(Routledge Classical Translations) Plutarch - Stephen Thomas Newmyer - Plutarch - Plutarch's Three Treatises On Animals - A Translation With Introductions and Commentary (2021)

PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES
ON ANIMALS
This volume offers a new translation of Plutarch’s three treatises on animals—

On the Cleverness of Animals, Whether Beasts Are Rational and On Eating
Meat—accompanied by introductions and explanatory commentaries.
The accompanying commentaries are designed not only to elucidate
the meaning of the Greek text, but to call attention to Plutarch’s striking
anticipations of arguments central to current philosophical and ethological
discourse in defense of the position that non-human animals have intellectual
and emotional dimensions that make them worthy of inclusion in the moral
universe of human beings.
Plutarch’s Three Treatises on Animals will be of interest to students of
ancient philosophy and natural science, and to all readers who wish to
explore the history of thought on human–non-human animal relations, in
which the animal treatises of Plutarch hold a pivotal position.
Stephen T. Newmyer is Professor Emeritus of Classics at Duquesne Univer-

sity in Pittsburgh, USA. He has published extensively on classical views on
the intellectual and emotional dimensions of non-human animals, and is
the author of Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics
(Routledge, 2006), Animals in Greek and Roman Thought: A Sourcebook
(Routledge, 2011) and The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern
Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (Routledge, 2017).
ROUTLEDGE CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS
Routledge Classical Translations provides scholars and students with

accurate, modern translations of key texts that illuminate distinctive aspects
of the classical world and come from a range of periods, from early Greece
to the Byzantine empire. Volumes include thematic groupings of texts, texts
from important authors as well as texts from the Byzantine period that are
relevant for the study of the classical world but which remain inaccessible.
Each volume has accompanying notes and commentary that provide a solid
framework for deeper understanding of the material. As well as providing
translations of significant texts, the series makes available material that is
untranslated into English or difficult to access, and places these texts within
new contexts to open-up areas of study and support research.
THE LOST HISTORY OF PETER THE PATRICIAN

An Account of Rome’s Imperial Past from the Age of Justinian
Thomas Banchich
THE SORROWS OF MATTIDIA

A New Translation and Commentary
Curtis Hutt and Jenni Irving
MUSAEUS’ HERO AND LEANDER

Introduction, Greek Text, Translation, and Commentary
Silvia Montiglio
PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES ON ANIMALS

A Translation with Introductions and Commentary
Stephen T. Newmyer
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

com/classicalstudies/series/CLTRA
PLUTARCH’S THREE
TREATISES ON
ANIMALS
A Translation with Introductions
and Commentary
Stephen T. Newmyer
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Stephen T. Newmyer
The right of Stephen T. Newmyer to be identified as author of this
work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and
78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-138-57084-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-70318-2 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
FOR
T H E HONOR A BL E W I L L I A M S . S T IC K M A N I V,
“A G o o d M a n S k i l l e d i n S p e a k i n g ”
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ix
Preface xi
1 Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence,

or On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertia animalium) 1
Introduction 1
Translation 20
2 Whether Beasts Are Rational, or Gryllus

(Bruta animalia ratione uti) 95
Introduction 95
Translation 106
3 On Eating Meat (De esu carnium) 128
Introduction 128
Treatise I: Translation 138
Treatise II: Translation 156
Bibliography 169
Index 177
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Amy Davis-Poynter and

Lizzi Risch at Routledge who welcomed this project with enthusiasm and
guided me to its conclusion. Their remarkable forbearance and indulgence
with my many questions and requests along the way deserve my special
thanks. The sensible editorial hand of Gail Welsh showed me, in a gentle
way, that there is always room for improvement.
ix
PREFACE
In the Introduction to his 1995 edition of Plutarch’s dialogue Bruta animalia

ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational), also called Gryllus, Giovanni
Indelli observed that Plutarch’s animal-related treatises had to that date not
attracted much scholarly attention.1 He cites in support of his observation a
slightly earlier comment by Francesco Becchi that makes the same claim.2
Writing a few years after Indelli, Giuseppina Santese, in her Introduction
to the edition of Plutarch’s De esu carnium (On Eating Meat) that she and
Lionello Inglese had composed, noted that that treatise had itself been little
studied or read, and had not yet been the subject of any special investigation.3
In the decades since Indelli and Santese made these observations,
research on the animal treatises of Plutarch (ca. 50–120 ce) has progressed
apace. A substantial body of scholarship now exists that includes mono-
graphs in a number of languages analyzing the three treatises as a group,
volumes of essays devoted to one or another of the treatises, and numer-
ous in-depth studies of individual passages in the three works.4 In addition
to such interpretative studies, critical editions and translations of the three
Plutarchan treatises on animals, De sollertia animalium (On the Cleverness
of Animals), Bruta animalia ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational), or
Gryllus, and De esu carnium (On Eating Meat), have appeared in a number
of languages in recent years. As the works of Indelli and Inglese and Santese
cited above suggest, important editions with translations and commentaries
have been directed to a non-English-speaking audience.5 Although the ani-
mal treatises of Plutarch have inspired a rich body of secondary scholarship
in English in the past two decades, he has been less well served in the case
of English-language editions and translations of the three works, despite
the pivotal position that they hold in the history of classical thought on the
place of non-human species in the hierarchy of animal creation.6
Plutarch’s treatises on animals, along with the treatise De abstinentia
(On Abstinence) by the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry (234–ca. 305 ce),
constitute the only extant Greek works that view non-human animals from
a predominantly philosophical perspective, and that attempt to define the
xi
P R E FAC E
nature of human–non-human animal relations and obligations. R eaders who

wish to study in English translation Porphyry’s elaborate defense of absti-
nence from meat eating are fortunate now to have the admirable t ranslation
and commentary by Gillian Clark.7 The most recent English translation
with commentary on the three animal treatises of Plutarch remains that
published in the Loeb Classical Library in 1957.8 The commentary to the
Loeb edition, provided in the ample footnotes, is directed rather narrowly
to classical scholars and is consequently rich in citations of parallel pas-
sages from other classical authors, quite often cited without comment on
their relevance to the Plutarchan context, in cross-references to other works
of Plutarch, again often cited without comment, and in identifications of
passages in Greek works to which Plutarch refers.
Plutarch’s animal treatises have likewise not attracted much attention
from translators in the more “popular” press. On the Cleverness of Animals
and Whether Beasts Are Rational were included in a Penguin selection from
Plutarch’s ethical works.9 These translations are accompanied by minimal
notes limited for the most part to occasional identifications of Plutarch’s
citations from other authors. The Introduction to the volume scarcely

alludes to the animal treatises included in the selection, and the transla-
tion of each animal treatise is preceded by an introduction of one-half-page
or less. Whether Beasts Are Rational is translated again in a more recent
Penguin collection of Plutarch’s essays, with generous commentary and
references to other works of classical literature alluded to in the treatise.10
The remaining two animal treatises of Plutarch are not included in that
edition. On Eating Meat, Plutarch’s plea for a vegetarian regimen that ad-
vances some arguments not found even in the much more extensive work of
Porphyry on the topic, does not appear to have been translated into English
or to have been the subject of an English-language commentary since the
publication of the Loeb edition. It has thus remained impossible for an in-
terested reader to find an English translation of Plutarch’s three treatises on
animals in a single volume with the exception of the Loeb, either in the form
of a scholarly edition with Greek text or in the more popular format of the
sort offered in the Penguin series.
Plutarch’s treatises on animals, like Porphyry’s systematic defense of
abstention from meat eating, possess an interest for a broader readership
today than was addressed by the Loeb edition. The decade of the 1960s wit-
nessed, in the United States and in Europe, an acceleration of interest in is-
sues of social justice that manifested itself, in the United States, in the Civil
Rights Movement and in Women’s Liberation, among other causes. In this
same period, the so-called Animal Rights Movement began to call attention
to the mistreatment and exploitation of non-human animals in the food,
medical, entertainment and cosmetic industries, and the argument was ad-
vanced by philosophers and animal activists that humans cannot justly deny
xii
P R E FAC E
rights to non-human species that they without question accord to other hu-
mans, because the assumptions upon which such denial has rested since
classical antiquity, in particular the supposed unique possession of reason
by human beings, are either false or without moral relevance. In his his-
torical account of changing attitudes toward other species, Richard Ryder
has written of this period, “The reawakening of interest in the ‘rights of
animals’ in the 1960s and 1970s was not due, initially, to proselytizing, but
to the spontaneous conclusion arrived at by many people that it was plainly
illogical as well as unjust to discriminate so grossly on the basis of species.”11
Since the 1960s, a monumental body of literature has been produced, by
ethical philosophers, animal behavioral scientists, social activists, and even
novelists, devoted to analysis of the complex issue of man’s place in the hi-
erarchy of animal creation and of his obligations, or lack of obligations,
toward other species. For persons who seek to gain a historical appreciation
of the development of thought on human–non-human relations, the animal
treatises of Plutarch occupy a pivotal position since they address many of
the issues that form the basis for current debate on the topic, and they an-
ticipate, at least in embryonic form, many of the arguments advanced by
animal advocates today.12 Available English translations and commentaries
on Plutarch’s animal treatises scarcely allude to Plutarch’s anticipations of
modern thinking on animals, and their publication antedates the appearance
of much of the most significant secondary-source analysis of the treatises.
Recent scholarship on the treatises has tended to focus, in the case of each
of the three works, on certain key issues central to a full appreciation of
the meaning of the Greek text. In the case of On the Cleverness of Animals,
scholars have endeavored to define the dimensions of animal “reason” or
“rationality,” as Plutarch employs these terms, to identify the philosophical
antecedents of his pronouncements on the intellectual capacities of non-
human species, and to note the instances where he appears to deviate from
earlier Greek speculation on animal mentality. Whether Beasts Are Rational
has inspired lively debate on the question of animal language, and on the
knotty problem of how we are to judge the tone of a lecture delivered by a
pig to a hero of Greek mythology. On Eating Flesh has proven interesting
to scholars because of the surprising “modernity” of the arguments that
it advances in support of the meat-free lifestyle. I have endeavored to take
account of these issues in composing the introductions and commentaries
to the three works.
In light of the timeliness of Plutarch’s works on animals, a fresh t ranslation
of the three treatises that seeks to place them in the context of Greco-Roman
discussion of animal issues, and at the same time to clarify their relation to
current philosophical and scientific thought on non-human animals, may
help to render Plutarch’s thought on animals accessible both to classical
scholars unfamiliar with current debate on human–non-human relations
xiii
P R E FAC E
and to readers in other disciplines who wish to become familiar with sem-
inal texts that date from the earliest stages of that debate. I hope that this
volume may be of interest not only to students of classical literature and
philosophy but also to “Greek-less” readers who seek to gain some knowl-
edge of classical thought on animals through study of primary source texts.
For that reason, I transliterate all Greek technical terms that come under
discussion, and I either translate or paraphrase all passages from Greek and
Latin authors that I cite in the Commentary.13 Since a reader may have a
particular interest in one of the treatises contained in the volume, the trans-
lation is designed so that each treatise may be studied independently of the
others. Some topics covered in the introduction to one treatise may therefore
reappear in some form in the introduction to another of the treatises, and
some secondary sources may be cited with full bibliographical particulars
in the notes to more than one of the treatises, which reduces the need to con-
sult the notes to another treatise for guidance on works cited. For readers
who are not classicists, I cite works of Plutarch which are not translated in
this volume, and those of other Greek and Roman authors, by their com-
monly used English names. All translations of Greek and Latin texts in this
volume are my own.
A would-be translator faces formidable challenges in undertaking to ren-
der Plutarch into another language. In his study of Plutarch, D. A. Russell
offers a perceptive analysis of the author’s style which makes clear a number
of the principal challenges involved. Labeling Plutarch “a conscious artist
in an elaborate manner,” Russell calls attention to his “varied syntax and
sophisticated word-order.”14 As to Plutarch’s choice of words, Russell notes
that “his vocabulary is three times that of Demosthenes,”15 and that he has
a marked penchant for abstract terms. Overall, Russell detects in Plutarch
a style that may be characterized as elevated and long-w inded, learned and
elusive, and difficult to represent effectively in any other language. I have
tried in my translation to steer a middle course, in light of the issues that
Russell lays out so eloquently. Where possible, I attempt to reproduce the
syntax of Plutarch’s sentences, which are rich in dependent clauses and par-
ticipial constructions, in hopes of giving some idea of the elaborateness of
his style, but I have not hesitated to divide long sentences into smaller units
when clarity is at stake, in the belief that subject matter deserves to take
precedence over rhetoric.
Russell notes of every attempt to present Plutarch in another language,
“Much of the flavor of course evaporates in translation.”16 I hope that enough
of the flavor of Plutarch remains in my translation to provide Plutarch a new
and appreciative audience of readers who care deeply about animal rights,
animal welfare, environmental integrity and other social issues that were
largely still in an embryonic stage when the three treatises contained in this
volume last appeared together in English translation.
xiv
P R E FAC E
Notes
1 Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali:
introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995)
20, “Sulle quattro opere nel loro complesso c’è una non copiosa letteratura …”
Indelli includes in his enumeration here Plutarch’s De amore prolis (On Love of
Offspring) along with the three treatises devoted entirely to animals, namely De
sollertia animalium (On the Cleverness of Animals), Bruta animalia ratione uti
(Whether Beasts Are Rational), or Gryllus, and De esu carnium (On Eating Meat).
2 Indelli 20 note 41, citing Francesco Becchi, “Istinto e Intelligenza negli Scritti
Zoopsicologici di Plutarco,” in Michele Bandini and Federico G. Pericoli, eds.,
Scritti in Memoria di Dino Pieraccioni (Florence: Istituto Papirologico G. Vitelli,
1993) 60, who notes that the animal treatises of Plutarch are works “che hanno
sinora riscosso un interesse assai limitato de parte della critica.”
3 Introduction to Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, eds. and transl.,
Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento
(Naples: D’Auria, 1999) 7, “è stato scarsamenta letto e studiato, nè mai fatto
oggetto di un’ indagine specifica.”
4 The Bibliography section in each number of Ploutarchos, the journal of the
International Plutarch Society, is a helpful guide to editions, translations and
studies of all works of Plutarch, and individual issues of the journal frequently
contain original scholarship devoted to Plutarch’s works on animals.
5 De esu carnium is translated as well in Donatella Magini, transl., Plutarco: Del
Mangiar Carne. Trattati sugli Animali (Milan: Adelphi, 2001). All three ani-
mal treatises of Plutarch are translated, with introduction, ample commentary
and bibliography, in Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, transl., L’Anima de-
gli Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi,
2015). Two of the animal treatises may be studied in French in Myrto Gondi-
cas, transl., L’Intelligence des Animaux, suivi de Gryllos, traduit du grec et
présenté par Myrto Gondicas (Paris: Arléa, 1991). De sollertia animalium has
been translated with extensive commentary in the excellent edition with Greek
text of Jean Bouffartigue, ed. and transl., Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales, Tome
XIV, 1re Partie, Traité 63, l’Intelligence des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
2012). De esu carnium is available in Portuguese translation with commentary in
Joaquim Pinheiro, transl., Plutarco: Sobre Comer Carne (Coimbra: Imprensa da
Universidade de Coimbra, 2019).
6 In her excellent survey of the considerable body of literature devoted to the
study of non- human animals in Greek and Roman literature, Julia Kindt,
“Review A rticle: Capturing the Ancient Animal: Human/Animal Studies and
the Classics,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 137 (2017) 213–225, while taking into
account recent analyses of Plutarch’s animal treatises, does not include in

her discussion the topic of translations or commentaries on Plutarch or other
classical authors who discuss non-human animals.
7 Gillian Clark, transl., Porphyry: On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006).
8 Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, ed. and transl., Plutarch: Moralia
XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
9 Rex Warner, transl., Plutarch: Moral Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
10 Robin Waterfield, transl., Plutarch: Essays (London: Penguin, 1992).
11 Richard Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 4. Ryder dates the birth of modern interest in ethical
issues relating to the treatment of non-human species to the publication of a
xv
P R E FAC E
major article, “The Rights of Animals,” by British novelist and animal activist
Brigid Brophy in the Sunday Times in October 1965.
12 For an analysis of Plutarch’s anticipations of arguments encountered in animal
rights literature and animal behavioral science, see Stephen T. Newmyer,
Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and
London: Routledge, 2006).
13 The Greek text of the treatises that I have followed in preparing my translation is
that of C. Hubert, ed., Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI. Fasc. 1, recensuit et emendavit
C. Hubert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1959). I have compared the Greek text of this edi-
tion against that in the editions of Cherniss and Helmbold, of Indelli, of Inglese
and Santese, and of Bouffartigue (see notes 1, 3, 5 and 7, above), and I note
i nstances where I follow a reading other than that in Hubert.
14 D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 21.
15 Russell 22.
16 Russell 23.
xvi
1
WHETHER LAND OR SEA
ANIMALS HAVE MOR E
INTELLIGENCE,
OR
ON THE CLEVER NESS OF
ANIMALS
(DE SOLLERTIA ANIMALIUM )
Introduction
Only a few persons now dispute that animals possess some
power of reasoning.
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871), Chapter 3
Plutarch’s longest and most detailed examination of the intellectual

endowments of non-human animals, and of the consequences for human
conduct toward other species that in his view flow from a demonstration of
such endowments in other animals, is generally known by the imprecise and
somewhat generic Latin title De sollertia animalium, usually translated as On
the Cleverness of Animals.1 The treatise has strong claims on the attention
of the modern reader with an interest in the history of ideas on the nature
of animal intellect and on human–non-human animal relations. Plutarch’s
contention that all animals have at least a share of reason and the conclu-
sion that he draws from that contention, that human beings have a moral
obligation toward non-human animals, places him outside the mainstream of
Greek philosophy and ethics. In addition, the treatise anticipates a number of
ideas central to current debate on the place of non-human animals in the hi-
erarchy of animal creation and on man’s ethical relationship to other species.
On the Cleverness of Animals is cast in the form of a dialogue which
concludes with an extensive catalogue of examples of “resourcefulness”
or “ingenuity” (the sollertia of the Latin version of the title) in non-human
species set forth in the course of an elaborate comparison of the intellec-
tual properties of land- and sea-dwelling creatures, a narrative technique
reflected more clearly in the Greek title of the work which may be translated
as Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence. This comparison
is set forth in the course of a debate, occupying the latter 30 chapters of the
1
ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS
work (965D–985C), in which one of the interlocutors in the dialogue offers

evidences of the intellectual superiority of land-dwelling species, after which
another argues for the superiority of sea-dwellers. The treatise ends abruptly,
with no decision reached on the question under discussion, a fact that has
prompted some scholars to conclude that the work survives in an incomplete
state. Another explanation that has been advanced for the apparent sudden-
ness with which the work ends is that Plutarch may not have intended in the
first place to argue that one group of animals was intellectually superior to
the other.2 Some scholars, moreover, have branded Plutarch’s technique of
analyzing the intellectual properties of non-human animals by juxtaposing
land- and sea-dwelling creatures as intrinsically artificial and useless, based
as it is on a distinction that has no real biological significance.3
The literary setting of On the Cleverness of Animals, as well as the iden-
tity of the interlocutors who contribute to the debate, have long intrigued
scholars. More than a century ago, Max Schuster argued that the work reflects
Plutarch’s activities as a teacher in his native town of Chaeronea in Boeotia,
in the course of which Plutarch would lecture on various philosophical top-
ics to friends and interested parties who were devotees of Academic, Stoic or
Epicurean philosophy.4 A relaxed, congenial and open-m inded atmosphere
prevailed at such gatherings, if one may judge by the ambience suggested in
On the Cleverness of Animals. Schuster maintains that Plutarch accepted no
money for the instruction that he offered, and that the discussions drama-
tized in his dialogues were conducted at the writer’s home. A remark near
the opening of the treatise (960A) stating that the thesis of animal rationality
had been advanced “yesterday” suggests that the reader is “dropping in” on
the continuation of an ongoing discussion. Apparently hunting was a topic
prominent in the discussion of the previous day (959C), and the issue of the
interplay of sportsmanship, amusement and cruelty inherent in the practice
of hunting seems to have been debated. The most prominent interlocutors
in the first seven chapters of the work, in which evidences of rationality in
non-human animals are set forth (959A–965B), are Autobulus, who is gen-
erally identified as Plutarch’s father, and Soclarus, who is believed to have
been a friend of Plutarch’s family. Not all of the other named speakers in the
dialogue can be identified with certainty.5
The date of composition of On the Cleverness of Animals is, like the
identity of some of its speakers, a matter of speculation. Although most of
Plutarch’s philosophical treatises provide no clues as to their date of compo-
sition,6 On the Cleverness of Animals contains one historical reference that
has been used to date the work. On one occasion, a speaker relates, a dog
performing in a play that appeared to be dead suddenly came to life and
rushed about happily and excitedly, an action that moved the “elderly Ves-
pasian,” who was in the audience (974A). This might be taken as evidence
that the dialogue was composed after the accession of the emperor Vespa-
sian in 69 ce but before his death in 79 ce. The reference is in fact of little
value since the dialogue might have appeared many years after the anecdote
2
took place. Bouffartigue argues for such a later date on the grounds that
the work suggests an experienced author who is comfortable in mingling
philosophy, rhetoric and science.7
The principal interest that On the Cleverness of Animals holds for the
modern reader, however, does not lie in the comparative chapters which
present zoological lore often inferior to the best of previous Greek science
and which are replete with anecdotes of wondrous actions and abilities
in non-human species that have questionable zoological merit.8 Indeed,
Plutarch’s very choice of animal species to illustrate one or another aspect
of animal “cleverness” in these chapters is not original with him, but closely
mirrors other classical treatments of the topic.9 It is principally in the seven
chapters (959A–965B) that precede the comparative chapters that the par-
ticular interest of the treatise lies for the modern reader, for here Plutarch
offers a detailed and spirited defense of what may be considered the overall
thesis of On the Cleverness of Animals, embodied in the comment by one
of the interlocutors early in the dialogue, that “all animals in one way or
another have a share (metechein) of reason and understanding” (960A). On
the Cleverness of Animals constitutes the earliest extant Greek defense of the
proposition that non-human animals possess at least a modicum of reason
and that human beings have a moral obligation to take account of their
interests in their interactions with them.10
These first seven “theoretical” chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals
seek to clarify the manifold senses in which non-human species may be said
to “share in” rationality by delimiting the dimensions of that rationality
and by offering examples to illustrate that contention. Plutarch’s position
is that the rational faculty in animal species is correctly understood to exist
in a “more or less” relation from one species to another, rather than in an
“all or nothing” relation, as the Stoics held. He argues that the error of the
Stoics in estimating the intellectual dimensions of non-human species is to
fault animals for not exhibiting the perfection of reason when nature did not
design some species to exhibit that perfection (962C). One cannot expect
to find the fullness of reason even in human beings, Plutarch maintains,
although they, unlike other animals, have at least the capacity to perfect
their reason through education and fostering (962C).11 He acknowledges, at
the same time, that the intellect of non-human animals, in comparison to
that of human beings, is “weak” (asthenē) and “muddy” (tholeron) (963B).
Plutarch characterizes the difference in intellectual capacity between an-
imal species as one of quantity rather than of quality, since, in his view,
all animals possess at least some degree of reason, and some, like human
beings, possess more than others, although reason manifests itself in all spe-
cies in similar ways with similar results: like human beings, other species
have sufficient intellect to enable them to navigate their lives successfully,
securing food while defending themselves against their natural enemies,
raising their young, constructing secure dwellings, and engaging in some
form of communication. Moreover, Plutarch contends, one regularly speaks
3
of “madness” in an animal when its behavior is erratic or when it suffers

from an affliction like rabies. Madness is an aberration of the intellectual
faculties of a creature. One would hardly speak of the disturbance of the
intellectual faculties of an animal if it did not have such faculties in the first
place. Hence, when a rabid dog fails to recognize its master, its judgment
and reason are disordered, and any philosophers who fail to acknowledge
these facts are, he maintains, either simply disregarding the evidence of their
senses or deliberately questioning the truth (963E–F).
The philosophers whose views Plutarch here and throughout the treatise
On the Cleverness of Animals most consistently characterizes as misguided
and oblivious to the clear evidence of the senses are the Stoics, against
whom his arguments for the presence of a degree of reason in non-human
animals are principally directed.12 Even when he does not name the school,
it is clear that he has them in mind since he frequently alludes to the titles
of treatises written by adherents of the school and he mockingly cites terms
and concepts that have a technical sense in Stoic philosophy.13 He rather
frequently alludes to the theories of the influential Stoic theoretician and
logician Chrysippus (ca. 280–207 bce), who appears to have contributed
substantially to the Stoic conception of the intellectual limitations of non-
human animals.14 It is important to note that, although Plutarch challenges
the Stoic contention that non-human animals are devoid of reason and pre-
sents an elaborate case against that position, he does not question the initial
premise of his philosophical adversaries that the possession of reason con-
fers moral standing. His approach is to argue rather that this prerequisite
does indeed exist in all animal species.
In Stoic teaching, actions which in human beings are directed by “rea-
son” (logos) are directed in non-human species by “impulse” (hormē). This
impulse enables non-human animals to flee their natural enemies and to
pursue their natural prey, but does not empower them to carry out higher
mental functions like choice or the exercise of will, much less to aim at good-
ness and justice. The origin of this distinction between human beings and
other animal species lay for the Stoics in the makeup of the animal soul.
According to Stoic teaching, every animal has an eight-part soul, consisting
of the five senses, the capacity for utterance, the capacity for reproduction,
and an eighth part called in Stoic doctrine the hēgemonikon, a kind of ruling
or guiding principle.15 This functions in all animals as a kind of overarching
guide that directs the actions of the soul. In human beings, the hēgemonikon
attains to rationality when a person reaches the age of seven or 14, the two
ages variously cited by Stoic authorities as marking the onset of reason, but
it remains irrational in other species. Morally speaking, the human being
now possesses the impulse toward goodness, while the non-human animal
possesses merely the impulse to survive. The impulse (hormē) of non-human
animals is sufficient to distinguish them from plants, but non-human an-
imals do not rise to the level of human beings. This dichotomy leads to a
4
permanent alienation between human beings and other animals that has
profound consequences for human morality. In Stoic parlance, human be-
ings have no covenant of justice with non-human animals.16 The interloc-
utor who advances the Stoic point of view in On the Cleverness of Animals
asks with some alarm how life could continue if human beings are expected
to deal kindly and harmlessly with other species, as one would naturally
do with beings endowed with reason. To do so would compel humans to be
deprived either of life or of justice (964A–B).
In his biography of Chrysippus, Diogenes Laertius informs us (Lives of
the Philosophers VII. 129) that the eminent Stoic had himself taken up the
topic of interspecies justice, and had declared that there could be no ques-
tion of such justice because of the “unlikeness” (anomoiotēta) that exists be-
tween human beings and other animals arising from the absence of reason
in non-human animals. Chrysippus is alluding here to the Stoic doctrine of
οἰκϵίωσις (oikeiōsis), a concept that is frequently judged to be the corner-
stone of the Stoic ethical system. The Greek term resists translation.17 The
noun oikeiōsis is certainly related to the noun oikia, “house, household,” to
the verb oikeioun, “to appropriate, to claim as one’s own,” and to the ad-
jective oikeios, “of one’s house, belonging, friendly.” That which is opposite
to oikeios is allotrios, “belonging to another, foreign.” Some translations of
oikeiōsis that scholars have suggested include “belonging,” “kinship,” “affil-
iation,” “appropriation,” “attachment” and “bonding.” All translations that
scholars have put forward stress the ideas of commonness, of creature sym-
pathy, and of shared experience. In his biography of Zeno, the founder of
Stoicism, Diogenes Laertius offers a helpful picture of the Stoic conception
of animal bonding (Lives of the Philosophers VII. 85–89). According to the
Stoics, Diogenes explains, the “first impulse” (prōtē hormē) of any animal at
birth is toward self-preservation because every animal is by nature dear to
itself. This causes an animal to flee things that are harmful and to seek out
things that it recognizes as “akin” (oikeia, VII. 85). In time, every animal
reaches out from itself to recognize others that are akin to itself. The later
Stoic Hierocles (second century ce) likened this process to the formation of
concentric circles in a pond that grow ever wider. In the case of human be-
ings, these circles eventually encompass the whole of humankind.
The operation of this “widening” was of central importance in Stoic eth-
ics, for the recognition of kinship in others was for the Stoics the origin of
justice. While humans feel kinship with other humans, and non-human an-
imals with other non-human animals, the bond of oikeiōsis can never exist
between humans and other animals because of the limitations of the soul
of non-human animals. A human being, on attaining to rationality, feels
increasingly alienated from other animal species, for the lifestyle, interests
and goals of rational beings have nothing in common with those of irra-
tional beasts. The goal of human life is to follow the promptings of reason
that teach humans to live in accord with virtue, while the goal of the life of
5
irrational animals is to obey the urgings of impulse (hormē) that guaran-

tee self-preservation. In the view of the Stoics, a being whose actions are
directed toward a goal of moral improvement, that is, the human being,
has nothing in common with a being whose actions are directed merely to
keeping it safe from danger, that is, the non-human animal. Plutarch’s inter-
locutor Soclarus, who advances the Stoic position in On the Cleverness of
Animals, acknowledges that both the Stoics and the Peripatetics maintain
that justice could not be born into the world but would remain formless, if
all animals were held to be possessed of a share of reason (963F–964A). It is
striking that Plutarch employs in this passage the same verb (metechein, “to
share in, to partake of”) that he uses to characterize the nature of rational-
ity in non-human animals near the beginning of the treatise, in what may
be considered the “thesis statement” of the work (960A). Again he seeks to
emphasize that reason in the animal kingdom is to be understood to stand
in a “more or less” relation rather than in an “all or nothing” relation.18
Soclarus’ objection is answered by Autobulus, who presents a more animal-
friendly vision throughout the dialogue. He suggests that the Stoics have
taken an exaggerated position, since there is no injustice involved in an act
of human violence against animals that would seek to harm human beings,
but only when such violence is directed against harmless animals (964C–D).
Such an approach deprives neither animals of reason nor humans of justice.
The ethical stance which the Stoics adopted toward non-human species,
against which Plutarch argues in On the Cleverness of Animals, may justly
be viewed as a “moralization” of the views of Aristotle on the intellectual
endowments of non-human animals. While Aristotle drew clear distinctions
between the intellect of human and non-human animals, he stopped short
of drawing the sorts of moral distinctions between the species that Plutarch
challenges.19 It is noteworthy that Aristotle draws a more categorical dis-
tinction between the species in his ethical and political treatises than in his
zoological works, where he presents a somewhat more generous construc-
tion of the intellectual faculties of non-human animals. At Politics 1332b3–6,
for example, Aristotle declares that other animal species live “primarily by
nature,” whereas “man lives by reason as well, for he alone possesses rea-
son.” In his Metaphysics, he makes a very similar observation that, while all
animals have by nature the power of “sensation” (aisthēsis), and while all
animals live by their “impressions” (phantasiais), human beings live also by
“skill and reasonings” (technēi kai logismois) (Metaphysics 980b26–28). In
History of Animals, however, Aristotle presents a more positive view of the
intellectual capacities of non-humans, allowing them a faculty that he terms
“practical intelligence” (sunesis), and he goes so far as to suggest that the
intellectual faculties of all animals stand in a “more or less” relation from
one animal to another (History of Animals 488b15–16), a position with which
Plutarch agreed. While Aristotle draws rather firm distinctions between the
intellectual capacities of humans vis-à-vis those of other animals, he does
6
not conclude therefrom that humans are better than other animals because
of their superior mental endowments, but rather merely different from them.
The Stoics subsequently incorporated features of Aristotelian zoology
into an ethical system grounded in the belief that a profound and uncross-
able boundary separates mankind from the remainder of animalkind. The
absence of reason in non-human animals precludes the existence of any
oikeiōsis between the species, but the Stoics drew the further conclusion
that the unique possession of reason by human beings accords them a moral
standing denied to the remainder of animal creation. In Cicero’s dialogue
De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the Ends of Good and Evil), the interloc-
utor who explicates the Stoic ethical system thus characterizes the school’s
position on the superior moral value of human beings (III. 67):
But in the same way that there exist the bonds of right between
men and men, so do they feel that there is no bond of right with
the beasts, for Chrysippus has well observed that other things were
born for the sake of men and gods while men and gods exist for their
own fellowship and society, so that men may use beasts for their
advantage without injustice.20
If rationality and moral value are to be viewed as linked, as seen in the Stoic
model, Plutarch viewed it as his task to prove that non-human animals do in
fact demonstrate evidences of some degree of reason. Since even the Stoics
acknowledged that all animals know from birth which things they should
pursue and which they should flee, they must, according to Plutarch, have
the ability to “judge” (krinein), to “remember” (mnēmoneuein), and to “pay
heed” (parechein), capacities essential to differentiating that which is to be
pursued from that which is to be avoided (960F). Creatures that are born
without the capacities of memory, preparation and judgment, not to men-
tion such capacities as fear and desire, could not exercise these functions if
they were by nature devoid of some degree of reason (960E–F). In support
of his thesis, Plutarch cites with approval the observation of the Aristotelian
philosopher Strato that a creature could not possess any sensation (aisthēsis)
“without some understanding” (aneu tou noein) (961A).
Although Plutarch is noteworthy as one of very few ancient thinkers
who argue the position that non-human species demonstrate evidences of
rational activity, his case for animal rationality is not without difficulties
and has been faulted by critics who point out, as shortcomings in his pres-
entation, an imprecise use of terminology in referring to the dimensions
of animal intellect,21 and a number of what appear to be contradictions in
his position on animal rationality between the case developed in his three
animal-related treatises and his assertions elsewhere. Some scholars have
maintained that these contradictions arise rather from the context in which
they occur than from any real and fundamental difference in philosophical
7
stance on the part of Plutarch.22 One such passage that has been frequently
singled out by critics occurs in Plutarch’s treatise De amore prolis (On the
Love of Offspring), wherein he argues that the rationality of human beings
affords them an understanding of such concepts as justice, virtue and di-
vinity, concepts that non-human animals lack because they are “irrational”
(aloga, 493B). Whereas human beings are endowed with reason, other spe-
cies follow nature more closely. Plutarch’s point here is therefore not so much
that non-human animals are inferior to human beings in their intellectual
faculties but rather that they have fewer opportunities than do humans to
run afoul of their intellectual faculties by deliberate surrender to external
passions. In a real sense, non-human animals can therefore be said to live
more in accord with nature because they do not have the capacity to contra-
vene that nature.
Equally problematic is Plutarch’s observation, De fortuna (On Fortune)
98C, that if human beings did not possess intellect (noun) and reason (logon),
their life would not differ from that of other animal species. Scholars have
sought to demonstrate that even this passage does not after all deny reason
to non-human animals, but merely implies that humans have a greater de-
gree of reason than do other species, so that Plutarch’s observation here is in
fact in line with his position in On the Cleverness of Animals that rationality
exists throughout the animal kingdom in a “more or less” relation.23 Here
too, what appears to be a contradiction in Plutarch’s position on animal
rationality can be viewed rather as a critique of the failings of human beings
who, although they are naturally endowed with intellects superior to those
of other animal species, violate their better instincts by a perverted appli-
cation of their intellectual faculties which enables them to indulge in vices
that do not lie open to other animal species that cannot act contrary to their
more limited intellectual faculties.24
Plutarch’s elaborate argument for the presence of a degree of reason in
non-human animals, which constitutes the central theme of the first seven
chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B) and which immedi-
ately precedes the comparison of the intellectual capacities of land- and
sea-dwelling creatures, culminates in a discussion (963F–965B) which may
be viewed as the topic toward which these early chapters point: if all ani-
mals are indeed endowed with at least a modicum of reason, is it the case
that human beings stand in some sort of ethical relationship with them?
Specifically, do humans have a debt of justice toward non-human ani-
mals?25 The fact that the discussion of the possibility of a relationship of
justice between the species immediately precedes the comparative chapters
might suggest that the reason why neither land-dwelling nor sea-dwelling
animals are ultimately declared to have superior mental endowments
is that Plutarch’s real goal in the treatise is to suggest that all animals,
regardless of their intellectual capacities, stand in a relationship of justice
with human beings.
8
The interlocutor Soclarus inaugurates this discussion of interspecies jus-

