisation programme of Zia ul-Haq as his own, as well as bolstering
alliances with religious parties, going as far as getting a Shariat Bill passed
which made Sharia the law of the land in Pakistan.30 However, Sharif’s
popularity did not last, as sustained civil disobedience, acts of lawless-
ness and failed economic policies all joined to produce dissatisfaction
within Pakistani society. Although the communist regime in Kabul was
eliminated, the conditions in Afghanistan remained extremely unsta-
ble. The Pakistani military used this as an opportunity to support an
ultra-conservative regime (the Taliban), which had come to power in
Afghanistan. As well as facing these issues in Afghanistan, internally
relations between the Prime Minister, the President, and the army were
on the decline. Ishaq Khan struck the first blow against Nawaz Sharif by
using his constitutional powers to dismiss the Sharif government and
once again dissolve the national assembly.31 The army intervened in
the political world again and persuaded both Sharif and Khan to resign.
The army replaced them, with Wasim Sajjid taking the office of interim
president and Moeen Qureshi acting as interim prime minister. This
interim government proved to be an interesting experience in Pakistan’s
tumultuous history, with Qureshi proving to be an honest leader who
began to implement such needed reforms as exposing corrupt practices
in government, cracking down on loan defaulters (a significant prob-
lem in Pakistan at the time), and demanding that the country begin
to live within its means. National elections were held in October 1993
and the PPP once again came to power with Bhutto as leader, while
the PML-N came in second led by Nawaz Sharif.32 In an alliance with
the PML-J, led by Junejo, the PPP formed the new civilian government
with Bhutto once again leading the country. This time Bhutto managed,
with the help of the PML-J, to take control of Punjab. Sharif was able
to form a coalition government in the areas of Baluchistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, but the power was squarely in the hands of Bhutto, who
then placed Farooq Leghari, a member of her own party, in the role of
President.
Even with these changes the country remained extremely unsta-
ble and economically unsound. Adding to the increasingly troubled
situation was the fact that Pakistan was placed on a state sponsor of
terrorism watch list by the US in 1993.33 Bhutto also faced numer-
ous political crises as well as facing the issue of her husband’s alleged
corruption, and she soon became caught up in dealing with these
accusations rather than actually running the country. As a result her

government floundered and chaos ensued across the nation, with
Sindh being affected by yet more sectarian violence and the tribal lead-
ers of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa becoming targets for assassinations. In
November 1996 President Leghari dismissed Bhutto’s government and
the 1997 elections that followed ended with Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N once
again taking power.34 By December of that year Sharif had extended
his powers so much that even President Leghari was forced to resign.
This ‘glory’ did not last for long, however, as Sharif failed to halt the
ethnic conflicts in Karachi and Sindh, nor the sectarian violence that
had broken out in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, nor the tribal struggles for
autonomy taking place in Baluchistan. These issues escalated at alarm-
ing rates throughout his term in office, and Sharif also had to deal with
an economy that was a shambles as well as an increasing foreign debt.35
Despite all of these issues, Sharif had, by 1998, managed to amass
more power than any other previously elected civilian government in
Pakistan. Under his leadership the nuclear programme was developed
and this resulted in Pakistan detonating nuclear devices in May 1998.36
These tests sent shockwaves around the world, and concerns grew that,
due to Pakistan’s instability, such technology could possibly be sold or
transferred to groups that might use them in terrorist plots.
It must be noted, however, that although Pakistan’s nuclear pro-
gramme had been in the process of development, the specific decision
to test a nuclear warhead came as a response to India’s test, which took
place before Pakistan’s and was not seen as an act of aggression from
its own perspective. Now confronted with growing unrest across the
country, Sharif proclaimed a state of emergency which enabled him
to rule Pakistan by ordinance and his own special decrees. Pakistan’s
Federal Shariat Courts were given greater freedom to mete out Islamic
justice across the country. The government had also gone so far as to
muzzle the press and ignored almost all the constitutional constraints
placed upon it. General Pervez Musharraf came on to the political
scene of Pakistan following the forced resignation of General Jehangir
Karamat. The popular view within the army was that General Musharraf
was planning a challenge to Sharif’s power. On October 12, 1999 Sharif
attempted to oust Musharraf while the general was out of Pakistan, but
the military had other plans and arrested Sharif.37 Upon his return to
Pakistan, Musharraf announced the immediate dissolution of the Sharif
government and the suspension of the constitution. However, he did not
declare martial law and stated specifically that the fundamental rights
contained in the constitution were to be preserved. As the country’s new
chief executive, Musharraf essentially enabled himself to take over total

power; doing so by citing the increasing turmoil in the country as the
reason why he needed to control all aspect of the government and
military. The situation at that time in Pakistan was dire, with the political,
social, and economic institutions in a state of collapse, the economy in
complete disarray, and society facing the onslaught of sectarian violence
on a daily basis. Pakistan was, at that time, at a critical juncture, once
again facing military rule and martial law. With Musharraf in power,
relations between Pakistan and the US began to fray, this essentially
being caused by numerous issues, including the nuclear arms race with
India and Pakistan’s sustained political instability.38
Musharraf’s Pakistan
In June 2001 Musharraf forced the resignation of President Rafique

Tarar and declared himself President of Pakistan, also effectively becom-
ing head of the government, since the position of prime minister had
not been filled since Sharif had been ousted. However, soon after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Pakistan’s political landscape
was dramatically altered. Pakistan, which had significant diplomatic
relations with Afghanistan, was slow to put pressure on the Taliban to
arrest al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It was not until the relationship
between al-Qaeda and the Taliban was unearthed, thus leading to the
US demanding Pakistani assistance, that Musharraf chose to side with
the US and pledged to help flush out the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements
from both Pakistan itself and from Afghanistan. Musharraf’s choice to
form an alliance with the US was met with outrage by the conservative
Islamists within Pakistan. Almost immediately following his announce-
ment, thousands of pro-Taliban Pakistani volunteers crossed the border
into Afghanistan to help fight against US troops. In the period imme-
diately following September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the
US, the Islamist militant population in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) increased rapidly as Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from all
over the world found refuge in the border lands in Pakistan, with thou-
sands more flocking to FATA.39 Waziristan was the target for Pakistani
military attacks against the militants. However, this area and other tribal
Pashtun regions have been historically off-limits to the central govern-
ment and government forces were met with stiff opposition. Musharraf
also faced a mutiny of sorts from his own military, who refused to fight
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. Musharraf’s government had
been battling religious extremism at home and he had gone so far as to
ban some of the more radical and fundamental militant groups, such as
the Tehrik-e-Taliban, which had long been active in Pakistan.
The issue of Kashmiri terrorism, however, was never mentioned nor
dealt with in any significant manner, and political and religiously
motivated acts of violence continued to escalate between the Kashmiri
Muslim opposition groups and the Indian security forces. This, in turn,
caused an increase in both Muslim–Hindu violence and in Sunni–Shia
violence in Pakistan. In August 2004 Shaukat Aziz took over as Prime
Minister, but Musharraf gave him little power and essentially held on
tightly to the reins of power, arguing that the country was too weak for
him to return it to a full civilian authority.40 Throughout Musharraf’s
reign, Pakistan continued to face increasing levels of sectarian violence.
Adding to the country’s already long list of woes was the earthquake
that struck in October 2005 in the Kashmir region, killing tens of thou-
sands of people. This is an extremely significant event in the case of
Pakistan, as it led to an increase in the overall levels of ‘failure’ within
the country and aided in the proliferation of support for the Taliban
and al-Qaeda alliance. This issue will be discussed in more detail later.
By 2007 Musharraf was once again seeking re-election to the presidency,
but due to the fact that he remained head of the military, opposition
parties and the Supreme Court objected on constitutional grounds.
In March of that same year Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar
Mohammad Chaudhry, which resulted in a general strike of Pakistani
lawyers as well as outbreaks of violence across the country.41 Musharraf
declared a state of emergency in November and once again the consti-
tution was suspended. The Supreme Court was also dismissed and the
new media were severely curtailed. Musharraf subsequently resigned
his position as a military leader and was sworn into the presidency as
a civilian in that same month. The autumn of that year saw Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif return to Pakistan and begin campaigning for
the scheduled January 2008 elections. Sadly, Benazir Bhutto was assassi-
nated by a suicide bomber, who shot her and then detonated his device
in December 2007 in Rawalpindi, resulting in riots across the country.
Musharraf was forced to place the country under a state of emergency
once again and postponed the elections until mid-February.
In March the PPP and the PML-N formed a coalition and Yousal Raza
Gilani was elected Prime Minister. The coalition, though not as solid
as once thought, went ahead with their plan to impeach Musharraf
and on August 18, 2008 he resigned from power. Musharraf’s departure
marked increased conflict within the coalition. Sharif’s PML-N pulled
out of the coalition and decided to put its own candidate forward for
the presidential elections in September. The election resulted in Ali

Zardari becoming President on September 6, 2008. Today, Pakistan may
possibly be in danger of collapsing: there is a rebellion in Baluchistan
and the FATA areas are out of the control of the state. Noam Chomsky
has stated that Pakistan was a paradigm of a failed state that had under-
gone an extremely dangerous form of radical Islamisation. The country,
he argues, is now in danger of collapsing as it grapples with rebellion,
militancy and extremism.42 If it is to survive, Pakistan needs to focus
on the issues that are of the utmost importance to providing stability
to a country on the brink of failure: the revival of the economy, decen-
tralisation of power, decentralisation of provincial autonomy, religious
tolerance, and curbing terrorism. For the case of Pakistan the restoration
of democracy without military influences and the devolution of admin-
istrative and political power are some of the necessary tools needed that
will have an effect in saving the country from failure.
Failure in context: Pakistan a failed state?
In order to assess Pakistan’s level of failure in a more accurate manner,

an in-depth analysis of its composition and economic and social stabil-
ity needs to be carried out. Pakistan has a population of roughly 176.2
million which makes it the seventh most populated country in the
world today.43 Pakistan is by no means a strong state when compared
to such countries as the US, Ireland, France, or Germany; yet when
compared to some of the countries that inhabit the top of the Failed
State Index, such as Sudan, Somalia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, or Zimbabwe, Pakistan does not fit the typical failed state profile
either. Adding to the already long list of woes facing Pakistan, the cur-
rent global economic downturn has turned out to be yet another ‘nail
in the coffin’ of the state, essentially further undermining stability.44
The question then is where does Pakistan stand in relation it its state
strength? As a case study of state failure, Pakistan is interesting but
extremely difficult to assess and categorise. What makes it so unusual
is that internally it can be divided into three clearly separate entities:
the functioning Pakistan, the weak and failing Pakistan, and the failed
Pakistan.
The already fragile situation in Pakistan has, especially since the
end of 2008, deteriorated even further and has many questioning its
viability as a state in the global context. Having elected a civilian gov-
ernment under the leadership of Zardari, Pakistan has still not found
the stability that it needs to function. Pakistan is basically composed
of numerous ethnic groups, each having their own political, economic,

and social differences. As well as that, the country has an extremely low
human development indicator score, especially in the areas of literacy,
poverty, and health and social service provision. Pakistan also has a
legacy of instability which was inherited at its inception and developed
throughout the years. These inherent challenges have been reflected
most prominently in the weakness of Pakistan’s politics and political
institutions.45 The demographic analysis of Pakistan is extremely
interesting and significant for putting its level of failure into context.
Demographically Pakistan’s age structure is quite skewed towards 15–64
year olds, and within that category the majority of the population,
almost 53 percent, falls in the 15–35 years age bracket. Overall, less
than 5 percent of the population are over the age of 65. These statistics
are extremely significant, as it is the 15–35 year-olds who are the main
targets for groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Along with the dire
levels of education provided by the government and the extremely dra-
matic downturn in the economy, the people of this age group especially
are left with no alternative than to join such militant and extremist
groups. Pakistan, as of 2009, had a moderate youth bulge, with the aver-
age age being 21 and over 35 percent of Pakistanis under the age of 15.46
This fact has proven to be an extremely negative issue for Pakistan, for
(as noted above) as it is this age group that has become the prime tar-
get for terrorist recruitment. Without an improvement in life for these
people, the current trend of joining militant groups and fighting against
the government will not end.
The ethnic composition of Pakistan also adds to the overall instability
currently afflicting the country. Punjabis make up almost 45 percent of
the entire ethnic composition of the country, followed by the Pashtuns,
who make up 15.42 percent, and the Sindhi (14.1 percent). What
makes this such a significant issue for the stability of Pakistan is that
although the Pashtuns only make up 15.42 percent of the entire ethnic
population, they are all mostly located at the Pakistani–Afghan border.
This border alliance makes it much easier for mass movement across the
border. The ease of movement is facilitated by the code of Pashtunwali,
which means that those crossing the border are offered protection by
those Pashtun living on the Pakistani side of the border, thus making the
Pashtuns one of the most important players in the proliferation of
terrorism in Pakistan. There is also a long-standing tension between the
ethnic groups, especially between the Pashtuns and the Punjabis. This
tension has simmered constantly in the background and flares up
randomly across the country in the form of suicide bombings of specific
targets, such as schools and mosques. Along with this is the issue of
religious composition in Pakistan. Islam is the dominant religion in
Pakistan, with 95 percent of the population falling under this category.
This in and of itself is not actually that significant when it comes to
the level of failure of Pakistan. However, it is the fact that, of those
Muslims, 75 percent are Sunni and 20 percent are Shia, that makes the
situation in Pakistan more unstable, due to the increasing sectarian
violence that is spreading across Pakistan. As well as dealing with the
infiltration of foreign terrorists, Afghan refugees, and members of the
neighbouring Taliban and al-Qaeda, Pakistan is faced with the ongoing
struggle between the Shia and Sunni Muslims.47 This has been the cause
of extreme levels of instability in Pakistan, both socially and politically.
Apart from the social and political issues that are negatively impact-
ing the stability of Pakistan, economically Pakistan seems to be on a
downward spiral that is making the rehabilitation of the country almost
impossible. Despite having received well over $7 billion dollars from the
US since the beginning of 2003, Pakistan is still in a dire economic situa-
tion. The statistics of GDP purchasing power and GDP official exchange
rates do not appear to be too damaging to Pakistan’s overall levels of
economic stability, being $427.3 billion and $167.6 billion respectively.
However, the overall GDP growth rate is relatively low at 2.7 percent,
and GDP per capita is also extremely low, at just $2,500. This alone is
significant, but it is the inflation rate that is causing Pakistan the most
damage. At the time of writing inflation in Pakistan stands at 20.3
percent which is completely devaluing both the currency and its trad-
ing power. The final issue being faced in the economic realm is the fact
that public debt is now at 49.8 percent, which means that Pakistan is
increasingly in a dangerous economic position. These statistics alone
seem to paint an extremely negative picture of the situation in Pakistan
and with due cause, however, these alone cannot accurately portray
Pakistan as a failed state.
Pakistan has consistently scored quite poorly in a number of areas
within such ranking schemes as the Failed State Index, especially with
regard to its legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group
paranoia; the level of criminalisation and/or delegitimisation of the state;
observing a security apparatus that operates as a ‘state within a state’;
a significant level in the rise of factionalised elites; and suffering from
the effects of intervention of other states or external political actors.
As well as the above indicators, Pakistan also scores quite badly, though
not as severely, in the areas relating to the mass movement of refugees
or internally displaced persons, which has created a number of complex
humanitarian emergencies; uneven economic development along

group lines; the suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law;
and the widespread violation of human rights. Even though Pakistan
has one of the strongest militaries in the world, it is not equipped to
deal with the internal struggles that the country is now facing. This,
along with the fact that the government has for so long chosen not to
try to disarm the militants, means that the military is now faced with a
dual task of trying to stabilise the country while at the same time trying
to appease the militants. The contentious and inherently violent nature
of Pakistani politics highlights the underlying struggle of the competing
networks for the right to power, dominance, and the control of state
resources.48 Due to governmental neglect and inability to dominate, as
well as an extremely ill-managed economy, Pakistan remains teetering
on the brink of state failure.49 The majority of the blame for Pakistan’s
uneven development can be associated with failure in governance and
its ill-functioning and neglected state institutions.
As well as the above, other issues impacting on Pakistan’s level of state
failure range from internal feudalism, neglected and ill-formed social
structure, tribalism, human rights abuses, and lack of solid health and
education systems – the list goes on and on. As can be ascertained by the
above information, although having been classified as a failed state, espe-
cially over the last ten years, the reality of the situation is entirely more
complex to comprehend. Despite the frequent changes of government
that Pakistan has gone through, as well as the periodic bouts of military
takeovers that it has witnessed, the country’s political system is surpris-
ingly predictable and resilient. Accordingly, the highly volatile and
contentious nature of Pakistani politics does not actually reflect the
underlying differences of approaches on such issues as policy devel-
opment.50 It, in fact, represents the struggle between the competing
networks across the country for power and dominance. There is little
in Pakistani politics that can be taken at face value, which means that
all actors must be analysed to come to a reasonable assessment about
the situation there.51 Therefore, one can look at the Pakistani state as
being somewhat of a conundrum: it is a failed state, a weak state, and
a functioning state all at the same time. Pakistan as the ‘failed state’
focuses mainly on the areas of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These
two areas of Pakistan, known as the tribal areas, harbour all of the traits
that one would expect to find in a failed state, including lack of govern-
ment control, porous borders, ethnic, and linguistic and cultural strife.
Pakistan as the ‘weak state’ is focused on the areas of Baluchistan and
Sindh. These areas of Pakistan show all the traits of a typical weak state,
i.e. areas witnessing armed challenges to central authority, difficulty of

government in controlling borders, and neglected public services such
as education and healthcare.
The final area is Pakistan as the ‘functioning state’. This includes the
Pakistan-Administered Northern Areas, the areas around Islamabad and
Rawalpindi. These areas witness adequate levels of government control,
have education and healthcare systems, and are party to the rule of
law. It is for this reason that classifying Pakistan as a typical failed state
is extremely dangerous and misleading. Despite the considerable level
of difficulties facing Pakistan, it would be erroneous to regard Pakistan
as something of a lost cause.52 While violence and instability will very
likely increase over the next couple of years, it is on balance unlikely
that the country will fail completely or collapse. This unlikelihood of
failure comes mainly from the historical context of the creation of
the Pakistani state, along with the dominance of the military. There
are undoubtedly large swaths of the country that are suffering from
severe security, economic, political, and social challenges, yet this has
been the situation there almost since Pakistan was created in 1947 and
therefore it is safe to say the situation is unlikely to deteriorate into the
predicted chaos and collapse. As the history of Pakistan has shown us
time and time again, it will in all likelihood continue to shift between
being a weak democracy led by weak leaders, to an autocracy ruled by
the military. There is always the possibility that Pakistan may indeed
disintegrate further and completely collapse, but this scenario is actually
highly unlikely. Pakistan is an unique case study in terms of not only its
structure but also its overall composition and its historical background.
The extent to which Pakistan as a state differs from the western ideal-
ised form of a state has often been linked to the unique reality of state-
hood in Pakistan.53 The clarification of the state as a concept and the
examination of the state of Pakistan as an individual case study should
serve as the theoretical foundation for the classification of Pakistan, not
as a failed state, but as one termed an endemically weak crisis state, even
though it does periodically display many of the distinctive features of a
failed state. In the case of Pakistan, the weakening of the state occurred
almost immediately after its foundation and manifested itself quickly
in a lack of governance and the visibility of porous borders. Pakistan’s
economy actually remains one of the strongest in its ‘neighbourhood’,
although on the political front it is still continually being hampered
by bad governance choices and internal political instability. Much of
Pakistan’s land mass is, in fact, somewhat out of the control of the
central government, and those areas that are out of control are plagued
by extremely divisive factional politics.54 Across the state of Pakistan

suicide bombings and other terrorist activities remain commonplace,
and this includes the most controlled and populous cities. The return to
a newly elected civilian government in late 2008 offers some hope that
Pakistan once again will be able to try to develop a long-lasting demo-
cratic tradition. However, there is still little to suggest that this civilian
government has actually done anything to abate the long-standing
factional politics that are so prevalent in the country. Having assessed
Pakistan in relation to the level of failure within the state, the next
element that needs to be analysed is what the underlying conditions
and causes of terrorism in Pakistan are.
The Pakistani state: connections to terrorism and

insurgency
There are several historical and structural factors that contribute to an

environment that is conducive to and that enables terrorist attacks to
be carried out. In Pakistan especially secessionist tendencies are strong,
and inter-state border and territorial disputes are ongoing; this adds to
the feelings of uncertainty that drain state resources. Along with this
are the porous borders and undefined borders along which extreme
ideological differences are causing tensions to boil over, leading to more
violence. The convergence of these factors, among many, creates the
environment necessary for terrorist groups not only to organise and
stage attacks, but to gain access to the funds that are necessary to carry
out such attacks on the internal, regional, and international levels.
Government/state weakness
With regard to the situation in Pakistan, what needs to be ascertained

is to what extent government and state weakness have played a role in
the current terrorist threat and infiltration into the country. The terms
‘strong government’ and ‘strong state’ have never been used in the
context of describing Pakistan. Pakistan is today a state teetering on the
brink of failure and its government has little if any control over large
swaths of territory, especially in the tribal regions of FATA, Waziristan,
and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. With the war against the Taliban and
al-Qaeda raging non-stop in the north west of the country, Pakistan is
dealing with some issues relating to state failure. It has been defined as
being a failed state throughout the literature, but has been re-categorised
in this study as being an endemically weak crisis state, although it still
shares many of the traits of weak and failed states. Institutions in

Pakistan are essentially weak because ‘the ruling classes that run the
country prefer a government of men to a government of laws, personal
to collective decision-making and private over public interest’.55 They
do not work according to normal prescribed procedures, instead acting
as an alternative to the decision-making procedures based solely on
the ruler’s ideas and impulses. The exception to this rule is the army,
which is seen as being the most important and strongest institution
in Pakistan. This interest and focus on the army has meant that other
political institutions have been neglected to the level of failure in
some areas. The weakness of political institutions in Pakistan is prob-
ably the main reason for the current levels of instability witnessed
there.56 Islamic extremists tend to thrive in an environment where the
state has retreated and has no programme for improvement, which
is currently being observed in Pakistan, the result of which is that
they manage to infiltrate and gain such a significant foothold on the
country that the message they spread gains traction and appeal that it
would otherwise not.
Within systems with adequate government and state strength, the
moderate populace normally might not be sympathetic to radical
voices. However, in these weaker states the citizens are at a loss of
what to do and who to turn to for support. Therefore, in times of
distress, these people will often turn to the extremist groups to provide
some semblance of stability. These groups do so as they are extremely
regimented and use strict guidelines which enable them to remain
tightly organised and efficient. Extremist and terrorist groups are expert
at taking advantage of any gaps in government. The danger in Pakistan
as it stands is not that the terrorists are going to overtake the entire
country or that the state is going to become a nuclear-armed Islamic
fundamentalist-run state, but that the government is extremely fragile
and is not capable of dealing with the underlying issues that are driving
the people towards the terrorist groups. Current US President Barack
Obama has noted his worry about the state of affairs in Pakistan on
numerous occasions and has also declared that he is not ruling out
the possibility in the future of US intervention to address the Islamic
extremist issue, which is becoming out of hand there.57 He has noted,
however, that he is confident that the Pakistani government is serious
about fighting Islamic militants who have infiltrated and in places
taken over parts of its territory. What is obvious in Pakistan is that
the current civilian government under President Asif Ali Zardari is
still unable to provide the basic services that ensure the loyalty of the
people. If the state of Pakistan cannot establish its writ across its entire
territory, it will remain weak and will allow infiltration and takeover by
terrorist organisations.
Breakdown and decline of social, political,

and economic order
The breakdown and decline of social, political, and economic order

within a state often creates the necessary circumstances in which
individuals and groups may be willing to join or support terrorist
groups. This occurs when the citizens feel that there is no alternative
available for them to survive other than to give their support to the
terrorist groups. There has been little or no time spent reflecting on
the reasons why there is so much social, political, and economic strife
in Pakistan, but the aim here is to gain an understanding of these issues
and assess their importance. The education and healthcare systems in
Pakistan are prime examples of the breakdown of social order within
the country. Pakistan inherited its poorly structured education and
healthcare system at independence in 1949 and not much has been
done to improve them since then. Although the education system has
been expanded across many provinces in Pakistan, literacy rates are still
only 55 percent. Even this figure is deceiving. In FATA for instance the
literacy rate is only 17.4 percent and in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa it
reaches just 34.4 percent.58 Government spending on education is also
deplorable at just 2.1 percent of GDP, compared to almost 40 percent of
GDP spent on the military.59 This is one of the main reasons why the
madrassas system has grown so rapidly in Pakistan. In essence, the pub-
lic education system has collapsed in the last 50 years due to the lack of
any significant budget allowance.
The same picture emerges from the healthcare system in Pakistan.
According to Akram and Khan, good healthcare generates positive
externalities for the society as a whole and the protection of health is
one of the most important roles of a government.60 In addition, the
healthcare sector is suffering from poor implementation and govern-
ance, uneven quality of services across the provinces, and a weak regu-
latory framework, all of which have resulted in extremely poor health
grades according to UNICEF.61 The problem with this neglect is that the
terrorist groups that have infiltrated the country are all too willing to
take over these roles that the government is supposed to implement.
Through offering such elements as free education and aid distributed
through clean schools, the leaders of these organisations gain both a
receptive audience and evidence of their own superior credentials to

lead.62 Therefore, the situation of basic education and healthcare ranges
from weak to non-existent in many parts of Pakistan and this state of
affairs has assisted in the process of Islamisation. Without addressing
these underlying issues Pakistan is never going to rid itself of the ter-
rorist threat.
Safe havens
Pakistan has had a long history of providing safe havens and support
for terrorist groups. This pattern continues in Pakistani politics, with
the governments, both civilian and military, using these extremist
elements for their own personal vendettas and political issues. The
extremists were once again put to use by the Pakistani government with
the outbreak of a civil war in Afghanistan, during which, while hoping
to consolidate their influence and control over Afghanistan, the govern-
ment of Pakistan chose the side of the Taliban. This was somewhat of a
catalyst to the situation in Pakistan today, which has completely grown
out of control. Pakistan plays host to numerous international terrorist
organisations and is today one of the main safe havens of groups such
as al-Qaeda. The existence and location of safe havens within Pakistan
are becoming more expansive than ever before. Numerous experts,
including Roy, have focused on the FATA areas as being the key safe
haven within Pakistan, as well as the areas along the border to the
west, from Baluchistan through to FATA and into Kashmir, which have
seen a rapid increase in the level of terrorist activity in recent years.63
Pakistan appears to be one of the new ‘hubs’ of terrorism. The location
and subsequent killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011
highlights this fact. Until this safe haven provided by the Pakistan is
halted, there will be little chance of the levels of terrorism, not only in
Pakistan, but in the region at large, being reduced.
Porous borders
Porous borders are one of the most significant challenges facing the
global attempts to halt the spread of terrorism. These porous borders
allow terrorists and their recruits to transit in and out of countries for
training, ideological re-enforcement, communications, and movement
of finances with ease. They also allow such groups to move with ease
from one territory to the next to carry out terrorist operations/acts. The
Pakistan–Afghanistan border region is widely believed to be the front
line in the war against Islamic militants. There has been a significant
increase in militant activity in the western border region of Pakistan,
mainly contained to the FATA provinces, but also branching into the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This area is one of the most ungoverned, com-
bustible regions in the world. The flow of money, people, and arms
between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas has profoundly influ-
enced the spread of terrorism between these two countries. Terrorists
have been exploiting Pakistan’s lax control of its frontiers for years,
including such groups as global terrorists, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani
Taliban and numerous other tribal militias, extremist networks, and
sectarian groups.64 These groups have established refuge in Pakistan and
use the porous borders to stage attacks. The region has never been stable
in the traditional sense, but since 9/11 it has been in turmoil, with a
complete lack of any government writ or power.
For more than a decade Islamic militants have been training in
Afghanistan and Pakistan in camps that are based on the border regions
between the two countries. According to a report by CNN more than
120 of these training camps are operating between the two countries.65
These camps could not function without the extremely weak and
porous borders that exist between Pakistan and Afghanistan and until
these borders are adequately addressed there will be little reduction in
the number of terrorists willing to carry out attacks. This cross-border
fertilisation of terrorism is preventing both Pakistan and Afghanistan
from defeating the forces that are threatening their stability. As a result
of the border situation, Afghanistan cannot get control over its ter-
ritory and therefore cannot defeat the Taliban if they can go across
the border into Pakistan as a safe haven.66 It also has a severe effect
on the stability of Pakistan, as it cannot root out those groups if they
can so easily seek refuge across the border in Afghanistan. This poorly
controlled border, coupled with still deteriorating relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, has essentially allowed al-Qaeda and other
insurgent groups to increase their activity in the region. Al-Qaeda ele-
ments along the border have increased their activity while continuing
to support and participate in the Afghan insurgency. According to a
report produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, with
such terrorist groups as the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) beginning to control
large swathes of the tribal areas (FATA) and increasing their influence
in the adjoining areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as Bannu, Tank,
and Kohat, an increase in cross-border attacks has taken place, none
of which would be possible without the ease of access provided by the
porous borders.67
Pool of recruits
For a terrorist organisation to be successful it needs to have an avail-

able pool of recruits from which to expand its membership. Within this
context, the existence of a large youth bulge in society is significant. To
highlight the dangers of youth bulge, Shuja Nawaz notes that there are 67
countries in the world with such youth bulges and 60 of them are currently
undergoing some kind of civil war or mass killing, including Pakistan.68
Although there is no dominant theory that is universally applicable, there
are a number of underlying variables that increase the likelihood for mass
radicalisation to occur. The majority of radicalised youth have a strong
sense of being discriminated against and feel alienated from society at
large. Other aspects that add to the process of radicalisation include lack
of adequate education and an overwhelming lack of economic opportu-
nity. The problem is then often accentuated in societies which exhibit
cultural polarisation, which is unfortunately the case in Pakistani society,
which displays virtually all these symptoms.69 Pakistan’s population has
grown rapidly from 45.9 million in 1960 to almost 176 million today.70
This population explosion has been accompanied by a youth bulge, with
over 35 percent of the male population being between the ages of 15 and
29, and the median age being just 18. As a result of this extremely young
demographic, Pakistan is witnessing growing levels of crime, violence, and
radical activity.71 By 2030 it is estimated that Pakistan’s population aged
below 24 will be upwards of 51 percent of the total population.72 Pakistan’s
failing economy is not helping the situation, and for millions of young
Pakistani men, ambitions for the future cannot be realised, thus leading
to increased frustration. This sense of frustration means that these young
men are easily recruited into radical and terrorist organisations. Adding to
this pressure on the youth of Pakistan are the influence of the Islamist and
terrorist groups, as well as the presence of an embedded extremist infra-
structure, the widespread and ever-increasing social networks of Pakistan’s
Islamic and politics militants, and a failure of the government to deliver
any credible results to the people. Essentially, it will be the orientation of
the youth two decades from now that will determine whether Pakistan is
a moderate, progressive Islamic state with a medium-sized economy, or an
ideologically fixated country that supports a radical vision.73
The gun culture in Pakistan has become completely out of control, and
this ease of use of weaponry has been beneficial to terrorist groups such
as al-Qaeda in the fact that they are able to infiltrate and recruit from a
group of citizens, who are already familiar with weapons. With the rising
levels of ethno-sectarian strife, a civil war still simmering in neighbour-
ing Afghanistan, poor economic conditions, bad governance, and an
almost non-existent law and order system in parts, Pakistan’s citizens
are dealing with rising levels of frustration and discontent. These feel-
ings have led to a rising sense of apathy, while the never-ending social
injustices have strengthened the appeal of small arms and light weapons
among the Pakistani population. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 acted as the catalyst to the proliferation of small arms in Pakistan.
The cross-border flow of weapons from Afghanistan which resulted was
quite extensive. As well as that, an estimated 30 percent of the weapons
funnelled by US and Pakistani intelligence services to the Afghan resist-
ance during that conflict were diverted for other purposes, including
arming the Taliban and other extremist groups in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan.74 Pakistan has one of the highest per capita rates of gun
ownership in the world. Although there are no official state-released
figures, rough estimates put the total number of small arms at large in
the country at more than 20 million, with about half of them illegally
owned. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone is believed to have nearly half a mil-
lion illegitimate small arms and light weapons in circulation.75
According to the Global Policy Forum (GPF) there exists roughly a ratio
of 9 to 1 in relation to the number of illegal weapons to legally licensed
weapons in Pakistan.76 The Pakistani Ministry of Interior corroborates this
by estimating that there are approximately 18 million illegal weapons
in Pakistan compared to some two million weapons held legally.77 The
illegal arms market also supplies militant sectarian groups, drug cartels,
and general criminals. In addition, the ongoing tribal disputes in the
frontier provinces of Baluchistan, Sindh and Punjab are being boosted by
the abundant availability of cheap firearms.78 The weakness or absence
of state control over territory and borders, which is often linked with
violent conflict, means that weapons, primarily of the small arms variety,
are readily available. However, although this may not be a central link to
terrorism, because much of today’s terrorism involves suicide bombings
and IEDs, which are made from readily available ingredients rather than
traditional weapons, terrorists sometimes use weapons and access to these
small arms to gain access to and to maintain safe havens.
Government complicity/support
Government complicity and/or support may not necessarily be linked to

state failure, as governments in non-failed states also support terrorists,
e.g. Iran (which ranked 32 in the FSI 2010), but state failure may make it
more difficult for governments to oppose terrorist groups and/or create
additional incentives to support them. This also aids in the necessary
cloak of invisibility that terrorist groups need to survive. There is no
denying that Pakistan as a state has been harbouring and supporting
Islamic terrorist groups for a long time. Beginning with Zia ul-Haq,
government support for extremist groups has been part of Pakistan’s for-
eign policy. Fearing a threat from India and having a hostile neighbour
in Afghanistan, Pakistan has chosen a dangerous strategy of supporting
extremist groups to further its political aims and objectives. The ISI,
Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, has been the main
component used in doing this and has played a significant role in both
the development and spread of these groups across South Asia. A num-
ber of quotes taken from a UK Ministry of Defence paper, which was
leaked in 2006, allege that the ISI has indirectly helped the Taliban and
al-Qaeda over the last three to four decades. It states that
Pakistan is not currently stable but on the edge of chaos … the West
has turned a blind eye towards existing instability and the indirect
protection of al-Qaeda and promotion of terrorism … Indirectly
Pakistan, through the ISI, has been supporting terrorism and
extremism.79
With little doubt, it can be argued that the ISI supported the Taliban
up until the attacks on 9/11, although this is still denied by the
Pakistani government. The context of the role played in creating the
current problem is that it has been argued that the modern jihadi
organisations were brought into existence in the 1980s by the ISI and
Saudi intelligence at the insistence of the CIA. The purpose for this
support was to create groups that could be used against the troops of
the USSR and the pro-Soviet Afghan government in Afghanistan fol-
lowing the 1979 invasion. In terms of support for extremist, terrorist,
and insurgent groups within Pakistan, many claims have been made in
relation to the role played by the government and more specifically of
the ISI in supporting such groups. In the period directly following the
9/11 attacks, much of the blame was placed directly on Musharraf, the
army, and the ISI for causing an increase in activity of these groups. In
this context it has been argued that Musharraf and the ISI were play-
ing a double-sided game with both the US and the Pakistani citizens,
specifically by allowing and facilitating the growth of Islamic extrem-
ism and the mushrooming of thousands of new extremist madrassas
in the country.
The ISI’s first major involvement in Afghanistan came after the Soviet
invasion in 1979, when it provided, together with the CIA, weapons,
money, intelligence, and training to the Afghan mujahideen. Even at
this early stage there were some that questioned the degree to which
Pakistani intelligence favoured the extremists and their belief systems
over the policies and beliefs of the US. Following the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, the ISI continued its support of extremist and terror-
ist groups by first supporting resistance fighters, and later the Taliban.
Even to this day Pakistan is accused of continuing that support, and
numerous US officials have accused the Pakistani government, and espe-
cially the ISI, of supporting terrorist groups. Robert Gates, US Defence
Secretary, stated in a May 2009 ‘60 Minutes’ interview that Pakistan ‘to
a certain extent, play[s] both sides’. Gates goes on to suggest that the ISI
has maintained links with groups like al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban
as a strategic hedge which will then help Islamabad to gain more influ-
ence over Kabul once the US pull out.80 It has been repeatedly reported
that Pakistan trains militants and sends them across the border into
Afghanistan to carry out attacks against US military forces.
In May 2006, for instance, the British Chief of Staff spoke to the
Guardian and stated that, ‘The thinking piece of the Taliban is out
of Quetta in Pakistan. It’s the major headquarters.’81 Speaking at the
Council on Foreign Relations in September 2006, then President Pervez
Musharraf responded, by saying that ‘it is the most ridiculous thought
that the Taliban headquarters can be in Quetta.’82 The ISI was instru-
mental in the formation of the Taliban in the early 1990s and ISI’s for-
mer head, Hamid Gul, has made no secret of his continued support.83
Given the hardening of the government’s position towards the Taliban
and their supporters in the tribal areas of Pakistan, various doubts have
been raised over the ISI’s continuing loyalty to the government. The ISI
has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for
Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar,
and other areas in Pakistan. In order to minimise detectability, the ISI
has also supplied indirect assistance – including financial assistance –
to Taliban training camps.84 There is also significant evidence that
the Taliban leadership has a support base in Quetta, Pakistan.85 Some
Pakistani military and ISI officials see the Taliban as an important
partner in a strategy to promote a friendly Pashtun government in
Afghanistan, significant for countering Indian and Iranian influence in
the country. Pakistan’s powerful and largely autonomous ISI is widely
believed to have provided significant support for militant Kashmiri
separatists over the past decade in what is perceived as a proxy war
against India. In March 2003, the chief of India’s Defence Intelligence

