CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

MODULE 3

1. US v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, 2 February 1917 Facts:

The girl charged the Accused for having raped her and with being the cause of her
pregnancy. He was her mother’s querido and was living with her as such at the time
the crime was committed. The act was qualified with of aleviosa as the Accused
rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her partly from behind with a sharp bolo,
producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and
one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of
that part. Such an attack necessitates the finding that it was made treacherously.
Nevertheless, death had not resulted in the said act.
The court was satisfied that there was intent to kill. A deadly weapon was used. The
blow was directed toward a vital body part. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill,
thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up
he declared that he had killed the complainant.
Issue:
Whether the crime was attempted or frustrated murder.
Held:
The crime committed was frustrated murder. Art 3 of the Penal Code defines a
frustrated felony as follows:
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
An attempted felony is defined thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
voluntarily desistance. 76
This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should
have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts.
A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented against his will, by some
outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included
between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be
said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control
1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

— that period between the point where he begins and the points where he
voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of
any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not
been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he
performs the last act, it is frustrated.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006 Facts:

Ruben Rodil, a taxi driver, stopped driving in April 1998 after a would-be rapist
threatened his life. He saved a would-be victim and was later cited as Bayaning
Pilipino by ABSCBN. Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo Rivera,
brother of Esmeraldo and Ismael, mocked Ruben for being jobless and dependent
on his wife. The next day, Ruben with his 3-year-old daughter went to the store to
buy food and look for his wife. Momentarily, the 3 brothers ganged up on Ruben.
People shouted “Awatin sila! Awatin sila!” Ruben felt dizzy but stood up. Ismael
threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back.
When policemen arrived, the brothers fled to their house.
Ruben sustained lacerated wounds and multiple abrasions, concussions, and
hematoma, among others. The doctor prescribed medicine for Rodil’s back pain
which he had to take for 1 month.
RTC ruled that the three accused are guilty of attempted murder.
CA affirmed, holding further that the prosecution was able to prove the intent to kill
Ruben.
Accused insist herein that:
1. the prosecution failed to prove the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled
and hit him with a hollow block;
2. based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben only sustained superficial
wounds in the parietal area, thus not life-threatening; and 3. they should be liable
for physical injuries only.
OSG asserts that CA was correct. Eyewitnesses testified that they saw Ruben
walking with his 3-year-old daughter and was caught off-guard by the assault and
simultaneous attack of the petitioner. Ruben was already lying on the ground being
mauled by the other petitioners when Edgardo hit him. Accused-petitioners could
have killed him were it not for the timely escape of the victim and the police
intervention.

Issues:
1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from
frustrated to attempted murder.

1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the
wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.

2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not
have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for
attempted murder. The intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts
of the accused. In fact, victim could have been killed had the police not promptly
intervened.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006

Facts:
A complaint for rape against petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. was filed by Martina
Lourdes T.
Albano. The information states that: about 1:50 in the morning or sometime
thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of
Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal
knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice. Petitioner was
a medical student in UST at that time when he was accused of attempting to rape
Malou Albano, also a medical student in UST by covering the victim’s face with a
piece of cloth covered with a chemical inducing dizziness and unconsciousness and
lying on top of Albano, pinning down its body. The victim was able to escape such
perpetrator when she had the chance to hold its sex organ, squeezed it and thereafter
ran away and sought help from its classmates who stays at room 310 of the same
floor and building where the victim lives.
Due to panic and the immediacy of her instinct to call for help, the only
identification Albano was able to recall from the perpetrator was that it was wearing
a white cotton shirt and a dark short with a smooth texture similar to that of satin.
The following day, a white shirt and an Adidas short with a handkerchief- all
garments covered with blue stain were retrieved from the bag owned by herein
petitioner. Several days before such incident, Chito confessed his feelings towards
the victim but was rejected by the latter. The security guard of the building, as well
as the friends of Albano, testified for the prosecution

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner committed attempted rape.