tice with his observation (963F) that both the Stoics and the Peripatetics
held that, if we take the view that all animals have a share of reason, jus-
tice could not come into existence. For the Stoics, reason possession was
a prerequisite for moral consideration. A debt of justice was owed only to
rational beings, and only human beings are the sort of creatures that can be
included in a covenant of justice. A denial of an obligation of justice toward
non-human species was implicit in the doctrine of oikeiōsis, which posits an
unbridgeable gap separating rational from irrational beings. Humans are
freed from any need to take into account the potential interests of other
species because they are “unlike” (allotrion) human beings and they share
with humans nothing that may be defined as oikeion, the opposite of that
which is allotrion. Tad Brennan has suggested that the term oikeion, in Stoic
parlance, refers to that which is “an object of concern” to human beings.26
Non-human animals, because they are devoid of reason, cannot be such an
object of concern.
To some extent at least, the Stoic case against according moral value to
non-human animals likely arose from a recognition of the realities of life in
the pre-industrial ancient world. To eschew the use of animals as sources
of food, as beasts of burden, and as implements of war, would render life
virtually impossible.27 Soclarus, in setting forth the Stoic position, observes
(964A) that, in the view of both the Stoics and the Peripatetics, humans could
not live “humanely” (philanthrōpōs) if they conducted themselves “without
harm” (ablabōs) toward other animals: the nexus between human life and
animal subjugation is clearly articulated here. Soclarus takes comfort, how-
ever, in the thought that it is impossible for human beings to act unjustly
toward creatures that have no conception of justice toward human beings
(964B). One cannot harm creatures that have no conception of right action.
Autobulus, however, suggests a solution to the dilemma that Soclarus pos-
its: it is not unjust to make use of animals that are gentle and harmless as
our helpers in human endeavors, but it is unjust to abuse them (965B). Nor is
it unjust for human beings to kill animals that are dangerous and that seek
to harm human beings. This solution neither denies reason to other animals
nor undermines the concept of justice. Moreover, he charges (964C), the
Stoics are not in a position to make their denial of reason to non-human
species a justification for denying an obligation of justice (dikaiosunē) to
them since, he charges, the Stoics have not adequately proved their thesis
that non-human animals are in fact irrational.
The discussion of justice toward non-human animals ends with a brief
catalogue of examples of unjust actions perpetrated by human beings
against other animals (965A–B) that is fascinating for the remarkable
similarity that it bears to enumerations of human behaviors toward other
animals that are condemned by modern animal rights philosophers and
animal advocates and welfarists. Autobulus judges it to be unacceptable
9
to include foie gras in one’s diet, or to force animals to perform acts that
are unnatural to them, inspiring fear in them and compelling them to be
cruelly separated from their young. Hunting and fishing are also singled
out as pursuits that amuse human beings by visiting suffering and death
on other creatures. Plutarch’s catalogue of human interactions with other
animal species that he considers to be morally unacceptable strikingly
foreshadows the motto of the American animal rights organization PETA
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) which states that “Animals
are not ours to experiment on, eat, wear, use for amusement, or abuse in
any way.”28 It is precisely in this sort of passage that the value of Plutarch’s
treatise On the Cleverness of Animals lies for the student of the history of
human–non-human animal relations, for he is the earliest extant Greek au-
thor who argues that human beings have an obligation toward other species
to take into consideration the possibility that their lives have value because
they are in some ways “akin” to human beings.29 The force of Plutarch’s
argument is to reject the strictures against non-human animals that are
fundamental to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. It is important to keep in
mind that Plutarch’s case for an ethical relationship between the species
is predicated on an acceptance of the Stoic principle that reason confers
moral value, an acceptance which inspires the lengthy demonstration, in
the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals, that all animals
have at least a modicum of reason.
In his defense of vegetarianism, On Eating Meat, Plutarch advances a
second type of argument according to which the claim that non-human
animals have to just treatment at the hands of human beings is not pred-
icated on the presence or absence of reason in them. In this second type
of argument, Plutarch suggests that the capacity of other animal species
to experience suffering and joy makes it incumbent upon human beings to
take their interests into account in their relations with them, not least be-
cause they, through their vocalizations that humans mistakenly interpret as
meaningless, ask for justice from their human tormentors (On Eating Meat
994E–F).30 Plutarch’s case for an ethical relationship between humans and
other animal species, viewed in its entirety, rests, therefore, not solely on an
acceptance of the Stoic argument that reason confers value and a demon-
stration that, contrary to the Stoic position, all species have such value as
participants in the world of rational beings, but also on the argument, prom-
inent in the work of American animal rights philosopher Tom Regan, that
animals can be harmed through deprivation of pleasures that are natural to
them and through infliction of harm by human beings.31 The idea that the
capacity of a creature to suffer confers moral value and that it is therefore
wrong for humans to visit such suffering upon them, finds its classic mod-
ern expression, long before Regan, in the often-cited dictum of the English
philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), “The question is not, Can they
reason?, nor, Can they talk?, but, Can they suffer?”32
10
The view that intellectual capacity and moral value are linked, a view
that, as we have seen, was accepted by Plutarch in On the Cleverness of An-
imals and the negative consequences of which he sought to mitigate in his
argument that other animal species do have at least a portion of reason,
survived the classical world to become perhaps the single most influential
idea governing human–non-human animal relations in Western history.33
Concern for the suffering of non-human species did not figure prominently
in classical discourse, and its anticipation in Plutarch is noteworthy. In re-
cent decades, ethical philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive ethology, the
branch of biology that investigates animal cognition, have developed the
terms of this debate in directions that ancient philosophy and natural sci-
ence could not have anticipated. It is increasingly asked, by both philos-
ophers and scientists, whether superior intellect does in fact confer moral
value. As the question is posed by some animal advocates, what does it mat-
ter, after all, if human beings are more intelligent than other species? Per-
haps other criteria, like the capacity of other animals to suffer and to feel joy
and to take in interest in their own lives, are what should concern humans.
This latter possibility found a place in Plutarch’s animal philosophy at a
time when it was scarcely envisioned elsewhere.
The case for rationality in non-human animals that Plutarch develops
in the first seven “theoretical” chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals
(959A–965D) is defended by citation of numerous instances of what Plutarch
regards as illustrations of various aspects of the intellectual properties of
other species that are set forth in the course of the 30 chapters (965D–985C)
that constitute the comparison of land- and sea-dwelling creatures. Here
too Plutarch’s manner of argument bears a striking similarity to modern
discussions of the intellectual and moral dimensions of non-human ani-
mals in that Plutarch’s exposition relies heavily upon anecdote and anthro-
pomorphization, types of evidence that classical scholars find of dubious
value in the same manner as do some modern philosophers and ethologists
who question the claims of developed intellectual and moral capacities in
non-human species advanced by some of their philosophical and scientific
colleagues.
Although Plutarch’s reliance upon anecdote and anthropomorphization
in the comparative chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals is perhaps the
aspect of his “zoology” that has most consistently attracted the negative at-
tention of critics for over a century, even the most casual perusal of the com-
parative chapters is sufficient to convince the reader that, in other aspects
of his relation to natural science as well, Plutarch was no Aristotle, a fact
that some critics hold against him. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that Plutarch, in his comparison of land- and sea-dwelling animals, exam-
ines other species primarily as a moralist rather than as a biologist, and his
intention in so doing is to extract appropriate lessons for human conduct
toward the remainder of animal creation. One can hardly deny the criticism
11
of Vittorio d’Agostino, writing almost a century ago, that Plutarch’s zoology

is little more than an assemblage of interesting anecdotes.34 Very similar
criticisms are still encountered in discussions of Plutarch’s animal treatises.
Recently, Bouffartigue noted that Plutarch’s zoological lore is intended to
astonish the reader, and he calls attention to Plutarch’s frequent use of terms
denoting wonder, amazement and paradox.35 It is not surprising, then, that
Plutarch is not always careful to distinguish mythological creatures from
animals found in nature if the mythological creatures illustrate a point that
he is eager to make. Nor is it likely that Plutarch’s zoological insights are
to any significant degree the result of direct observation. Occasionally, an
interlocutor in the dialogue claims to have been an eyewitness to an event
that he describes. Aristotimus claims (973A) to have heard a story from two
individuals who were witnesses to the strange behavior of a jay at Rome,
and he shortly after claims (973E) to have witnessed himself the astonishing
behavior of a dog in the Roman theater. Such claims may be merely liter-
ary embellishments intended to lend immediacy to the narrative, although,
given Plutarch’s obvious affection for his animal brethren, it is plausible that
his own experiences have on occasion worked their way into his narrative in
some form. Since Plutarch cites some of the same animal species that other
writers cite to illustrate virtues or vices in other species, scholars suspect that
Plutarch relied predominantly on commonplace books for his examples.36
Plutarch’s tales, mentioned above, of a talented jay that taught itself the
music of a trumpet after meditating on the melodies of the instrument, and
of a scene-stealing dog that delighted Roman theatergoers by appearing to
spring back to life on cue in the course of a play, are typical instances of the
sort of anecdotal evidence of animal intellect with which he seeks to demon-
strate that other species have traces of rationality, and both illustrate at the
same time his tendency to view behaviors in other species in terms that “hu-
manize” those behaviors. Plutarch anthropomorphizes non-human behavior
to such an extent that he frequently seems willing to conclude that behavior
in a non-human animal that resembles a particular behavior in a human
being is an instance of that same behavior in the non-human animal. This
anthropomorphizing approach in Plutarch is traceable as well in his take
on the issue of whether non-human animals are capable of emotional states.
In Plutarch, behavior in a non-human animal that, if observed in a human
being, would be indicative of the presence of a particular emotion in a hu-
man is taken as evidence that that same emotion is occurring as well in the
non-human animal.37 Plutarch’s reliance upon anecdote and anthropomor-
phization has been condemned as detrimental to his credibility as a writer on
zoological lore since Dyroff’s early study of Plutarch’s animal psychology.38
Although recent decades have witnessed greater willingness on the
part of some philosophers, psychologists and animal behavioral scien-
tists to countenance the idea that, as Plutarch had maintained, intellec-
tual capacities in animals exist in a “more or less” relation, that is, that
12
rationality is a continuum, other animal investigators still adopt what

may be viewed as a Neo-Stoic position according to which man’s superior
intellect affords him a moral standing that other species cannot claim.
Proponents of this position resist attempts to isolate continuities between
human beings and other animals, and find the use of anecdote and an-
thropomorphization to illustrate such continuities to be particularly nox-
ious strategies. In his book Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel,
ecologist Carl Safina discusses at length the hostility once aroused in the
scientific community by assertions of continuities between species that
relied to any degree on anecdotal evidence or on an anthropomorphiz-
ing stance, a hostility that was most intense during the years in which
behaviorism prevailed in animal studies. To anthropomorphize was,
he notes, sufficient to destroy an academic career in that environment.
Safina’s description of scientific orthodoxy under behaviorist domination
closely mirrors, in modern scientific parlance, the attitudes against which
Plutarch fought in his refutation of the Stoic position on the superiority
of human beings to other species:
Professional animal behaviorists inserted a hard divider between

the nervous system of the entire animal kingdom and one of its spe-
cies: humans. Denying the possibility that any other animals have
any thoughts or feelings reinforced what we all most want to hear:
We are special. We are utterly different. We are better. Best. (Talk
about projecting!)39
The decades since the decline of behaviorism, with its opposition to any talk
of thoughts or feelings in non-human animals, have witnessed an increasing
acceptance, in both philosophical and scientific circles, of the position that
other animal species demonstrate evidences of cognition in a relationship
that is correctly understood as a spectrum in which human beings provide
the most developed example of intellectual sophistication, and that it is sci-
entifically valid to employ anecdotal evidence and anthropomorphizing
analogies to describe that spectrum of cognition in the animal world. Ethol-
ogist Marc Bekoff argues that researchers may justly employ both anec-
dote and anthropomorphization, bolstered by rigorous neurological study
of similarities between human and non-human brains, because, in the final
analysis, we have no choice but to interpret non-human animal behavior
in terms that make sense to us. He speculates that the tendency of human
beings to view other species in humanlike terms may be “hardwired” in
the human brain. Perhaps our need to view other animals in human terms,
he suggests, may help us to make ethical decisions in our behavior toward
them.40 Bekoff’s stance suggests that the battle that Plutarch waged in his
treatise On the Cleverness of Animals is slowly being won, and in terms that
Plutarch would have understood and approved.
13
Notes
1 On the frequent unsuitability of the Latin titles to Plutarch’s philosophical
treatises, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and
Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 30. D. A. Russell,
Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 164, notes that even the Greek titles given
to Plutarch’s treatises are probably not original with the author himself. In this
volume, I call the treatise whose Greek title translates as Whether Land or Sea
Animals Have More Intelligence by the English translation of its Latin title,
On the Cleverness of Animals, since the treatise is generally referred to by that
English title in scholarship devoted to it.
2 Both explanations for the abrupt ending appear in the comment in Harold
Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984; reprint of edition of 1957) 479, “To some edi-
tors the ending is suspicious because of its brevity and vagueness; they regard
it as added by an ancient editor who could not find the original termination.
But the sudden turn at the end may merely indicate that the whole debate is in
reality a single argument to prove the thesis that animals do have some degree of
rationality.”
3 Already Adolf Dyroff, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia
(Würzburg: Bonitas-Bauer, 1897) 7 note 1, had branded the sea–land approach
to comparison “recht privitiv.” Similarly, Jean Bouffartigue, ed., Plutarque,
Oeuvres Morales, Tome XIV, 1re Partie, Traité, 63 l’Intelligence des Animaux
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012) viii, charges that the seriousness of the topic
under discussion is vitiated by the silliness of the manner of argument, “mais le
sérieux de la question est miné par le caractère artificiel et presque ludique de la
joute.” It is worth noting, however, that Plutarch is not the only ancient writer on
animals whose criteria of classification are liable to strike us as less than cogent.
In his life of Theophrastus (ca. 370–287 bce), Diogenes Laertius lists treatises
by that philosopher devoted to discussions of animals that are believed to bear
grudges, to animals that burrow, and, particularly reminiscent of Plutarch’s
approach, to animals that live on dry land (Lives of the Philosophers V. 43).
Plutarch’s technique of comparing the excellences of land- dwelling ani-
mals against those of sea-dwellers recalls his employment of the synkrisis, or
“side-by-side judgement,” which follows all but four of the paired biographies
of his Parallel Lives and which compares and contrasts the moral qualities of
his biographic subjects. Some scholars have found these comparisons less than
convincing and far-fetched. On Plutarch’s use of the synkrisis, see David H. Lar-
mour, “The Synkrisis,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 405–416, and Stephen T. Newmyer, “Human-A nimal In-
teractions in Plutarch as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten
Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., Interactions Between Animals and Humans in
Graeco-Roman Antiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252.
4 Max Schuster, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De sollertia animalium, mit
besonderer Berüchsichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit Plutarchs (Dissertation, Munich)
(Augsburg: Himmer, 1917) 1–21. Bouffartigue xviii–xix argues that Plutarch
does not provide sufficient information to support Schuster’s interpretation of
the setting of the dialogue.
5 On the identity of the characters of the dialogue see Helmbold 319 and Bouf-
fartigue xv. An invaluable resource for identifying the personages mentioned in
the works of Plutarch is Bernadette Puech, “Prosopographie des Amis de Plu-
tarque,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 33, 6 (1992) 4831–4893.
14
6 On the difficulty involved in attempting to date the philosophical works of

Plutarch, see Introduction to On Eating Meat note 10.
7 Bouffartigue xx–xxi.
8 The comparative chapters well illustrate the fascination with “animal wonders”
that is the main feature of the branch of ancient literature on non-human ani-
mals designated by the term “paradoxography,” which is primarily interested in
marvelous and incredible behaviors and abilities in non-human species. Bouf-
fartigue xii, charging that the emphasis on this sort of material causes the scien-
tific value of the treatise to be debased, calls attention to the fact that the Greek
verb θαυμάζϵιν (thaumzein), “to wonder at, to be astonished at,” appears, in ver-
bal and adjectival forms, 14 times in the course of the treatise. The treatment
of animals in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History and in Aelian’s Nature of Ani-
mals is similarly heavily indebted to this sort of wonderful lore. See Mary Bea-
gon, Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992) 8–11 and “Wondrous Animals in Classical Antiquity,” in Gordon Lindsay
Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 414–440, and Steven D. Smith, Man and
Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of Claudius Aelianus (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 196–198. Kenneth Kitchell, “A De-
fense of the ‘Monstrous’ Animals of Pliny, Aelian, and Others,” Preternature:
Critical and Historical Studies in the Preternatural 4 (2015) 125–151, argues that
one may sometimes defend accounts of animal marvels in ancient authors as real
facts debased by poor observation, while some such accounts have suffered from
frequent retelling. It is somewhat ironic that elsewhere Plutarch, whose accounts
of non-human animals certainly do not shy away from the marvelous and the
grotesque, condemns the propensity in human beings to seek out the odd and
sensational because of a perverted sense of curiosity about life, De curiositate
(On Curiosity) 517D–521D. Plutarch does not seem to heed his own advice.
Plutarch’s fascination with animal wonders calls attention to the fact that his
interest in non-human animals is not after all primarily biological but rather
ethical: what interests him is the moral lessons for human conduct that may
be learned from the actions of other animal species, and in this, his goal does
not differ substantially from that of his Lives, in which the actions of historical
figures teach the consequences of virtue and vice. Plutarch’s “biology” has long
been the subject of harsh criticism. Dyroff 40 note 4 had observed of Plutarch’s
scientific lore, “Bedenklich ist bei Pl. sehr vieles,” and he charges that Plutarch
possessed a genuine interest in other species but did not have the mental acuity
or taste for cautious investigation that would have made him a man of science in
the manner of an Aristotle.
9 Sherwood Owen Dickerman, De Argumentis Quibusdam apud Xenophontem,
Platonem, Aristotelem Obviis e Structura Hominis et Animalium (Dissertation,
Halle, 1909) and “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psy-
chology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42 (1911) 123–
130, demonstrated that ancient writers regularly cite the ant, the bee, the spider
and the swallow as exhibiting various aspects of animal intelligence, often dis-
cussing the various species in the same order of presentation. Dickerman, “Some
Stock Illustrations” 130, speculates that most ancient writers on animal intellect
are dependent upon some earlier, now-lost source, perhaps the Pre-socratic phi-
losopher Alcmaeon of Croton, for both this choice of species and for the order of
presentation. Bouffartigue xxxvi–xlvi discusses the question of the underlying
literary source of the animal anecdotes in Plutarch, Pliny the Elder and Aelian,
and notes that Aelian at times reproduces the phraseology of Plutarch without
15
mentioning his name, and at times discussed anecdotes pertaining to particular

species in the order in which the same anecdotes occur in Plutarch. This leads
him to suspect a common literary source for the two authors. Bouffartigue also
observes that Aelian’s manner of presentation of anecdotes is often more exu-
berant and embellished than is Plutarch’s. That embellishment at times consists
of a moral reflection on the part of Aelian in which the behavior of some non-
human animal is declared to be more praiseworthy than that of human beings.
10 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers V. 49, notes that Theophrastus wrote
a one-volume treatise entitled On the Intelligence and Character of Animals. The
title suggests that Theophrastus might have treated some of the issues of animal
intellect and behavior that are covered in On the Cleverness of Animals. It is im-
possible to determine the extent to which Plutarch may be indebted to the earlier
treatise for doctrine and examples. Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken
der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam:
Grüner, 1977) 164–170, offers a valuable discussion of the possible contents of
this lost treatise.
11 This passage in De sollertia animalium is analyzed and discussed in greater de-
tail in Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–35.
12 Plutarch’s response to Stoic philosophical doctrine is analyzed in the classic
work of Daniel Babut, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1969). See also Jan Opsomer, “Plutarch and the Stoics,” in Beck 88–103.
13 A number of Stoic technical terms are cited disparagingly at On the Cleverness
of Animals 961C–D. On Plutarch’s mocking use of Stoic technical terminology,
see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–36.
14 Plutarch mentions Chrysippus by name (On the Cleverness of Animals 980A–B),
in the course of the land- and sea- comparison, mocking him for his inordinate
fascination with a certain species of crab that he never failed to discuss in his
works. Chrysippus’ theories and technical vocabulary are alluded to without
mention of his name at On the Cleverness of Animals 961C–E. For further dis-
cussion of Chrysippus in the animal-related treatises of Plutarch, see Newmyer,
Animals, Rights and Reason 57–60.
15 The Stoic conception of the nature of the animal soul, both human and non-
human, is set forth in Aetius, Placita IV. 4. 4 (=SVF II. 827) and IV. 21 (=SVF
II. 836). The eight-part division of all animal souls is cited there as part of the
teachings of Chrysippus.
16 In On Eating Meat, Plutarch was about to take up the topic of whether there is
after all no covenant of justice with non-human animals at the point where the
treatise breaks off (999B).
17 S. G. Pembroke, “Oikeiōsis,” in A. A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London:
Athlone, 1971) 114, calls the concept “a central idea in Stoic thinking from the
start,” while noting that it has “a persistent reputation for being impossible to
translate.” Similarly, Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 154, notes that the term has eluded
successful translation, and cites, as “unsuccessful candidates” for translation
of the term, “appropriation,” “affinity,” and “familiarization.” Although the
concept is most consistently associated with the Stoics and is considered to be
central to their ethics, some scholars suggest Theophrastus as the philosopher
who first gave expression to the idea. On the Theophrastean connection, see C.
O. Brink, “οἰκείωσις and οἰκειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral
Theory,” Phronesis 1 (1955–1956) 123–145. In his treatise on vegetarianism, De
abstinentia (On Abstinence), the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry (234–ca.
305 ce) explains at some length (III. 35) Theophrastus’ position that humans and
16
other animals are akin because all have the same “principal elements” (archai),
that is, flesh, skin and bodily fluids. Francesco Becchi, “Lignes Directrices de
la Doctrine Zoopsychologique de Plutarque,” Myrtia 17 (2002) 159–174, argues
forcefully that Plutarch’s conviction that human beings owe a debt of justice
to non-human animals because of their kinship with human beings and their
common elements is heavily influenced by Theophrastus’ theory of interspecies
kinship. See especially 169–173.
18 Porphyry offers a similar characterization of the Stoic position on the conse-
quences for human morality that would follow if non-human animals are judged
after all to stand “in a relation of kinship” (oikeiōs, On Abstinence I. 4) with hu-
man beings: the very concept of justice would founder since non-human species
are, according to the Stoics, “of no concern to us” (mēden hēmin prosēkonta, I. 4).
19 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the West-
ern Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 2, writes of this distinction,
“Aristotle, I believe, was driven almost totally by scientific interest in reaching
his decision that animals lack reason. But in the next generation the Stoics and
Epicureans had a moral concern because they both had theories of justice which
denied justice to animals, on the grounds that animals lack reason. The Stoics
further saw animals as providentially designed for us.”
20 Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 67, sed quomodo hominum inter homines
iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim
Chrysippus cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis
et societatis suae, et bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint since iniuria.
For further discussion of Stoic views on the interconnectedness of kinship and
justice in Stoic ethics, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward An-
imals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54, and
21 Already Dyroff, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia 56, charged
that Plutarch does not make exact distinctions in his use of technical psychologi-
cal vocabulary, and appears to employ the terms sunesis, dianoēsis and phronēsis
interchangeably. Philip Sidney Horty, “The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in
Plutarch,” Apeiron 50, 1 (2017) 103–133, offers a subtle analysis of the vocabulary that
Plutarch employs to characterize the intellectual features of non-human animals,
and he concludes that Plutarch maintains that non-human species operate intellec-
tually at a much lower level than do human beings. The nature of animal intellect
must, in Horty’s view, be understood in a qualified sense as a kind of practical wis-
dom sufficient to allow non-human species to carry out the activities of daily living.
22 An excellent analysis of apparent contradictions between Plutarch’s pronounce-
ments on animal rationality in On the Cleverness of Animals and his pronounce-
ments on the topic elsewhere is presented in Francesco Becchi, “Irrazionalità e
Razionalità degli Animali,” Prometheus 26 (2000) 205–225. Becchi demonstrates
that most of the apparent contradictions can be explained as due to the con-
text of the work in which they occur, and that frequently Plutarch’s intention is
not to argue that non-human species are intellectually inferior to human beings
but rather that humans contravene and abuse the superior intellect with which
they are endowed. Similarly, Giuseppina Santese, “Animali e Razionalità in
Plutarco,” in S. Castignone and G. Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo
Antico (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 1994) 141–170, argues that apparent contradictions
in Plutarch’s estimation of the intellect of non-human species arise from the dif-
fering nature of the treatises in which the topic is discussed, and that he always
maintains the position that all animals have in common the properties of ration-
ality, perception and imagination.
17
23 On this passage, see Becchi, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità” 215 and Santese, “An-
imali e Razionalità” 165.
24 In his dialogue Whether Beasts Are Rational or Gryllus, Plutarch allows the pig
Gryllus, who has been temporarily endowed with speech by the witch Circe, to
argue that non-human animals have a greater natural propensity toward virtu-
ous behavior than do human beings because their virtues, including courage and
temperance, are not, as is the case with sophisticated human beings, in reality
perversions of virtues (987B–C). Whereas, for example, warfare among non-
human animals entails genuine courage free of deceit, among human beings it
often involves trickery and unscrupulous behavior (987C–D). This is because
human beings have the capacity to pervert their better natures, while other spe-
cies with less developed intellectual faculties do not. On this passage, see Com-
mentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 26.
25 Plutarch’s case for an obligation of justice toward non-human animals is dis-
cussed at length in Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just
Beasts,” 47–65. It is important to note that Plutarch does not advance the ar-
gument, in On the Cleverness of Animals, that other animal species have them-
selves an understanding of justice, although he does assert that the behavior of
ants suggests that they have in them the “seeds of justice” (spermata dikaiosunēs,
967E). For a discussion of modern ethological views on the possibility of a sense
of justice or fair play in non-human species, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and
Reason 52–53.
26 Brennan 158.
27 In his dialogue Septem sapientium convivium (Banquet of the Seven Sages), the
interlocutor Solon laments (159B) that the human need for food makes injustice
unavoidable because it involves taking the lives of other beings, be they animal
or plant.
28 Website of PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals).
29 It is possible that the argument that human beings have a debt of justice toward
other species because of their innate kinship with them may have appeared in
the animal writings of Theophrastus, in particular in his lost treatise On the
Intelligence and Character of Animals. See note 17.
30 For a discussion of this passage, see below, Introduction to On Eating Meat,
pp. 132–133.
31 On Regan, see Introduction to On Eating Meat note 21.
32 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1798)
Chapter XVII.
33 Animal rights philosopher Gary Steiner, Animals and the Moral Community:
Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press,
2008) ix, well characterizes the persistence of the idea that reason and moral
status are linked, “There is a long and regrettable history of thinking in the
West according to which human beings are morally superior to animals and
hence enjoy the prerogative to use animals for whatever purposes they see fit. A
predominant tendency in this thinking is to suppose that our putatively superior
intellect entitles us to treat animals as if they were created to satisfy our desires.”
Steiner 134–137 offers a detailed analysis of the contribution to this historical
reality made by the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. Steiner xi makes it clear that he
prefers sentience to cognitive capacity as a criterion for moral considerability.
34 Vittorio d’Agostino, “Sulla Zoopsicologia di Plutarco,” Archivo Italiano di Psic-
ologia 11 (1933) 35, calls Plutarch’s zoology “più che altro una raccolta di aned-
doti interessanti.”
35 Bouffartigue xii–xiii.
18
36 Helmbold 313–314 contends that “there can be little doubt … that a considera-
ble variety of works has been utilized.” On the possible identity of sourcebooks
which Plutarch may have consulted, see above, note 9.
37 For a detailed examination of Plutarch’s view of the operation of the emotions
in non-human species, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human and
Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (Oxford and
New York: Routledge, 2017) Chapter 7, “Animal Affect: ‘Man Alone of Animals’
Emotional?” 121–133.
38 Dyroff 46 suggests that it never occurred to Plutarch how dangerous to research
on animals such anthropomorphization (Vermenschlichung) could prove. On
Plutarch’s tendency to anthropomorphize, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and
Reason 7, and The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought 63 and
74 notes 80–81.
39 Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry
Holt, 2015) 28.
40 Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: New World Library,
2007) 131.
19
Translation
Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence,
or
On the Cleverness of Animals
(De sollertia animalium)1
959 1. AUTOBULUS:2 When asked what sort of man he considered the poet
Tyrtaeus3 to be, Leonidas4 said, B “One good at [arousing]5 the souls of
young men,” since he instilled eagerness, along with courage and the love of
honor, in the youths so that they took no thought of themselves in warfare.
I am afraid, my friends, that the encomium on hunting6 that was read aloud
yesterday may excessively arouse our young men who are fond of hunting to
the point that they come to view all other activities as trivial and worthless,
and cling to this exclusively. After all, I sense that I myself became rather
caught up with excitement again, not in keeping with my age, and longed,
like Euripides’ Phaedra, “to shout to the hounds and chase the spotted
deer.”7 C So did the speech move me with the subtlety and persuasiveness
of its arguments!
SOCLARUS: Quite true, Autobulus! That speech seems to have aroused
the art of rhetoric from a long period of neglect,8 charming the youth and
putting them in a spring-like mood. But what pleased me most was the
introduction of gladiators, and the argument that not the least reason to
praise hunting was the fact that, after it directs toward itself our inborn or
acquired love of armed conflict between human beings, it provides a pure
spectacle of skill and intelligent courage ranged against unreasoning force
and violence,9 a fact that accords well with the passage in Euripides:
“The strength of man is small, but

D With his subtlety of mind
He overmasters the fierce offspring
Of sea and land and mountain.”10
2. AUTOBULUS: In fact, my dear Soclarus, they say that it was from that
very source that there came upon men an insensitivity to suffering and a
cruelty that tasted slaughter and grew accustomed, in the chase and the
hunt, to feeling no disgust at blood and wounds of animals but rather to de-
lighting in their slaughter and death. And so it was in Athens: the first man
20
who died at the hands of the Thirty was a certain informer who was said to
have been rightly condemned, and so too the second and third. After that,
proceeding little by little, they attacked honest men and eventually did not
spare the best citizens.11 E So too the first man who killed a bear or a wolf
was held in high esteem, and some cow or pig was declared guilty of hav-
ing tasted the sacred offerings and was deemed worthy of death.12 Next the
consumption of deer and hare and gazelle introduced the consumption of
the flesh of sheep and, in some places, of dogs and horses. And tearing and
chopping up the tame goose and the dove, that “companion of the hearth,”
as Sophocles says,13 not as in the case of weasels or cats, out of hunger for
food, but for pleasure and a delicacy,14 they fortified the bloody and brutish
part of man as much as possible, and were shut off from and rendered insen-
sitive to pity, blunting their sense of gentleness for the most part. F The Py-
thagoreans of old, on the other hand, practiced gentleness toward animals
in order to inspire humane feelings and compassion.15 960 Habitual action
is a powerful inducement to guide the human being through the working of
emotions that come to dwell in a human being little by little.
Well, somehow we have without noticing it come in our discussion upon a
topic in no sense unrelated to our topic of yesterday nor to that which we shall
shortly take up today.16 As you know, yesterday we expressed the view that all
animals, in some way or another, have a share of thought and reasoning capac-
ity,17 and we offered a pleasant opportunity to our young huntsmen to debate
the intellectual properties of sea- and land-dwelling animals. We will decide
the question today, it appears, if the supporters of Aristotimus and Phaedi-
mus still stand by their challenges. B The former fellow offered himself to his
companions as an advocate for the position that the land produces creatures
superior in intellect, while the latter would argue that those of the sea do so.
SOCLARUS: They do hold fast to their positions, Autobulus, and they will
be here in just a moment. I saw them getting ready at dawn. But, if you’re
willing, before the debate commences, let us take up some topics that were
appropriate to yesterday’s discussion but did not find an opportunity to be
covered or were discussed without due seriousness because we were drink-
ing.18 It seemed to me that there was some clamor of objections arising from
the Stoics on a matter of substance, namely, that, just as the immortal is
opposed to the mortal and the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the cor-
poreal to the incorporeal, C so too must it be that the irrational is opposed
to and set against the rational: this latter among these pairs must not be left
incomplete and imperfect.19
3. AUTOBULUS: Well, dear Soclarus, who ever held such a view, that, while
a rational element exists in things, there is no corresponding irrational?
There is an irrational element in abundance in things that are bereft of a
soul: we do not need any other antithesis to the rational. Everything that is
21
without a soul, since it is irrational and devoid of understanding, is at once

opposed to that which has reason and understanding along with a soul.20
And if anyone contends that nature is not complete, but that nature which
is besouled possesses both a rational and an irrational element, another
will contend that besouled nature has both a representational element and
a nonrepresentational element and a sentient element and an element that
lacks sensation. D This is so that nature may have these antithetical and op-
posed properties and shortcomings equally balanced in each comparison.
But if he is misguided who looks for both the sentient and the insentient in
the class of besouled creatures, and also for that which does and does not
possess a representational element, inasmuch as every besouled creature is
already possessed of both a sentient and a representational element, so like-
wise will he be unreasonable who demands that a besouled creature possess
both a rational and an irrational element, since he is arguing against men
who believe that nothing that possesses sensation does not also possess in-
telligence, and that there is no creature that does not by nature possess some
degree of belief and rationality as well as perception and impulse. E For
nature, which they correctly say does everything toward some purpose and
goal,21 did not create a sentient being for the single purpose of perceiving
when something is happening to it. But since there exist many things which
are akin to it and foreign to it,22 a being would not survive for a moment
if it did not learn to avoid some things and to enter into association with
others. Now, perception supplies the knowledge of both of these to each
being. Creatures born with no capacity to reason or judge or recollect or
attend could not by any means perform those actions of pursuing and seiz-
ing upon things that follow upon a perception of usefulness and of steer-
ing clear of and fleeing those things that are harmful and troublesome.23
F Those creatures that you deprive altogether of expectation, memory, in-
tention, preparation, hope, fear, inclination and grief, have no use for eyes
and ears, though they have them.24 It would 961 be preferable to be free of
all sensation and representation if one has no means of making use of these
faculties, than to experience pain and distress and anguish if one has no
means of evading them.
There is a statement by the natural philosopher Straton25 that argues that
it is not at all possible to have perception without mental action. Oftentimes
when we are reading, the letters confront our sight and sounds reach our
ears, but these things escape our notice because our minds are focused else-
where. Then in time the mind refocuses, and goes after every item that it
had let pass by while reading. Just so it is said, “The mind can see, the mind
can hear: the rest is deaf and blind.”26 This means that, if there is no un-
derstanding present, sensation experienced by the eyes and ears produces
no perception. For that reason, King Cleomenes,27 B when a recitation was
praised during a drinking party, replied, when asked if it was not an excellent
22
performance, that others must take up the question since his mind was in the
Peloponnese. Therefore it is necessary that all of us who have sensation also
have intellect, if we are born to have sensation because of intellect.
Let us accept then that sensation does not need the mind in order to per-
form its own task. But when the sensation is removed that produces in a
being the capacity to differentiate the kindred from the alien, what is it that
henceforth recalls and fears the painful and desires the useful?28 And when
this capacity is not present, what is there in creatures C that devises and
prepares for them lairs and hiding places and traps for the creatures that
they catch and escapes from their attackers?29 And these are the very same
writers who wear us out30 with their “Introductions,”31 always defining
“purpose” as “indication of accomplishment,” “design” as “impulse before
an impulse,” “preparation” as “action before an action,” and “memory”32
as “comprehension of a proposition in the past of which the present is com-
prehended by sensation.”33 None of these is not a function of reason, and all
of them are found in all animals. Of course this goes for mental processes
which they call “notions” when they are at bay but “thoughts” when they
are in action. D And too, while they acknowledge that all emotions in com-
mon are “faulty judgments and opinions,”34 it is remarkable that they disre-
gard many actions and motions in animals that are indicative of anger, fear,
and, indeed, jealousy and envy.35 Besides, they punish their dogs and horses
when they do wrong, not without purpose but to chasten them, instilling in
them through pain that mental distress that we term repentance.36
Pleasure37 that comes through the ears is called “enchantment,” and that
coming through the eyes is “sorcery.” They make use of both against animals
in the hunt. Deer and horses are “enchanted” with pipes and flutes,38 and
E they summon crabs from their holes by overpowering them with flutes,39
and they say that the shad comes to the surface of the water and approaches
when there is singing and clapping. And also, the horned owl is captured by
such enchantment as it tries to work its shoulders rhythmically, delighting at
the sight of singers.40 As for those who stupidly assert on this issue that ani-
mals neither feel pleasure nor anger nor fear, and cannot make preparations
or remember, but that the bee “as it were remembers,”41 and the swallow “as
it were makes preparations,” and the lion “as it were displays anger,” and
the deer “as it were senses fear,” how, I wonder, will they react to those who
assert that animals do not see or hear but F “as it were see” things and “as
it were hear,” and do not make sounds but “as it were make sounds,” and do
not live at all, but “as it were live”! These statements, it seems to me, are no
more contrary to clear facts than are those others.
4. SOCLARUS: Well then, Autobulus, include me among those who believe