Agency reported providing the US with ‘solid documentary proof’ that
70 Islamic militant camps are operating in Pakistani Kashmir.86 There
is virtual unanimity that the ISI has continued to provide assistance to
Afghan insurgent groups.
In terms of the ongoing issues between Pakistan and India, it is
argued here that the Taliban were essentially enabled by the Pakistani
ISI in order for them to be used to create trouble and instability in
neighbouring India. This threat came to the fore most recently with the
2008 Mumbai bombings. At this time ten men linked with the group
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba invaded buildings in Mumbai and killed 164 people.
These men left Karachi in Pakistan on November 23, 2008, travelling to
India on a hijacked boat. Many had described the events in Mumbai as
India’s 9/11. The attacks occurred at the busiest places. Besides hotels
and hospitals, terrorists struck at railway stations, Crawford Market,
Wadi Bunder, and on the Western Express Highway near the airport.
Seven places were been attacked with automatic weapons and grenades.
Even with direct evidence of the ties to Pakistan, President Asif Ali
Zardari claimed that the attacks were carried out by non-state actors.
However, police reports confirmed that nine of the attackers con-
fessed to belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba), a Pakistani
Kashmiri separatist organisation, covertly supported by the ISI.87
There are two main breeding grounds for terrorism in and around
Pakistan, namely Kashmir and the border area close to Afghanistan
(the Durand Line), and these two areas attract fighters from all over the
world. According to Stern, the Pakistani militant groups are killing civil-
ians and engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the guise
of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports these militants
and their religious schools as cheap ways to fight India and educate
Pakistan’s youth. This policy, however, is creating a culture of violence
that exacerbates internal sectarianism and destabilises the region.
Without change, this monster threatens to devour Pakistani society. In
an indication of the increasing international understanding of just how
significantly jihad threatens to destabilise Pakistan, a report carried by
the RAND Corporation argues that it is no longer apparent that the
army or ISI exercise complete control over the proxies they have helped
to create, some of which are now openly talking about fomenting a
fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan itself.88
Afghan insurgent groups fall into three loose fronts along the
Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The northern front, which includes a large
HIG presence, is based in such Afghan provinces as Nuristan, Kunar,
Laghman, and Nangarhar, as well as across the border in Pakistan. The

central front includes a loose amalgam of foreign fighters, including
Central Asians and Arabs. They are located in a swath of territory extend-
ing from Bajaur to the FATA in Pakistan, and such Afghan provinces
as Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika. Mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani
has been active in the central front against Afghan and coalition forces.
Finally, the southern front, which includes a large Taliban presence, is
based in Baluchistan and the FATA, as well as such Afghan provinces
as Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, Zabol, and Paktika. In addition to
the Taliban, a number of drug-trafficking and tribal groups have also
been active in the southern front. All of these fronts enjoy sanctuary
in Pakistan.89 Overall, then, experts generally suspect that Pakistan still
provides some support to the Taliban, though probably not to the extent
it did in the past. This governmental support and complicity may have
been proved without a doubt with the recent capture of Osama bin
Laden in Abbottabad, just 35 miles outside of Islamabad on May 1, 2011.
The fact that bin Laden had been using Pakistan as a base and sanctu-
ary came as little surprise to many but the close proximity to Pakistan’s
capital city left little doubt that the Pakistani government had been
supporting him in the preceding years. This has proved to be extremely
detrimental to the relationship between Pakistan and the US and has
also challenged the role played by Pakistan in the counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism missions of which it has been so important.
6
Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism,
and Insurgency in Context – Part 2
Terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan
Pakistan has become one of the world’s centres of radical Islamic

ideology and its terrorist adherents, with some of the main elements
of al-Qaeda and militant Islamic organisations using it as a base. In
2009 alone, for example, there were a total of 2,586 terrorist, insur-
gent, and sectarian related terrorist attacks; the highest percentage
of attacks being reported from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (1,137),
followed by Baluchistan with 792 attacks, FATA with 559, Punjab
with 46, Sindh with 30, and 12 in Islamabad.1 This rise in the level
of attacks occurred despite a persistent counterterrorism campaign by
the Pakistani military, and once again the border regions are the most
active when it comes to terrorist attacks. Many of these attacks have
been directly attributed to the ease of access that terrorist groups have
from Afghanistan into Pakistan and vice versa, with, from January 4 to
January 10, 2010 alone, a total of 22 terrorist attacks being carried out
in the border regions.2 Support for Islamic militancy in Pakistan did
not emerge from a religious base, as is the case in Afghanistan or Iraq,
but emerged from the guidelines that were adopted from the policies
enforced by the West against the Soviet Union during the invasion of
Afghanistan (1979–1988). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one
of the main catalysts for the strengthening of the relationship between
the military in Pakistan and its Mullahs – a relationship which resulted
in Pakistan moving closer towards Islamic fundamentalism. Essentially
it was the failure of Pakistan’s underlying political institutions, rampant
corruption, poverty, and denial of equal rights that provided a base for
extremist religious beliefs to take root.
109
The Deobandi Sunnis were the largest beneficiaries of the Afghan

jihad, with their madrassas receiving large amounts of funds during this
period. These madrassas quickly became the forefront of jihadi activism
and terrorism in Pakistan. The Sunni-dominated groups are the most
influential and active of the terrorist organisations in Pakistan, but
the Shias also have numerous violent militant terrorist organisations.
Their overall influence, however, has lessened significantly over time. It
must be noted that not all of the militant religious groups in Pakistan
are involved in terrorism, but they do form an important element in
the militant Islamic framework within that country. There are two
major elements in Pakistani society that use religion as a motivation
for acts of terrorism. The first are the sectarian groups that are active in
Pakistan. These groups originate and exist in both the Sunni and Shia
sects of Pakistan. The second group are the jihadi organisations, the
most active of which are Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami and Karkat-ul-
Jihad-e-Islami.3 Almost all of the militant groups have had connections
with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and most of them obtained
their training there. Many of these groups have also been linked with
elements of al-Qaeda. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the terrorist and
insurgent groups that are most active in Pakistan.
Some observers believe that in addition to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, such jihadi groups in Pakistan as Lashkar-e-
Tabia, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen maintain links
with al-Qaeda.4 These groups are of mixed sources, i.e. both Shia and
Sunni in origin, and many of them operate both internally in Pakistan
and on the external level in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and other areas
of the world. Following 9/11, Pakistan became a central figure in the
global ‘war on terror’, with intelligence cooperation between the US
and Pakistan helping to track down and arrest leading al-Qaeda suspects
inside Pakistan. Pakistan gave unprecedented support to US forces first
during the war to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and then in the
long drawn-out war against the remnants of al-Qaeda. The effectiveness
of the measures undertaken by the Pakistani government is, however,
still a matter of great debate. The efforts made by the government to
control al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat have produced some concrete results.
For example, the government has apprehended over 1,000 al-Qaeda
operatives and foreign militants, including Abu Zubayda (March 2002
in Faisalabad), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003 in Rawalpindi),
and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005 in Mardan).
Furthermore, the government has also launched an operation against
al-Qaeda in Pakistan’s FATA, which represents the first time in the
Table 6.1 Terrorist/insurgent groups in Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Lashkar-e-Omar Sipah-e-Sahaba

Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan Tehreek-e Nafaz-e- Lashkar-e Jhangvi
Shariat-e-Mohammadi
Sipah-e-Muhammad Jamaat-ul-Fuqra Nadeem
Pakistan Commando
Popular Front for Armed Muslim Unity Army Harakat-ul-
Resistance Mujahideen Al-alami
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Harakat-ul-Ansar Lashkar-e-Toiba
Jaish-e-Mohammad Harkat-ul Mujahideen Al Badr
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Lashkar-e-Jabbar Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-
Islami
Muttahida Jihad Council Al Barq Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen
Al Jihad Jammu and Kashmir People’s League
National Liberation
Army
Muslim Janbaz Force Kashmir Jehad force Al-Jihad Force
Al Umar Mujahideen Mahaz-e-Azadi Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba
Jammu and Kashmir Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen Islamic Students
Students for Liberation League
Front
Tehrik-e-Hurriat-e-Kashmir Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqar Al Mustafa
Jafaria Liberation Fighters
Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami Muslim Mujahideen Al Mujahid Force
Tekrik-e-Jihad Islami Inquilabi Mahaz Al-Rashid Trust
Al-Akhtar Trust Rabita Trust Ummah Tamir-e-Nau
Source: International Crisis Group & National Counter Terrorism Centre.5
history of the country that Pakistan’s military has been deployed in the
region.6 Even with these improvements in security and in addressing
the issue of terrorism in Pakistan, the overall levels of terrorism and
terrorist activity have remained on an upwards trend. The number of
terrorist attacks reached a peak in 2009, but the statistics still show that
there is a lot of terrorist activity occurring within Pakistan’s border,
resulting in an increase in the levels of civilian deaths. This increase
in death rates is having a negative effect on the support levels of the
Pakistani government and is also causing a massive backlash towards the
US. It will be extremely interesting to observe these trends in Pakistan
following the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. It may
become likely that the rates of terrorism following these withdrawals
will increase, as the groups who are active along the Afghan–Pakistani
border gain more freedom of movement. This would have a detrimental

effect on the stability of Pakistan, whose government is already some-
what fragile. The Pakistani state may not survive a massive influx of
terrorist organisations and may in fact succumb to the level of state fail-
ure witnessed by Afghanistan and Iraq. If this were to occur, the added
element of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) would mean
that Pakistan could be the most threatening terrorist state in the world.
The origins of state failure, terrorism,

and insurgency in Pakistan

The aim of this section is to carry out an assessment of the origins of
state failure, terrorism, and state failure within Pakistan and also to
provide an analysis of the most significant of these indicators for the
stability and proliferation of terrorism within Pakistan. Regime type
has probably been one of the most important and influential factors
as to why Pakistan has been so deeply affected by terrorism. Pakistan
is currently under the control of a civilian government in a democratic
system. This type of system (representative democratic system) should
statistically be the type of system that would be less likely a target and
host of terrorism and terrorist organisations. However, in the case of
Pakistan, history dictates that it does not stay a democracy for long and
usually reverts to being a military autocracy. This constant political dis-
ruption throughout its history has left Pakistan with a legacy of violence
that is deeply ingrained in its political and social institutions, citizens,
and ideology. The majority of the regimes that have controlled Pakistan
since its creation in 1947 have in some form or other supported terror-
ist groups, both internally and externally, support which has created a
legacy that has led to massive instability across the country.7
As well as that, the most dominant and long-running regime type has
been the military autocracy, and this has proved to be one of the most
destabilising factors for Pakistan. These military autocracies have focused
their attention on strengthening the military and have neglected to pay
attention to civilian needs and wants, which has resulted in distrust and
hatred towards the government by the people, who see it as doing noth-
ing more than protecting itself and its own interests.8 This has pushed
the citizens towards the terrorist organisations, who they see as being
the answers to their problems. Groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda
have stepped in where the government has faltered and provided the
people with such essentials as healthcare and education and have, in
many parts of the country, more support from the people than does
the government.9 If this trend continues, these groups will be able to
infiltrate further into the social and political realms of Pakistan and will
further threaten the legitimacy of the government.
Pakistan has also been racked with internal turmoil since its crea-
tion and has in recent years been pushed into the process of steady
decline in state authority.10 Pakistan, having a history of alternating
between weak civilian governments and military autocracies, has failed
to develop any healthy political institutions, a lasting democracy, an
impartial judiciary, or a thriving economy, which does not bode well
for the long-term stability of the country.11 The factor of declining state
authority is especially relevant for the case of Pakistan, as the country is
highly volatile and the impact of extremist and terrorist groups is of the
highest level. Without adequate levels of state authority being projected
across all areas of the country, the state will remain a constant target of
these terrorist organisations. Within Pakistan nowhere has been more
out of control than the regions of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
These areas have essentially never been under any form of control from
the state, and consequently it is in these areas that we are now seeing
the highest levels of terrorist activity. FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
are outside the writ of the government and have their own semi-
political structures in place that are run by extremist factions.12 The
government has failed to adequately assert its dominance and influence
in these areas, thus resulting in the emergence of extremist groups who
are willing to provide the essentials that the citizens need. Swat is a key
example of the massive consequences that declining state authority can
have on a country. Swat, once the holiday destination for the wealthy
in Pakistan, has been taken over by extremist and terrorist militants and
has been turned into a sanctuary where they plan and carry out attacks
across Pakistan and into Afghanistan.
One of the main reasons as to why this situation in the tribal areas
has occurred is that the constitution of Pakistan has been neglected
by so many consecutive governments.13 The constitution of Pakistan
dictates the state authority, and the layout and distribution of legisla-
tive power between the central state and the outside provinces, yet
these formal guidelines have never really been applied by either the
civilian or military governments. This lack of governmental writ and
decades of in-fighting have fostered instability across the region, result-
ing in the overall level of authority declining significantly. This causes
a significant problem for Pakistan especially, as there are two possible
suitors that are only too willing to fill this gap. One scenario is that the
military once again steps in to take over the role of leader of the state
until what they deem to be a suitable government replacement can be
found. The other scenario is that the Islamic fundamentalist groups
who are spread throughout the country manage to take over or gain
more influence and completely destroy what little level of government
control and state authority is left, thus turning Pakistan into a collapsed
state (which would be much more unlikely to occur under the more
stable and structured military rule). Pakistan has had an extremely dif-
ficult time in trying to establish stable and effective political institutions
which can be directly linked to the ease at which terrorist organisations
have been able to infiltrate the country. Pakistan’s political institu-
tions, although functioning in areas, remain extremely limited in their
influence and ability to carry out the jobs necessary for the state to
develop.14 As a result of this the country has found itself becoming ever
more vulnerable to terrorist organisations and their influence, especially
in the border and tribal areas, where institutional capacity is almost at
zero percent in places.
In addition, the Pakistan military and the civilian government have
always had a somewhat tenuous relationship and this has not helped to
correct the underlying flaws of the political institutions. From the suc-
cessive military regimes that have weakened the political institutions,
to the corrupt civilian governments that have repeatedly provided
the incentive for military coups, it is no surprise that the citizens of
Pakistan have never been provided with any stable form of government.
According to Rashid, Pakistan’s inability to forge a national identity has
led to an intensification of ethnic, linguistic, and regional nationalism,
which has splintered and fragmented the country, and this has then
aided in the mismanagement and neglect of the institutions of the
country.15 Adding to this turmoil is the fact that political parties in
Pakistan have been accused on numerous occasions of corruption.
Pakistan’s political factions have found it extremely difficult to cooperate
with each other as well as to submit to the rule of law, and as a result
the country is far from developing a consistent form of government.16
The weakness of the political institutions in Pakistan is one of the main
reasons for the failure of democracy to take hold in Pakistan, which in
turn has allowed the military to step into power on numerous occasions
and overrule the political institutions in Pakistan. However, this was not
the only reason for the underlying weakness of both the state and the
political institutions in Pakistan.
Provinces such as North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, and
Bajaur have never been governed by traditional institutions, such as
a bureaucracy and judiciary, instead being governed by political officers.

Thus the people of these areas have little constitutional protection of
their rights.17 Because of this lack of institutional capacity, these areas
have become the ideal place for militant groups that seek to create a
caliphate from which to launch the global jihad to take root.18 Pakistan
is not likely to collapse entirely, but the overall ability of the govern-
ment to control the country has been called into question on numer-
ous occasions. Pakistan’s long-standing institutional structural flaws
need to be addressed if the current government is to try to suppress
the rising levels of militant violence that are currently sweeping the
country. It has been this governmental neglect that essentially enabled
the militants to establish a foothold in the tribal areas in the first place,
and unless the government can follow the army’s offensive with devel-
opment, infrastructure, jobs, and justice, extremist groups will always
thrive in the tribal areas.19
Pakistan has a long history of victimising, marginalising, and discrim-
inating against its religious, ethnic, and political minorities.20 The polit-
ical rivalries amongst these groups have, on numerous occasions, led to
violence and terrorism and are one of the main contributing factors to
national unrest and instability. The Punjabis’ power is concentrated in
the larger and more influential towns of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and
it is from here that the central government has developed. The areas
of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contain mainly Pashtun elements,
and provinces such as Baluchistan and Swat are made up of Sindhis,
Baluchis, and Mujahirs. Adding to this already simmering tension
are the Mujahirs from India, who amount to roughly seven million
people.21 The government has seemingly decided to neglect entirely the
political rights of these citizens in the tribal areas, instead letting them
develop their own ad hoc systems of government. The Afghan refugees
living in the border lands of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where
there is virtually no political influence or government control, are also
feeling the negative effects of this political marginalisation. This has
caused extreme levels of discontent and has been one of the most signif-
icant factors in the proliferation of terrorist acts. There is also the issue
of the underlying provincialism and ethnic rivalries which have contin-
ued to impede the process of national integration and which have aided
in the further marginalisation of the minorities in the country.
Even Islam, which is seen as being the key uniting force within
Pakistan, has proved to be insufficient to prevent the increasing levels
of violence relating to political marginalisation. The political process
has become stagnant, ideologically corrupt, and ineffective in the
eyes of certain elements of the community. The structure of the politi-

cal system and political parties has also had an impact on the levels of
violent activity within the country. Political parties in Pakistan have,
in general, been crippled by the regional and ethnic factors that over-
shadow the political scene in Pakistan.22 That may be why political
disenfranchisement has become a really significant issue especially in
Pakistan, and as a result regions such as FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
have become sanctuaries for sectarian and international terrorists and
centres of arms and drugs trade.23 The recent surge of violent activity
and terrorism that is emanating from South Waziristan, and which is
being carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), has been caused by
grievances against the state. It is interesting to note, however, that the
political grievances that are being used as propaganda by these terrorist
organisations are not always directly related to the politics and govern-
ment of Pakistan. There are numerous other elements that interact to
form the basis for terrorist activity, including social, health, and civil
rights grievances which are even more compelling for people to turn to
violence than are basic political grievances.
Tied to this is the fact that Pakistan’s Islamic ideology has been
developed through a somewhat evolutionary process, with the his-
torical experience of the country pre- and post-division being an
extremely fundamental dimension in the creation of the theoretical
development of the country. Pakistan has struggled to create some
form of functioning liberal democratic state on one hand, while
ensuring that it conforms as much as possible to Islamic orthodoxy
on the other.24 This focus on building an ideological state has caused
Pakistan to lag behind in almost all the areas that define a functional
modern state. However, the most detrimental issue to Pakistan in this
realm is focused on the ideological differences within the country,
specifically those tied to Islam and its interpretations. The current
situation in Pakistan has its origins in the views that were propagated
by some of the early politicians of the country, who argued that the
ideology of the country was to be Islam. This was to become particu-
larly evident in the case of the Zia regime. Pakistan was not created
in the name of Islam, but on the understanding that it would be a
haven for Muslims from the subcontinent to live peacefully according
to their varied practices, beliefs, and customs. What makes Pakistan
interesting in this situation is the fact that the basis of nationhood is
not territorial, racial, linguistic, or ethnic but is based solely on the
fact that they belong to the same faith: Islam. It has been this focus
on Islam, coupled with the fact that there is a lack of any other strong
legitimising identity, that has allowed Pakistan to become dominated

by violence and terrorism.25 This is also tied strongly to the process of
state formation of the state of Pakistan.
The understanding of the initial process of state formation is crucial
to understanding the development of countries and has important
consequences for a state’s future development. The inadequacies and
failures of some Asian Muslim states, most notably Pakistan, is assumed
to be linked to their shared unstable social and religious characteristics.
They are perceived as backwards due to tribal and religious affiliation
and the role that these play in fuelling extremism. Pakistan’s traumatic
birth, the impact of its division between East and West, the bloody
secession of Bangladesh, and its insecure boundaries have all changed
the idea of Pakistan as a unified nation-state with fixed boundaries and
shared identities.26 The geostrategic insecurities created by Pakistan’s
historically strained relations with India and Afghanistan have played a
key role in the evolution of the state. Most importantly, however, they
have also contributed to the militarisation of Pakistani politics. This
strongly security-orientated approach has been applied by the coun-
try’s ruling elite in its attempt to achieve political order, whereby the
state provides security and basic administration, and expects citizens to
accept its authority, without necessarily participating in governance. It
is this lack of participation which has, in part, caused Pakistan’s politi-
cal instability. Historically, Pakistan’s state formation process had been
guided by defence matters, with defence spending placing a tremendous
financial burden on Pakistan’s state of martial law, and accounting for
the largest part of the budget for decades. The underlying motives for
state growth in general have been dictated by the necessity to expand
the defence budget in order to match India’s military capacity. This
could lead to the argument that the basic law guiding Pakistan’s political
economy has been to be ready for war.27
Another significant relationship in Pakistan is that between Islam
and politics. The relationship that we see in Pakistan between Islam
and politics is not a recent or new phenomenon. The use of Islam to
mobilise the masses in terms of Pakistani unity up to independence
in 1947 was a successful but short-lived phenomenon. Since the mid-
1970s, Pakistani leaders have particularly drawn on Islam as a means
to challenge opponents and build electoral support and legitimacy for
their regimes. The effects of this are clearly visible in today’s Pakistan,
with religious extremism on the rise and certain sectors of the military
allegedly siding with extremist elements and home-grown Taliban.28
As a direct result of its violent and unstable process of state formation,
modern Pakistan today contains several key paradoxes which have a

detrimental impact on its stability: inefficient bureaucracies alongside
effective patronage networks; a principle of justice and protection for
all alongside the extraordinary accrual of power to some justified on
cultural and political grounds; and the claim to religiously inspired
modernity alongside complete intellectual and political capitulation to
groups like the Taliban and other religious and political groups.29
Political corruption has been an issue that has dominated Pakistani
politics for over 50 years, with four elected governments being dis-
missed and overthrown as a result of allegations of corruption and the
misuse of power.30 Corruption is a significant obstacle for development
in Pakistan and remains an issue that is both widespread and systemic
within the system. Corruption exists in many forms, with the following
being the most highly affected in Pakistan: police and law enforcement
agencies; judiciary and legal professionals; tax and customs; and health
and education.31 Against this unstable backdrop the political situation
in Pakistan has continued on its downward spiral. The abuses and high
levels of institutionalised corruption are wreaking havoc across the
country and are thus providing even more shelter for terrorist groups
to take refuge under. Over the last four decades, the levels of corruption
within the country have grown extremely rapidly. While the bureau-
cracy has overstepped its powers and parameters, the judiciary has con-
doned the wrongdoings of the army, which has had no qualms about
staging coups to overturn civilian dispensations. Many institutions
have relied on power wrongfully seized to frame rules that have brought
monetary advantages to their members, who have then resorted to
protecting corruption, as this has best suited their vested interests.32
Without these institutions functioning to their highest capacity, the
situation in Pakistan can never truly be resolved. The terrorist organisa-
tions that have flourished in Pakistan rely on the corrupt police forces
for protection, the corrupt judiciary to turn a blind eye to their actions;
and a corrupt government to provide them with the essential cover that
they need to survive.
The rule of law provides a state its legal backbone, and without that
backbone the country can no longer function adequately. Throughout
its history Pakistan’s rule of law has been used and abused by its many
leaders, from Zia to Bhutto, and from Sharif to Musharraf. Within
Pakistan the system of the rule of law is seen as merely being another
means of political control of the citizens, which leaves individuals
vulnerable to abuses from the state. This lack of rule of law has caused
much violent reaction from the citizens as well as allowing the
infiltration into the country of terrorist groups who thrive on the chaos
caused by these inadequate institutions. In order for an effective system
of rule of law to emerge, institutions such as the police and judiciary
must be accessible to all citizens. For Pakistan this had led to numerous
violent revolts throughout the country in relation to the issue of polic-
ing and the rule of law. This symbolises a change in the current situa-
tion in Pakistan which may be extremely beneficial to the underlying
current of violence, which is never too far from the surface. Once the
people feel that they are being treated fairly by the government, they
may lack the spark needed to ignite so many of the frustrations that
they feel, thus leading to a reduction in violent activity and terrorism.
For Pakistan, a nationalistic struggle for autonomy among its ethnic
groups has manifested itself through the use of Islam as the religious
basis for the entire country, which then created its national identity.33
Nationalism aims to bring together the nation under an all-encompassing
ideology, but this has proved to be almost impossible in Pakistan,
especially with all of its varying underlying ethnic nationalities. The
two forms of Islam, Sunni and Shia, both have completely differing
doctrinal beliefs. The 1990s were filled with mounting tensions and
ethnic clashes between the Sunni and Shia Muslims which resulted in
Pakistan being politically unstable.34 The provinces of Baluchistan and
Sindh are probably the most visible examples of a nationalistic struggle
for autonomy causing violence in Pakistan. Baluch nationalists have
clashed violently with the Pakistani government and army on numer-
ous occasions, beginning in 1947 right up to today. The province of
Sindh is also witnessing a surge of nationalistic tendencies. Sindh has
always been characterised by isolation from the central government of
Pakistan and has operated under a somewhat repressive and dominant
feudal system which varies greatly from that operating in the northern
regions. The main difference between the situation in Baluchistan and
Sindh is that the nationalist struggle in Sindh is based on the attach-
ment of the people from a number of different ethnic groups to the
land. As a result of their feelings of neglect from the government, these
two provinces have been in constant struggles for autonomy.
Also, the weakness that comes with the lack of government control
over these areas has left them open and vulnerable to infiltration by
terrorist organisations. Perhaps the most significant and dangerous
struggle for autonomy within Pakistan comes from the Pashtuns.
The Pashtuns are from the southern province of Afghanistan, called
Waziristan. The Pashtun culture is significantly different from that of
any other ethnic group in Pakistan: they emphasise the ideas of honour,
freedom, and bravery and only recognise the Pashtun authority, which
is collectively imposed by the community.35 Added to this is the fact
that Pakistan has been unable to successfully incorporate the Pashtun
into a unified nation-state due to the long-running border dispute
(Durand Line) between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even though almost
every area of concern for the survival of Pakistan is affected by national-
ism, the most significant issue in relation to the Pashtun community is
not in fact their nationalist struggle, but their direct link to Afghanistan
and the terrorist groups that inhabit the border regions.

Pakistan is in the middle of an economic crisis, with over 48 million
Pakistanis currently surviving on less than $2 dollars per day.36 The danger
for Pakistan in relation to poverty is that it is tied directly to the failing
education and healthcare systems. Those families that fall under the
poverty line in Pakistan are not able to send their children to state-run
schools. Instead, they are forced to send them to the madrassas schools,
which, in many cases, have been directly tied to the spread of religious
fundamentalism. The same issue arises with the healthcare system,
where these families are not able to gain access to state-run healthcare
and instead turn to those hospitals run by the extremist groups. This
growing level of poverty in Pakistan may be forcing people closer to the
terrorist groups that the government is trying to destroy. Pakistan is not
an equally divided nation and the areas that feel the most pressure from
poverty are the tribal areas, such as FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
which have always been the least wealthy of Pakistan’s provinces due to
the lack of government control there. This issue of poverty ties directly
into that of economic marginalisation and the two are quite similar in
their effects on the population. Therefore there may be some truth to
the theory that poverty aids in the development of and proliferation of
terrorism, but there are numerous more complex elements interacting
to produce terrorism, not just poverty. Even though the insurgency is
garnering more press time, the economic difficulties facing the coun-
try are also posing an immediate danger within both Pakistan and the
region as a whole. Unless there is an economic turnaround and the
standard of living of the average Pakistani improves, the public will
hold the government accountable, with unpredictable consequences.37
Pakistan has been in the grip of an economic, political, and security
crisis that shows no signs of abating any time soon. This, coupled with
a militancy and cross-border insurgency, is threatening to completely
topple the newly formed civilian government and challenges the overall
stability of the country. These threats are ongoing and if left unchecked
for too much longer could cause the country to fall completely into
state failure. The fragility of the current civilian government has been
highlighted by the lack of effective government institutions function-
ing in Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy as of 2008 was on the brink of disas-
ter, due mainly to extreme structural flaws coupled with the worsening
global financial situation and inefficient economic policies. Hagel and
Kerry, both US Senators, note that the ‘short-sighted economic policies
during the Musharraf era focused on consumption-led growth creating
unsustainable trade and fiscal deficits which worsened throughout 2008
and on into 2009’.38 The provinces of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
were dealing with crumbling schools, almost non-existent healthcare
systems, and a complete lack of any sound infrastructure, whereas areas
such as Islamabad and Rawalpindi were being funded for the creation
and development of new schools and hospitals. This divide remains in
place to this day, and has been the cause of many of the violent out-
bursts by Pakistani citizens, who feel that they have been completely
marginalised solely due to the region in which they live.
The wealth of the nation is found in those cities and towns closet
to the capital, and the further one moves from there the poorer the
people become. As a result of this, the people in these poorest areas
have become desperate and have time and time again turned to extrem-
ist and terrorist groups for fiscal support. The uneven distribution of
wealth in Pakistan has become an issue of detrimental importance for
the survival of the country. The Pakistani government’s actions in rela-
tion to this uneven distribution of wealth also have a lot to do with
the increasing levels of terrorism within a given territory. The Pakistani
government currently spends roughly 2 percent of its entire Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) on education and an even more worrying just
0.5 percent of GDP on healthcare, with the majority of the remainder
being filtered into the military. Once again it is the central cities, such as
Islamabad and Rawalpindi, that have seen the most fiscal benefit, while
the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and Baluchistan remain
extremely poor. If this process of economic marginalisation and the
uneven economic development does not stop, Pakistan is never going
to be able to rid itself of the terrorist threat. These terrorist and extrem-
ist groups are purposefully targeting such areas as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and FATA because these are the ones that are in most need of help. By
preventing them from developing both economically and politically,
the current government of Pakistan is doing just what the governments
before them have done – providing fuel to the terrorist fire.
Pakistan has, to some extent, been witness to a process of rapid

modernisation which took place following the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks. Once Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan,
Pakistan became the beneficiary of millions of US dollars in aid. These
funds were the catalyst for a period of economic modernisation in
Pakistan, but the process was not an even one. This disparity can be
seen in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh, and the tribal areas in
FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where little of the benefits from the
massive influx of funds into Pakistan were seen. Instead, the majority of
the money remained in the capital cities, as well as being used to fund
the Pakistani army. Therefore as minute parts of the country were flour-
ishing under the aid packages the majority of the provinces saw little if
nothing of the funds. This then resulted in increasing levels of violent
activity, political violence, and terrorism in many cases.
Since modernisation took place rapidly, it has had even more det-
rimental effects on social stability, dramatically widening the gaps
between individuals’ aspirations and their means of achieving their
dreams.39 The current downturn in Pakistan’s economic climate comes
on the heels of a quite prosperous era under Pervez Musharraf. Towards
the end of 2007 the legitimacy of the government was being called
into question and the rate of terrorist attacks began to rise. As the
government’s legitimacy and influence grew weaker, the economy also
began to wane, placing even more pressure on the already weak govern-
ment and thus causing a vicious circle of weakness. During the period
2004–2006, GDP levels in Pakistan averaged roughly 7 percent growth
along with an inflation level of 8 percent. By October 2008 inflation
had reached a staggering 25 percent. The value of the Pakistani rupee
also dropped more than 25 percent while the stock market dropped by
almost 40 percent.40 However, the short-term economic issues facing
Pakistan tell only part of the story of the development challenges facing
the current government. The longer the global economic crises lasts, the
more severe and dangerous the situation in Pakistan is going to become.
The country is already weak enough without having to deal with any
further fiscal challenges, and the weaker the country becomes the easier
it is for the terrorist groups to infiltrate, expand, and eventually control.

Pakistan is the prime example of the detrimental effects that a large gap
between rich and poor can have on a state. Pakistan’s population has
grown from just under 34 million in 1951 to almost 180 million people
in 2010, and is predicted to reach over 200 million by 2020. As a result
Pakistan is now the sixth most populous country in the world. A large
majority of Pakistan’s citizens are based along the border cities on the
Indus River, with Karachi being Pakistan’s most heavily populated city,
followed by Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Peshawar. Within Pakistan the
age demographics are skewed significantly to the 15–35 year old group
who make up almost 57 percent of the population, with the majority
of these being centred in the 20–30 year old category.41 This is followed
by the 0–14 year olds, who make up 35 percent of the population.
Finally, the 65 and over category makes up just 4.2 percent of the popu-
lation.42 This skewed demographic is significant in the case of Pakistan
because the target audience of the terrorist organisations is, in most
cases, those in the 15–35 age bracket. Adding to this is the alarming
rate of both unemployment and inflation, a result of which is the fact
that the people of Pakistan are essentially being forced into the arms of
extremists, who are providing healthcare, education, and social benefits
that the government is not. Pakistan’s diversity is most visible along
the cultural lines and less among its linguistic and religious ones. The
Punjabis are the largest ethnic group in Pakistan. There are other reli-
gious groups in Pakistan, such as Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs but
these make up a tiny percentage of the overall population.43 As a result
of their minority status, these groups have felt persecuted and have
been the target of numerous terrorist and religiously motivated attacks,
once again adding to the turmoil in the country.
Ethnically driven insurgencies have played a major role in the failure
or breakdown of numerous states across the globe. In the majority of
cases the reason behind such insurgencies erupting in the first place is
political and economic marginalisation. Baluchistan, for example, has
been in the throes of an ethnic conflict since 1948. Experts in the area
argue that the rise of secular conflicts in Pakistan is a direct result of the
expanding Islamisation process, as well as of the marginalisation of the
secular democratic forces within the country.44 This has emanated from
the fact that, over the years, both the civilian and military governments
have allowed the religious extremist organisations to flourish, even aid-
ing their expansion in certain instances. These underlying differences
in ethnic composition, religion, and wealth, as well as the underlying
cleavages in the country, have meant that Pakistan has never really had
a chance to become a strong nation. In fact, following the events of
September 11, 2001, they have in fact weakened the state even further.
Without adequate attention from the government of Pakistan, these
issues are going to continue to fester until they reach, once again,
violent proportions.
In essence, these issues are providing the terrorist and insurgent groups
active in Pakistan with the distractions needed for them to take root even
further in the country, as well as providing them with the recruits they
need to carry out their attacks. If provided with the necessary educa-
tion, infrastructure, and opportunities, Pakistan’s increasingly urban and
youthful population can make a significant contribution to the econ-
omy and eventually also to a broad process of democratisation, through
a growing awareness of citizen’s rights and legitimate expectations of the
state. However, if they are not absorbed into the economy, there is a risk
that they may become disaffected and even vulnerable to recruitment by
both sectarian and religious extremists.45 For Pakistan, the conditions for
the growth of a violent culture have been in existence since the bloody
creation of the state; but it was the jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan
that really triggered the expansion of violence in the Pakistani culture.
The proliferation of violence is one of the most serious social problems
in Pakistan, a fact which is still valid for Pakistan today.46 The constant
change in the political field in Pakistan has had a massively negative
impact on Pakistani culture, pushing it closer to violence and extrem-
ism. The shift between military and civilian rule in Pakistan has histori-
cally led to periods of extended violence and chaos, which feeds into the
psyche of the people; the violence then becomes entrenched in society
and over time becomes the norm. The citizens, in turn, see violence as
a valid option for dealing with any issues that they may have in the
political and social context, and therefore the cycle of violence becomes
normal routine in the society at large.47
As well as that, the madrassas system in Pakistan, which in many
areas remains outside the realm of government control, is also pro-
viding the setting for the growth of a violent culture. Many of these
schools have become radicalised over time and are producing a large
number of young men who have become indoctrinated into a radical
form of Islam. This radicalisation is adding to the overall culture of
violence as these students do not see the negative side of using violence
to solve problems, since they see Islam as being a justification for the
use of violence to reach a political/social/economic goal. This religious
schooling, which is promoting radicalisation and extremism, coupled
with the unstable political situation and the history of the Pakistani
government using violence against its citizens, has left an indelible
mark on Pakistani society and culture. The culture of violence is having
a massive negative impact on both the stability of the Pakistani state
and the proliferation of terrorism. Interestingly, even though there
existed a culture of violence in Pakistan prior to the 9/11 attacks, its
growth has been massively triggered by outside influences, namely the

US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq are providing the source material necessary to extremist and
terrorist groups within Pakistan to extend the culture of violence among
a citizenry that has become increasingly anti-American and pro-jihad,
especially in the border regions of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

