EVANGELISTA, Robert Kevin B.
2008003472
UST – CLR1 Petition Class
CASE DOCTRINES OF WEEK 1 CASES
Topic
When law takes effect
NCC 2
Revised Administrative
Code (RAC) Sec. 18-24
Exec. Order 200, Sec. 2
Ignorance of the law
Case Title Doctrine
Tañada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA The clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the Civil
27 Code, refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. Said clause does not
mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. The
legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended.
Publication requirement applies to (1)
all statues, including those of local
application and private laws; (2)
presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution; (3)
Administrative rules and regulations
for the purpose of enforcing existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation; (4)
Charter of a city notwithstanding that
it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the
details” of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
Further, publication must be in full or
it is no publication at all since the
purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the law. The Supreme
Court said that the aforementioned
laws shall be immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective
only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the New
Civil Code.
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Excusable negligence may be
NCC 3 PHIL 217 invoked as basis of good
faith. But, gross and
inexcusable negligence
cannot be deemed as proper
basis of good faith. In this
case, the fact that the
petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is
not a lawyer was treated by
the court as an excusable
negligence. The petitioner has
no idea that the possession
and enjoyment of the fruits
are characteristics of a
contract of antichresis.

Retroactivity of laws DM Consunji vs. CA, G.R. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine
NCC 4, cf. NCC 2252 – 2269 No. 137873, April 20, 2001 is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the
accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it
and that the plaintiff has no
such knowledge, and
therefore is compelled to
allege negligence in general
terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish
negligence. The inference
which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that
the chief evidence of the true
cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant
but inaccessible to the injured
person.

Retroactivity of laws Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, G.R. In an action for partition, the
NCC 4, cf. NCC 2252 – 2269 No. 192383, December 4, determination of the
2013. existence of co-ownership is
imperative. Further, before an
order for partition is
rendered, the issue on
 ownership must first be
determined.

Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22 Dona Adela v Tidcorp, G.R. The existence of a waiver
Family Code (FC) 256 No. 201931, February 11, 2015 must be demonstrated clearly
since a waiver by implication
Mandatory or Prohibitory is frowned upon.  A waiver
Laws must be voluntary, made
NCC Art. 5 with NCC Art. knowingly, intelligently, and
17 (3) with awareness of the
circumstances and
Waiver of rights consequences. 
NCC Art. 6
NCC Art. 2035

Revised Penal Code (RPC)
22
Family Code (FC) 256
Mandatory or Prohibitory
Laws
NCC Art. 5 with NCC Art.
17 (3)
Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. A waiver is a voluntary and
189516, June 08, 2016 intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known
existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would
have enjoyed.

Waiver of rights
NCC Art. 6
NCC Art. 2035

Repeal of laws Thornton vs. Thornton, Aug. Implied repeals are not
NCC 7 16, 2004 favored in this jurisdiction.
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. The two laws must be
XVIII Sec. 3 absolutely incompatible, and
FC 254 a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be
drawn.

Judicial Decisions Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
NCC 8 136921. April 17, 2001 states that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the
 legal system of the
Philippines.

Judicial Decisions De Castro v JBC, G. R. No. Judicial decisions assume the

NCC 8 191002, April 20, 2010 same authority as a statute
itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the
extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that
must control the actuations,
not only of those called upon
to abide by them, but also of
those duty bound to enforce
obedience to them. The
Court, as the highest court of
the land, may be guided but
is not controlled by
precedent. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a
precedent in a subsequent
case only when its reasoning
and justification are relevant.

Judicial Decisions UCPB v Uy, GR 204039, Jan. The doctrine of stare decisis
NCC 8 10, 2018 becomes operative only when
judicial precedents are set by
pronouncements of the
Supreme Court (SC) to the
exclusion of lower courts. It is
true whether or not the
decisions of the lower courts
are logically or legally sound,
as only decisions issued by
the SC become part of the
legal system. At most,
decisions of lower courts only
have a persuasive effect.
Thus, the CA erred in
applying the doctrine of stare
decisis when it relied on
decisions it had issued.