what you say. And yet when I compare the character and lifestyles and ac-
tions 962 and behaviors of animals to those of human beings, I notice not
23
only a great deficiency of attainment among animals and no clear aiming

toward virtue for which reason is born,42 nor any advancement toward it
or desire for it, so that I am at a loss to understand how nature granted the
beginning of reason to creatures that are not capable of attaining to its end.
AUTOBULUS: But this does not sound strange, Soclarus, to those philoso-
phers whom we are discussing. Although they maintain that love of offspring
is the starting point for our community life and our sense of justice, and they
observe that this is powerfully developed in animals, they deny and refuse to
believe that animals have a share of justice.43 B Mules are not without organs
of generation: they are able to use their genitals and wombs with pleasure,
but they cannot reach the goal of reproduction. Consider this too: is it not
ridiculous to assert that persons like Socrates and Plato take part in wicked
conduct to no less a degree than does any slave, and that they are just as fool-
ish, undisciplined and unjust, and then to fault the imperfect and imprecise
inclination toward virtue in animals as being the absence of reason and not
a state of weakness and incompleteness of virtue, inasmuch as they agree
that vice is an imperfection of reason, a failing that infects every animal?44 C
We see that cowardice, intemperance, injustice and malevolence are found in
many animals.45 He who maintains that a creature that is not born to exhibit
the fullness of reason does not exhibit any reason at all, is in the first place
no different from someone who maintains that an ape does not have a share
of ugliness or a tortoise a share of slowness because the former is not capable
of beauty or the latter of speed. In the second place, he does not take note of
the difference that is right before his eyes: reason is innate in every creature,
whereas real and complete reason comes from cultivation and training.
Therefore, there is a share of the faculty of reason in all living things, but
they cannot claim that even a human being has the uprightness and wisdom
that they seek.46 Just as there is a difference in sight from one creature to
another and of flight from one to another D (hawks and cicadas do not see
alike, nor do eagles and partridges fly alike), so too not every being that
possesses reason has the flexibility and keenness of that faculty in the high-
est degree attainable.47 While there are many examples in animalkind of
sociability, courage and cleverness at procuring and managing the materials
of life,48 so too on the other hand there are examples of their opposites, of
injustice, cowardice and silliness in animals.49
The topic which forms the subject of today’s debate proves my point.50 On
the premise that there is some difference, some assert that land-dwelling an-
imals are by their nature more advanced toward virtue, while others assert
that sea-dwellers are. E This is obvious if you compare storks with hippo-
potamuses. The birds care for their fathers while the hippopotamuses kill
their fathers in order to mount their mothers.51 So too if you compare doves
with partridges. Male partridges make off with the eggs and destroy them52
because the female will not allow copulation when she is tending the eggs,
24
whereas male doves take their turn in the care of their offspring, warming
the egg and being the first to feed the nestlings. The male drives the female
back to the eggs and the nestlings by pecking her if she has been away a long
time. While Antipater53 censured F asses and sheep for their lack of clean-
liness, he unaccountably overlooked lynxes and swallows: lynxes dispose of
their urine by hiding it and making away with it, while swallows teach their
young to dispose of their droppings outside the nest.54
Why do we do not say that one tree is less intelligent than another55 in the
manner that a sheep is less intelligent than a dog, or that one vegetable is less
courageous than another, as a deer is less courageous than a lion? 963 Or,
just as in the case of stationary objects, one is not slower than another, as too
with voiceless things one is not more weak-voiced than another, so too, in
the case of those beings that by nature do not have the power of understand-
ing, one is not more cowardly or lazier or more intemperate. The differences
that we observe arise from the greater or lesser degree of understanding, of
one sort in one creature and of another sort in another.
5. SOCLARUS: But it is astonishing how the human being excels other an-
imals in his readiness to learn and his quickness of wit and in those things
that relate to justice56 and to sociability.
AUTOBULUS: And yet, my friend, many animals outdistance all human be-
ings, one in size, another in speed, yet another in keenness of sight and sharp-
ness of hearing.57 Man is not for that reason blind or weak or deaf. B We run, if
more slowly than deer, and we see, if less keenly than hawks, and nature has not
left us bereft of strength and size, even though we are nothing in these capaci-
ties when compared to the elephant and the camel.58 Similarly, let us therefore
not say of beasts, if their understanding is less keen and their thought processes
inferior [to ours], that they do not understand or think at all, and that they have
no reason, but rather that their reason is weak and clouded, like an eye that is
dim-sighted and confused.59 If I were not eagerly looking forward to our young
men, C learned and well-versed in lore as they are,60 collecting examples, one of
them selecting animals from land and the other those from the sea, I would not
refrain from enumerating countless examples of quickness to learn and of clev-
erness in animals, of which grand Rome has provided us buckets- and shovels-
full of examples from the imperial theaters.61 But let us leave these things fresh
and untouched for them to ornament with their eloquence.
I want to examine a small matter with you at leisure. I believe that every
part and faculty has its own shortcoming and defect and affliction, as the
eye experiences blindness, the leg lameness and the tongue faulty pronun-
ciation, each of which defects is found in no other faculty. There can be
no blindness in that which was not born to see or lameness in that which
was not meant to walk, nor would you call an animal that has no tongue
D inarticulate62 or one without a voice a stammerer. Therefore, that which
25
by its nature does not understand or reason or think is not to be termed

witless or deranged or mad, for it is not possible to be “afflicted” if one does
not possess a capacity of which the affliction consists of a deprivation or
imperfection or some other failing. Certainly you have come upon mad63
dogs, as I have mad horses. Some say that cattle64 and foxes exhibit mad-
ness too. Dogs furnish examples enough, since this [condition in them]65 is
undisputed. This supports the contention that animals possess reason and
understanding in no small degree, for rabies and madness are the afflictions
arising when their rational faculty becomes disturbed and disquieted.66 E
We do not say that their sight or hearing is disordered. Similarly, in the case
of a human being who becomes melancholy or deranged, he who does not
acknowledge that it is the faculties of thought or reckoning or remember-
ing that become upset and corrupted in that person, is wrong-headed (we
customarily state of deranged persons that they “are not themselves,” but
have “left their senses”). Likewise, the person who does not believe that mad
dogs have undergone anything other than a loss of their faculties of thought,
reckoning and memory, so that, in their mental disorder, they do not recog-
nize F the faces of their loved ones and avoid their usual diet, that person
seems either to be ignoring facts or, if he does take into account the conclu-
sion that is to be drawn from the facts, to be holding out against the truth.67
6. SOCLARUS: Your conjecture seems correct. The Stoics and the Peripatet-
ics in particular hold out for the opposite position, namely, that justice could
not come into existence, but would be altogether formless and insubstantial,
964 if all animals had a share of reason.68 In that case, it will be necessary
either that we commit injustice if we do not spare them, or that we live the
life of animals if we give up the use of them. I omit the countless numbers of
Nomads and Troglodytes who know of no other food but meat.69 But for us
who live, I believe, in a civilized and benevolent manner, what activity will
remain for us on land or sea or in the mountains, what manner of diet, if we
learn to B conduct ourselves in an innocent and innocuous manner toward
all living beings, as is incumbent upon us if they are possessed of reason
and are akin to us?70 So we have no solution to this impasse, which either
deprives us of life or of justice, unless we take heed to that ancient boundary
and law by which, according to Hesiod, he who divided up the species and
accorded to each of them its own proper behavior, allowed
“That fish and fowl and winged birds should eat

Each other, in which justice has no home;
Justice he gave to man,”71
to exercise toward one another. Those who do not have the capacity to act
justly toward us cannot be treated unjustly by us.72 Those who reject this ar-
gument have not left any path, C broad or narrow, for justice to insert itself.
26
7. AUTOBULUS: My friend, you have articulated what is “dear to the

hearts”73 of these men. We must not allow philosophers, like women in the
pains of childbirth, to fasten about their necks a charm to hasten birth, so
that they may easily and without toil give birth to justice for us. They do not
allow to Epicurus, in the case of the largest objects, even a small and trifling
concession, namely, the swerve of a single atom to the slightest degree,74 so
that the stars and animalkind and chance may come into existence and so
that free will would not be destroyed for us. It is necessary for them to shed
light on something that is obscure and to seize upon something that is obvi-
ous and, in the case of justice, to make no conjecture concerning animals75
unless the matter is agreed upon and they do not themselves argue in some
contrary manner. D Justice has another path76 which is not so precarious
and precipitous and does not lead along a path of discarded truths. My son
and your companion,77 my dear Soclarus, points out the path, under the
guidance of Plato, to those who are not contentious but are willing to follow
along and learn. Empedocles and Heraclitus78 take it as a fact that man
is not totally free of injustice when he handles animals as he does: often
humans lament and rail at “nature,” claiming that she is “necessity” and
“war,” and that she contains nothing that is unmixed and pure, but E is in-
stead actuated by unjust passions. Thus they say that birth itself arises from
an act of injustice, with the mortal and the immortal joining together, and
that the being that is created is nourished, contrary to nature, on the limbs
of its parent.
Nevertheless, while this appears excessively severe and bitter, there is a
remedy which does not deprive animals of reason but enables those who
make use of animals in a seemly manner to preserve the claim of acting
justly. When the wise men in ancient times introduced this, gluttony, allying
itself with luxury, rejected it and made away with it, but Pythagoras took
it up again, teaching humans to benefit without being unjust. F For they
do not commit injustice at all who punish and slay those animals that are
savage and dangerous79 while placing the tame and sociable species in the
service of humans as our coworkers, as each was born to do,
“Offspring of horse and ass and spawn of bulls,”
which Prometheus in Aeschylus says he “gave” to us,
965 “Like slaves, to take our work upon them.”80
And likewise we keep guard with dogs and raise goats and sheep to milk
and shear. Human life is not lost or eradicated if men to not have platefuls
of fish or goose liver pâté, or if they do not slaughter beef cattle or goat kids
for banquets, nor compel animals against their will to exhibit bravery and
to fight while men lounge in the theater or amuse themselves at the hunt,81
27
while they destroy those that do not by nature defend themselves.82 I think
that the individual who seeks to amuse himself and to make merry should
do so with creatures that play along cheerfully, not as when Bion83 remarked
that B youths throw stones at frogs in jest, but that the frogs do not die in
jest but for real. Similarly, those who hunt and fish delight in the suffering of
their dying prey,84 some of the creatures having had their cubs and nestlings
snatched from them. It is not those who make use of animals who commit
injustice, but those who use them cruelly, carelessly and savagely.85
8. SOCLARUS: Hold on, Autobulus! Rein in your attack! Here come a num-
ber of men, all of them hunters, whom you won’t easily bring around to your
position and to whom you should not cause pain.
AUTOBULUS: Good advice! Well, I recognize Eubiotus86 C and my cousin
Ariston, and Aeacides and Aristotimus here, the son of Dionysius from Del-
phi, and Nicander the son of Euthydamus, “experienced,” as Homer says,87
at hunting on land and for that reason allied to Aristotimus. Phaedimus
comes along too, with Heracleon of Megara and Philostratus of Euboea
in company with him, those islanders and coast-dwellers, “whose thoughts
are of the sea.”88 Here is our comrade Optatus: like the son of Tydeus, “you
could not tell which side he champions.”89 Optatus, “with many prizes from
the sea and mountain hunts,”90 has glorified the Huntress and Dictynna.91
D It is obvious that he has come with no intention of allying himself with
one side or the other. Or do I guess incorrectly, my dear Optatus, that you
will be a neutral and impartial arbitrator for the young people?
OPTATUS: Your surmise is quite correct, Autobulus, since long ago Solon’s
law that punished those who championed neither one side nor another in a
civil conflict was abandoned.92
AUTOBULUS: Sit with us, so that if we need a witness, we will not trouble
the works of Aristotle93 but will come away with a true verdict by following
your expertise.
SOCLARUS: Well then, young men, have you come to an agreement on the
order of presentation?
PHAEDIMUS: We have, after much wrangling. E As Euripides says,
“The lot, the child of Chance, presiding here,”94
Brings the land animals first into court, before sea creatures.
SOCLARUS: Well then, Aristotimus, it’s time for you to speak and for us
to listen.
9. ARISTOTIMUS: The court is open for the pleaders …95 … and some
[fishes]96 waste their sperm when they go after the females that are giving
28
birth. A species of mullet that they call pardias 97 feeds on its own slime. And
during the winter the octopus sits and devours itself,
“In fireless home and joyless haunts,”98
so lazy or senseless or gluttonous it is, if not guilty of all three. For this rea-
son, Plato, while setting forth his Laws,99 discouraged or F rather enjoined
young men against conceiving a love for hunting the denizens of the sea
since no training in courage or exercise of intelligence or anything that fos-
ters strength or speed or agility is provided to those who busy themselves in
hunting bass or conger eels or parrot-wrasse. 966 But on land, courageous
animals give a workout to the danger-loving and manly qualities of those who
fight the animals.100 Cunning animals sharpen the intelligence and sagacity
of their pursuers, and swift animals give practice to the strength and indus-
try of their opponents. This is what has made hunting a fine pursuit, while
fishing has nothing so splendid about it. Which one of the gods deigns to be
called “Conger-slayer,” as Apollo is called “Wolf-slayer,”101 or who is called
“Mullet-slayer,” as Artemis is called “Deer-slayer”?102 And is it strange if it
seems nobler to a person to have caught a deer or a gazelle or a hare than to
have bought it, or conversely, what is strange if it seems more dignified to
have bought a tunny-fish or a crab or a bonito than to have caught one? B The
lowliness and the absolute resourcelessness and lack of cleverness in them
has rendered fishing base and dreary and unworthy of a free person.
10. On the whole, the endowments by which philosophers103 demonstrate

that animals have a share of reason are purposefulness, preparedness, mem-
ory,104 emotions, care for offspring,105 gratitude for benefits and recollection
of past injuries; likewise, the capacity to find that which is necessary to life,
and demonstrations of virtues like courage,106 sociability,107 self-discipline
and largeness of spirit. Let us inquire whether it is not the case that sea-
dwellers are devoid of these qualities, or perhaps have some faint and indis-
tinct glimmer of them which an observer can scarcely discern. It is possible
to pick out and observe C clear and distinct and powerful examples of each
of the qualities that I have isolated in the case of land-dwelling and earth-
born creatures. As a first example, contemplate the purposefulness and pre-
paredness of bulls when they kick up dust as they prepare for battle,108 and of
wild boars when they sharpen their tusks. And in the case of elephants, since
their tusks become blunted and worn down when they dig at and cut down
the trees that they consume, they use one of their tusks for this purpose but
keep the other sharp and pointed for self-defense.109 And too the lion always
walks with its paws clenched, concealing the claws within so that they do
not dull their points by wear or leave a ready trail for those who are track-
ing them.110 D It is not easy to detect a sign of the lion’s claw, and hunters
who come upon these indistinct and obscure tracks are led astray and go off
the trail. You have certainly heard that the mongoose arms itself for battle
29
in a manner not inferior to that of the hoplite, with so much mud does it
cover itself, putting about itself a coat when it prepares to do battle with the
crocodile.111 We see the preparedness of swallows before they produce off-
spring: how well they place solid twigs about as a foundation, and then they
mold the lighter pieces around this. And if they perceive that the nest needs
some sticky mud, they E fly along the surface of a pond or lake, touching the
surface with the tips of their wings, just so that they become damp but not
weighted down by the moisture. They then gather up some dust and smear it
over and bind the parts that are loose and are slipping apart. In regard to its
shape, the nest is in no way angular or many-sided, but it is as uniform and
spherical as they can finally make it. Such a nest is sturdy and roomy and
does not allow outside animals to get a hold to make an attack.112
For more than just one reason, one might feel amazement at the hand-
iwork of the spider, the common model for women’s looms and hunters’
nets.113 The exquisiteness of the thread and the uniformity of the weave,
which has no interruptions or warp, F reveals rather the continuity of a
thin membrane and a stickiness that is achieved with some unseen gluelike
substance that is intermixed with it. Also, its coloration, which gives the web
an airy and hazy look, prevents it from being seen, but most remarkable of
all is the way in which the spider, like a clever net fisherman, quickly draws
the web tight and seizes upon the prey, 967 as soon as it perceives it and
detects its presence. The fact that we see and observe this every day gives
credence to my account. Otherwise it would seem a mere tale, as I thought
the tale of the crows in Libya that, when in need of something to drink,
toss stones [into a vessel], filling it up, and raise up the water until it can be
reached.114 Later, when I saw a dog on board a boat dropping some pebbles
into a half-empty jar of oil while the sailors were away, I was amazed at
how it perceived and understood that lighter substances are forced upward
when heavier ones settle under them. There are similar stories about Cre-
tan bees and the geese of Cilicia. B When the bees are about to go around
some windy promontory, they ballast themselves with little stones so as not
to be carried past it.115 And the geese, because they fear eagles, put a little
stone in their mouths when they are passing over the Taurus Mountains, as
if muzzling and bridling their fondness for noise making, so that they can
pass by in silence and undetected.116 The manner in which cranes fly is also
well known. Whenever the wind is strong and the air turbulent, they do not
fly, as in fair weather, in a straight line or in a crescent-shaped formation,
but they form at once a triangle and they cleave the air with the point of it so
C that they do not break the formation. Whenever they land, the birds that
are on guard at night support themselves on one foot, while in the other foot
they grasp and hold tight to a stone. The stress involved in holding the stone
forces the bird not to fall asleep for a long time, but whenever it lets go, the
falling stone quickly wakes the bird that has released it.117 Hence it is not
surprising that Herakles tucked his bow under his arm and,
30
“His mighty right arm placed upon it, sleeps,

Pressing his left upon his club.”118
Nor am I surprised at the man who first guessed how to open a closed oys-
ter when I read about the clever tricks of cranes. Whenever one swallows
a closed mussel, it puts up with the D discomfort until it senses that it has
been softened and loosened by the warmth of its stomach. Then it vomits up
the opened mussel and removes the edible portion that has been exposed.119
11. It would be impossible to discuss exhaustively the domestic arrange-

ments and provisions of ants,120 but neglectful to overlook the topic entirely.
Nowhere does nature have so tiny a mirror of greater and finer actions. They
display a reflection of every virtue, as in a drop of clear water. “Affection
dwells therein,”121 that is to say, in their sense of fellowship, and their de-
votion to hard work is the very image of courage. And too there are many
seeds of temperance and wisdom and justice.122 E While denying that an-
imals have a share of reason, Cleanthes said that he had witnessed the fol-
lowing sight: some ants came to another anthill, carrying a dead ant. Some
ants came out from the anthill to communicate with them, and then went
back in again. This happened two or three times. Finally, some ants carried
up a larva from below, as if as a ransom for the corpse. F Some of the first
group of ants picked up the larva and, handing over the corpse, departed.
The courtesy that they exhibit when they meet is one of those things that is
obvious to all, as those that are not carrying anything move from the path
for those that are carrying a load to allow them to pass.123 Also obvious is
the way in which they gnaw through and tear apart things that are diffi-
cult to carry and maneuver, so that they are easier for a number of them to
carry.124 Aratus considers it a sign of rain when ants arrange and cool their
eggs in the open,
“Or ants that brought up all their eggs in haste,

From hollow nest.”125
Some do not write “eggs” here but rather “provisions,”126 that is, the grain
that they have laid up when they sense it is moldy 968 and they fear that
it will be rotted and decayed. But their anticipation of the germination of
wheat trumps every conception of their intelligence. Wheat does not stay
dry and free from decay, but falls apart and becomes milky as it germinates.
In order to keep it from going to seed and losing its nutritional value, the
ants eat out the portion from which the wheat sends forth its new shoot.127 I
do not approve of those who [mutilate]128 anthills in order to study them “an-
atomically,” so to speak. In any case, they remark that the path down from
the opening is not straight or easy for another creature to pass through. B It
terminates in three hollow areas after breaking up into winding and twisted
31
paths supplied with chambers and perforations. One of these hollow areas
is their common dwelling, while another is the chamber in which they store
provisions, and the third is where they house their dying comrades.129
12. I do not think that you will judge it inappropriate if I introduce ele-
phants130 after discussing ants so that we may consider the nature of the
intellect found in the smallest animals alongside that in the largest, for it is
neither buried in the latter nor deficient in the former. Others are amazed
at how elephants are taught to learn and display various sorts of C stances
and gyrations, the complexity and subtlety of which would not be easy for
humans to memorize and retain.131 I view the intellect of the elephant as
revealed more in its self-generated and self-taught132 feelings and motions
that are, so to speak, unmixed and pure. Not long ago at Rome, when a
large number of elephants were being taught to adopt some tricky stances
and to turn around in complex formations, one of them that was very slow
to learn and was repeatedly rebuked and punished, was observed by itself
in the light of the moon D rehearsing and practicing its lessons.133 Hag-
non134 relates that some while ago in Syria, an elephant was being raised in
a house, and its keeper would each day, on receiving its ration of grain, steal
away half of the grain and keep it dishonestly. One day, when the master
was present and looking on, the keeper poured out the whole measure. The
elephant, looking on, raised its trunk and separated the grain and put half
of it off to one side, thereby accusing the keeper as eloquently as possible of
wrongdoing.135 Another elephant, whose keeper would mix stones and dirt
into its barley, scooped up some ashes and threw them into the pot when
the keeper’s meat was cooking. E Yet another elephant, at Rome, having
been abused by children who pricked its trunk with their styluses, raised
one of them aloft and seemed about to dash it. When an outcry arose from
the onlookers, the elephant gently placed the child back on the ground and
walked away, considering it adequate justice for a child of that age to have
been frightened.136 They tell other wonderful tales about wild, free-ranging
elephants, in particular about their crossing rivers: the youngest and small-
est offers to go first into the water. The others look on. If the smallest sticks
out above the water, there is substantial surplus of water that affords them
F confidence.137
13. I think, at this point in my presentation, that I should not overlook the
case of the fox because of its similarity. The mythographers say that a dove
released from the ark served as a signal to Deucalion that the storm was still
in force when she returned, but that it was now fair weather when she flew
away.138 Even now, the Thracians, when they set out to cross a frozen river,
use a fox to test the firmness of the ice. 969 Moving along slowly, it puts
its ear forward. If it senses by the sound that the water is flowing by near
the surface, it judges that the depth of the frozen water is but slight, and it
32
draws back if it is allowed to. If it does not hear sound, it is encouraged and
proceeds on.139 Let us not say that this is an instance of perceptual acuity
devoid of reason, but rather a syllogism derived from a perception, namely:
“That which makes a sound is in motion; that which is in motion is not fro-
zen; that which is not frozen is liquid; that which is liquid gives way.” So too
logicians140 say that a dog, when at a place where the road is divided into
branches, employs the disjunctive syllogism with several terms, reasoning to
itself, B “The prey has run along this path, or that one, or that one. It did not
go along that one or that one. So, it went along the remaining one.”141 Per-
ception provides nothing beyond the minor premise: reason adds the other
premises and the conclusion. But in truth the dog does not need such testi-
mony, for it is false and ambiguous. Perception itself points out the path of
the animal’s flight by its traces and droppings, without a nod to disjunctive
and conjunctive propositions.142 One can observe the dog’s natural powers
by many other actions and experiences and obligations which are not per-
ceived by the nose and ears, C but which are performed and observed solely
by the intellect and reason. It would be absurd of me to speak of the dog’s
self-control and obedience and shrewdness to you who observe and deal
with these things every day.
When the Roman Calvus143 was slain in the civil wars, no one was able
to cut off his head before they had surrounded and cut down the dog that
guarded and defended him. King Pyrrhus144 while on the road encountered
a dog that was watching over the body of a slain man. Learning that it had
remained there for three days and had not eaten, and that it had not aban-
doned the body, D he ordered that it accompany his retinue. A few days
later there was an inspection of the troops in the presence of the seated king.
The dog was in attendance, lying quietly. When it beheld the murderers of
its master passing by, the dog rushed at them, barking wildly and turning
repeatedly toward Pyrrhus, so that not only he but everyone present became
suspicious of the men. Arrested at once and interrogated, they confessed to
the murder after some small bits of outside evidence had been introduced,
and they were punished.145
E They say that the dog of the wise Hesiod did the same thing, convict-
ing the sons of Ganyctor of Naupactus by whom Hesiod was murdered.146
More striking than these examples that we have mentioned is what our fa-
thers learned about while they were studying in Athens. A man who had
slipped into the temple of Asclepius took the more compact silver and gold
offerings and withdrew, thinking that he had escaped notice. When none of
the temple attendants took heed of its barking, the watchdog, named Cap-
parus, pursued the temple robber. It did not give up when hit with stones at
first. F At dawn, the dog did not come close to him but followed the robber,
keeping an eye on him, and he did not accept the food that the man offered
him. The dog passed the night keeping watch on him when he stopped to
rest, and when he set out once again, the dog got up and followed after him,
33
wagging its tail at others whom he encountered on the road but watching the
robber and keeping close to him. The men who were looking into the matter
heard this from persons who had encountered them and had told them the
color and size of the dog, and they applied themselves more earnestly to the
pursuit. When they apprehended the man, they escorted him back to Crom-
myon.147 970 The dog led the group back, turning about excitedly and filled
with joy, as if it viewed the robber as its own catch and quarry. They voted
to provide its food at public expense and entrusted this task to the priests
for all time, imitating the kindness of the Athenians toward the mule. When
Pericles was building the Parthenon on the Acropolis, stones were brought,
of course, by many teams of animals each day. Now, one of the mules that
had taken part enthusiastically in the work and had been retired because of
age would go down to the Ceramicus148 and B would always meet up with
teams carrying stones, turning around with them and walking together with
them, as though encouraging them and urging them on. The people of Ath-
ens, astonished at its ambition, decreed that it be fed at public expense, in
the same manner as a vote taken to feed an athlete retired due to old age.149
14. Therefore,150 we must agree that those who maintain that we have no
relation of justice toward animals are correct,151 as far as sea creatures and
those that inhabit the depths are concerned. These creatures are completely
devoid of sociability,152 without natural affection, and free of all pleasant-
ness of disposition. Homer put it nicely when he said, in reference to a man
who seemed unsociable and savage,
“the blue-g ray sea begot you,”153
in the belief that the sea produces nothing kind or gentle. A person who uses
such language of land-dwelling animals is harsh and savage. C Or will you
even deny that there was a relation of justice between Lysimachus154 and
the Hyrcanian dog that alone stayed by his corpse and, when the body was
cremated, rushed up and leapt onto the pyre? They say that the eagle kept
by Pyrrhus (not the king but some private citizen) acted in the same manner.
It stayed close to his body when he died and hovered about the bier when
the body was borne off. At last, it settled itself down onto the bier and was
burned with him.155
When King Porus156 was wounded in the battle against Alexander, his
elephant gently and carefully drew out D many of the javelins with its trunk,
and though it was itself badly off, it did not stop until it sensed that the king
had lost much blood and was slipping off his horse. Fearing he would fall, it
knelt down to provide him a painless slide down. Bucephalas,157 when free
of his saddle, allowed his groom to mount him, but when he was adorned
with his royal trappings and collars, he did not allow anyone but Alexander
to mount him. If others attempted to approach him, he would rush at them
34
and neigh loudly and rear up, trampling those who E could not get out of the
way in time and escape.
15. I am not unaware that my examples will seem rather random to you, but it
is not an easy task to find any clever animal that provides an example of just
one virtue alone.158 Their love of honor appears in their affection for their off-
spring,159 and their cleverness is revealed in their nobility, while their versatil-
ity and sagacity cannot be separated from their courage and spirit. Certainly,
for those who wish to divide up and distinguish such features, dogs offer an
example of a mind that is at the same time tame and lofty when they turn away
from animals that cower before them, as is perhaps referred to here:
“The howling dogs rushed forth. Odysseus

Crouched down with cunning and let fall his staff,”160
for dogs no longer attack creatures that subjugate themselves and adopt a
submissive stance.161
They say also that the preeminent dog of the Indians, […]162 by Alexander,
lay still when a stag and a boar and a bear were let loose and paid no attention
to them, but when a lion appeared, the dog rose up and readied itself for com-
bat, 971 showing itself the opponent of the lion while disdaining all of the other
beasts.163 Dogs that hunt hares enjoy ripping them apart, and they eagerly lap
up their blood if they kill them themselves, but if, as often happens, a hare gives
up and, having exhausted its breath in a final run, dies, the hounds, on coming
upon it, do not touch it at all. They stand about and wag their tails, as if they
strive not for food but rather for victory and the thrill of competition.164
16. Although there exist many examples of cleverness, I will pass over foxes
and wolves and the tricks of cranes165 and jackdaws, B which are plain
enough to see, and shall cite Thales the oldest of the Wise Men,166 not the
least of whose marvelous deeds, they say, was to have gotten the better of a
mule by a clever trick. One of the mules that carried salt slipped by chance
upon entering a river and, once the salt had melted away, it was freed of its
burden, and it took note of the reason why and bore it in mind. As a result,
each time it stepped into the river, it purposely lowered itself and soaked the
bags, bending down now to one side and now to the other. When Thales got
word of this, he ordered them to fill the sacks with wool and sponges instead
of salt, and to drive the mule into the water after they had outfitted it in this
manner. C So, when it had carried out its usual performance and had filled
its load with water, it realized that its clever ruse was unprofitable and in
future it crossed the river with such care and watchfulness that the water
never touched its burden even by accident.167
Partridges demonstrate another sort of cunning while exhibiting their
love for their offspring. They train their nestlings, when they are not yet able
35
to escape, to lie on their backs if they are being pursued and to hold some
lump of earth or litter so as to conceal themselves. The mothers draw the
pursuers away and distract their attention by darting about at their feet and
rising up little by little, D until they give the impression that they are being
caught, and they lure them away from their nestlings.168
Hares, on returning to their lairs, arrange their leverets one here and one
there, often leaving the distance of a plethron169 between them, so that, if a
man or a dog comes around, they are not all endangered at the same moment.
The hares themselves run about leaving tracks in many places, and finally
they take powerful leaps away from their tracks and settle down to sleep.170
The bear, prior to being overtaken by that state called hibernation, and
before she becomes E entirely torpid and heavy and immobile,171 cleans out
her den and, when about to go down into it, she adopts as light and shallow
a step as possible, moving on the tips of her paws, and she turns her body
around and backs into the den.172
Hinds generally give birth along the road, where carnivorous beasts do
not approach. Stags, when they perceive that they have grown heavy from
fat and plumpness, withdraw to protect themselves by hiding when they do
not trust in flight.
F The manner in which hedgehogs defend and protect themselves is the
subject of a proverb:
“The fox knows many things, the hedgehog one–

But that one great.”173
When the fox approaches, as Ion174 says,
“It curls its spiny body in a knot,

And lies immune to claw and tooth.”175
But its foresight in caring for its young is even more subtle. In the autumn, it
burrows under vines and with its feet it shakes grapes from the clusters onto
the ground. After rolling around in them, it gathers them up onto its spines.
972 Once, when I was a child, I happened to see176 one that looked like a
bunch of grapes crawling or walking along, so covered with fruit was it as it
moved.177 It then goes down into its den and gives the grapes to its young to
take from it and share. Their lair has two openings, one facing south and the
other north. Whenever they perceive a change in the air, just as helmsmen
alter their sail, they stop up the opening that faces the wind and open the
other. A certain man in Cyzicus observed this and got a reputation for being
able to foretell on his own from which direction the wind would blow.178
B 17. Juba179 says that elephants exhibit sociability along with intelligence.
Those who hunt them dig out pits and cover them with thin twigs and light
36
rubbish. Now, whenever one of those that are traveling in groups falls in sud-
denly, the others bring wood and stones and toss them in, filling the space of
the pit so that the elephant can easily exit.180 He relates also that elephants,
without any instruction, pray to the gods, purifying themselves in the sea
and supplicating the rising sun by raising their trunks like hands.181 Hence
they are the animal most loved by the gods,182 C as Ptolemy Philopator183
witnessed, for when he had defeated Antiochus and wished to reverence the
god in splendid fashion, he carried out, among many other offerings, a sac-
rifice of four elephants. Having dreams at night after this event in which god
threatened him angrily because of that sacrifice, he performed many acts of
atonement and set up four bronze statues of elephants.184
The sociability of lions is in no way inferior. The young ones take the slow
and elderly lions out on the hunt. Whenever the older ones grow tired, they
sit down to rest and the younger ones go hunting. If they catch anything,
they roar D like the bleating of a lamb. The old ones take note of this and
participate in the feast.185
18. The loves of many animals are wild and furious, but some species exhibit
a refinement not unlike that of humans and an approach to lovemaking not
without its charm.186 Such was the case of the elephant at Alexandria that
was a rival in love to Aristophanes the Grammarian.187 They were in love
with the same garland seller, and the elephant was no less insistent a suitor.
It brought her fruit when it had passed by the market, and it stood beside
her for long periods, E working its trunk like a hand inside her clothing and
gently touching her tender breasts.188
A serpent189 that developed a love for an Aetolian woman would come to her
at night, sliding underneath her body along her skin, without harming her in-
tentionally or by accident, and it would always depart discretely around dawn.
Since it did this repeatedly, the woman’s family moved her far away. The ser-
pent did not come by for three or four nights while it apparently looked for her
and wandered about. When it finally located her after much difficulty, it coiled
about her without its usual gentleness but rather roughly, F pinning her arms
to her body with its coils and whipping her legs with the end of its tail, demon-
strating a light and affectionate anger that contained more forbearance than
chastisement.190 The tale of the goose in Aegium that was in love with a boy
and that of the ram that lusted after the harp-player Glauke,191 which are well-
known, I omit because I suspect that you have had enough of such accounts.
19. Starlings192 and crows193 and parrots194 that learn to use speech and
that provide their instructors a readily-moldable and imitative vocal path
for them to form and teach, 973 seem to me to support and advocate for
other animals on the question of their ability to learn, teaching us that in
a certain sense they partake of uttered reason and internal reason.195 For
that reason it is utterly ridiculous to compare them with animals that do not
37
possess sufficient voice even to bellow or roar.196 What music and charm
there is in their natural and untrained voices! The most learned and elo-
quent writers bear witness to this when they liken their sweetest poems to
the songs of swans and nightingales. Since teaching entails more application
of reason than does learning, we must believe Aristotle when he says that
animals teach too.197 B He says that a nightingale had been observed teach-
ing its nestlings how to sing.198 Supporting his contention is the fact that
nestlings separated from their mothers at an early age sing in an inferior
manner.199 Nestlings raised in the company of their mothers are taught and
learn not for glory or fame, but rather for the pleasure of competing with
each other in song and because they love the beauty of their voice rather
than its usefulness.
I can tell you a story on this subject that I heard from many Greeks and
Romans who witnessed the incident.200 A certain barber who had a shop in
Rome opposite the precinct that they call the Market of the Greeks reared
a C marvelous creature, a jay capable of producing many tones and notes201
that reproduced human words and the sounds of animals and the notes of
musical instruments202 without any prompting, making it rather a habit and
a matter of honor to leave nothing unspoken or unimitated. It happened
that a certain wealthy man from the area was being carried to his grave to
the accompaniment of many trumpets. As was usual, they halted in front of
the shop, and the trumpeters, who were well-received and ordered to play
on, remained there for a considerable time. After that day, the jay was voice-
less and speechless, not making even the sounds that indicate its own wants
and needs. D Passersby who previously had been amazed at the parrot’s
voice were now even more astonished at its silence. Other bird handlers were
suspected of poisoning it, but most people conjectured that the blast of the
trumpets had knocked out its hearing. Neither of these explanations was
true, but it was instead a period of training, it would seem, and of retreating
into itself for the sake of its imitative skills, as it prepared and readied its
voice like a musical instrument. All of a sudden its voice returned and shone
forth with none of its customary old imitations but E articulating the melo-
dies of the trumpets with the instruments’ intervals and voicing all of their
modulations while executing all the rhythms of their tunes. Thus, it appears,
as I said above,203 that self-instruction is a greater evidence of reason in an-
imals than is quickness to learn [from outside tutelage].204
I think I should not pass over one particular instance of learning in a dog,
something that I witnessed myself in Rome.205 The dog appeared in a mime
that had a dramatic plot, and it offered up representations of the actions that
were appropriate to the emotions and activities that were being portrayed.
When they feigned an attempt to poison it with a drug that induced sleep but
was, in the context of the play, supposed to be fatal, the dog F took the bread
in which the poison had been infused, and, a short time later, it resembled a
person who was trembling and stumbling and drooping his head. Finally, it
38
stretched itself out like a corpse and allowed the actors to drag it about and
move it around as the plot of the play dictated. When the dog realized from
the words spoken and the actions depicted that it was the appropriate mo-
ment, it stirred, at first quietly, as if roused from the depths of sleep, 974 and
then raised its head and gazed about. Then, to the amazement of the audi-
ence, it got up and walked to the appropriate actor and fawned on him with
joy and affection, so that the entire audience and Caesar (old Vespasian206
was present then at the Theater of Marcellus) were much affected.
20. Perhaps we come off as ridiculous when we play up the capacity of ani-
mals to learn, since Democritus207 shows that they are our teachers in very
important matters, the spider in the case of weaving and mending, the swal-
low in house construction, sweet-sounding swans and nightingales in our im-
itation of their songs.208 We see in animals a substantial portion of the three
divisions of the healing art, B for they do not make use of pharmaceuticals
alone.209 When they have devoured a serpent, tortoises eat marjoram and
weasels eat rue. Dogs clean themselves out with a certain type of grass when
they have digestive problems. The snake sharpens and refines its dimmed
eyesight with fennel. When the bear emerges from hibernation, it eats wild
arum as its first meal. Its sharp taste opens up the animal’s gut which has
grown tight. At other times, when it has become nauseated, it betakes itself
to anthills and sits there, sticking out its tongue which is slippery and soft
with sweet moisture, until it becomes covered with ants. C It swallows them
down and this helps it recover. The Egyptians say that they have observed
and imitated the practice of the ibis that purges itself with salt water, for
their priests cleanse themselves with water from which an ibis has drunk.210
If water is tainted or in some way unwholesome, an ibis will not go near it.
Some animals, on the other hand, heal themselves by abstaining from
food, as wolves and lions do. When they have become glutted with flesh,
they lie down and rest, sunning themselves. The say that a tigress, if a kid is
offered to her, maintains a fast for two days, and on the D third, though she
is famished, she asks for some other food and tears her cage apart. They say
she spares the kid because she regards it as a companion and cage-mate.211
They also tell how elephants employ surgery. They stand around those
that have been wounded and easily and without harm they draw out spears,
javelins and arrows without ripping their skin.212 Cretan goats, when they
have eaten dittany, easily expel arrows and provide pregnant women a les-
son easily learned, that that herb has abortifacient qualities. There is noth-
ing other than dittany that goats seek and go after when they are wounded.
21. Although these examples are amazing, they are less so than [the case of]
those creatures that have E an understanding of number and the ability to
count,213 as do the cattle that live in the area of Susa. They irrigate the royal
pleasure garden there with water raised in buckets, the number of which is
39
pre-set, for each animal raises one hundred buckets per day. It would be im-
possible to trick them or force them to raise more. Indeed, though they have
often tried it as an experiment, the cow resists and does not move once she had
delivered her assigned quota, so precisely does she calculate and remember
her tally, as Ctesias of Cnidus has reported.214 The Libyans laugh at the Egyp-
tians when they tell the tale of the oryx F that lets out a cry215 on that day and
hour when the star rises that they call Sothis and that we call both the Dog
Star and Sirius. When the star rises at the exact moment with the sun, they say
that all goats turn to the east. They maintain that this is a very powerful proof
of its cycle and that it agrees exactly with their mathematical tables.
975 22. So that my account may end with a crowning touch, come, let me
“move from the sacred line,”216 and say a bit about the sense of the divine in
animals217 and about their prophetic powers. It is no small or ignoble branch
of the art of divination but a very ancient one that takes its name from birds,
for their sharpness and intellectual acuity and their responsiveness to every
mental image due to their suppleness of mind provides the god an instru-
ment for his prophetic work. He prompts them to employ their voices and
chirpings and to assume their formations that are now opposing and now
favoring, like the wind, […]218 some of them impeding actions and endeavors
and others guiding them to their conclusion. B For that reason, Euripides
calls birds in general the “heralds of the gods.”219 Socrates says of him-
self that he was the “fellow-slave of the swans.”220 Likewise, among kings,
Pyrrhus221 enjoyed being called “Eagle,” and Antiochus222 “Hawk.” Well
then, although there are thousands upon thousands of examples of land-
dwelling and flying animals that foretell the future for us, it is not possible
for the advocate of sea creatures to point out a single instance,223 for they
are all dumb and blind with respect to foreknowledge, and they have been
consigned to the godless and titanic224 abode, as into the dwelling of the
unholy, where the rational and intellectual part of the soul has been snuffed
out, for they have the smallest portion of sensation, C confused and washed
out, so that they seem to be gasping for air rather than living.225
23. HERACLEON: Get ready, my dear Phaedimus, and rouse yourself to

defend the denizens of the sea and islands for us! This is no children’s game,
but a formidable contest and oratorical display that lacks only the judicial
bar and the raised platform.226
PHAEDIMUS: Well, Heracleon, there is obviously an ambush lying in wait
for us, for while we were hung over yesterday and in a stupor, this gentle-
man, cold sober, attacked us on purpose.227 I can’t beg off. Admirer of Pin-
dar that I am, I don’t want to have this sort of reputation:
D “To make excuses when combat comes your way