There have been several common grievances that have caused the out-
break and proliferation of terrorism over the years, prominent among
those being occupation by a foreign power or foreign intervention.
Foreign intervention in Pakistan has been one of the most conten-
tious issues, not only for the government but also for the people. The
relationship between the US and Pakistan was formed with the negotia-
tion of a mutual defence assistance agreement in 1954, which emerged
mainly due to the concerns of the US in reference to Soviet Union
expansion and Pakistan’s need for security from the threat from India.48
The relationship between Pakistan and India has been constantly
shifting, with the two being more relaxed in terms of their political
relationship at times to being hostile foes over the years. The first sign
of a cooling of the relationship occurred following the Indo-Pakistani
wars of 1965 and 1971.49 During this time the perception was formed
among the Pakistani people that the US was an ally that could not be
trusted, a perception which has lasted to this day. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan marked another significant turning point in this relation-
ship, and once again Pakistan was seen as being a valuable ally to the
US. It had become a key transit country for arms to the Afghan resist-
ance movement. However, it was the relationship after the 9/11 attacks
that was to be the greatest challenge for the two nations. The Pakistani
government, under Musharraf, was forced to make a choice – either
support the US in its ‘war on terror’ or become one of the enemies. This
caused a significant backlash against the US, which was seen as using
bully tactics against Pakistan in order to get what it wanted.
The US’s almost forceful appeals for Pakistan to become a direct ally
in the war on terror has been cited by many terrorist groups as a reason
not to trust the US. The most important issue, however, has been the
issue of US drone attacks within Pakistan’s borders. Pakistan has vehe-
mently opposed the expanded US plan for unmanned drone attacks
against militants in its tribal areas, where it is believed Afghan Taliban
leaders are in hiding. The missile strikes from these drones have created
fierce anti-American sentiment across Pakistan. Baluchistan has been
especially hard hit by these attacks in the past year. To date, these drone
attacks have been limited to Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas on the bor-
der with Afghanistan, which are being used as sanctuaries for al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. These attacks have actually proven to be a double
edged sword for the US with regard to their success. One the one hand,
they have successfully killed some of the most prominent militants,
including Abu Laith al-libi, a senior level member of al-Qaeda, and Abu
Khabab al-Masri, a nuclear weapons expert. One the other hand, how-
ever, they have also resulted in civilian deaths and mass destruction,
which has outraged the citizens. The attacks not only fuel the militancy
but also undermine the government’s effort in the counterinsurgency
process. The military operations in the tribal areas have triggered out-
rage, disgust, and anger amongst the people there. The drone attacks
have also resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, an issue
which the Pakistani government is not able to deal with efficiently at
the moment, thus adding to the overall levels of instability.
These attacks are not paying off on either side. Although they are
killing some of the most dangerous men in the world, they are leav-
ing behind a trail of civilian deaths that are causing mass protests and
distrust against the US. In essence the US is losing the battle for hearts
and minds in Pakistan and may in fact be playing into the hands of the
same terrorist groups that they are trying to destroy. There is a debate
as to whether these acts themselves can be classified as being terrorist
in nature, as they are, in a number of cases, resulting in the deaths of
civilians and not any terrorist group members. From the western per-
spective the use of these drones and the civilian deaths are often times
seen in terms of collateral damage and not as acts of terrorism, yet from
the perspective of those being targeted and affected by them, the acts
could be described as being terrorist in nature. It is extremely difficult to
classify these acts and this may need to be addressed in further debates
on the topic.
Also having a massive impact on the stability of the country is the
fact that Pakistan and India have been rivals since the separation of the
British Indian subcontinent in 1947. At this time the Indian subconti-
nent was partitioned into the Hindu-dominated India and the newly
formed Muslim state of Pakistan. Almost immediately following this
partition there were riots and a massive population movement which
resulted in over half a million people being killed and one million
becoming homeless.50 Since then the areas of Kashmir and Jammu
have remained a key source of dispute between Pakistan and India. For
almost 70 years now bilateral relations between Pakistan and India have
been dominated by the Kashmir issue, leading to suspicion, conflict,

violence, and war. The causes of the tensions between Pakistan and
India are deeply rooted in their historical contexts. The Kashmir issue
has resulted in two wars (1947 and 1965) and a border conflict (Kargil
1999), and has also led to an increase in terrorist and extremist attacks,
especially over the last decade. Pakistan and India first went to war in
October 1947, the cause of which was the move by Pakistan to back an
insurgency in Kashmir. The war lasted until January 1, 1949, when a
ceasefire line was established, but the status of the territory remained
unsolved. In April 1965, following clashes between border patrols on
both sides of the border, and the launch of a covert offensive across
the ceasefire line by Pakistan into the Indian-administered sections of
Kashmir and Jammu, another war began. This war lasted for three weeks
before both sides agreed to desist under a UN-sponsored ceasefire.
By 1971 Indo-Pakistani relations had deteriorated even further,
with the eruption of a civil war in Pakistan. This civil war pitted East
Pakistan against West Pakistan, with India situated in the middle of the
two areas. India invaded Pakistan in support of its people after almost
ten million civilians fled East Pakistan across the border. The Pakistani
army surrendered and on December 6, 1971, East Pakistan became the
independent country of Bangladesh. In relation to Kashmir and Jammu,
both sides agreed to recognise the ceasefire line. By 1989 the Kashmir
issue had once again flared up and this time an armed resistance broke
out against Indian rule in the Kashmir valley. The Kashmir issue has also
been one of the most important factors in terms of creating state insta-
bility, mainly due to the immense drain on state resources (for example
extreme military spending). From the Pakistani perspective, not much
has changed in that it still argues that the former states of Jammu and
Kashmir are disputed territories and that India is thus illegally occupy-
ing them. The only acceptable solution to the issue would be through a
UN-mandated ‘free and impartial plebiscite’, which would result in the
Kashmiris having the right to choose between Pakistan and India.51 As
a result, to this day Pakistan sees the threat from India as being more
important to the welfare and security of the state than that from ter-
rorism and internal instability. Of the almost $12 billion that Pakistan
has received from the US since its agreement to join the ‘war on terror’,
the majority has been used to fund the army, which is still based along
the Pakistan–India border, as well as other areas of military spending
such as weapons, ammunition, and training of soldiers.52 This constant
threat from India has led the government of Pakistan to neglect its role
as provider of political, social, and economic goods to its citizens, which
has led to increased instability within its borders. This, in turn, has
allowed the country to fall into a weakened state, thus leading to easier
access by terrorist groups.
Historically, there have been numerous attempts to try to address
the issue. During the 1990s, for example, the governments of Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both engaged with India in talks surrounding
the Kashmir issue in an extremely constructive manner. However, the
military were unwilling to support this and acted to stymie all further
talks. Bhutto, during the first government, tried to normalise relations
with India, yet the military chose to support Pakistan-based Kashmir-
orientated groups, which meant that Bhutto’s hard work was to be in
vain. A similar situation took place under the leadership of Sharif, who,
with the signing of the Lahore Agreement, made some of the most
significant steps towards normalising relations with India. Once again,
however, the military acted against these progressive measures. In a
more modern context, under the leadership of Musharraf, Kashmir once
again acted as the pivot point, which almost led to war. The Musharraf
regime essentially took a very hard line approach to the Kashmir issue,
refusing to renounce Pakistan’s territorial claims over Kashmir, reject-
ing Kashmir’s status under the Indian constitution and continuing to
support India-oriented jihadi groups.53 This fear and loathing is not
just one-sided: within India suspicions of Pakistani intentions remain
extremely high, even in the face of progressive talks. This has been
highlighted by the fact that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has prioritised political talks with a direct terrorist or security focus
over all other aspects of the peace talks. The Pakistani government has
shown that it is more than willing to engage with India diplomatically
and politically and has also shown that is willing to realistically address
the issue of Kashmir.
In March 2011, the PPP-led government resumed negotiations and
peace talks with India. Departing from the traditional Pakistani position,
the government no longer insisted on linking Pakistan–India relations
directly with the Kashmir issue, which is central to the years of hostil-
ity, conflict, and war between the two nations. Additionally, India has
taken the step of refraining from publicly countering the advances made
by the Pakistani government in terms of their efforts to restrain and
constrain the India-oriented jihadi groups; in particular, the Lashkar-
e-Tayyaba (LeT). While these progressive views are being built on and
extended through foreign policy on both sides, there are, however, still
challenges emanating from those more hard-line extremist elements that
refuse to allay their suspicions of one another. It has been argued that
Pakistan must place more of its efforts towards countering the anti-India
oriented military-backed extremist groups, including the LeT and Jaish-
e-Mohammad. Adding to this is the fact that Pakistan’s military remains
hostile towards India and continues to support groups such as the
Pakistan Defence Council (PDC).54 This is going to remain a challenge for
both the Pakistani and Indian governments long into the future.
Summary
Pakistan remains one of the central figures in the ongoing battle against
extremism and terrorism, yet it remains one of the most significant
terrorist hotspots in the world today. Its territory continues to pro-
vide terrorist and extremist organisations with a safe haven and there
remain questions surrounding the government’s overall effectiveness
and willingness to actively target these groups. Pakistan’s willingness to
involve itself in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions has
been seriously called into question following the May 1, 2011 capture
and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, a city just 35 miles
from the capital Islamabad. The level of terrorist activity within the
Pakistani state continues to increase and is causing massive damage to
the legitimacy of the government. It is also causing increasing levels of
anti-American sentiment, which has increased even more rapidly with
the current US policy of using drone attacks on the Afghan–Pakistan
border regions. The situation in Pakistan is volatile at best and unless
certain underlying issues within the state are addressed, the situation
will continue to disintegrate even further. This would be detrimental
not only to the national interests of the US with regard to battling ter-
rorism, but also to the stability of the region at large. In the context of
Pakistan, this chapter has highlighted the fact that the combination of
regime type, corruption, conflict with neighbouring states, the exist-
ence of safe havens, an open pool of recruits, and porous borders has
had the most detrimental impact on the evolution of the Pakistani state
and on the situation there today. The significance of these findings may
be used in the future to develop policies which target Pakistan in rela-
tion to both its stability as a nation-state and its role in addressing ter-
rorism. However, without adequately addressing these underlying issues
there remains little hope that Pakistan can develop into a strong state
that is capable of dealing with the terrorist threat without the presence
or influence of the US. In fact, it seems likely that, for the foreseeable
future, Pakistan will remain one of the most prolific producers of and
havens for terrorist and other extremist organisations.
7
Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,
Since its creation in 1920 through to the 2003 invasion by the US, the
history of Iraq has been a complex and violent one. Chronic political insta-
bility and major internal divisions, being ethnic, sectarian, economic,
and inter-tribal in nature, emerged very early in development of the
Iraqi state. The abuse of power by Iraq’s leaders was also evident in the
early stages of the state’s development, which meant that the country
was essentially founded on corruption, dishonesty, and the abuse of
power. However, it was to be the era of republican rule in Iraq that
would produce the system of politics that became hostage to the will
of the leaders, creating ‘a strictly hierarchical power pyramid’ system
that would remain in place until the collapse of the Saddam Hussein
regime in 2003.1 The historical background section will be broken into
three specific sections or eras: the pre-Saddam Hussein Era, the Saddam
Hussein era, and the US-invasion and post-Saddam era.
The pre-Saddam Hussein era
The modern state of Iraq was created when Britain invaded the areas
around Basra and Baghdad following the outbreak of the First World War.
In 1921 Britain imposed a colonial monarchy on the area and placed a
Syrian Sunni, Faysal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashem, in control as King
of Iraq.2 At the time of Faysal’s rise to power, the population of Iraq was
roughly 2.5–3 million people, and even at this early stage the people
were deeply divided along religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and
tribal lines. From the outset, the government in Iraq became dominated
by the minority Sunnis, a fact which further provoked tensions between
the Sunni and Shia Muslims. The ethnic composition at that time was
quite similar to Iraq today, with approximately 55 percent being Arab
130
Iraq Context – Part 1 131
Shia, inhabiting the regions south of Baghdad; 20 percent being Arab

Sunnis, occupying the areas north of Baghdad; 20 percent being Sunni
Kurds in the northern part of the country along the Turkish and Iranian
borders; and the balance being made up of various Christian sects, Jews,
Yazidis, Mandaeans, and others.3 By 1932 Iraq had gained its formal
independence and was officially admitted to the League of Nations as a
sovereign state. The eventual overthrow of the British monarchy took
the form of a military coup d’état in July 14, 1958, which brought an end
to the first phase in the tumultuous history of Iraq. The coup was car-
ried out by a number of diverse groups under the control and leadership
of Abd al-Salam Arif’ and Abd al-Karim Qasim.4 By late 1958, power lay
with Qasim, and under the new constitution he was to hold the posi-
tions of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief
of Iraq. There was popular approval and expressions of confidence in the
new regime and in Qasim himself, which was rare in Iraqi society, but
beneath the surface tensions and differences were emerging. The clear-
est of these was the expression of this disunity being the growing rift
between Qasim and ‘Arif, which took the form of a struggle for supreme
power. As a result of this power struggle, ‘Arif was officially relieved of
his political functions on September 30, 1958 and Iraq was plagued with
constant instability from 1958 to 1980.5
During this time four successful military coups took place, along
with eight failed ones, and there were 15 others that were uncovered
before they could be implemented.6 On October 7, 1959, the second
of the coup attempts led by pan-Arab Free Officers took place and was
swiftly followed be a massive a rally in Mosul. Violence soon engulfed
the city, with ‘Kurds fighting Arabs, Christians fighting Muslims, and
Arab clans fighting other Arab clans’, a trait that would remain in Iraqi
society until today.7 This coup was quickly defeated and it was not
until the third coup attempt, on February 9, 1963, led by a coalition of
Ba’athists and Nasserites under the leadership of Colonel Abd al-Salam
‘Arif, that Qasim was removed from power and subsequently killed. As a
result of this coup, the Ba’athists and pan-Arabs gained control of Iraq,
but almost immediately the situation deteriorated rapidly, with both
sides having extremely differing views of how the state should be run
and about the future of Iraq. ‘Arif’s main focus, once in power, was to
maintain his status as leader of the country. In doing so he knowingly
neglected the country, paying little attention to the wider economic
and social problems of Iraq, leading to widespread political strife and
economic and social breakdown. On many levels ‘Arif’s regime, and
later that of his brother, was a typical form of military rule backed by
a myriad of Arab nationalist groups. The ‘Arif brothers ruled for five
years and were notable more for their failures than for their accomplish-
ments. The first ‘Arif regime never managed to achieve stability in Iraq
and divisions within the leadership became even more deeply evident
after the death of ‘Arif and the rise to power of his brother.
Neither of the ‘Arifs, however, had managed to create any form of
institutional base for their rule outside of the armed forces and, as a
result, the social and political foundations of the state remained weak
and continued to be vulnerable to threats from disaffected groups (espe-
cially those from within the military).8 The political situation in Iraq
remained on this knife-edge, with each side refusing to compromise
with the other, lasting until July 30, 1968, when, following the seizure
of key government buildings in the capital Baghdad in another coup,
the Ba’athists returned to power. Just a few days after securing their hold,
the Ba’ath had established a full monopoly of power in Iraq and on July
18, 1968 Ahmand Hasna al-Bakr was formally proclaimed President.
During the course of the first two years of his rule, al-Bakr became
devoted to imposing Ba’athist rule on the country, and to ensuring that
all political opposition was destroyed. The ruling Ba’ath regime set out
to turn Iraq into a totalitarian state. This was not a new phenomenon in
the Iraqi system, and there had been a growing trend towards this form
of leadership in Iraq well before the Ba’ath seizure of power.9 During this
time corruption and the abuse of power by the ruling elite became com-
monplace, which would have lasting effects on Iraq’s political realm.
Each of the previous rulers of Iraq had made subtle and not so subtle
changes to policy that allowed a person like Saddam Hussein to become
a dictator with relative ease. The rise of Saddam Hussein was, therefore,
the result of a transformation, on the social level, that was more than
several decades in the making. Saddam Hussein’s rapid rise to power was
not out of place in the history of Iraq and many of the methods Hussein
used, such as excessive violence, of terror tactics, and the influence of
propaganda, had already been prefigured in all of the previous regimes.
Saddam’s rise was, in fact, highly typical of the characteristics of the
Iraqi state itself and was a result of a particular narrative in the history of
the Iraqi state, one in which ‘exclusivity, communal mistrust, patronage
and the exemplary use of violence were the main elements’.10
The Saddam Hussein era (1979–2003)
On July 16, 1979, al-Bakr formally announced his resignation due

to the increasing pressure from Saddam Hussein, and as a result
Saddam Hussein was sworn in as President, with ‘Izzat al-Duri being

appointed vice-president. Almost immediately Saddam began to insert
the control of the Ba’ath Party into every sphere of life in Iraq and
every organ of state power, including the military, soon came under
his direct control. Saddam quickly made it apparent that there would
be no toleration of opposition to his regime, implementing the use of
militia groups, mass arrests, and public hangings of opposition party
leaders and members. Under Saddam the Iraqi state was transformed
into what has been termed a ‘dual state’, where, on one side, there
was the bureaucracy of government and all other necessary organisa-
tions to form the public state of Iraq, and on the other there was the
‘shadow’ state, where the real nexus of power of the Iraqi government
was based.11 This shadow state was composed of a series of organisa-
tions, networks, and patronised clients who were directly serving
the president. However, it must be noted that even though Saddam
Hussein’s rule was based on terror and dominance, his rule was not
always negative and there can be little doubt of the significant eco-
nomic, social, and political reforms that took place under his leader-
ship. Apart from the complete control that Saddam Hussein had over
every aspect of life in Iraq, it was his use of violence and terror that
had the most significant effect on the people of Iraq, in essence creat-
ing a state of fear. The following are some of the most brutal events
that took place under Saddam’s rule:
1. Political oppression: July 1978 decree: any persons whose ideas

conflicted with those of the Ba’ath Party were subject to immediate
execution; Kurds and Shia were the main targets
2. Ethnic cleansing: Complete extermination of Kurds was one of the
administration’s highest priorities
3. Religious persecution: Ba’ath Party dominated by Sunni Muslims
(one-third of entire population). Promoted marginalisation of Shia
and purge of Iranian influence
4. Dujail massacre 1982: the July 1982 assassination attempt on Saddam
Hussein resulted in slaughter of 148 Shi’ites, including children
5. Barzani clan abductions 1983: Head of Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) Masoud Barzani fighting Ba’athist oppression. Saddam Hussein
ordered abduction and murder of 8,000 members of Barzani’s clan
6. Al-Anfal campaign 1986–1989: Genocide campaign – extermination
of ‘every living thing’ in Kurdish north. Approximately 182,000
people slaughtered. Halabja poison gas massacre 1988 killed 5,000
people
7. Campaign against Marsh Arabs: Shi’ite Marsh Arabs targeted by

Hussein through destruction of 95 percent of marshes, which
depleted food supply. Reduction of population from 250,000 to
approximately 30,000
8. Post-uprising massacres 1991: Aftermath of Operation Desert Storm –
US encouraged rebellion against Hussein regime. Resulted in as many
as 2,000 killings of Kurdish rebels every day12
Even though these events would have a significant impact on the future
of Iraq, it was the Iran/Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait, followed
by the UN-implemented sanctions regime that would have some of the
most detrimental effects of Iraq, pushing the already fragile state closer
to failure. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, it appeared
that the conditions were ripe for outside intervention by Iraq into the
now-weakened Iran. In June 1979 the first cross-border skirmishes took
place, involving an Iraqi air raid on the Iranian border which killed
six people. In 1980, at a meeting of the National Assembly, Saddam
announced the abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Saddam
Hussein saw this as an opportunity to strike against Iran and shift the
balance of power in the region towards Iraq, but this turned out to be a
catastrophic miscalculation on Saddam’s part. On September 22, 1980
Saddam ordered a set of pre-emptive attacks on Iran’s military airfields
by an aerial bombardment, which was quickly followed by a direct inva-
sion of Iranian territory.13 In the first few months of the war, it appeared
that Iraq was the dominant side, but by the end of March 1981, the
Iranian side had begun to retaliate with force and by September 1981
had managed to drive the Iraqis back from their main hold in Abadan.
The Iranians had also inflicted heavy damage on Iraqi oil and industrial
installations in Basra and by March 1982, had begun a major offensive
which resulted in the recapture of Khorramshahr.14 During this time,
an estimated 40,000 Iraqi troops were taken prisoner.15 By autumn of
that year, most of the fighting had moved across the border onto Iraqi
territory and by June the Iranians had penetrated Basra.
The Iran/Iraq war lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980
until the ceasefire on August 20, 1988.16 The aftermath of the Iraq/
Iran War was disastrous for both sides. The financial burden on the
Iraqi state was enormous and by August 1983 Iraq’s foreign reserves has
fallen to $3 billion (down from $30 billion at the end of 1980). As well
as that, the country was almost entirely dependent on handouts from
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The eight years of war crippled the develop-
ment of the nation’s economy, infrastructure, education, and healthcare
systems and pushed the Iraqi state closer towards complete failure. The
overall cost in both human and material losses took a massive toll on
Iraqi society and the economic costs of the war were staggering. Western
sources estimated that nearly 400,000 people had died (roughly a quar-
ter Iraqi and three-quarters Iranian), an additional 750,000 people had
been wounded, and that the total cost of war was $452.6 billion for Iraq
and $644.3 billion for Iran.17 One of the most significant consequences
of the war with regard to the stability of the Iraq state was that a foreign
debt of over $100 billion had been amassed; a debt level so staggering
that it left the country teetering on complete bankruptcy. By the mid-
1980s, Iraq had re-established full diplomatic relations with the US,
and was also benefiting from the material support of a range of Western
states, most notably France and the UK.18
Less than two years after the Iran/Iraq war, Iraq was once again fac-
ing another war; this time with Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops
moved into Kuwait and within a few hours were in control of the
country. This invasion caused an immediate backlash from both the
Arab League and the UN. As a response to the invasion, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990 which banned all
imports and exports, allowing only medical supplies to the imported
without restrictions, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.19
A total economic and trade embargo was also placed on Iraq and its oil
export pipelines were cut off. This resolution imposed multilateral sanc-
tions on Iraq which would prove to be the most severe and devastating
ever to be imposed on any country in the world. In November 1990 the
UN passed Resolution 678, which demanded the unconditional with-
drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a resolution which authorised the
use of military force if Iraq failed to comply. However, Saddam refused
to withdraw troops and on January 16, 1991, the allied forces attacked
Iraq and subjected it to a devastating six-week aerial bombardment,
followed by the engagement of ground troops. Due to the devastation
caused by the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq was not capable to defend against such
an attack, and by February 24, 1991 Kuwait had been liberated follow-
ing a series of air bombardments and a ground campaign. Over two-
thirds of the Iraqi army had been destroyed and a further 90,000 troops
had been captured.20 A ceasefire was signed on February 28, 1991, but
this was just the beginning of a long and devastating process of sanc-
tions which would cripple the Iraqi state.
The invasion and the war resulted in at least 100,000 deaths among
both the military and the civilian population and some 300,000
wounded, with as many as 2.5 million people being displaced and over
$170 billion in property and infrastructural damage being caused in

Iraq.21 Essentially, Iraq’s infrastructure, including electric power sta-
tions, sewage plants, and water treatment facilities, was almost com-
pletely destroyed.22 Within a relatively short time, the effects of these
enforced shortages were being felt by the Iraqi population, as malnutri-
tion and disease took their toll, causing infant mortality rates to rise
to levels not seen in Iraq for over 40 years. As a direct result of the
sanctions regime, Iraqi citizens went from First World to Third World
status at a staggering speed.23 In order to fully comprehend the impact
of the sanctions, they need to be broken down into the four distinct
phases: the embargo which the UNSC imposed on Iraq following the
invasion of Kuwait; the six-week Gulf War of 1991; the further sanctions
regime under Resolution 687; and the sanctions under the oil-for-food
program. Table 7.1 provides an overview of each of these four phases,
It soon became clear that the effects of the oil-for-food programme were
not as significant as has been hoped and, although it did provide some
relief to the country, it did little to address the underlying conditions
Table 7.1 Sanctions regimes in Iraq
The UNSC embargo UNSC Resolution 661 – created a set

August 1990–April 1991 of conditions which virtually cut Iraq
off from the world economy. Included
a ban on all trade, an oil embargo, a
freezing of Iraqi government financial
assets abroad, an arms embargo,
suspension of international flights, and
a ban on financial transactions.
The air war and the economy January 16, 1991 – start of six-week
Desert Storm campaign, which
culminated in the eviction of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait by the end of February.
The first oil-for-food programme Need for funds to finance UN
operations in Iraq and provide financial
resources to the UN Compensation
Fund prompted UNSC to authorise
export of $1.6 billion of oil over a six
month-period.
Oil-for-food under Resolution 986 Resolution 986 allowing Iraq to sell $2
billion worth of oil every six months.
However, Iraqi government decided to
reject Resolution 986, thus plunging
economy even deeper into crisis.
Source: Alnasrawi.24
affecting the country. In 1998, UNICEF published an independent

report on the impact of sanctions, which highlighted the dire situation
that was emerging in Iraq following the implementation of these sanc-
tions. The most significant were those that targeted the foodstuff and
medicines entering Iraq. This would cause malnutrition on a massive
scale across Iraq and would also result in a rapid increase in the levels of
both adult and child mortality. One of the most controversial impacts of
the sanctions regime on Iraq was the fact that it actually strengthened
the grip of the Saddam regime over the population. Saddam and his
dominant leadership role essentially caused the sanctions programme
to backfire against the UNSC by the use of a rationing system of the
aid. The sanctions programme also hampered any destabilisation of
Hussein’s government and instead allowed the leader to reinforce his
hold on power.25 The rationing system served as both a political weapon
which gave the leader the opportunity to manipulate large sectors of the
population and as a constant reminder of the population’s dependence
on the Iraqi state.
As well as providing Saddam with an outlet for regaining his control
over the country, the sanctions programme also resulted in the elimina-
tion of the social forces necessary to destabilise the government, thus
further entrenching Saddam’s status. These sanctions would remain in
place, in one form or another, until 2003. For the majority of his reign,
Saddam Hussein’s regime was in a constant state of decay. In order to
bolster his authority, Saddam, like the majority of Iraq’s leaders before
him, tried to deflect attention away from Iraq’s numerous problems
instead of trying to remedy them. The US-led invasion in 2003 pushed
the country over the brink into government disintegration and com-
pletely fractured the state. As a result of the invasion, Saddam Hussein
removed himself from the country’s already fragile political system and
social institutions collapsed; a power vacuum emerged which was left
unfilled for too long; the professional classes left, causing a massive
brain-drain; millions of people were internally displaced; and sectarian
rivalries plunged the country into a well-organised terrorist campaign,
an evolving insurgency, and a vicious civil war. Following the invasion,
Iraq was essentially left as a shell of a state.
US invasion and post-Saddam Iraq
By April 2003, through the combination of war, sanctions, and rampant

criminality, the Iraqi state was on the verge of collapse.26 Upon enter-
ing Iraq, the US was severely unprepared for the economic, political,
social, and cultural conditions that it faced. In the first year of the US
occupation, Iraq’s political institutions and state infrastructure were
almost completely destroyed, one of the main causes being that there
were not enough adequate plans in place to handle the situation that
arose following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime.27 The real
problem, however, was the fact that the Bush administration did not
want to fully engage in a large-scale peacekeeping/nation-building exer-
cise. As a result, when the Saddam Hussein regime collapsed a vacuum
emerged, which was exacerbated even further by the subsequent US
decision to dismantle the Iraqi military, police, and more generally state
institutions. The lack of control enforced by the foreign troops in pre-
venting the spread of looting and organised crime added to the growing
perception among the Iraqis that they were in no way in control of the
situation. This lack of confidence in the US forces helped turn a three-
week long looting rampage into an organised and politically motivated
insurgency.28 With regard to the Iraqi case, the term ‘insurgency’ will
be understood as being an organised rebellion which is aimed at over-
throwing a constituted or provisional government through the use of
subversion and armed conflict. This may or may not involve the use of
tactics such as bombings.
In the context of Iraq, then, this was an extremely interesting event
whereby the terrorist campaign continued alongside the fledgling insur-
gency, thus making it extremely difficult in the majority of instances to
differentiate between the two. The events in Fallujah are seen as being
the flashpoint or creation point of the insurgency, in other words trig-
gering a separate entity from that of the terrorist campaign. On April 28,
2003, following some minor demonstrations against the occupation of
local schools and municipal buildings by US forces, violence and acts of
terrorism erupted, resulting in the deaths of 15 people and the wound-
ing of a further 65.29 Soon after, a second protest resulted in the deaths of
three Iraqi civilians and the wounding of 17 US troops. These two events
were to become key motives for the expansion of terrorist attacks against
US forces, as well as for the proliferation of the growing insurgency into
cities and towns bordering Fallujah along the Euphrates River. The situa-
tion was compounded even further by the actions that took place under
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the newly appointed vice-
roy to Iraq, Paul Bremer III. On June 17, 2003 the CPA announced that
the Iraqi armed forces in their entirety were to be dissolved. It was also
announced that a process of de-Ba’athification was to be implemented,
with the aim of ridding Iraq of all the ideological, political, and security
excesses that had been incurred under the 35 years of Ba’athist rule in
Iraq.30 These edicts resulted in upwards of 300,000 Iraqi men becoming

unemployed immediately, as well as removing from the already strained
government ministries 30,000 of its most experienced administrators.31
Many of those who were now unemployed, and who had military
experience, soon gravitated to either the terrorist organisations or the
insurgency as a source of financial support and as a source to vent their
frustrations against the newly formed government. This resulted in the
insurgency not only expanding rapidly, but also taking on a more disci-
plined form. By the time of the capture of Saddam Hussein on December
13, 2003, the insurgency had taken on a much more fragmented shape,
separate from that of the terrorist campaign, and the targets took on a
more sectarian aspect. By autumn 2003, the US lacked any significant
form of political legitimacy that it could have projected in areas such
as Baghdad, which, combined with the rising levels of terrorist violence
across the country, forced a change of policy from the US to try to quell
the growing frustrations of the Iraqi people. The option of ending the
occupation, disbanding the CPA, and transferring sovereignty to a new
Iraqi government was put in place, with the hope that it would provide
a more stable situation on the ground. On November 12, 2003 President
George Bush announced that the US would be transferring sovereignty
to Iraq, and on June 28, 2004 the CPA officially handed power over to
the Iraqi Interim Government, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
and President Sheik Ghazi al-Yawer.32 However, this transfer of power
resulted not in increased stability, but in the intensification of the insur-
gency. By mid-2004 the insurgency had gained mass appeal across Iraq
(with the exception of the Kurdish areas in the north and a minority
area of the Shia south). Of Iraq’s 18 provinces, four were most severely
affected by terrorist violence and instability, namely Baghdad, Anbar,
Diyala, and Salah ad Din. The terrorist violence in these four key areas
took a number of different forms.
In Baghdad the violence was largely seen to be carried out between
Sunni and Shia sects, whereas in Anbar the violence was attributable to
the Sunni insurgency and to al-Qaeda. In Kirkuk, the ongoing struggle
between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen was the main source of violence,
whereas in Basra and the south the violence largely took the form of an
intra-Shia power struggle.33 Amidst the chaos of the insurgency and the
rising levels of terrorist and insurgent violence, the task of forming a new
Iraqi government continued. There were two elections that took place
in 2005, aimed at being the critical turning point in Iraq’s post-regime
transition. The first took place in January and the other in December,
as well as a constitutional referendum which was held in October. The
conditions under which the 2005 elections were held were extremely
precarious, with the insurgency continuing practically unabated,
terrorist violence reaching extremely high levels across many of Iraq’s
provinces, a number of the potential candidates foregoing campaigns
due to death threats, and a lack of adequate security. Despite this, almost
eight million Iraqis voted in the January 30, 2005 elections, the results
of which created a 275-member Transitional National Assembly. The
result of the elections were unsurprising, with the United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA) (a coalition of political parties) yielding an overwhelming victory
of 48 percent of the total vote, or 140 seats in the 275-seat Transitional
National Assembly, the Kurdish Coalition List (KCL) (a combination of
the two main ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan: the Kurdish Democratic
Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) receiving 75 seats, the secu-
lar list of Iyad Allawi taking 40 seats, and the Sunni Arabs taking the
remaining 17 seats (there had been a Sunni boycott of the elections).34
On April 27, 2005 a new government of Iraq was officially formed,
composed of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and Kurdish Coalition List
(KCL), with Ibrahim al-Ja’fari named as Prime Minister. This government
was purely transitional in nature, accomplished little during its one year
reign, and enjoyed little popular legitimacy.35 It did, however, manage
to draft the electoral law, known as the Traditional Administrative Law
(TAL), for the in all future elections in Iraq. A draft constitution was
developed in August 2005, and was endorsed by both Shia and Kurdish
members, but not by any Sunni representative. The process was seen as
being rushed in order to prevent insurgents and terrorists from taking
advantage of the political vacuum arising from an extended transition
as well as to allow for a swift handover of power to Iraqis and subse-
quent US troop withdrawal.36 The constitutional referendum, which
took place on October 15, resulted in the approval of the new Iraqi con-
stitution, particularly in the predominantly Shi’ite and Kurdish areas. It
was rejected in the Sunni areas, with many Sunni Arab leaders claiming
that fraud had kept them from being able to defeat the constitution.
Following an investigation by the Independent Electoral Commission
of Iraq (IECI), however, it was ruled that there was no evidence of fraud
and the constitution was deemed to be ratified by public approval. The
constitutional process was a disaster for Iraq’s stability and fuelled both
the insurgency and the terrorist violence. It also produced a text that
was highly ambiguous and that was filled with internal contradictions,
all of which would carry the seeds of future discord within the country.37
The referendum was followed by a general election, which took place
amid rising levels of terrorist violence on December 15, 2005. This
election resulted in a turnout of roughly 80 percent of the population,

which this time included the Sunni community. The results of the elec-
tion were as follows: the UIA won 128 seats in the 275-seat national
assembly, the Kurdistan Coalition came in second with 53 seats, the
Iraqi Consensus Front was third with 44 seats, Allawi’s NIL won 25 seats,
and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue won 11 seats.38 The election
resulted in a political deadlock and by the end of April 2006 there was
still no government in place, the main reason being that there were
high levels of opposition to the UIA’s choice for Prime Minister, Ibrahim
al-Ja’fari. In mid-April, Ja’fari agreed to step back and was replaced by
Jawad al-Maliki on April 26. By that time terrorism in Iraq had reached
a peak, with the country facing not only the growing insurgency and
terrorist campaign against the Coalition forces, but also an internal
struggle in the Sunni community coupled with a Sunni and Shia civil
war. The single most influential factor driving the insurgency was the
exclusion of Sunnis from the political process, which provided it with
rationale, receptivity, and recruits.39
Tensions were also heightened between the Arab and Kurdish com-
munities, especially in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Al-Maliki had
inherited a country that was on the path to civil war and which barely
maintained the façade of constitutional and democratic government.
Shi’ite versus Shi’ite tensions and clashes became steadily more seri-
ous in the south, whereas Sunni tribal elements clashed with Islamist
movements like al-Qaeda, and Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities who
were competing for territory and influence in the north.40 These ten-
sions came to a head on February 22, 2006 when insurgents attacked
the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, a Shi’ite religious landmark. With this
act came the realisation that Iraq was now facing not only a growing
campaign of terrorism and an increasingly strong insurgency, but also a
civil war. This event triggered a massive increase in the levels of sectar-
ian violence across Iraq and by the summer of that year the primary
threat to Iraqi security had evolved from ‘terrorism’ to ‘insurgency’ to
‘ethnic and sectarian violence’. By early 2006, the Sunni communities
in Iraq began to view al-Qaeda as being more of a threat to their safety
than the US occupation and there was to be a significant change in
momentum towards stability and compromise in 2005 with the Sunni
Awakening.41 This began in February 2005, and took the form of a
revolt against the increasing levels of terrorism used by AQI against
local Iraqis, such as mass killings of males in small towns, increases
in the levels of suicide attacks, and an overall increase in the use of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The Sunni Awakening took place
in two distinct phases.42 The first phase was the Anbar Awakening,
which was a grassroots movement funded by the Iraqi government
and which was supported by the US government. This first stage of the
Awakening officially began in September 2006 in Ramadi and was led
by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.
The second phase was the formation of the Awakening Councils
(Sons of Iraq programme) in Diyala and Baghdad in mid-2007, which
was a US-funded programme led by General Petraeus and supported by
US troops.43 This phase aimed to extend the success of the Awakening
programme in Anbar into other Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq. It was
during this period ( January to June 2007) that the surge of US troops
also took place. The surge strategy outlined a process whereby an addi-
tional 30,000 troops would be added to the already 140,000 marines
and soldiers who were deployed in Iraq. The tactic of a troop surge was
based on the assumption that securing Baghdad would be essential to
prevent a sectarian war between Sunni insurgents and Shia militias,
while it would also create the political arena necessary for the two sects
to reconcile.44 As a result of the Anbar Awakening, the subsequent Sons
of Iraq programme, and the US troop surge, the situation in Anbar
province changed dramatically, producing a complete turnaround in a
province once thought to be lost beyond all repair.45 These events were
important in providing stability to Iraq, but there were two other factors
that also played significant roles. The first of these was that Baghdad
had been transformed into a Shi’ite-dominated city, thus providing
sectarian stability to the capital. The second critical factor was that
fact that Iraq’s neighbouring countries began to recognise the Maliki
government. Accordingly, both the transformation of Baghdad into a
Shi’ite city and the recognition and support of Iraq’s neighbours for the
county’s new political leadership have been instrumental in stabilising
the country.46 This improvement in security would have positive effects,
not only on the security situation in Iraq, but also on the 2010 general
elections.
Iraq’s second round of parliamentary elections, which took place on
March 7, 2010 were one of Iraq’s most politically competitive and open.
Despite the sporadic violent attacks across the country, Shia, Sunni, and
Kurds turned out in large numbers to vote for their new parliament.
Overshadowing this achievement, however, were the inconclusive
election results, the severe division between the campaigning parties
and claims of election fraud – all of which served to underscore the
monumental challenges facing the central government.47 The initial
election results showed Nuri Kamal al-Maliki trailing Ayad Allawi by 80
seats to 91, with neither side being able to create a coalition that would
allow them to create a new government.48 This slim lead was to be chal-
lenged by al-Maliki who, on October 1, managed to gain the support
of the Shi’ite factions (who had previously been his main opposition).
This newly formed alliance allowed al-Maliki to move one step closer
to becoming the majority leader in the now 325-member Parliament.
Once again claims of fraud were made, but were discounted by a
UN-backed recount that declared that there was no evidence of fraud in
the elections and that the allocation of seats was to remain unchanged.
This growing discontent with the election results, coupled with legal
challenges and growing sectarian resentment, produced a political
deadlock which remained in place throughout the spring and summer
of 2010.49 Al-Maliki was officially returned to power for a second term
on December 21, 2010. Overall, the Iraqi elections did not result in the
hoped peaceful transition of power, but instead revealed the increasing
mistrust within Iraqi society, and specifically among the ruling elites.
The elections highlighted just how fragile the country’s political sys-
tem, and even more so its political institutions, had become while also
showing that Iraq still has a long way to go before it becomes a stable,
sovereign, and self-reliant country.50
Failure in context: Iraq a failed state?
Even though Iraq has remained in the top 10 failed states of the world
according to the Failed State Index, it nonetheless remains a function-
ing state: one that has shown resilience to complete failure and collapse.
In the economic realm, Iraq remains on a downward trend which is pre-
venting any significant reconstruction taking place. Iraq remains highly
indebted, with an external debt of over $52.58 billion. Its GDP purchas-
ing power and GDP official exchange rates stand at $113.4 billion and
$82.15 billion respectively. Iraq’s GDP growth rate and its GDP per
capita remain extremely low at just 0.8 percent and $3,800 respectively.
This extremely low rate of GDP per capita means that Iraq does not have
the ability to grow rapidly enough to meet the needs of its citizens, thus
leading to rampant unemployment, lack of education, and a growing
population that is almost entirely reliant on external aid. Inflation in
Iraq is extremely low, peaking at just 2.4 percent, which is a significant
rise from the rate of −2.8 percent in 2009. Iraq’s unemployment rate has
risen to over 15 percent, which together with the lack of education and
over 25 percent of the population falling below the poverty line, has
proved to be one of the most detrimental factors to Iraq’s stability.51 The
majority of those unemployed are young males who, without any other
sources of income, are prime targets for groups such as al-Qaeda. As
well as that, Iraq exhibits extremely low levels of human development,
especially in the areas of literacy, poverty, and health and social service
provision. There are massive discrepancies in the allocation of these
essential resources, with less than 20 percent of Iraq’s population having
100 percent access to water and sanitation and just under two-thirds of
the country being able to use more just 12–14 hours of electricity per
day. The lack of adequate access to these resources has resulted in many
violent outbursts and a growing lack of support for both the govern-
ment and the US. The issue of literacy levels in Iraq has also played a
significant role in the increasing levels of instability and terrorism.
As it stands, one in five Iraqis aged 10–49 cannot read or write;
illiteracy among Iraqi women (24 percent) is more than double that of
Iraqi men (11 percent); and rural populations are more adversely affected
by illiteracy (25 percent) than urban populations (14 percent). There
are also significant differences in illiteracy rates amongst the different
governorates of Iraq. The lowest rates of illiteracy appear to be in Diyala,
Baghdad, and Kirkuk, which are some of the key areas where the major-
ity of terrorism occurs. The highest literacy levels are estimated to be in
Dahuk and Sulaimaniyah within the Kurdistan region in the north, and
Muthanna, Missan, and Qadissiya in the south. The Shia/Sunni divide
has been one of the main driving factors behind the growth of internal
terrorist and insurgent attacks within Iraq and has also provided impe-
tus for attacks against the Coalition forces and Kurdish minority groups.
Unity among the diverse ethnic groups has yet to occur and without it
the grievances felt among these groups will continue to destabilise the
already fragile Iraqi state. Adding to this instability is the refugee crisis
in Iraq. This existed long before the US-led invasion, and was in fact
extremely prevalent under Saddam Hussein’s regime, but its effect on
the stability of the country has become more significant than ever. The
instability in both the Iraqi government and its economic system means
that the country is not equipped to deal with the increasing numbers
of refugees and IDPs. As well as the negative effects that these IDPs and
refugees are having on the stability of the country, they are also provid-
ing a source of recruits for groups such as al-Qaeda. These groups offer
financial stability, education, and even healthcare to these people in
return for support, which allows them to infiltrate towns and villages
and carry out attacks without much resistance.
Interestingly, this massive population movement has also been linked
to the success of the ‘surge’ in 2007. While the American and Iraqi
governments celebrated the ‘success’ of the surge, which they claimed

