PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE – FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. xgrno             September
xdate, 2008
xcite

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 161032

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA,* and

and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, BRION, JJ.

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, G.R. No. 161176

JOCELYN BARLIZO, and

PHILIP PICHAY,

Petitioners,

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Promulgated:

CARLOS SO,

Respondents. September 16, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our

democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth
estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility.
There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and
it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been
crossed.
 The Facts

On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of

Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on September
8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City. These
were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as
author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay,
as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the
publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues
of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25,
1999.1 The four informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-1598

That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, being then the
columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
"REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said publication on May 11, 1999, its daily
column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS

Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of

Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata na government official
sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.

Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa

Iglesia ni Kristo.

Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang

pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.

Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa

mga kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired
wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his
reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public
opinion.2

Criminal Case No. 99-1599

That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, being then the
columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
"REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said publication on May 12, 1999, in daily column
"DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

SI ATTY. SO NG BOC

"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of

Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.

Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si

So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara ang totoong laman ng mga
container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties
at taxes.

Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container

na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng salapi yung ibang mga
ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic]
bibig diyan sa mga buwayang taga BOC.

Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga,

ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.

Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili
niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng mas mabilis.

Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay
sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka korbata at holdaper.
Magnanakaw ka So!!"

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired
wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his
reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public
opinion.3

Criminal Case No. 99-1600

That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro

Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, being then the
columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
"REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said publication on May 19, 1999, in daily column
"DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

xxxx

"Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence

Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel Aquino ng
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa South Harbor.

Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.

Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.

Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-
release ng kanilang kargamento."

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired
wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his
reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public
opinion.4
 Criminal Case No. 99-1597

That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro

Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, being then the
columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
"REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said publication on June 25, 1999, its daily
column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

xxxx

Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau

of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang opisyales ng Remate
sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil
binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.

Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita

tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang iyong kaluluwa sa
impyerno.

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired
wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his
reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public
opinion.5

On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned,

while Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on December 15, 1999.
They all pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.

At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that

during the four dates of the publication of the questioned articles,
the complaining witness was not assigned at South Harbor; (2)
that the accused and complaining witness did not know each other
during all the time material to the four dates of publication; (3)
that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the
Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness of the Remate
newspaper; (5) the column therein and its authorship and the
alleged libelous statement as well as the editorial post containing
the designated positions of the other accused; and (6) the
prosecution’s qualified admission that it is the duty of media
persons to expose corruption.6

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M.

Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla, and complainant
Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary evidence as
well.

Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo,
and that the articles were untrue because he had known Atty. So
since 1992 and had worked with him in the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service Division of the Bureau of Customs. He
further testified that upon reading the articles written by Tulfo, he
concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject
articles identified "Atty. Carlos" as "Atty. ‘Ding’ So" of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division, Bureau
of Customs and there was only one Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the
Bureau of Customs.7

Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified

that she issued a certification in connection with these cases upon
the request of Atty. So.8 This certification stated that as per
records available in her office, there was only one employee by
the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who was also known as "Atty.
Ding So" in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs.9

Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of

the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that having read the
articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were untrue, as he knew
Atty. Carlos "Ding" So.10

Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these

consolidated cases. He further testified that he is also known as
Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of
Customs since October 1981, and that he was assigned as Officer-
in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service Division at the Manila International Container Port since
December 27, 1999. He executed two complaint-affidavits, one
dated June 4, 1999 and the other dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal
Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases
of libel against Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He
testified that petitioner Tulfo’s act of imputing upon him
criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him
dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the
legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-
officers and employees and superior officers in the Bureau of
Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said articles.
He said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental
anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment. He
further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the
officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city
editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are equally responsible and liable
to the same extent as if they were the author of the articles. He
also testified that "Ding" is his nickname and that he is the only
person in the entire Bureau of Customs who goes by the name of
Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding" So.11

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the
subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met
him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his
criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not
directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name
of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was
the practice of certain people to use other people’s names to
advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles
had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as
per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been
promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on
Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had
to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau
of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.12

Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos

"Ding" So when the latter filed a case against them. He testified
that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.; that he
was designated as the national editor of the newspaper Remate
since December 1999; that the duties of the position are to edit,
evaluate, encode, and supervise layout of the news from the
provinces; and that Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey
Briones, Vice President for Editorial and Head of the Editorial
Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in the
subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he anything to do with the
latter’s column.13

Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she

classifies the news articles written by the reporters, and that in the
Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her
supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as
national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her
subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting,
editing, and layout of the page assigned to her, the Metro page.
She further testified that she had no participation in the writing,
editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column
was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-accused from
the Remate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the
publication and editing of the subject articles were the
responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given blanket authority to
write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page
wherein Tulfo’s column appeared was supervised by Bueno as
news editor.14

Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo

Publishing House, Inc. since December 1998. He testified that the
company practice was to have the columnists report directly to the
vice-president of editorials, that the columnists were given
autonomy on their columns, and that the vice-president for
editorials is the one who would decide what articles are to be
published and what are not. He further testified that Tulfo was
already a regular contributor.15

The Ruling of the RTC

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found

petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The dispositive portion
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO,

SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO and
PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00
Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the same
Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby

sentences EACH of the accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, for
EACH count with accessory penalties provided by law.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey
Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay wrote and published the
four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard, being, in the
mind of the Court, of whether it was false or not, the said articles
libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE
MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an
additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all with subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.16

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following

errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE

UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT THAT
HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WORKING AT THE NAIA. HE CRITICIZED ANOTHER
PERSON WORKING AT THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE,
THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS LACKING.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK

OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DISCREDIT OR
DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY JURISPRUDENCE.

3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE

COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO.17

His co-accused assigned the following errors:

The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri,

Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay liable for the
defamations contained in the questioned articles despite the fact
that the trial court did not have any finding as to their participation
in the writing, editing and/or publication of the questioned
articles.
 B

The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was

committed by all of the accused on the basis of its finding that the
elements of libel have been satisfactorily established by evidence
on record.

The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the

one referred to by Erwin Tulfo in his articles in question.18

In a Decision19 dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA

dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by
Tulfo, while the rest of his co-accused filed a motion for
reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution dated
December 11, 2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.20

Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking

to reverse the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318
which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners Cambri,
Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought a similar petition docketed as
G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same CA
decision.

In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were

consolidated since both cases arise from the same set of facts,
involve the same parties, assail the same decision of the CA, and
seek identical reliefs.21

Assignment of Errors

Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:

Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant

evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not declaring the assailed
articles as privileged; the CA erred in concluding that malice in
law exists by the court’s having incorrectly reasoned out that
malice was presumed in the instant case.
 II

Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not

privileged, the lower court, nonetheless, committed gross error as
defined by the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its
misappreciation of the evidence presented on matters substantial
and material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.22

Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their

own assignment of errors, as follows:

A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of

Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By Holding Cambri,
Salao And Barlizo Liable For The Defamatory Articles In The
May 11, 12, 19 And June 25, 1999 Issues Of Remate Simply
Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And City
Editor Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also
Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was The President Of Carlo
Publishing House, Inc. Without Taking Into Account The
Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The
Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.

B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion

In Manifestly Disregarding The Unrebutted Evidence That
Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of
The Defamatory Articles In Question.

C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence

In Holding That The Person Referred To In The Published
Articles Was Private Complainant Atty. Carlos So.23

Our Ruling

The petitions must be dismissed.

The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed

first.

In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the
ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals. 24 In essence, he argues that
the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged
communication" under Borjal and that the presumption of malice
in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the
burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.

This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the

first being that Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages
based on libel, and was not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in
Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the
complainant, which shall be differentiated from the present case in
discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the
subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case,
the subject is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that
the articles written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries on
matters of public interest."25 It shall be discussed and has yet to be
determined whether or not the articles fall under the category of
"fair commentaries."

In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo’s articles

being qualifiedly privileged communication is raised for the first
time in the present petition, and this particular issue was never
brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC
nor the CA had a chance to properly consider and evaluate this
defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of
Art Borjal, and argues that the prosecution should have proved
malice in fact, and it was error on the part of the trial and appellate
courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the
RPC. This lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution,
the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that Tulfo had never
raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are
privileged communications must first be established by the
defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the CA.
Even so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review.

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official,

who served as the OIC of the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous
articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at the
Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of public
interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles of
Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are
defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.

Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press

The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld
the same when it came to commentaries made on public figures
and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom
of the press was given greater weight over the rights of
individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is
not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal
burden of responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a
right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod
over the rights of others.

The Journalist’s Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of

Journalists of the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that
it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that
this freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art. I of said code
states that journalists "recognize the duty to air the other side and
the duty to correct substantive errors promptly." Art. VIII states
that journalists "shall presume persons accused of crime of being
innocent until proven otherwise."