Casts valor into utter darkness.”228
40
So then, you have a lot of free time since it is not your discourse that lies idle
but your dogs and horses and fishing nets and hunting nets, because a “day
of rest” has been granted today to all land and sea creatures because of our
debate.229 But fear not. I will use [our time]230 judiciously, introducing no
opinions of philosophers or Egyptian tales or unsubstantiated Indian or
Libyan anecdotes.231 I will provide a few of those facts which are witnessed
everywhere by those who work the sea and which have eyewitness credibil-
ity. E Nothing impedes one’s view of the behavior of land animals, for one’s
senses enjoy a wide-open panorama. But the sea furnishes only a few stingy
glimpses and covers in darkness the birth and upbringing and modes of
attack and mutual defense of its denizens. There are among these not a few
instances of intelligence and memory and sociability that we cannot observe
and that thus hinder our argument.232 And also, land-dwelling animals, be-
cause of their similarity of birth and their dwelling together with humans,233
have in some measure taken on human characteristics and derive some ben-
efit from their upbringing and teaching234 and from their imitation of hu-
mans. This contact sweetens their bitterness and sullenness, F just as fresh
water sweetens sea water when mixed with it, and all of their dullness of
wit and heaviness is wakened from its slumber and warmed to life by the
excitement of human contact. But the life of sea creatures, because it is cut
off by great boundaries from association with human beings, is alien and
976 distinct, a thing unto itself, untouched by foreign influences as a result
of its location, rather than its nature. For their nature, which is receptive to
such information as does reach them and holds onto it closely, renders many
eels, called “sacred” in Arethusa,235 obedient to humans, and many fishes in
many locations pay heed to their names.236 So do they tell of the moray eel
of Crassus whose death Crassus mourned. Once, when Domitius asked him,
“Did you not weep when your eel died?” he replied, “Did you not refrain
from weeping when your three wives died?”237
The crocodiles of the priests not only recognize their B voices when they
call but even allow themselves to be touched, and they open their mouths
wide and present their teeth to be cleaned by hand and to be wiped with
linen cloths.238 Our dear Philinus239 returned recently from traveling
around Egypt, and he told us that he had seen an old woman in Antae-
opolis240 asleep on a bench with a crocodile that stretched out modestly
beside her. They say that, a long time ago, when King Ptolemy summoned
the sacred crocodile and it did not pay heed or obey when the priests en-
treated it and begged it, they thought that this action foretold the death of
the king, which occurred not long after.241 C Thus it would seem that the
race of sea-dwellers is not lacking in the highly-regarded art of divination.
I understand that around Sura, a village in Lycia between Phellus242 and
Myra, men sit and make divinations with fishes, in a skillful and rational
manner, as one would with birds, observing their swimming and their re-
treats and pursuits.
41
24. Well then, let these be enough examples to prove that these animals
are not alien to us or devoid of human sensibilities.243 The totality of sea
life affords sufficient evidences of their pure and natural intelligence. No
creature that swims, and does not merely attach itself to rocks and cling
there, is readily captured by humans and cannot be overmastered without
hard work, D as asses are by wolves and bees by bee-eaters244 and cicadas
by swallows and snakes by deer which easily draw them forth (hence the
name of the deer is derived not from its “swiftness” but from its “attract-
ing” of the snake).245 The sheep summons the wolf by striking its hoof, and
they say that many animals, and especially the ape, approach the panther
because they delight in its scent.246 But with almost all sea creatures, their
wary sense of presentiment, which is on guard against attacks because of
its intelligent functioning, makes fishing no easy task but one that requires
all sorts of equipment and E clever strategizing against the fish. This is
obvious from many examples that are ready to hand. Fishermen do not
like for an angling rod to be thick, although they do need one that is flex-
ible because the fishes that are caught thrash about. They choose instead
a slender rod so that it does not stir up the suspicions of a fish by casting
a wide shadow. Also, fishermen do not make the fishing line thick with
multiple strands for the loop, nor do they make it rough since that provides
evidence of a trick to the fish. They also arrange it so that the threads that
must extend toward the hook appear as white as possible. In that way, they
escape detection in the seas because of the similarity of color. F As for the
words of the poet:
“She hurled into the depths of sea like lead

Affixed to horn from oxen of the field
That comes, a harbinger of death, to greedy fish,”247
some persons misunderstand this and suppose that the ancients used the
hair of oxen for their fishing lines, so that they assert that “keras” means
“hair,” and that for that reason “keirasthai” means “to get a haircut.”248
They say that 977 in Archilochus, a “keroplastēs” is someone who enjoys
arranging and embellishing the hair.249 This is not true, for they use the hair
of horses that they take from males. The females render their hair weak by
wetting it with their urine. Aristotle250 says there is nothing clever or subtle
in these verses but that in fact a bit of horn was placed around the line be-
fore the hook since when the fishes encountered something else they chewed
it through. They use hooks that are rounded to catch mullets and bonitos
which are small-mouthed because they are wary of a hook that is broader.
Oftentimes a mullet is wary even of a rounded hook and circles around it,
lashing the bait with its tail and B gulping down the pieces that it has dis-
lodged. If it cannot do this, it closes its mouth and puckers up and, touching
it with the tip of its lips, it nips at the bait.
42
The sea-wolf has more manly courage that does the elephant:251 when it
falls victim to a hook, it draws it out from itself, not from some other fish.
It twists this way and that, widening the wound, and endures the pain of
the tear until it dislodges the hook. The alōpēx does not often approach a
hook but avoids the bait, but if it is caught, it immediately turns itself inside
out.252 Because of its elasticity and suppleness, it can naturally turn and
twist its body so that, when its inner parts are outside, C the hook falls off.
25. Well then, these examples show intelligence and the skillful and remarka-
ble employment of that intelligence for their advantage. Other fishes display
sociability and affection for each other,253 along with understanding, like the
anthias254 and the parrot-wrasse. When a parrot-wrasse has swallowed a hook,
the others that happen to be roundabout leap at the hook and nibble it off.255
These fish present their tails from outside to their comrades that have fallen
into a fish-trap and pull them, when they eagerly latch onto their tails, and
draw them out.256 The barbiers go to the rescue of their comrades even more
vigorously. They lift the fishing line along their backs and raise their spines in
an attempt D to saw the line and to break it in two on the sharp edge.257 Indeed,
we do not know of a land animal that undertakes to fight for another animal in
danger, not the bear nor the boar nor the lioness nor the leopard. In the arena,
animals of the same species huddle together and stand in a circle with one an-
other, but they do not know to or intend to help one another, rather fleeing and
darting away as far as possible from a wounded or dying animal. The tale of the
elephants that carry [materials] to ditches and raise by a ramp a comrade that
has slipped in,258 is, my dear friend, exceedingly farfetched and something that
enjoins us to believe it on the order of a royal decree, namely, from the books
of Juba.259 E If it is true, it demonstrates that many sea-dwellers are not at all
inferior in community spirit or understanding to the most intelligent of land-
dwellers. I will soon devote a separate discussion to their sociability.
26. Fishermen, who note that most fish elude wounds from the hook by de-
fensive measures like those of wrestlers, resort to force like the Persians, us-
ing dragnets, since for those caught in them there is no escape either through
reasoning or through cleverness.260 Mullet and rainbow wrasse are caught
in casting-nets and round-nets, as are goby and sea bass. F Fishermen trawl
and gather the so-called “net fish,” the mullet and gilthead and scorpion
fish, into their dragnets, the sort of net that Homer has correctly labeled the
“catch-all.”261 But the galē262 has strategies even against this, in the manner
of the sea bass. When it senses that a net is being dragged, it forcefully sepa-
rates the mud at the bottom and scoops it out by striking against it. When it
has made a space that allows the net to pass over it, it thrusts itself into that
space and holds close to it until the net has passed by.263
When the dolphin realizes that it has been caught in the folds of a net, it
waits patiently, not upset but rather glad, for it feasts on the endless supply
43
of fish that are present, without any effort on its part. But as soon as it ap-
proaches land, it escapes by eating through the net. 978 If it does not escape,
it suffers no harm the first time, but the fishermen sew rushes in its crest and
release it. If it is caught again, they punish it with blows, recognizing it by the
stitchery. This seldom happens, for most of them feel grateful that they have
been forgiven the first time and take care not to do harm in the future.264
Moreover, although there are many examples of cautiousness, vigilance
and elusiveness, we ought not to pass over the behavior of the cuttlefish. It
has along its neck the so-called mytis, full of a dark liquid that they call
“ink.”265 B Whenever it is overtaken, it releases the liquid, contriving thereby
to slip away and to elude the gaze of its pursuer by causing the sea to be
darkened around it. It imitates the gods of Homer who oftentimes steal away
and rescue those whom they choose in a “dark cloud.”266 But enough of this.
27. We may observe ingenious examples in many of sea creatures of their

skill at attacking and catching prey. The starfish, which knows that its body
dissolves and liquefies everything that it touches, offers up its body and pays
no heed when it is touched by creatures that approach and overtake it. Of
course you know the capacity of the torpedo267 not only to render rigid any
creature that comes into contact with it, C but even to create a heavy stiff-
ness right through the net in the hands of the fishermen who touch the net.
Some who have made trial of this say that if one is beached, those who pour
water on it from above feel the painful sensation running along the hand and
dulling the sense of touch since the water is altered and modified. Since it has
an innate sense of this capacity, it never launches a frontal attack and never
endangers itself.268 Circling its prey, it sends forth its discharges like arrows,
first infecting the water and D then the victim through the water, which can
neither defend itself nor flee but is held fast as if by chains and is frozen stiff.
The so-called “fisherman,”269 well known to many, derives its name from
its behavior. Aristotle says that the cuttlefish employs the same trick.270 It
lets down from its neck, in the manner of a fish hook, a tentacle which has
the property of lengthening when released or of winding back up when the
fish draws it in. When it sees a small fish nearby, it allows it to bite the ten-
tacle and little by little it draws it back without the fish noticing, and it leads
it in, until the fish that has been snagged is within easy reach of its mouth.
E Pindar has made the octopus’ change of color271 well-known when he writes:
“In all the cities where you come to dwell,

Be minded like the sea beast’s skin,”272
And similarly Theognis:
“Take on a mind that, like the octopus,

Adopts the color of the rock it makes its perch.”273
44
Now, the chameleon does change colors, but not from any stratagem or at-
tempt to conceal itself, but rather out of fear because it is by nature timid and
lacking in courage. This process is accompanied by an abundance of air, as
Theophrastus says.274 Almost the entire body of the animal is made up of its
lungs, F which is proof that its body is air-laden,275 in consequence of which it
readily undergoes changes. Now, the color change of the octopus is intentional
and not the result of accident,276 for it changes color on purpose, employing
the device to elude what it fears and to catch its prey. It thereby catches the lat-
ter which cannot escape, and escapes the former which passes on by. The claim
that it devours its own tentacles is false,277 but the claim that it fears the moray
eel and the conger is true because it is ill-treated by them278 and cannot do
anything about it since they slip away. 979 At the same time, the crayfish easily
overmasters it when it gets caught in its grasp since its smoothness is no help
against its rough exterior. Yet if the octopus manages to thrust its tentacles in-
side, the crayfish perishes. Nature has devised this cycle and repetition of pur-
suit and escape from each other as a contest of shrewdness and intelligence.279
28. Well then, Aristotimus has told us about the hedgehog’s foreknowledge
of the winds,280 and he expressed admiration for the triangular formation
of cranes in flight.281 I can’t cite even one crane from Cyzicus or Byzan-
tium,282 but I know all the “sea-hedgehogs”283 that ballast themselves with
stones B when they sense that a storm and swollen sea are coming in order to
keep themselves from being turned upside down because of their lightness
or swept away when a wave develops, and to ensure that they stay firmly
in place because of the little stones.284 The alteration of the flight path of
cranes in opposition to the winds is not characteristic of just one species,
but all fishes are so minded and swim against wave and current, taking
care that, when a blast from the rear rushes at them, their scales do not get
folded back, thereby rendering the body bare and rough. For this reason,
they always maintain a prow-forward position, C since in that way they slice
through the water, which exerts pressure on their gills and, flowing smoothly
by, forces their rough skin down rather than pulling it up. As I said, this is
common to all fishes excepting the sturgeon. They say that this fish swims
against the wind and current and does not fear any roughening of its scales
because the overlaps do not face in the direction of the tail.
29. The tunny fish senses the equinox285 and the solstice so keenly that it teaches
men about these, and it needs no astronomical tables to do so, for wherever it
happens to be when the winter solstice overtakes it, it stands fast in that loca-
tion and remains there until the equinox. D But as to that clever stratagem of
the crane that grasps the stone so that it will be roused from sleep if the stone is
dropped,286 how much more clever is the trick of the dolphin, which
“May neither stop nor halt its forward course.”287
45
By nature it is in constant motion,288 and the cessation of its motion is also

the cessation of its life.289 When it needs sleep, it raises its body to the sur-
face of the sea and then lets itself sink, on its back, lulled by the rolling mo-
tion of the water as it hangs suspended, until it touches bottom. Awakened
by this, it hastens back up and, when on top of the water once again, it lets it-
self go again and is borne downward, devising thereby a sort of rest mingled
with movement.290 E They say that tunnies do the same thing for the same
reason. Since I have just finished an account of the tunny’s mathematical
foreknowledge of the reversal of the motion of the sun, to which Aristotle
bears witness,291 listen to an account of its understanding of arithmetic. But
first, let me tell you about its understanding of optics, of which Aeschylus
seems not to have been unaware, for he says somewhere:
“Left-glancing, like the tunny fish.”292
They do seem to have weak sight in the other eye. This is why, when they
enter the Black Sea, they hug the right side and, when they exit, they hug the
opposite side, always intentionally and sensibly entrusting their protection
to their stronger eye.293 F It seems that a knowledge of arithmetic is neces-
sary to their sociability and their mutual affection, and they have reached a
high level of mathematical knowledge:294 since they take delight in feeding
together and swimming together in schools, they always form their school
into a cube, solid on all sides and consisting of six equal planes. They then
swim in formation, guarding the square front and back. 980 In truth, the
lookout who tracks the tunnies, if he reckons up with exactness the number
of fish on the surface, immediately reports the entire count of the fish, since
he is aware that the depth is equal to the breadth and length.
30. Their tendency to herd together has given the bonito295 their name,
which I believe is true also of the pelamys.296 No one could cite the number
of other species of fish that are observed living together sociably in schools,
but let us rather turn our attention to creatures that display a unique type
of partnership and symbiosis. Among these is the pinna-g uard about which
Chrysippus spilled a huge quantity of ink,297 for it occupied a front seat in
every one of his writings, whether on physics or ethics. B He did not inquire
into the sponge-g uard, for he would not have left it unmentioned. Well then,
the pinna-g uard is a crab-like creature that lives with the pinna and sits in
front of its shell, keeping guard and allowing the shell to be open and gaping
wide until one of the little fishes that constitute its prey happens to fall in.
Then it nips the flesh of the pinna and goes inside it. The pinna then closes
its shell, and together they eat the prey that is ensnared within.
A little creature, not crablike but rather resembling a spider,298 is in con-
trol over the sponge. The sponge is neither lifeless nor without sensation nor
bloodless, clinging as it does to rocks as do many creatures, C but it has
46
a distinct sort of movement, inward on itself and outward, which needs a

kind of reminding and supervision. It is loose-textured and relaxed in the
pores because of its idleness and sluggishness. Whenever something edible
happens by, the guard gives a signal and the sponge closes about it and de-
vours it. Moreover, if a person comes along and touches it, it is informed by
the guard that scratches it. The sponge shudders, so to speak, and closes its
body by stiffening and contracting it, so that it is no easy task for fishermen
who want to cut it away from underneath.
The murex,299 grouping together like honey bees, make a comb in which
they are said to reproduce.300 They gather up D edible pieces of oyster-g reen
and seaweed that cling to shells and provide each other a kind of circular
feast in rotation, distributing food in order to one after the other.
31. How could anyone be the least bit surprised at the sociability of these crea-
tures when the most unsociable and savage of animals that rivers, lakes and
seas produce, the crocodile, shows itself to be amazingly inclined to partner-
ship and kind feeling in its association with the plover? The plover is a bird that
dwells in marshes and around rivers that guards the crocodile, not providing
its own food but feeding off the crocodile’s leavings. When it senses that E
the mongoose, while the crocodile sleeps, is plotting against it, smearing itself
with mud like an athlete covering itself with dust,301 it rouses the crocodile by
making noises and by pecking at it. The crocodile is so gentle toward the bird
that it opens its mouth wide and allows it inside. It is pleased that the plover
calmly picks out and removes with its bill the pieces of food that are caught in
its teeth. When the crocodile has had enough of this, it tips its snout up as a
signal and does not lower it until the plover takes note of this and flies away.302
F The so-called “guide”303 is a fish small in size and shaped lie the goby.
It is said to resemble a ruffled bird because of the roughness of its scales.
It always accompanies one of the great whales and swims in advance of it,
guiding its path so that it doesn’t run aground in the shallows or fall into
a lagoon or some strait that is difficult to exit.304 981 The whale follows it,
as a ship follows the tiller, altering course obediently. Anything else, be it
animal, ship or stone, that it engulfs in its gaping mouth is utterly destroyed
immediately and perishes, completely consumed. But the little fish that it
recognizes it takes into its mouth like an internal anchor. The fish sleeps
inside it while the whale lies motionless and is moored. When the fish comes
out again, the whale follows it and does not forsake it day or night. If it does,
the whale wanders about and goes astray, and many whales have perished
when beached, without a pilot, so to speak. We saw this ourselves not long
ago near Anticyra.305 B They say that, prior to that incident, when a whale
ran aground not far from Bouna306 and rotted, a plague occurred.
Well then, may we justly compare with these partnerships and compan-
ionships the friendships of foxes and snakes that Aristotle says exist because
of their mutual hostility toward the eagle,307 and those of bustards and
47
horses308 because the birds like to come near and pick over the dung? I do
not myself observe this same degree of care for one another even in bees or
ants, for although they all promote the common interest, there is no regard
or thought in any one of them for any other individual.
32. We will note this difference even more when we turn our attention C to
the oldest and greatest of social relations, namely, those of reproduction
and childbearing. First of all, fishes that live in a sea that lies beside lagoons
and that receives rivers, retreat to those when they are about to spawn, in
pursuit of the gentleness and calmness of the waters, since calm water is
ideal for spawning. In addition, lagoons and rivers are free of wild creatures
so that the offspring may be safe. This is why a great many fish spawn about
the Black Sea.309 It does not produce any large creature excepting a slight-
bodied seal and a small dolphin. Moreover, the mingling of rivers emptying
D into the Black Sea, which are very numerous and large, provides a gentle
and suitable mixture for fish giving birth.
The most amazing tale is told about the anthias,310 which Homer calls the
“sacred fish.”311 Some, however, take “sacred” in the sense of “great,” just as
they call the os sacrum312 the “great bone,” and they term the serious illness
epilepsy the “sacred disease.”313 Others understand “sacred” in the ordinary
sense, as “dedicated” or “hallowed.” Eratosthenes314 seems to be speaking
of the gilthead315 when he writes,
“Swift sacred fish with gold upon its brow.”316
Many suppose that the sturgeon is meant here, for it is rare and not easily
caught, though it appears often about Pamphylia.317 When they catch one,
the fishermen don wreathes and put wreathes on their boats, and when the
fishes sail by, the men receive them with shouts and clapping and hold them
in high honor.318 E But most people suppose that the anthias is the fish that
is called “sacred,” for wherever it is seen, there is no ferocious sea beast.
Sponge divers dive with confidence and fish spawn without fear, as if the
fish were a guarantor of their safety. The reason for this behavior is hard to
account for, whether the sea beasts flee the anthias as elephants flee a pig319
or lions flee a cock, or whether there are indications of places that have no
sea beasts, which the fish recognizes and keeps guard over, being intelligent
and possessing a good memory.
33. In truth, both parents look out for the welfare of their offspring. The
males do not eat the young, F but rather stand by guarding the eggs, as Ar-
istotle relates.320 Some males follow the females and sprinkle the eggs with
milt little by little. Otherwise the young do not grow but remain imperfect
and stunted. In particular, the wrasse constructs something like a nest from
seaweed and surrounds the spawn, sheltering it from the swell.
48
982 The love of the dogfish for its young is not inferior to that of any of the
tamest creatures in its kindliness and goodness of spirit. They give birth to the
egg and then they nourish and carry the offspring not outside but inside them-
selves, as if from a second birth.321 When they grow larger, they release them
and teach them to swim nearby. Then they take the young into themselves
through the mouth and allow their bodies to be used as a dwelling place, as a
place to feed, and as a refuge until the young can fend for themselves.322
B The care of the tortoise for the birthing and wellbeing of her offspring
is amazing. The mother comes out of the sea and gives birth near the water.
Since she is unable to incubate them or to remain on land for an extended
period, she drops the eggs onto the sand and heaps overtop of them the
softest of the sand. When she has covered them over and has hidden them
safely,323 some say that she scratches and marks the place, making it easy
for her to recognize, while others say that she leaves the unique markings
and impressions because she has been turned over by the male. What is still
more remarkable, she watches for the fortieth day324 C (the eggs are devel-
oped and hatched in that time period of time) and then approaches them,
each tortoise recognizing her own treasure, and she opens it more happily
and eagerly than a man does a chest of gold.
34. Crocodiles behave similarly in other respects, but their capacity to cal-
culate their location defies human understanding and reckoning. They say
in consequence that the animal’s foreknowledge is not a matter of reason
but of divination. Neither more nor less, but only so far as the Nile in flood
will overflow and cover the earth, just so far does the female go to deposit
her eggs,325 D with the result that a farmer who comes upon this scene may
take note and report to others how far the river will advance. She performs
this calculation so that she can sit on her eggs while wet herself without her
offspring getting wet. When the young abandon their shells, the mother rips
to pieces with her mouth and slays the one that, on emerging from the egg,
does not at once grab hold of whatever presents itself, be it a fly or a gnat or
an earthworm or a blade of straw or grass.326 She loves and tends to those
that are high-spirited and active, dispensing her affection by judgment free
from emotion, as the wisest of men consider correct.
Seals likewise give birth on dry land, and they little by little bring their
offspring forth to make trial of the sea, quickly bringing them back again. E
They do this many times in succession until the young are accustomed to it
and grow brave, enjoying sea life.327
Frogs employ a call at the time of their mating, producing the so-called
“wail,” a sound signaling attraction and mating.328 When the male has drawn
the female to him, they await the night together, for they cannot mate in the
water and they are afraid to do so on land during the day. When it turns
dark, they come forth and mate with pleasure. Otherwise when they make
their call they are awaiting rain.329 This is one of the most certain of signs.
49
35. But, dear Poseidon, what a ridiculous mistake I have almost made! F
While dwelling on seals and frogs, the sea creature that the gods love most,
the wisest of them all, has escaped my attention. What nightingales can
justly be compared with the halcyon330 in its love of song, what swallows
in its affection for its young, what doves in its love for its mate, or what
bees in its workmanship?331 Whose births and offspring and labor pangs
has the god more honored? They say that one single island was anchored
fast to welcome the delivery of Leto’s children.332 But they say that when
the halcyon is about to give birth around the time of the solstice, the god
makes the whole sea calm and waveless.333 983 Because of her, men will-
ingly sail for seven days and seven nights at the height of winter, reckoning
travel on sea to be safer than on land at this time. If I should be required
to speak briefly of every virtue that she has, she is so attached to her mate
that she sits with him not just on one occasion but throughout the year, and
she accepts his advances, not out of licentiousness, since she never mates
with another male, but rather out of affectionate regard and friendliness,
like a married woman.334 When the male grows weak from age and finds it
burdensome to keep up, she takes over, carrying him in his infirmity and
feeding him, B never deserting him or leaving him alone. She lifts him onto
her shoulders and carries him about everywhere, caring for him until the
end of his life.335
With regard to her affection for her offspring and her provisions for the
welfare of her young, when she senses that she is pregnant, she turns imme-
diately to the task of building her nest, not lumping together mud or fixing
the nest onto walls or roofs as swallows do, nor using many parts of her body
in the work, as the bee employs its body to enter and open the wax, its feet
all in contact at the same time to separate the entirety into hexagonal com-
partments. C But the halcyon, with just one simple tool to do her work, her
mouth, and nothing else to work along with her and to assist in construction,
what wonders she devises and fashions that one could scarcely believe unless
he beheld what she had fashioned by herself, or rather beheld her “ship-
building.” This alone of many designs cannot be capsized or submerged.
She collects the spines of the garfish and gathers up and binds them one to
the other,336 entwining with the straight ones those that are aslant, as if she
were pulling thread through the warp, introducing twists and bends of one
through the other, so that she forms a structure rather oblong in shape, like
D the fisherman’s basket. When she has finished it, she takes it and places it
at the water’s edge where the sea laps it gently and teaches her how to plug
it where it is not well fitted together and to fill it in where she sees that it has
been loosened by the blows. She binds it and tightens the joints so that the
whole cannot be undone or pierced even by stone or iron. No less astonish-
ing are the proportions and shape of the hollow cavity. It is so shaped as to
allow only her to enter in. The entrance is totally hidden and not observable
by others so that not even any seawater can penetrate inside. E I assume that
50
there is none among you who has not seen the nest. Since I have seen it often
and touched it,337 it occurs to me to recite or chant the verse:
“Once such a thing there by Apollo’s shrine”338
I beheld, the altar of horns, sung of as one of the so-called seven wonders,339
because it needs no glue nor any other sort of bond, being fastened and held
together solely with horns from the right side of the animals. May the god
be gracious …340 to a man who is beloved by the Muses and is an islander
when he sings of the siren of the sea, and may he laugh at the objections that
my detractors raise. Why … Apollo … Conger-slayer,341 since he knows that
Aphrodite, F who was born from the sea, reckons all [sea] creatures as sa-
cred to her and as her brethren, and that she derives no joy from the slaugh-
ter of any of them. You know that at Leptis,342 the priests of Poseidon do not
consume any sea creature at all, and that those initiated into the mysteries at
Eleusis worship the red mullet as sacred,343 and that the priestess of Hera at
Argos refrains from eating it out of respect. This is because the red mullet in
particular kills and devours the sea-hare344 which is lethal to humans. For
this reason, these animals have immunity, being considered friendly toward
man and a source of protection.
984 36. In truth, many Greeks have temples and altars dedicated to Arte-
mis, “Goddess of the Fishnet,”345 and to Apollo, “God of Dolphins.” The
place that the god made his chosen seat,346 … the inhabitants are descended
from Cretans who received divine guidance from a dolphin. The god did not
himself change form and swim before the fleet, as the tellers of tales relate,
but rather he sent a dolphin that guided the men and brought them to land
at Cirrha.347 They say also that Soteles348 and Dionysius, who were sent to
Sinope by Ptolemy Soter to escort Serapis back,349 were blown off course by
a strong wind around Malea when they had the Peloponnese on their right.
B Then, when they were lost and disheartened, a dolphin appeared at the
prow and, one might say, appealed to them to follow it, leading them then to
a safe haven with gentle swells where they might remain unharmed, until the
animal conducted and led them on and put the vessel safe on land at Cirrha.
After making sacrifice in thanksgiving for their safe voyage, they realized
that they needed to take down one of the two statues, that of Pluto, and to
make a cast of that of Persephone and to leave it behind.
It is understandable that the god would find the music-loving nature of
the dolphin pleasing.350 Pindar compares himself to this animal and says
that he is roused,
C “Like a dolphin on the sea,

That lovely music of the flute
Stirs up on waveless depths.”351
51
But it is even more likely that its love for man has rendered it dear to the gods,
for the dolphin is the only creature that loves man for his own sake.352 Among
land animals, some do not associate at all with human beings, while others,
the tamest, do so out of necessity because humans feed them, as the dog, the
horse and the elephant do with the humans with whom they dwell. Swallows
live inside houses to secure those things that they need, namely darkness and
a sufficient degree of safety, but they fear man as a wild beast. The dolphin
alone possesses by nature that which the best philosophers seek: friendship
without advantage. D Although it has no need of anything from any human
being, it is a kindly friend to all humans and has aided many. No one has not
heard the story of Arion, which is much talked about.353 You yourself, my
friend, conveniently reminded us of the story of Hesiod,354 but “you did not
reach the story’s end.”355 When you introduced the anecdote about the dog,
you should not have omitted the dolphins since the information that the dog
provided when it howled and attacked the murderers would have been unil-
luminating had not the dolphins taken up the corpse as it floated on the sea
near the temple of Nemean Zeus, one group eagerly receiving it from another
group and, putting it on land at Rhium, showing that he had been slain.356
E Myrtilus of Lesbos357 tells the story of Enalus of Aetolia who was in love
with the daughter of Smintheus. She was thrown into the sea by the Penthili-
dae on the order of the oracle of Amphitrite. When he leaped into the sea af-
ter her, he was carried safely to Lesbos by a dolphin.358 And the good will and
friendship of the dolphin toward the young man of Iasus seemed to amount
to love in light of its intensity. It swam and played with him by day and it
allowed him to come into close contact with its body. When he mounted
into it, it did not flee away but joyfully carried him, wandering wherever he
guided it. On one occasion, in the midst of heavy rain and pounding hail, the
youth fell off and drowned. F The dolphin took up the body and delivered it
and himself onto the land.359 It did not abandon the body until it had itself
died, thinking it just to have a share in the death for which it thought itself
responsible. The design on the coins of the people of Iasus is a memorial to
this calamity, a depiction of a youth carried by a dolphin.360
As a result of this, the stories about Coeranus, fabulous as they were,
gained an audience. 985 A Parian by birth, he bought in Byzantium a net-full
of dolphins that had become entangled in a net and were in danger of being
slaughtered, and he set them all free. A bit later, they say, he was sailing in a
penteconter that had fifty pirates on board. In the strait between Naxos and
Paros, the story goes, the ship capsized and the others perished, but it is said
that a dolphin slipped beneath him and raised him up.361 He was deposited
on shore at Sicinus, near a cave which is to this day pointed out and called
Coeraneum. It is said that Archilochus is referring to this in the verse:
“From fifty men the kind Poseidon

Left only Coeranus.”362
52
B Later, when he died, his relatives burned his body near the sea. A large
number of dolphins appeared along the shore, as if making it clear that they
had come for the funeral and staying until it was completed.363
Stesichorus364 relates that the shield of Odysseus had a dolphin as its de-
vice, and Critheus365 reports that the Zacynthians keep alive the memory of
why that is so. Telemachus, while a small child, fell into deep water near the
shore and was rescued by dolphins that took him onto their backs and swam
with him to land. For that reason, his father had a carving of a dolphin on
his signet ring and this same ornament on his shield, C as payback to the
animal.366
Well, after I promised you at the outset that I would not tell you any fa-
bles, I have somehow inadvertently, in the course of my dolphin tales, run
aground on Odysseus and Coeranus, and I impose this sentence on myself:
I shall stop talking at this point!
37. ARISTOTIMUS: Gentlemen of the jury, you may vote now.