contributed to the drop in sectarian violence and insecurity, many
international reports and studies argued that it was, in fact, the major
population shift that was the main factor in that decline of terrorism.52
Thus the decrease in terrorism in Iraq has not necessarily been a sign
of reconciliation, but rather a symptom of the population shift, in
which neighbourhoods and cities have been completely redefined. The
increase in levels of both IDPs and refugees and the resultant emergence
of uneven economic development across group lines has caused back-
lash against both the newly formed Iraqi government and the US. This
lack of cohesion is just one symptom of Iraq’s fractured political system
and ethno-sectarian divisions, but is one that has played a detrimental
role in the progression of stability across the country.
Iraq is home to over 2,000 tribes and clans, which are divided
between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurd factions. Under the Saddam regime,
the political realm was factionalised based on ethnic background, and
leadership positions were restricted to a select number of the larger
Sunni tribes and clans, including the Jubbar, ad-Dulaym, al-‘Ubayd,
Kharzaj, Sammar, al-Mushahada, ‘Aqaydat and Sa’dun. With the fall of
the Saddam regime in 2003, however, the protection that these groups
once thrived under was removed and there emerged a power vacuum
which further catalysed the rise of factionalised elites and created an
upsurge in the levels of inter-tribal terrorist violence. Even though Iraq
appears to have stabilised somewhat politically, the rise of factional-
ised elites is continuing unabated in many parts of the country, par-
ticularly in the south. In essence, Iraqi cities had been turned into an
international frontier for terrorist and insurgent forces, destroying the
country’s infrastructure, creating a new political system defined along
ethno-sectarian lines, and pushing the country closer to full-scale civil
war. The dismantling policy of the Iraqi military and police institu-
tions, the establishment and support the de-Ba’athification process, the
emerging sectarian violence in many cities in Iraq, and the subsequent
security plan for Baghdad after the 2007 military surge, have all brought
new political, economic, and social realities to the region.
They have also drastically and permanently altered the lives of Iraqis
and altered the structure of the Iraqi state itself.53 Some of the most
devastating results of the occupation have been the establishment of a
sectarian political system, the introduction of suicide bombings to Iraq,
a significant rise in political assassinations, kidnappings, and unlawful
imprisonments, and continuing political failure and corruption. Perhaps
one of the most damaging effects of the occupation on the composition of
Iraqi society has been the increase in intra-ethnic and religious ‘purges’ of
many of Iraq’s minorities. Iraq’s minority communities include both reli-
gious and ethnic groups. The main Muslim minorities are the Turkomans
(3–4 percent of the population – either Shia or Sunni), the Faili Kurds
(Shia), and the Shabaks (predominately Shia). Muslims comprise about
96 percent of Iraq’s religious community combined with the Chaldean,
Assyrians, Syriacs, and Armenians. Iraq is also home to a number of
migrant or refugee communities, the largest being the Palestinians.54
The situation in Iraq is therefore described here as being in a fluid state,
especially over the last decade, and makes the assessment of state strength
extremely complex to carry out. Therefore, state failure in Iraq is some-
what of a conundrum; it is both a failed and functioning state (depending
on what area of the country is being assessed). It is witnessing a lack of
government control in many areas of the country; it has porous borders;
is party to outbreaks of ethnic and social violence; and remains occupied
by an external actor. However, it also has many elements that show that
it is a functioning state. The elections in 2010 provided the country with
its own democratically elected government, which, with the help of the
US, is beginning to exert its influence across the country. The legal and
judicial systems are troubled but functioning adequately and the educa-
tion and healthcare systems, although still fragile, are slowly improving.
Also, while the levels of terrorism may be on the increase once again, it
would be highly unlikely that they will reach those of 2006–2007. It is
also highly unlikely that the country will collapse or fail completely. It
is for these reasons that it is argued here that Iraq has yet to reach the
status of the traditional ‘failed state’ and according to the newly devel-
oped spectrum of state failure, Iraq can be categorised as being a crisis yet
functioning state. Having assessed and re-categorised Iraq’s level of state
failure, it is now necessary to assess the underlying conditions that enable
terrorist and insurgent groups to thrive there.
The Iraqi state: connections to terrorism and insurgency
Safe havens
The denial of safe havens to terrorists has, since 2001, been a key
national security concern of the US and has played a major role in the
development of counter-terrorism policy. The debate surrounding Iraq
being a safe haven for terrorist groups has been ongoing. Al-Qaeda
managed to establish enclaves for small periods of time, particularly
in Anbar province during 2005, and has been able to recruit and train
fighters from inside and outside the country.55 As well as that there have
been numerous senior al-Qaeda operatives killed or captured in Iraq.

Between 2001 and 2008, it was mostly foreign-born terrorists who came
to Iraq to fight Americans. At this time al-Qaeda probably numbered in
the low thousands and was at its peak strength. More importantly, how-
ever, was the fact that its effectiveness had, at this point, far exceeded its
their numbers. A stable and prosperous Iraq was not in the interests of
AQI. Its strategy was to discredit the US and the interim government by
all means possible. It also involved creating a civil war between Sunnis
and Shi’ites to completely destabilise Iraq and force the Americans to
withdraw, which would in theory leave Iraq open to be another terrorist
safe haven.56 Iraq differs from Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, in a
number of ways in relation to the issue of safe havens.
Afghanistan under the Taliban consciously provided safe havens to
groups such as al-Qaeda. Similarly, in Pakistan, elements of the Pakistani
state were arguably complicit in providing safe havens for terrorists. In
Iraq, terrorist groups are able to operate because the government does
not have full control of its territory, but in general the Iraqi government
does not provide support to those groups. Since the Anbar Awakening
and the US troop surge, there has been a significant reduction not only
in the support for terrorist groups such as AQI, but also in the availability
of safe havens within the country.57 The US and Iraqi forces have con-
tinued to make progress against these groups and there was a significant
reduction in the number of security incidents in Iraq that began in the
last half of 2007 and continued through 2009, with a steady downward
trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and IED attacks.
AQI, though still dangerous, experienced the defection of members, lost
key mobilisation areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and
funding, and was forced to change targeting priorities. By 2009 Iraq was
no longer classified as being a high-level terrorist safe haven, due mainly
to the US military presence and the developing leadership of the Iraqi
government. Although Iraq may not be the same kind of haven that it
was pre-2009, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to view Iraq as
a potential or actual safe haven which, with the US troop withdrawal,
should be monitored extremely closely to prevent a return to the past.58
Porous borders
Iraq shares its 2,260 mile border with Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Syria, and it is the porous nature of this border coupled
with the neighbouring states that makes this such a significant issue
in relation to terrorism in Iraq. It is impossible to protect 100 percent
of Iraq’s borders, but significant improvements have been made in
addressing its porous nature since 2003. However, the situation still
remains extremely unstable. Since 2001 the borders have been the key
entryway for weapons and jihadists from all over the world who come
to fight in the insurgency. Iraq’s neighbours have long been criticised
for allegedly failing to stop militants entering and exiting the country.
Iraq’s own struggling border security forces remain unable to adequately
police its long and porous borders. Under the leadership of Saddam
Hussein, much focus was placed on the security of Iraq’s borders and an
estimated 50,000 paramilitary troops patrolled the borders at the time.
In addition, local tribes were paid to monitor the areas where they lived
to prevent illegal border crossings.59 With the 2003 invasion and the
subsequent edicts released under Bremer’s leadership, almost all of this
force was disbanded, leaving Iraq’s border essentially freely open.
Following the rise of terrorism and violence, especially in the period
2006–2007, focus was shifted to Iraq’s international borders and Ports
of Entry (POEs). Iraqi and coalition forces began a programme to
improve Iraq’s internal security environment and successfully counter
AQI insurgents and militia organisations in the cities and provinces.60
The main areas of infiltration came from the borders with Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan. These areas feed directly into the Iraqi provinces of
Anbar, Ninawa, Karbala, Najaf, and Muthanna – all of which contain
the highest levels of extremist organisations, violent conflict, and ter-
rorist activity. The US began a process of training border police almost
immediately following the 2003 invasion in order to tighten control
over the borders with Iraq’s neighbours. As a result of the US-led secu-
rity programme, there are approximately 258 control towers positioned
along all of Iraq’s borders, which cover roughly 2,170 miles.61 The Iraqi
forces have now also shifted focus towards preventing the cross-border
flow of foreign fighters, weapons, and funds from Iraq’s neighbours.
This is extremely important, as the majority of Iraq’s suicide bombers
(75 percent), for example, were cross-border insurgents who originated
from Saudi Arabia. The border area between Syria and Iraq has been wit-
ness to some of the most violent clashes between US–Iraqi forces and
insurgents, and both Iran and Syria continue to be the greatest source of
smuggling, including AQI operatives, foreign fighters, and munitions.
Iraq has numerous areas across its borders that are porous, on both
the Iraq–Iran and the Iraq–Syria borders. The porous western border
with Syria is perhaps one of the most significant, as it is here that
multiple routes are available to foreign terrorists to infiltrate Iraq. In
the south along the Shatt al-Arab there are also numerous porous areas
which allow the illegal crossing of smugglers into Basra. To the north,
multiple illegal crossing points in Maysan and Wasit provinces facilitate

the flow of insurgents and weapons. The weak border in Diyala pro-
vides the shortest route to Baghdad.62 Iraq has managed to implement
a somewhat successful border control plan, with the employment of
15,000 new border police, but cross-border flows from Iran and Syria
remain to be effectively halted. Iraq’s porous border has also has a
significant impact on the levels of refugees that are both entering and
leaving the country. The UNHCR is currently working with the Iraqi
government to try to put an end to the massive displacement issue
which is having a detrimental impact on Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s border
safety and security is a vital element to the ability of the government to
exercise its sovereignty and to prevent terrorism from further destabilis-
ing the fragile states. Without this ability, Iraq will remain a country
plagued by terrorism and insurgency.
Pool of recruits
Iraq has long provided a valued pool of recruits for terrorist and insur-
gent groups, a trend that does not seem to be coming to an end. The
post-invasion chaos and dismantlement of Iraqi security forces left
many young men, who were militarily trained, unemployed. The peo-
ple of Iraq, already war-weary and economically, socially, and politically
drained, saw the mounting fatalities as another reason not to trust the
government. Even though the number of deaths has decreased signifi-
cantly since the peak in levels during the period 2006–2007, there still
remains an extremely high level of annual deaths attributed to the
ongoing war in Iraq. The killings of Iraqi civilians by US forces gener-
ated resentment and made people willing to fight back, thus providing
the necessary pool of recruits for terrorist, insurgent, and extremist
groups. The situation was made all the worse by the economic situation
in Iraq. One of the other main causative factors for the high level of the
available pool of recruits is economic based. Iraq’s high rate of unem-
ployment, coupled with the extreme youth bulge means that there
is a massive potential pool of recruits in Iraq, who, if not adequately
addressed, could be the next generation of terrorists and insurgents.
If the overall economic opportunities do not improve adequately
these youths represent a potential pool of recruits for terrorism. Since
the fall of the Saddam regime, the youth of Iraq especially view the US
as being the root cause of the economic, political, and social turmoil
afflicting the country. Even with the US troop withdrawal, this feel-
ing of frustration has not been removed, and has in fact been turned
towards the Iraqi government, which they now view as being the cause
of the country’s problems. President Bush, in a speech made in 2007,

highlighted the importance of this fact and noted that the frustration
and hopelessness of the people makes it easier for radical movements
and radicals to be able to freely recruit.63 While much progress has been
made, both in addressing the economic issues and in reducing the fatal-
ity levels, there remain too many problems that are having a negative
effect on a large portion of the Iraqi population. Without effective and
speedy change in these two key areas, the issue of there being an active
pool of recruits in Iraq will not be removed in the near future, thus ena-
bling the insurgency and terrorist activity to continue unabated.
According to numerous available reports, Iraq is one of the most heavily
armed countries in the world and this mass availability of weapons
in Iraq has had a massive impact on the spread of the insurgency and
on the increasing levels of terrorism and sectarian violence. A massive
stockpiling of weapons took place in Iraq under the Ba’athist regime,
with numerous munitions dumps being located across the country
providing an available supply of both small arms and explosives to the
general population. The rapid collapse of the regime following the inva-
sion allowed these munitions to become even more widely available
and at very low prices to all citizens, militias, insurgents, and terrorist
groups. This increase in munitions, combined with the increasing popu-
lar disenchantment of the Iraqi population with the occupation, was
one of the key factors in the increase in politically motivated violence
and terrorism across the country. As early as 2003, the issue of civilian
gun ownership in Iraq was a massive concern. The gun culture is per-
vasive in Iraq with small arms being readily available on both the legal
and the black markets. Besides the availability of guns, Iraqi civilians
also have access to other ‘light weapons’, such as mortars, bombs, and
even rocket-propelled grenades. The majority of military-style weapons
possessed by Iraqi civilians come from three sources: the government
arsenals which were looted in 1991, weapons that were provided from
Iran in support of the Shia rebels, and those weapons provided to
leaders of Sunni and Shia tribal leaders supplied directly by the Iraqi
government.64
The collapse of Saddam’s regime and the subsequent destruction of
the Iraqi Army by US edict caused the unemployment of thousands of
Iraqi troops, all of whom were free to return home without any employ-
ment, but with their weapons. It is estimated that there are currently
approximately 9.75 million guns in Iraq, but this figure is at best on
the lower level of estimates, as there is a lack of gun registration in the

country, thus making it virtually impossible to gather any viable infor-
mation. The availability of weapons had been detrimental to stability in
Iraq for many years prior to the invasion, but the invasion resulted in
a trigger for their mass proliferation on a scale never witnessed before.
This uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Iraq
is an issue that has not been fully addressed by either US or Iraqi policy-
makers. Even though Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had included
disarming Iraq’s many militias as part of his national reconciliation
plan, no concrete measures have been drawn up as a means to actually
address this challenge. Violence and terrorism in Iraq will continue una-
bated unless the availability of weapons is reduced and a proper anti-
weapons policy is introduced and monitored by the Iraqi government.
Government complicity and support

Iraq is once again in turmoil, with escalating levels of terrorist violence
and an ongoing political deadlock affecting the stability of the country.
The government of Iraq appears to be struggling to deal with the coun-
try’s many underlying issues since the withdrawal of US troops. As well
as that there are now claims emerging that the government may once
again be providing support for certain extremist elements in the coun-
try, which are in turn feeding into the growing instability.65 Iraq has a
long history of its political leaders providing support for extremist and
terrorist groups in order to promote their power and influence. Since
the 2003 invasion by US-led forces, and the implementation of a new
Iraqi government, this process appeared to have come to an end. Recent
events have, however, cast a shadow over the validity of, for example,
the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, and questions have begun to
emerge as to the legitimacy of his government. Legitimacy here relates
to the degree to which people and groups in society accept the govern-
ment, its institutions, and people, and in Iraq this legitimacy has been
called to question on numerous occasions in relation to the terrorist
threat and the ongoing insurgency. This process of questioning legiti-
macy involved three phases: crisis of confidence, conflict of legitimacy,
and crisis of legitimacy.66
The future of Iraq looks grim and the government is again criticised as
appearing to be doing little to prevent the situation from escalating fur-
ther. Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, for example, who was in exile in
the Kurdish region of Iraq, lashed out at Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
and his leadership, arguing that Iraq could soon return to widespread
sectarian terrorist violence that could require the return of US forces. In
fact, there have been many worrying trends that have emerged which
may point to a return to a ‘Saddam Hussein’-type situation, which
would be devastating to the country. Prime Minister al-Maliki, for exam-
ple, became the Chief in Command, Minister for Defence, Minister
of the Interior, Chief of Intelligence, and Chief of National Security,
which in reality should not be permitted under the new constitution
of Iraq.67 With this type of power concentration taking place, many are
now questioning if Iraq is heading back to the same kind of regime that
prevailed before 2003.
Summary
Iraq contains many of the necessary elements needed for state failure
and terrorism to occur: religious fundamentalism; the promotion and
use of terrorism by internal non-state groups; the possible availability
of weapons of mass destruction; a history of military dictatorship; and
a crumbling society and political infrastructure. However, there is a
significant difference between Iraq and the previous cases of Pakistan
and Afghanistan (although the situation there shares some similarities
to Iraq in relation to the influence from outside actors) that make it
somewhat untypical as a case study under the auspices of state failure.
That difference is that for Iraq, its process of state failure was almost
entirely triggered by outside influences, i.e. the US-led invasion in 2003.
It is also interesting to note that what began as a terrorist campaign in
2003 had, by 2005, developed into a fully fledged insurgency, coupled
with inter-ethnic terrorist violent campaigns. Prior to the invasion
Iraq had been a functioning, albeit borderline weak, state ruled by a
powerful dictator (Saddam Hussein). The state under the leadership of
Hussein was troubled but was by no means a failed or failing state; at
best it was a borderline weak state. As a result of this uniqueness, Iraq is
seen in the context of being what is termed here a ‘Trigger’ case study
under the auspices of terrorism and state failure. This double-edged
campaign means that in the context of Iraq, assessing terrorism and ter-
rorist violence becomes more difficult in that one has to try to evaluate
which acts are tied to the terrorist campaign and which are tied to the
insurgency. This will become evident throughout the next chapter, and
where relevant the terms insurgency and terrorism have been defined
in more detail.
8
Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,
The origins of state failure and terrorism in Iraq are extremely diverse
and there are numerous cross-cutting elements that tend to mirror them-
selves in a number of the sub-categories listed below. This is especially
the case with regard to the indicators of regime type, declining state
authority, and institutional lack of capacity, as well as corruption and a
lack of rule of law. There is a significant link between the elements con-
tained in the social/cultural factors section of demographic imbalances
and cultural cleavages and the underlying culture of violence. The aim
here is to analyse each of the elements and try to distinguish which are
the most detrimental to the stability of Iraq and which are key in the
proliferation of terrorism within the country.
For Iraq, regime type has been an influential factor in relation to both
state failure and terrorist activity. Throughout its relatively short exist-
ence, Iraq’s political landscape has evolved through periods of military
rule, dictatorship, and civilian leaderships. This fragmented political his-
tory has resulted in an extremely fragile political balance in Iraq which,
on numerous occasions, has threatened the stability of the entire state.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had a direct tie to regime type, specifically
impacting on the stability of Iraq as a nation-state and on the levels of
terrorist activity. Since the invasion of 2003, the government of Iraq has
been drastically altered, once again changing from a dictatorship into
a weak but expanding form of democratically elected parliamentary
government. The transformation of Iraq’s authoritarian political system
into a parliamentary democracy has had a number of negative impacts
153
on both the stability of the country and terrorist activity. The election
process of the government was questioned on numerous occasions
and the general consensus amongst the Iraqi citizens with the election
of al-Maliki was that the country was once more going to be pushed
towards an ethnic/sectarian civil war due to the shift from Sunni to
Shia leadership. The effect of this change has been mostly negative,
with the al-Maliki government remaining locked in a battle to protect
the credibility and legitimacy of the government to an ever-weary Iraqi
people. As well as that, the threat of terrorism is a constant reminder to
the already fragile democratic government that the country may not be
ready to fully embrace its new regime type.
The authority of the Iraqi government, though never strong, has
slowly begun to elevate to a level where it can promote its power
beyond the borders of the capital city of Baghdad and into the sur-
rounding provinces. However, even with this increase in authority,
the lack of institutional capacity means that the government remains
unable to promote this power across the country as a whole, which
has been detrimental to both the stability of the country and to the
counter-terrorism/security process. There has been a growing political
momentum, since 2003, to encourage institutional development across
Iraq in the hope that this would contribute to national reconciliation,
mitigate sectarianism, and quell insurgent and terrorist violence. The
initial reform efforts involved setting numerous benchmarks aimed
at developing a power-sharing initiative, while at the same time
developing a federalist-type system in the country. The aim of these
initiatives was to try to overcome the underlying political issues, which
were directly linked to the power shift among Iraq’s various ethnic com-
munities (specifically Sunni, Shia, and Kurd). It was also hoped that
the majoritarian features of the political system would be lessened so
that the emergence of a more parliamentary democratic system could
be implemented. However, these changes have, in fact, had the oppo-
site effect on Iraq and have played a significant role in the increase
of terrorism.1 Iraq, with the aid of the US, has managed to somewhat
successfully establish its new political institutions, especially under the
leadership of al-Maliki, but these institutions still lack adequate capacity
to carry out their functions to the levels needed to create a fully stable
Iraq.
USAID Iraq, the dominant coalition-based organisation in Iraq,
has developed what is termed an Administrative Reform Project to
address this lack of institutional capacity in Iraq. This reform project
aims to strengthen the government’s resource management system
along with its civil service structures, while also promoting economic
diversification. The project also aims to bring essential public services to
acceptable levels across Iraq. The overall theory under these reforms is
that by strengthening Iraq’s policy and resource management systems at
the national, provincial, and local levels, Iraq’s ‘whole-of-government’
capacity will be improved in three key specific areas: Civil Service,
National Policy Management, and Administrative Decentralisation.2
It is argued that by improving these areas, the stability of Iraq can be
greatly improved and thus as a result the levels of terrorism across the
country should decrease. However, a detailed history of institutional
reform efforts in Iraq actually shows that institutional reforms have not
constituted advancement in the political equilibrium of the country,
have not been credible, or have had perverse consequences for the
country.3
Accordingly, that would suggest that there are limits on institutional
reform and the importance of alternative means of restraining terrorist
violence, especially for the case in Iraq. The reconstruction of Iraq’s
institutions has not ended with the formation of the al-Maliki led
government: the process has a long way to go before the country’s
political, social, and economic institutions have developed to a level
where they can function without the aid of outside sources. This
extremely slow regeneration process has caused a backlash from the
Iraqi citizens, especially those outside of Baghdad, where the effects of
the reforms have yet to be seen. The Iraqi government needs legitimacy
and administrative capacity, two essential elements that it has yet to
capture, in order to survive. The only way that this can be achieved is
through the creation of government institutions that are linked directly
to Iraqi society, i.e. that are free, fair, open, and transparent. These insti-
tutions need the capacity to function on all levels and need to provide
a link between the country and the central government in Baghdad,
something that still remains incomplete. Until the issue of lack of
institutional capacity is adequately addressed in Iraq, the authority of
the state can never be pushed beyond its already narrow boundaries
of the capital of Baghdad and the internal threats to the stability of the
country, including increased levels of terrorism and insurgent violence.
Corruption exists in all aspects of Iraqi society and politics, affecting
the heads of the government ministries to the security guards at the
checkpoints of the country’s borders and cities. Corruption is not a new
phenomenon in Iraq and existed under Saddam’s rule, but in Iraq today
it has become so endemic that it is making it extremely difficult for
the government to function and has taken on a new dimension. It has
evolved into being almost an ‘institution’ in Iraq. It has been argued that
corruption has now become so severe that it has been elevated to a form
of ‘irregular warfare’ – with various groups competing for access to posi-
tions of power and limited resources thus causing violent conflict. The
issue of corruption in Iraq has become so endemic that it has also been
described as Iraq’s second insurgency, or the ‘second war in Iraq’.4 There
are at least three separate factors that have contributed to the high lev-
els of corruption in Iraq. The first was the failure to re-establish any type
of financial or quality control on reconstruction work in the post-war
period, which foreign contractors were quick to take advantage of. The
second factor was that the US and its allies sought to remake the Iraqi
state immediately after the invasion without first developing a detailed
plan of action. Finally, there was the failure to clarify the mandate of
key anti-corruption bodies, including the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA),
the Commission on Integrity, and the Inspectors General.5
Compared to Middle Eastern standards of corruption in general, Iraq’s
corruption levels are seen as being extremely high and can be classed as
being almost universal across all sectors of the country, be they political,
social, or economic. The following are some of the most prominent
ministries where corruption is rampant: the Ministry of Interior, the
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Health, Ministry
of Oil, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Electricity, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and the Ministry of Science
and Technology.6 Some of these institutions stand on such fragile ground
that their effectiveness has been seriously compromised and therefore
the challenge of addressing corruption in Iraq is limited at best.7 Even
with the support of the US, the Iraqi government remains unable to
adequately enforce even the most basic and rudimentary anti-corruption
laws, which many argue is aiding the re-emerging insurgency.8 This
process has been hampered even further by the fact that the justice
system in Iraq remains extremely weak and fragile, making the
enforcement of anti-corruption laws almost impossible. As well as that,
the system is subject to political pressures, intimidation by outside
sources and is itself also corrupt in many areas. The excessive levels of
corruption across Iraq at both national and local levels of government
have created widespread resentment among the Iraqi citizens, who
view corruption as a link between the degradation of public services
and the rising levels of insecurity and terrorism. Corruption affects the
lives of the Iraqis so significantly that opinion polls show that today
Iraqis are more concerned with widespread corruption than continuing
acts of terrorism, viewing them as almost interlinked.9 This high level

of corruption has also had an extremely negative impact on the levels
of support for the government and often acts as a propaganda tool for
the insurgent or terrorist organisations to use against the government
in order to gain support.
Beyond the effects that corruption has on the political and social
systems in Iraq, it is also having a serious effect on oil production in
Iraq, with experts estimating that upwards of 150,000–200,000, and
perhaps as many as 500,000, barrels of oil per day are being stolen solely
due to corrupt activities.10 It has become so significant that US officials
have on numerous occasions stated that corruption is, in certain areas,
more responsible than the activities of the insurgents for breakdowns in
the oil sector. Yet one of the most dangerous aspects of such high levels
of corruption is that the funds amassed from corruption often find their
way into the hands of insurgents, militias, and/or terrorist organisations.
According to one senior Iraqi official, corruption is estimated to cost
Iraq $5–7 billion per year, and much of that can be traced from corrupt
aid agencies directly to militias and terrorist organisations.11 The Iraqi
government has been quite vocal of late with regard to its policies on
tackling corruption, but the Office of the Prime Minister remains some-
what hostile to the idea of an independent agency dealing with and
prosecuting cases of corruption. The lack of accountability then goes on
to promote corruption in a vicious cycle, which has many questioning
the complicity levels of the government in relation to corruption in its
ministries. There has been some progress made, however, and there are
sections of the Iraqi government that have shown slow improvement in
relation to the application of anti-corruption laws and procedures. Even
though this is a promising sign, this change is not happening quickly
enough nor is it happening outside the main cities in Iraq. Thus cor-
ruption continues to undermine state legitimacy and shows no sign of
abating.12
Another significant factor contributing to the instability in Iraq is
the nationalistic struggle for autonomy, specifically in terms of the
Kurdish community in Iraq. The global Kurdish community is located
mainly in the countries of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and of the
20–25 million Kurds in the world, almost 4.5 million of them are
located in Iraq, comprising 15–20 percent of the entire Iraqi population.
Although Kurdish tribalism is Islamic in nature, religion has traditionally
taken a secondary role to Kurdish nationalism and this nationalism
has traditionally overshadowed allegiance to the Iraqi state. The result of
this is a blurring of the role of Sunni Islam as a cohesive force among
the Iraqi people and the Kurdish minority. This was evident especially
under Ba’athist rule, which, by its pan-Arab definition, excluded
the Kurds completely from the political processes of Iraq. Under the
Saddam regime, Kurds suffered brutal campaigns of violence and ethnic
cleansing, the most notorious being al-Anfal, conducted between 1986
and 1989, which resulted in the deaths of over two million Kurds. These
atrocities and the backlash that resulted facilitated the emergence, in
1991, of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). This regional govern-
ment emerged in the context of Western/US no-fly zones that provided
protection to the Kurds from the Saddam regime. In Iraq, the Kurds are
located in an autonomous zone in the north of Iraq comprised of the
provinces of Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Diyala. The majority of
Kurds see themselves as being an ethnically distinct, autonomous or
semi-autonomous component of Iraq, identifying more closely with
their ethnic Kurdish identity.13
Following years of repression and violence under this regime it was
thought that, with its end, the Kurds would give up their autonomous
position. This was not the case, however, and the Kurds remain set
on creating a separate state for themselves. Maintaining autonomy is
their minimal demand. Since 2003 the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) has been one of the few parts of Iraq that has functioned rela-
tively effectively. Ironically, therefore, de facto independence of Kurds
has produced a moderately effective functioning state in northern Iraq.
The Iraqi constitution, combined with the post-Saddam political situ-
ation in Iraq, allowed the Kurds for the first time to gain substantial
political strength. The constitution (Article 113) includes protection of
the Kurdish autonomy and also officially recognises the three Kurdish
provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah as a legal autonomous
region of Iraq. According to Katzman, this was so significant a move
that it meant that Iraq’s neighbours, as well as many in Baghdad, now
saw the Iraqi Kurds as a threat, especially in the political realm. This fear
has become so severe that Sunni–Shi’ite alliances are even being formed
in Iraqi Arab politics to contain the power of the Kurds.14
One of the most significant issues in relation to this autonomy and
demand for independence is the issue of Kirkuk and its oil reserves.
The Kurds have long argued that this area legally belongs to them and
that they should have complete access to both the oil and the revenue
generated from its sale. However, these oil fields technically remain part
of the national patrimony and the oil remains under federal control,
with the Kurds receiving their share of the revenue.15 This has led to
an increase in communal violence as the Kurds try to strengthen their
position by settling Kurds in Kirkuk, while at the same time attempting

to expel the city’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shi’ites) along with the
Turkomans.16 Even as the US troop surge was at its peak and terrorism
across other areas of Iraq was beginning to lessen, there were increas-
ing numbers of violent incidents in this region. It appears that the
main fear of the Kurds gaining complete control of this area is that the
affiliation of Kirkuk to the KRG would give the Kurds enough economic
strength to heighten their push for complete independence (Kirkuk sits
on roughly 10 percent of Iraq’s overall proven oil reserves). Overall,
it would be even more detrimental to the stability of Iraq if further
demands for autonomy were to emerge from this region. With the lack
of trust in the Iraqi government, it is not difficult to imagine that the
Sunni-dominated provinces of Ninawa, Ta’mim, Saladhin, and parts of
Anbar could be the next areas to move towards the idea of becoming
autonomous regions of Iraq. If this were to happen, it could once again
reignite the already fragile battle between Shi’ite and Sunni and might
even cause the complete collapse of the country.
Iraq’s economy is still heavily centralised and state-dominated; the rev-

enue from oil production comprises roughly two-thirds of Iraq’s GDP,
and is the sole basis of over 90 percent of total government revenues. The
majority of the population depends on the government for employment,
yet Iraq has one of the lowest employment-to-populations ratios in the
region. Three of the most influential economic factors affecting Iraq’s
stability and the spread of terrorism are poverty, the uneven distribution
of wealth, and deepening economic stagnation and these will be assessed
here in order to understand their impact on the stability of the country.
When assessing poverty, for the case of Iraq, there are a number of differ-
ent estimates as to the exact poverty rates, but the majority of them fall
between 23 and 30 percent. Almost ten million Iraqis remain in absolute
poverty since the invasion in 2003, with the majority of being those under
30 (the prime targets for terrorist group recruitment). This represents, it is
argued here, just over 30 percent of the entire population. According to
the report, there are several causes for this state of abject poverty:
1. The occupation by the US and the ensuing terrorist violence resulted

in a mass of ‘destitute’ people, including widows, orphans, and inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs), amounting to roughly two million
people.
2. The failure of reconstruction efforts resulted in the failure to create

employment for Iraqis, leading to increasing unemployment levels
and further poverty across the country.
3. The mismanagement of resources due to corruption and a lack of
experienced cadres, professionals, and technocrats meant that the
vast majority of people were left without even the basic necessary
resources needed to survive.
4. The endemic corruption of the government has greatly contributed
to the inequity of wealth distribution, which, coupled with a massive
mismanagement of the country’s resources, has led to an inflation
rate that feeds into the cycle of poverty.17
Many Iraqis live just above the poverty line of $2.20 per day and are
highly vulnerable to falling further below this poverty level, as the gap
between poverty and destitute in Iraq is just 4.5 percent. In addition,
there is large portion of what are termed non-poor living just above
the poverty line. Overall, a small reduction in economic growth would
substantially increase the poverty rates across Iraq. Iraq’s Ministry of
Planning and Development Cooperation released its National Strategy
for Poverty Reduction in Iraq for 2010–2014 in November 2009, which
set targets of reducing poverty in Iraq from seven to five million people
within this time frame or from the current levels of over 23 percent to
just over 16 percent by 2014.18 The aim is to provide the people of Iraq
with a more stable economic life which would then, in theory, provide
them with lesser incentives to join terrorist organisations such as
al-Qaeda, who often prey on the poor for recruitment. In doing so, the
Iraqi government hopes to prevent the proliferation of terrorist organi-
sations across the country, especially in the south and central provinces
in Iraq, where poverty is most prevalent. This then leads to the aspect
of uneven distribution of wealth across Iraq. The uneven distribution of
wealth has been an issue long affecting the people of Iraq and it appears
that it is still playing a detrimental role in the country’s overall levels
of stability and can directly challenge the legitimacy of the state. The
issue of the allocation of aid resources coupled with the allocation of
Iraq’s oil revenue has long played a key role in the overall instability of
the Iraqi state. The allocation of aid can have a massive impact on the
stability of a country, the reason being that those areas that witness the
poor allocation of aid are more likely to be faced with increasing pov-
erty levels, which thus leads to increased frustration and the possibility
of violent outbreaks. This resentment feeds into the spread of both the
insurgency and the proliferation of terrorism.
The allocation of aid has become focused mainly on Baghdad and its
surrounding cities, with little of it reaching the areas that are in most
need, such as Erbil, Diyala, Al Anbar, and Basra.19 These are the areas
of Iraq from where the majority of the terrorist violence and instability
emanates and also where the majority of Iraq’s extremist, insurgent and
terrorist groups are based. It would therefore seem apparent that a system
of revenue distribution which covers these areas would be extremely
beneficial, not only to the stability of the country, but also to decreasing
the overall levels of terrorism and the spread of terrorism and the insur-
gency. Assistance to Iraq has changed substantially over the past years
and will continue to evolve throughout the reconstruction of the Iraqi
state. From 2003 to 2006 the focus was on restoring essential services,
such as health, education, water, and electricity, improving economic
opportunities, building the foundation of democracy and governance,
and managing conflict. In 2007, the focus shifted to strengthening the
effectiveness of government and civil society, expanding private sector
opportunities, supporting focused stabilisation activities, and providing
humanitarian assistance and support for internally displaced persons.
These types of activities continued until 2009 when US assistance began
shifting from reconstruction to building Iraq’s capacity to reconstruct
and govern itself effectively.20 Aid allocation and its lack of effective-
ness has become so significant that the 2005 constitution even con-
tained articles that aimed to address these issues by dictating how the
country’s resources are to be allocated – noting that the resources must
be distributed equitably to allow prosperity throughout the nation. As it
stands, the Constitution already specifies that the oil and gas resources
belong to all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates and that
the revenues of these resources shall be distributed in a fair manner in
all parts of the country to ensure balanced development throughout
Iraq.21 The Iraqi constitution recognises the need to allocate resources
fairly and equally across the entire country in order to address the
growing levels of instability and terrorism. If this aim is to be reached,
Iraq’s leaders need to put more effort towards building upon the
constitutional framework that has been developed in order to create a
strong resource distribution scheme which can be implemented across
the entire country.22
The government of Iraq is aware of the significance of aid allocation
specifically in relation to the uneven distribution of wealth and has taken
steps to improve its planning, monitoring, coordination, tracking and
reporting on international aid flows. These are all key components of
an effective aid management system. Iraqis still, however, face a void of
economic trade, high unemployment and underemployment rates, and