Ruling: Santos. J:

No, the petitioner did not commit attempted rape.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has
carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) 0By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented.
Also, under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code,
rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. 0.
In this case, there is absolutely no dispute about the absence of the sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007 Facts:

The petitioner, Aristotel Valenzuela (Valenzuela), who was wearing an
identification marked “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)”, together with co-
accused, Jovy Calderon (Calderon), were sighted by the witness, Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard at the open parking area of the supermarket, hauling a push
cart with cases of a well-known detergent. The petitioner unloaded these cases in
an open parking space where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela returned inside the
supermarket and went out with more boxes and unloaded them again at the same
area in the parking. Shortly after, Valenzuela left the parking and boarded a taxi
and went to the space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the boxes of
detergent into the taxi and boarded the vehicle, which was stopped by Lago while
trying to leave the area. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and reacted by
fleeing by foot. The merchandize were recovered and the duo were convicted of the
crime consummated theft by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 90. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the thus the Petition for
Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court concludes that “under the Revised Penal Code, there is no
crime of frustrated theft”. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. Hence, the crime of theft can only be frustrated or consummated and
is punishable according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code - “Consummated
felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.”

The petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

People v. Dio, G.R. No. L-36461, 29 June 1984

Facts: An information for robbery with homicide was filed against the accused-
appellant. According to the plaintiff, the accused tried to steal the “Seiko” wrist
watch of the victim, but the latter resisted and fought with the robbers. One of the
robbers stabbed the victim on the left side of his chest. The victim ran down the
stairs and shouted for help. The victim later on died, the watch is still strapped to
his wrist.
The appellant claims that he should not have been convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not consummated.
Issue: Did the lower court erred in convicting the accused for special complex crime
of robbery with homicide - YES
Held: The evidence adduced show that the appellant and his companion were
unsuccessful in their criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so
as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier,
when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his wrist.
The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an
offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated
because of the resistance offered by the deceased. The crime committed by the
appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the penalty prescribed by law is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
 

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

6. People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1990.

FACTS:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo
Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The
accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered
the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee thereat who was on her
way out for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was
made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the
owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters and told the former that all they
needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter to get a paper bag
wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and
handed it to Appellant. Accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were
herded to the office and kept there as hostages.

At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four
accused also took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told
Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released.
Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks
were closed.

Police, military authorities, and the Mayor appealed to the accused to surrender but
they refused. The authorities assaulted the place resulting in the injuries to both
daughters and accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares.

After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each
of the accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided by law and to pay the costs."

ISSUE:
Whether lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and
in not holding that the same was merely attempted.

RULING:
No. The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the
property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken
into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have
made his escape with it.

Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and

not merely attempted Robbery is in order.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate

costs.

SO ORDERED.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

People v. Lamahang, G.R. No. L-43530, 3 August 1935

FACTS:
• The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him
guilty of attempted robbery.
• At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was
patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuent es streets of the City of Iloilo,
caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
• At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman.
• The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the police man showed up, who instantly arrested him
and placed him under custody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then
held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, comm itted by means of force, with
the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three
months and one day of arr esto mayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without bein g frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of s
ome personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, it may only be
inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intenti on was to enter by means of
force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the stor e, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete f
inding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as
the material damage is wanting, the nature of the act ion intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the
1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

acts executed (accio n medio). The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be
direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary,
in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the
fact under consideration does not constitute attempt ed robbery but attempted
trespass to dwelling. Against the accused must be taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the
record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been render ed
against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930

Facts: Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H.
Mooney, a resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan
Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with
Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On the morning of March 4, 1929,
Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from
him the whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about two-
thirds of the fish corral had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused
to pay the price agreed upon at that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan
warned him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him.
On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name
of Perpetua Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of the Perpetua, his back
being to the window. Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio
Borinaga from the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the
latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated.
Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured.
Borinaga ran away towards the market place. But Borinaga was persistent in his
endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to
renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their
guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away.
The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the
Court of First Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The homicidal
intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More
than mere menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill,
and apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon
was used. The blow was directed treacherously toward the vital organs of the
victim. The means used were entirely suitable for accomplishment.
Issue: WON the facts constitute frustrated murder
Held: Yes. Although no exact counterpart to the facts at bar has been found either in
Spanish or Philippine jurisprudence, a majority of the court answer the question
propounded by stating that the crime committed was that of frustrated murder. This
is true notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured in the least.
The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of
execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work
of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by
reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily
1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act
was passed. No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to
establish a lesser crime than that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a
wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life fully meriting the penalty imposed in
the trial court. Therefore, judgment appealed from will be affirmed.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

People v. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, 17 March 1934 Facts:

Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado, the latter being the sister of the decease
Arcadio Holgado and a cousin of the other deceased Marcelino Panaligan, had a
litigation over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang, Province of
Batangas. On September 28, 1931 and on December 8 of the same year, Kalalo
filed a complaint against the said woman in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
By virtue of the motion filed by his opponent Isabela, Kalalo’s complaint was
dismissed as well as the second complaint filed. This complaint arose from a claim
over a parcel of land. Kalalo cultivated the land in question during the agricultural
years, but when harvest time came Isabela reaped all that had been planted thereon.
On the day of the crime, Isabela and her brother deceased Arcadio, decided to order
the land ploughed, and employed several laborers for that purpose. These men went
to the said land early that day, but Kalalo who had been informed thereof proceeded
to the place accompanied by his brothers and mother and aunt. They were all armed
with bolos. Upon their arrival at the land, they ordered those who were ploughing to
stop, which the harvesters did because of the threatening attitude of Kalalo. Later
on, Isabela and two others arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Arcadio
the brother of Isablea ordered the laborers to continue ploughing. At this point,
Kalalo approached Arcadio and other appellants approached Marcelino and they all
simultaneously struck with their bolos. After Arcadio and Marcelino had fallen
dead on the ground, Kalalo took from the holster of Marcelino’s belt and fired four
shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene. The appellants
attempted to prove that the fight was provoked by Marcelino who fired a shot at
Kalalo upon seeing the latter’s determination to prevent Arcadio and his men from
ploughing the land in question. The appellant attempted to provide as well that it
was only Kalalo who fought alone against deceased Marcelino and Arcadio and
inflicted upon them wounds which resulted in their death, appellant testifying that
he was compelled to do so in defense of his own life because both of the deceased
attacked him first, the former with a revolver and the latter with a bolo. As held by
the trial court, the allegation that appellant acted in self-defense is unfounded.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple homicide in
each of the cases.
b) Whether or not accused-appellant Kalalo is guilty of the crime of discharge of
firearms. 87 Held:

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

a) Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines murder, the circumstance of
“abuse of superior strength,” if proven to have been presented, raises homicide to
the category of murder. But this court is of the opinion that said circumstance may
not properly be taken into consideration as qualifying circumstance or as a generic
circumstance, if it is borne in mind that deceased were also armed, one of them with
a bolo and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties
and their strength was almost balanced because a revolver is effective more than
three bolos. Therefore, this court is of the opinion that the acts established in cases
Nos. 6858and 6859 merely constitutes two homicides, one for the death of Arcadio
and the other for Marcelino, with no modifying circumstance to be taken into
consideration.
b) As to case No. 6860, evidence shows that Kalalo fired four successive shots at
Hilario Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene of the crime in order not be
reached by appellants. The fact that said appellant not having contented with firing
one shot fire three more successive shots shows that he is bent on killing Hilarion.
However, he failed for causes independent of his will either by poor aim or his
victim was successful in dodging the shots.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

10. People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989 • Facts:

Lolito Soriano, Ricardo Tan, Marcial Laroa were on their way to Davao City to sell
fish. Ricardo Tan was the person behind the wheel. Emeliano Trinidad, a member
of the Integrated National Police, asked if he could hitch a ride to Agusan Del
Norte. He carried two firearms and wore his uniform. Trinidad warned him to slow
down because they were approaching dangerous territory. Tan cautiously drove
until he heard two gunshots. He inspected his surroundings instantly and discovered
that Soriano and Laroa were slouched down as they were hit on the head.
Tan was able to exit the car and hail a passing jeepney. Tan noticed Trinidad sitting
in the jeepney's rear and jumped out and transferred to another. The passengers of
the second jeepney were hesitant to let him in, resulting in him clinging to the side
of the Jeepney. Trinidad fired two bullets. One hit Tan on the right thigh.
Eventually, Tan encountered a member of the Philippine Constabulary who helped
him board a bus for Butuan.
Issue:
Whether Emeliano Trinidad is criminally liable for frustrated murder.