SOCLARUS: We have for some while now agreed with Sophocles words:
“Well has the argument of two opposing sides

Come fixed together at the middle point,”367
for by putting together what you have stated in opposition to one another,
you will fight a good battle against those who deny reason and understand-
ing to animals.368
Commentary
1 On the Greek title of the treatise, see Introduction p. 1 and note 1.
The Greek title of the treatise hints at a solution that the work fails to
deliver, since ultimately no decision is rendered as to “whether land or
sea animals have more intelligence.” The adjectival form of the noun
ϕρόνησις (phronēsis) appears, in the title of the work, in the compar-
ative degree, ϕρονιμώτϵρα (phronimōtera) to refer to a type of intel-
lectual capacity possessed in a greater degree either by land-dwelling
or sea-dwelling animals. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1140a24–33,
defines phronēsis as a kind of practical wisdom that enables a human
being to deliberate successfully concerning his own welfare and advan-
tage toward the attainment of the good life. He acknowledges as well
(1141a26–28) that even some non-human animals may be said to pos-
sess phronēsis since they have a capacity for prudence concerning the
regulation of their own lives. Jean-Louis Labarrière, “De la Phrone-
sis Animale,” in Daniel Devereux and Pierre P ellegrin, eds., Biologie,
Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: Éditions du Centre Na-
tional de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990) 405–428, argues that Aristotle
is somewhat ambiguous in his use of the term phronēsis in the case of the
53
intellectual capacities of non-human animals, at times using the term

synonymously with the term sunesis, a sort of practical intelligence that
enables an animal to navigate successfully the necessities of its life. This
latter type of intellectual activity is closer to the meaning of sollertia
found in the Latin version of the title of Plutarch’s treatise, since that
term describes a kind of cleverness or resourcefulness or adroitness.
2 Autobulus, the interlocutor in On the Cleverness of Animals who de-
fends the position that all animals have a “share of thought and rea-
soning capacity” (960A), was the father of Plutarch. He refers (964D)
to Plutarch as his son and as the companion of Soclarus. On this iden-
tification of Autobulus, Robert Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2001) 9, notes charmingly, “Character-
istically, Plutarch’s father’s name is an item of information that Plutarch
neither reveals nor hides. By general agreement, we have it recorded in
the odd dialogue Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer,” in which
one interlocutor is “a sweet old man named Autobulus, who at one point
casually refers to ‘my son, dear Soclarus, your friend’ who teaches phi-
losophy in the tradition of Plato (964d). This son can hardly be anyone
but Plutarch.”
Soclarus, who advances the Stoic-inspired argument in the dialogue
that animals are devoid of reason, has been identified as a citizen of
Chaeronea, Plutarch’s hometown in Boeotia, and a close friend of
Plutarch who was granted Roman citizenship through the intervention
of Lucius Mestrius Soclarus.
The names of the remaining participants in the dialogue are intro-
duced at 965B–C, at the point where the discussion of the intellectual
capacities of non-human animals ends and the comparison of land- and
sea-dwelling creatures commences. The interlocutor Heracleon takes
part also in the Plutarchan dialogue De defectu oraculorum (On the De-
cline of Oracles). Concerning the remaining participants in On the Clev-
erness of Animals, Helmbold 318 note c, remarks, “Of the other speakers
in this dialogue, nothing is known except what may be inferred from the
present work.” On the question of the identity of the individuals who are
mentioned in the works of Plutarch, see Introduction note 5.
3 The Spartan elegiac poet Tyrtaeus (seventh century bce) was known
for composing rousing verses intended to inspire the Spartan armies to
valor in battle.
4 Leonidas was the king of Sparta (ca. 490–480 bce) who fell at Thermo-
pylae with 300 Spartan warriors in the war against the Persians.
5 The text is corrupt here. I follow the reading in Hubert (κακκονη̑ν).
Bouffartigue 67 note 2 discusses various readings that have been sug-
gested by scholars and translates the corrupt word as “ennoblir.”
6 The reference here to an “encomium on hunting,” the first of a sub-
stantial number of references to hunting in the treatise, has received
considerable scholarly attention. According to the so-called Lamprias
Catalogue of the works of Plutarch, he wrote a treatise entitled On
Hunting, now lost. Some scholars consider the reference here to be an
54
allusion to that lost work, although no indication of its authorship is

given in the present passage. Hubert Martin, “Plutarch’s De Sollertia
Animalium 959B–C: The Discussion of the Encomium on Hunting,”
American Journal of Philology 100 (1979) 99–106, discusses a number of
problems raised by the reference to the “encomium,” and he concludes
that a real work is intended, but not the now-lost treatise of Plutarch.
More recent scholarship on the “encomium” is surveyed in Bouffartigue
xxi–xxiv.
Hunting is a recurring theme in On the Cleverness of Animals, and
the practice is both favorably and unfavorably judged. In the present
passage, Autobulus expresses concern that young men will become fix-
ated on it to the exclusion of other pursuits, but at the same time he
admits that, despite his age, the reading of the encomium on hunting
inspired in him a desire to “chase the spotted deer.” The interlocutor
Soclarus, who throughout the dialogue advances the Stoic view on the
irrationality of non-human animals, opines (959C) that hunting illus-
trates the contrast between human skill and intellect and the unreason-
ing violence of other species. Later, the interlocutor Aristotimus makes
a similar observation (966A) that the opportunity that hunting provides
a person to match wits against cunning and swift animal adversaries
makes hunting a noble pursuit. In contrast, Autobulus, who had admit-
ted to a degree of excitement on hearing the encomium on hunting read
aloud, but who is the speaker who advances the position in the opening
seven chapters of the treatise that non-human animals have a share of
reason, laments (959D) that the savagery involved in hunting causes hu-
mans to become insensitive to the sufferings of animals and to feel no
disgust at blood and gore. He remarks similarly (965B) that hunting and
fishing are objectionable because they encourage men to amuse them-
selves by causing the suffering and death of animals, even separating the
young of animals from their mothers.
Inasmuch as the comments on the practice of hunting made in On the
Cleverness of Animals are put into the mouths of a number of interloc-
utors who advance positions that may not necessarily reflect the beliefs
of Plutarch, one may run the risk of over-reading the text to draw firm
conclusions on his position from their statements, but it is worth noting
that, since the first seven chapters of the treatise are devoted to a defense
of the position that all animals have at least a share of reason, it seems
justifiable to conclude that Plutarch would disapprove of a practice that
visited deliberate harm and suffering on other reasoning beings. Pietro
LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele, Fram-
menti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2015) 221, make this
point forcefully, “Una volta che si è dimostrato che è possibile parlare
di forme di intelligenza degli animali, sarà infatti quanto meno difficile
giustificare ogni forma di violenza su di essi.” Katarzyna Jazdzewska,
“Not an ‘Innocent Spectacle’: Hunting and Venationes in Plutarch’s De
sollertia animalium,” Ploutarchos N. S. 7 (2009/2010) 35–46, observes
that hunting is an important theme in the treatise, but that it is not
55
coherently treated: Autobulus opposes hunting but is conciliatory to

hunters. She argues that the answer to the apparent inconsistency of
the theme in the treatise lies in Soclarus’ designation of hunting as a
“spectacle” (959C) and in his description of the Roma arena, for he has
in mind the staged hunts (venationes) of the arena. It is these, she ar-
gues, that Autobulus condemns, and she cites in defense of her position
Plutarch, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (Precepts on Statecraft) 822C,
where he recommends that all state spectacles, including gladiatorial
shows, be removed that excite a taste for bloody and murderous actions.
On Plutarch’s attitudes on hunting, see also Stephen T. Newmyer, Ani-
mals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and
London: Routledge, 2006) 31–33 and 73.
7 Euripides, Hippolytus 218–219, slightly modified.
8 Long ago, Max Schuster, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De soll-
ertia animalium, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit
Plutarchs (Dissertation, Munich) (Augsburg: Himmer, 1917) argued
that De sollertia animalium was intended as a rhetorical school exer-
cise produced at a school that Plutarch conducted in his hometown of
Chaeronea. The rhetorical cast of the treatise, he argues, is traceable
in the technique of comparison between land- and sea-dwelling crea-
tures and in the fact that no conclusion is ultimately drawn as to which
type of creature is superior since the work was not intended as a seri-
ous scientific investigation (62). Similarly, Helmbold 312 remarks, “The
occasionally bantering tone may serve to indicate that we have before
us something of a school exercise from Plutarch’s own academy, with
perhaps the first draft of the second part composed by pupils.”
9 See note 3.
10 This fragment from the lost Aeolus of Euripides (fragment 27 Nauck) is
cited by Plutarch also at On Fortune 98D, in a slightly different form.
11 Plutarch, On Eating Meat 998A–B, makes this same argument that hu-
man beings, once they have developed a taste for the slaughter of other
animals, move easily into the slaughter of their fellow human beings
since such treatment of other species renders them insensitive to vio-
lence. He cites the same example in that passage of the increasing vio-
lence of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens as proof that one act to violence
makes the next that much easier to countenance. See Commentary to
On Eating Meat Treatise II notes 28–31.
12 Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 29, records that the first sacrifice of an an-
imal occurred when an ox, returning from the field, tasted a cake that
had been set out for sacrifice and a farmer in anger struck the animal
dead with an axe. Previously, Porphyry records, sacrifices had been re-
stricted to crops and human beings were vegetarian.
13 The play in which the phrase occurred is unknown (Nauck 782).
14 In both of Plutarch’s other animal-related treatises (Whether Beasts Are
Rational 991C–D and On Eating Meat 994A–B and 995C), human be-
ings are accused of eating animals not out of necessity, as other species
are compelled to do, but merely to add luxury and variety to their diet.
56
In all three treatises, the same term (ὄψον, opson “delicacy, relish”) is
used to designate the frivolous food choices that humans demand.
15 On Plutarch’s attitude toward Pythagoras and his teachings and his ref-
erences to Pythagoreanism in his animal-related treatises, see Introduc-
tion to On Eating Meat, pp. 129–130.
16 On the literary setting of the dialogue, see Introduction, p. 2 and
note 4.
17 This observation may be considered to be the “thesis” of the first seven
chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B), that all animals
“have a share of” reason. The dimensions of the rational capacities
of non- human species are explored in these “theoretical” chapters.
Plutarch’s approach in these chapters is to argue, largely in opposition
to the Stoic position, advanced in the dialogue by the interlocutor So-
clarus, that rationality in animal species is correctly viewed as a “more
or less” relationship rather than as an “all or nothing” relationship. The
placement of this “thesis” statement is noteworthy, coming as it does
immediately after Autobulus’ reference (959F) to Pythagoras’ attempts
to inspire humane feelings and compassion for other species in man-
kind, and shortly before Plutarch introduces the concept of interspecies
kinship (960E–F). Plutarch argues in the first seven chapters that, while
the Stoic contention that reason is of paramount importance may be
valid, their conclusion from this position that only human beings have
reason is ultimately indefensible, and, at the same time, that reason is
not after all the sole criterion for assessing the value of a living being.
The capacity for sensation, and indeed for suffering, must likewise be
taken into account, as Pythagoras contended. Having stated that all
creatures have a share of reason, Plutarch proceeds to demonstrate
how that circumstance proves that all living creatures are akin. He thus
mounts a twofold attack on the Stoic position on the intellectual and
moral inferiority of non-human animals by arguing both that other spe-
cies possess at least a modicum of reason and are therefore akin to their
human brethren, and that their capacity to suffer must be taken into
account in human–non-human relations. This latter contention finds
expression in the subsequent discussion of justice which is prominent in
the first seven chapters of the treatise. For an analysis of Plutarch’s case
for rationality in non-human species, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and
Reason, Chapter 2, “The Nature of the Beast: The Search for Animal
Rationality,” pp. 10–47. See also Introduction to On the Cleverness of
Animals, pp. 7–8 and note 21.
Plutarch’s case for the presence of reason in non-human species has
been criticized for a number of perceived shortcomings. In his early
study of Plutarch’s animal psychology, Adolf Dyroff, Die Tierpsycholo-
gie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia (Würzburg: Bonitas-Bauer, 1897) 56,
charged Plutarch with imprecision in his use of technical philosophical
vocabulary and with a less than perfect understanding of the subtleties
of the Stoic position on animal intellect which he attacks in the trea-
tise, so that he uses technical terms referring to various dimensions of
57
animal intellect interchangeably. Similarly, Plutarch has come under at-

tack for his heavy reliance on anecdote and anthropomorphization in
the development of his case for rationality in non-human species, and
for his consequent tendency to judge that actions and behaviors wit-
nessed in non-human animals that appear to resemble similar actions
and behaviors in human beings are evidence that non-human species
possess skills generally viewed as unique to human beings.
18 Such comments as these provide only the most general impression of
the literary setting of the dialogue and do not offer any proof that the
dialogue reflects a debate that actually took place. Bouffartigue xviii, in
his discussion of the setting of On the Cleverness of Animals, observes
justly, “La mise en scène du dialogue est des plus discrètes. Ni décor ni
mobilier ne sont évoqués … Il n’est pas sans importance, toutefois, que
le texte établisse une unite de lieu entre les événements de la veille (la lec-
ture publique d’un discours, un banquet et une amorce de discussion), et
la dialogue lui-même.”
19 Soclarus refers here to the Stoic theory of opposites set forth by Chry-
sippus (ca. 280–207 bce) in his treatise Πϵρὶ ϵ᾿ναντίων (Peri enantiōn, On
Opposites), according to which that which is rational in the universe
must be counterbalanced by that which is irrational, that which is im-
mortal by that which is mortal, and that which is indestructible by that
which is destructible. The fragments of Chrysippus’ treatise on oppo-
sites are found in SVF II. 172–180. Soclarus suggests here that rational
creatures, that is, human beings, must necessarily be balanced by irra-
tional creatures, that is, non-human animals.
20 Autobulus accepts Soclarus’ assertion that the rational is counterbal-
anced by the irrational, but he locates the irrational in those things
in nature that are devoid of soul. The Stoics did not deny that non-
human animals possess a soul. Therefore, non-human animals do not
constitute the irrational element of creation. On the Stoic theory of the
eight-part soul that all animals possess, see Introduction, pp. 4–5 and
note 15.
21 Aristotle, Politics 1253a9, states that nature does nothing in vain. The
Stoics adopted this idea in their own doctrine that the universe was the
work of Providence, and that nature did nothing in vain in fashioning it
(SVF II. 1140).
22 Plutarch’s use of the terms “akin” (οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion) and “alien”
(ἀλλότριον, allotrion) here indicate that he is alluding to the Stoic ethical
doctrine of οἰκϵίωσις (oikeiōsis), the sense of kinship, bonding or be-
longing that living creatures feel toward other living creatures. In Stoic
teaching, humans sense their kinship with other humans as non-human
animals sense their kinship toward other non-human animals, but hu-
mans do not sense this kinship toward non-human animals because
non-human animals are irrational. From birth, all living beings have
the capacity to sense what other beings are akin to them and with which
they can therefore safely associate while at the same time recognizing
those that are alien to them and are thus to be avoided. Kinship the-
ory became the cornerstone of Stoic ethical philosophy and the starting
58
point for their position that human beings cannot stand in any relation
of justice toward non-human animals because other species are not ra-
tional and are therefore not akin to humans, and his mention at this
point of the concept of kinship and alienation prepares the way for the
upcoming discussion of interspecies justice. On Stoic kinship theory,
see Introduction, pp. 5–7 and Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason,
pp. 20–26.
23 Autobulus argues here that, since all animals clearly know by nature
what things they must pursue and avoid as either beneficial or harmful to
their lives, they must have some innate reasoning capacity. The conclu-
sion, Autobulus implies, that naturally follows from that fact is that all
animals are in fact akin (oikeioi), contrary to the position of the Stoics.
24 It is noteworthy that Plutarch includes hope, fear and grief, concepts that
are now viewed as types of emotions, in his list of those capacities in
animals that follow upon the possession of sensory organs, since emo-
tional states were generally viewed in classical psychology to be impossi-
ble for non-human animals. In Aristotelian psychology, emotions (πάθη,
pathē) were considered to be phenomena that inspire persons to change
their opinions concerning their judgments, and that are accompanied by
pleasure and pain (Rhetoric 1378a20–22). According to Aristotle’s defi-
nition, fear is an emotion that arises from the impression that evil is at
hand. Fear would therefore lie outside the capacity of the non-human
animals because they could not make the judgment that danger is im-
minent. Further, Aristotle argued, Politics 1253a10–18, that non-human
animals do not have a sense (αἴσθησις, aisthēsis) of good or bad or right
or wrong so that certain emotions that depend upon the recognition of
such normative concepts would be impossible for non-human animals.
Similarly in Stoic theory, a rational element was presupposed in Stoic
psychology. According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers
VII. 110–114, the Stoic Zeno held that every emotion entailed a contrac-
tion or motion of the soul that followed on a judgment (κρίσις, krisis) that
some proposition is true. Fear is the emotion that follows a judgment that
danger is near. Non-human animals, in Stoic theory, are irrational and
can therefore not evaluate their experiences or experience emotions in
response to them.
Plutarch’s case for emotional states in non-human species, as it ap-
pears subsequently in the argument of On the Cleverness of Animals,
depends heavily upon anecdote, anthropomorphization and analogy
with emotional states in human beings. It is upon these same sorts of
arguments that the case for emotions in non-human species is based
in current cognitive ethological thought and in the polemic of animal
rights philosophers, and this approach is still attacked as unsound. For
a discussion of Plutarch’s views on emotions in non-human animals and
on the current state of debate on emotions in non-human animals, pro
and con, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human in Ancient
and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and
New York: Routledge, 2017), Chapter 7, “Animal Affect: ‘Man Alone of
Animals’ Emotional?” pp. 121–133, with bibliography.
59
25 Straton of Lampsacus (ca. 340–269 bce), whom Plutarch terms here a

“natural philosopher” (ϕυσικός, phusikos), was head of the Peripatetic
school of philosophy following Theophrastus. In his brief life of Stra-
ton, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers V. 59–60, lists works by
him on natural phenomena, on logic and on ethical topics.
26 This verse is cited as well by Plutarch at On Fortune 98C and at On the
Fortune of Alexander 336B, where he attributed it to the comic play-
wright Epicharmus (530–440 bce). Porphyry, On Abstinence I. 4, cites
the first half of the verse, without attribution.
27 Cleomenes III was king of Sparta (235–222 bce). He is the subject of a
biography by Plutarch.
28 Plutarch again alludes to the Stoic ethical theory of oikeiōsis here, men-
tioning the capacity in all animals to recognize from birth that which is
akin and that which is alien to them. Autobulus’ question is ironically
intended, for no animal loses this capacity because every animals is en-
dowed with a degree of intellect.
29 Aristotle, Physics 199a22–26, maintains, in contrast to Plutarch’s state-
ment here, that the activities of non-human animals are not the result of
technological skill, forethought or planning.
30 The Stoics are meant here. Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions 1038B,
employs the same verb ἀποκναίϵι (apoknaiei, “wears out, wearies”) that
he employs here, to complain that the Stoic Chrysippus, in every one of
his works, tires the reader with constant reminders of the natural affin-
ity that humans have toward each other, a reference to Stoic oikeiōsis
theory.
31 Helmbold 331 note c, observes, “Introductions” or “Elementary Trea-
tises” were “titles used by Chrysippus …”
32 On Plutarch’s disparaging references to Stoic technical terms, see Intro-
duction, p. 4 and note 13.
33 Bouffartigue 72 note 34, observes of this last definition, “Plutarque est
le seul à transmettre cette definition de la mémoire …”
34 Plutarch repeats this characterization of the Stoic understanding of the
emotions (πάθη, pathē) in his treatise Moral Virtue 441C, where he states
that they claim that emotions are intemperate reason arising from evil
and mistaken judgments that have been allowed to gain strength. Later
in that same treatise (447A), his characterization of their view is close
to that given in the present passage, in that he states that they hold that
desire, anger and fear are merely perverse judgments. See note 24. For a
detailed and subtle analysis of Stoic doctrine on the emotions, see Mar-
garet R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007).
35 The question of the emotional capacities of non-human animals re-
mains a topic of intense debate among ethologists and philosophers.
Neuroscientist Marc D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really
Think (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), who is willing to attribute anger
and fear to some non-human species, draws the line at what he terms
“normative emotions” (213), those that require an observer to make
60
moral judgments about a situation. He writes (224) of the capacity for

such emotions in non-human animals, “[My] hunch is that they lack the
moral emotions or moral senses. They lack the capacity for empathy,
sympathy, shame, guilt, and loyalty.” In contrast, biologist Marc Bek-
off, The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal Emotions
(New York: Discovery Books, 2000) 24, who contends that some non-
human species experience a broad range of emotional states, including
love, joy, shame and grief, bases his position on the analogous brain
structures that humans and non-human species share and on the pres-
ence of identical neurochemicals across species that are involved in the
production of emotions in human beings. This leads him to conclude
that non-human animals do share some of the emotional states that hu-
mans experience.
Bekoff’s position, like that of Plutarch, has come under attack
from scientists and philosophers as relying on anecdote and an-
thropomorphization. Bekoff argues, however, that these tools,
when added to rigorous biological observation, are valid. Unabash-
edly anecdotal and anthropomophizing in its approach is Jeffrey
Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep:
The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995), a
work that at times sounds quite Plutarchan in its enthusiastic retailing
of amazing and touching anecdotes that are taken to illustrate a range
of emotional states in non-human species. Ecologist Carl Safina, Be-
yond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt,
2015) 29, observes on the current state of the acrimonious debate on
animal emotions “Simply deciding that other animals can’t have any
emotions that humans feel is a cheap way to get a monopoly on all the
world’s feelings and motivations. People who’ve systematically watched
or known animals realize the absurdity of this. But many still don’t.”
36 Plutarch’s observation that the Stoics punish their dogs to instill in them
the sort of pain which, when experienced by human beings, is termed
“repentance” (μϵτάνοια, metanoia) illustrates a characteristic charge
that he makes when attacking the Stoics: their positions, he likes to
point out, are marked by glaring self-contradictions. In the present in-
stance, Plutarch charges that the Stoics, inadvertently and in contra-
diction to their position on non-human animals, attribute to them both
rational and emotional dimensions, for the punishment assumes that
the animals can reflect upon its purpose, and that, at the same time, they
can experience such emotional states as fear or anguish which the pun-
ishment would arouse. Plutarch devoted an entire treatise, De Stoicorum
repugnantiis (Stoic Self-Contradictions) to what he views as a character-
istic failing of the Stoics.
37 In his life of the Stoic Zeno, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers
VII. 114, gives the Stoic definition of “pleasure” (ἡδονή, hēdonē) as an
irrational elation in the presence of that which seems to be worth choos-
ing. The pleasure that entices through the ears is called “enchantment”
(κήλησις, kēlēsis). Stobaeus, Eclogae II. 9, 20 (=SVF III. 402) says that,
61
according to the Stoic definition, pleasure that enters through the eyes
by means of cunning or trickery is called γοητϵία (goēteia). Plutarch’s
wording here is so close to the Stoic formulation of these definitions that
it is clear that he has the Stoics in mind.
38 Aelian, Nature of Animals XII. 44, recounts that Libyan mares are cap-
tivated by music and dance about to the sound of pipes, following the
herdsman while he plays and halting when he halts. If he plays with
greater intensity, the mares weep tears of delight.
39 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 31, observes that crabs take so much de-
light in flute music that they not only emerge from their holes, but even
leave the sea under the influence of the music.
40 In Aelian’s discussion of the musical tastes of horned owls (Nature of
Animals XV. 28), he not only corroborates Plutarch’s claim that they are
caught by musicians, but he adds that dancers who thus hunt the owls
have named a dance after the animals, and that the owls are delighted
to know that humans imitate them!
41 Helmbold 335 note c, observes of Plutarch’s repeated use here of the
phrase “as it were,” “A favourite expression of Aristotle’s; but it is the
Stoics who are being reproved here …” The Stoics maintained that,
while non-human animals are irrational, they have faculties which are
analogous to the rational faculty in human beings, so that what appear
in non-human animals to be instances of a certain intellectual or emo-
tional activity are merely “as it were” that activity. Seneca, On Anger
I. 3. 6, for example, observes that animals lack emotions, but do have
certain impulses similar to those emotions (muta animalia humanis af-
fectibus carent, habent autem similes quosdam impulsus). With regard to
analogous intellectual activity, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II. 29,
states that man has mind, while in beasts, there is something similar to
mind (in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis). Plutarch’s se-
ries of “as it were” assertions, satirically intended, become increasingly
exaggerated culminating in the notion that, if one were to follow the
Stoic position to its conclusion, one could claim that animals were not
really alive at all.
42 In Stoic teaching, the presence of reason is a precondition for the growth
of virtue, so that, in their view, children, while still irrational, cannot be
viewed as possessing either virtue or vice, but once they attain to ra-
tionality, they may be considered to demonstrate one or the other (SVF
III. 537). In Plutarch’s view, non-human animals are naturally disposed
to virtuous behavior. At Whether Beasts Are Rational 987B, Plutarch’s
talking pig Gryllus argues, in opposition to Soclarus’ position here, that
non-human animals have a greater natural propensity toward the pro-
duction and perfection of virtue than do human beings, without need
for instruction or provocation. Aelian, in the Preface to Nature of Ani-
mals, observes that it is a remarkable fact that, while human beings are
blessed with reason and speech, other animals have by nature a share
of virtue as well as of many human excellences. On the virtues of non-
human animals, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 36–39.
62
43 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 495C, takes up the subject of the re-
lation between love of offspring and the birth of justice, giving there a
somewhat less generous reading of the capacity for justice in non-human
animals, which he there calls “irrational” (ἄλογα, aloga), than that which
he here puts into the mouth of Autobulus. In the case of non-human
species, the love of offspring exists in an imperfect and inadequate state
that cannot lead to a true sense of justice. Autobulus, on the other hand,
places no such strictures on the sense of justice in non-human species,
and he is arguing for the presence of reason in other species, which is
denied in the passage in On the Love of Offspring. Some scholars have
taken this apparent contradiction as an indication that, when he wrote
On the Love of Offspring, Plutarch was under the influence of Stoic
thought, while other scholars have argued that no real contradiction
exists. Francesco Becchi, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità degli Animali,”
Prometheus 26 (2000) 212–215, suggests that Plutarch downplays the in-
tellectual endowments of non-human animals only to contrast the nat-
ural and untainted actions of non-humans with the decadent actions of
humans who circumvent their superior intellectual endowments. As in
On the Cleverness of Animals, Becchi concludes, Plutarch is arguing that
all animals have some degree of intellectual activity. On apparent con-
tradictions in Plutarch’s stance on animal rationality, see Introduction,
pp. 7–8 and note 22.
44 Plutarch is again arguing that all animals have a share of reason and
have therefore at least some inclination toward virtue, however imper-
fect it may be. Certain classes of living beings, be they human or non-
human, do not by nature possess perfect reason, nor can they therefore
exhibit perfect virtue, but this does not mean that they possess no rea-
son at all. In non-human animals, as in slaves, reason is imperfect but
nevertheless present. Slaves and non-human animals share this imper-
fect reason and imperfect virtue, inasmuch as they are two classes of
beings not designed by nature to exhibit the perfection of reason. Nev-
ertheless, human beings have the possibility of perfecting their innate
reason through what Autobulus calls “care and education” (962C), an
option that does not lie open to non-human animals.
45 In Whether Beasts Are Rational 992C–D, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryl-
lus, arguing as Autobulus has that non-human animals have a share of
reason, maintains that such vices as stupidity and slothfulness in some
animals species are in themselves proof of reason, for they are manifes-
tations of imperfect reason.
46 Plutarch refers sarcastically to the Stoic notion of the inaccessibility of
true wisdom. Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048E, notes that the
Stoic Chrysippus said that neither he himself nor any of his acquaint-
ances or relatives was a good person, not to mention the remainder of
mankind, who are madmen and fools. Cicero, On the Ends of Good and
Evil IV. 21, states that, in the view of the Stoics, all vices and sins are
equal, and all who have made progress toward virtue but have not yet
attained to it, are miserable and equal to the wickedest of mankind.
63
47 Plutarch cites the example of gradations in physiological capacities be-

tween animal species to support his overall thesis that the intellectual
capacities of non-human animals exist in a more-or-less relation, rather
than in an all-or-nothing relation.
48 Autobulus alludes to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis, which held that
every creature has an innate knowledge of what things it must pur-
sue and what it must avoid to ensure the successful conduct of its life.
Seneca, Moral Letters CXXI. 6, holds that non-human animals know
by nature how to manage their lives, for “they come into being with
this knowledge: they are born fully-trained” (cum hac scientia prodeunt.
instituta nascuntur). Autobulus, in contrast to Seneca and the Stoics,
argues that this knowledge is bolstered by a degree of reason. On Stoic
oikeiōsis theory, see notes 22–23.
49 Although Plutarch’s animal treatises are replete with examples of ani-
mal “virtues” of the sort that Autobulus singles out here, the “vices” of
non-human species are scarcely mentioned and not illustrated beyond
the merest hint. See note 45.
50 On the possibility that the dialogue is intended as a rhetorical exercise
in a school that Plutarch conducted, see note 8.
51 Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 23, reports this filial devotion among
storks, and in his account of the less than devoted behavior of the hip-
popotamus toward its father, Nature of Animals III. 19, he reports that it
is the most impious of animals, for it eats its parent.
52 Aristotle, History of Animals 613b24–29, says that male partridges
destroy the eggs because the males are ill-behaved and mischievous.
Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 16, includes the sexual motive for the
male’s behavior that Plutarch mentions.
53 The reference is probably to the Stoic philosopher Antipater of Tar-
sus (second century bce), who is believed to have written a book about
animals.
54 The term that Plutarch employs here for “urine,” λυγγούριον (lungourion),
means the urine of lynxes. The term was sometimes used of amber be-
cause of the belief that lynx urine would harden into a yellowish stone.
Pliny, Natural History VIII. 137, speaks at length of this notion, observ-
ing that lynx urine dries into a flame-colored solid, which some say is
how amber is formed. The lynx, he notes in agreement with Plutarch’s
account here, covers is urine to hasten the process of solidification.
Aelian, Nature of Animals IV. 17, corroborating this account, adds that
the urine, once solidified, is used for engravings. Pliny, Natural His-
tory X. 92, gives the same account of the bowel habits of swallows that
Plutarch gives.
55 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus employs this same image, asking, Whether
Beasts are Rational 992C–D, why we do not say that one tree is less en-
dowed with understanding than another.
56 Soclarus denies that non-human animals can approach human beings
in their capacity to participate in two aspects of life that were essen-
tial to Stoic ethics, namely justice and social life. The Stoic position on
64
the impossibility of a relationship of justice between human beings and

non-human animals is treated at some length below (963F–965A). In
Whether Beasts Are Rational, the talking pig Gryllus, who had main-
tained that non-human animals possess the cardinal virtues of wisdom,
prudence, courage and justice, was about to take up the topic of jus-
tice when the treatise breaks off (999A). For a detailed discussion of
Plutarch’s position on the topic of justice between the species, see Ste-
phen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient In-
sights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54 and Animals,
Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just Beasts: Animal Morality and Hu-
man Justice,” pp. 48–65.
Soclarus likewise denies that non-human animals can approach hu-
mankind in the matter of “sociability” (κοινωνία, koinōnia). The notion
that human beings participate naturally in a kind of social union with
other humans may be viewed as an aspect of Stoic oikeiōsis theory, ac-
cording to which human beings from birth sense a kinship with other
humans that in time leads to social union and civilized society. Cicero,
On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 65, argues that the fact that no one
would wish to live alone in the desert, even if surrounded by pleasures,
proves that humans are “born for society and intermingling and for a
natural union with our fellowman” (intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem
congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos).
In the subsequent discussion, Plutarch provides numerous anecdotal ex-
amples of “sociability” in non-human animals (966B, 972B, 972C, 977C,
979F, 980D).
57 Most ancient writers were willing to acknowledge the obvious fact that,
however much the intellectual endowments of human beings may sur-
pass those of other animal species, non-human animals have a natural
anatomical advantage over humans in their possession of claws, fangs,
fur, beaks and other defensive tools. Pliny, Natural History VII. 2–3,
gives an affecting account of how man is cast forth into the world by
nature, rather like a cruel stepmother, naked and helpless, with none
of the defensive features provided by nature to other of her offspring,
so that man alone of animals must acquire everything necessary to life
from outside of himself. Aristotle, Parts of Animals 687a23–687b2, puts
an interesting spin on the fact of man’s shortcomings by arguing that
only man can change his weaponry at will, making him therefore far
more versatile than are other animal species. For a discussion of ancient
views on the anatomical superiority of non-human animals and of some
texts which maintain in contrast that humans are in fact naturally an-
atomically superior to other species, see Newmyer, The Animal and the
Human, Chapter 3, “‘Man Alone of Animals’: Three Classic Ancient
Texts,” pp. 23–43 and Chapter 6, “Body Image and the Rise of Civiliza-
tion,” pp. 107–120.
58 Seneca, De beneficiis (On Benefits) II. 29. 1–2, observes that human be-
ings are never satisfied with the gifts that the gods have bestowed upon
them, but complain that they do not have the bulk of the elephant or the
65
speed of the stag or the lightness of the bird, and they are even imperti-
nent enough to complain that the gods have not made them their equal.
59 In line with his thesis (960A) that all animals possess a share of reason,
Plutarch maintains here that all reason exists in all animal species in a
“more or less” relation, rather than in an “all or nothing” relation, in the
same manner that one species has the advantage over others in matters
of strength or size. See note 17.
60 The adjectives that Autobulus chooses to describe the young men who
will debate the relative excellences of land-dwelling versus sea-dwelling
creatures, ϕιλόλογοι (philologoi), “loving learning, loving argumenta-
tion,” and ϕιλογράμματοι (philogrammatoi), “loving books,” both sug-
gest an appreciation of their subject that is derived from handbooks
rather than from first-hand study and eyewitness familiarity with the
information that they relate, and lend support to the position that the
dialogue has the flavor of a school exercise. See note 8.
61 Plutarch provides examples of instances of clever behavior of non-
human animals in the Roman arena at 968C and E. On the thematic
function of the Roman arena in Whether Beasts Are Rational, see note 6.
62 Aristotle, History of Animals 535b1–3, states that animals that have no
tongue or a tongue that cannot move freely “do not speak articulately”
(οὐ διαλέγϵται, ou dialegetai). Apparently Aristotle would have disa-
greed with Autobulus. On ancient views on the vocalizations of non-
human animals, see Andrea Tabarroni, “On Articulation and Animal
Language in Ancient Linguistic Theory,” Versus 50–51 (1988) 103–121,
Maria Fusco, “Il Linguaggio degli Animali nel Pensiero Antico,” Studi
Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44, and Thorsten Fögen, “Animal Communica-
tion,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of An-
imals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014) 216–232.
63 The term that Plutarch uses here for “mad” (λυττώσαις, luttōsais) is a
participle derived from the noun λύττα or λύσσα, the Greek term used
for rabies. Pliny, Natural History XXIX. 100, explains that there is a
small worm on the tongue of dogs which is called lytta in Greek, and
that if it is removed when dogs are still puppies, dogs will not go mad.
64 Bouffartigue 78 note 70, maintains that Plutarch has in mind here the
excitability of horses and the distraction caused in cattle by the bite of
the gadfly.
65 I supply the words in brackets because the verb has no expressed subject.
66 Plutarch regards the mental disarrangement observable in cases of ra-
bies to be indications of disturbance of the rational faculty of an animal,
and not of the action of pathogens. In any case, his description of the
behavior of a rabid dog is accurate.
67 Plutarch once again attacks the Stoics here.
68 Cicero, On Duties I. 50, sets forth the Stoic position on the connection
between reason and justice, explaining that, in their view, “in no respect
are we human beings further from the nature of beasts, in which we
often say that there is courage, as in horses and lions, but we do not say
66
that there is in them justice, fairness or goodness; for they are devoid
of reason and speech” (neque ulla re longius absumus natura ferarum,
in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iusti-
tiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis
expertes). This denial of a relationship of justice between the species
arises from the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis: since non-human species are
irrational, in Stoic teaching, they have no kinship with rational beings,
that is, with human beings. Human beings stand in no ethical relation
with other species, in consequence of which humans may use them as
they wish. Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 67, notes that the
Stoic Chrysippus held that “humans have no bond of right with the
beasts” (homini nihil iuris cum bestiis). Consequently, Chrysippus con-
cluded, “humans may use animals to serve their needs without injus-
tice” (bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem possint sine iniuria).
Cicero’s connection of reason and language in On Duties is significant
since it was important that participants in a relationship of justice be
able to verbalize an understanding of morality and to assert their desire
to be included in a relationship of justice, which was impossible for irra-
tional animals that have no meaningful language.
In On Eating Meat 994E, Plutarch attempts to refute both the Stoic
charge that non-human animals have no meaningful language and that
human beings cannot stand in a relation of justice with non-human ani-
mals. He there depicts an animal at the point of slaughter pleading with
its slayers to take its life only out of necessity and not out of a desire for
a more elaborate meal. Human beings assume incorrectly that the utter-
ances of the animal are “inarticulate” (anarthrous) and not the pleas for
justice (dikaiologias) that they in fact are. Human beings, in Plutarch’s
view, must include non-human animals in a covenant of justice if they
have some understanding of the meaning of justice and some ability to
articulate that understanding. For detailed discussion of this passage
and bibliography on the philosophical issues raised in it, see Commen-
tary to On Eating Meat Treatise I notes 24–28.
69 On the exclusively carnivorous diet of the Nomads and Troglodytes, see
On Eating Meat Treatise I note 8. Strabo, Geography XVI. 4. 17, states
that the diet of the Troglodytes consisted of meat and bones chopped up
and baked in skins. They drank a mixture of blood and milk.
70 Soclarus recognizes that all human activities that involve interac-
tion with other species, whether those activities involve encounters
with other animals in farming, hunting, fishing or eating, necessarily
have moral implications for human beings. He immediately after this
acknowledgment posits a dilemma that arises for human beings who
contemplate the notion of justice toward other species: either we admit
that non-human animals are to be included in a covenant of justice with
human beings, in which case the concept of justice founders, or we must
forego the advantages of civilized life. The stringent position that the
Stoics adopted with regard to including other animals in a covenant
of justice with humans may be viewed in part as a consequence of the
67
realities of preindustrial life: human beings could not live comfortably

without heavy dependence on other animals for labor and food. Their
doctrine of oikeiōsis relieved the Stoics of the need to feel guilt at the use
of non-human animals to serve their needs, a doctrine to which Soclarus
alludes in his assertion of the undesirability of regarding other species
as “possessed of reason and akin to us” (λογικοι̑ ς καὶ ὁμοϕύλοις, logikoîs
kai homophulois). In his life of the Stoic Zeno, Diogenes Laertius noted
(VII. 129) that the Stoics held that there could be no question of justice
between human beings and other animals because of their “unlikeness”
(ἀνομοιότητα, anomoiotēta). For Cicero’s formulation of this idea, see
note 68.
71 Hesiod, Works and Days 277–279. This passage constitutes the earliest
surviving Greek text that draws an ethical distinction between humans
and other animals. While Hesiod’s verses are appropriately cited by So-
clarus to back up his assertion that non-human animals cannot have a
conception of justice, it is interesting to note that Hesiod makes a point
of stating that the god gave justice to human beings, in the manner of
a gift, so that one may assume that before receiving this gift, human
beings were in no respect superior to other animals, and that their eleva-
tion to a station of moral superiority was not due to any commendable
action on their part.
72 Citing this passage, Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals:
The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993) 119–120, observes, “The Greeks also discussed whether animals
themselves exercised justice or had a sense of it … The only case I have
noticed of such an argument is one attributed to the Stoics and Peripa-
tetics (i.e., Aristotelians), that there can be no such thing as wronging
those who do not exercise justice (dikaiopragein) toward us. The point
here is more one about the lack of reciprocity than about the lack of
a sense of justice.” In his course of his classification of the divisions
of justice, Aristotle includes reciprocal justice (τὸ ἀντιπϵπονθός, to an-
tipeponthos, Nicomachean Ethics 1132b21), the sort of justice that deals
with requiting offenses with equal offenses, although he was speaking
solely of human justice. Contrary to Sorabji’s assertion, Plutarch in fact
provides more than one anecdotal example in non-human animals of
the sort of reciprocal justice that Aristotle defines (On the Cleverness of
Animals 968E, 970B–C, 984F). Modern ethological research has shown
that some species do demonstrate examples of reciprocity, whether it be
positively viewed as altruism or negatively as revenge. Frans deWaal,
Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other
Animals (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press,
1996) and The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society
(New York: Harmony Books, 2009) 173–182, provides examples of ap-
parent acts of reciprocal justice in the animal kingdom, in which non-
human animals settle scores for hurts that they have suffered from their
peers, or share food when food has been provided for them on previous
occasions.
68
73 Euripides, Ino fragment 412, 3 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta

Kannicht.
74 Autobulus refers to the Epicurean doctrine of the παρέγκλισις (parenkli-
sis), or “swerve” of the atom. Although there is no detailed discussion
of the concept in the surviving fragments of the works of Epicurus, the
concept is discussed in detail in Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II.
216–293. According to Lucretius, atoms, which normally fall in straight
paths, diverge from those paths and collide as a result of this swerve
(Latin, clinamen). If this random action did not occur, there would be no
creation. The Epicurean school used the concept of the swerve as well to
argue for free will, to which Plutarch alludes here, for the randomness of
the occurrences of the swerve removes the possibility of determinism in
the universe. The concept is explained at length also in Cicero, On The
Ends of Good and Evil I. 18–20. Plutarch was not well-disposed to Epicu-
reanism, and Epicurean doctrines come under attack rather frequently in
his works. A number of treatises that he devoted to attacks on the school
are lost, but three survive: Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes), an attack
on a work written by Colotes, a pupil of Epicurus; Non posse suaviter
vivi secundum Epicurum (Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible), an
attack on the central Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the goal of life;
and An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum (Is “Live Unknown” a Wise
Precept?), an attack on the Epicurean notion that one should avoid ce-
lebrity. For a helpful discussion of Plutarch’s views on Epicureanism, see
Eleni Kechagia-Ovseiko, “Plutarch and Epicureanism,” in Mark Beck,
ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 104–120.
75 That is, they should refrain from asserting that non-human animals are
irrational.
76 At this point, Autobulus undertakes a refutation of the dilemma posed
by Soclarus (964B) that, if human beings accord justice to non-human
animals, either the very concept of justice will be confounded or human
life will become impossible.
77 Autobulus refers to Plutarch himself. See note 2.
78 Empedocles charges (DK31 B128 = Inwood 122) that human beings
committed the greatest abomination when they ripped out the life from
animals and devoured their limbs, and he laments (DK31 B139 = In-
wood 124) that he did not die before tearing animals apart for food. Ar-
istotle, Rhetoric 1373b14–16, notes that Empedocles had held that, with
regard to that which has life, it is not just for any person to take that life.
Plutarch speaks approvingly of Empedocles’ stance on abstention at On
Eating Animals 997E. In Plutarch’s treatise Banquet of the Seven Sages,
the interlocutor Solon laments (159B–C) that nature has made it impos-
sible for humans to live free of injustice because they must sustain their
own live by taking the lives of other living creatures, whether plant or
animal. On Solon’s observation, see On Eating Meat Treatise II note 8.
Plutarch seems to mention Heraclitus in the present passage not as an
authority on the notion that humans and non-human animals stand in a
relation of justice toward each other, but rather for his idea (DK22 B80)
69
that strife and necessity produce everything in life, an idea to which Au-
tobulus refers. Empedocles likewise stresses the operation of necessity
(ἀνάγκη, anankē) in the universe (DK31 B115 = Inwood 11).
79 In his biography of Pythagoras, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philos-
ophers VIII. 3, reports that Pythagoras enjoined human beings to go to
war against lawlessness, never harming or killing a plant that is harm-
less or an animal that does not injure humans. Similarly Porphyry, On
Abstinence II. 22, quoting from the text of Theophrastus’ treatise De pi-
etate (On Piety), states that it is acceptable to slay all irrational animals
that are “by nature unjust” (ἄδικα τὴν ϕύσιν, adika tēn physin) while it is
unjust to eradicate those animals that are not impelled by their nature
to do harm, for humans have no relation of justice with animals that
are harmful and that do wrong by their nature but only with animals
that do not exhibit such a malevolent nature. The position articulated
here is set forth with particular forcefulness in the ethical fragments
of Democritus (ca. 470–ca. 370 bce) who maintained (DK68 B257–258)
that a human being who kills unjust animals that desire to do harm are
blameless, and that one should by all means kill such animals because
one receives thereby a greater share of justice in every society.
80 These verses, from the lost Prometheus Unbound of Aeschylus (Tragi-
corum Graecorum Fragmenta 189a Radt), are cited by Plutarch also at
On Fortune 98C but are otherwise unknown.
81 Autobulus’ list of behaviors that he considers objectionable anticipates
the motto of the animal rights organization PETA (People for the Ethi-
cal Treatment of Animals), “Animals are not ours to experiment on, eat,
wear, use for amusement, or abuse in any way.” It is noteworthy that Au-
tobulus here expresses in passing a negative view of hunting, although
the pursuit is at times more sympathetically viewed in the treatise. See
note 6 for a discussion of the motif of hunting in On the Cleverness of
Animals.
82 At On Eating Meat 994B, Plutarch makes a similar point about human
food choices: we do not eat dangerous animals against which we must
defend ourselves, but rather those that are harmless and tame and are
devoid of natural defenses against us. See On Eating Meat Treatise I
note 19.
83 Bion of Borysthenes (ca. 335–ca. 245 bce) is most often associated with
the Cynics, and is considered the inventor of the diatribe, a popular
philosophical form of a satirical nature that mocked human failings in
a lighthearted manner. Helmbold 354 note a, comments on Plutarch’s
mention of Bion here, “Bion and Xenocrates were almost alone among
the Greeks in expressing pity for animals.” He seems to forget Plutarch
himself. Acts of deliberate, wanton cruelty toward non-human animals
are not common in ancient accounts of human–non-human interactions.
An instance of such an act is recounted by Plutarch, On Eating Meat
996A–B, where an Athenian is punished for flaying a living ram.
84 See note 81. With Autobulus’ charge that hunters and fisherman enjoy
the suffering of their prey, compare the observation of Matt Cartmill,
70
A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through His-

tory (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1993)
229, “Even some hunters concede that the main motive for hunting is a
simple, weasel-like joy in killing things and seeing foamy blood on the
ferns.”
85 The issue of the suffering of non-human animals does not figure prom-
inently in ancient discussions of human treatment of other animals.
Since the criterion for according moral standing to a being in ancient
philosophy was the presence or absence of reason in that being, the Sto-
ics concluded that human beings could have no obligations toward non-
human animals and could use them as they wished and treat them as
they wished, as is revealed in Cicero’s exposition of the Stoics position
on human treatment of non-human animals (see note 68). Plutarch here
suggests a different model: it is unjust to mistreat animals, not because
they are not rational, but because they are sentient beings that can suf-
fer. It is therefore, in his view, morally unacceptable to visit cruelty upon
them. Herein Plutarch anticipates a trend in modern animal rights phi-
losophy to reject the centuries-old primacy of reason as a criterion for
moral worth and to substitute a concern for a being’s capacity to suffer.
Animal rights philosopher Gary Steiner, Animals and the Moral Com-
munity: Mental Life, Moral Status and Kinship (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2008) xi, illustrates this position, “I reject the tradi-
tional prejudice that moral status is in any way a function of cognitive
capacities. I argue instead that sentience—the capacity to experience
pleasure and suffer pain—is a sufficient condition for equal considera-
tion in the moral community.” See further, Introduction, pp. 70–71.
86 On the identity of the personages mentioned by Autobulus, see note 2.
87 Plutarch cites the adjective from Odyssey VIII. 263, where it is applied to
dancers.
88 The phrase occurs at Iliad II. 614 and Odyssey V. 67. Plutarch slightly
alters the form of the verb as it occurs in Homer to fit the syntax.
89 Homer, Iliad V. 85. The son of Tydeus is Diomedes, whose heroic ex-
ploits are the subject of Iliad V.
90 The source of this verse is unknown.
91 The huntress goddess Artemis is sometimes called Dictynna, “Goddess
of the Fishnet,” from δίκτυον (diktuon), “fishing net,” as she is referred to
at 984A. Artemis was worshipped under this name especially in Crete.
92 Plutarch, Solon 98A–B, reports that one of Solon’s peculiar laws was
that mandating that a person who took neither side in a factional disa-
greement should be disenfranchised on the grounds that the person is
indifferent to the common good and more interested in protecting his
own welfare. Plutarch calls the law strange and surprising. Aristotle,
Constitution of the Athenians VIII. 5, mentions the law and gives the
same motivation for its passage.
93 Autobulus has in mind especially the zoological treatises of Aristotle,
probably in particular History of Animals. The zoological lore recounted
in the comparative chapters that follow is in fact more anecdotal and less
71
biologically informed than the material set forth in Aristotle’s zoolog-

ical works. See Introduction note 9 on Plutarch’s use of commonplace
books for examples of animal behavior in the comparative chapters.
94 The fragment is from a play of Euripides of unknown title (Tragicorum
Graecorum Fragmenta 989 Kannicht).
95 A lacuna occurs here, the length of which is difficult to determine.
Bouffartigue 84 note 105 surmises that Aristotimus advanced the the-
sis that sea animals are inferior to land animals, although he expresses
uncertainty as to how Aristotimus would have handled that topic at its
first introduction here.
96 The subject is unexpressed in the Greek text. The syntax suggests that
Aristotimus had just contrasted another group of fishes with those that
waste their sperm.
97 The noun παρδίαϛ (pardias) is not found elsewhere, and scholars sub-
stitute πϵραίαϛ (peraias), a type of mullet. Aristotle, History of Animals
591a24, says that the peraias feeds on its own slime and is therefore al-
ways hungry.
98 Hesiod, Works and Days 524–525. Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 27, states
that the octopus is the most omnivorous of all sea creatures, and, if it
cannot find prey, will eat its own tentacles. Aristotle, History of Animals
591a5, denies that the octopus devours itself.
99 Plato, Laws 823d–824a, dictates that only those types of hunting are ac-
ceptable that inspire courage by forcing the hunter to run, shoot or strike
his prey. Thus the prey of the hunter should be limited to land-dwelling
quadrupeds. Fishing, in contrast, is lazy and requires no show of courage.
100 See Cartmill 233, “The connection of hunting with masculinity runs
deep, and both hunters and their critics often comment on this. Hunting
has been a stereotypically male activity throughout most of Western
history … Some hunters think that their sport affirms their virility as
well as their masculine identity.”
101 This epithet occurs at Sophocles, Electra 6.
102 Artemis is called ϵ᾿λαϕήβολοϛ (elaphēbolos), “deer slayer,” at Homeric
Hymn to Artemis II. 2. Plutarch, Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table
Talk) 660D, mentions a festival to Artemis called the Elaphēbolia.
103 It is not clear to which philosophers Aristotimus is referring.
104 Autobulus had maintained (961B–C) that these capacities are found in
non-human animals and allow them to distinguish those animals that
are hostile to them from those that are friendly.
105 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 494E–F, notes with approval that, in
the case of non-human animals, both parents care for their offspring
with equal fortitude and endurance.
106 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus offers a lengthy exposition of the courage
of non-human species at Whether Beasts Are Rational 987B–988E.
107 Examples of “sociability” (κοινωνία, koinōnia) in non-human animals
are found at 970B, 972B, 975E, 977C and E, 979F and 980E.
108 In his account of this phenomenon, Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 1, adds
that the bull, like a human wrestler, acts as his own trainer, withdrawing
72
to a private place to prepare himself for combat, while refraining from

sexual activity and living with self-restraint. The same anecdote is re-
counted in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 51.
109 This anecdote is repeated with very similar details by Aelian, Nature of
Animals VI. 56 and by Pliny, Natural History VIII. 8.
110 Plutarch, De curiosite (On Curiosity) 520F, repeats this claim of lions.
Aelian, On Nature IX. 30, states merely that lions wipe out their foot-
prints to prevent hunters from detecting their location but he leaves out
any mention of the claws.
111 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at 980E. Aristotle, History of Animals
612a16–20, says the animal covers itself with mud to protect itself from
the bite of the asp, and Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 22, agrees with
Aristotle’s account.
112 The nest building skills of the swallow are described in similar detail
in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 22. Aelian, Nature of Animals III.
24, adds an anthropomorphizing touch to his account of swallow archi-
tecture by noting that the female swallow places wool that she plucks
from sheep over the exposed twigs in the nest to prevent the fledglings
from feeling discomfort. In a similar vein, Aristotle, History of Animals
612b23–27, in his description of swallow nest building, remarks that the
swallow builds just as do human beings. Swallows are one of the ani-
mals often cited in ancient accounts of animal intelligence. See Intro-
duction note 9.
113 Spiders are another animal whose skill at building is routinely cited in
ancient accounts of animal intelligence. Aristotle, History of Animals
623a7–623b3, goes into some detail describing the various types of webs
that spiders weave and their hunting tactics with webs. Similar detail is
found in the account of spider webs in Pliny, Natural History XI. 79–84.
Less detailed but still appreciative accounts are found in Philo of Alexan-
dria, On Animals 17–18 and Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 21. See note 112.
114 This stratagem is described also by Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 48 and
Pliny, Natural History X. 125. This behavior has often been commented
upon by ornithologists who note that corvids, a group of birds that in-
cludes crows, ravens, jays and magpies, have impressive problem-solving
skills. Ornithologist Tony Angell, Ravens, Crows, Magpies, and Jays (Se-
attle: University of Washington Press, 1978) Preface, notes, “To the degree
that corvids do these things they are set apart from other avian families
and it appears that no other birds approach their level of intelligence.”
See Stephen T. Newmyer, “Tool Use in Animals: Ancient and Modern
Insights and Moral Consequences,” Scholia N. S. 14 (2005) 3–17.
115 This behavior of bees is recorded also by Aristotle, History of Animals
626b25–26, Pliny, Natural History XI. 24 and Aelian, Nature of Animals
V. 13. The bees are called Cretan only in Plutarch’s account.
116 Plutarch repeats this anecdote below at 979A–B and in his treatise De
garrulitate (Talkativeness) 510A–B, where he states that human beings
can learn a lesson from cranes that take measures to prevent the overuse
of their tongues.
73
117 In Pliny’s version of this anecdote, Natural History X. 59, dropping the
stone serves to convict the drowsy bird of “negligence” (indiligentia).
Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 13, agrees closely with Plutarch’s account.
118 This fragment of an unknown tragedy (Tragicorum Graecorum Frag-
menta 416 Kannicht-Snell) is not cited elsewhere.
119 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 35, gives the same account. Cicero, On the
Nature of the Gods II. 124, and Pliny, Natural History X. 115, state that
this strategy is employed by the spoonbill (platalea in Cicero, platea in
Pliny).
120 The ant joins the bee and the swallow in ancient accounts of animal be-
havior as an animal whose actions most clearly suggested a level of in-
telligence, perhaps in even a higher degree than in the case of the bee
and the swallow. This is suggested in Plutarch’s anecdote (967E) of the
Stoic Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), who subscribed to the Stoic position that
non-human animals are irrational but, as Plutarch relates, found himself
impressed by what he apparently regarded as an action that suggested at
least some purposefulness, although Plutarch does not comment specifi-
cally as to what conclusions Cleanthes drew from the actions of the ants.
In his version of the anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 50, observes
that Cleanthes was compelled, despite his own arguments against the idea,
to concede that non-human animals are not without some degree of “rea-
soning power” (λογισμόϛ, logismos). On ants in ancient accounts of animal
intelligence, see Introduction, note 9 and notes 112–113 above. For a dis-
cussion of the anecdote of the ants, see LiCausi and Pomelli 112–113, who
note that the anecdote does not seem to be found outside of Plutarch and
Aelian. The action of the ants offers an instance of the sort of “pay back”
behavior termed reciprocal justice. See note 72.
121 Homer, Iliad XIV. 216
122 Aristotimus ascribes to ants the four cardinal virtues of courage, tem-
perance, wisdom and justice. On the elaborate exposition of these virtues
in non-human animals by Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus, see Introduc-
tion to Whether Beasts Are Rational pp. 97–99 and note 10. Bouffartigue
xxxii notes that the cardinal virtues are in fact seldom mentioned in On
the Cleverness of Animals, a fact which is remarkable in light of the com-
parative length of the treatise and the efforts of the defenders of both
land- and sea-dwelling animals to point out the respective excellences of
the animals that they champion.
123 In his account of the anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 25, states
that this behavior shows how respectful and considerate the ants are.
124 Aristotimus’ description of the action of the insects recalls the remark-
able behavior of leafcutter ants.
125 Aratus, Phaenomena 956–957. Vergil, Georgics I. 379–380, includes this
action of the ants among his catalogue of animal behaviors that signal
the approach of rain.
126 Some, according to Aristotimus, read ἤια (ēia), “provisions” here, rather
than ὤια (ōia), “eggs.” This pedantic observation suggests that Plutarch
was consulting a commentary on Aratus while composing this sentence.
74
127 In his account of this activity, Pliny, Natural History XI. 109, remarks
that it provides evidence of the industriousness and hard work of ants.
128 The manuscript tradition here is corrupt. I follow Bouffartigue who
reads πηρο ̑υνταϛ (pērountas), “maiming, mutilating,” over Hubert’s
πληρο ̑υνταϛ (plērountas), “filling,” which makes little sense in the context.
129 Aelian, Natural History VI. 43, agrees with Plutarch’s account of three
chambers, but he states that this allows for the dwellings of male ants to
be separate from those of female ants.
130 No animal impressed ancient naturalists more profoundly than did the
elephant, whose intellectual and emotional dimensions were the sub-
ject of numerous anecdotes. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 1, offers an
extraordinary encomium on the excellences of the elephant, an animal
that he declares to be “nearest to human perceptions” (proximum hu-
manis sensibus), capable of understanding the language of the country
where it lives, responsive to affection and honors, and endowed with
virtues “which are rare even in humans” (quae etiam in homine rara),
among which he lists honesty, wisdom, justice and even reverence for
the heavens.
131 Aristotimus admiringly describes the gyrations that elephants are

taught to perform as examples of their quickness to learn, but Plutarch’s
talking pig Gryllus chastises human beings for forcing non-human an-
imals to learn to perform movements and actions that are contrary to
their nature for the mere amusement of humans (992A–B). See Com-
mentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 99.
132 Similarly, the talking pig Gryllus expresses admiration for the numer-
ous skills that non-human animals learn unaided that help them to live
their lives successfully, Whether Beasts Are Rational 991E–F. See Com-
mentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational notes 93–98.
133 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 6, relates this anecdote in similar language.
Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 11, goes into some detail on the subject
of the dancing lessons which elephants at Rome received, and he com-
ments admiringly on the restraint that the animals displayed when they
were beaten for not learning their steps, for they did not allow them-
selves to show anger at the punishment.
134 Hagnon of Tarsus (second century bce) was a pupil of the Stoic philos-
opher Carneades and a rhetorician. On Plutarch’s mention of him here
Bouffartigue 90 note 148 observes, “on n’a aucune idée du type d’ou-
vrage dans lequel une telle notice a pu prendre place.”
135 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 52, relates this anecdote in a similar man-
ner. On the mathematical skills on non-human animals, see Stephen T.
Newmyer, “Calculating Creatures: Ancients and Moderns on Under-
standing of Number in Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica
N. S. 89 (2008) 117–124.
136 The behavior of the elephant illustrates the “pay back” characteristic of
reciprocal justice. See note 72.
137 In Pliny’s account of this anecdote, Natural History VIII. 11, the younger
elephants go first so that the older and heavier ones do not wear away
75
the river bed by their weight and thereby make the river deeper and
more difficult for the younger animals to cross.
138 The similarity of Plutarch’s account to the biblical flood story is strik-
ing. Although there survive other Greek accounts of Deucalion and the
flood, Helmbold 376 note a, observes, “Plutarch is the only Greek au-
thor to add the Semitic dove story …”
139 Plutarch recounts this anecdote also at De primo frigido (The Principle
of Cold) 949D. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 103, includes the anecdote in
his account of animals that provide warnings to human beings. Aelian,
Nature of Animals VI. 24, recounts the anecdote in language closely par-
allel to that of Plutarch.
140 Aristotimus refers to Stoic logicians, and in particular to Chrysippus
who was known for his work on logic. The anecdote of the “reasoning
dog” that follows is associated in ancient sources with Chrysippus.
141 In his discussion of Stoic doctrine on the varieties of arguments con-
tained in his life of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius notes, Lives of the Philos-
ophers VII. 79, that Chrysippus distinguished five types of syllogisms.
The type involved in the scenario of the dog in Aristotimus’ exposition
is of the sort called in Diogenes’ account the fifth disjunctive syllogism.
In this type, if one alternative can be contradicted, the other is true. The
anecdote is recounted as well in Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 59, Philo
of Alexandria, On Animals 45, where it is called the fifth complex inde-
monstrable syllogism, and at Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 6. Referring
to this anecdote Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals 26, observes,
“Chrysippus is not here conceding that the dog really reasons. But he
presumably allows that it has perceptual appearances, even negative
ones corresponding to the absence of a scent.”
142 It is surprising that Plutarch, who is eager to prove that non-human
animals have the faculty of reason, dismisses the evidence of the dog’s
ability to distinguish between alternatives as an example of that reason.
143 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VII. 10, the Ro-
man’s name is Galba. Calvus has been restored in the text of Plutarch
from what appears to be a fragmentary form of a name. In any case,
the Calvus in question is unknown. The anecdote of King Pyrrhus that
Aristotimus recounts next is also found in the passage of Aelian, Nature
of Animals VII. 10.
144 King Pyrrhus of Epirus in northwestern Greece (319–272 bce) is most
famous for his costly victories against the Romans.
145 In Aelian’s elaborate version of the anecdote, he includes a moralizing
reflection that the dog’s actions illustrate that even animals have been
given a share of kindliness and affection, which, though existing in a
greater degree in human beings, are not put into practice by human be-
ings who are given to committing atrocities against their friends for the
sake of money.
146 Plutarch repeats the anecdote at 984D and provides an extended version
of the tale at Banquet of the Seven Sages 162C–F without mention of the
dog. Even Thucydides, Histories III. 96, alludes briefly to the murder of
Hesiod.
76
147 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VII. 13, the rob-
ber confessed to his crime under torture. The name of the dog is not
given in Aelian.
148 The Ceramicus (Κϵραμϵικόϛ, Kerameikos) was a section of northwestern
Athens known as the district of the potters (kerameis).
149 This anecdote appears rather frequently in ancient sources. Plutarch
recounts it also in his biography of the elder Cato (339A–B) without
mentioning the Ceramicus. In Aristotle’s version, History of Animals
577b30–578a2, a decree was passed to allow the mule to eat freely from
grain supplies set out in trays by grain merchants. Pliny, Natural History
VIII. 175, records that the mule was 80 years old, but disregarded its age
to encourage the other mules in their labors, which moved the Atheni-
ans to decree that it be allowed access to the stands of grain dealers.
Aelian’s account, Nature of Animals VI. 49, agrees in most details with
Plutarch’s version at 970B.
150 The sudden change of subject here suggests a lacuna.
151 Aristotimus has the Stoics in mind here. On the topic of justice toward
animals, see especially 963F–965B and notes 68–78.
152 This charge is specifically denied by Phaedimus, the defender of sea-
dwellers, at 975E, although he admits that the virtues of underwater
creatures are difficult to witness.
153 Homer, Iliad XVI. 34, uttered by Patroclus to Achilles in frustration at
the hero’s stubborn refusal to rejoin battle.
154 Lysimachus (ca. 355–281 bce), the friend and successor of Alexander,
became king of Thrace, Macedon and Asia Minor. The anecdote is
found also at Pliny, Natural History VIII. 143, and Aelian, Nature of
Animals VI. 25.
155 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 40, gives a double version of the anec-
dote. An eagle belonging to Pyrrhus (Aelian does not specify whether he
means the king or Plutarch’s private citizen) starved itself on the death
of its owner, while another eagle owned by a private citizen threw itself
on its owner’s pyre. At Natural History VI. 29, Aelian describes an eagle
that both starved itself when its master fell ill and leapt onto the boy’s
pyre when he died.
156 Porus was king of the Pauravas, an Indian people, and was defeated
by Alexander at the battle of the Hydaspes River (326 bce). Plutarch
recounts this same anecdote in his Life of Alexander 699B–C. Aelian,
Nature of Animals VII. 37, agrees with Plutarch’s accounts.
157 Bucephalas (or Bucephalus), whose name means “Ox-head,” from a
brand mark in this shape on his flank, was Alexander’s favorite horse
that only he was able to tame. In his version of the anecdote recounted
in Plutarch, Pliny, Natural History VIII. 154, relates that the horse would
allow anyone to mount him if he was not wearing his trappings.
158 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus remarks similarly, Whether Beasts Are
Rational 987B–C, that it would be difficult to find any virtue that ani-
mals do not have in a greater degree than do the wisest humans.
159 On the love of offspring in non-human animals and the part that it plays
in the birth of justice, see note 43.
77
160 Homer, Odyssey XIV. 30–31.

161 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1380a25, and Pliny, Natural History VIII. 146, both
state that dogs will not attack humans when they sit down. Pliny notes
as well, Natural History VIII. 48, that lions will not attack humans who
adopt a suppliant pose before them. Aristotle likens this behavior in
dogs to the lessening of anger in a human being when the individual
against whom the anger is directed humbles himself.
162 The text is corrupt here.
163 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 1, recounts this anecdote in very similar
detail, adding that the dog recognized its real enemy in the lion.
164 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 2, suggests that the dog will not tear up
a hare that is already dead because it does not wish to take credit for
another’s labors, inasmuch as the dog’s interest in the hunt is its natural
love of honor and not a desire for the meat.
165 The tricks of cranes are detailed in 967B–C.
166 Thales of Miletus is generally included in the traditional listing of
Greek sages of the sixth century bce. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the
Philosophers I. 40–44, notes that at times one individual was substituted
for another in the list. Plutarch’s dialogue Convivium septem sapientium
(Banquet of the Seven Sages) is an account of an imaginary dinner at the
court of Periander of Corinth (reigned ca. 627–585 bce) at which Thales
took part.
167 This anecdote is told in very similar detail in Aelian, Nature of Animals
VII. 42.
168 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at Whether Beasts Are Rational 992B. In
Pliny’s version of the anecdote, Natural History X. 103, the bird pretends
to be injured and as soon as the hunter is about to lay hands on her, she
moves off a bit further, until she has evaded his grasp and the nestlings
are safe.
169 A plethron is equivalent to 30 meters or 100 Greek feet.
170 This ruse is alluded to briefly in Aelian, Nature of Animals XIII. 11.
171 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 127, reports that the sleep of the hibernating
bear is in the first two weeks so deep that is cannot be aroused even by
blows.
172 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 3, reports that the bear avoids detection
by lying down and entering its den on its back, dragging itself along and
thereby avoiding all traces of paw-prints.
173 This proverb is attributed to the iambic poet Archilochus (seventh cen-
tury bce) by the compiler of proverbs Zenobius (early second century
ce) (V. 68 Leutsch-Schneidewin). The poet may mean that, while others
have various defenses, his sole means of attack is his iambs.
174 Ion of Chios (ca. 480–ca. 420 bce) wrote tragedies and other types of poetry.
175 Zenobius cites these verses in the same passage in which he discusses the
verses of Archilochus discussed in note 173, and attributes them to Ion
of Chios.
176 On claims of eyewitness observation of the phenomena detailed in On
the Cleverness of Animals, see Introduction, pp. 11–12 and note 36.
78
177 In the version of this anecdote given in Pliny, Natural History VIII. 133,
the hedgehog covers its spines with fallen apples. Even more fantastic is
the variant of the anecdote in Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 10, where
he records that the hedgehog rolls on crates of figs and stores up the figs
that attach themselves to its spines so that it has food for times when
food is scarce. Helmbold 394 note b, judges the phrase “so covered with
fruit was it as it moved” to be “an unnecessary explanation” contained
in the manuscripts.
178 Aristotle, History of Animals 612b4–9, relates this anecdote of a man in Byz-
antium. Plutarch alluded again to this anecdote at 979A, mentioning both
Cyzicus and Byzantium, suggesting that he has the passage of Aristotle in
mind at that point.
179 Juba, king of Mauretania (ca. 48 bce–23 ce), known for his learning,
was a prolific writer in many genres, including history, and was often
cited by Plutarch and other writers. The anecdote reported by Plutarch
is found at Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker III. 275.
180 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 24–25, discusses the elephants’ efforts to res-
cue their comrades without mentioning Juba as his source. In Aelian’s
account of the anecdote, Nature of Animals VI. 61, he compliments the
dutifulness of the elephants and contrasts it with the family troubles of
human beings.
181 The ancients seem to have been fascinated with the question of whether
non-human animals have some conception of divinity. See Commen-
tary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 110. For a discussion of the
topic, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Mod-
erns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di
Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129.
182 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 2, relates that a king once sent a contin-
gent of men to slay some elephants for their tusks, and along the way,
a pestilence struck and killed all but one of the men, who reported the
incident to the king. This allowed the king to discover that elephants are
“beloved by the gods” (θϵοϕιλϵῖϛ, theophileis).
183 Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 244–205 bce) defeated Antiochus III of Syria
at Raphia in southern Palestine in 217 bce. He had a large number of
elephants in his fighting force.
184 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 44, relates this anecdote, adding the ob-
servation that elephants worship the gods while humans doubt if they
exist and question, if they do exist, whether they have any concern for
human beings.
185 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals IX. 44, the old
lions lick the young ones as if to congratulate them on their success at
the hunt before they partake of the feast.
186 At Whether Beasts Are Rational 990C–F, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryl-
lus discusses the sexual activity of non-human animals in some detail,
with conclusions that differ in some particulars from the presentation
of Aristotimus. Since Gryllus is in that passage arguing for the temper-
ance exhibited by non-human animals, his emphasis is on the natural
79
restraint and modesty of non-human species in their lovemaking, rather

than on the wildness of their passions. A notable difference between
Aristotimus’ account and that of Gryllus is the pig’s condemnation of
unions of human beings with other animals (990F), which Aristotimus
describes (972D–F) with wonderment rather than horror. For a fasci-
nating discussion of interspecies unions in classical literature, see Craig
A. Williams, “When a Dolphin Loves a Boy: Some Greco-Roman and
Native American Love Stories,” Classical Antiquity 32 (2013) 200–242.
187 Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257–180 bce) was head of the Library
at Alexandria (195–180) and was famous for his work on linguistic and
textual topics, in particular his work on the text of the Homeric poems.
In his version of this anecdote, Pliny, Natural History VIII. 13, compli-
ments the elephant for having the good taste to become the rival in love
of a great scholar!
188 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38, notes that elephants are fond of per-
fumes, and he implies that it was this fondness that first attracted the
attention of the elephant to the garland seller.
189 The term that Plutarch employs here, δράκων (drakōn), Latin draco, is
used sometimes generically to refer to a snake, while other authors use
it of larger snakes, especially of nonpoisonous varieties. See Kenneth F.
Kitchell, Jr., Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z (London and New
York: Routledge, 2014) s. v. “draco.”
190 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VI. 17, which
takes place in Judaea, the girl was afraid of the snake’s ardor and she
moved away for a month, and when she returned, the snake whipped her
legs in anger at being scorned. Aelian draws the conclusion from this
anecdote that Zeus and the other gods do not overlook other species but
indicate their regard for them by such an occurrence.
191 In Aelian’s retelling of this anecdote, Nature of Animals V. 29, both a
goose and a ram were in love with Glauke.
192 Pliny, Natural History X. 120, records that in his own time, members of
the Roman royal family had a starling (Latin sturnus) and some night-
ingales that were taught to speak both Greek and Latin, and that they
practiced diligently, learning new phrases daily and constructing longer
and longer sentences. Statius, Silvae II. 4. 19, states that the starling
faithfully reproduces the words that it has heard.
193 Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 4, asserts that crows, jays and parrots
remember what they hear, listening diligently to their teachers, and
have been known to report on wrongdoing that they have overheard in
their homes. He argues that the complexity and variety of bird speech
indicates the presence of reason in the animals.
194 Pliny, Natural History X. 117, states that, whereas other birds imitate the
human voice, the parrot actually talks. Aelian, Nature of Animals XIII.
18, notes that the Brahmins of India placed parrots above all other birds
as the only type of bird capable of imitating human speech convinc-
ingly. He adds, XVI. 17, that parrots that spend time around humans
learn to speak like children and become as talkative as they are, but that
80
parrots that live in forests do not produce intelligible speech. Near the
end of his dialogue On Animals, Philo of Aexandria, who opposes the
argument advanced earlier in the work that animals are rational, states
(98) that the utterances of blackbirds, crows, parrots and other birds
have no more meaning than do the sounds of a flute, and they do not
indicate the operation of reason in the animals.
195 Aristotimus’ mention here of “uttered reason and internal reason” is
an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of reason in its linguistic manifesta-
tion. The Stoics distinguished what they termed λόγοϛ προϕορικόϛ (logos
prophorikos), or “vocalized reason, meaningful speech,” from λόγοϛ
ϵ᾿νδιάθϵτοϛ (logos endiathetos), “internal reason, thought.” The latter of
these gives meaningful vocal expression to the former. In Stoic teach-
ing, the capacity for meaningful speech arises in the part of the soul
called the ἡγϵμονικόν (hēgemonikon), or “governing principle.” While all
animals have this component of the soul, it remains non-rational in the
case of non-humans animals, so that their utterances cannot issue from
reason and cannot therefore have meaning: their utterances cannot be
the product of thought. This is what Philo of Alexandria means in his
assertion that the utterances of birds have no more meaning than the
notes of a wind instrument (see note 194). Aristotimus argues that the
ability of birds not only to imitate human speech but to form words
and to learn human language proves that birds possess both forms of
reason: their utterances do indicate the operation of reason. The Stoic
position on the two types of reason is explained in Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus mathematicos (Against the Mathematicians) VIII. 275 (=SVF
II. 135), who states that the Stoics held that non-human animals do not
differ from humans in uttered reason, since crows, parrots and jays ut-
ter articulate sounds, but in internal reason. The Stoic doctrine on the
two types of reason is set forth also in Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 2.
For a detailed discussion of the concept, see Max Mühl, “Der λόγοϛ
ϵ᾿νδιάθϵτοϛ und προϕορικόϛ von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von
Sirmium 351,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962) 7–56 and Stephen
T. Newmyer, “Speaking of Beasts: the Stoics and Plutarch on Animal
Reason and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di
Cultura Classica N. S. 63, 3 (1999) 99–110.
196 Aristotle, History of Animals 535b17, observes that fishes can produce
only squeaking sounds because they have no lung, windpipe or pharynx.
197 Aristotle, History of Animals 608a18–21, states that some animals are
capable of teaching and learning, both from each other and from hu-
mans, because all animals have at least some hearing.
198 Aristotle, History of Animals 536b17–19, states that the nightingale has
been observed teaching its nestlings to sing, which suggests that song
must be learned and is not the same thing as the voice.
199 This claim is repeated at Whether Beasts Are Rational 992B–C.
200 On claims of eyewitness observation, see note 176.
201 Aristotle, History of Animals 615b19–21, states that the jay has a great
variety of voices and utters a different one almost daily. Aelian, Nature
81
of Animals VI. 19, notes that the jay can imitate all sounds, and espe-
cially the human voice. On Porphyry’s assertions on the vocalizations of
the jay, see note 193.
202 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 19, states that some birds imitate the
neighing of horses and others the sounds of raindrops.
203 Aristotimus has not in fact made exactly this observation previously.
204 I have added the words in brackets since self-learning vs. learning from
outside has been the topic.
205 See note 176.
206 On attempts to date the composition of On the Cleverness of Animals
on the basis of this mention of Vespasian, see Introduction, pp. 2–3 and
note 7.
207 Plutarch’s reference here is the sole source for this statement of Dem-
ocritus (DK68 B154). The animals that Democritus is credited with
singling out, the spider, the swallow and the nightingale, are standard
examples cited in ancient accounts of the intelligence of non-human an-
imals. See Introduction, p. 3 and note 9.
208 These activities of the swallow and spider are detailed at 966D–E.
209 Aristotimus numbers pharmacy, surgery and dietetics as the three

branches of the healing art, all of which are practiced by non-human an-
imals in some fashion. In the course of his life of Plato, Diogenes Laer-
tius, Lives of the Philosophers III. 85, states that there are five branches of
medicine: pharmacy, surgery, dietetics, diagnostics and the prescription
of remedies for pain. The topic of “animal doctoring” is taken up by the
talking pig Gryllus, Whether Beasts Are Rational 991E–F, with some
of the same examples of animal cures that Aristotimus cites. Gryllus
emphasizes more so than does Aristotimus the idea that a knowledge of
cures in non-human animals is a matter of nature and not of teaching.
Plutarch offers a more detailed discussion of medical knowledge in non-
human animals at Quaestiones naturales (Natural Questions) 918B–E,
where some of the remedies catalogued by Aristotimus and Gryllus are
cited.
210 Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (On Isis and Osiris) 318C, states that the
ibis taught the Egyptians the use of enemas through its practice of
purging itself, and he notes as well in that passage that the ibis will not
touch tainted water. Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 35, notes that the ibis
first taught the Egyptians the art of purging the intestines, but he says
modestly that he will leave it up to others to explain exactly how it did
so!
211 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 2, tells this anecdote of a πάρδαλιϛ (parda-
lis), a big cat that may have been a leopard or a panther. Aelian moralizes
his account with the observation that, unlike the restrained behavior of
the cat, humans are more likely to betray their relations. On the identity
of the pardalis, see Kitchell, s. v. “leopard.”
212 This behavior is attributed to the elephant of King Porus at 970D, and
Phaedimus, the defender of the intelligence of sea-dwellers, alludes dis-
paragingly to the anecdote at 977B.
82
2 13 On the mathematical skills of non-human animals, see note 135.