In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the

Journalist’s Code of Ethics and exercised his journalistic freedom
responsibly.

In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the

Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and
was using his public position for personal gain. He went even
further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his
religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa
miyembro nito."26 He accused Atty. So of stealing from the
government with his alleged corrupt activities. 27 And when Atty.
So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article,
challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty.
So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa
[Bureau of Customs]."28

In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know

Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to the
publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not
conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations before he
published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of
Customs.

In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of

people using the names of others for personal gain, and even
stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued
then that it may have been someone else using the name of Atty.
So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was
the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further,
for even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even
knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty.
So’s name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the
information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of
the person he was accusing.

The trial court found Tulfo’s accusations against Atty. So to be

false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of contents of articles does
not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of
the articles does not prove malice. Neither did Borjal give
journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications. It
cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would
always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged
communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be
scrutinized further:

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere
error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual
malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of
truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and
reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice
of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as
well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and
tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v.
Noel we held –

A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage,

should be free to report on events and developments in which the
public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled
to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for
libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany

strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability
for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin
of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason
that the New York Times doctrinerequires that liability for
defamation of a public official or public figure may not be
imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of
the person making the libelous statement.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom
must be done "consistent with good faith and reasonable care."
This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject
articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case
of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and
instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an
adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but
this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or
injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their
profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of
responsibility.

Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged

communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the
RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the
instances of qualified privileged communications is reproduced as
follows:

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are

privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against
a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts.30 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public

interest." While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope
of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the
subject of the article is a public figure or a matter of public
interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability.
Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public
official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. As previously mentioned,
the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were
false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information
before publishing his articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a
source in the Bureau of Customs and relied only on this source for
his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records
of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the
villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo’s articles related no
specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a
corrupt public official. These columns were unsubstantiated
attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being
privileged simply because the target was a public official.
Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against
public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance
of official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters
of public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do
not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech.31 Journalists still bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing
about public figures or matters of public interest. As held in In Re:
Emil P. Jurado:

Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist

who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman
may ecape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory
allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation
bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such
imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged
to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and
reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists’ Code
of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his
profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to
make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or
institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the
same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would
compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word
for the reliability of those sources.32

The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his

allegations against Atty. So, only citing his one unnamed source.
It is not demanded of him that he name his source. The
confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists are
accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists
making no efforts to verify the information given by a source, and
using that unverified information to throw wild accusations and
besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists
have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at
least investigate their stories before publication, and be able to
back up their stories with proof. The rumors and gossips spread by
unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or
novelists who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and
pass them off as reality. There must be some foundation to their
reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.

Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some

degree of care even when writing about public officials. The case
stated:

Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the

individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public
officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need
to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment
or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is
precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking
freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to
exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee
the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally
accepted point of balance or adjustment between the two interests
involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil
law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism
profession in the Philippines.33

Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be
considered as qualified privileged communication under the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the
presumption of malice "a fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or
of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions." This particular provision has several elements
which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from
the presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as
follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding

may be considered privileged, the following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his
functions;

(b) That it is made in good faith; and

(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.34

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated
by the provision. They provide no details of the acts committed by
the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless
accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good
faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to
verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to
attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a
disgrace to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the
elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is
present in Tulfo’s articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are
qualified privileged communications under the RPC.

Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair"

and "true," Tulfo’s articles do not meet the standard. "Fair" is
defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty."35 "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct;
exact; actual; genuine; honest."36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these
requirements, as he did not do research before making his
allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were
baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely
wild accusations.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by

the shield of qualified privileged communication, this would still
not protect Tulfo.

In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged

communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption of malice in
law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon
the prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then
argues that for him to be liable, there should have been evidence
that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject
articles.

The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,37 and reiterated in Flor v. People, which should be to
determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.38

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published
the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same
were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the
finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he
based his writings, and that the defense presented no evidence to
show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot
argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So,
personally, there was no malice attendant in his articles. The test
laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to
meet that test.

The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting

respondent Atty. So can be considered as further evidence of
malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, 39 wherein publication after
the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a
malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did
he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming
respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to
malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.

Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication,

Tulfo also argues that the lower court misappreciated the evidence
presented as to the identity of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote
about Atty. "Ding" So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who
worked at the South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty.
Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has
arisen a cloud of doubt as to the identity of the real party referred
to in the articles.