Duty to render judgment Magat v. Tantrade, G.R. No. Petitioners were

NCC 9, 10 205483, August 23, 2017 simultaneously afflicted with
RPC 5 the tragedy of death and
constrained by their means.
 These were compelling
reasons warranting a
solicitous stance towards
them. Justice is better served
by extending consideration to
them and enabling an
exhaustive resolution of the
parties' claims. This is
especially so as petitioners'
utmost good faith was
demonstrated; they having
seen to it that, even as they
were imploring the Court of
Appeals' understanding, each
of the technical requirements
of Rule 42 was satisfied.

Duty to render judgment Piedad v. Bobilles, G.R. No. It is a better rule that courts,
NCC 9, 10 208614, November 27, 2017 under the principle of equity,
RPC 5 will not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of
laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice
would result. It would be
more in keeping with justice
and equity to allow the
revival of the judgment
rendered by Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon in Civil Case No.
639. To rule otherwise would
result in an absurd situation
where the rightful owner of a
property would be ousted by
a usurper on mere
technicalities.

Duty to render judgment People v Tulagan, G.R. No. It is a basic rule in statutory
NCC 9, 10 227363, March 12, 2019 construction that what courts
RPC 5 may correct to reflect the real
and apparent intention of the
legislature are only those
which are clearly clerical
errors or obvious mistakes,
omissions, and misprints, but
not those due to oversight, as
shown by a review of
 extraneous circumstances,
where the law is clear, and to
correct it would be to
change the meaning of the
law. Thus, a corrective
legislation is the proper
remedy to address the noted
incongruent penalties for acts
of lasciviousness
committed against a child.

Presumption and Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18

Applicability of Custom
NCC 11 - 12
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art.
XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2),
(3)
Phil. 79 Acts the performance of
which has not proved
destructive or injurious and
which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for
so long a time that they have
ripened into custom, cannot
be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent.

Legal periods Internal Revenue v Both Article 13 of the Civil

EO 292, RAC Sec. 31
Rules of Court (ROC) Rule
22
Primetown, GR 162155,
August 28, 2007
Code and Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of
legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year.
Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a
year is composed of 12
calendar months. Needless
tostate, under the
Administrative Code of 1987,
the number of days is
irrelevant.

The Court holds that Section

31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987,
being the more recent law,
governs the computation of
 legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori.

Legal periods Commr. v. Aichi Forging, Respondent’s assertion that

EO 292, RAC Sec. 31 G.R. No. 184823, October 6, the non-observance of the
Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 2010 120-day period is not fatal to
22 the filing of a judicial claim as
long as both the
administrative and the
judicial claims are filed
within the two-year
prescriptive period has no
legal basis. 

There is nothing in Section

112 of the NIRC to support
respondent’s view.
Subsection (A) of the said
provision states that "any
VAT-registered person,
whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may,
within two years after the
close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or
paid attributable to such
sales." The phrase "within
two (2) years x x x apply for
the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund" refers to
applications for
refund/credit filed with the
CIR and not to appeals made
to the CTA. This is apparent
in the first paragraph of
subsection (D) of the same
provision, which states that
the CIR has "120 days from
the submission of complete
documents in support of the
application filed in
accordance with Subsections
(A) and (B)" within which to
 decide on the claim. 

In fact, applying the two-year

period to judicial claims
would render nugatory
Section 112(D) of the NIRC,
which already provides for a
specific period within which
a taxpayer should appeal the
decision or inaction of the
CIR. The second paragraph of
Section 112(D) of the NIRC
envisions two scenarios: (1)
when a decision is issued by
the CIR before the lapse of
the 120-day period; and (2)
when no decision is made
after the 120-day period. In
both instances, the taxpayer
has 30 days within which to
file an appeal with the CTA.
As we see it then, the 120-day
period is crucial in filing an
appeal with the CTA.

CONFLICT OF LAWS Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, Under the Doctrine of

GR 193707, Dec. 10, 2014 Processual Presumption, if
NCC 14 the foreign law involved is
Art. 2, Revised Penal Code not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.
Hence, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it
is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of
parents to support their
children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

Tenchavez v. Escaño 15 Article 15 of the Civil Code of

NCC 15 SCRA 355 the Philippines, already in
FC 26 par. 2 force at the time, expressly
provided that "Laws relating
to family rights and duties or
to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of
the Philippines, even though
living abroad." The grant of
effectivity in this jurisdiction
to such foreign divorce
decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and
scandalous discrimination in
favor of wealthy citizens, to
the detriment of those
members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to
sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.

NCC 15 Board of Commissioners vs.