a large majority of the population being classified as poverty-stricken,
which if not addressed, will cause an increase not only in the instability
of the country but also in the levels of violence and terrorism.23 This
general lack of funding and resources, as well as the economic margin-
alisation of many of Iraq’s minority groups, has created a favourable
situation for instability and terrorism to arise and proliferate. This has
become extremely obvious in provinces such as Al Anbar and Karbala,
where insurgent, extremist, and terrorist groups alike take advantage
of the population’s dissatisfaction with the government and with the
foreign presence in the country. As was the case in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan, insurgent and criminal activity is statistically more likely
to spread to areas where there is persistent poverty, thus making the
uneven distribution of wealth such a serious issue. If these two factors
are not addressed in the near future, there will undoubtedly be a mas-
sive spread of insecurity in the already fragile provinces as well as an
increase in the levels of terrorist violence.
The process of deepening economic stagnation, on the other hand, is
putting a strain on the government and is causing a significant threat to
the overall stability of the country. Iraq has a long history of economic
stagnation despite its vast oil resources – resources that were misman-
aged throughout the 1970s under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.
Iraq’s tradition of using its economic finances to promote its military
and defence spending has taken from the much needed investment
in social and economic development programmes. This high level of
defence spending is, however, only one of the reasons behind Iraq’s
economic stagnation. Iraq’s economy has also suffered from many years
of fiscal mismanagement, oil crashes, economic sanctions, two major
wars, and (most recently) the US-led invasion and the subsequent insta-
bility and insecurity that it has caused.24 The high dependence of the
Iraqi state on oil revenues remains a key challenge for the government
with regard to economic expansion. Lack of economic opportunity,
coupled with a lack of modernisation across all areas of Iraq, has led to
a massive backlash against both the Iraqi government and the US-led
coalition forces. This is creating a massive pool of future recruits for
insurgent and terrorist groups, who have once again begun to entrench
themselves in some of the poorest and least policed areas of Iraq, such
as Karbala, Al Anbar, and Al Muthanna.
Since the US invasion even more pressure has been placed on the
already critical economic situation in Iraq. This has not been aided
by the policy of promoting external contractors to carry out internal
infrastructural reconstruction programmes. The importance of dealing

with these economic challenges, however, goes beyond their economic
values. They argue that the insurgency in Iraq is partially fuelled by the
dissatisfaction of the Iraqi population, particularly in the Sunni areas.
Insurgent and terrorist groups recruit from unemployed and disenfran-
chised Iraqis who do not see any hope for the future, and who blame the
lack of economic and job opportunities on the Iraqi government, the
occupation of US forces, and the failure of post-conflict reconstruction
efforts.25 Without the improvement in general economic standards in
Iraq, the process of modernisation can never really be implemented and
this will have catastrophic effects not only on the people of the country
but on the stability of the country itself.
Iraq is an Arab-dominated country, with almost 80 percent of the popu-

lation being of Arab descent. The ethnic composition of Iraq is one of
the main contributing factors to its instability, with differing ethnic
groups, namely Shia, Sunni, and Kurd, each having their own political,
economic, and social differences. This ethnic breakdown shares close ties
to the religious composition and its effects on Iraq. Iraq is also a Muslim-
dominated country, with almost 97 percent of the population being
Muslim. This fact in and of itself does not have a direct effect on the level
of state failure. It is, instead, the internal divisions within the Muslim
community that have the most significant effects on Iraq’s stability.
Iraq’s Muslims are divided into the majority Shia (60–65 percent)
and the minority Sunni (32–37 percent). The ongoing struggle between
these two groups has contributed significantly to the growing levels
of political and social instability in Iraq. Of all of the cleavages that
exist within Iraqi society, it is those of the ethno-sectarian variety
that have had the most serious effects, not only on the stability of the
country but on the proliferation of the insurgency and terrorist activity.
Ethno-sectarian division involves the partition or decentralisation of a
state along ethnic and/or sectarian lines. This creates a security dilemma
that exists when one community faces a distrustful ‘other’ while at the
same time its own defensive actions are viewed as being antagonistic
to the security of that ‘other’.26 It has been argued that once conflict or
war mobilises these ethnic groups, that war cannot end until the popu-
lations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions.27
These ethno-sectarian cleavages have become even more important to
the stability of Iraq in the post-2003 period.
In the current discourse surrounding the political future of Iraq, there

are those who are calling for the complete ethno-sectarian division of
Iraq. It is argued that Iraq has three distinctly separate ethno-sectarian
communities, namely Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd, and that each of these
should exist in their own ethnic homogeneous state or province.28
There are those, however, who argue against the idea of the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq, noting that this will in no way put an end to
the terrorism. Instead, it may in fact increase the levels of violence and
terrorism in the country while destabilising the already weak country
even further. As historical precedent highlights, and especially in the
case of Iraq, the prevalence of inter-sectarian and non-sectarian-based
terrorist violence, the disintegration of the Iraqi central government,
the alienation and isolation of Iraqi minorities, and the likelihood of
opportunistic or defensive neighbours, all suggest that terrorism in Iraq
will continue even with the proposed federalisation of the country.29
Additionally, Iraq’s history of war and long-term violence has resulted
in there being a ‘culture of violence’ among its citizens, which is having
a significant impact not only on the levels of terrorism in the country,
but also on the country’s overall stability. The significance of cultural
violence is that it promotes structural and overt violence in a given
society, which denies human beings their four basic needs: survival,
well-being, identity, and freedom, all of which are extremely rare for
the Iraqi people.30 The culture of violence in Iraq is based on society’s
configuration of norms, practices, and institutions; it is a product of
social structural organisation and psycho-cultural dispositions.31 When
violence becomes so entrenched in everyday life, such as is the case
with Iraq, it becomes extremely difficult to break the cycle and change
perceptions about the use and validity of violence. Therefore, when
conflict arises, people tend to seek security in increasingly smaller and
narrower identity groups. This, it seems, is why the lines of contem-
porary armed conflict are increasingly drawn along ethnic, religious,
or regional affiliations rather than along ideological or class lines.32
Never has this been more applicable than in the case of Iraq, where the
underlying culture of violence is a core feature of the ethno-sectarian
conflict that is being fought alongside the evolving insurgency. For Iraq,
this concept of a culture of violence has become even more significant
since the 2003 US-led invasion. The full effect of this underlying cul-
ture was observed almost immediately following the fall of the Saddam
Hussein regime, with the riots and looting in Baghdad and Fallujah
being two of the prime examples. It has also become commonplace for
minor disputes to lead to massive outbreaks of violence, conflict, and
terrorism, which directly challenge not only the reconstruction and

security efforts but also the stability of the entire country. This culture
of violence, which is entrenched in the psyche of the people, has taken
decades to reach the level it has today and will not be eradicated in a
short period of time. Policymakers need to try to develop ways to reduce
the Iraqi people’s reliance on acts of violence for solving disputes in
order to guarantee the stability and security of the country. Without
adequately addressing this issue, the levels of terrorism in Iraq are not
going to be reduced in the near future.
The US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation triggered

a breakdown of the already fragile Iraqi state. Against this backdrop
of mounting terrorism, mass exodus, and rampant corruption, the
state of Iraq began to crumble at an astounding rate. The invasion
triggered huge economic losses, further disruption and devastation
of the state’s capacity to function. There was a stunning loss of Iraqi
confidence in the occupiers, having witnessed a climate of lawlessness
that emboldened surviving regime loyalists other Iraqi nationalists,
religious extremists, and organised-crime rings to launch even broader
campaigns of terror, murder, and mayhem under their influence. For a
brief period, the Iraqi state ceased to exist in any meaningful form and
a complete political vacuum emerged. As a result, Iraq descended into a
‘failed state syndrome’, a process that the country had little or no inde-
pendent capacity to stop.33 From the period 2003 through to 2010, Iraq
went through five phases of instability and war:
• Phase 1: Foreign entry (March 2003–September 2003)

• Phase 2: Loss of control (September 2003–March 2006)
• Phase 3: Full-scale civil war (March 2006–March 2008)
• Phase 4: Turning point (March 2008–March 2009)
• Phase 5: Stasis (March 2009–March 2010)34
The Sunni insurgency that emerged in Iraq as a direct result of the

invasion was not the product of any one specific politically or socio-
economically marginalised group. It was an interesting phenomenon
in that it was formed by a dominant group that was seeking to restore a
position of power that it had once held, which was then joined by other
groups who began to vie for power. From this breakdown of the most
commonly affiliated groups in the insurgency, a further division can be
distinguished comprising of two main active groupings. The first group,

who are in the majority, can be described as being Islamic nationalists.
The aim of this group is to remove the coalition from Iraq. Their objec-
tives include reversing the political developments imposed by foreign
oppressors. These groups use Islam as a unifying force in the resistance
movement, not as a tool for the promotion of a global jihad. The second
group are the minority and more radical of the two. These are composed
mainly of Jihadi Salafists and strict ideological Ba’athists. The aim of
this group is to oust the occupation from Iraq while also causing the
complete collapse of the political system, thus igniting a full-blown civil
war.35 Following the invasion ethno-sectarian identities were reified
into fixed political cleavages, where politics and identity were fused into
the concept of parties. This meant that national issues were now viewed
through an ethno-sectarian prism, with the consequence being that
particularistic concerns would now generally be the defining elements
of national policy.36 The overall result of the invasion and occupation
on Iraq was that the country’s entire internal political, social, economic,
and security system was destroyed and the country was essentially trig-
gered into complete state collapse for an extremely short period of time.
The situation has not improved with the withdrawal of US forces
and has in fact deteriorated. At the peak of the occupation there were
over 170,000 US troops and more than 500 active bases across Iraq.
President Obama declared that the US was leaving behind a sovereign,
stable, and self-reliant Iraq. However, Iraq still lacks robust political
structures or even the basic ability to defend its borders, and the Iraqi
central government remains unable to promote its rule across the entire
country.37 Levels of terrorist violence are once again increasing and the
ethno-sectarian divisions are deepening at a rapid pace. The insurgency
is as active as it was at the beginning of the campaign, a fact highlighted
by the increasing levels of terrorist attacks. Terrorist organisations are
once again openly operating in areas of the country where govern-
ment influence is almost non-existent, such as parts of Al Anbar and
Karbala. Since the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq on December 18,
2012, there has been a significant increase in levels of violence across
the country. A series of deadly attacks are now threatening to push Iraq
into a situation of renewed chaos and state failure. During the occupa-
tion, armed groups were directly challenging the US forces, which was
expected. However, the levels of violence post-withdrawal have shocked
many, especially in terms of the growing tensions between Sunnis and
Shias, Kurds and Arabs, and Muslims and Christians that are erupting
en masse across the country.
The escalating levels of violence being witnessed in Iraq are taking

place in many different parts of the country, thus making it extremely
difficult for the government to try to improve the nation’s infrastruc-
ture and to prevent the nation from returning to the levels of instability
witnessed during the initial stages of the US invasion. It must be noted
that the levels of violence have not reached those witnessed during
the height of the sectarian conflict (2006–2007), but terrorist, extrem-
ist, and insurgent attacks remain an almost daily occurrence, resulting
in the deaths of several hundred Iraqis each month. According to the
Iraq Body Count (IBC) statistics, prior to the withdrawal of US troops
the average death rate was between 223 and 340 per month (2011).
For 2012 these numbers have risen and in January alone 451 civilians
were reported to have been killed, compared to 390 in January 2011.
The IBC also notes that 278 civilians were killed in February 2012, once
again an increase from the year before, when 250 had been killed.38
Table 8.1 provides a more in-depth view of the levels of fatalities during
the period 2003–2014.
Additionally, as can be seen from Figure 8.1, 2013 has far outreached
2012 in terms of overall levels of fatalities meaning that Iraq is nowhere
near the stable country that the US claimed to have left behind follow-
ing its, what is argued here, premature withdrawal.
This increase in violence is having a detrimental impact on the overall
stability of both the Iraqi government and the country as a whole. The
conflicts that Iraq is facing with its neighbouring states are having some
of the most significant impacts on the stability of the nation. Iraq is
a land-locked country, bordered by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait,
Jordan, and Turkey. Of all of its neighbours, however, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Syria have the most significant impact on Iraq, in relation to both
its stability and security and the terrorism threat. Some of the main
issues that exist between Iraq and Iran, for example, are in relation to
the border oilfields, the planned oil pipeline between Abadan and Basra,
and Iranian assistance to Iraq with regard to electricity and infrastruc-
ture, which is where a security dilemma is created. The fall of Saddam
Hussein in 2003 sparked a new era in Iraq–Iran relations, with Iran
seizing on the fractured political and vulnerable security situation in
Iraq and working vigorously to extend its economic and political reach
using both diplomatic and military means.39 Iran’s influence in Iraq
remains substantial, but it has waned from a high point in 2005–2008.
Some experts have long predicted that Iran’s influence would fade as
Iraq asserts its nationhood, as the security situation has improved, and
as Arab–Persian differences re-emerge. Iran has sought to achieve its
168
Table 8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2003–2014
Yr Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
03 3 2 3,977 3,435 546 597 647 794 565 517 486 526
04 610 663 1,004 1,303 654 901 825 874 1,033 1,016 1,652 1,112
05 1,188 1,284 902 1,144 1,392 1,346 1,530 2,276 1,422 1,298 1,467 1,133
06 1,544 1,570 1,946 1,799 2,271 2,571 3,283 2,851 2,559 2,977 3,064 2,886
07 2,970 2,652 2,699 2,538 2,834 2,192 2,690 2,481 1,366 1,295 1,110 987
08 847 1,072 1,637 1,299 890 747 643 682 606 590 535 582
09 372 403 426 567 390 501 407 618 333 435 226 475
10 263 304 336 385 387 385 443 516 254 312 307 218
11 389 254 311 289 381 386 308 401 397 366 279 388
12 524 356 377 392 304 529 469 422 396 290 253 275
13 357 360 403 545 888 659 1,145 1,012 1,221 1,095 903 983
14 1,076 930 1,009 1,013
Source: IBC.40
’12 ’13 ’14

9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
Figure 8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2012–2013
goals in Iraq through several strategies: supporting pro-Iranian factions

and armed militias, attempting to influence Iraqi political leaders and
faction leaders, and building economic ties throughout Iraq that might
accrue goodwill to Iran – strategies which have, on numerous occasions,
hindered US efforts to stabilise Iraq.41
As of early 2009, there appeared to be a public Iraqi rejection of
Iranian political influence over Iraq. Iran’s declining political influence
in Iraq was evident mainly through its failure to derail the forging of
the US–Iraq Security Agreement that authorised the US military presence
beyond December 31, 2008.42 By the end of 2009, Iran’s political influ-
ence in Iraq was further jeopardised by an increased political rift between
the pro-Iranian Shi’ite factions. Iranian influence is most prevalent in
Baghdad, the Kurdish areas of the north, and Shi’ite areas in the south.
There are numerous allegations that Iran has been arming and training
Shi’ite militias in Iraq, one specifically emanating from General Petraeus.
He noted in 2008 that Iran was continuing to arm, train, and direct
‘Special Groups’ – radical and possibly breakaway elements of the Jaish
al-Mahdi (JAM) – and to organise the Special Groups into a ‘Hezbollah-
like force to serve [Iran’s] interests and fight a proxy war against the
Iraqi state and coalition forces…’.43 Trade relations have also burgeoned,
especially following the decrease in terrorism in Iraq after 2007.
By the beginning of 2009, the two countries conducted about
$4 billion in bilateral trade and also developed a free trade zone around
Basra, which buys electricity from Iran. This increase in economic rela-
tions continued in 2011, with Iraq, Iran, and Syria signing a $10 billion
natural gas deal in which the three states agreed to construct a pipeline
originating in southern Iran and extending to Syria.
The relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has also had a massive
impact on Iraq, especially in relation to terrorism. It is inevitable that
religious issues play a significant role in the Saudi–Iraqi dynamic, but
neither government had any religion-based concerns or grievances
regarding the other until 2009 and the bombings in Baghdad. Saudi
Arabia’s Iraq policy is dominated by four main issues: oil production,
domestic stability within Iraq, foreign presence/influence in Iraq, and
Iraq’s ongoing political evolution. Saudi Arabia shares its longest bor-
der with Iraq, the majority of which is remote, un-demarcated and
undefended. The lack of patrolling of this border has resulted in an
uncontrolled flow of terrorist operatives in both directions, bringing
with them heavy arms pilfered from the former regime. The Saudi gov-
ernment’s biggest fear is that disorder will spill over its own borders,
bringing with it people who are willing to join al-Qaeda elements who
are already active in Saudi Arabia.44 Although foreign jihadists consti-
tute a relatively small proportion of the insurgent fighters in Iraq, they
make up the vast majority of the suicide bombers, with some analysts
estimating as many as 75 percent of the suicide attacks are carried
out by Saudis.45 Although the Saudi government is more immediately
worried about instability on the kingdom’s northern border than about
the internal shape of a future Iraqi government, this does not mean
it is unconcerned about the direction of Iraq’s political evolution.46
However, of even greater concern to the Saudis than the stability in Iraq
are the ambitions of Iran, Turkey, and Syria in the region. The current
crisis between Syria and Iraq is an extremely serious development,
which could possibly induce spillover effects on a wide range of issues
beyond the development of bilateral relations. However, unlike Iran,
Syria remains a relatively marginal player in Iraq.
Nonetheless, Damascus has embarked on a concerted strategy to culti-
vate relations with key Iraqi political players across ethnic and sectarian
lines. Iraq and Syria have had a tortured relationship for decades, but up
until recently relations between the two traditional rivals had seemed to
be warming considerably.47 Syria’s alleged ‘blind eye’ to the funnelling
of insurgents and arms across its border into Iraq has been a key issue
dividing the two countries. The western areas of Iraq adjacent to Syria
are largely Sunni, with tribal ties spreading over the border into areas
like al-Bukamil and Deir az-Zor, where there has been serious unrest
and suspicion of cross-border support. Syria’s failure to prevent Sunni
fighters from infiltrating across its 450-mile border with Iraq is the most
contentious issue dividing the two countries. Insurgents crossing into
Iraq from Syria generally fall into two categories: pro-al-Qaeda jihadists
transiting from the Gulf and former Iraqi Ba’athists and other Iraqi
Sunni elements.48 The Syrian government strongly denies allegations
that it is allowing its border to serve as an insurgent gateway. The mag-
nitude of the insurgent threat emanating from Syria is difficult to gauge.
Even if Damascus provides full cooperation in preventing insurgent
and arms traffic across its border, the overall impact of Iraq’s conflict,
while positive, would probably not significantly improve Iraq’s internal
stability. While the flow of insurgents from Syria into Iraq has garnered
significant attention, the flow of refugees from Iraq into Syria exerts a
far more destabilising impact.49 The continuous flow of Iraqi refugees
into Syria has triggered widespread inflation and severely strained
Syria’s already insufficient public services and infrastructure.
The refugees are placing increased pressures on Syria’s subsidised
economy, as the country’s worn infrastructure and overburdened pub-
lic services are forced to meet even greater demands.50 As well as the
growing terrorist threat, Iraq’s government is increasingly worried that
a prolonged standoff in neighbouring Syria could upset its own fragile
security and fractious political order, especially following the with-
drawal of US troops. The Iraqi government is so focused on this issue
that, despite the fact that its military is already overstretched, it has
stepped up security this month along the 376-mile border with Syria in
an attempt to protect itself from the fallout of clashes there.51 Since the
beginning of the Syrian crisis it has become apparent that armed groups
are increasingly forging links across the Syrian–Iraqi border, which
is fuelling sectarian tensions. The UN special envoy to Iraq, Nikolay
Mladenov, has warned that the conflict in Syria was ‘affording terrorist
networks the occasion to forge links across the (Iraq–Syria) border and
expand their support base’. He has also warned that the combination
of a divided leadership in Iraq, coupled with unresolved constitutional
issues between communities and the growing threat emanating from
Syria has resulted in the creation of a ‘fragile and explosive’ situation
in Iraq.52 The situation is becoming even more fragile for the already
over-stretched al-Maliki government due to the increasing protests by
the Sunnis, who feel that they are being mistreated by the Shia-led
government. According to reports, clashes between security forces and
Sunni tribesman in Anbar province have resulted in the displacement
of over 400,000 people.53 These tensions have then been further height-
ened by the conflict in Syria which is placing more pressure on the
sectarian divide. Al-Maliki had previously noted (2013) the impact that
the Syrian war could have on Iraq, highlighting the fact that a victory
for the rebels in Syria would spark a sectarian war in Iraq. It seems that
he was correct and Iraq is now in an extremely precarious position in

terms of its security and overall levels of state stability. Therefore, for
Iraq, the influence of and conflict with its neighbouring states has had
a strong influence, not only on its stability but also on its overall secu-
rity levels, as these states have been sources of weapons, funding, and
support for both the insurgency and terrorist threat within the country.
Summary
One of the most important aspects with regard to the current situation
in Iraq has been the impact of the US-led invasion in 2003. Following
this invasion, Iraq was triggered into state failure, which caused massive
instability and fragility in all areas of the state. This triggered failure
makes Iraq an extremely unique case in relation to the analysis of
the connections between terrorism and state failure there. Iraq today
remains one of the central figures in the ongoing battle against terror-
ism and extremism in the Middle East and has unfortunately become a
bastion for militants and extremists all over the world, who use it as a
legitimising factor in their pursuit of a global Islamic caliphate. It
appears likely that, unless the underlying issues facing the Iraqi state
are addressed swiftly and correctly, the state will continue to suffer from
high levels of terrorism. The current Iraqi government has made some
improvements in the stability of Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime, yet the country remains on a knife-edge in relation to its levels
of state failure and terrorist activity. The lack of progress in relation to
security within Iraq means that the country is nowhere near reaching
the targets set by the US (i.e. building a safer and more stable Iraq)
upon their initial invasion of Iraq almost a decade ago. In 2011 the
levels of terrorist activity rose by almost 20 percent and groups such as
al-Qaeda have once again begun to emerge openly in cities across the
country.54
In addition, the Arab Spring is having a spillover effect in Iraq and has
increased levels of terrorism on the somewhat porous border areas with
Syria. Security in Iraq is nowhere near the levels it needs to be in order
to allow the government to deal with the terrorist and insurgent threat,
and until these issues are addressed the situation in Iraq will remain
fragile at best and explosive at worst. The evolution of the state has
been marred by the inadequacies and overall bad leadership of its gov-
ernments. Under Saddam’s leadership, the state developed a policy of
supporting terrorist groups in order to promote its foreign policy objec-
tives, which would have detrimental effects on the strength of the state
and on terrorism within the state. The government Iraq under Nouri
al-Maliki appeared at first to be playing an active role in developing the
Iraqi state into a democratic system. However, claims of corruption and
dictator-like actions against al-Maliki suggest that Iraq may once again
be facing a military-style leadership structure. The withdrawal of US
forces will have a devastating impact not only on the stability and ter-
rorist levels in Iraq, but also for the entire region. In the already fragile
Iraq, the government appears to be pushing the country to a turning
point with deeply sectarian dimensions, which could lead to another
civil war in the country.
9
Conclusion
Prior to the 2000s, the world’s failed states were seen primarily through
the lens of humanitarian issues, and the concept that these states could
be the leading players in the era of ‘new’ modern terrorism was unim-
aginable. This perception changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and
since then the role played by failed states in relation to international
terrorism, such as the case of Afghanistan, has been given much more
attention. However, the majority of failed states have not experienced
significant levels of terrorism, nor have they become major source of
international terrorism. Although the phenomena of state failure and
terrorism have been extensively studied, especially over the past decade,
the underlying connections between the two phenomena have remained
relatively underexplored. Throughout the chapters of this book there
have emerged three key questions, which relate to the possible connec-
tions between failed states and terrorism that this book aims to answer:
• To what extent do failed states play a role in the proliferation of

terrorism in the global context?
• Is it possible to trace a pattern of state failure that is more susceptible
to attracting or facilitating terrorism and terrorist organisations?
• What are the underlying conditions of state failure that allow the
infiltration of terrorist organisations into the territory of the states
concerned?
As well as the questions listed above, this book also aimed to address the
limitations in current research, which include the following:
1. There has been a general lack of analytical and empirical research

on the connections between state failure and terrorism, with the
174
Conclusion 175
majority of literature focusing on a limited number of studies and

tools for measuring state failure which are already in existence, such
as the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index. However, the use of this
ranking scheme as a tool for assessing the connections between
state failure and terrorism is misguided, as the Failed State Index, for
example, only aims to measure state failure not terrorism.
2. There is little, if any, in-depth comparative analysis within the
literature with regard to the connections between state failure and
terrorism, and where this does occur it usually relies on the most
basic understandings of the process of state failure.
3. The current spectrum of state failure and the analytical tools used
have become somewhat outdated and fail to address those states that
fall ‘in-between’ the set categories of failed states. This is leading to
the creation of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to state failure, which
needs to be addressed.
This book has aimed to address these limitations and provide a more
in-depth analysis of the phenomena of state failure and terrorism in
the comparative and analytical context. The areas of terrorism and state
failure and their connections have been presented, analysed, and dis-
cussed in great detail. All three of the states covered in this book share
similar historical experiences and have a dominant Muslim population,
which may result in higher levels of extremism and radicalisation, thus
leading to a stronger link to the current trend in Islamic-fronted terror-
ism. It must be noted, however, that there are a number of differences
that exist between these states, specifically with regard to the case of
Iraq. Most specifically, Iraq in the context of state failure was unique
in the context of this research in that its process of failure was almost
entirely triggered by outside forces, i.e. the US-led invasion in 2003. For
this reason, Iraq is being termed a ‘Triggered’ case study in state failure,
which makes it unique in terms of both its levels of state failure and
the existence of terrorism within its territory. This makes Iraq different
from the other cases and, even though they share similar structures and
beliefs, and has allowed the analysis of a distinctive case to be carried
out. There were a number of other possible case studies to choose from,
such as Somalia, but it was decided that common cases were the best fit
to the research questions rather than any other form of case selection.
The overall aim of this book was to fully understand the concepts of
state failure and terrorism on the individual and comparative levels and to
assess what, if any, are the specific connections between state failure and
terrorism which can be identified. The centrality of focus that is placed
on the arguments that failed states and terrorism are directly linked in the
majority of the literature and policy documents is fundamentally flawed
and exaggerated, and may in fact be detrimental to the study of state fail-
ure and terrorism. This argument stems from the fact that, as mentioned
above, there is a lack of detailed analytical and empirical research on the
connections between state failure and terrorism. As well as that, the argu-
ment that failed states are directly connected to terrorism has not been
subject to detailed examination and in many cases the ‘one size fits all’
approach is used when both discussing and assessing the role played by
the process of state failure in relation to terrorism.
The connections between state failure and terrorism have been
debated and argued throughout the academic literature, especially over
the last decade, with authors such as James A. Piazza, Aidan Hehir,
Robert Rotberg, Hamre and Sullivan, Wilkenfield and Gurr, Takeyh
and Gvosdev, and Stewart Patrick being the most prolific in their field.
Taking some of these main authors into consideration, the following
provides an overview of some of their main arguments and critiques:
– Hamre and Sullivan argue that failed states are threats to interna-
tional security and the chances that they will become sanctuaries
for terrorist networks with a global reach are higher than those for
strong, functioning states.1
– Other academic studies, including those by Piazza and Hewitt, and
Wilkenfield and Gurr, have also concluded that state failure has direct
connections to terrorist activity.2 Piazza hypothesises that state fail-
ure helps to foster the conditions necessary to create and/or enable
terrorists.3
– Takeyh and Gvosdev argue that failed states lack the ability to project
power internally and have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement
capacities, thus providing opportunities for terrorist groups to organ-
ise, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications
centres.4 They also argue that failed states offer terrorist groups larger
pools of recruits as they contain larger numbers of disaffected citizens
for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behaviour.
Also, having carried out a large-scale literature review, a number of core

arguments were found that are repeated with regard to the connections
between state failure and terrorism:
1. Failed states enable and facilitate the emergence of terrorism.

2. Failed states are more likely to contain terrorist groups than
non-failed states.
Conclusion 177
3. Failed state are more to likely have high level of terrorist attacks and
contain high numbers of terrorist groups.
4. Failed states are more likely to be used as havens by terrorist
organisations/groups.
One of the main critiques of the above arguments is that there is a lack
of adequate levels of research in the field. The majority of the literature
has focused on general discussions of state failure and terrorism rather
than on detailed empirical studies of the relationship and connections
between the two phenomena. Because of this limitation, this book
has also aimed to negate these arguments and instead argue that in
the majority of cases there may in fact be no conclusive relationship
between failed states and terrorism. It is argued here, having carried out
an in-depth analysis of the literature, that the centrality afforded to the
argument that failed states and terrorism are directly linked is, in many
cases, exaggerated and misleading. This is tied to an interesting finding
of the review: the fact that the countries with the highest number of
active terrorist groups are not necessarily the most failed states accord-
ing to the Failed State Index. These countries tend to be located more
towards the failing to weak level on the spectrum of state failure.
The main arguments contained in this book also highlight that,
firstly, there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level
of failure and the number of terrorist groups that are based there.
Secondly, the placement or ranking of a particular state on the Failed
State Index does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with
respect to the incidence of terrorism. Finally, there are significant num-
bers of FTOs and domestic terrorist groups present in states with a low
level of failure, as well as in relatively strong democracies. It is argued
here that one of the most significant issues with the existing hypothesis
on state failure is that there are failed states that do not exhibit any asso-
ciation with terrorism. Yet, it can also be argued that states which are
not classified as failed, and that have relatively stronger economic and
human development scores, also appear to be prone both to contain-
ing terrorist organisations and becoming the victim of terrorist attacks.
This counter-intuitive finding could possibly suggest that a relatively
more structured and efficient economic base actually favours the facili-
tation of terrorist organisations in a specific area than does complete
economic collapse and failure. If all failed states were directly linked
to being breeding grounds and bases for terrorist organisations, then it
would be expected that those states listed at the top of the Failed State
Index would exhibit extremely high numbers of terrorist groups, but
this is not, in the majority of cases, the reality: e.g. Democratic Republic
of Congo and Sudan. These findings therefore negate the hypothesis
contained in such works as Piazza’s ‘Incubators of terror: do failed and
failing states promote terrorism’.5
It must be mentioned, however, that certain failed states have acted as
bases and hosts for terrorist groups, but there are no definitive connec-
tions in relation to this which can provide an example of which failed
state would be more likely to produce terrorism. Therefore, it is more
convincing to argue that there are many other factors besides a state’s
level of failure that would make it more likely to produce terrorism.
Thus the decision to actually establish a terrorist base in a specific state
does not seem to equate with either the generic quality of state failure
inherently attractive to terrorists nor to the particular attractiveness
associated with the level of failure within that state. It must also be high-
lighted that other states experience failure, yet are not targeted by these
groups and have no demonstrable association with terrorism. Certain
conditions within failed states may be conductive to the emergence of
terrorist groups, but the problem lies in the fact that these particular
problems are not specific to failed states and democracies also play host
to terrorist groups. In fact, it has been argued that many western stable
democracies actually contain many of the elements that are more attrac-
tive to terrorist organisations than do those states that have failed.
Therefore it has been argued throughout this book that the majority
of failed states pose little if any significant global security threat and
have, in fact, insignificant connections to the spread of international
terrorism. It is more likely that if terrorism is going to occur in these
states, it will emanate from domestic terrorist groups and not from
FTOs. In fact, these states are more likely to pose security threats to
their own citizens through threat of death and injury through civil war;
low-level violence; threat of criminality (rape, robbery, expulsion from
villages/homes); threats in terms of hunger; disease; etc. This is similar
on an external basis, where failed states often pose threats in terms of
spillover to neighbouring states of armed groups, ethnic groups, weap-
ons flows, cross-border criminality, etc. Through this understanding
of the typical level of threats posed by the majority of failed states, it
could be argued that the larger global threat posed by failed states
has been exaggerated. Of the top 10 states listed on the Failed State
Index for 2011, only three (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have any
significant levels of terrorist activity, whereas states that are lower on
the index, such as Indonesia (63), Philippines (56), and Lebanon (45),
contain relatively higher numbers of terrorist groups than the other top
Conclusion 179
20 failed states listed in the Failed State Index.6 This counter-argument

of the main authors such as Robert Rotberg and Adeed Dawisha – the
augmented spectrum of state failure, the creation of the indicator lists,
and more in-depth analysis of the cases in question – has been one of
the main contributions to the field of terrorism and state failure.
Main findings of research
The standard version of the spectrum of state failure contains five dif-
ferent levels of failure, beginning at strong and moving to weak, failing,
failed, and finally collapsed. The augmented spectrum of state failure,
specifically devised for this book, contains an additional five categories
of failure: resilient/enduring states, faltering states, fragile states, endem-
ically weak states, and crisis states. The development of this augmented
spectrum of state failure has numerous positive implications for the
understanding of the concept of state failure and provides a sophisti-
cated understanding of the range and types of states that may be affected
by failure. Chapters 3–8 then focused on carrying out a comparative case
study analysis of three states currently classified as being failed and that
are severely afflicted with terrorist activity – Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Iraq. This comparative analysis was carried out by applying and assess-
ing the impact that the factors identified in Chapters 1 and 2, had on
each of the countries in relation to terrorism. It is argued here that the
most significant factors in relation to the impact that they have on
both the stability of the state and the issue of terrorism in Afghanistan
are: regime type; declining state authority and institutional capacity;
ideological cleavages; corruption and the lack of rule of law; culture of
violence; foreign occupation; and external/foreign intervention; conflict
with neighbouring states; safe havens; porous borders; pools of recruits;
availability of weapons; and government complicity and support.
For the case of Pakistan, a similar trend emerged with regard to the
factors that had the most significant impact on the levels of state fail-
ure and terrorism affecting the country. The following are the most
influential factors that have had an impact on Pakistan: regime type;
declining state authority; corruption and the lack of rule of law; culture
of violence; foreign occupation and external/foreign intervention; con-
flict with neighbouring states; decline in social and political order; safe
havens; porous borders; pool of recruits; and government complicity
and support. Finally, having analysed Iraq, there emerged a number of
important factors which provided an insight into reasons why the state
has become such a hub of terrorist activity. The following are the factors
which appeared most significant for Iraq in relation to both its level of
state failure and terrorism: regime type; declining state authority and
institutional capacity; ideological cleavages; corruption and the lack
of rule of law; culture of violence; nationalist struggle for autonomy;
demographic imbalances; foreign occupation and external/foreign
intervention; conflict with neighbouring states; the breakdown/decline
of social, political and economic order; the existence of safe havens;
porous borders; availability of pools of recruits; the availability of weap-
ons; and government complicity and support. Table 9.1 provides an
overview of the comparative results of the significance of each of the
factors as applied to the case studies.
Table 9.1 Impact of factors used in case studies
Type Factor Afghanistan Pakistan Iraq
Political Regime type X X X

Declining state authority X X X
and institutional capacity
Political marginalisation
and political grievances/
discontent
Ideological cleavages X X
Corruption and a lack of X X X
rule of law
Nationalistic struggle for X
autonomy
Economic Poverty
Economic marginalisation
and/or the uneven
distribution of wealth
Rapid modernisation and
a deepening economic
stagnation
Social/cultural Demographic imbalances X
and cleavages
Culture of violence X X X
External/ Foreign occupation and X X X
environmental external/foreign intervention
Conflict with neighbouring X X X
states
Natural disasters and
natural Resources
(continued)
Conclusion 181
Table 9.1 Continued
Type Factor Afghanistan Pakistan Iraq
Government/ Weakness and/or absence X

state weakness of state structures
Breakdown/ Breakdown and decline X X
decline of of social, political and
social, political economic
and economic
order
Safe havens Weakness or absence of X X X
state control of certain
regions enables the
creation of safe havens
Porous borders Weakness of absence of state X X X
control allows terrorists and
recruits to transit in and out
of the country with ease
Pool of recruits May be caused by e.g. youth X X X
bulge, high unemployment
rates, and political, social,
economic alienation
Availability of X X
weapons
Government Not necessarily linked to X X X
complicity/ state failure but state failure
support may make it more difficult
for governments to oppose
terrorist groups and/or
create additional
incentives to support them
Boxes marked with X denote a significant impact of that factor on the case study
Aside from the factors listed above, there were a number of core
distinguishing features specific to the individual case studies that
enabled them to be further distinguished from each other with regard
to their levels of state failure and terrorist activity. The augmented
spectrum of state failure that was developed for this book provided the
addition of five new categories of state failure:
– Resilient/enduring state
– Faltering state
Table 9.2 Alternative state failure descriptions of the case studies
Original spectrum of state Augmented spectrum of state