This argument is patently without merit.

The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other

witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfo’s articles. There is
the certification that there is only one Atty. So in the Bureau of
Customs. And most damning to Tulfo’s case is the last column he
wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against him by Atty.
So of the Bureau of Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched
further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due
to the exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by
Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This last article is an
admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the target
of his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So"
at South Harbor, or someone else using the name of Atty. So as
the real subject of his attacks, when he did not investigate the
existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor
investigate the alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of
Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of
the Atty. So referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points
to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.

Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication

and the matter of the identity of the person referred to in the
subject articles, there remains the petition of the editors and
president of Remate, the paper on which the subject articles
appeared.

In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim

that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the
subject articles, and are thus not liable.

The argument must fail.

The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons
responsible for libel:

Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish,

exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or

business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from
liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide absence of
participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states
the responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and
other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they
conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because
the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the
author.

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for
libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they
had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot
say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on
which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly
hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of
Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.

As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not
fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot
simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their
responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of
a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its
management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally
liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous
article.40 On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager
to know and control the contents of the paper, 41 it is held that said
person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees,42 so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or
manager knew the contents of the publication.43 In Fermin v.
People of the Philippines,44 the Court held that the publisher could
not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the
preparation and publication of a libelous article. The Court cited
U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the persons
enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally liable, and it is
worth reiterating:

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United

States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is
liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith
and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a
publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but
also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any
connection with its publication are liable as publishers.

xxxx

In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46
Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility of the
manager or proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court
said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):

"The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor

of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the
ground that the libelous article was published without his
knowledge or consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper,
such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the
manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be
held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and
it should be no defense that the publication was made without his
knowledge or consent, x x x.

"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a

newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees
whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published
what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefore,
whether he was individually concerned in the publication or not, x
x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in
the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree of
guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.

"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was
published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of
its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution
against such proprietor or manager."

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this

same question was considered and the court held that in the
criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a
libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to have published the
libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove
that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication
until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction
were afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground
for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the
court, said:

"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be

used for the publication of improper communications, to use
reasonable caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be
published." (Wharton’s Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1
Bishop’s Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill.,
195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)

The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English

courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon
said that he was "clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a
newspaper was answerable criminally as well as civilly for the
acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the management of
the paper."
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and
Mr. Justice Foster.

Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:

"An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers,
although he did not know of its being put into the paper and
stopped the sale as soon as he discovered it."

In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that –

"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a

newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally,
and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in
publishing it."45

Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject
articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must Cambri, Salao,
Barlizo, and Pichay.

Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the

punishment must still be tempered with justice. Petitioners are to
be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply for
probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in the belief that
they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v. People,46 the
Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the penalty of
imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v.
Court of Appeals,47 the accused was merely fined in lieu of the
original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of expression
as well as freedom of the press may not be unrestrained, but
neither must it be reined in too harshly. In light of this,
considering the necessity of a free press balanced with the
necessity of a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000
for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, should suffice.48 Lastly, the responsibilities of the
members of the press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards
they encounter in their line of work must also be taken into
consideration.

The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art.

2199 of the Civil Code provides, "Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages."
There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the
complainant Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be
measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.

In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual

and moral damages:

A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary

loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We
have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which
could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to

compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be
understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the
injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such
injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in
Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A causal relation,
in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in the
Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding on
the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the
first must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct
consequence thereof.49

It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for
that Atty. So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification
for the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the
Civil Code, which states that moral damages may be recovered in
cases of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. As the
cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within
the ambit of Art. 2219(7).

Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or

compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or compensatory
damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect
the offended party’s right to recover moral damages.50

And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to

state at this juncture that Tulfo’s libelous articles are abhorrent not
only because of its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So
himself, but also because of their impact on members of his
family, especially on the children and possibly even the children’s
children.

The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of
kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino family, such that the
whole family usually suffers or rejoices at the misfortune or good
fortune, as the case may be, of any of its member. Accordingly,
any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and reputation of
the head of the family, as here, invariably puts the other members
in a state of disrepute, distress, or anxiety. This reality adds an
imperative dimension to the award of moral damages to the
defamed party.

The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified.

Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "In criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party." No aggravating
circumstances accompanied the commission of the libelous acts;
thus, no exemplary damages can be awarded.