214 Ctesias of Cnidus (fifth century bce) was court physician to King Artax-
erxes II of Persia and author of historical works about Persia and India.
The anecdote referred to here (Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker
34) is known only from Plutarch’s account and from Aelian, Nature of
Animals VII 1.
215 Pliny, Natural History II. 107, and Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 8, re-
port that the oryx sneezes to mark the rise of the Dog Star.
216 The reference is to a Greek board game called pesseia, resembling chess,
in which players cross a median line on the board. Hence the phrase
means something like “take one’s best shot.”
217 On ancient views on the spiritual dimension of non-human animals,
see note 181.
218 The manuscript is corrupt and ungrammatical at this point.
219 This phrase is not found in the surviving tragedies of Euripides. Plutarch
may have had in mind Ion 159, where the playwright speaks of a bird as
the “herald of Zeus.”
220 Plato, Phaedo 85b.
221 On Pyrrhus, see note 144.
222 Antiochus II Hierax (ca. 263–226 bce), son of Antiochus II (ca. 287–246
bce), was called ἵϵραξ (hierax), “hawk,” because of his greed.
223 Phaedimus refutes this charge at 976B–C, citing an instance of a sa-
cred crocodile that would not come to King Ptolemy when summoned
by him, an action which portended the king’s death. Aelian, Nature of
Animals VIII. 4, repeats this anecdote, admitting that he does not know
which Ptolemy is in question.
224 According to Hesiod, Theogony 736–739, the Titans, when defeated by
Zeus, were consigned to Tartarus for eternity, and not to the bottom of
the sea. At On Eating Meat 996C, Plutarch associates the “Titanic” in
general with that which is irrational, unordered and violent, as he does
here, but he does not draw any connection there with the sea.
225 Plutarch may be alluding here to Plato’s description, Timaeus 92b, of
fishes, which are fashioned by the gods from the stupidest of human
beings and live in the most extreme abode, in muddy depths, in keeping
with their lack of intelligence.
226 Helmbold 414 note a, observes on this comment, “That is, it is so re-
alistic that one might imagine oneself in the lawcourts or the public
assembly.”
227 Phaedimus may have in mind here the remark of Alcibiades in Plato,
Symposium 214c, that it is unfair to pit a drunken man against sober
ones in a debate.
228 Pindar, fragment 228 Snell-Maehler. The verses are not cited by any other
author, but appear again in identical form in Plutarch, An seni respublica
gerenda sit (Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Life) 783B.
229 That is, there will be no hunting or fishing on this day of the debate.
230 I have supplied the words in brackets because the text contains no noun
here. Something like “leisure time” or “day off” must be intended.
83
231 He has in mind the sorts of tales narrated at 976A, 974C and F, and
976B. On this comment of Phaedimus, Bouffartigue 104 note 263, ob-
serves that Plutarch seems to portray Aristotimus as more reliant upon
the opinions of others, while Phaedimus is portrayed as possessing bet-
ter critical faculties and exactitude of mind.
232 Aristotimus had charged (966B and 970B) that sea-dwelling animals are
devoid of sociability and memory.
233 Pliny, Natural History IX. 1, states that is the nature of land animals to
“live in a sort of association with human beings” (hominum quadam con-
sortione degentia indicata natura est). Phaedimus’ argument in 975E–F
takes a hint from Stoic kinship theory since he concedes that land-
dwelling animals appear to reveal more natural kinship with human be-
ings than do sea-dwellers, to the point that land-dwelling animals have
taken on human characteristics.
234 Phaedimus’ point is illustrated in the anecdote of Aristotimus (973E)
of a dog that learned to perform in pantomimes. In contrast, Plutarch’s
talking pig Gryllus argues strongly, Whether Beasts Are Rational
991F–992A, that non-human animals are self-taught.
235 There were fountains called Arethusa in Elis in the Peloponnese and on
the island of Ortygia near Syracuse on Sicily and the text does not make
clear which is intended. Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4, alludes to the
eel of Arethusa, also without making clear which is intended.
236 Pliny, Natural History X. 193, recounts that, while fishes have no ears,
they nevertheless hear, for they come to the sound of clapping, and in
the aquarium of the emperor, various sorts of fishes come when called,
sometimes even individually.
237 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (How
to Profit by Your Enemies) 89A and at Praecepta gerendae reipublicae
(Precepts on Statecraft) 811A. It occurs as well in Aelian, Nature of An-
imals VIII. 4. Lucius Licinius Crassus (140–91 bce) was co-c ensor in
92 bce with Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus with whom he frequently
quarreled. Pliny, Natural History IX. 172, tells a similar story of the Ro-
man orator Hortensius who so loved his eel that he likewise wept at its
death.
238 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4, offers a similar account, without
mentioning the linen cloths. The willingness of the crocodile to have its
teeth cleaned was noted already by Herodotus who relates, Histories II.
68, that the mouth of the crocodile becomes filled with leeches because
of all the time that it spends in the water, and the crocodile allows the
sandpiper to hop in its open mouth and eat the leeches. The crocodile,
Herodotus notes, enjoys this and never harms the bird.
239 Titus Flavius Philinus of Thespies in Boeotia was a close friend of
Plutarch. At Questionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 727B, he is de-
scribed as a vegetarian follower of Pythagoras. See Puech, “Prosopog-
raphie” 4869.
240 Antaeopolis, the ancient town of Tjebu, was located in southern Egypt
on the eastern bank of the Nile.
84
2 41 See note 223.

242 The location of this town in Lycia is unknown. Aelian, Nature of An-
imals VIII. 5, describes this divination with fishes and mentions the
names of the same Lycian towns where the practice took place.
243 Phaedimus asserts that the denizens of the sea have “kinship” with hu-
man beings and are not “alien,” another hint at Stoic oikeiōsis theory.
244 The bee-eater (μϵ´ροψ, merops) is a bird that, according to Aristotle, His-
tory of Animals 615b25–28 and Pliny, Natural History X. 99, feeds its
parents.
245 Phaedimus gives a punning and farfetched etymology for the name
of the deer (ϵ᾿´λαϕοϛ, elaphos) which, he claims, is not derived from its
“swiftness” (ϵ᾿λαϕρότηϛ, elaphrotēs), but from its “attraction of the
snake” (῾ϵ´λξιϛ ὄϕϵωϛ, helxis opheōs).
246 Aristotle, History of Animals 612a12–15, notes that the panther is aware
that other animals take delight in its scent, and it uses it to attract prey.
Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 40, reports that the panther hides in foliage
and waits for its prey to be enchanted by its scent, leaping upon them
when they are so under its spell.
247 Homer, Iliad XXIV. 80–82, with reference to Iris’ swiftness.
248 The noun κϵ´ραϛ (keras) means “horn.”
249 The scholiast on the verses of Homer cited in note 248 states that later
authors used the word “horn” to describe a horn-like arrangement of
the hair, and he cites a verse from Archliochus that mentions an indi-
vidual named Glaucon as a person who “arranges his hair in horns”
(keroplastēn) (Archilochus fragment 117 West).
250 The reference to Aristotle may be incorrect here, unless Plutarch refers
to the edition of the poems of Homer that Aristotle is credited with pro-
ducing. Helmbold reads here “Aristarchus,” a reference to Aristarchus
of Samos (ca. 216–144 bce), head librarian at Alexandria and editor of
Homer.
251 Phaedimus alludes to Aristotimus’ account of the surgical prowess of
the elephant, detailed at 974D.
252 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 12, details this action of the “fox shark”
(ἀλώπηξ, alōpēx). The fish that Plutarch has in mind is in fact the sea
scolopendra, to which he attributes this behavior at De sera numinis
vindicta (The Slowness of Divine Justice) 567B.
253 This contradicts Aristotimus’ assertion (970B) that sea-dwellers do not
exhibit sociability. See note 152.
254 The identification of the fish called here ἀνθίαϛ (anthias) is in doubt.
Helmbold 426 note a, states that it is “probably the Mediterranean bar-
bier, Serranus anthias.”
255 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 4, tells this anecdote of the anthias, re-
marking that their behavior is like that of loyal comrades and trusty
fellow-soldiers.
256 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 22, states that mice rescue a companion
that has fallen into a jar by latching onto each other’s tails and drawing
the unfortunate mouse from the jar.
85
257 This action is detailed in Ovid, Halieutica 46–48, and in Pliny, Natural
History IX. 182.
258 This is described at 972B. The cooperative helping behavior of ele-
phants is in fact frequently commented on by ethologists. deWaal, The
Age of Empathy 133, describes a rescue effort similar to that in Plutarch
in which elephants worked together to rescue a calf that had fallen into
a mud hole, “The matriarch and another female started working on the
problem, one of them climbing into the hole on her knees, while the mud
was creating deadly suction on the calf. Both females worked together,
placing their trunks and tusks underneath the calf until the suction was
broken and the calf scrambled out of the hole.”
259 This is a joking reference to the fact that the anecdote questioned here
by Phaedimus is attributed to King Juba at 972B.
260 Herodotus, Histories III. 149 and VI. 31, describes how the Persians,
after invading an island, would join hands, forming a human net-like
chain which reached from one coast to the other. The soldiers would
then advance together and round up the inhabitants of the island.
261 The noun that Plutarch employs here for the catch-all net, πάναγρα (pa-
nagra), is not found elsewhere. Homer, Iliad V. 487, speaks of a λίνον
πάναγρον (linon panagron), a “net that catches all.” In Homer’s usage,
the term is adjectival.
262 The identity of the fish called here γαλη̑ (galē) is not certain. Aelian,
Nature of Animals XV. 11, describes it at some length, noting that it is
sometimes called hepatus, also unidentified. Aelian claims that it can
blink its eyes and that it feeds on the eyes of all dead creatures that it
finds.
263 Oppian, Halieutica III. 121–125, describes this stratagem of the sea bass.
264 In his version of this anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals XI. 12, the
dolphins take care not to be caught a second time because they are
ashamed to have been captured in the first place.
265 Aristotle, History of Animals 524b15–23, describes the mytis at some
length, stating that cephalopods do not have viscera but have instead
the mytis, upon which rests the ink sac, from which they discharge ink
when they are frightened. The cuttlefish has the most ink. The noun
used by both Aristotle and Plutarch for “ink” (θολός, tholos) also means
mud or dirt dissolved in water. Aristotimus employs the term in an ad-
jectival form at 963B to describe the reasoning powers of non-human
animals as clouded or muddy.
266 This phrase occurs at Iliad V. 345, when Apollo rescues Aeneas from
combat by enveloping him in a dark cloud.
267 Aristotle, History of Animals 620b20–24, relates that the torpedo (νάρκη,
narkē) has the ability “to cause numbness” (ναρκᾶν, narkān) in any crea-
ture that comes near it as it lies burrowed in sand. Aelian, Nature of
Animals IX. 14, adds that he has heard from individuals who have expe-
rienced the phenomenon that if a person even touches the net in which
the torpedo is caught, he experiences numbness throughout his entire
body.
86
268 Pliny, Natural History IX. 143, states that the torpedo is well aware of its
power and does not itself suffer from its capacity to inflict shocks.
269 The “fisherman” (ἁλιϵῦς, halieus) is also called the “fishing frog” (ba-
trachos). Aristotle, History of Animals 620b11–20, explains that it has
hair-like projections above its eyes, the ends of which are rounded to
resemble bait.
270 Aristotle, History of Animals 621b30, calls the cuttlefish the “most rogu-
ish” (πανουργότατον, panourgotaton) of the cephalopods because of its
use of tricks.
271 Aristotle, History of Animals 6224–14, says that the octopus, which he
brands as stupid for coming near the hand of a human being if it is put
under the water, changes its color to match its surroundings as a strata-
gem for hunting prey.
272 Pindar, fragment 43 Snell-Maehler. Plutarch cites the verses again at
Natural Questions 916C.
273 Theognis 215–216, cited again by Plutarch at Natural Questions 916C,
following the verses of Pindar also cited at 916C (see note 273).
274 Theophrastus, fragment 189 Wimmer. Aristotle, History of Animals
503b2–4, states that the chameleon changes color when it is inflated. At
Parts of Animals 692a21–23, he attributes its change of color to fear and
a lack of blood.
275 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 122, holds that the chameleon is the only
animal that does not live on food or drink but only on the nutrition that
it derives from air.
276 Plutarch asserts that the color change of the octopus is a function of its
intelligence rather than an instinctual act. This explanation is offered as
well in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 30.
277 This idea is introduced also at 965E, at which point Aristotimus seems
to accept it as true. See note 98.
278 Pliny, Natural History IX. 87, denies that the octopus devours its own
tentacles, but states that the conger eel chews them.
279 See note 277.
280 See 972A and note 178.
281 See 967B.
282 Aristotomus mentioned only cranes of Cyzicus (972A). Plutarch seems
to have in mind here the version of the anecdote in Aristotle, History of
Animals 612b4–9, where both Cyzicus and Byzantium are mentioned.
See notes 178 and 281.
283 Helmbold 439 note e, remarks of this creature, “i. e., the sea-urchin, re-
garded by the ancients as a sort of marine counterpart of the hedgehog
because of the similar spines.”
284 Pliny, Natural History IX. 100, and Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 33
also record this behavior.
285 Aristotle, History of Animals 598b25–27, and Aelian, Nature of Animals
IX. 42 comment on the astronomical skills of this fish.
286 See 967C and note 117.
287 The source of this verse is unknown.
87
288 Pliny, Natural History XI. 235, reports that the dolphin is the only ani-
mal that suckles its young while in motion.
289 Aelian, Nature of Animals XI. 22, also comments on the perpetual mo-
tion of the dolphin and he agrees that it dies if it ceases movement.
290 Pliny, Natural History X. 210, in contrast, states that both dolphins and
whales have been heard snoring.
291 Aristotle, History of Animals 598b25–29, states that some fishes cease
movement at the winter solstice.
292 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 308 Radt. The verse is cited also by
Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 42.
293 Pliny, Natural History IX. 50, and Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 42,
both record this phenomenon.
294 On the mathematical skills of non-human species, see note 135.
295 Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae (Learned Banqueters) 278a, notes that Ar-
istotle thought that the name of this fish, ἀμία (amia), possibly to be
identified with the bonito and mentioned at 966B, could be derived from
its tendency ἅμα ἰέναι (hama ienai), “to go together,” because of their
tendency to accompany other fishes.
296 The identity of this fish is in doubt. Bouffartigue 118 note 350 speculates
that it may be a variety of tunny fish. Plutarch etymologizes its name as
derived from πέλϵιν ἅμα (pelein hama), “to be together.” Pliny, Natural
History IX. 47, states that this type of fish is in the springtime called
pelamydes, from the Greek word for “mud” (πη̑λος, pēlos) because of its
habit of burrowing in the mud.
297 Plutarch, Self-Contradictions of the Stoics 1035B and 1039B, similarly
criticizes Chrysippus for his repetition of topics. See note 30. The iden-
tity of the pinna-g uard is somewhat in doubt. The pinna appears to be a
bivalve, while the pinna-g uard is described in ancient sources as a kind
of shrimp or crab. Athenaeus, Learned Banqueters 89d, supports the
description of the action of the pinna-g uard that Plutarch gives here.
He states that the pinna is a kind of oyster (ὄστρϵον, ostreon) and that
the pinna-g uard (πινοϕύλαξ, pinophulax), a small crab, nips at passing
fish to signal to the pinna that food is near. If the pinna is deprived of
the pinna-g uard, Athenaeus claims, it will perish. In that passage, Ath-
enaeus mentions that Chrysippus discussed the pinna and the pinna-
guard in his work On Good and Pleasure.
298 That is, the creature is in fact a kind of crab, despite its appearance.
Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 16, describes the actions of the crab
in language unusually close to that of Plutarch, suggesting a common
source. Aelian even includes the remark that the sponge needs to be
reminded to move. Phaedimus’ remark that the sponge is neither life-
less nor without sensation or blood recalls the comment of Aristotle,
History of Animals 588b20, in the course of his discussion of how nature
progresses from the inanimate to animals by very slight gradations, that
the sponge is in every respect like a plant. Pliny, Natural History IX. 148,
maintains, in contrast, that sponges clearly have intelligence because
they are aware of the presence of sponge-gatherers and they contract
88
when they approach to make themselves difficult to harvest. Plutarch

attributes this action to the presence of the spiderlike crab.
299 The murex is the sea snail from which was derived the purple dye highly
valued in antiquity.
300 The mistaken idea that the murex builds a honeycomb-like structure is
derived from Aristotle, History of Animals 546b18–21.
301 This ritual is mentioned also at 966D.
302 On the dental hygiene of crocodiles, see note 239.
303 The identity of this fish is in doubt.
304 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 13, claims that all fishes have need of
guides, excepting the shark. If the guide dies, the large fish is sure to
die as well. Oppian, Halieutica III. 62–110, tells of the “guide” (ἡγητήρ,
hēgētēr) of the whale which functions as the eyes and ears of the whale.
To capture the whale, Oppian recommends that the guide be captured
first since the large beast is helpless without it.
305 Anticyra is a port town on the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth.
306 The location of Bouna is unknown. Some scholars have suggested that
the town of Boulis is meant, which was not far from Anticyra.
307 Aristotle, History of Animals 610a12, states that foxes and snakes are
friends because both live underground.
308 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 28, states that the bustard is quite fond of
horses, and that it ignores all other animals but delights in flying up to
the horse and keeping it company.
309 Plutarch may be borrowing here from the lengthy discussion in Aris-
totle, History of Animals 598a30–598b2, on the fishes of the Black Sea.
Aristotle claims that the Black Sea is notably free of savage fishes, with
the exception of dolphins and porpoises.
310 On the anthias, see 977C and note 255.
311 Homer uses the phrase “sacred fish” (ἱϵρὸς ἰχθύς, hieros ichthus) at Iliad
XVI. 407, but not in reference to the anthias.
312 The os sacrum is the large bone at the base of the spine.
313 The author of the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease states (1)
that he does not regard epilepsy as any more sacred or divine than any
other disease. Plato, Timaeus 85a–b, explains that the disease derives its
name from the fact that it affects the divine parts of the victim’s nature
residing in the head.
314 Eratosthenes (ca. 285–194 bce) worked as librarian at Alexandria and
was known for the range of his writings, on mathematics, literary criti-
cism, philosophy and poetry.
315 On the gilthead, see 977F.
316 Eratosthenes, Hermes fragment 14 Hiller (= fragment 12 Powell).
317 Pamphylia was a region in southern Asia Minor.
318 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 28, describes this celebration in very
similar language. He notes too that some people think that the celebra-
tion was held when the anthias was caught rather than the sturgeon.
319 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38, states that the elephant is terrified of the
squeal of a pig.
89
320 Aristotle, History of Animals 568b1–14 and 621a21–29, describes this ac-
tivity on the part of the males of a type of fish that he calls the γλάνις
(glanis).
321 Aristotle, History of Animals 565b25–26, relates that the dogfish releases
its young and takes them back inside its body, a capacity that it shares
with the angel fish and the torpedo.
322 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 17, states that the offspring of the dogfish
slip immediately back inside their mother’s womb if they become fright-
ened. Oppian, Halieutica I. 734–741, adds that the dogfish experiences
pain when taking its offspring back into its body, but it nevertheless
does so willingly.
323 Aristotle, History of Animals 558a4–14, describes the hatching of the young
and the maternal care of various types of tortoises. Pliny, Natural History
IX. 37, agrees with Aristotle’s observation that the mother turtle sleeps on
the eggs at night.
324 Aelian, Varia Historia (Historical Miscellany) I. 6, recounts that sea tur-
tles are so proficient at reckoning numbers that they keep count of the
days since they laid their eggs, and on the fortieth day, they dig up their
young and take them off with them.
325 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 52, claims turtles and crabs similarly re-
move their eggs to high ground to avoid inundation, and that asps do so
with their young.
326 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 3, states that the father tears a newborn
crocodile to pieces if it does not immediately seize some creature be-
cause he considers the young animal to be illegitimate, but if the young
animal does exhibit this savage behavior, it is loved by both parents and
considered one of the family. According to Pliny, Natural History X. 10,
a similar paternity test is carried out by the sea-eagle (haliaëtus). The
adult bird compels the young to look directly at the sun. If the young
bird blinks, the adult expels it from the nest as illegitimate.
327 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 9, gives a similar report of seal behav-
ior. Pliny, Natural History IX. 41, reports that the mother seal brings
her young down to the water on the twelfth day. Oppian, Halieutica I.
686–701, offers a fanciful description of how, on the thirteenth day after
birth, the mother seal takes her young into the water to introduce them
to her home country, as it were, giving them a guided tour of the won-
ders of the deep.
328 Aristotle, History of Animals 536a9–15, notes that the frog is capable
of making its distinctive croaking, called ὀλολυγών (ololugōn), because
of the peculiar formation of its tongue, and that it constitutes the male
mating call. Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 13, states that the call is like
a lover’s serenade.
329 Plutarch, Natural Questions 912C, repeats and elaborates this claim,
stating that the frog emits this croak as a sign of joy, in happy anticipa-
tion of the approach of rain.
330 The halcyon, although frequently mentioned in ancient sources, is of
uncertain identity. Aristotle, History of Animals 542b21–25, states that it
is the bird most rarely seen, appearing only at the setting of the Pleiades
and at the solstice.
331 On the swallow and bee as stereotypic examples of animals whose be-
havior serves as a model for human beings, see Introduction to On the
Cleverness of Animals note 9.
90
332 Zeus’ wife Hera, enraged that Leto was pregnant by her husband, for-
bade every land to allow her to give birth there, but the island of Delos,
which floated and was not moored to the sea bottom, allowed her to
give birth on it, and as a reward it was anchored to the sea bottom by
four pillars. Delos became especially dear to Apollo. See Callimachus,
Hymn to Delos 273.
333 Pliny, Natural History X. 89–90, notes of the halcyon that it breeds only
at midwinter, during what are called the “halcyon days,” at which time
the sea is calm and navigable.
334 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus speaks at length, Whether Beasts Are Ra-
tional 989A and 990C–D, of the natural chastity of non-human animals,
which he contrasts with the promiscuity of human beings. See Whether
Beasts Are Rational, Commentary notes 72–74.
335 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 17, mentions a bird called the κηρύλος
(kērulos) which lives with the halcyon, which carries it on its back when
the kērulos is old and feeble. Aelian contrasts this considerate treatment
of the elderly with the scorn that human beings have for old people.
Aristotle, History of Animals 593b14, mentions the kērulos in the course
of his description of the halcyon but does not offer any anecdotes of its
behavior.
336 Aristotle, History of Animals 616a19–32, describes the construction of
the nest of the halcyon, which he states is made of the bones of the gar-
fish. Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 17, gives an account of the building
of the nest of the halcyon that agrees closely with that given in Plutarch.
337 Both Bouffartigue 60 note 409, and LiCausi and Pomelli 491 note 280,
take note of the fact that it is not clear to what object Phaedimus is re-
ferring that is often observeable.
338 Homer, Odyssey VI. 162, slightly altered.
339 The altar of horns is mentioned as a marvel by Martial, Book of Specta-
cles 1. 4, and Ovid, Heroides XXI. 99–102, numbers it among the won-
ders of Delos, but Plutarch is the first author who includes it among the
Seven Wonders.
340 There is a lacuna here, and the text of the remainder of the chapter is
uncertain in places so that the meaning remains unclear.
341 There is a lacuna here as well, and the connection of the text with the
previous sentence is in doubt. At 966A, Aristotimus states that Apollo
is never called “Conger-slayer.”
342 There seems to be some geographical confusion in the account given
here. Leptis Magna on the Libyan coast, the site to which Plutarch seems
to refer, does not appear to have had a cult of Poseidon. At Table Talk
730D, Plutarch again mentions Leptis as a cult site of Poseidon where the
priests abstain from fish, and he numbers as well the Egyptians, Syrians
and some Greeks among those who avoid fish. The motivation of those
groups, he suggests there, is a desire to act justly and to remove luxury
from their diet. Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 61, agrees that the Syrians
eat no fish, and at IV. 7, he mentions that some Egyptians avoid fish.
343 Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 16, reports that the priests at Eleusis ab-
stain from fish and fowl.
344 The sea-hare is a mollusc with two projections that resemble the ears of
a hare. Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 45, states that it resembles a snail
without a shell. He notes that it causes stomach pain or death when
eaten.
91
3 45 See note 91.

346 A lacuna must be assumed here. The grammar is incoherent.
347 The third Homeric Hymn to Apollo 393–403 relates how Apollo, in the
guise of a dolphin, guided Cretan sailors to Cirrha, near Delphi.
348 The name Soteles has been supplied here by editors from Plutarch, On
Isis and Osiris 361F, where the anecdote is also related, including the
name of Soteles.
349 Tacitus, Histories IV. 83–84, tells this anecdote of Ptolemy I Soter (ca.
367–282 bce) in some detail.
350 The claim that the dolphin is partial to music is found repeatedly in
ancient sources. In Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages 162F, the inter-
locutor Solon remarks that it is well known that the dolphin loves music
and will follow it. Pliny, Natural History XI. 137, claims that dolphins
can obviously hear because they are enchanted by music and can be
caught when under its spell.
351 Pindar, fragment 140b Snell-Maehler.
352 With this claim that dolphins alone among non-human animals have
an affection for human beings as human beings, Plutarch inaugurates
a series of anecdotal accounts (984C–985B) of behaviors by dolphins
that seem to indicate in them what would be viewed, if seen in human
beings, as instances of altruism, philanthropy, and a sense of reciprocal
justice. R. H. Barrow, Plutarch (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967) 116,
has written, with reference to this set of anecdotes, “The long section
given to the dolphin as the most intelligent of animals (the only one
which takes the initiative in becoming friendly with man), anticipates
in small compass what is now being written about this animal.” Bar-
row is referring to instances reported by cognitive ethologists of dol-
phins that come to the aid of their fellow-dolphins when they perceive
that they are injured, and likewise to reports of dolphins raising out of
the water human beings whom they see foundering and carrying them
safely to shore.
The ethical dimension of such actions is currently the subject of in-
tense debate among philosophers and animal behavioral scientists.
They ask whether such behaviors on the part of non-human animals
qualify them to be viewed as moral agents, that is, as individuals who
perform actions for moral purposes: do the dolphins intend to help?
This would require on the part of the aiding animals sufficient mental
capacities to allow for perspective taking on their part, that is, for the
recognition that another creatures is in need and that they can help.
Philosophers and cognitive ethologists who deny the possibility that
non-human animals can be moral agents argue that animals would have
to have language to articulate the position that they act out of a desire
to help. In the terms of the argument developed in On the Cleverness of
Animals, the anecdotes in 984C–985B clearly suggest to Plutarch what
would now be viewed as moral agency, while his Stoic opponents would
argue that the lack of reason and of meaningful language on the part
of non-human animals would render such agency impossible. For a de-
tailed analysis of these sections in On the Cleverness of Animals, see
Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 5, “Beauty in the Beast:
Cooperation, Altruism and Philanthropy among Animals,” pp. 76–84.
353 It is rather surprising that Plutarch merely alludes here to the most fa-
mous ancient tale of dolphin “philanthropy,” that of the rescue of the
92
singer Arion by a dolphin, which was retold in classical authors with

various interpretations and emphases. Herodotus, Histories I. 23–24,
recounts that the poet Arion of Methymna on Lesbos, when set adrift
by Corinthian sailors who sought to rob him of the money that he had
earned on a concert tour, was rescued by a dolphin that carried him
back to the court of Periander of Corinth where he was staying. On
returning to the court of Periander, the sailors told him that Arion had
safely reached his destination of Taenarum in Sicily, but when the singer
appeared in court, the sailors were arrested. Pliny, Natura History IX.
28, adds the detail that the animal was drawn by the sound of Arion’s
playing since dolphins love music. Aelian, Nature of Animals XII. 45,
likewise emphasizes the love of music characteristic of dolphins. The
tale is recounted at some length in Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages
161A–162D, where it is heavily moralized. A school of dolphins is now
involved, and the animals are said to behave toward Arion in a manner
“kindly-disposed” (ϵὐμϵνω̑ς, eumenōs) toward him. For an analysis of
the passage in Banquet of the Seven Sages, see Stephen T. Newmyer,
“Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium,” in José
Ribeiro Ferreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias,
eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Es-
tudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009)
497–507, and “Human-Animal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary
on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas,
eds., Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco-Roman Antiq-
uity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 242–248.
354 See 969E.
355 Homer, Iliad IX. 56.
356 At Banquet of the Seven Sages 161D, Plutarch says that the animals
worked as a team carrying the body, passing it along from one to the
other, as if they viewed it as a duty necessary and incumbent upon all of
them.
357 Myrtilus of Methymna on Lesbos (third century bce) wrote Lesbiaka, a
history of Lesbos. The passage referred to is preserved as Fragmenta der
Griechischen Historiker III. 477.
358 This anecdote is recounted at length by Plutarch at Banquet of the Seven
Sages 163A–D.
359 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 15, recounts this tale at length. In his
account the youth was accidentally killed when his veins were severed
by the dorsal fin of the dolphin during vigorous play with the animal.
Aelian does not speculate, as does Plutarch, on the feelings of the dol-
phin at having caused the death of its human playmate. Pliny, Natural
History IX. 27, gives an unadorned version of the anecdote, mentioning
only the mutual affection of the boy and the dolphin.
360 Bouffartigue 134 note 439, observes, “Le type du personnage chevau-
chant un dauphin est relativement commun dans la numismatique
grecque.”
361 On modern accounts of such aiding behavior on the part of dolphins,
see note 353.
362 Archilochus, fragment 192 West. This is the sole source for the verse.
363 Plutarch here suggests that some animals are capable of the emotion
of grief. Pliny, Natural History IX. 25, offers a very similar tale of dol-
phin grief, in the case of a dolphin that played with a boy at Naples and
93
allowed him to ride on its back. When the boy died of natural causes,
the dolphin came to their usual meeting place and “sad, and in the man-
ner of a mourner, it also died of grief, as no one could doubt” (tristis et
maerenti similis ipse quoque, quod nemo dubitaret, desiderio expiravit).
Aristotle and the Stoics denied that non-human animals were capable
of true emotions because they were functions of reason and involved
mental operations that non-human animals could not perform. For a
discussion of ancient views on the operation of the emotions, and of cur-
rent scientific and philosophical debate on the question of the emotional
capacities of non-human animals, see notes 24 and 35.
364 Stesichorus, fragment 225 Page.
365 Nothing is known of this author.
366 This anecdote is otherwise unknown.
367 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 867 Radt.
368 Neither side is declared victorious, but both sides are commended for
making a successful case for the presence of reason in non-human ani-
mals. On the question of whether the ending of the treatise is complete
as it survives in the manuscripts, see Introduction, pp. 1–2 and note 2.
94
2
WHETHER BEASTS AR E
R ATIONAL,
OR
GRYLLUS
(BRUTA ANIMALIA
R ATIONE UTI )
Introduction
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if
the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they
only know their own side of the question.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863), Chapter 2
In the opening lines of the Introduction to his translation of Plutarch’s di-