FC 26 par. 2 de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 Philippine law, following
the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a
marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Referring to
marriages contracted abroad,
Art. 71 of the Civil Code
(now Art. 26 of the Family
Code) provides that "all
marriages performed outside
of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where
they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country" and
any doubt as to the validity of
the matrimonial unity and
the extent as to how far the
validity of such marriage
may be extended to the
consequences of the
coverture is answered by Art.
220 of the Civil Code in this
manner: "In case of doubt, all
 presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family.

NCC 16 Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358 Doctrine of Renvoi is

applicable where the
decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of
another. it is not disputed
that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time
of his death. So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern,
the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of
the law of the place where the
properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from
ours.

NCC 16 Tayag v Benguet No one could dispute the

Consolidated, GR L-23145, power of an ancillary
Nov. 29, 1968 administrator to gain control
and possession of all assets of
the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Such a power is
inherent in his duty to settle
her estate and satisfy the
claims of local creditors. It is
a general rule universally
 recognized that
administration, whether
principal or ancillary,
certainly extends to the assets
of a decedent found within
the state or country where it
was granted, the corollary
being "that an administrator
appointed in one state or
country has no power over
property in another state or
country"

NCC 17 Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Lex loci celebrationis relates

Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, to the "law of the place of the
NCC 18 November 23, 2007 ceremony" or the law of the
place where a contract is
made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of
the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed."
It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of
the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties or
the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly.
Under the "state of the most
significant relationship rule,"
to ascertain what state law to
apply to a dispute, the court
should determine which state
has the most substantial
connection to the occurrence
and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the
court should consider where
the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties.
This rule takes into account
several contacts and
evaluates them according to
 their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue
to be resolved.

Since these three principles in

conflict of laws make
reference to the law
applicable to a dispute, they
are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of
law. They determine which
state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive
issues of a conflicts problem.
Necessarily, as the only issue
in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law
rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet
called for.

NCC 17 Raytheon v Rouzie, GR Under the doctrine of forum

162894, February 26, 2008 non conveniens, a court, in
NCC 18 conflicts-of-laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the
most "convenient" or
available forum and the
parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies
elsewhere. Petitioner’s
averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case
are not sufficient to oust the
trial court of its jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. No. 1192-
BG and the parties involved. 

HUMAN RELATIONS Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA Mere breach of a promise to

NCC 19 – 21 648 marry is not an actionable
wrong. However, the extent
to which acts not contrary to
law may be perpetrated with
impunity is not limitless for
Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that any person who
 willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage.

HUMAN RELATIONS Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994 The essential feature under

NCC 19 – 21 Article 21 of the Civil Code is
seduction, that in law is more
than mere sexual intercourse,
or a breach of promise of
marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power
or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which
the woman has yielded. Hus,
there is no case for recovery
of damages under Artcile 21
of the NCC, if seduction is
absent from the facts.

Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115 Where a man's promise to

marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor
 and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such
injury should have been
committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11- The Court defined

2922, April 4, 2011 immoral conduct as conduct
that is willful, flagrant or
shameless, and that shows a
moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and
respectable members of the
community. To justify
suspension or disbarment,
the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an
act so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high
degree.

Metroheights Subd. v CMS The principle of abuse

Construction, G.R. No. of rights departs from the
209359, Oct. 17, 2018 theory that 'he who uses a
right injures no one.' The
modern tendency is to depart
from the classical and
traditional theory, and to
grant indemnity for damages
in cases where there is an
abuse of rights, even when
the act is not illicit. Article 19
of the New Civil Code was
intended to expand the
concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to
provide, specifically in

Navarro-Banaria vs. Banaria,
et al.
G.R. No. 217806. July 28, 2020
statutory law. If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can
make him liable for damages
for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him
liable. Also, Article 19 has
given rise to certain rules,
such that where a person
exercises his rights but does
so arbitrarily or unjustly or
performs his duties in a
manner that is not in keeping
with honesty and good faith,
he opens himself to liability.
Thus, the elements of an
abuse of rights are the
following:
(1) there is a legal
right or duty;
(2) which is exercised
in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring
another."
While Article 19 of the New
Civil Code may have been
intended as a mere
declaration of principle, the
"cardinal law on human
conduct" expressed in said
article has given rise to
certain rules, e.g., that where
a person exercises his rights
but does so arbitrarily or
unjustly or performs his
duties in a manner that is not
in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself
to liability. The elements of
an abuse of rights under
Article 19 are: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring
 another.
Consequently, when Article
19 is violated, an action for
damages is
proper under Article 20 and
21 of the New Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a
violation of law.