State failure categorisation failure categorisation
Afghanistan Failed state Crisis/failing state
Pakistan Failed state Endemically weak/crisis state
Iraq Failed state Crisis yet functioning state
– Fragile state
– Endemically weak state
– Crisis state
The addition of the extra categories of state failure may provide a more
nuanced understanding of the process of state deterioration in countries
across the world that may now be miscategorised as failed according to
the current spectrum of state failure. Having carried out the analysis of
each of the case studies and applying the newly formed augmented spec-
trum of state failure, it is possible to draw up Table 9.2, which provides an
outline of the alternative level of state failure for each of the case studies.
Of the three case studies, Afghanistan was, prior to the 9/11 attacks
and subsequent US invasion, the closest to fitting the classical ideal or
model of what a failed state should be. The government in power at that
time, the Taliban, was in control of the majority of the country, but had
failed to provide the political, economic, and social institutions neces-
sary for a state to survive. The Taliban ruled through a policy of coer-
cion and violence and thus created a situation where their power only
existed as long as they were able to promote fear among the citizens of
the country. This resulted in numerous challenges to their dominance,
especially from rival Islamic groups such as the Northern Alliance, led
by Massoud. As a result of their inherent weakness in controlling the
state in an adequate fashion, de facto regional power centres emerged
in all provinces of the country which directly challenged the Taliban’s
central government. These de facto regional power centres also facili-
tated the emergence of terrorist organisations and extremist groups.
These groups flourished in the unstable environment and were able to
entrench themselves in areas of Afghanistan, especially those bordering
Pakistan. In the case of Afghanistan, the weakness of its border, espe-
cially that with Pakistan, coupled with the fragile and flawed govern-
ment of the Taliban, pushed it towards failure. For the purpose of this
book, Afghanistan is not described as being a failed state; it is instead
described as being a crisis/failing state.
Conclusion 183
It was the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent US invasion that

triggered a brief collapse of the state and also created a power vacuum.
This enabled terrorism to expand across all regions of Afghanistan, thus
challenging the legitimacy of the government and preventing the state
from functioning in any decent capacity. Currently, the areas where the
insurgency is the strongest are primarily areas controlled by the Taliban,
including the northern districts of Kandahar Province, the north-
eastern districts of Helmand province, the southern districts of Oruzgan
Province, the western districts of Zabul Province, and districts in
Paktika, Paktia, Gardez, Wardak, and Logar Provinces. For Afghanistan,
its ongoing insurgency stems from three fundamental issues. The first
emanates from the lack of state formation and the inability of the
central government to establish a significant presence throughout the
country. This lack of influence creates instability and also causes power
vacuums that extremist and terrorist groups are more than willing
and able to fill. The second issue is the failure to make the rural areas
secure. This failure makes it impossible to carry out the necessary devel-
opment and reconstruction efforts that other parts of Afghanistan are
privy to, thus causing resentment and distrust in the government from
these areas. This is apparent in such areas as Zabol, Paktika, Paktia, and
Nangarhar. Finally, there has been a lack of any meaningful improve-
ment in the lives of the majority of people in the southern half of the
country. These areas, such as Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah,
are some of the poorest and least developed areas of Afghanistan, and it
is from here that the majority of terrorist attacks have emanated.7
For the case of Pakistan, there is an extremely significant regional
variation that exists in relation to its level of state failure. Even though
Pakistan borders the extremely fragile Afghanistan, it does not share all
of its traits listed above. For Pakistan, state failure is province-specific
and not a whole-country phenomenon. Pakistan has been described
in this book as being a failed, failing, and functioning state all at the
same time. The border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are
some of the most dangerous in the world and are, on both sides of
the border, highly failed. For Pakistan these regions, specifically FATA,
NWFP, and Waziristan, witness little to no government control, have
no political, social, or economic institutions, and are essentially lawless
in nature. These are the regions of Pakistan that have been described
as completely failed and witness the highest levels of terrorist activity.
Then there are those areas of Pakistan which function quite effectively
and have all of the necessary tools to be classified as functioning. These
areas tend to lie in and around the capital city of Islamabad, and include
the towns of Gurjat, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. These areas contain high
levels of government visibility, have the necessary political, social, and
economic institutions, and show high levels of support for the govern-
ment. However, these areas also witness high levels of terrorist activity
and are targets for the numerous extremist terrorist groups active in
Pakistan. The areas in between these regions are functioning adequately
but remain unstable. They include areas such as Sibi, Multan, Zhob,
Sukkur, and Khairpur. It is in these areas that the least amount of ter-
rorist activity occurs, but where government influence is weak – which
is interesting, as one would assume that due to the inherent weakness
they would act as ideal havens for terrorist groups.
The government of Pakistan also has a role to play in relation to
terrorism. The Pakistani government, unlike that of Afghanistan and
Iraq, has a long history of supporting terrorist groups and of ‘turning a
blind eye’ to the actions of these groups. Successive Pakistani govern-
ments have promoted Islamic radicalism to further their ambitions in
Afghanistan and Kashmir. Throughout the current counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism programmes, there have been ongoing claims
from Kabul that Pakistani security forces chase al-Qaeda terrorists
within Pakistan but make little effort to arrest Taliban fighters or stop
them from crossing the border into Afghanistan.8 This support has
resulted in the expansion of terrorist groups that have an affiliation to
certain elements of the Pakistani government and has also resulted in
numerous challenges to the validity of the Pakistani government with
regard to its willingness to be involved in counterterrorism and counter-
insurgency missions in the region. Due to these ill-conceived Pakistani
policies of encouragement and appeasement of the extremist and
terrorist groups, fundamentalist Islam in the border regions may now
be too powerful to stop unless the countries on both sides of the border
address their underlying weaknesses. Violence in Pakistan is not, how-
ever, limited to Afghanistan-related issues. The underlying and inherent
weaknesses in the tribal regions provide the impetus for violent sectar-
ian organisations, such as the Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, to establish
operating bases there and expand their campaign of violence. This
increase in sectarian violence has also occurred in the south-western
province of Baluchistan, where the army and the Baluch Liberation
Army have engaged in major skirmishes.9 Pakistani jihadists’ strength,
and the growing weakness of the Pakistani state (as seen by its failures
during the August 2010 floods) meant that the Pakistani army could not
operate against the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other major terror-
ist organisations, even if it wanted to do so. It is therefore likely that,
Conclusion 185
until the underlying issues affecting the Pakistani state are inadequately
addressed, the Taliban will continue to receive sanctuary in Pakistan,
thus making it impossible to destroy the Afghan insurgency or quell the
increasing levels of violence in Pakistan.10
Unlike Afghanistan and Pakistan, where state failure was inher-
ent for a long period of time, failure in Iraq was triggered by outside
forces. Although the invasion by the US in 2003 easily toppled Saddam
Hussein’s regime, the ability of Western military intervention to suc-
ceed came into question very quickly after the removal of Saddam. The
US-led coalition was, on its initial arrival, ill-prepared for the multifac-
eted insurgency that developed, and as a result the country descended
into violence to such a degree that it appeared that there would be no
end to the foreign military mission.11 A troop surge and a change in the
tactical approach to the growing insurgency coincided with changes in
the relationships between the numerous competing factions and forces
within Iraq. The confluence of events permitted a political solution,
with an Iraqi civilian government being elected, but this did little,
if anything, to change the underlying situation. Essentially, external
intervention produced state collapse within Iraq, thus triggering an
anti-American insurgency. This insurgency combined over time with
the underlying ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq to become an
inter-ethnic/inter-religious terrorist campaign. Iraq remains distinctly
divided into three ethnic regions. The provinces of Dohuk, Erbil,
Ta’mim, Suleimaniyah, and Diyala to the north and north east con-
tain a Kurdish majority and are, in many ways, autonomous from the
central government of Iraq. These areas have, since the creation of
the state, caused tension and violence due to the claims of autonomy by
the Kurds in the region. In the areas of Ninevah, Ta’mim, Salahuddin,
Diyala, and Baghdad, there exists a majority of Sunni Muslims. These
areas of Iraq tend, along with the Kurdish regions, to be least affected
by terrorist activity. They do, however, exist as somewhat fragile regions
with limited government control and influence in places.
The regions of Iraq that witness the highest levels of both state failure
and terrorist activity are those with the Shia Muslim majority. These
areas are Karbala, Wasit, Baghdad (which is a highly divided province),
Babil, Qadisiyah, Misan, Dhi-Qar, and Basrah. It is too soon to tell how
far a functioning state is being re-established in Iraq and it is also too
soon to ascertain whether levels of terrorism will decline or increase
following the withdrawal of US troops. The situation there remains
highly unstable and the government in power faces challenges to its
legitimacy from all areas of the country. As well as that, the political,
social and economic institutions, which were essentially destroyed by

the US during the invasion, now only exist and function in the major
cities in and around Baghdad.
As can be seen from the above overview, there are subtle underlying
differences in the character of state failure and how it relates to terror-
ism within each of the case studies. This ties into the overall analysis of
the relationship between state failure and terrorism.
Concluding observations
Throughout the book there are numerous findings that both support
and challenge the overall arguments and understandings of the con-
nections between state failure and terrorism. From the results outlined
above, it becomes obvious that there is no one factor that can determine
whether a state is more susceptible to terrorism. Rather, it is a combina-
tion of factors which, when they reach the ‘perfect storm’ of instability,
enable terrorist groups to infiltrate and expand. Some other interesting
findings have also emerged throughout the process of this book. Firstly,
there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level of failure
and the number of terrorist groups that are based there. Secondly, the
placement or ranking of a particular state on the Failed State Index
does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with respect to the
incidence of terrorism. Finally, there are significant numbers of Foreign
Terrorist Organisations and Domestic Terrorist Organisations present in
states with a low level of failure, as well as in relatively strong democ-
racies – for example ETA in Spain and the Continuity Irish Republican
Army in Ireland. The understanding of the connections between
state failure and terrorism gained from this research has provided an
important input for the realms of terrorism and state failure. It has a
significant impact for our understanding and comprehension of the
relationship between state failure and terrorism and also has a signifi-
cant impact on the realm of international relations with regard to the
study of terrorism in the international context.
This is a growing field of research and the tools developed in this
book may be of use in future contextual analysis of state failure and
its connections to terrorism on a larger scale. It also has a significant
impact on the study of Middle Eastern and South Asian politics, with a
specific focus on statehood and the processes of state failure that have
occurred in these areas. There is one common element that ties each
of these states together, and that is Islam. Although highly contro-
versial, it must be noted that the majority of terrorism witnessed in
Conclusion 187
today’s world occurs in the Islamic world and is undertaken by Islamic

groups.12 This has created a tie between Islam and terrorism which
has permeated throughout academic literature, policy documents, and
new reports. This connection between Islam and terrorism produces an
argument which is based around the notion that failed and weak states
with Islamic populations may currently be a particular problem rather
than those failed states that do not have a majority Islamic presence.
Therefore, counter-terrorism policies and future counter-terrorism mis-
sions should focus on these Islamic nations of the world. However, it
is argued here that, even though the majority of terrorist acts today are
carried out by individuals and groups with ties or affiliations towards
Islam, this cannot be used as a core reason for all Islamic majority
countries to be seen as being threats with regard to terrorism. There
are many Islamic countries in the world that do not face the threat
from terrorism, nor do they contain high levels of terrorist organisa-
tions, such as Qatar and Oman. Therefore, one could argue that the
focus on Islamic countries as being definitive threats or possible threats
with regard to international terrorism is therefore somewhat erroneous
and may cause future problems with regard to the implementation of
counter-terrorism policy in these areas of the world.
This book may possibly inspire future research into the area of
state failure and terrorism in a different geographical context, such as
Africa, which has some of the highest concentrations of state failure,
yet comparatively the lowest levels of terrorist activity among these
kinds of states. It would prove extremely interesting to carry out such
an analysis, specifically on a state such as Somalia, which is an Islamic
country and has been consistently one of, if not the most, failed states
in the world, yet has not been as directly involved in the current trend
of terrorism on any large scale. There are, however, some signs that
Somalia may be moving closer towards this trend, with the US in 2006
carrying out attacks against the al-Shabaab terrorist group, who are pro-
gressively becoming more aggressive with their use of violence. As well
as that, states such as Nigeria (where Boko Haram operates) may also, in
the future, become havens for terrorist organisations and are currently
witnessing increasing levels of violence in the context of terrorism.
This may be a precursor to the shift and evolution of terrorism over the
coming years. Essentially, this book has argued that there is no direct
correlation between a state’s placement on the Failed State Index and the
number of terrorist groups contained there. From this, then, it can be
argued that there are other factors, unrelated to the degree or character
of state failure, which determine whether a state is likely to experience
terrorism or indeed become a source of terrorism. State failure and state

weakness can make a state more vulnerable or susceptible to terrorism
internally, by penetration of foreign terrorist groups, and by becoming
safe havens for international terrorism. However, whether or not failed
or weak states experience terrorism is dependent on other factors which
relate to their historical and political experience and patterns of devel-
opment, and which also relate to international and ‘outside’ factors and
influences. Therefore, to automatically suggest that a failed state is more
likely to be a terrorist state simply due to its failure is misleading at best.
There exist many failed states in the world today that do not play a role
in terrorism and that are in no way tied to the facilitation or existence
of terrorist groups. Overall then, this book has shown that, even though
there may be certain features of failed states that make them attractive
to terrorist organisations and more prone to terrorist violence, not all
failed states are affected by or influence terrorism in the same way or
through the same factors.
Notes
Preface
1. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, p. 16, Penguin, London.
2. Wolff, Stefan (2006) State Failure in a Regional Context, http://www.stefanwolff.
com/working-papers/state-failure.pdf.
1 Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure

1. Schmid, Alex P., Jongman, Albert, J., Michael, Stohl, H., Jan, Brand,
Flemming, Peter A., Van Der Poel, Angela, and Thijsse, Rob (1988) Political
Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and
Literature, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Books.
2. FBI, 28 C. F. R Section 0.85 (1998), Definitions of Terrorism, http://www.fbi.
gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.htm.
3. United Nations, United Nations Draft Convention, http://www.un.org/terrorism/
instruments.shtml.
4. United States State Department, Title 22 US Code Section 2656 f(d), http://
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2656f.html.
5. Ibid.
6. European Union Centre for Freedom, Security and Justice, Article 29 EU Treaty,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/terrorism/fsj_criminal_
terrorism_en.htm.
7. Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Towards a Definition of Terrorism,
http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/definition-terrorism.htm.
8. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566, http://www.un.org/en/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1566(2004).
9. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Clarifying
Definitions of Terrorism for the Purpose of Insurance, http://www.oecd.org/docu
ment/30/0,2340,en_2649_201185_34070430_1_1_1_1,00.html.
10. US Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, US
Patriot Act 2001, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html.
11. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Transnational Terrorism:
The Changing Nature of Modern Terrorism, http://www.transnationalterrorism.
eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf.
12. Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press.
13. Wilkinson, Paul, Nye, Joseph S. and Satoh, Yukio (2003) Addressing the New
International Terrorism; Prevention, Intervention and Multilateral Co-operation,
US: Trilateral Commission Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.
14. Schmid, Political Terrorism.
189
190 Notes
15. Ghupta, Dipak (2005) Exploring roots of terrorism, in Bjergo, Tore (ed.) Root
Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, Routledge University
Press, New York.
16. Bjergo, Root Causes of Terrorism.
17. Bandura, Albert (1990) Mechanisms of moral disengagement, in Reich,
Walter and Hamilton, Lee (eds) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies,
Theologies, States of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Washington D.C.
18. Roberts, Adam (2002) Can we define terrorism?, Oxford Today – The University
Magazine, Vol. 14, No. 2.
19. Held, Virginia (2008) How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence,
Oxford University Press, New York.
20. Sinai, Joshua (2008) How to define terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2,
No. 4.
21. Ibid.
22. Smelser, Neil J. and Mitchell, Faith (eds) (2002) Terrorism – Perspectives from
the Behavioural and Social Sciences, National Academic’s Press, Washington
DC.
23. Ibid.
24. Moghadam, Assaf (2006) The Roots of Terrorism, Chelsea House Publishing.
25. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
27. Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 57.
28. Ibid., p. 58.
29. Terrorism Research Unit (2010), State sponsored terrorism, http://www.
terrorism-research.com/state/.
30. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
31. United States Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism Annual List,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
32. Richardson, Louise (2006) What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy,
Containing the Threat, Random House, New York, p. 74.
33. Fukuyama, Francis (2006) Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Johns
Hopkins University Press, Maryland.
34. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.
35. Crenshaw, Martha (1981) The causes of terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13,
No. 4 July.
36. Smith, Haviland (2008) Defining terrorism: it shouldn’t be confused with
insurgency, American Diplomacy, December 2008, http://www.unc.edu/
depts/diplomat/item/2008/1012/comm/smith_defining.html.
37. Terrorism Research Centre (2009) Differences between Terrorism and
Insurgency, Retrieved February 12, 2009, http://www.terrorism-research.com/
insurgency/.
38. Bernsten, Gary (2008) Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National
Leadership: A Practical Guide, Potomac Books, Washington D.C.
39. Ibid.
40. CIA (2012), Guide to Analysis of Insurgency, http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/
product/insurgency.pdf.
41. Ibid.
42. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency 3–33.5
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), paragraph 1–2, 2.
Notes 191
43. National Defence University Press (2010), Insurgency: theory and practice,
NDUP, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.
44. Hammes, T.X. (2006) The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century,
St. Paul, MN Zenith Press, New York/London.
45. CIA, Guide to Analysis of Insurgency.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Rotberg, R. (2002) Failed states in a world of terror, Foreign, p. 2.
49. Crisis Research Centre (2012), Department for International Development at
London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.crisisstates.
com/.
50. United States, Fragile States Strategy 2005, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
pdaca999.pdf.
51. OECD (2013), OECD Fragile States, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/
FragileStates2013.pdf.
52. World Bank, Fragile States Index, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/theme-
conflict.html
53. Rotberg, Robert I. (2002) The new nature of nation-state failure, The
Washington Quarterly, Vol 25, No. 3.
54. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Economic Development
(OECD) (2008) Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations:
from fragility to resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper Series, http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf.
55. World Bank, Fragile States Index.
56. Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, Conflict Assessment Tools, http://global.
fundforpeace.org/cewa.
57. Rice, Susan E. and Patrick, Stewart (2008) Index of state weakness in the devel-
oping world, Brookings Institute for Peace Studies.
58. Ibid.
59. OECD, Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations.
60. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2010)
Promoting resilient states and constructive state-society relations – legitimacy,
transparency and accountability, Special Report No. 168, http://www.bmz.de/
en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/spezial168.pdf.
61. World Bank (2009) Making development climate resilient: a World bank
strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank Annual Report, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Overview_of_Strategy.pdf.
62. Patrick, Stewart and Brown, Kaysie (2007) Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assess-
ing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States, International Peace Academy.
2 Assessing the Connections Between State Failure,

Insurgency, and Terrorism
1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004) 9/11 Commission Report,
W.W Norton & Co Inc, New York, p. 361.
2. Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas (2002) Do terrorist networks need a home?,
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 Summer, pp. 97–108.
192 Notes
3. Ghulam M. Haniff (2009) Is Pakistan a Failed State? Hamara Pakistan, http://

hamarapakistan1947.wordpress.com/2009/09/16/is-pakistan-a-failed-state/.
4. ITS (2008) Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and
risks European Commission FP6 Program, http://www.transnationalterrorism.
eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf.
5. Newman, Edward (2007) Weak states, state failure and terrorism, Terrorism
and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 463–488, and Hehir, Aiden (2007)
The myth of the failed state and the war on terror, Journal of Intervention and
State-building, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 307–332.
6. Menkhaus, Ken (2003) Quasi-states, nation-building and terrorist safe
havens, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 7–23, and Von Hippel,
Karin (2002) The roots of terrorism: probing the myths, The Political Quarterly,
Vol. 73, No. 25, pp. 1–39.
7. Dublin Embassy (2004) Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 – State Department
Identifies 40 Foreign Terrorist Organisations, http://dublin.usembassy.gov/
ireland/terror_organisations.html.
8. National Counterterrorism Centre (2012), Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&
Rcv=Incident&Nf=p_IncidentDate%7CGTEQ+20080101%7C%7Cp_Incident
Date%7CLTEQ+20081231&N=0 and Fund for Peace Failed State Index http://
www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011.
9. National Counterterrorism Centre, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System.
10. Hehir, Aiden (2007) The myth of the failed state and the war on terror, Journal
of Intervention and State-building, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 307–332.
11. Von Keppel, Giles (2002) Jihad and the Trail of Political Islamism, Belknap
Press, Cambridge, p. 303.
12. Fund for Peace (2008) Failed State Index 2011, http://ffp.statesindex.org/
rankings-2011-sortable.
13. Innes, M. (2005) Terrorism sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: challenging
conventional assumptions, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 4,
p. 298.

1. BBC (2012), Focus on Afghanistan, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia-12011352.
2. Goodson, Larry P. (2001) Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional
Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, University of Washington Press, Washington
D.C, p. 12.
3. Crews, Robert D. and Tarzai, Amin (2008) The Taliban and the Crisis of
Afghanistan, Harvard University Press, USA, p. 11.
4. Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass
Mobilisation, Civil War and the Future of the Region, Palgrave, New York, p. 22.
5. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. ix.
6. Rotberg, Robert (2007) Building a New Afghanistan, Brookings Institute Press,
Washington D.C, p. 57.
7. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 74.
Notes 193
8. InfoPlease (2011) Afghan History – Early History, Pearson Family Education

Network, http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/world/afghanistan-
history.html.
9. Tanner, Stephen (2009) Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the
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10. InfoPlease, Pearson Family Education Network.
12. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan,
November 2008 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm.
13. Ritscher, Adam, A Brief History of Afghanistan, http://afghangovernment.
com/briefhistory.htm.
14. US Department of State, ‘Diplomacy in Action – Background Note:
Afghanistan’.
16. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan.
17. Rubin, Barnett R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University
Press, London, p. 17.
18. Margesson, Rhoda (2007) Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future
Prospects, CRS Report for Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.
pdf.
19. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan.
20. Singh, K. R. (2004) Post-war Afghanistan: reconstructing a failed state,
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 4.
22. Crews and Tarzai, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, p. 248.
24. Ibid., p. 184.
25. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. 73.
27. Rashid, Ahmed (1994) Advantage Rabbani, Far Eastern Economic Review, July
7, 1994, p. 22.
28. Coll, Steve and Rupert James (1990) Afghan rebels veto drive for Kabul, The
Washington Post, November 28, 1990, pp. 27–28.
29. Gall, Sandy (1994) An interview with Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud,
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30. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 164.
31. Rashid, Ahmed (1990) Friendless foe, Far Eastern Economic Review, October
25, p. 18.
32. Maley, William (2001) Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban,
Hurst & Company, London, p. 43.
33. Ibid., p. 69.
34. Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 285.
35. Kakar, Kuwan (2000) An Introduction to the Taliban, Institute for Afghan
Studies, Kabul, Afghanistan, p. 23.
36. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and
Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, Library of Congress
New York, p. 509.
37. National Geographic (2011) Inside the Taliban, http://channel.national
geographic.com/channel/episodes/inside-the-taliban/.
194 Notes
38. Kaplan, Robert D. (2010) Man versus Afghanistan, The Atlantic, April.
39. Federation of American Scientists (2008), Report of Accountability Review
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fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_daressalaam.html.
40. Perl, Raphael and O’Rourke, Ronald. (2001), Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:
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2001.
41. Junger, Sebastian, Afghanistan’s slain rebel leader, National Geographic http://
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april/apr10c2001.html.
43. Kakar, Palwasha, (2006) Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative
Authority, Harvard Law Review 2006, Massachusetts.
44. Dorronsoro, Giles (2009) The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan,
Carnegie Endowment for Peace.
45. PBS Frontline (2009), The Return of the Taliban, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/taliban/tribal/map.html.
46. Stratfor, The Taliban In Afghanistan: An Assessment, September 28, 2009.
47. New York Times, Afghanistan: An Overview, March 24, 2010, http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/
index.html.
48. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/af.html.
49. Fund for Peace (2010), Failed State Index 2010, http://www.fundforpeace.org/
global/library/cr-10-99-fs-failedstatesindex2010-1103g.pdf.
50. Fund for Peace (2011), Country Assessment – Afghanistan, http://www.
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51. Corruption Perception Index (2009), Transparency International, London, UK,
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53. Brigadier Rashid Wali Janjua (2009) State failure in Afghanistan and security
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AFGHANISTAN_AND_SECURITY_CHALLENGES_FOR_PAKISTAN.
54. Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan.
55. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan.
56. Mullen, Rani D. (2008) Democracy building at the precipice in Afghanistan,
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 55–83.
57. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 218.
58. Ibid., p. 224.
59. Mullen, Democracy Building at the Precipice in Afghanistan.
60. Huria, Sonali (2009) Failed states and foreign military intervention: the
Afghanistan imbroglio, IPCS Special Report, No. 67, March.
61. Cole, Beth Ellen (2007) Afghanistan’s economy: on the right road, but
still a long way to go, United States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/
publications/afghanistans-economy-the-right-road-still-long-way-go.
Notes 195
62. Ibid.
64. Shahrani, Nazif M. (2002) War, factionalism and the state in Afghanistan – in
focus September 11 2001, American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3.
65. Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan.
66. Bajoria, Jayshree (2009) The troubled Afghan–Pakistani border,
Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/
troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905.
67. Roy and Zahab (2004) Islamist Networks: The Afghan–Pakistan Connection, p. 109.
68. STRATFOR (2010) Afghanistan at the crossroads, STRATFOR Global Intelligence.
69. Rashid, Ahmed (2009) The Afghan impasse, New York Review of Books,
September 16.
70. Sinno, Abdulkader H (2008) Achieve counter-insurgency cooperation in
Afghanistan by resolving the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, NBR Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 5.
71. Population Action International (2011) Topic – Afghanistan, http://population
action.org/topics/7-billion/.
72. Beehner, Lionel (2007) The effects of youth bulge on civil conflicts,
Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-
bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093.
74. Beehner, The effects of youth bulge on civil conflicts.
75. Giustozzi, Antonio (2010) Nation-building is not for all – the politics of
education in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Analysts Network, February.
76. Boone, Joe (2010) Afghanistan civilian deaths up 31% this year, says United
Nations, Guardian Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/
afghanistan-civilian-deaths-up-un.
77. Rogers, Simon (2010) Afghanistan civilian casualties: year by year, month
by month, Guardian Online, August 13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/
datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#.
78. UNAMA, Afghanistan mid-year report 2010 protection of civilians in armed
conflict, August 2010.
79. Giustozzi, Nation-building is not for all – the politics of education in
Afghanistan.
80. Louise, Christopher (1995) The social impacts of light weapons availability
and proliferation, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, March 1, https://www.
essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Social%20Impact%20.pdf.
81. Ibid.
82. Bhatia, Michael V. (2008) Afghanistan and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament
and Security in a Post-War Society Routledge Press p. 119.
83. OECD (2005) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)’, Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) OECD – Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention Issues
Brief.
84. Louise, ‘The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation’.
85. Chopan, Saghar and Daud, Malaiz (2009) Political leadership in post-Taliban
Afghanistan: the critical factor, in Afghanistan 1979–2009: in the grip of
conflict, The Middle East Institute – Viewpoints Special Edition.
86. Sinha, Shakti (2009) Legitimacy or credibility? The case of Afghanistan, in
Afghanistan 1979–2009: in the grip of conflict, The Middle East Institute –
Viewpoints Special Edition, Washington D.C.
196 Notes
87. Chopan and Daud, Political leadership in post-Taliban Afghanistan: the

critical factor.
88. Leipold, J. D. (2009) Government reform key to Afghanistan, United
States Army, October 27, http://www.army.mil/article/29411/government-
reform-key-to-afghanistan-says-kilcullen.

1. National Counterterrorism Centre (2011) Report on Terrorism National
Counterterrorism Centre Washington D.C http://fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.
pdf; and Counterterrorism Calendar (2012) Terrorist groups, National Counter
Terrorism Centre, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html.
2. Williams, Brian G. (2007) Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan, Islamic Affairs
Analyst, September, http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/IAA%20suicide.
pdf.
3. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and
Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, Library of Congress,
p. 129.
4. Williams, Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan.
5. Stern, Jessica (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill,
pp. 283–288.
6. Ibid.
7. Turner, Bryan S. (ed.) (1970) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth and
Wright Mills, Oxon New York, p. 36.
8. Johnson, Thomas H. and Mason, Chris M. (2009) Democracy in Afghanistan
is wishful thinking, Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 2009, http://www.
csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0820/p09s01-coop.html
9. Ibid.
10. Centre for American Progress (2009) Building democracy in Afghanistan.
11. Burki, Shireen K. (2010) Bold move to save Afghanistan: bring back a king,
Christian Science Monitor.
12. CNN (2010) Can democracy work in Afghanistan, CNN News, http://
afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2009/12/11/can-democracy-work-in-afghanistan/.
13. Chief of Staff, Pentagon (2010) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National
Security Forces, Department of Defence, Washington D.C, April 2010.
14. Evans, Ann, Manning, Nick, Osmani, Yasin, Tulley, Anne, and Wilder,
Andrew (2004) A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, World Bank and
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
15. Ghani, Ashraf (2009) A ten year framework for Afghanistan, Atlantic Council,
April 2009, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5176~v~A_
Ten-Year_Framework_for_Afghanistan__Executing_the_Obama_Plan____
And_Beyond.pdf
16. Goodson, Larry P. (2001) Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional
Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, University of Washington Press, Washington
D.C, p. 204.
Notes 197
17. Carnegie Endowment for Peace (2009) Finding the right grand strategy in
Afghanistan – success in Afghanistan: searching for the right formula, May
12, Transcript of Annual Conference, Washington D.C
18. Rubin, Barnett R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University
Press New, Haven and London, p. 169.
19. Fange, Anders (2010) The state of the Afghan state, Afghanistan Analysts
Network, Germany and Afghanistan.
20. Lane, Tom (2010) UN Leader Ban Ki-moon gives Afghanistan a warning,
January 5, BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8440602.stm
21. Ghani, A ten year framework for Afghanistan.
22. US Department of State (2009) International Religious Freedom Report 2009 –
Afghanistan, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm.
23. Filkins, Dexter (2010) Overture to Taliban jolts Afghan minorities, New York
Times, June 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/world/asia/27afghan.
html.
24. Wadhams, Caroline and Cookman, Colin (2010) Assessing peace prospects in
Afghanistan – the Peace Jirga and President Karzai’s new peace deal, Centre for
American Progress, June 1, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/
peace_jirga.html.
25. Filkins, Overture to Taliban jolts Afghan minorities.
26. Woodrow Wilson Centre (2004) Political transition in Afghanistan: the state,
Islam and civil society, Asia Program, Special Report No. 122, June, http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asiarpt122.pdf.
27. Naysan Adlparvar (2009) Democracy for Afghanistan, Institute of Development
Studies, http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/news/democracy-for-afghanistan.
28. Shiri, Arif (2009) Does democracy have a future in Afghanistan? – Flaws in
election process casting doubts, Kabul Press, September 19, http://kabulpress.
org/my/spip.php?article4067.
29. Asian Development Bank (2007) Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A
Roadmap for Strategy and Action, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/
pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf.
30. Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2010) Afghan Perceptions and Experiences
of Corruption, http://www.iwaweb.org/corruptionSurvey2010/National
Corruption2010.html.
31. Chief of Staff, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,
Washington D.C.
32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010,
A/64/705 S/2010/127, http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/
World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf.
33. United States Institute of Peace, Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan,
Special Report 117, March 2004, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr117.pdf.
34. Ibid.
35. Harvard National Security Journal (2009) NSJ Analysis: Connecting the Rule of Law
with Afghanistan’s Security Strategy, November 5, http://harvardnsj.org/2009/11/
nsj-analysis-connecting-the-rule-of-law-with-afghanistans-security-strategy/.
36. National Human Development Report (2004) Security With a Human Face:
challenges and responsibilities, UNDP Afghanistan, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/
default/files/afghanistan_2004_en.pdf
198 Notes
37. Asian Development Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan.

38. IFAD (2010) Rural poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Rural
Poverty Portal, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/
tags/afghanistan.
39. Ibid.
40. CIA, World Factbook (2012) Afghanistan, CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.
41. World Health Organization, Country Health Profile, http://www.who.int/gho/
countries/afg.pdf.
42. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Mausner, Adam (2010) Agriculture, food and
poverty in Afghanistan: is a population-centric strategy possible?, Centre
for Strategic and International Studies, April 26, http://csis.org/publication/
agriculture-food-and-poverty-afghanistan.
43. Rural Poverty Portal (2010) Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
International Fund for Agricultural Development Rome, http://www.
ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/afghanistan.
44. Cordesman, Anthony (2010) Shape, clear, hold, build and transfer: the
metrics of the Afghan War, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
January 12, http://csis.org/files/publication/100112_AfghanLngMetrics.pdf.
45. Budget for 1386 (2007–2008) Afghan Ministry of Finance, and Aid Effectiveness
and the Role of Civil Society Organisations, Afghan Ministry of Finance, January
2008, and Improving Aid Effectiveness for Reducing Poverty, Draft, Afghan
Government January 2008, p. 1.
46. World Bank (2005) Afghanistan: Managing Public Finance for Development,
December.
47. Waldman, Matt (2008) ‘Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan’,
ACBAR Advocacy Series, March, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/6B8F790E6E26231EC1257412004B5482-Full_Report.pdf.
48. RAND (2005) The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From Congo to Iraq.
49. Waldman, Matt (2008) Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6B8F790E6E26231EC125741
2004B5482-Full_Report.pdf.
50. World Bank, Afghanistan.
51. AFP (2009) Afghan insurgency inspiring new fighters: analysts, January
12, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Afghan+insurgency+inspiring+new+
fighters%3A+analysts-a01611765724.
52. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Focus on Afghanistan: A Long
Road to Recovery, July 2009, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus_on/
afghanistan/afghanistan_1.html.
53. Rotberg, Robert (2007) Building a New Afghanistan, p. 12.
54. Pentagon (2010) Report on progress toward security and stability in
Afghanistan and United States plans for sustaining the Afghanistan national
security forces, Pentagon Congressional Report, April 24, http://www.defense.
gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04)26)10.pdf.
55. USAID (2009) Afghanistan: Economic Growth, Fall Report, http://www.usaid.
gov/afghanistan/economic-growth.
56. CIA, World Factbook – Afghanistan.
58. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.
Notes 199
59. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 205

60. STRATFOR, Afghanistan at the Crossroads.
61. Ibid.
62. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.
63. NATO, Afghanistan Report 2009, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/
pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf.
65. World Health Organization (2010) Progress in the prevention of injuries in
the WHO European Region, Country Reports, http://www.euro.who.int/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0006/98718/Ireland.pdf.
66. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) Feature article: Population by age, sex,
Australian states and territories, Australian Government Bureau of Statistics,
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbyReleaseDate/AE3C
AF747F4751CDCA2579CF000F9ABC?OpenDocument.
67. Central Intelligence Agency (2012) Country Study – Saudi Arabia, CIA World
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
print/country/countrypdf_sa.pdf
68. Tripathi, Deepak (2010) American afflictions – Afghanistan, Iraq and a growing
culture of violence, May 13, http://antiisgood.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/
american-afflictions-afghanistan-iraq-and-a-growing-culture-of-violence/.
69. Nordland, Rod (2010) Violence up sharply in Afghanistan, NY Times, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/world/asia/20afghan.html.
70. Mather, Dave, Afghanistan: foreign intervention and social transformation,
Critique, Vol. 34, http://www.critiquejournal.net/dmather34.pdf.
71. Harper, Stephen (2009) Foreign troops can’t defeat Afghanistan’s insurgency:
Harper, CBC News, March 1, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/01/
cnn-harper.html.
72. STRATFOR, Afghanistan at the Crossroads.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Nagra, Bunn (2010) US-NATO occupation forces in Afghanistan: pullout or
chased out? Global Research, April 25, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=18853.
76. Rubin, Barnett R. and Siddique, Abubakar, Resolving the Pakistan–
Afghanistan Stalemate, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, http://
www.usip.org/files/resources/SRoct06.pdf.
77. Rashid, Ahmed (2000) Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia, p. 202.
78. International Crisis Group (2007) Pakistan’s tribal areas: appeasing the
militants, Asia Report, No. 125, December 11, 2006.
79. Rasul, Bakhsh Rats (2008) Afghanistan and Pakistan: difficult neighbours,
in ‘Post-September 11 Afghanistan–Pakistan relations: prospects for
counter-insurgency cooperation’, National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 19,
No. 5, December, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=361.
80. Ibid.
81. Dorronsoro, Giles (2011) Afghanistan: the impossible transition, The Carnegie
Papers, June Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
82. SIGAR (2011) Despite Improvements in MOI’s personnel systems, additional
actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce
200 Notes
strength. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, April 25,

http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2011-04-25audit-11-10.pdf.
83. Dorronsoro, Afghanistan: the impossible transition.
84. Ibid.

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202 Notes
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204 Notes

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4. Lynch, Thomas F. (2008) Sunni and Shia terrorism: differences that matter,
Combatting Terrorism Centre, Occasional Paper, December 29.
5. South Asia Terrorism Portal (2011) Terrorism in Pakistan, http://www.
satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm;
and Counterterrorism Calendar (2012) Terrorist Groups, National Counter
Terrorism Centre, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html.
6. Khan, The terrorist threat and the policy response in Pakistan.
7. Bajoria, Jayshree (2011) The ISI and terrorism: behind the accusations,
Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-
accusations/p11644.
8. Synnott, Hillary (2009) What is happening in Pakistan, Survival, Vol. 51,
No. 1, p. 76.
9. New America Foundation (2011) FATA: Inside Pakistan’s tribal regions, New
American Foundation Online, http://pakistansurvey.org/.
10. Ali, Tariq (2008) The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power,
Pocket Books, London, p. 53.
11. Bajoria, Jayshree, Pakistan’s fragile foundations, Council on Foreign Relations,
March 2009, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-fragile-foundations/
p18749.
12. Hussain, Zahid (2007) Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam I.B
Tauris Books p. 61.
13. Alagappa, Muthiah (2001) Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political
Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, California, p. 389.
14. Abbas, Hassan (2005) Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, East Gate Books,
New York p. 78.
15. Rashid, Ahmed (2008) Descent into chaos: the US and the disaster in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Central Asia, Penguin Books, New York.
16. Haqqani, Hussain, The role of Islam in Pakistan’s future, The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2004–2005, http://khakh.yolasite.com/resources/winter_
haqqani.pdf.
17. Baker, Aryn (2009) ‘Pakistan’s Army Gets Serious’, TIME Magazine, November
9, p. 33.
18. ibid., p. 34.
19. Ibid., p. 35.
20. Alam, Muhammad Badar, Pakistan: Marginalisation and discrimination
against the minorities, The Dawn, September 15, 2009, http://www.sacw.net/
article1113.html.
Notes 205
21. Kukreja, Veena (2003) Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and
Crises, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
22. Cohen, Stephen Philip (2004) The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings, Washington,
D.C, p. 30.
23. Bajoria, Pakistan’s fragile foundations.
24. Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises.
25. Bakhshish Yousaf Chaudhry (2009) The Quaid and the ideology of Pakistan,
DAWN, August 16, 2009, http://notesonpakistan.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/
ideology-of-pakistan-in-light-of-quid-e.html
26. Mezzera, Marco and Aftab, Safiya (2009) Democratic and transitional
justice cluster: country case study Pakistan – Pakistan state society analysis,
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, January 2009.
27. Wilke, Boris (2001) State formation and the military in Pakistan: reflections
on the armed forces, their state and some of their competitors, Working Paper
No. 2, University of Hamburg, Germany.
28. Mezzera and Aftab, Democratic and transitional justice cluster.
29. Christie, Kenneth (2011) Abandoning the state, securing religion: Pakistan’s
identity politics, ECPR Annual Conference, August 25–27, University of Iceland.
30. Chene, Marie Overview of corruption in Pakistan, Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre, August 2008, http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.
cfm?id=174.
31. Corruption in Pakistan, Anti-Corruption Research Centre, http://www.u4.no/
helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query43.cfm.
32. Dawn Editorial (2009), Transparency International ranks Pakistan as the
42nd most corrupt state in the world. http://www.transparency.org.pk/news/
newsdec09.php.
33. Haqqani, H. (2005) Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, The Brookings Institution for Peace, Washington D.C.
34. Sinkler, Adrian (2005) Nations in Transition: Pakistan, Thomson Gale, New York.
35. Khan, Adeel (2005) Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in
Pakistan, Sage Publications, London, p. 90.
36. World Vision (2010) Pakistan: Poverty Unveiled, http://meero.worldvision.
org/sf_pakistan.php.
37. Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator John Kerry (2009) Needed: A com-
prehensive US policy towards Pakistan, A Report by the Atlantic Council,
February 2009, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/812-
pakistan-report-comprehensive-us-policy-needed.
38. Ibid.
39. Samuel Huntington (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University,
New Haven, CT.
40. Hagel and Kerry, A comprehensive US policy towards Pakistan
41. CIA (2009) World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.
42. Index Mundi (2009) Pakistan Demographics Profile 2009, http://www.
indexmundi.com/pakistan/demographics_profile.html.
43. Encyclopaedia of the Nations (2010) Pakistan – Religions, http://www.
nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Pakistan-RELIGIONS.html.
44. Bajoria, Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, Council on Foreign Relations.
206 Notes
45. Mezzera and Aftab Democratic and transitional justice cluster.