Ruling:
No, the accused is guilty and charged with attempted murder beyond a reasonable
doubt because he failed to perform all the necessary acts that would have caused
Ricardo Tan’s demise.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

11. Martinez v. CA, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007

Dean Dongui-is, 30 years old, was a teacher at Tubao National High School, La
Union.
Petitioner, Benjamin Martinez, a tricycle driver, was the husband of Dean’s co-
teacher, Lilibeth Martinez. In October 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a
complaint for damages against the spouses Martinez in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Tubao, La Union, alleging that Benjamin, a suitor of Elvisa
Basallo, had been paddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations.
Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband from spreading lies, and she replied
that Elvisa had been her husband’s mistress. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 226.
On February 3, 1999, Dean went to Tubao Credit Cooperative (TCC) to pick up the
dividend certificates of his wife who was a member of the cooperative. He left the
building and walked to his car which was parked in front. While he was
approaching his car, petitioner, armed with bolo, suddenly emerged from a vehicle
parked near the bank and stabbed him on the left breast. Dean fled to the bank
office and was able to gain entry into the bank. Petitioner ran after him and upon
cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was able to parry the blow with his
right hand, and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to the floor and tried
to stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew on his left breast. Dean managed to run
to the counter which was partitioned by a glass. Unable to get inside the counter,
petitioner shouted at Dean: “Agparentomeng ka tatta ta talaga nga patayen ka tatta
nga aldawen (You kneel down because I will kill you now this day).” Meantime,
SPO1 Sulatre who was at Tubao Police Station near the bank was informed of the
fight. He rushed to the place and when he arrived, he saw Barangay Captain Oller
and his son Nicky. Nicky handed SPO1 Sulatre the bolo which petitioner used to
stab Dean. Petitioner was brought to the police station and put him in jail thereafter.
Petitioner kept on shouting: “Napatay kon, napatay kon (I killed him, I killed him).”
On the other hand, Dean was brought to a hospital where he was operated. He
sustained two stab wounds in the anterior chest, left, and a lacerated wound in the
right elbow, forearm. Had it not been for the blood clot that formed in the stab
wound on the left ventricle that prevented the heart from bleeding excessive, Dean
would have died from profuse bleeding. He needed medical attendance for more
than 30 days barring complications.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

On March 10, 1999 SPO1 Salutre filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder
against petitioner in the MCTC. On September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor
of La Union indicted Benjamin for frustrated murder before the RTC, Branch 31,
for the same province. On October 13, 2000, the accused, assisted by counsel, was
arraigned and entered a plea Dean was so jealous of him because his mistress,
Elvisa, had also been his mistress. Petitioner also claimed that he never boasted that
he had killed Dean. On April 30, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
petitioner of frustrated homicide (not frustrated murder, as the prosecution failed to
prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery). The court rejected petitioner’s
twin defenses of denial and self-defense. On February 21, 2005, Court of Appeals
(CA) rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision of RTC with modifications
to the period of sentence. Petitioner contended that he merely acted in self-defense
and should he be convicted of any crime, it should be of less serious physical
injuries only, absence the element of intent to kill.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s claim of lesser crime (i.e. less serious physical
injuries) be considered.
Held:
NO. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime
committed is either consummated physical injuries (if offender had no intention to
kill the victim), or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated or attempted
murder (if the offender intends to kill the victim). Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of the following: (a) motive; (b) nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim. To begin with, as
between the petitioner and the victim, the former had more hatred to harbor arising
from the fact that the victim filed a suit against him and his wife. Petitioner thus had
more motive to do harm than the victim. Secondly, petitioner was armed with a
deadly 14 1⁄2-inch bolo. Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean merely
to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to stab the victim three times. The
wounds, two of which penetrated his heart and lung, being serious, would not only
negate self-defense; they likewise indicate determined effort to kill. Moreover,
physical evidence is evidence of highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred of witnesses. Fourthly, from the manner the crime was committed, there
can be hardly any doubt that intent to kill was present. Dean was defenseless and
unarmed while petitioner was deadly armed. Lastly, the words uttered by petitioner

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

while he was assaulting Dean were most revealing, “You kneel down because I will
kill you now.” It cannot be denied that petitioner had the intention to kill Dean.
Petitioner performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated
because of the timely medical intervention applied on the victim.
 