Catalan vs. Basa, G.R. No. A donation is an act of

PERSONS 159567, July 31, 2007 liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously a thing
CAPACITY TO ACT or right in favor of another,
who accepts it. Like any other
NCC 37 - 39 contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent
in contracts presupposes the
Presumption of capacity following requisites: (1) it
should be intelligent or with
an exact notion of the matter
to which it refers; (2) it
should be free; and (3) it
should be spontaneous. The
parties' intention must be
clear and the attendance of a
vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the
donation voidable.
In order for donation
of property to be valid, what
is crucial is the donor’s
capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation.
Certainly, there lies no doubt
in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely
given. However, the burden
of proving such incapacity
rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient
proof to this effect is
presented, capacity will be
presumed.

Restrictions on capacity to
act
NCC 38 - 39, cf. NCC 1327
(a) Minority, R.A. 6809, FC
5; 45 (1); cf. R.A. 6809, NCC
1327, NCC 1390 (par. 1), 1403
(par. 3), NCC 1397, 1399,
NCC 1489, NCC 1426 - 1427
(b) Insanity, FC 45 (2), NCC
1327 (1), 1328
(c) Deaf-Mutism, NCC
1327 (2), 807 & 820
Mercado v. Espiritu 37 Phil
215
The courts have laid down
the rule that the sale of real
estate made my minors who
pretend to be of legal age,
when in fact they are not, is
valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse
themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them or to have
them annulled. Such
judgement does not violate
the laws relative to the sale of
minors’ property, nor the
juridical rules established in
consonance therewith.

(d) Prodigality, ROC Rule

92 Sec. 2

(e) Civil Interdiction, RPC

31, 34, 41

(f) Family Relations, FC

150-151; cf. FC 87, NCC
1490, NCC 2035, cf. NCC
963-967

(g) Alienage, cf. Art. IV, Secs.

1-5, 1987 Constitution

(h) Absence, NCC 381 – 396,

FC 41

(i) Insolvency and

Trusteeship, NCC 1381, 1491,
2236

(j) Gender, Art. II, Sec. 14,

1987 Constitution; cf. NCC
403

See also: Rule 3 Section 4,

1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
(k) Physical
Incapacity/Disease, FC 45(5),
45(6), 46, NCC 820

To determine the intrinsic

Heirs Of Favis, Sr. v
Gonzales, et al., GR. No.
185922, Jan. 15 2014
validity of the deed of
donation subject of the action
for annulment, the mental
state/condition of the donor
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the
time of its execution must be
taken into account. Factors
such as his age, health and
environment among others
should be considered.

The acknowledgment of
NATURAL PERSONS De Jesus v Syquia, G.R. No. paternity required in No. 1 of
L-39110, Nov. 28, 1933 article 135 of the Civil Code is
NCC 40 - 41 satisfied by the production of
more than one document of
NCC 42 indubitable authenticity,
containing, all together, the
NCC 43, Rule 131, Sec. 33, admission of the father
ROC recognizing a particular child
as of his paternity, the
admission of one writing
being supplement by those of
another.

Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801 Personality begins at

conception. This personality
is called presumptive
personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should
occur later, otherwise the
fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal
personality.

Only one with a juridical

personality can die. Here the
unborn child never died

Natural Persons (NCC 40-41)
Natural Persons (NCC 42)
NCC 43, Rule 131, Sec. 33,
ROC
because it never acquired a
juridical personality. Article
40 limits the provisional
personality of a conceived
child by imposing the
condition that the child
should be subsequently born
alive.
Continental Steel vs. Article 42 plainly states that
Montano, GR 182836, October civil personality is
13, 2009 extinguished by death.
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in
relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of
the general provisions on
civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity,
which is the fitness to be the
subject.
Under Article 40, a
Quimiging v Icao, 34 SCRA conceived child, although as
134 yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its
own for all purposes
favorable to it. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors,
particularly the defendant
even if the said child is only
“env entre de sa mere”
The estate of the deceased
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of person is considered a
Pio Fragante 80 Phil 776 "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice
resulting from the
impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.