46. Ahmad, Eqbal (1999) The roots of violence in Pakistani society, Akhbar, Vol.
5. http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar/article.php?article=80&category=5
&issue=8.
47. Stern, Jessica (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill,
ECCO Publications.
48. Kronstadt, K. Alan (2009) Pakistan–US Relations, Congressional Research
Services Report, February 6.
49. Bruno, Greg (2008) US–Pakistan military cooperation, Council on Foreign
Relations, June 26, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/uspakistan_
military_cooperation.html.
50. BBC (2002) Indo-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm.
51. International Crisis Group (2010) Steps towards peace: putting Kashmir first,
ICC Asia Brief, June.
52. Belasco, Amy (2011) The cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other global war on
terror operations since 9/11, Congressional Research Service, March 29, http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; and BBC (2011) Pakistan: US sus-
pends $800m of military aid, BBC News South Asia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-south-asia-14099402.
53. International Crisis Group (2012) Pakistan’s relations with India: beyond
Kashmir, ICC Asia Report No. 224, May.
54. Ibid.
7 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,and Insurgency

1. Dawisha, Adeed (2009) Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey/London, p. 28
2. Miller, Deborah (2003) The War Against Iraq, The Lucent Terrorism Library,
Farmington Hills USA.
3. Abdullah, Thabit A. J. (2006) Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos: Iraq Since
1989, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing
4. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Sluglett, Peter (2001) Iraq Since 1958: From
Revolution to Dictatorship, IB Tauris Press, London.
5. Ibid.
6. Abdullah, Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos
7. Tripp, Charles (2007) A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge USA.
8. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958.
9. Abdullah, Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos.
10. Tripp, A History of Iraq.
11. Ibid.
12. Head, Tom (2010) The War Crimes of Saddam Hussein, http://civilliberty.
about.com/od/internationalhumanrights/p/saddam_hussein.htm.
Notes 207
16. Global Security, Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm.
19. Arnove, Anthony (2000) Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and
War, South End Press, Cambridge, MA.
20. Dawisha, Iraq, p. 226.
22. Arnove, Iraq Under Siege.
23. Ibid.
24. Alnasrawi, Abbas (2001) Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990–
2000, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2.
25. Mazaheri, Nimah (2010) Iraq and the domestic political effects of economic
sanctions, Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2010.
26. Dodge, Toby (2005b) ‘Chapter Two: Rebuilding the Iraqi State’, Adelphi
Papers, Vol. 45 No. 372, pp. 25–42.
27. Bensahel, Nora, Oliker, Olga, Crane, Keith, Brennan Jr., Richard R., Gregg,
Heather S, Sullivan, Thomas, and Rathmell, Andrew (2008) ‘After Saddam:
Pre-war Planning and the Occupation of Iraq’ RAND Corporation Library of
Congress Press, Virginia.
28. Dodge, Toby (2005a) Chapter One: Order and violence in post-Saddam Iraq,
Adelphi Papers, Vol. 45, No. 372, pp. 9–23
29. Fattah, Hala (2009) A Brief History of Iraq, Library of Congress.
30. Ibid.
32. Cordesman, Anthony (2008) Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict,
Praeger Security International, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies.
33. Baker, James A. and Hamilton, Lee H. (2009) The Iraq Study Group
Report
34. Talanani, Jalal (2005) Shi’ite Alliance wins plurality in Iraq, CNN, February
14, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/13/iraq.main/index.
html?_s=PM:WORLD
36. Hiltermann, Joost R. (2006) Elections and constitution writing in Iraq, 2005,
Middle East at the Crossroads, http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2006/aarticles/
aHiltermann.pdf
37. Ibid.
38. Whitehead, Douglas and Harnmeijer, Jelte (2006) Voting against occupation –
Iraq’s election results, http://earthweb.ess.washington.edu/~jelte/Articles/
Ruckus/February2005/IraqElections.pdf
39. Baker, Pauline H. (2005) Iraq as a failed state: lessons from the January
elections – October 2004 to April 2005, Fund for Peace, Report No. 4
40. Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency.
41. Ibid.
42. Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling, Jensen (2010) The Iraqi and AQI roles
in the Sunni Awakening, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 1.
43. McCary, John A. (2009) The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives, The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 43–59.
208 Notes
44. Lobe, Jim (2007) Iraq: US surge strategy successful in shifting the violence,
Inter Press Service, http://antiwar.com/lobe/archives.php?offset=60.
45. McCary, The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives.
46. Schwartz, Lowell H. (2009) Is Iraq safe yet?, RAND Corporation, March 5,
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/03/05/PS.html.
47. Strategic Survey (2010) Middle East/Gulf, Strategic Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1,
pp. 201–258.
48. New York Times (2010) Iraq Elections, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/iraq/elections/index.html.
49. Ottaway, Marina and Kaysi, Daniel A. (2010) Winners and losers in the Iraqi elec-
tion battle, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.
org/2011/01/10/winners-and-losers-in-iraqi-election-battle/cla.
50. Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael E. and Pollack, Kenneth M. (2008) How
to leave a stable Iraq, Foreign Affairs, September/October.
51. CIA World Factbook (2010) Iraq, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.
52. See: Agnew, John, Gillespie, Thomas W., and Gonzalez, Jorge (2008)
Commentary, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 40, pp. 2285–2295; Gregory,
Derek (2008) The biopolitics of Baghdad: counter insurgency and the
countercity, Human Geography, Vol. 1 No. 1; Fox, Maggie, Satellite images
show ethnic cleanout in Iraq, Reuters, September 19, 2008, http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSN1953066020080919.
53. Dewachi, Omar (2011) Insecurity, Displacement and Public Health Impacts of the
American Invasion of Iraq, CostofWar.Org, http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/
files/articles/19/attachments/DewachiIraqiRefugees.pdf
54. Taneja, Preti (2007) Assimilation, exodus, eradication: Iraq’s minority
communities since 2003, Minority Rights Group International, London.
55. Roggio, Bill (2006) Safe havens and Iraq, Counter-Terrorism Blog, http://
counterterrorismblog.org/2006/05/safe_havens_iraq.php.
56. Kachejian, Kerry C. (2011) Chaos in Iraq: understanding the enemies within,
Opposing Views, http://www.opposingviews.com/i/politics/2012-election/
chaos-iraq-understanding-enemies-within.
57. United States Department of State (2011) Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf.
58. US-GAO (2011) Combatting Terrorism – US Government Should Improve Its
Reporting On Terrorist Safe Havens, United States Government Accountability
Office, June 11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11561.pdf.
59. SCIFORUM (2004) Iraq’s Porous Border, http://www.sciforums.com/
showthread.php?t=39664.
60. Oluic, Steven Gen (2009) Iraq’s border security – key to an Iraqi endstate,
Combatting Terrorism Centre – Sentinel, January 15, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/iraq%E2%80%99s-border-security-key-to-an-iraqi-endstate.
61. Daily Times (2005) Iraq’s porous borders challenge frontier forces, Daily Times
Online, August 23, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/23-Aug-2005/
iraq-s-porous-borders-challenge-frontier-forces.
62. Oluic, ‘Iraq’s border security – key to an Iraqi endstate.
63. The Guardian (2002) Pentagon sees 5 million child terrorists in Iraq,http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq.
64. Stohl, Rachel (2003) Small Arms are Continuing Threat in Iraq, Christian
Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1105/p09s02-coop.html.
Notes 209
65. Dodge, Toby (2012) The resistible rise of Nuri al-Maliki, OpenDemocracy.
net, March 22, http://www.opendemocracy.net/toby-dodge/resistible-rise-of-
nuri-al-maliki.
66. Masters, Daniel (2008) Does Regime Type Influence Terrorism? – Evaluating the
Home-Grown Vs. Foreign Terrorist Dimension, University of North Carolina,
North Carolina, USA.
67. Tawfeeq, Mohammad and Pleitgen, Frederik (2012) Iraqi Vice President
predicts return to sectarian violence, CNN, January 13, http://edition.cnn.
com/2012/01/30/world/meast/iraq-al-hashimi/index.html?hpt=imi_c1.
8 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

1. International Crisis Group (2010) Loose ends: Iraq’s security forces between
US drawdown and withdrawal, Middle East Report, No. 99, October 26.
2. USAID (2012) Iraq, USAID Iraq, http://iraq.usaid.gov/node/2.
3. Haggard, Stephen and Long, James (2009) On benchmarks: institutions and
violence in Iraq, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University
of San Diego, http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/6557.pdf.
4. House of Representatives (2007) Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform 2007, House of Representatives, Washington D.C, https://house.
resource.org/110/org.c-span.201345-1.raw.txt.
5. Al-Ali, Zaid (2009) Iraq: face of corruption, mask of politics, OpenDemocracy.
Org http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-acts-on-corruption.
6. CBS News (2008) Iraq: A State of Corruption, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
iraq-state-of-corruption-11-04-2008/.
7. Al-Ali, Zaid (2009) Iraq: face of corruption, mask of politics.
8. Ibid.
9. Gwertzman, Bernard (2011) As the US plans to withdraw its troops, problems
loom in Iraq, Business Insiders, http://www.businessinsider.com/problems-
loom-over-iraq-as-the-us-plans-its-troop-withdrawl-this-year-2011-7.
10. Baker, James A. and Hamilton, Lee H. (2009) The Iraq Study Group Report,
United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C.
11. Ibid.
12. Baker, Pauline H. (2010) Iraq on the edge, Fund for Peace, Report No. 10,
2009–2010.
13. Islamopedia Online (2010) Kurds in Iraq, http://www.islamopediaonline.
org/country-profile/iraq/major-religious-communities/kurds-iraq.
14. Katzman, Kenneth (2008) The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq, CRS Report for
Congress, February 5, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101816.
pdf.
15. New York Times (2004) Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq, January 9, http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/01/09/opinion/kurdish-autonomy-in-iraq.html.
16. Katzman, The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq
17. UNDP (2009) Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Governance, Crisis Prevention
and Recovery and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq, http://erc.undp.org/
evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=3796.
18 Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (2009) National Strategy
for Poverty Reduction in Iraq for 2010–2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
210 Notes
IRFFI/Resources/IraqPovertyReductionStrategyPressReleaseEnglishandArabi.
pdf.
19. Anderson, Edward (2008) Practices and Implications of Aid Allocation, UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), May.
20. USAID (2012) Government of Iraq, January 13, http://iraq.usaid.gov/
21. Constitution of Iraq, Article 117.3.
22. Williams, Paul R. and Simpson, Matthew T. (2008) Rethinking the political
future: an alternative to the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq, PILPG, https://
www.wcl.american.edu/journal/ilr/24/documents/Williams-Simpson.
pdf?rd=1.
23. Ibid.
24. Cordesman, Anthony and Al-Rodhan, Khalid (2007) Gulf Military Forces in an
Era of Asymmetric Wars, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
25. Ibid.
26. Jervis, Robert (1978) Cooperation under the security dilemma, World Politics,
Vol. 167, pp. 169–170.
27. Kaufmann, Chaim D. (1998) when all else fails: ethnic population transfers
and partitions in the twentieth century, International Security, Vol. 125, No.
12, p. 120.
28. Philips, David L. (2005) Losing Iraq: Inside the Post-War Reconstruction Fiasco,
Westview Press, New York, p. 237.
29. Williams and Simpson (2008) Rethinking the political future.
30. Rupesinghe, Kumar and Correa, Marical R. (1994) The Culture of Violence,
United Nations University, Japan.
31. Ross, Marc Howard (1993) The Culture of Conflict, London: Yale University
Press, p. 21.
32. Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 13.
33. Baker, Pauline H. (2004) Iraq as a failed state: a six month progress report –
October 2003 through March 2004, Fund for Peace, Report 2.
34. Baker, Pauline H. (2010) Iraq on the edge, Fund for Peace, Report No. 10,
2009–2010.
35. Hafez, Mohammed M. (2007) Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology
of Martyrdom, United States Institute for Peace.
36. Dawisha, Adeed (2009) Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
37. Muir, Jim (2011) Last US troops withdraw from Iraq, BBC News, December
18, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16234723.
38. Iraq Body Count (2012) Deaths in Iraq – Iraq Body Count Statistics, Iraq
Body Count, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/.
39. Fulton, Will, Farrar-Wellman, Ariel and Frasco, Robert (2011) Iraq–Iran foreign
relations, Iran Tracker, August 5, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/
iraq-iran-foreign-relations.
40. Iraq Body Count (2012) Deaths in Iraq – Iraq Body Count Statistics, Iraq
Body Count, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/.
41. Katzman, Kenneth (2010) Iran-Iraq Relations, Congressional Research Service,
April 15, Report Number 7-5700.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. McMillan, Joseph (2006) Saudi Arabia and Iraq: oil, religion, and an
enduring rivalry, United States Institute for Peace Special Report No. 157.
Notes 211
45. Bloom, Mia (2007) Grim Saudi export – suicide bombers, LA Times, July 17,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/17/opinion/op-suicidebomb17.
46. McMillan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: oil, religion, and an enduring rivalry.
47. Lynch, Mark (2009) The Syrian–Iraqi spat, Foreign Policy, September 2, http://
lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/the_syrian_iraqi_spat.
48. USIP (2007) Syria’s Relations with Iraq, United States Institute for Peace,
Washington D.C.
49. Ibid.
50. BBC (2011) Syria: the view from next door, BBC News, November 29, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15936813.
51. Dagher, Sam (2011) Syria chaos worries Iraq, The Wall Street Journal,
November 26, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203764804
577059910227806388.html.
52. Al-Jazeera (2014) UN warns of Syria spillover into Iraq, Al-Jazeera, March
28, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/un-warns-syria-
spillover-into-iraq-201432821452664854.html.
53. Ibid.
54. OSAC (2012) Iraq 2012 OSAC Crime and Safety Report, US Department
of State – Bureau of Diplomatic Security, https://www.osac.gov/Pages/
ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12114.
9 Conclusion
1. Hamre, John J. and Sullivan, Gordon R. (2002) Toward post-conflict resolu-
tion, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 85–96.
2. Hewitt, Joseph J., Wilkenfield, Jonathan, and Gurr, Ted R. (2008) Peace
and Conflict 2008, Centre for International Development and Conflict
Management.
3. Piazza, James A. (2008) Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states
promote transnational terrorism?, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52,
pp. 469–488.
4. Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas (2002) Do terrorist networks need a
home?, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 97–108.
5. Piazza ‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Terror?’
6. Fund for Peace (2008) Failed State Index 2011, http://www.fundforpeace.org/
global/library/cr-11-14-fs-failedstatesindex2011-1106p.pdf.
7. Johnson, Thomas H. and Mason, Chris M. (2007) Understanding the Taliban
and insurgency in Afghanistan, ORBIS, Winter.
8. Ibid.
9. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010a) South and Central Asia,
Strategic Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 295–330.
10. Dorronsoro, Giles (2010) Afghanistan at the Breaking Point, Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, Washington D.C.
11. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010a) Perspectives, Strategic
Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 17–36.
12. Pearson Education (2010) Chapter 3: Terrorism in the Global Context,
pearsonhighered.com, http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_
us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205005802.pdf.
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Index
Abbottabad, 101, 108, 129 AQ, 3, 29, 34, 44, 48, 66, 81, 102,
abrogated, 86 116–117
accord, 16, 177 AQAP, 31, 63
activism, 110 Aqaydat, 145
Afghan, 38–48, 50–60, 62–78, 80–82, AQI, 31, 141, 147–148
88, 94–95, 102, 104–108, 110–111, AQIM, 31
115, 125, 129, 184–185 Aqsa, 31
Afghani, 47, 63–64, 78 Arab, 45, 62, 130–132, 135, 140–141,
Afghanistan, 10, 13, 17, 21, 30, 148, 158, 163, 167, 172
32–35, 37–82, 87–89, 91, Arabia, 44–45, 77, 134, 147–148,
101–102, 104–107, 109–113, 167, 170
117, 119–120, 122, 124–126, Arabian, 31, 63
147, 152, 162, 174, 178–185 Arabs, 108, 131, 134, 139–141,
Afghans, 39, 41, 44, 46–48, 57, 60, 159, 166
64–65, 69, 71–74, 77 Arbil, 158
Africa, 8, 19, 55, 187 Arif, 131–132
Agreement, 128, 134, 169 Arifs, 132
agreement, 125, 127 Armenians, 146
agreements, 66 arsenals, 150
aid, 8, 23, 38, 41, 51, 59, 74–75, 87, Asbat, 31
100, 122–123, 137, 143, 154–155, ASG, 31, 63
157, 160–161 Asia, 9, 38–39, 55, 78, 105
Algiers, 134 Asian, 10, 117, 186
Allawi, 139–142 Asians, 108
Alliance, 45–46, 88, 140, 182 Asif, 99, 107
alliance, 41–43, 52, 86, 89, 91–92, Askariya, 141
94, 143 assassinate, 87
alliances, 78, 86, 89, 158 assassinated, 39, 85
allies, 13, 39, 45, 67, 83, 156 Assassination, 33
Alnasrawi, 136 assassination, 3, 62, 133
Amanullah, 39 assassinations, 90, 145
American, 8, 59, 68, 77–78, 125, 129, assault, 43
144, 185 Assyrians, 146
Americans, 147 attack, 3, 5, 7, 12, 45, 62, 135
Amin, 39–40 attacked, 43, 107, 135, 141
anarchy, 50, 57 attackers, 107
Anbar, 139, 142, 146–148, 159, attacks, 5, 7, 17–18, 32, 45, 53–55,
161–162, 166, 171 62, 64, 77–80, 82, 91, 98, 102,
Anfal, 133, 158 105–107, 109, 111, 113, 122–127,
ANO, 31 129, 134, 138, 141–142, 144,
Ansar, 31, 111 147, 166–167, 170, 174, 177,
appeasement, 59, 184 182–183, 187
229
230 Index
augmented, 17, 25, 179, 181–182 Benazir, 84, 88, 92, 128
Australia, 3, 76 Bhutto, 84, 86–90, 92, 118, 128
Australian, 24 bilateral, 126, 169–170
authoritarian, 153 Bissau, 33
autocracies, 112–113 Boko, 187
autocracy, 97, 112 bomb, 7, 45
autocratic, 39 bombardment, 134–135
autonomous, 16, 106, 158–159, 185 bombardments, 135
autonomously, 81 bomber, 64, 92
autonomy, 22, 81, 90, 93, 119, bombers, 62, 148, 170
157–159, 180, 185 Bombing, 33
Awakening, 141–142, 147 bombing, 7, 62, 64
Awami, 86 bombings, 5–6, 8, 45, 64, 98, 104,
Ayad, 139, 142 107, 138, 145, 170
Ayub, 86 bombs, 1, 150
Azadi, 63, 111 borders, 7, 18–20, 22, 54, 58, 96–98,
Azam, 85 101–102, 104, 125, 128–129, 131,
Aziz, 92 146–148, 154–155, 166, 170,
Azrah, 53 179–181, 183
Bosnia, 74
Babil, 185 Botswana, 26
Babrak, 39–40 Bremer, 138, 148
background, 47, 83, 94, 97, 130, 145 Brigade, 31, 63
Badakhshan, 50, 75 Brigades, 6
Badakhstan, 73 Britain, 38, 130
Badghis, 43 British, 39, 78, 106, 126, 131
Badghris, 53 Brookings, 24
Badr, 63, 111 buffer, 66
Baghdad, 130–132, 139, 142, Bukamil, 170
144–145, 149, 154–155, 158, bureaucracy, 115, 133
161, 164, 169–170, 185–186 Burhanuddin, 42
Baghlan, 50 Burma, 33
Bajaur, 108, 114 Burundi, 33
Balkh, 43, 73, 76 Bush, 45, 138–139, 150
Baluch, 119, 184
Baluchis, 115 cadres, 160
Baluchistan, 54, 68, 87, 89–90, 93, caliphate, 115, 172
96, 101, 104, 108–109, 115, 119, campaign, 8, 11–12, 46, 55, 62, 71,
121–123, 125, 184 77, 88, 109, 133, 135–139, 141,
Bangladesh, 31, 63, 87, 117, 127 152, 166, 184–185
Bannu, 102 campaigns, 61–62, 140, 152, 158, 165
Barack, 99 captured, 16, 43–44, 135, 147
barracks, 5 CAR, 33
Barzani, 133 cartels, 104
Basque, 6, 31 Carter, 8
Basra, 130, 134, 139, 148, 161, 167, CAST, 23
169 catalyst, 16, 101, 104, 122
Basrah, 185 ceasefire, 127, 134–135
Belfer, 24 cells, 16
Index 231
cellular, 15–16 Commission, 140, 156

CFR, 2 Communist, 31
Chad, 33, 93 communist, 39, 41, 88–89
Chaudhry, 92 communists, 42, 46
checkpoints, 155 Conflict, 23–24, 180
chieftainships, 38 conflict, 12, 14–16, 19, 24, 26, 37,
Christian, 10, 131 39, 57–59, 66, 72–73, 77, 79, 84,
Christians, 123, 131, 166 88, 92, 104, 123, 127–129, 138,
CIA, 15, 24, 47, 105–106 148, 151, 156, 161, 163–164, 167,
civil, 18–19, 22, 34, 41, 43–45, 47, 55, 171–172, 179–180
57, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 74, 85–86, Conflicts, 68
89, 101, 103–104, 107, 116, 127, conflicts, 12, 19, 22, 40, 55, 90,
137, 141, 145, 147, 154–155, 161, 123, 167
165–166, 173, 178 Congo, 21, 32, 93, 178
civilian, 2–3, 5, 57–58, 61, 78, 89–90, Congress, 41
92–93, 98–99, 101, 111–114, 118, connections, 27, 29–30, 34, 84, 98,
120–121, 123–124, 126, 135, 147, 110, 146, 172, 174–178, 186
150, 153, 168–169, 185 constitution, 84–87, 90, 113, 128,
civilians, 4–5, 7, 58, 126–127, 138, 131, 140, 152, 158, 161
149–150, 167 constitutional, 89–90, 92, 115,
clan, 16, 133 139–141, 161, 171
clandestine, 2 contractors, 156, 162
clans, 131, 145 controversial, 59, 67, 137
cleansing, 133, 158 Convention, 2
cleavages, 37, 69–70, 123, 153, 163, conventional, 11, 13, 62
166, 179–180 convergence, 49, 98
clientelistic, 52 Cooperation, 19, 26, 160
Coalition, 138, 140–141, 144 cooperation, 69, 80, 110, 171
coalition, 46, 53, 79–82, 89, 92, 108, Copenhagen, 34
131, 140, 143, 148, 154, 162, 166, Corps, 13–14
169, 185 correlation, 29–30, 35, 55, 57, 75,
coerce, 2–3 177, 186–187
coercion, 3, 65, 77 corrupt, 9, 28, 47–48, 52, 59, 71, 89,
coercive, 12 114–115, 118, 156–157, 176
Cole, 5, 45 Corruption, 23, 48, 118, 155–156, 180
collapse, 17, 20–21, 24, 32, 40, 42, 49, corruption, 19, 47–48, 50, 52, 55, 58,
75, 78, 91, 97, 115, 130, 137–138, 66, 70–72, 75–76, 87–89, 109,
143, 146, 150, 159, 166, 177, 183, 114, 118, 129–130, 132, 145, 153,
185 156–157, 160, 165, 173, 179–180
COLLAPSED, 25 counterforce, 44
collapsed, 21, 24, 100, 114, 137–138, Counterinsurgency, 13–14
179 counterinsurgency, 80, 108, 126,
colonial, 130 129, 184
colonisation, 22 counterterrorism, 108–109, 129, 184
Columbia, 31 counterterrorist, 53
combat, 4, 13, 48, 80 coup, 11, 39, 77, 131–132
combatant, 2, 5, 13, 61 coups, 114, 118, 131
combatants, 4–5, 7 CPA, 138–139
Commando, 111 CPI, 48
232 Index
CPP, 31 disenchantment, 70, 150

Crisis, 27, 63, 111, 182 disenfranchisement, 20, 116
crisis, 19, 24, 27, 37, 40, 48–49, 67, disintegration, 57–58, 82, 137, 164
75, 79, 97–98, 120, 136, 144, 146, displacement, 30, 126, 149, 171
151, 170–171, 179, 182 Diyala, 139, 142, 144, 149, 158,
Cuba, 8 161, 185
culture, 15, 46, 53, 58, 65, 70, 77–78, Dohuk, 158, 185
83, 87, 103, 107, 119, 124–125, Dost, 39
150, 153, 164–165, 179–180 Dostam, 42–43
cyber, 6 DRA, 39
DRC, 33
Dahuk, 144, 158 drone, 125–126, 129
Daikundi, 73 drones, 125–126
Damascus, 170–171 drug, 46–48, 50–51, 53, 71, 75, 87,
danger, 29, 93, 99, 120 104, 108
Daoud, 39, 65, 77 drugs, 116
Dawisha, 179 Dujail, 133
DDR, 58 Dulaym, 145
debt, 72, 75, 90, 95, 135, 143 Durand, 54, 107, 120
decentralisation, 93, 163 Duri, 133
decentralised, 16 Durrani, 38–39
decline, 38, 51, 89, 100, 113, 145,
179–181, 185 economic, 6–9, 11, 16, 18–21, 24,
declining, 113, 153, 169, 179–180 27–29, 32, 39–40, 47, 50–52,
delegitimisation, 95 55, 58–59, 64, 66, 69–70, 72–73,
democracies, 30, 34, 65, 177–178 75–76, 89, 91, 93–97, 100,
democracy, 24, 51, 65, 69–70, 84, 93, 103–104, 120–124, 127, 130–131,
97, 112–114, 153, 161 135, 137, 143–145, 149–150,
democratisation, 73, 124 155–156, 159–163, 165–167, 169,
Demographic, 180 177, 180–184, 186
demographic, 28, 94, 103, 123, economically, 89, 95, 121, 149, 165
153, 180 economy, 22, 37–38, 50–52, 66, 71,
demonstrations, 138 74–75, 77, 84–85, 90–91, 93–94,
Denmark, 26 96–97, 103, 113, 117, 121–122,
dents, 83 124, 134, 136, 159, 162, 171
denying, 30, 105 education, 20, 51, 56–58, 71, 94,
Deobandi, 110 96–97, 100–101, 103, 112, 118,
destabilis, 149 120–121, 123, 134, 143–144, 161
destabilisation, 137 Eelam, 31
destabilise, 2, 107, 137, 144, 147 Egyptian, 9, 34, 63
destabilising, 30, 82, 112, 164, 171 election, 8, 67, 86–88, 92–93, 140–143,
devolution, 93 154
DHKP, 31, 63 elections, 42, 46, 87–90, 92–93,
dictator, 132, 152, 173 139–140, 142–143, 146
dictatorial, 87 electricity, 52, 73, 76, 144, 161, 167,
dictatorship, 22, 83, 152–153 169
Directorate, 105 ELN, 31
Disarmament, 58 embargo, 135–136
disease, 34, 136, 178 emir, 39
Index 233
empirical, 29, 174, 176–177 Failed, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32–35, 37, 93,
employment, 11, 49, 149, 159–160 95, 143, 175–179, 182, 186–187
Endemically, 182 failed, 17–25, 27–30, 32, 34–36, 47,
endemically, 26, 97–98 49, 83, 89–90, 93, 95–99, 104,
Enduring, 46, 62, 122 113, 131, 135, 143, 146, 152, 165,
enduring, 25, 179, 181 174–179, 182–183, 187–188
environment, 2, 43, 49, 55, 57–58, Failing, 20
66, 77, 98–99, 148, 182 failing, 19–20, 22, 24, 35, 38, 49, 93,
environmental, 21, 78, 125, 165, 180 103, 120, 148, 152, 177–179,
Erbil, 161, 185 182–183
ETA, 6–7, 31, 186 Failure, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17,
état, 11, 131 19, 21, 23–25, 27–29, 31, 35, 37,
Ethiopia, 33 61, 83, 93, 109, 130, 143, 153
ethnic, 2–3, 6, 16, 19–21, 24, 34, failure, 1, 17–27, 29–30, 32, 34–36,
37–38, 42–43, 47, 50, 53, 62, 38, 43, 47, 49–50, 53, 59, 64,
68–70, 72, 81, 84, 88, 90, 94, 67, 81–83, 92–99, 103–105, 109,
96, 114–116, 119, 123, 130, 141, 112, 114, 121, 123, 134–135,
144–146, 152, 154, 158, 163–164, 143, 145–146, 152–153, 156, 160,
170, 178, 185 163, 166, 169–170, 172, 174–183,
ethno, 1, 6, 55, 65, 69, 104, 145, 185–188
163–164, 166 Faisalabad, 110
ETIM, 63 Fallujah, 138, 164
Euphrates, 138 faltering, 26, 179
Europe, 45, 63, 76 Farah, 43, 50, 76, 183
European, 2, 7 Faraj, 110
execution, 86, 133 FARC, 31
exile, 86, 88, 151 Farooq, 89
extermination, 133 Faryab, 43, 50
External, 78, 125, 165, 180 FATA, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100–102,
external, 9, 18–19, 21, 34, 38, 45, 108–110, 113, 115–116, 120–122,
72, 79, 95, 110, 143, 146, 162, 125, 183
178–180, 185 fatalities, 149, 167–169
extremism, 10, 48, 91, 93, 105, 117, fear, 2–5, 8, 61, 128, 133, 158–159,
124, 129, 172, 175 170, 182
Extremist, 99 federalisation, 164
extremist, 27, 38, 41, 50, 53, 56–58, federalist, 154
60–61, 65, 77, 79–80, 82, 87, 94, feudal, 119
99, 101–106, 109, 113, 115, 117, feudalism, 96
120, 123, 125, 127–129, 148–149, flashpoint, 138
151, 161–162, 182–184 Foreign, 23, 30–31, 74, 106, 125, 165,
extremists, 50, 52, 54, 99, 101, 106, 180, 186
123–124, 165, 172 foreign, 8, 13, 22, 30, 32, 38–39, 47,
51–53, 57, 64, 66, 69, 74–75,
faction, 41, 169 78–79, 81–82, 84, 90, 95, 108,
factional, 98, 145 110, 125, 128, 134–135, 138,
factionalised, 95, 145 147–148, 156, 162, 166, 170,
factionalism, 40, 53 172, 179–180, 185, 188
factions, 41, 43–44, 59, 61–62, 67, fractured, 19, 83, 137, 145, 167
113–114, 143, 145, 169, 185 FRAGILE, 26
234 Index
Fragile, 19, 23–24, 26, 182 Ghor, 43, 50

fragile, 21, 40, 47, 51–52, 67, 72–73, Ghulam, 85, 88
75, 82, 93, 99, 112, 134, 137, Gilani, 92
143–144, 146, 149, 153–154, 156, Global, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18,
159, 162, 165, 171–173, 179, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38,
182–183, 185 40, 42, 44, 46, 48–50, 52, 54, 56,
Fragility, 24 58, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74,
fragility, 71, 121, 172 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92,
fragment, 84 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106,
fragmentation, 40–41, 66–67, 72, 82 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118,
fragmented, 38, 44, 70, 114, 139, 153 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 132,
framework, 24, 37, 66, 72, 100, 110, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144,
161 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156,
France, 93, 135 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170,
fraud, 140, 142–143 172, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184,
freedom, 18, 45, 54, 61, 67, 90, 112, 186, 188
120, 164 global, 11, 13, 17, 21, 23, 29, 34, 37,
frontier, 104, 145 73, 75, 83, 93, 101–102, 110, 115,
frontiers, 102 121–122, 157, 166, 172, 174, 176,
FSI, 33, 105 178
FTO, 30 globalisation, 13
FTOs, 30, 34–35, 177–178 Gorbachev, 41
functioning, 21, 35, 51–52, 82, 93, governance, 11, 19–20, 24, 37, 50–52,
96–97, 114, 116, 118, 146, 152, 58, 64–66, 70, 72, 76, 80, 96–97,
158, 176, 182–185 104, 117, 161
Fund, 23–24, 30, 47, 136, 175 governed, 65, 114–115
fundamental, 9, 19, 56, 90, 116, 183 governing, 14, 43, 70, 85
Fundamentalism, 29 Government, 14, 22, 24, 49, 57–58,
fundamentalism, 10, 79, 83, 109, 120, 98, 100, 104, 139, 151, 158, 181
152 government, 2–3, 6–8, 11–16, 19–23,
fundamentalist, 1, 6, 9, 53, 62, 82, 99, 27, 40–43, 46, 48–57, 59–62,
107, 114, 184 65–68, 70–72, 74–78, 80, 82–83,
fundamentalists, 9, 69 85–91, 94, 96–103, 105–108,
funded, 24, 121, 142 110–115, 118–130, 132–133,
funding, 8–9, 51, 66, 71, 74–75, 147, 136–147, 149–151, 153–157,
162, 172 159–164, 166–167, 170–173,
Fuqra, 111 179–180, 182–185
governmental, 8, 21, 27–28, 42, 66,
GDP, 18, 23, 72, 74–75, 95, 100, 96, 108, 113, 115
121–122, 143, 159 governments, 13, 21, 23, 38, 54,
Genocide, 133 56, 65, 80, 88, 101, 104–105,
genocides, 24 113–114, 118, 121, 123, 128–129,
geographical, 19–21, 187 145, 181
geopolitics, 37 governor, 43, 85
geostrategic, 117 governorates, 144, 161
Germany, 93 grassroots, 11, 13, 142
Ghadir, 42–43 grievance, 13, 15, 29–30, 95
Ghazi, 139 grievances, 48, 52, 68, 116, 125, 144,
Ghazni, 50, 53, 81 170, 180
Index 235
growth, 10, 18, 26, 47, 51, 59, 66, 70, Hindu, 10, 92, 126
75–76, 85, 95, 105, 117, 121–122, Hindus, 123
124–125, 143–144, 160 historical, 20–21, 38, 47, 49, 83,
guerrilla, 11–13, 41, 59, 61–62 97–98, 127, 130, 164, 175, 188
guerrillas, 21 historically, 64, 68, 91, 117
Guinea, 33 Homeland, 6
Gulbuddin, 42, 44, 62–63 homogeneity, 35
Gulf, 134, 136, 171 homogeneous, 37, 163–164
gun, 46, 58, 71, 87, 103–104, hopelessness, 150
150–151 hostage, 8, 130
guns, 1, 62, 150 hostile, 43, 105, 125, 129, 157
Gurjat, 184 hostilities, 20, 86
Gvosdev, 176 hotbed, 83
hotspots, 129
Habibullah, 39 HUJI, 31, 63
Hafizullah, 40 HUM, 31
Hagel, 121 humanitarian, 18–19, 23, 37, 96, 135,
Haghani, 42 161, 174
Haiti, 33 hunting, 46
Haji, 42–43 Hussein, 9, 130, 132–134, 137–139,
Halabja, 133 144, 148, 152, 162, 164, 167,
Hamahangi, 43 172, 185
HAMAS, 9 Hyderabad, 88
Hamas, 9, 31
Haqqani, 59, 81, 108 identity, 21, 70, 84, 114, 117, 119,
Harakat, 31, 63, 111 158, 164, 166
Haram, 187 Ideological, 180
harassment, 67 ideological, 2–4, 37, 62, 69–70, 79,
hatred, 79, 112 98, 101, 116, 138, 164, 166,
haven, 9, 53, 101–102, 116, 129, 179–180
146–147 ideologically, 103, 115
havens, 8–9, 34, 53–55, 101, 104, ideologies, 4, 69–70
129, 146–147, 177, 179–181, 184, ideology, 7, 12–13, 38, 69, 109, 112,
187–188 116, 119
Hazara, 50, 68 IDPs, 144–145, 159
HDI, 23, 37 IECI, 140
health, 51, 58, 73, 94, 96, 100, 116, IED, 147
118, 144, 161 IEDs, 104, 141
healthcare, 18, 20, 56, 97, 100–101, Iftikhar, 92
112, 120–121, 123, 134, 144, 146 IJU, 31, 63
Hekmatyar, 42–44, 62 illegal, 12, 104, 148–149
Helmand, 50, 53–54, 73, 76, 78, illegally, 104, 127
108, 183 illegitimate, 42, 104
Herat, 41–43, 46, 53 illicit, 37, 48, 66, 70
Hezbollah, 9, 31, 169 illiteracy, 144
hierarchical, 16, 130 imbalance, 77, 81
hijacked, 107 imbalanced, 77
hijackings, 5 imbalances, 77, 153, 180
Hikmatul, 63 IMF, 75
236 Index
impact, 16–17, 20, 38, 48, 65, 67, instability, 27, 36–37, 40–41, 43, 45,
74, 95, 113, 116–118, 124, 126, 47, 49–50, 52, 58–59, 66, 69, 73,
129, 134, 136–137, 149–150, 157, 82, 90–91, 94–95, 97, 99, 105,
159–160, 164, 167, 170–173, 179, 107, 112–113, 115, 117, 126–128,
181, 186 131, 139, 144, 151, 157, 160–163,
impacts, 20, 64, 137, 153, 167 165, 167, 170, 172, 183, 186
implementation, 100, 137, 151, 187 Institute, 24, 102
implications, 32, 179 institution, 42–43, 99, 156
IMU, 31, 63 institutional, 1–2, 21, 65–67, 114–115,
incentives, 76–77, 105, 160, 181 132, 153–155, 179–180
incidents, 32–33, 147, 159 institutions, 18, 20–22, 26, 30, 38, 48,
independence, 15, 84–85, 100, 117, 50–52, 56, 66–67, 70, 72, 81–82,
131, 158–159 91, 94, 96, 99, 109, 112–114,
independent, 6, 23–24, 27, 66, 71, 118–119, 121, 137–138, 143, 151,
127, 157 154–156, 164, 182–184, 186
Index, 19, 23–25, 30, 32, 34–35, 37, insurgencies, 11–13, 15–16, 28, 32,
48, 93, 95, 143, 175, 177–179, 34–36, 38, 123
186–187 Insurgency, 1–32, 34–38, 40, 42, 44,
index, 1, 23–24, 34, 178 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60–62,
India, 3, 39, 84, 86, 88, 90–91, 105, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80,
107, 115, 117, 125–129 82–84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98,
Indian, 38, 84, 92, 106–107, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108–110, 112,
126–129 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126,
indicator, 47, 94, 179 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138,
indicators, 18, 23–24, 47–48, 95, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150,
112, 153 152–154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164,
indigenous, 47, 64, 74 166, 170, 172, 176, 178, 180, 182,
indirect, 105–106 184, 186, 188
indoctrinated, 124 insurgency, 10–17, 27–30, 34–36,
Indonesia, 34, 178 40, 46–47, 50, 54–55, 58–62, 64,
Indus, 123 66–68, 71, 73–77, 79–81, 84, 98,
ineffective, 47, 50, 58, 115 102, 109, 112, 120, 127, 137–141,
inefficient, 71, 118, 121 146, 148–152, 156, 160, 163–166,
inequalities, 22, 52, 72 172, 183–185
infidels, 78 Insurgent, 11–12, 57, 74, 163
infiltrate, 99, 104, 113–114, 122, 144, insurgent, 11–16, 32, 34–36, 53, 102,
148, 186 105, 107, 110–111, 124, 139,
infiltrated, 99–100 144–147, 149, 154–155, 157,
infiltration, 81, 95, 98, 100, 119, 161–162, 167, 170–172
148, 174 Insurgents, 12, 14, 81, 170
inflation, 95, 122–123, 160, 171 insurgents, 12–13, 15–16, 34, 36, 50,
infrastructural, 136, 163 52, 54–55, 62, 71, 75, 78, 81, 106,
infrastructure, 16, 37, 83, 115, 121, 140–142, 148–150, 157, 170–171
124, 134, 136, 138, 145, 147, integration, 82, 115
152, 171 interference, 22, 28–29, 53, 59, 79
insecure, 73, 117 interim, 42, 89, 147
insecurities, 117 internal, 18–21, 24, 29–30, 37, 40–41,
insecurity, 2, 24, 52, 58, 72–74, 145, 51, 53, 69, 79, 82, 84, 96–98, 107,
156, 162 113, 127, 130, 140–141, 144,
Index 237
148, 152, 155, 162–163, 166, Islamic, 1–2, 6–7, 9–10, 29, 31, 37, 42,
170–171 62–63, 65, 69, 78, 84, 86–88, 90,
internally, 21, 28, 84, 89, 93, 95, 110, 99, 102–103, 105, 107, 109–111,
112, 137, 161, 176, 188 114, 116, 134, 157, 166, 172, 175,
International, 23, 48, 55, 63, 75, 182, 184, 187
102, 111 Islamisation, 87, 89, 93, 101, 123
international, 2, 7, 9, 11–12, 17–18, Islamising, 56
21, 23, 28–29, 34, 36, 38, 41, Islamism, 85, 87
45–46, 50–54, 67, 69, 74–75, Islamist, 38, 70, 91, 103, 141
78–80, 82, 98, 101, 107, 116, 136, Islamists, 91
145, 148, 161, 174, 178, 186–188 Islamiyya, 9, 31, 63
intervention, 21, 51, 78, 80, 95, 99, Ismaeli, 43
125, 134, 179–180, 185 Ismail, 42–43
intimidate, 2–3, 12 Israel, 9
intimidation, 2–4, 156 Israeli, 8
invaded, 39, 107, 127, 130 Itihad, 88
invasion, 10, 37, 40, 47, 54, 61–62,
64, 79–80, 87, 91, Jaish, 31, 62–63, 110–111, 129, 169
104–106, 109, 125, 130, Jalalabad, 44, 53
134–137, 144, 148–149, Jalaluddin, 108
151–153, 156, 159, 162, JAM, 169
164–167, 172, 175, Jamhoori, 88
182–183, 185–186 Jamiat, 42, 111
IRA, 6–7, 31 Jammu, 111, 126–127
Iran, 8–10, 41, 47, 105, 134–135, JeM, 63
147–150, 157, 167, 169–170 Jews, 123, 131
Iranian, 9–10, 63, 87, 106, 131, Jhangvi, 31, 63, 110–111, 184
133–135, 167, 169 Jihad, 9, 31, 63, 110–111
Iranians, 134 jihad, 31, 61–62, 67, 107, 110, 115,
Iraq, 9, 17, 30–35, 62, 64, 109, 124–125, 166
111–112, 125, 130–167, Jihadi, 166
169–173, 175, 178–182, 184–185 jihadi, 85, 105, 110, 128
Iraqi, 130–151, 154–173, 185 jihadist, 81–82
Iraqis, 134, 138, 140–141, jihadists, 64, 148, 170, 184
144–145, 156, 159–161, Jordan, 147–148, 167
163, 167 judicial, 65, 71, 146
Irbil, 158 judiciary, 113, 115, 118–119
Ireland, 76, 93, 186 Junejo, 88–89
Irish, 6, 31, 186
irregular, 12–13, 156 Kabul, 40–44, 46–47, 49, 51, 53–54,
Ishaq, 88–89 64–66, 74, 79, 81, 88–89, 106, 184
ISI, 43, 105–107 Kahn, 86
Islam, 10, 31, 55–56, 63, 65, 69, Kamal, 142
84–85, 87, 95, 115–117, 119, 124, Kandahar, 41–42, 44, 46, 50, 53–54,
157, 166, 184, 186–187 73, 76, 78, 108, 183
Islamabad, 46, 54, 79, 97, Karachi, 88, 90, 107, 123
106–109, 115, 121, 123, Karbala, 148, 162, 166, 185
129, 183 Kargil, 127
Islami, 31, 42, 63, 81, 88, 110–111 Karim, 131
238 Index
Karkat, 110 leadership, 16, 42–43, 59–60, 85, 87,