12. Mondragon v. People, G.R. No. L-17666, 30 June 1966
The complainant, Serapion Nacionales, was opening the dike of his rice field in
order to drain the water therein, when he saw the appellant, Isidoro Mondragon,
coming towards him, and telling him not to open the dike. The complainant
explained that he was opening the dike because he was preparing the ground for
planting the next morning. All of a sudden, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant,
who dodged the blow. Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo and struck the
complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant backed out, unsheathed his
own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and between the middle
and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and the
complainant did not pursue him but went home instead.
Thereafter, the petitioner was prosecuted for the crime of frustrated homicide. After
trial, he was found guilty of the crime of attempted homicide. The petitioner
elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the crime committed was attempted homicide.
Held:
NO. The intent to kill is an essential element of the offense of frustrated or
attempted homicide, and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That
element must be proved with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
After carefully examining the record, the SC found that the intention of the
petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively shown.
The Court held that the facts brought out in the decision of the CA in the present
case do not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended
party. On the contrary, there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from
which indicates that the petitioner had no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner
started the assault on the offended party by just giving him fist blows; the wounds
inflicted on the offended party were of slight nature, indicating no homicidal urge
on the part of the petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went away when the
1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.
 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

offended party started hitting him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the
petitioner had intended to kill the offended party he would have held his ground and
kept on hitting the offended party with his bolo to kill him. The element of intent to
kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries suffered by
the offended party were not necessarily fatal, the Court held that the offense that
was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious physical injuries.

13. People v. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L-5848, 30 April 1954

Sy Pio shot three people early in the morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong
Kiap, Ong Pian and Jose Sy. Sy Pio entered the store at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz
Manila and started firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy.
Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose Sy, Tan asked ―what is the idea?ǁ thereupon, Sy
Pio turned around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot at his right shoulder and it
passed through his back. He ran to a room behind the store to hide. He was still able
to hear gunshots from Sy Pio‘s pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital where his wound was
treated. He stayed there from Septenber 3-12, 1949. He was released upon his
request and against physician‘s advice and was requested to return for further
treatment which he did 5 times in a period of 10 days. His wound was completely
healed; he spent P300 for hospital and doctor‘s fees.
Sy Pio was found by the Constabulary in Tarlac. Lomotan, a police from Manila
Police Department went to Tarlac to get Sy Pio. He admitted to Lomotan that he
shot the victims and handed him the pistol used in the shooting.
According to Sy Pio‘s declaration, some months prior to the incident, he was
employed in a restaurant owned by Ong Pian. Sy Pio‘s wife, Vicenta was also
employed by Ong Pian‘s partner. When he tried to borrow money from Ong Pian
for his wife‘s sick father, Ong Pian only lent him P1. his wife was able to borrow
P20 from her employer.
Afterwards, defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work. Ong Pian presented
a list of Sy Pio‘s debts and these were deducted from his wife‘s monthly salary. Sy
Pio could not remember incurring such debts. As such, he was resentful of Ong
Pian‘s conduct. In Tan Siong Kiap‘s case, a few months before Sept3, Sy Pio was
able to realize the sum of P70 and he put his money in a place in his room. The next
day, Sy Pio found that his money was gone. Tan tolf Sy Pio that he had probably
given the money to his wife.
Thereafter, Sy Pio could hear that he had lost his money gambling. ASo early in the
morning of Sept 3, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman who has a pistol was away, he got

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

his pistol and went to a restaurant in Ongpin where Ong Pian worked and shot him.
Afterwards he went to Sta Cruz and shot Jose Sy and Tan. 95
Issue:
Whether or not the accused performed all acts of execution necessary to produce the
death of the victim.
Held:
No, the fact that Ta was able to escape, which Sy Pio must have seen, must have
produced in his mind that he was not able to hit the victim at a vital part of the
body. In other words, Sy Pio knew that he had not performed all the acts of
execution necessary to kill Tan. It does not appear that Sy Pio continued in the
pursuit, he ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exists in our mind that Sy Pio
had actually committed all the acts of execution or passed the subjective phase of
the said acts. The Court therefore, did not find Sy Pio guilty of frustrated murder,
but of attempted murder instead because Sy Pio did not perform all the acts of
execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention that he had
to kill his victim might be carried out.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

14. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990

Facts: An information for robbery with homicide was filed against the accused-
appellant. According to the plaintiff, the accused tried to steal the “Seiko” wrist
watch of the victim, but the latter resisted and fought with the robbers. One of the
robbers stabbed the victim on the left side of his chest. The victim ran down the
stairs and shouted for help. The victim later on died, the watch is still strapped to
his wrist.
The appellant claims that he should not have been convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not consummated.
Issue: Did the lower court erred in convicting the accused for special complex crime
of robbery with homicide - YES
Held: The evidence adduced show that the appellant and his companion were
unsuccessful in their criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so
as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier,
when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his wrist.
The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an
offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated
because of the resistance offered by the deceased. The crime committed by the
appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the penalty prescribed by law is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

 
15. People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, 30 March 2000 Facts:
Primo Campuhan was convicted of the crime of statutory rape and was sentenced to
the penalty of death. In this appeal, accused questioned the credibility of the
victim's mother, Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argued that her narration should not
be given any weight since it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such
a specific description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she
could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the
accused and his victim.
On April 25, 1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four-year old
Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare
Milo chocolate drinks for her two children. As Corazon was busy preparing the
drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" which made her to
rush upstairs. There, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees

ISSUE: Whether Primo Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.