NCC 43, Rule 131, Sec. 33, Dumlao v. Quality Plastics 70
ROC SCRA 472
Eugenio v. Velez 185 SCRA
425
Berot v. Siapno, G.R. No.
188944, July 09, 2014
Joaquin v. Navarro 93 Phil
257
Joaquin v. Navarro 93 Phil
257
A deceased person could not
have been validly served
with summons. He had no
more civil personality. His
juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, was lost
through death.
As correctly alleged by
respondents, the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy
became moot and academic
due to the death of the person
allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of
custody remained, which the
court a quo had to resolve.
A deceased person does not
have such legal entity as is
necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to
substitute cannot lie and
should be denied by the
court. An action begun by a
decedent’s estate cannot be
said to have been begun by a
legal person, since an estate is
not a legal entity; such an
action is a nullity and a
motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not, likewise, lie,
there being nothing before
the court to amend.
The opposite theory—that the
mother outlived her son is
deduced from established
facts which, weighed by
common experience,
engender the inference as a
very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence
by which civil cases are
decided, this inference ought
to prevail.
 The presumption that the
CITIZENSHIP AND Romualdez-Marcos vs wife automatically gains the
DOMICILE COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 husband’s domicile by
operation of law upon
Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1987 marriage cannot be inferred
Constitution from the use of the term
“residence” in Article 110 of
NCC 50 the Civil Code because the
Civil Code is one area where
FC 68-69, cf. NCC 110, cf. FC the two concepts are well
55, 101, 152 delineated.

A survey of jurisprudence
relating to Article 110 or to
the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would
suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses
her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband’s choice
of residence upon marriage.

Llamanzares vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 221697etc., April 5,
2016
Under Article IV, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution,
"Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth
without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."
"Having to perform an act"
means that the act must be
personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling
status is done not by the child
but by the authorities.
Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination
of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of
the child. Lastly, the process
is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of
such citizenship by one born
of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the
1935 Constitution, which is
an act to perfect it.
There are three requisites to
acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the
old domicile. To successfully
effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence
and establishing a new one
and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.

SURNAMES Naldoza v Republic, G.R. No.
L-55538 March 15, 1982
NCC 364-380
RA 9255
FC 176
Yasin v. Hon. Judge Shari’a
Court G.R. No. 94986 (1995)
In re: Stephanie Garcia, G.R.
No. 148311, March 31, 2005.
The change of name is
allowed only when there are
proper and reasonable causes
for such change. Where, as in
this case, the petitioners are
minors, the courts should
take into account whether the
change of name would
redound their welfare or
would prejudice them.
Under the Civil Code, the use
of the husband's surname
during the marriage , after
annulment of the marriage
and after the death of the
husband is permissive and
not obligatory except in case
of legal separ. When a
woman marries a man, she
need not apply and/or seek
judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing
the word "Mrs." before her
husband's full name or by
adding her husband's
surname to her maiden first
name. The law grants her
such right (Art. 370, Civil
Code).
While the use of surname is
fixed by law, the law is silent
as to the use of middle name.
The middle name or the
mother’s surname is only
considered in case there is
identity of names and
surnames between
ascendants and descendants,
in which case, the middle
name or the mother’s
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise
silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use, as
it merely provides that “an
adopted child shall bear the
 surname of the adopter.”

The Supreme Court ruled

Remo v DFA, March 5, 2010 that the conflicting rules
between the New Civil Code
and R.A. 8239 must be
harmonized. Thus, the
following guidelines were
laid down:

The permissible rule

on the use of a woman’s
maiden name is applicable
only for a first time passport
application. However, once
the woman adopted the
surname of her husband, she
is no longer allowed to revert
back to her maiden name.
Nonetheless, the rule accepts
of certain exceptions such as:
(1) death of husband; (2)
divorce; (3) Annulment; (4)
nullity of marriage.

From the foregoing

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. provisions, it is clear that the
206248, February 18, 2014 general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by
RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly
recognized by the father
through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register
or when an admission in a
public document or private
handwritten instrument is
made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of
the father.
Art. 176 gives
illegitimate children the right
to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein
 respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.