Karmal, 39–41 90, 93, 106, 128, 131–132, 137,
Karzai, 46, 48, 50, 55, 78 142, 145, 147–148, 151–152, 154,
Kashmir, 9, 86, 92, 101, 106–107, 162, 171–173
110–111, 126–128, 184 leaderships, 26, 153
Kashmiri, 92, 106–107 League, 84–86, 111, 131, 135
Kashmiris, 127 Lebanon, 5, 21, 34–35, 178
Kenya, 33, 45 legal, 20, 65–66, 71, 75, 118, 143,
Keyani, 43 146, 150, 158
Khabab, 126 legally, 104, 158
Khalid, 110 Leghari, 89–90
Khan, 39, 42–43, 85–89, 100 Legitimacy, 65, 151
Khyber, 86, 88–90, 96, 98, 100, 102, legitimacy, 12, 14–16, 19–20, 24,
104, 109, 113, 115–116, 120–122, 41, 48, 50, 52, 64–65, 70, 76,
125 113, 117, 122, 129, 139–140,
kidnapping, 3, 62 151, 154–155, 157, 160, 183,
kidnappings, 4, 6, 8, 145 185
killed, 5, 7, 38, 40, 43–44, 88, 107, legitimate, 19, 65–66, 76, 79, 124
126, 131, 133–134, 147, 167 legitimising, 117, 172
killing, 51, 92, 101, 103, 107, 126, LeT, 128–129
129 Liaquat, 85
killings, 134, 141, 149 liberal, 39, 70, 116
Kirkuk, 139, 141, 144, 158–159 liberalism, 77
KRG, 158–159 liberated, 46, 135
Kunar, 50, 53, 81, 107 Liberation, 31, 42, 63, 111, 184
Kunduz, 43, 50 links, 35, 64, 72, 77, 106, 110, 171
Kurd, 145, 154, 163–164 literacy, 94, 100, 144
Kurdish, 6, 133–134, 139–141, 144, literature, 3–4, 7–8, 19, 23, 25, 29–30,
151, 157–158, 169, 185 98, 175–177, 187
Kurdistan, 31, 133, 140–141, 144, 158 Logar, 50, 53, 73, 81, 183
Kurds, 131, 133, 139, 141–142, 146, London, 27
157–159, 166, 185 looting, 138, 164
Kuwait, 134–136, 147, 167 loyalists, 165
LTTE, 31
Laden, 44–46, 91, 101, 108, 129
Lahore, 128, 184 madrassas, 44, 56, 87, 100, 105, 110,
Lashkar, 31, 63, 81, 107, 110–111, 120, 124
128, 184 Maghreb, 31
lawless, 89, 183 majoritarian, 154
lawlessness, 47, 50, 165 Malaysia, 63
laws, 3, 21, 65, 71, 99, 156–157 Maliki, 141–143, 151–152, 154–155,
leader, 7, 38, 41–42, 45–46, 49, 59, 171, 173
84–85, 87–89, 91–92, 108, 114, malnutri, 136
131, 133, 137, 143 malnutrition, 137
leaders, 9, 16, 20–21, 41, 43–45, 51, marginalisation, 67, 115, 120–121,
59, 68, 78–80, 84–85, 97, 100, 123, 133, 180
117–118, 125, 130, 133, 137, 140, marginalised, 67, 121, 165
150–151, 169 martial, 86, 88, 90–91, 117
Index 239
mass, 3, 40, 83, 87, 94–95, 97, 103, MQM, 88

112, 126, 133, 139, 141, 150–152, Muhammad, 39, 84–85, 88, 111
159, 165 Mujadidi, 42
massacre, 133 Mujahideen, 31, 63, 108, 110–111
massacres, 134 mujahideen, 40–44, 46, 53, 55, 61–62,
Massoud, 42–45, 182 87, 106
MEK, 9, 31 Mullah, 42, 44–46
militancy, 79, 87, 93, 109, 120, 126 multilateral, 135
militant, 61, 77, 79, 91, 94, 102, 104, Musharraf, 84, 90–92, 105–106, 118,
106–107, 109–110, 115 121–122, 125, 128
militants, 45, 78, 80, 91, 96, 99, Muslim, 38, 55, 63, 65, 84–85, 88, 92,
102–103, 106–107, 110, 113, 115, 111, 117, 126, 146, 163, 175, 185
125–126, 148, 172 Muslims, 63, 84, 95, 116, 119,
militarisation, 58, 117 130–131, 133, 146, 163, 166, 185
military, 5–6, 8–9, 11–16, 19, 23, Muthanna, 144, 148, 162
40–44, 46, 48, 53, 55, 61, 66,
71, 78–81, 83–85, 88–93, 96–97, Nafaz, 63, 111
100–101, 106, 109, 111–114, 117, Najibullah, 41, 44
121, 123–124, 126–129, 131–135, Nangarhar, 42–43, 75, 81, 108, 183
138–139, 145, 147, 150, 152–153, narcotics, 38, 52, 76, 88
162, 167, 169, 171, 173, 185 nation, 20, 23, 25, 37, 43, 47–48,
militia, 27, 42–44, 61, 68, 133, 148 56, 66, 69–70, 83–85, 90, 117,
militias, 76, 102, 142, 150–151, 157, 119–121, 123, 129, 134, 138, 153,
169 161, 167
minorities, 67–68, 115, 141, 146, 164 nationalism, 4, 69, 114, 157
minority, 11, 29, 67–68, 123, 130, nationalistic, 79, 119, 157
139, 144, 146, 158, 162–163, 166 nationalists, 119, 165–166
Mirza, 85–86 nationhood, 116, 167
mission, 50, 54, 81, 185 Nations, 2, 21, 47, 131
missions, 80, 108, 129, 184 nations, 20–21, 37, 46, 72, 125,
mistrust, 38, 79, 132, 143 128, 187
mobilisation, 16, 40, 43, 147 NATO, 54, 57, 59, 65
mobilise, 16, 117 Nawaz, 88–90, 92, 103, 128
modernisation, 22, 122, 162–163, 180 negotiate, 41, 59
modernity, 118 negotiations, 9, 128
Mohammad, 31, 39, 62–63, 85–86, neighbouring, 34, 42, 75, 79, 95, 107,
92, 110–111, 129 124, 129, 142, 147, 167, 171–172,
Mohammadi, 63, 111 178–180
money, 44, 68, 76, 102, 106, 122 neighbours, 38, 142, 148, 158, 164,
monopoly, 21–22, 132 167
Moroccan, 31, 63 nexus, 51, 76, 133
mortality, 24, 47, 136–137 Nidal, 31
Mosul, 131, 141 Nifaz, 111
motivated, 1–2, 9–10, 15, 92, 123, Niger, 33
138, 150 Nigeria, 33, 55, 187
motivations, 4, 9 Nimroz, 54, 76
motives, 117, 138 Ninawa, 148, 159
movements, 7, 11, 61, 87, 141, 150 Ninevah, 185
240 Index
Norway, 8 Pakistan, 17, 21, 27, 32–35, 41,

Nouri, 151, 173 44–47, 50, 53–56, 59, 63,
nuclear, 90–91, 99, 112, 126 79–81, 83–129, 147, 152, 162,
Nuristan, 40, 81, 107 178–185
NWFP, 86, 183 Pakistani, 9, 53–55, 63–64, 80,
83–84, 88–89, 91–92, 94, 96–99,
Obama, 79, 99, 166 101–112, 117–122, 124–129, 147,
occupied, 146 184–185
occupiers, 13, 79, 165 Pakistanis, 94, 120
occupying, 14–15, 78, 131 Paktia, 50, 78, 81, 108, 183
OECD, 2, 19, 25 Paktika, 50, 73, 78, 81, 108, 183
oil, 134–136, 157–162, 167, 170 Palestine, 31
oilfields, 167 Palestinian, 9
Oman, 187 Palestinians, 146
Omar, 44–46, 63, 111 Panjshir, 50
Operation, 46, 62, 122, 134 Parachinar, 53, 106
operations, 13, 15–16, 28, 32, 40–41, paramilitary, 21, 148
81, 101, 126, 136 Parliament, 46, 85, 143
operatives, 110, 147–148, 170 parliamentary, 65, 85–87, 142,
opium, 38, 70, 75–76 153–154
opponents, 6, 13, 40, 79, 87, 117 partition, 126, 163
opportunities, 28, 52, 124, 149, 161, Pashtun, 42–43, 46, 50, 55, 68, 81, 91,
163, 176 94, 106, 115, 119–120, 126
opportunity, 18, 40, 56, 74, 86, 88–89, Pashtuns, 43, 64, 68, 94, 119
134, 137, 162 Pashtunwali, 46, 94
opposition, 16, 40, 43, 62, 67, 81, 86, patronage, 59, 118, 132
91–92, 132–133, 141, 143 PDPA, 39–40
organisation, 2, 10–12, 15, 19, 23, perception, 18, 125, 138, 174
27, 30, 32, 46, 103, 107, 154, perceptions, 70, 164
164 Pervez, 84, 90, 106, 122
organisations, 3–4, 11–12, 21, 28, Peshawar, 41–42, 59, 123
30–32, 34, 41, 66, 80, 82–83, Petraeus, 57, 142, 169
100–101, 103, 105, 109–110, phenomena, 1, 4, 11, 29, 174–175,
112–114, 116, 119, 123, 129, 139, 177
148, 157, 160, 166, 174, 177–178, phenomenon, 10, 13, 17–18, 20–21,
182, 184, 187–188 27, 58, 61, 83, 117, 132, 155,
organised, 7, 12, 14–16, 47, 50, 99, 165, 183
137–138, 165 Philippines, 31, 34, 178
Oruzgan, 108, 183 polarisation, 103
Osama, 44, 91, 101, 108, 129 police, 7, 66, 107, 118–119, 138, 145,
outbreak, 101, 130 148–149
overthrow, 6, 11–12, 14, 77, 110, 131 policies, 15, 27, 48, 89, 106, 109, 121,
overview, 1, 17, 38, 48, 62, 64, 83, 129, 157, 184, 187
110, 136, 176, 180, 186 Policy, 23–24, 104, 155
policy, 3, 8, 22, 25, 29, 36, 51, 56,
pacification, 18 59, 68, 79–80, 84, 96, 105, 107,
Pakhtunkhwa, 86, 88–90, 96, 98, 100, 128–129, 132, 139, 145–146, 151,
102, 104, 109, 113, 115–116, 155, 162, 166, 170, 172, 176,
120–122, 125 182, 187
Index 241
Political, 14, 22, 24, 52, 64, 112, 116, 119–122, 139–140, 148–149, 154,
118, 133, 153, 180 158–160, 162, 182, 185
political, 2–16, 18, 20–24, 26–29, provincial, 48, 51, 66, 86, 88, 93, 155
37–38, 40–44, 47–48, 50–53, provincialism, 115
55–59, 61–62, 64–71, 73, 75, 77, proxy, 88, 106, 169
79, 81, 83–97, 99–101, 105, 109, psychological, 3–5, 38
112–118, 120, 122–125, 127–128, Punjab, 85, 87–89, 104, 109
130–133, 137–143, 145, 149, Punjabis, 94, 115, 123
151–158, 163–167, 169–171, 176, purges, 146
179–185, 188
politicides, 24 Qadir, 42
politics, 18, 20, 52, 68–69, 82, 84–85, Qadisiyah, 185
94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 116–118, Qadissiya, 144
130, 155, 158, 166, 186 Qaeda, 9, 13, 30–31, 45–46, 53–54,
poppies, 75–76 57, 63–65, 76–77, 79, 81, 91–92,
Porous, 22, 54, 101, 147, 181 94–95, 98, 101–102, 104–106,
porous, 54, 82, 96–98, 101–102, 129, 109–110, 112, 126, 139, 141, 144,
146–149, 172, 179–180 146–147, 160, 170, 172, 184
Poverty, 22, 47, 72–73, 160, 180 Quetta, 88, 106
poverty, 23, 38, 55, 58, 72–75, 94,
109, 120, 143–144, 159–160, 162 Rabbani, 42–44, 56
power, 3, 11–16, 19–20, 26, 28, 39–40, radical, 30, 40, 70, 82, 87, 92–93, 99,
42–47, 53–54, 61–62, 66, 68–69, 103, 109, 124, 150, 166, 169
77, 84–86, 88–93, 95–96, 102, radicalisation, 103, 124, 175
113–115, 118, 125, 130–134, radicalised, 103, 124
136–137, 139–140, 143, 145, radicalism, 184
151–152, 154, 156, 158, 165, 176, radicals, 150
182–183, 185 Rank, 33, 48
PPP, 86, 88–89, 92, 128 rank, 22–25, 48, 62
President, 8, 39, 44–46, 77–79, 86–91, ranked, 22, 37, 47, 72, 105
93, 99, 106–107, 132–133, 139, ranking, 22–24, 30, 95, 175, 177, 186
150–151, 166 Rashid, 111, 114
president, 40, 86–89, 133 Rawalpindi, 39, 85, 92, 97, 110, 115,
presidential, 86, 93 121, 123, 184
procedures, 99, 157 rebellion, 40, 93, 134, 138
processes, 65, 71, 73, 158, 186 rebellions, 61
programme, 23–24, 58, 87, 89–90, 99, rebels, 134, 150, 171
136–137, 142, 148 reconstruction, 59, 74, 77, 79, 143,
programmes, 80–81, 162–163, 184 155–156, 160–161, 163, 165, 183
proliferation, 29, 57–59, 92, 94, 104, recruit, 56–57, 66, 78, 104, 146, 150,
112, 115, 120, 124–125, 138, 151, 163
153, 160, 163, 174 recruitment, 56, 73, 79, 94, 124,
propaganda, 116, 132, 157 159–160
protests, 126, 171 recruits, 28, 55–57, 77–78, 81–82, 101,
province, 43–44, 53–54, 76, 78, 81, 103, 124, 129, 141, 144, 149–150,
119, 142, 146, 164, 171, 183–185 162, 176, 179–181
provinces, 38, 42, 44, 46, 50, 54, reform, 154–155
67–68, 73–75, 78, 80–81, 85–87, reforms, 11, 15, 39, 89, 133, 155
100, 102, 104, 107–108, 113, 115, refuge, 54, 91, 102, 118
242 Index
refugee, 47, 144, 146 resources, 2, 12–13, 15, 30, 41, 53, 66,
refugees, 41, 47, 67, 88, 95, 115, 68–69, 74, 96, 98, 127, 136, 144,
144–145, 149, 171 156, 160–162
Regime, 112, 180 resurgent, 50
regime, 9, 15–16, 22, 39–41, 46, 48, retaliate, 134
64–65, 67, 69, 71, 79, 88–89, retaliation, 78
110, 112, 116, 128–134, revenue, 28, 158, 160–161, 176
136–139, 144–145, 149–150, revolts, 61, 119
152–154, 158, 164–165, 170, Revolution, 9, 39, 87, 134
172, 179–180, 185 revolution, 10–11, 22, 87, 107
regimes, 112, 114, 117, 132, 136 Revolutionary, 15, 31, 40, 63
region, 6, 14–16, 40, 46, 80, 92, revolutionary, 6, 13, 24, 41
101–102, 107, 111, 113, 120–121, riots, 85, 87, 92, 126, 164
129, 134, 144–145, 151, 158–159, RIRA, 31
170, 173, 184–185 root, 73, 76, 82, 88, 102, 109, 115,
regional, 38, 42–43, 72, 79–80, 84, 124, 149
98, 114, 116, 130, 158, 164, rural, 40, 51, 71–72, 74, 144, 183
182–183 Russia, 38
regions, 8, 49–50, 54–55, 76, 78, 81, Russian, 39, 104
87, 91, 98, 102, 109, 113, 116,
119–120, 125, 129, 131, 159, 161, sabotage, 14
163, 181, 183–185 Saddam, 9, 130, 132–135, 137–139,
reign, 38–39, 88, 92, 137, 140 144–145, 148–150, 152, 155, 158,
relationship, 17, 27–28, 57, 69, 79, 162, 164, 167, 172, 185
85, 108–109, 114, 117, 125, 170, Salafists, 166
177, 186 Salahuddin, 185
relationships, 9, 60, 85, 185 Salam, 131
Religion, 22 Samangan, 43, 50
religion, 4, 10, 13, 62, 65, 69, 85, 95, Samarra, 141
110, 123, 157, 170 sanctions, 19, 134, 136–137, 162
Religious, 14, 68, 133 sanctuaries, 116, 126, 176
religious, 2–3, 6, 9, 16, 19–21, 27, sanctuary, 13, 59, 79, 81, 108, 113,
37, 42, 55–56, 61, 65, 67–70, 79, 185
83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 107, Saudi, 44–45, 76, 105, 134, 147–148,
109–110, 115, 117–120, 123–124, 167, 170
130, 141, 146, 152, 163–165, Saudis, 170
170, 185 Sayyaf, 31, 62–63
religiously, 1, 9, 92, 118, 123 Sayyed, 42–43
representative, 13, 50, 65, 85, 112, 140 secession, 117
repression, 158 secessionist, 98
repressive, 50, 67, 72, 119 sectarian, 37, 49, 62, 65, 87, 90–92,
Republic, 21, 32, 39, 93, 178 95, 102, 104, 109–110, 116, 124,
Republican, 6, 31, 86, 186 130, 137, 139, 141–143, 145,
resentment, 51, 74, 143, 149, 156, 150–151, 154, 163–164, 166–167,
160, 183 170–171, 173, 184
resilient, 25–26, 96, 179 sectarianism, 85, 107, 154
resistance, 14, 40–41, 44–45, 52, 61, Security, 2, 19, 135, 152, 169, 172
78, 106, 127, 144, 166 security, 8, 18–20, 24, 28, 30, 34, 45,
Resolution, 2, 24, 135–136 50–53, 65–66, 70–78, 80–81, 84,
Index 243
92, 95, 97, 111, 117, 120, 125, spillovers, 27

127–128, 138, 140–142, 145–149, sponsor, 8–9, 89
154–155, 163–167, 171–172, 176, sponsored, 1, 6, 8, 127
178, 184 sponsoring, 8
separation, 43, 69, 126 sponsors, 8
Separatist, 15 sponsorship, 8
separatist, 1, 6, 107 stabilisation, 161
separatists, 106 stabilise, 40, 42, 46, 67, 84, 96, 169
September, 37, 40, 44–45, 85–86, 91, stabilised, 145
93, 106, 122–123, 131, 134, 142, stabilising, 44, 55, 57, 142
165 stability, 2, 26, 44, 51–52, 59, 66–67,
service, 71–72, 86, 94, 144, 155 69, 72–74, 80, 82, 84, 93–95, 99,
Shabaab, 31, 187 102, 112–113, 118, 121–122, 124,
Shah, 38–39, 42, 44 126, 129, 132, 135, 139–145,
Sharia, 13, 71, 89 149, 151, 153–155, 159–165, 167,
Shariat, 63, 89–90, 111 170–173, 179
Sharif, 42, 46, 88–92, 118, 128 stagnation, 75, 159, 162, 180
Shia, 43, 92, 95, 110, 119, 130–131, State, 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11, 13, 15, 17–19,
133, 139–142, 144–146, 150, 154, 21, 23–32, 34–35, 37, 42, 47, 61,
163, 171, 185 83, 93, 95, 109, 130, 143, 153,
Shias, 110, 166 175, 177–179, 182, 186–188
Shinrikyo, 31 state, 1–2, 5–6, 8, 13, 17–30, 32,
Shura, 42–43, 59 34–38, 40, 42–43, 47–53, 56–59,
Sindh, 87–88, 90, 96, 104, 109, 119, 64–66, 69–71, 73, 75–76, 78,
122 81–85, 87, 89–93, 95–101,
Sindhi, 88, 94 103–105, 107, 112–114, 116–118,
Sindhis, 115 120–124, 126–135, 137–138,
skirmishes, 37, 48, 134, 184 143–147, 152–153, 155–166, 169,
smuggling, 46, 148 172–188
Social, 22, 58, 76, 122, 156, 163, 180 statehood, 21, 186
societal, 11, 19, 57, 68 STATES, 25–26
societies, 13, 18, 29, 55–58, 103 States, 19, 23–25, 27, 30, 37
society, 6–7, 12–13, 27, 40–42, 51–52, states, 3, 11, 17–30, 32–36, 55–56,
60, 66, 69–70, 83, 85, 89, 91, 100, 58, 65, 72, 79–80, 84, 95, 99,
103, 107, 110, 124, 131, 135, 143, 104–105, 117, 123, 127, 129, 135,
146, 151–152, 155, 161, 163–164 143, 147, 149, 167, 169, 172,
socioeconomic, 49 174–180, 186–188
soldiers, 40, 78, 127, 142 Stockholm, 34
Somalia, 21, 33, 93, 175, 187 strategic, 12, 38, 53–54, 62, 79, 106
sovereign, 19–20, 131, 143, 166 strategies, 4, 27, 79, 169
sovereignty, 18, 24, 68, 139, 149 strategy, 4, 11, 13, 23–24, 81,
Soviet, 10, 17, 38, 40–41, 46–47, 105–106, 142, 147, 170
50–51, 53, 61–62, 67, 87–88, strength, 18, 23, 25, 36, 47, 50, 65,
105–106, 109, 125 67, 93, 99, 146–147, 158–159,
Soviets, 40–42, 61 172, 184
Spain, 186 STRONG, 25–26
spectrum, 17, 19, 23–27, 35, 146, 175, strong, 6, 18, 21, 24–26, 30, 37,
177, 179, 181–182 46–47, 49–50, 53, 55, 65, 68,
spillover, 34, 64, 170, 172, 178 71, 75, 82, 93, 98, 103, 116,
244 Index
123, 129, 141, 154, 161, 172, Terrorism, 1–32, 34–38, 40, 42, 44,
176–177, 179, 186 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60–64,
structural, 49, 52, 57, 98, 115, 121, 164 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80,
structure, 7, 11, 15–16, 42, 49, 56, 66, 82–84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98,
76, 84–85, 94, 96–97, 103, 116, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108–112, 114,
145, 173 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128,
structures, 7, 15–16, 50, 66, 71, 113, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142,
155, 166, 175, 181 144, 146, 148, 150, 152–154, 156,
struggle, 12–14, 31, 40, 43, 61, 69, 83, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172,
95–96, 119–120, 131, 139, 141, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188
157, 163, 180 terrorism, 1–14, 16–18, 25, 27–30,
subcontinent, 116, 126 32–37, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56–62, 64,
Sudan, 8–9, 32–33, 44, 93, 178 66–67, 71, 73–74, 76–77, 79–85,
suicide, 10, 62, 64, 92, 94, 98, 104, 89, 92–94, 98, 101–102, 104–105,
141, 145, 148, 170 107, 110–112, 115–117, 119–122,
Sunni, 92, 95, 110, 119, 130–131, 124–126, 129, 138, 141, 144–157,
133, 139–142, 144–146, 150, 159–162, 164–165, 167, 169–170,
154, 157–159, 163–165, 170–171, 172–180, 183–188
184–185 Terrorist, 30, 63, 111, 166, 186
Sunnis, 110, 130–131, 141, 147, 166, terrorist, 2–3, 6–11, 13, 17, 28–32,
171 34–36, 45, 48–49, 53–58, 61–62,
Swat, 113, 115 64, 67–69, 73, 75–76, 78–80,
Sweden, 7 82–83, 90–91, 94, 98–103,
Swedish, 7 105–106, 109–116, 118–129,
Syria, 8–9, 21, 147–149, 157, 167, 137–141, 144–147, 149–155,
169–172 157, 159–164, 166–167,
Syrian, 130, 171 170–172, 174, 176–179,
181–188
tactic, 5–6, 9, 14, 16, 62, 64, 142 terrorists, 7, 9, 13, 32, 35–36, 53, 57,
tactics, 4, 10–11, 13, 15, 53, 61, 87, 60, 95, 99, 101–102, 104, 107,
125, 132, 138 116, 140, 146–149, 176, 178,
Tajik, 63, 68 181, 184
Tajikistan, 45 theory, 23, 56, 65, 70, 103, 120, 147,
Tajiks, 68 155, 160
Taliban, 9, 13, 31, 43–48, 50, 53–65, totalitarian, 65, 132
67–81, 89, 91–92, 94–95, 98, trade, 24, 49, 53, 70, 75–76, 88, 116,
101–102, 104–108, 110–112, 121, 135–136, 162, 169
116–118, 125–126, 147, 182–185 tradition, 66, 98, 162
Taraki, 39–40 traditional, 4, 6, 12, 15, 25, 38–39, 46,
Tehrik, 31, 63, 92, 102, 111, 116 62, 65, 69, 102, 104, 114, 128,
territorial, 20, 55, 98, 116, 128 146, 170
territories, 18, 20, 40, 42, 81, 127 traditionally, 16, 37, 157
territory, 7, 12–13, 15, 18–20, 22, 35, traditions, 7, 40, 65, 87
43, 45, 49, 53–55, 81, 87, 98–101, trafficking, 47–48, 50, 75, 108
104, 108, 121, 127, 129, 134, 141, transformation, 132, 142, 153
147, 174–175 transition, 81, 139–140, 143
terror, 2, 4–8, 10–11, 17–18, 46, 106, transnational, 81–82
110, 112, 125, 127, 132–133, 165, transparency, 48, 58
172, 175, 178, 184, 186 transparent, 11, 20, 155
Index 245
tribal, 16, 37–38, 46, 49, 54, 61–62, Violence, 2–3, 77, 131, 151, 184
69–71, 78, 90–91, 96, 98, 102, violence, 2–6, 9–14, 18–19, 21–22,
104, 106, 108, 113–115, 117, 120, 28, 30, 34, 37, 43–45, 48–49,
122, 125–126, 130, 141, 145, 150, 52, 57–59, 61–62, 64, 66–69, 71,
170, 184 75–78, 87–88, 90–92, 95, 97–98,
tribalism, 96, 157 103, 107, 112, 115–117, 119,
tribes, 69, 145, 148 122, 124–125, 127, 132–133,
tribesman, 171 138–141, 145–146, 148, 150–155,
trigger, 151 158–159, 161–162, 164–167,
triggered, 51, 61, 124–126, 141, 152, 176, 178–180, 182, 184–185,
165, 171–172, 175, 183, 185 187–188
triggering, 39, 85, 185 violent, 7, 12, 21, 39–40, 44, 48, 58,
troops, 41, 61, 64, 75, 77–81, 91, 61, 67, 73, 77, 82, 96, 104, 110,
105, 111, 134–135, 138, 142, 116–119, 121–124, 130, 142,
148, 150–151, 166–167, 171, 144, 148, 152, 156, 159–160,
185 184
troubled, 27, 43, 89, 146, 152 violently, 8, 119
tumultuous, 85, 89, 131 volatile, 37, 68, 70, 80, 96, 113, 129
Tunisian, 63 vulnerable, 15, 29, 56, 59, 72, 114,
Turkey, 147, 157, 167, 170 118–119, 124, 132, 160, 167,
Turkish, 131 188
Turkistan, 63
Turkmen, 139 Wardak, 50, 53, 68, 183
Turkomans, 146, 159 warfare, 5, 11–13, 61, 156
warlords, 21, 46, 66, 68, 75
UK, 78, 105, 135 water, 51, 76, 136, 144, 161
UN, 23, 67, 127, 134–136, 143, 171 Waziristan, 91, 98, 114, 116, 119, 183
uncontrolled, 47, 50, 58, 151, 170 WEAK, 25–26
underemployment, 162 weak, 16, 19–20, 24, 26–27, 29, 35,
unemployed, 139, 144, 149, 163 47, 50, 52, 55–56, 58, 64, 67,
unemployment, 11, 23, 56, 72, 123, 70–72, 81, 84–85, 92–93, 96–102,
143, 150, 160, 162, 181 113, 122, 132, 149, 152–153,
uneven, 30, 73–74, 96, 100, 121, 145, 156, 164, 177, 179, 182, 184,
159–162, 180 187–188
ungoverned, 54, 102 weakened, 21, 40, 47, 114, 123,
UNHCR, 72, 149 128, 134
UNICEF, 100, 137 weakening, 57, 97
unrest, 56, 73, 78, 88, 90, 115, 170 weaker, 10, 99, 122
UNSC, 136–137 weakness, 19–20, 22–24, 27, 49–51,
urban, 15–16, 41, 72, 74, 124, 144 53, 57, 59, 65–66, 76, 81, 94,
USAID, 19, 24, 154 98–99, 104, 114, 119, 122,
USSR, 41, 105 181–182, 184, 188
Uzbek, 68 weaknesses, 59, 184
Uzbekistan, 31, 63 wealth, 15, 73–74, 121, 123, 159–162,
Uzbeks, 43 180
weaponry, 58, 103
vacuum, 21, 44, 53, 85, 137–138, 140, weapons, 8–9, 13, 34, 57–58, 76, 83,
145, 165, 183 88, 103–104, 106–107, 112,
variables, 24, 35–36, 103 126–127, 148–152, 172, 179, 181
246 Index
West, 84–85, 87, 105, 109, 117, 127 Yazidis, 131

western, 34, 55, 75, 78, 97, 102, 126, Yemen, 5, 33, 63
148, 170, 178, 183–184 youth, 47, 55–56, 58, 77, 79, 94, 103,
withdraw, 15, 41, 65, 135, 147 107, 149, 181
withdrawal, 41, 50, 53, 61, 64, 67,
75, 79, 106, 111, 140, 147, Zabul, 50, 53, 73, 183
149, 151, 166–167, 173, Zardari, 93, 99, 107
185 Zia, 85, 87–89, 105, 116, 118
wounded, 43, 45, 85, 135 Zimbabwe, 33, 93
writ, 54, 71, 100, 102, 113 Zulfikar, 63, 84, 86–87

Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating The Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

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Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating The Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

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Countering Global

Terrorism and Insurgency

Calculating the Risk of State Failure in

New Security Challenges Series

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

List of Figures and Tables x

1 Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure 1

2 Assessing the Connections between State Failure,

3 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

4 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

5 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

6 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

7 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency

Failure in context: Iraq a failed state? 143

8 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in

1.1 Spectrum of state failure 25

1.1 Definitions of terrorism 2

• To what extent do failed states play a role in the proliferation of

By addressing these key questions it may be possible to understand

The problems of defining terrorism

In order to understand fully what terrorism is, a core definition or

Table 1.1 Definitions of terrorism

US FBI/Code of The unlawful use of force and violence against

Table 1.1 Continued

India An act of terrorism is comparable to a peacetime

into two groups of definitions: those used by organisations and those

The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or

This definition encompasses many of the elements that are seen as

of forms of terrorism that exist also makes it extremely difficult to

calculations of the government or society concerned, rather than as a

What are the most common types of terrorism?

There are so many forms of terrorism in existence today that it has

In recent decades, specifically in the period post-9/11, the terms ‘terror-

of our understanding of them. According to Smith, it is extremely

The problems of defining insurgency

Defining insurgency in the modern context is as difficult, if not more

• Their desire to control a specific area or territory

An insurgency can also be defined as an organised movement aimed

the insurgents involved use their limited assets, grassroots support,

Table 1.2 Definitions of insurgency

Joint Chiefs of Staff The organised use of subversion and violence by

What are the most common types of insurgency?

Having outlined the major definitions of insurgency it is now essential

each insurgency is different and is shaped by conflict-specific factors

1. Revolutionary: seek to replace the existing political order with a

Now that both terrorism and insurgency have been assessed, it is

Defining and understanding state failure

The emergence of state failure has had an extremely important impact

our ability to develop a core definition that could be applied universally.

Table 1.3 Definitions of state failure

characteristics and definitions contained in the literature. When a state

in many of the world’s nations has been one of violent suppression of

Table 1.4 Root causes of state failure

Historical Social/cultural Political/state Economic

Historical legacy Culture of Structural Rapid urbanisation

in 1990, but exists today as a failing state which retains a government

Assessing and ranking a failed state

many of these efforts were focused on humanitarian and aid-related

Table 1.5 Studies and assessments of state failure

The Political Instability Uses extensive open source date to isolate

Source: Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.57

is based on a five-point grading scale which begins with the strong

Figure 1.1 Spectrum of state failure