RULING: No, he is not guilty of statutory rape. WHEREFORE, the Decision
of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is
MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
As stated in Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime
of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are
present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
Therefore, I conclude that the accused is punishable only of ATTEMPTED RAPE.
 

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

16. US v. Valdes, G.R. No. L-14128, 10 December 1918.

FACTS:
On Apirl 28, 1918 between 8:00 a.m and 9:00 a.m, Mrs. Auckback called to inform
Mrs. Lewin that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of their house.
Mrs. Lewin ordered Paulino Banal, a servant, to look for the fire.
He found a piece of a jute sack and a rag soaked with kerosene oil which was
burning placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol.
At that moment, Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while
Hugo Labarro, was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested Valdes and Labarro.
After his arrest, Valdes made a statement admitting that it was he who had set the
fire to the sack and the rag. On affidavit, he denied putting the rag and piece of jute
sack soaked with kerosene in the place where they were found. He said that it was
the servant Banal who had done so.
On being arraigned, he said that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he
had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in the police
station.
For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with
respect to the other defendant Hugo Labarro.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Valdes is guilty of arson.

RULING:
No, the crime is classified only as a frustrated arson. According to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, “A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.”. In the case, the defendant performed all the acts conducive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of his will, the
criminal act which he intended was not produced. The fact of setting fire to a jute
sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of the house
and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the
latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house. Therefore,
there is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a
connection with the commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

mayor immediately inferior in degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal
Code, should be imposed in its medium degree.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the
modification however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be given
eight years and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed
in Article 57 of the Code. The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances.
So ordered.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

MODULE 4
1. Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015 Facts:
On March 16, 1987, Rosalino Dungo killed Belen Sigua inside the field office of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, by stabbing her in the chest, throat, stomach,
and other body parts using a knife, which Dungo drew from his envelope.
According to the autopsy, the victim sustained a total of 14 wounds, 5 of which are
fatal. The Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga charged the accused with
the crime of murder. The accused raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the
prosecution presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua, to testify that the accused
visited their house to confront him on why his wife was making it difficult for the
accused to transfer the landholding his father to him. The trial court convicted him
because the act of concealing a fatal weapon and the act of taking flight in order to
evade arrest indicates that accused was sane during the time he committed the
stabbing.
Issue:
Whether or not Dungo is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12(1).
Held:
No, Dungo is not exempted from criminal liability. Under Art. 12 of the RPC, an
imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had
acted during a lucid interval. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts
without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern;
or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Under our jurisdiction, Section
1039 of the Revised Administrative Code states that insanity is "a manifestation in
language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently
diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or
of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." An insane
person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
In this case, although according to the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, Dungo suffers from psychosis which is organic and permanent, it could be
treated with medication. The conversation he had with the husband of the victim a
month before the incident belies the defense’s argument that Dungo has no lucid
intervals. It is unusual for an insane person to confront the person who wronged
him. It can be inferred from this confrontation that Dungo was aware of his acts. He

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

was not insane at the time of the commission of the crime or if he was, he had a
lucid interval.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

2. People v. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003 Facts:

On February 5, 1988 11:30 pm, Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her
husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although
already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them. Edmar had a heated
argument with Julian. Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as she
was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left, then returned to block
Joselito and Julian. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face.
Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar
and Julian swapped punches. As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled out
his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left
arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him. Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who
were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided
to join the fray. Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed
together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito. As Joeslito was stabbed 11
times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal. Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie
went after Julian who ran dear life. When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer
running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block
and bashed Joselito’s head. Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck
Joselito once more before fleing from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa
rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.
Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in concluding that there was conspiracy in the assialed
incident Held:
The court ruled that the mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will
not suffice. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Even if two or more offenders
do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable
as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. Odilon all by himself
initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim,
the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the
Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they
conspired to kill the victim. Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet
consummated so Pilola is a principal by direct participation.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