As the Court said in the case

RULES GOVERNING Reyes v. Alejandro, 141 SCRA of Jones vs. Hortiguela, the
PERSONS WHO ARE 65 declaration of absence made
ABSENT in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to
enable the taking of the
NCC 381-383, 384-389, FC 96, necessary precautions for the
101, 124, NCC 390-396, FC 41 administration of the estate of
the absentee. The need to
have a person judicially
declared an absentee is when
he has properties which have
to be taken cared of or
administered by a
representative appointed by
the Court; the spouse of the
absentee is asking for
separation of property; or his
wife is asking the Court that
the administration of all
classes of property in the
marriage be transferred to
her.

Upon this premise, the rule

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero,
124 SCRA 425
on presumption of death
under Article 391(1) of the
Civil Code must yield to
the rule of preponderance
of evidence. As this Court
said in Joaquin vs.
Navarro: "Where there are
facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational
conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not
step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence
controls." The Court cannot

Manuel vs. People, G.R. No.
165842, Nov. 29, 2005
Pantollano v Korphil, GR
169575, March 30, 2011
permit Article 391 to
override, or be substituted
for, the facts established in
this case which logically
indicate to a moral
certainty that Capt. Lucero
died shortly after he had
sent his last radio message
at 9:50 p.m. on February 16,
1980.
The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse is
for the benefit of the spouse
present, as protection from
the pains and the
consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the
defense of good faith based
on mere testimony is found
incredible.
The presumption of
death of the spouse who had
been absent for seven years, it
being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, is
created by law and arises
without any necessity of
judicial declaration
The provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code state that a
person "shall be presumed
dead forall purposes,
including the division of the
estate among the heirs, when
inter alia, the person has been
in danger of death under
other circumstances and his
existence has not been known
for four years. Thus, Vedasto
can only be presumed dead

Rep. vs Granada, GR 187512,
June 13, 2012
Rep. vs Narceda, GR 192760,
April 10, 2013
after the lapse of four years
from August 2, 1994 when he
was declared missing.
Vedasto is thus presumed
legally dead only on August
2, 1998.It is only at this time
that the rights of his heirs to
file their claim for death
benefits accrued.
By express provision of law,
the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and
executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts.
Article 41 of the Family Code
provides that for the purpose
of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a
summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. The
judgments rendered
thereunder, by express
provision of Article 247 of the
Family Code, are
immediately final and

Republic v Hon. Estrada, G.R. provides that a marriage
No. 214792, March 18, 2015
executory upon notice to the
parties. An appellate court
acquires no jurisdiction to
review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is
immediately final and
executory. It follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial
court’s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
Article 41 of the. Family Code
contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before
the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years
and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already
dead. In case of
disappearance where there is
a danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse
present must institute a
summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the
 absent spouse.

In this case,
Diego's absence for more
than 30 years, which far
exceeded the law-required
four years of absence, is
more than enough to declare
him presumptively dead
for all legal intents and
purposes.

Article 176 of the Family

ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL Dela Cruz v Gracia, G.R. No. Code, as amended by R.A.
REGISTER 177728, July 31, 2009 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of
NCC 407-413 his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized
RA 9048, as amended by him/her as his offspring
Rep. Act No. 101752 through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register,
Rule 108, Rules of Court or through an admission
made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The
recognition made in any of
these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of
acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no
separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.

Under Article 278 of the New

Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall
be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation
must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the
putative father.

In a special proceeding for

Braza v Registrar, G.R. No. correction of entry under
 Rule 108 (Cancellation or
181174, Dec. 4, 2009 Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.

Doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not
through collateral attack; An
action seeking the declaration
of marriage as void for being
bigamous and one
impugning a child’s
legitimacy are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of
the Family Code,
respectively, and the petition
should be filed in a Family
Court.

While the law requires the

Corpus v Sto. Tomas, GR entry of the divorce decree in
186571, Aug. 11, 2010 the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decree’s
registration—there must first
be a judicial recognition of
the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata
effect; The registration of the
foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void
and cannot produce any legal
effect.

The recognition that the

Regional Trial Court (RTC)
may extend to a foreign
divorce decree does not, by
itself, authorize the
 cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry—a petition
for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in
the civil registry; The Rules of
Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding
by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected—Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements
that must be complied with
before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.

The recognition of the foreign

divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of
a party or a particular fact.

As public documents, they

Iwasawa vs Gangan, G.R. No. are admissible in evidence
204169, Sept. 11 2013 even without further proof of
their due execution and
genuineness; Not only are
said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because
they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated
therein.