Conclusion

The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach

and the information it imparts, it can mold and shape thoughts and
opinions of the people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or
against someone, it can build up heroes or create villains.

It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal

discussion and dissemination of ideas, and to encourage people to
engage in healthy debate. It is through this that society can
progress and develop.

Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press
must also acknowledge the corollary duty to publish responsibly.
To show that they have exercised their freedom responsibly, they
must go beyond merely relying on unfounded rumors or shadowy
anonymous sources. There must be further investigation
conducted, some shred of proof found to support allegations of
misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for
journalists to destroy the reputation and honor of public officials,
if they are not required to make the slightest effort to verify their
accusations. Journalists are supposed to be reporters of facts, not
fiction, and must be able to back up their stories with solid
research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to
exercise that power judiciously cannot be understated.

But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free
does not mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still acknowledged
that the freedom can be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom,
there must be a corresponding sanction. It falls on the press to
wield such enormous power responsibly. It may be a cliché that
the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the
lesson to be learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be
wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always guided by
conscience and careful thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most

effective checks on government power and abuses. Hence, it
behooves government functionaries to respect the value of
openness and refrain from concealing from media corruption and
other anomalous practices occurring within their backyard. On the
other hand, public officials also deserve respect and protection
against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official
wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law and
jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom. The
common but most unkind perception is that government
institutions and their officers and employees are fair game to
official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice
on the ground is just as disconcerting. Reports and accusation of
official misconduct often times merit front page or primetime
treatment, while defenses set up, retraction issued, or acquittal
rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The
unfairness needs no belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is
sometimes not enough.

Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government

impasse is the fact that a maliciously false imputation of
corruption and dishonesty against a public official, as here, leaves
a stigmatizing mark not only on the person but also the office to
which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service also
unduly suffers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R.

Nos. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision
dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be
a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the
award of actual damages and exemplary damages is DELETED.
The Decision dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112
in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600 is
modified to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO,

SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and
PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to pay a
fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 6,000) per count of libel
with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.

Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey

Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and published the
four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard whether it was
false or not, the said articles being libelous per se, they are hereby
ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and
severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000) as
moral damages. The claim of actual and exemplary damages is
denied for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B.

NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

_ftnref1* Additional member as per August 27, 2008 raffle.

1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 39.
2
 Id. at 38-39.
3
 Id. at 39-40.
4
 Id. at 40-41.
5
 Id. at 41-42.
6
 Id. at 42.
7
 Id. at 43.
8
 Id. at 44.
9
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 88.
10
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 44.
11
 Id. at 45-46.
12
 Id. at 46-47.
13
 Id. at 48-49.
14
 Id. at 49-50.
15
 Id. at 50-51.
16
 Id. at 38-39.
17
 Id. at 52.
18
 Id. at 53.

_ftnref20[19] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole

and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
and Rosemari D. Carandang.
20
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 68.
21
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 168.
22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), pp. 16-17.
23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 20.
24
 G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1.
25
 Id. at 22.
26
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 10.
27
 Id. at 11.
28
 Id. at 12.
29
 Supra note 24, at 30-31.
30
 Borjal, supra at 23.
31
 Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571,
October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 574.
32
 A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 299, 332.

_ftnref34[33] Id. at 327.

_ftnref35[34] 2 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code 858

(13th ed., 1993).
35
 Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (6th ed., 1990).
36
 Id. at 1508.
37
 376 US 254, 11 L ed. 2nd 686.
38
 G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 440, 456.
39
 29 Phil. 595 (1915).

_ftnref41[40] Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis 133, 65 NW 744; Faulkner

v. Martin, 133 NJL 605, 45 A2d 596; World Pub. Co. v. Minahan,
70 Okla 107, 173 P 815.

_ftnref42[41] Faulkner, supra.

_ftnref43[42] World Pub. Co., supra.

_ftnref44[43] Faulkner, supra; Goudy v. Dayron Newspapers,

Inc., 14 Ohio App 2d 207, 43 Ohio Ops 2d 444, 237 NE2d 909.

_ftnref45[44] G.R. No. 157643, March 20, 2008.

_ftnref46[45] U.S. v. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, 50-52 (1910).

_ftnref47[46] G.R. No. 142409, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 275.

_ftnref48[47] G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 692.

_ftnref49[48] Administrative Circular No. 08-2008. See Fermin v.

People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008.
49
 G.R. No. 1045676, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
50
 Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA
774, 781.
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