3. People v. Larrañaga, 421 SCRA 530, 3 February 2004

Facts: On July 16, 1997 at about 10 o’clock more or less in the evening, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the said
accused all private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping each
other, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully and feloniously kidnap or
deprive Marijoy Chiong and Jacqueline Chiong, of their liberty and on the occasion
thereof, and in connection, accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have
carnal knowledge against them with the use of force and intimidation and
subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill did then
and there inflict physical injuries and threw Marijoy into a deep ravine which
caused her death.
Issue: Whether or not witness who is also one of the perpetrators is a credible
witness for the crime charged.
Held: Yes. Rustia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that
positive identification of an accused by a credible as the perpetrator of the crime
demolishes alibi, the much abused sanctuary of felons. Rusia’s testimony was
corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants.
Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim’s family.
As we received closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we could not discern
any motive on their part why they should testified falsely against the appellants. In
the same vein, it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the
rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body
found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are
not convinced, Rusia testified that Josman instructed Rowen “to get Rid” of
Marijoy, and following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep
ravine. Furthermore, inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that
the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of Marijoy. The packaging tape and the
handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and
Jacqueline while they were being detained. The body had the same clothes worn by
Marijoy on the day she was abducted. The members of the Chiong family
personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy which they eventually buried.
They erected commemorative at the ravine, cemetery, and every place which
mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it
was the body of Marijoy that was found in the ravine.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

4. People v. Garchitorena, 597 SCRA 420, August 28, 2009 FACTS:

On September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 in the evening, Dulce Borero along with his
brother Mauro Biay y Almarinez was selling “balut” at Sta. Inez Almeda
Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna.

Dulce Borero was about seven (7) arms length away from her brother Mauro Biay.

Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay approached Jessie, the
latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessie’s companions (co-accused) Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro repeatedly with a shiny
bladed instrument. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself while
being stabbed by the (3) accused, until her brother slumped face down on the
ground.

Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away. Borero claims she wanted to
shout but nothing came out from her mouth. Witness went home to call for her elder
brother Teodoro Biay, but when they return to the scene the victim was no longer
there as he had been brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital.

Trial Court: Guilty, Court of appeals: Affirmed, Supreme Court: Affirmed and
Modifications.

ISSUE:

Is there conspiracy shown in the case?

HELD:

Yes, accuse appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of
their common objective. Jessie Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted his
arms; in turn, Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold Garchitorena, strangled Mauro
Biay and straddled the Mauro Biay on the ground, then stabbed him.

Direct proof is not essential for conspiracy, for it may be inferred from the acts of
the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Accused-appellant Garcia
also argues that there was no conspiracy, as “there was no evidence whatsoever that
he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

designs.” We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo, 307 SCRA 436 (1999) we
stated: “Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not
essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to,
during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose,
concert of action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually
hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.”

All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character
of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. Where there is
conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow
is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent
and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

5. People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, 6 July 2011

FACTS: In the afternoon of April 2001, La Loma Police Station received a request
from the sister of accused Milan that there is a drug trade that is happenning on
their house in Quezon City. At arounf 4:00 PM, SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar (Red) along
with Police Officer 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores, and SPO1 Montecalvo went
to Milan’s house and surrounded the area. The door of the house was open,
enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan, and Chua inside.

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, and shouted “Walang gagalaw!”.
They are instantly shot and failed to return fire causing their instant death. SPO1
Montecalvo fell on the ground, SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan “Sugurin mo
na!”. Milan lunged Montecalvo but failed to maul him because the police officer
was able to fire his gun to Milan. Thereafter, Estores went inside the house to pull
Montecalvo out.

RTC found the three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Likewise, they were also found guilty of attempted murder in Relation to Article 6
par 2, having been acted in conspiracy. CA affirmed the decision.

Accused appealed to SC, arguing that the court a quo erred in holding that ther is
conspiracy among the appellants.

ISSUE: WON accused-appelants are guilty of conspiracy to commit murder against

SPO1 Montefalco.

RULING: YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not
establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan
or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during
and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is
sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless
of the degree of participation of each.

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang
was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing
the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to
wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.

 CRIMINAL LAW 1 - SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – SCHOOL OF LAW

SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). These facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the
three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

1D U.I.O.G.D. MELCHOR, Jomel Paul U.