Since the promulgation of

Republic v Olaybar, G.R. No. Republic v. Valencia, 141
 SCRA 462 in 1986, the
189538, Feb. 10, 2014 Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that “even
substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, with the true facts
established and the parties
aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial
proceeding.”

As long as the procedural

requirements in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are
followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the
civil register.

A Filipino citizen cannot

dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the
civil registry. Republic vs.
Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605, G.R.
No. 189538 February 10, 2014

It is mandatory that the

Barcelota v Republic, G.R. mother of an illegitimate
No. 222095, Aug. 7, 2017 child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all
cases, irrespective of whether
the father recognizes the
child as his or not. The only
legally known parent of an
illegitimate child, by the fact
of illegitimacy, is the mother
of the child who conclusively
carries the blood of the
mother.21 Thus, this
provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely
named as parents.
 The mother must sign and
agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate
because she has the parental
authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In Briones
v. Miguel, 23 we held that an
illegitimate child is under the
sole parental authority of the
mother, and the mother is
entitled to have custody of
the child. The right of
custody springs from the
exercise of parental
authority.24 Parental
authority is a mass of rights
and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's
physical preservation and
development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect
and the education of their
heart and senses.

Republic Act No. 10172

Republic v Gallo G.R No. defines a clerical or
207074, Jan. 17, 2018 typographical error as a
recorded mistake, “which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding.” Thus:

“Clerical or
typographical error” refers to
a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work
in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil registry that
is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth,
mistake in the entry of day
and month in the date of
birth or the sex of the person
 or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing
record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction
must involve the change of
nationality, age, or status of
the petitioner. 

By qualifying the
definition of a clerical,
typographical error as a
mistake “visible to the eyes or
obvious to the
understanding,” the law
recognizes that there is a
factual determination made
after reference to and
evaluation of existing
documents presented.

The Court ultimately

Republic v Tipay, G.R No. recognized that substantial or
209 controversial alterations in
the civil registry are
allowable in an action filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, as long as the issues
are properly threshed out in
appropriate adversarial
proceedings.  Court adheres
to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and
the true facts established
provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. 
Most importantly, with the
enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9048 in 2001, the
local civil registrars, or the
 Consul General as the case
may be, are now authorized
to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the
civil registry, or make
changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of a
judicial order. This law
provided an administrative
recourse for the correction of
clerical or typographical
errors, essentially leaving the
substantial corrections in the
civil registry to Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

Morisono v Morisono, G.R Pursuant to Republic vs.

No. 226013, July 2, 2018 Manalo, foreign divorce
decrees obtained to nullify
marriages between a Filipino
and an alien citizen may
already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of
who between the spouses
initiated the divorce;
provided, of course, that the
party petitioning for the
recognition of such foreign
divorce decree – presumably
the Filipino citizen – must
prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. A favorable
decree dissolving the
marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have
the same result whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or
not: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be with

Miller v Miller, G.R No. The petition for correction of

200344, August 28, 2019 entries to stop Joan to use
 “Miller” as her last name was
correctly dismissed.  Glenn's
initiatory pleading before the
Regional Trial Court of
Masbate City is a Petition for
Correction of Entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of
Joan Miller y Espenida. This
type of petition is governed
by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The summary
procedure for correction of
entries in the civil registry
under article 412 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is confined to
"innocuous or clerical errors,
such as misspellings and the
like, errors that are visible to
the eyes or obvious to the
understanding" or corrections
that are not controversial and
are supported by indubitable
evidence.

Falcis v Civil Registrar, G.R Rule 65 petitions are not per

No. 217910, September 3, se remedies to address
2019 constitutional issues.
Petitions for certiorari are
filed to address the
jurisdictional excesses of
officers or bodies exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Petitions for
prohibitions are filed to
address the jurisdictional
excesses of officers or bodies
exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial
functions. 

Based on petitioner’s
presentation of the case,
which is lacking in an actual
or imminent breach of his
rights, it is patently obvious
that his proper remedy is not
Rule 65, but rather, a petition
for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Contrary to the basic

requirement under Rule 65,
petitioner failed to show that
respondent exercised any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function. From
this, no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction can
be appreciated. Petitions for
certiorari and prohibition
require the proper allegation
not only of a breach of a
constitutional provision, but
more important, of an actual
case or controversy. 

Therefore, the Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by petitioner against the
Civil Registrar General is an
improper remedy.