alogue Whether Beasts Are Rational, also known as Gryllus, William C.
Helmbold calls attention to a number of issues that have complicated study
of this brief but charming work,
Many will find this little jeu d’esprit as pleasant reading as anything
in Plutarch. In part, this may be due to its (perhaps accidental) brev-
ity; but its originality and freshness are undeniable. These qualities
have, to be sure, puzzled a number of scholars who are still disputing
whether the sources are principally Epicurean or Peripatetic or Cynic.1
Helmbold, with a gentle swipe at the long-w indedness normally characteris-
tic of Plutarch, calls attention to the brevity of the treatise, due perhaps, he
suggests, to imperfect transmission of the text; to its relatively lighthearted
nature, which is in sharp contrast to the seriousness which marks On the
Cleverness of Animals and On Eating Meat; to its apparent generic unique-
ness; and to the identity of the several philosophical schools that have been
regarded by scholars as potential sources for the theoretical portions of
the dialogue. Underlying Helmbold’s characterization of Whether Beasts
Are Rational is a recognition of the fundamental disjunction between the
amusing tone of the work, arising in part from its parodic features, and the
work’s engagement with ideas traceable to a number of philosophical tradi-
tions that suggests some deeper message beneath its playful exterior. This
95
W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L
playfulness led Helmbold to speculate that Plutarch may have written the
dialogue “when he was quite young,”2 on the assumption that the mature
and serious Plutarch would not have produced such a witty miniature. The
work provides no internal clues to its date of composition, which is not sur-
prising in view of its mythological setting, and some scholars have argued
that the work’s uncertain relationship to a number of philosophical schools
complicates the issue of dating.3
The narrative framework of Whether Beasts Are Rational, which contrib-
utes to the originality and freshness of the work which Helmbold acknowl-
edges, is at the same time the principal source of scholarly debate on the
philosophical allegiance and intent of the little work. Whether Beasts Are Ra-
tional is the only extant Plutarchan dialogue with a mythological setting and
with characters drawn from the world of Greek myth, a circumstance which
might be expected to cast doubt on the serious intent of the argument set forth
in the dialogue. Moreover, the work advances a position that one does not
encounter in either On the Cleverness of Animals or On Eating Meat, namely,
that non-human animals are intellectually and morally superior to human
beings.4 When one takes into account the fact that this provocative thesis is
advanced in Whether Beasts Are Rational by a pig endowed with speech, the
reason for the frustration voiced by scholars who have attempted to assess the
message of the little work becomes clear. Can the reader, scholars have asked,
give credence to moral philosophy expounded by a talking pig?
As is the case with a number of Plutarch’s philosophical treatises, the
Greek title of the dialogue, translated in this volume as Whether Beasts Are
Rational, does not adequately represent the contents of the work. The Greek
title, Πϵρὶ του̑ τὰ ἄλογα λόγῳ χρη̑σθαι (Peri tou ta aloga logōi chrēsthai), may
be rendered as On the Use of Reason by Animals. Since Plutarch is known
to have composed another work, now lost, with a very similar title, some
confusion has arisen as to which of these works has survived.5 Plutarch’s
philosophical works are more frequently referred to by Latin titles, given to
them at some later date, which are often even less faithful representations of
the contents of the works in question than are the Greek titles.6 Two Latin ti-
tles are attached to Whether Beasts Are Rational, and most scholars refer to
the work by some translation of the longer of these, Bruta Animalia Ratione
Uti, which is a close translation of the Greek title of the work. The work is
also referred to as Gryllus, from the name assigned to the talking pig who
delivers the philosophical message of the dialogue.
The Greek name “Gryllus” is derived from the verb γρυλίξω (grūlizō),
“grunt,” as of a pig, and the noun γρυ̑λος or γρυ̑λλος (grūlos, grūllos) signi-
fies a pig, or “grunter.”7 Hence, the name of the swinish interlocutor in the
dialogue may be translated as “Squeaker” or “Grunter” or “Oinker.” The
name Gryllus is assigned, somewhat offhandedly, to the pig who is endowed
with speech and assigned to present the point of view of non-human animals
in Whether Beasts Are Rational. The dialogue is a reimagining of the famous
96
scene in Homer’s Odyssey (X. 203–574) in which the hero Odysseus asks the
witch Circe to return his men to human form from the pig form into which
she has turned them. In Plutarch’s reworking of the scene, the witch suggests
to Odysseus that this might not be so simple as he supposes, for they might
in fact not desire to leave their present form and to return to life as human
beings (986A). She singles out one pig and endows him with speech so that
Odysseus may sound him out on the subject, and when the hero asks Circe
by what name he should address him, she suggests that “Gryllus” is as good
a name as any (986B). When Odysseus explains to Gryllus that he has peti-
tioned Circe to reconvert his men, Gryllus stops him up short, and assures
him that he has come to realize, now that he has experienced both states,
that life as a pig is preferable to life as a human being, whom he labels that
most wretched of animals (986D–E).
Although the narrative setting of Whether Beasts Are Rational is most di-
rectly dependent on Odyssey X, scholars have in recent years argued that the
rather negative portrayal of Odysseus in Plutarch’s dialogue shows the in-
fluence of post-Homeric Greek literature, in particular of tragedy, in which
the cruelty and vanity of the hero are stressed.8 At the beginning of the
dialogue, Odysseus admits that he will gain glory among his fellow Greeks
if he succeeds in his mission to have his comrades returned to human form
(985E), and Circe mocks him for his “love of honor” (philotimiān) which
she suggests might prove detrimental to himself as well as to his comrades.
The witch hints here at the subsequent argument of the dialogue, a signifi-
cant portion of which is devoted to an exposition of the idea that qualities
that appear to be virtues in human beings are after all perversions of those
virtues, and that humans are naïve and misguided in believing that they
are in possession of excellences that are present in pure form only in non-
human animals. It is the philosophical agenda of the talking pig to prove
the truth of this position in the course of the dialogue, and the eloquent
pig employs Odysseus as a straw man whose arguments he demolishes by a
demonstration that non-human animals are by nature predisposed to those
virtues to which humans mistakenly lay claim (987B). Ironically, it is a pig
who systematically lays bare the pretensions and cruelties of Greece’s most
illustrious living hero.9
Gryllus proceeds to prove that life as a pig is preferable to life as a hu-
man being by demonstrating, in the bulk of his presentation, that other
animals excel humans in those virtues to which humans most like to lay
claim. The soul of non-human animals, he begins, is like a field whose soil
is so fertile that it produces its crops without need of cultivation: so does the
soul of non-human animals produce a crop of virtues (987A). This, Gryl-
lus explains, is because the soul of non-human animals is “more naturally
adapted” (euphuesterān, 987B) and “more perfectly formed” (teleioterān,
987B) toward the production of virtue. Moreover, in non-human animals
the virtues appear in their pure and genuine form. The virtues that Gryllus
97
singles out for discussion are those often viewed as the “cardinal virtues”
in Greek philosophical thought: “wisdom” (phronēsis), “courage” (andreiā),
“justice” (dikaiosunē), and “temperance/moderation” (sōphrosunē).10 Not
surprisingly, Gryllus begins his examination of the virtues with an analy-
sis of “courage,” for this is an attribute closely associated with Odysseus
and one in which the hero takes especial pride. In human beings, Gryllus
argues, courage is more accurately to be described as a fear of punishment
and disgrace: humans act with apparent bravery merely to avoid disgrace
(988C). Ironically, Odysseus, known for his clever tongue, offers no rebuttal
to Gryllus’ charges, but merely comments on the pig’s eloquence and urges
him to expound his views on “temperance” (988F).
Gryllus’ strategy in discussing temperance is similar to that employed in
his discussion of courage: he argues that non-human animals display the
virtue in a pure and undiluted form. Only human beings covet riches, elabo-
rate feasts and unseemly sexual pleasures. Non-human animals, in contrast,
control their desires in all of these things (989F). The pig argues for the su-
periority of non-human animal behavior in the matter of desires by offering
a classification of types of desires: those that are natural and necessary, like
food; those that are natural but unnecessary, like sex; and those that are
unnatural and unnecessary, like elaborate meals and expensive clothing and
jewels (989B–C).11 Only human beings care for such luxuries, while other
animal species content themselves with modest and easily-attainable meals
and sexual intercourse only in season (990B–C). Nor do non-human ani-
mals indulge in homosexual unions as do the heroes of Greece (990D–E).12
The conclusion that Gryllus draws from this line of argument arises directly
from the thesis that underlines his comparison of human and non-human
animal behavior throughout his discussion of the cardinal virtues, namely,
that non-human animals are superior to human beings in that their conduct
is in accord with nature and does not do violence to that nature (990F).
Gryllus’ consideration of temperance concludes with a comparison of the
eating habits of humans and of other animal species, which bears a close
resemblance to the set of arguments marshalled in Plutarch’s treatise On
Eating Meat to prove that the eating habits of human beings are marked by
excess and violence. Human beings, Gryllus argues, unlike other animals,
cannot be satisfied with simple foods that are easily attainable and simply
prepared, but they seek out the exotic and luxurious, and sustain their own
lives by depriving other species of theirs in a cruel and bloodthirsty man-
ner (991C). A further proof of human incontinence is the fact that, unlike
other species, humans are omnivorous: nothing escapes the appetites of
man (991D).
At the point where Gryllus takes up the third of the “cardinal virtues,”
“wisdom” (phronēsis), a break in the text occurs that renders it impossi-
ble to gain a full picture of his case against humans, but in many respects,
Gryllus’ surviving assertions recall Plutarch’s characterizations of animal
98
intellect in On the Cleverness of Animals, although Gryllus’ presentation

is relatively compressed. Gryllus’ presentation on animal wisdom is intro-
duced abruptly, in the course of a discussion of the use of condiments by
humans to season their meals (991D), an indication that a lacuna is to be
suspected at this juncture. The pig’s thesis in his treatment of this virtue is
identical to that encountered in his discussion of temperance: non-human
animals possess wisdom by nature. They know without instruction how to
tend their wounds and how to self-medicate with soothing and healing herbs
and drugs (991E–F). In this activity, Gryllus contends, nature is the teacher,
and if Odysseus refuses to call this wisdom, he must devise some other ap-
propriate name by which to describe the phenomenon (991F).
The conclusions that Gryllus draws from his examples of animal behav-
iors suggesting the presence of wisdom in non-human animals are once
again highly reminiscent of Plutarch’s position on the presence of reason in
non-humans. On the basis of his examples, the pig asserts that the soul of
non-human animals is not “without a share” (amoiros, 992C) of reason and
intelligence, a choice of words that calls to mind the statement of the inter-
locutor near the beginning of On the Cleverness of Animals, that all animals
“have a share of reason and understanding” (960A).13 Shortly after (992D),
Gryllus asserts that reason exists in non-human animals in a “more or less”
relation, again recalling arguments set forth in On the Cleverness of Ani-
mals, and he employs the same verb (metechein, 992D) to describe the notion
of “shared” reason that Autobulus had employed in On the Cleverness of An-
imals 960A. Unfortunately, the text of Whether Beasts Are Rational breaks
off just as Odysseus asks the pig how creatures that have no knowledge of
the divine can be reckoned to be rational.14 The pig’s response, and any dis-
cussion that might have followed of the fourth “cardinal virtue,” “justice”
(dikaiosunē), are missing.15
As Helmbold has observed,16 one of the most challenging aspects of study
of Whether Beasts Are Rational is the determination of its philosophical
allegiance or allegiances, and scholars have drawn varied conclusions on
the topic of Plutarch’s borrowings from Greek philosophical schools. The
question is complicated by the fact that a number of the pig’s observations
may be traced to more than one school. Gryllus’ repeated emphasis on the
simple life led by non-human animals that contrasts sharply with the love
of luxury and self-indulgence characteristic of human life, echoes the praise
of austerity and the rejection of excess that are encountered in Stoic, Cynic
and Epicurean depictions of ideal human conduct. Gryllus’ often-repeated
claim that non-human animals are immune to desires and passions that are
foreign to them recalls the Stoic injunction to “live according to nature,”
a goal to which human beings, according to Stoic teaching, should strive
and one which, in Gryllus’ estimation, non-human animals cannot fail to
attain.17 Other scholars have viewed Whether Beasts Are Rational as es-
sentially Cynic in inspiration, beginning with the pronounced theriophilic
99
bent of the work in which human life is denigrated by praising the simple
and unspoiled lives of other animals. Further Cynic touches in the work
include Gryllus’ insistence that human beings are the unhappiest of animal
species (986D–E), the assertion that the desire for fame, riches and sexual
indulgences, characteristic of human beings but not of other animals, is
blameworthy, and the claim that the life of non-human animals is preferable
because it naturally rejects all unnecessary behaviors.18 Some have viewed
Gryllus’ classification of desires (989B–C) as a borrowing from Epicurean
thought.19
It is important to keep in mind, in discussing the sources of Gryllus’ phil-
osophical pronouncements, that these are after all the musings of a talking
pig, and that therefore his entire presentation may be ironically intended.
Plutarch may have wished to mock the schools whose doctrines are set forth
with such solemnity by the earnest porker. Although the ideas that Gryllus
presents may in themselves be deserving of careful consideration, the heap-
ing up of philosophical commonplaces derived from several schools may
be an aspect of the humor of the little dialogue and not the exposition of a
consistent and serious philosophical position. This fact requires the reader
to confront the difficult question posed by Whether Beasts Are Rational:
how is one to evaluate Gryllus and the message that he presents? That is to
say, what exactly is Gryllus? If he can speak, he must be viewed as human
since, in Greek thought, non-human animals do not have genuine speech
because they are not rational.20 David Konstan has argued that Gryllus
must therefore be viewed either as purely a pig or as a human in pig form,
for there is no third choice.21 Hence, Gryllus cannot be viewed as a talk-
ing pig because he would have to be rational. Tom Hawkins has described
the idea of talking animals in Greek thought as a “category crisis,” and he
concludes that Plutarch did not intend the reader to believe that Gryllus or
other non-human animals are truly rational and therefore capable of the
virtues that Gryllus ascribes to them.22 Such speculation on the complex
issue of Gryllus’ identity and function in the context of Whether Beasts Are
Rational leads to the surprising conclusion that, in some respects at least,
the work is more difficult to interpret than are the more substantial and
philosophically dense Plutarchan treatises on animals, On Eating Meat and
On the Cleverness of Animals.
Although Whether Beasts Are Rational cannot be said to have earned a
place in the history of philosophical speculation on human–non-human an-
imal interactions and obligations by its anticipation of ideas encountered in
current animal rights philosophy, as have both On Eating Meat and On the
Cleverness of Animals, the little work has enjoyed an afterlife not shared by
the other two works. Homer’s episode of the encounter of Odysseus with the
formidable witch Circe, the passage supplying the narrative framework for
Plutarch’s dialogue, proved immensely influential on subsequent European
literature in the works of authors who were fascinated by the dynamic of the
100
relationship of the hero with the seductive and dangerous witch.23 The epi-
sode of Circe’s conversion of Odysseus’ men into animals finds a prominent
place in such postclassical retellings of the Homeric scene. In his dialogue
Circe, published in 1549, Giambattista Gelli (1498–1563) portrays the pig-
convert Grillo, who joins an oyster, a mole, a buck, an elephant and other
animals, arguing, as had Plutarch’s Gryllus, that it is preferable to be any
animal but a human being.
Plutarch’s dialogue proved influential upon seventeenth-c entury French
writers as well who took the episode of Odysseus’ encounter with a talking
pig in a quite new direction. The theologian Fénelon (1651–1715), remem-
bered today primarily for his didactic novel Les Aventures de Télémaque
(1699), likewise inspired by Homer, included in his collection Dialogues des
Morts (1693) a dialogue entitled “Ulisse et Grille,” which draws its inspira-
tion from Odysseus’ remark near the end of Plutarch’s dialogue (992E) that
one cannot judge as rational animals that have no knowledge of the divine.
In Fénelon’s dialogue, the pig rejects the false immortality that Odysseus’
quest for fame confers, and describes the true immortality that Christian-
ity offers. Without true religion, Grille argues, human beings would be no
better than beasts. Fénelon is not arguing that a pig is superior to a human
being, but rather that a human being has the hope of true salvation if he
follows a life of virtue.24 The distinguishing characteristic of the French pig
is his ability to envision the rewards of true faith to which Odysseus, who
worships fame in the manner of the Greeks, remains blind. It is interesting
to speculate on what Plutarch, dedicated priest of Apollo at Delphi who
never makes mention of Christianity, would have thought of Fénelon’s pious
reimagining of his pig-philosopher Gryllus, who is well schooled in pagan
ethical theory. Perhaps, as an ardent student of religions, Plutarch would
have found the sermonizing French pig intriguing and amusing.
Notes
1 Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, eds., Plutarch: Moralia XII
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957) 489.
2 Helmbold 490, with a tart comment on Plutarch’s usual prolixity, “It is only too
likely that the more mature Plutarch would have gone on and on.”
3 Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali:
introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995)
21–33, discusses the complicated issue of Plutarch’s philosophical borrowings
in Whether Beasts Are Rational, and labels the work (34) “un’ operetta fonda-
mentalmente retorica” that shows no strict allegiance to any one school and that
does not allow for the conclusion that the work is early.
4 See Giuseppina Santese, “Animali e Razionalità in Plutarco,” in S. Castignone
and G. Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo Antico (Pisa: Edizioni ETS,
1994) 160, “Ci troviamo, come è evidente, nel Grillo, in presenza di una chi-
ara, decisa affermazione della superiorità etica e razionale dell’ animale, tesi
che però non trova riscontro altrove nell’ opera plutarchea.” The notion that
101
non-human animals are morally superior to humans and at least as rational as

they has been dubbed “theriophily,” or “love of beasts,” a position which George
Boas, “Theriophily,” in Philip P. Wiener, ed., Dictionary of the History of Ideas
(New York: Scribners, 1973) IV, 384, defines as “a complex of ideas which ex-
presses an admiration for the ways and character of animals.” Boas notes that
ideas put forward by proponents of this position often include the assertion that
non-human animals are either as rational as humans, or, if less so, that they are
better off without developed reason, and that they are happier than humans
and more morally advanced. Boas views ancient expressions of such ideas as a
reaction to Aristotle’s position that only man is a rational animal, and he calls
attention to the fact that theriophilic sentiments in ancient literature may be
merely ironic, intended not so much to elevate non-human animals as to casti-
gate human beings for their failings. James E. Gill, “Theriophily in Antiquity:
A Supplementary Account,” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969) 401–412,
provides a more detailed analysis of the place of Whether Beasts Are Rational in
the history of theriophilic thought than is found in Boas, and he concludes (412)
that in the treatise “the major elements of the tradition of theriophily have at
least been united into an argument which is coherent if not logical.”
5 The so-called Catalogue of Lamprias, a listing, of uncertain date, of the works
of Plutarch, gives as numbers 127 and 135 two works of similar title, one of which
may refer to the extant treatise Whether Beasts Are Rational. The other of these
works is lost. Angelo Casanova, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta an-
imalia ratione uti,” in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and
Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A.
Stadter by the International Plutarch Society (Málaga: University of Málaga
Press and Logan: Utah State University Press, 2005) 121–131, argues that the ti-
tle Whether Beasts Are Rational cannot be correct for the work so entitled, since
it more accurately reflects the subject matter of On the Cleverness of Animals.
6 On the difficulties posed by the titles by which Plutarch’s philosophical treatises
are known, see D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 164, “The
conventional Greek titles … are probably not Plutarch’s own; the Latin titles
vary somewhat in different editions.”
7 Lucas Herchenroeder, “τί γαρ του̑το πρὸς τὸν λόγον; Plutarch’s Gryllus and the
So-Called Grylloi,” American Journal of Philology 129 (2008) 347–379, notes that
Whether Beasts Are Rational has been studied principally for its connection to
philosophy, while its connection to Greek comedy has been neglected. He points
out that the Greek noun grūllos also referred to a type of vulgar dance, and he
speculates that the dialogue may have been accorded some form of dramatic
presentation.
8 Angelo Casanova, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e la Tradizione della Figura di Ulisse,”
Plutarchos N. S. 4 (2006/2007) 19–28, argues that the figure of Odysseus in
Whether Beasts Are Rational is more directly influenced by the portrayal of the
hero in Odyssey XII than in Odyssey X, and he maintains that Plutarch was in-
fluenced more heavily by post-Homeric literature, especially by tragedy, than by
Homer in his negative portrait of Odysseus, whose wiliness and dishonesty are
rather favorably portrayed in Homer. He argues some of these same points in “Il
Grillo di Plutarco e Omero,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les Grecs de l’Antiquité et
les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: UL3, 2005) 97–109.
9 The Greek reader would not have missed the irony involved in a narrative in
which a pig gets the better of a wily Greek hero since the pig was held in low re-
gard by the Greeks. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II. 160, notes that the Stoic
Chrysippus (ca. 280–207 bce) is said to have remarked that the gods furnished
102
the pig with a soul that acted like salt, to preserve the animal until a human be-
ing could eat it.
10 The cardinal virtues as given in Plutarch correspond to those listed in Plato
(Republic 427a–434c), but others are at times included in ancient enumerations.
For a helpful discussion of the cardinal virtues, see Helen North, “Canons and
Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature,” in Luitpold
Wallach, ed., The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor
of Harry Caplan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) 165–183. For a more
detailed discussion of the place of the cardinal virtues in Whether Beasts Are
Rational, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Human-A nimal Interactions in Plutarch
as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund
Thomas, eds., Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco-Roman An-
tiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252. Christophe Bréchet, “La
Philosophie de Gryllos,” in Boulogne 43–61, maintains that the argument set
forth by Gryllus is in fact more immediately indebted to Plato’s tripartite divi-
sion of the soul (Republic 435b ff.) than to ancient enumerations of the cardinal
virtues, and that Gryllus argues that, in each of its parts, the soul of the non-
human animal is equal or superior to that of the human being: in the case of the
“appetitive” (epithūmētikon) part of the soul, non-human animals are not subject
to excesses common in human beings; in the “spirited” (thūmoeides) part, the
animal soul is purer; and in the “rational” (logistikon) part, the non-human soul
is not inferior to that of the human.
In the dialogue De animalibus (On Animals) by the Jewish philosopher Philo of
Alexandria (ca. 20 bce–ca. 50 ce), which survives only in an Armenian transla-
tion, the interlocutor Alexander discusses at considerable length the excellences
of non-human animals, illustrating in succession their wisdom, moderation,
courage and justice (10–71). Many of the examples of the virtues that Philo cites
are those found in Gryllus’ presentation, suggesting a common source for both
authors. On the use of stock examples in classical accounts of animal behav-
ior, including those of Plutarch and Philo, see Introduction note 9 to On the
Cleverness of Animals. The Armenian text of Philo’s On Animals is translated,
with extensive commentary, in Abraham Terian, ed., Philonis Alexandrini de An-
imalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary
(Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).
11 The classification of desires presented here by Gryllus is most closely associated
in ancient philosophy with the ethical doctrine of Epicurus; see his Letter to
Menoeceus 127–128 and his Principal Doctrines (Kuriai Doxai) XXIX.
12 The Greeks seem to have taken an inordinate interest in the question of whether
non-human animals engage in same-sex unions. Plato (Laws 836c) states that
they do not, while Pliny the Elder (Natural History X. 166) records that hens en-
gage in activity that resembles sexual union if they cannot locate male partners.
Modern biology has shown that Gryllus is mistaken. Bruce Bagemihl, Biological
Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 1999), shows that homosexual activity can be isolated in 400 species.
13 On the function of this concept as the central thesis of On the Cleverness of Ani-
mals, see Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 3–4.
14 For a discussion of ancient notions on the possibility that non-human animals
have a concept of the divine, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Reflect: An-
cients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbi-
nati di Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129.
15 Ironically, Plutarch’s treatise On Eating Meat also breaks off just as the topic
of justice toward non-human animals is about to be taken up (999B). For a
103
discussion of Plutarch’s views on the issue of whether human beings have a debt
of justice toward other species, and of whether non-human animals have a sense
of justice operative in their own lives, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights
and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge,
2006) Chapter 3, “Just Beasts: Animal Morality and Human Justice,” 48–65.
16 See Introduction, pp. 95–96 and note 1.
17 In his Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius states (VII. 87) that already
Zeno (ca. 334–ca. 262 bce), the founder of the school, had espoused the doctrine
that the goal of human life was to live in accord with nature. While the exact
meaning of this assertion has been much debated, it appears to entail the idea
that, in the case of human beings, living in accord with their nature requires
them to live a life of reason and to choose virtuous behavior over excess and
perversion. Because, in Stoic teaching, non-human animals are viewed as irra-
tional, they cannot choose to live a life of virtue. For them, living in accord with
nature involves heeding the promptings of “impulse” (hormē) which guides them
and allows them to live successful if not virtuous lives. For a helpful discus-
sion of the possible connotations of the Stoic concept of “living in accord with
nature,” see Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2005) 134–153.
18 The Cynic borrowings in Whether Beasts Are Rational are analyzed in detail
in Jorge Bergua Cavero, “Cinismo, Ironía y Retórica en el Bruta ratione uti de
Plutarco,” in Estudios sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y Naturaleza (Madrid: Ediciones
Clásicas, 1991) 13–19. For a discussion of the Cynic denunciation of unnecessary
luxuries and of the Cynic understanding of the concept of “living in accord with
nature,” see William Desmond, Cynics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 2008) 77–161. Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken
der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam:
Grüner, 1977) 188–191, argues that Whether Beasts Are Rational is influenced by
Cynic satire, in which heroic ideals were regularly mocked and comparison of
contrasting lifestyles was made by someone who had known both. Thus, in his
view, Plutarch’s intention in the dialogue was to imbue a Cynic genre with his
own ethical and psychological ideas.
19 See note 11. For a survey of scholarly opinions on Epicurean elements in Whether
Beasts Are Rational, see Indelli 22–24.
20 See John Heath, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the Other in Homer,
Aeschylus, and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 6, “The
primacy of reason as a distinguishing criterion derived over time from the far
more obvious fact of experience that beasts do not speak. ‘Dumb’ animals do
not possess any language.” For a historical survey of classical ideas on the na-
ture of animal vocalization, and of the part played by reason in the capacity for
meaningful language in any species, see Maria Fusco, “Il Linguaggio degli An-
imali nel Pensiero Antico: Una Sintesi Storica,” Studi Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44.
Fusco’s discussion of Plutarch (30–32) is limited largely to content summary of
Whether Beasts Are Rational. See also Thorsten Fögen, “Animal Communica-
tion,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in
Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 216–232.
21 David Konstan, “A Pig Convicts Itself of Unreason: The Implicit Argument of
Plutarch’s Gryllus,” Hyperboreus 16–17 (2010–2011) 371–385. For an enlighten-
ing discussion of some of the anthropological problems that the figure of Gryl-
lus presents as a human–non-human hybrid, see Pietro LiCausi and Roberto
Pomelli, eds., L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco,
Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2005) 200–202.
104
22 Tom Hawkins, “Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Litera-

ture,” Humanities 6, 3 (2017) doi: 10.3390/h6020037.
23 For a historical survey of this literature, see Bernhard Paetz, Kirke und Odys-
seus: Überlieferung und Deutung von Homer bis Calderón (Berlin: deGruyter,
1970). Paetz is particularly interested in appearances of the myth in Spanish
sources. Rather surprisingly, he does not mention Plutarch’s dialogue. Emma-
nuel Hatzantonis, “I Geniali Rimaneggiamenti dell’ Episodio Omerico di Circe
in Apollonio Rodio e Plutarco,” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 54 (1976)
5–24, taking note of Paetz’ omission of the Plutarchan reworking of the episode
in Whether Beasts Are Rational, offers a reading, consisting largely of content
summary, of Plutarch’s dialogue.
24 For a more detailed discussion of the appearance of Gryllus in seventeenth-
century French authors, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Of Pigs and People: Plutarch
and the French Beast Fable,” Ploutarchos 13, 1 (1996) 15–22, where additional
bibliography is cited. For discussion of Gryllus’ appearances in Spanish and
Italian literature, see Indelli 14–18.
105
Translation
Whether Beasts Are Rational,

or
Gryllus
(Bruta animalia ratione uti)1
(985) D 1. ODYSSEUS: I think I have learned these things, Circe, and I believe
I will remember them.2 But I would gladly learn from you whether you number
any Greeks among those whom you have changed from men to wolves and lions.3
E CIRCE: Many, my dear Odysseus. But why do you ask?

ODYSSEUS: Because, by Zeus, I think I would gain great honor among
the Greeks if, with your kind cooperation, I could take my comrades home,
restoring them to human form and not allowing them to grow old in the
bodies of wild beasts, against nature, enduring a miserable and inglorious
life in that form.4
CIRCE: Here’s a fellow who supposes that his own quest for honor should be
allowed to bring catastrophe, not only upon himself but, because of his stupidity,
on his companions and on people who have no connection with him!
ODYSSEUS: You’re stirring and brewing up another potion5 of words for
me, Circe! You will surely turn me into a beast if you convince me that it is
a catastrophe to turn F from a beast into a human being.
CIRCE: Haven’t you already done something even more astonishing to yourself in
rejecting an immortal and ageless life with me,6 and hurrying off through count-
less perils to a mortal wife who, I can assure you, is already an old woman, 986
so that you can become even more renowned and admired than you already are,
pursuing empty glory and a phantom instead of truth?7
ODYSSEUS: Let that be as you say, Circe. What’s the point of quarreling
repeatedly about the same things? Please oblige me and free the men.
CIRCE: By Hecate,8 it’s not that simple! These are no ordinary creatures. First
ask them if they wish it.9 If they refuse, my noble friend, reason with them and
bring them around. If you don’t persuade them and they come out on top in the
debate, be satisfied that you’re mistaken about yourself and your friends.
B ODYSSEUS: Why do you mock me, blessed lady? How could they de-
bate10 with me or I with them as long as they are asses and pigs and lions?
106
CIRCE: Take heart, most ambitious of men! I will give them understand-
ing11 and speech for your sake, or instead, one of them will be enough to
speak for all. There! Talk with that one.
ODYSSEUS: How shall I address him? Who was he among men?12
CIRCE: What difference does that make to your discussion?13 Call him
Gryllus,14 if you like. I’ll withdraw now so that he doesn’t seem to be trying
to please me, contrary to his own views.
C 2. GRYLLUS: Greetings, Odysseus!

ODYSSEUS: And to you, by Zeus!
GRYLLUS: What do you wish to ask me?
ODYSSEUS: Since I know that all of you were once human beings, I pity
you all, but it is natural that those who were Greeks who have fallen into this
misfortune should concern me more. Therefore, I’ve asked Circe to release
any one of you who wishes it and to restore him to his former appearance,
sending him home with us.
GRYLLUS: Stop, Odysseus! Not another word! We too all think poorly of
you since you were falsely acclaimed as a fellow who seemed more intelligent
than other men, you who fear a D change from worse to better because you
hadn’t given it any thought. Just as children fear medicines from their doctor15
and run away from their school lessons, things which convert them from sickly
and ignorant sorts into healthier and wiser beings, so have you shrunk away
from being transformed from one creature into another, and at this very mo-
ment you consult with Circe, shaking in fear that she may turn you into a pig or
a wolf before you realize it. And you urge us, who live with countless blessings,
to abandon all of them and the woman who provides them and to sail off with
you, having become once again human beings, E that most hard-pressed and
ill-fated of creatures!16
ODYSSEUS: It seems to me, Gryllus, that you lost not only your form but
your intelligence as well because of that potion!17 You’re full of strange and
utterly twisted notions. Perhaps some delight in this sort of body bewitched
you into taking on this shape?18
GRYLLUS: Neither of these, King of the Cephallenians.19 But if you would
like to reason together20 rather than to trade insults, I who have experienced
both sorts of life21 will easily win you over to realize that we rightly love this
manner of life rather than the other.
ODYSSEUS: I’m very eager to hear!
3. F GRYLLUS: And I to tell you. Let’s begin then with the virtues in which,
I see, you humans take great pride on the assumption that you humans excel
107
beasts in justice, wisdom, courage and the other virtues.22 But answer me
this, o wisest of men!23 I once heard you telling Circe about the land of the
Cyclopes24 that, although it is not plowed at all and although no one plants
anything there, yet it is by nature so excellent in quality that, on its own, it
produces every sort of crop. 987 Do you think more highly of this land than
of the harsh soil of Ithaca that feeds goats and scarcely yields even a small,
stingy and worthless harvest after much effort and struggle?25 And don’t
take offense and answer me out of regard for your homeland rather than in
accord with the truth.
ODYSSEUS: Well, I have no need to lie, for though I love and embrace my
homeland more, yet I praise and admire the other.
GRYLLUS: Well then, we shall say that the wisest of men B deems it right to
praise and approve one thing but to prefer and hold dear another. I suppose
you would have made the same answer about matters of the spirit too since the
situation is the same as with the land: that spiritual soil is better which produces
virtue without effort, just as is that land that produces crops spontaneously.
ODYSSEUS: It’s as you say.
GRY LLUS: Then you are at this moment agreeing that the soul of beasts is
more naturally suited and constituted for the production of virtue, for with-
out instruction or command, as if unsown and unplowed, it brings forth and
strengthens that virtue which is appropriate to each creature.26
ODYS SEUS: And that virtue is shared by animals, Gryllus?
4. GRYLLUS: What virtue, rather, is not found in them more so than in

the wisest of humans? C Take first the virtue of courage, in which you take
great pride, feeling no shame when you are called “bold”27 and “destroyer
of cities,”28 you who with tricks and ploys deceive men who know only a
forthright and noble manner of warfare and who have no acquaintance with
tricks and lies,29 and who give to your villainy the name of that virtue which
least countenances villainy. Yet you see that the style of attack against each
other and against you humans that animals employ is free of trickery and
artifice, for animals defend themselves with manifest courage and true valor.
Nor do they fear any D legal summons or indictment for desertion of duty.
Rather it is in their nature to flee subjugation and to maintain their courage
till the end. They are not beaten even when their bodies are vanquished
and they do not give up in spirit but die in the fray. When many animals
are perishing, their valor withdraws, along with their high-spiritedness, and
becomes gathered into one part of their body,30 standing strong against
their slayer, leaping about and flashing anger until, like a fire, it becomes
quenched altogether and dies out. They do not entreat their slayer nor do
they ask for pity or acknowledge defeat, nor does a lion become the slave to
a lion or a horse to a horse, E as a human does to a human, welcoming that
108
name that is derived from cowardice.31 In the case of those animals that hu-
mans overmaster by tricks and traps, those that are full-grown refuse food
and bear up against thirst, inviting and embracing death over slavery. To
nestlings and cubs, which are easily led and docile because of their age, they
offer all sorts of deceitful allurements and beguilements32 bewitching them,
and in time they build in them a taste for pleasures that are contrary to their
nature33 and that enfeeble their lives, so that in time they accept and endure
this so-called “taming” which is in reality a feminization of their courage.
F From these examples it is easy to see that courage is inborn in animals.
In humans, endurance34 is contrary to their nature. You can easily observe
this, excellent Odysseus, from the fact that in animals, the natural inclina-
tion toward courage is equal in the sexes and the female is in no way inferior
to the male35 in undertaking those tasks necessary to the struggle for life
and protection of offspring. You’ve heard of the sow of Crommyon which,
though female, caused Theseus such trouble.36 988 And her wisdom would
not have profited the Sphinx as she sat high upon Mt. Phicium37 weaving her
riddles and obscure pronouncements, had she not excelled the Thebans in
strength and courage. They say that the Teumesian vixen38 lived somewhere
around there, “a baleful creature,”39 and nearby the serpent that did battle
with Apollo for the oracle at Delphi.40 Your king received Aethe from the
Sicyonian as the price for exemption from military service.41 He planned
that admirably, since he preferred a brave and spirited horse to a cowardly
soldier! You have yourself observed that leopardesses and lionesses are in
no way inferior to the males in spirit and strength,42 whereas while you are
off at war, your wife sits at home by the hearth-fire, B not, like the swallows,
defending herself from those who come against her and her household, even
though she’s a Spartan.43 Why would I bother to mention Carian and Maeo-
nian women?44 It is obvious from my examples that humans have by nature
no share of courage,45 for otherwise women would be equally courageous.
Thus it is that you practice courage under compulsion of law and not will-
ingly or intentionally but in servitude to custom or censure and the views
and opinions of outsiders. C You undergo dangers and difficulties, not be-
cause you are courageous but because you fear some other eventuality even
more,46 just as that one of your companions who arrives first takes up the
light oar not because he scorns it but rather because he fears and avoids the
heavier one, and just as one endures the lash so as not to be wounded and
defends himself against an enemy rather than be tortured or killed, not be-
cause he is courageous in facing those prospects but because he is afraid of
the other possibilities. Thus it is clear that your courage is in reality prudent
cowardice and your bravery is fear that knows how to escape some conse-
quences by embracing others. In short, if you suppose that you are superior
to beasts in courage, D why is it that your poets address the greatest fighters
as “wolf-minded” and lion-hearted” and “boar-like in courage,”47 but no
one of them addresses a lion as “man-hearted” or a boar as “man-like in
109
courage”? Just as, I believe, when poets call swift persons “wind-footed”48
and handsome men “god-like,”49 they exaggerate in their imagery, so do they
liken the work of the mighty warriors to higher things. The reason for this
is that high-spiritedness is, one might say, the tempering and cutting edge of
courage.50 Animals employ this in a pure form in their battles, whereas in
the case of you humans, it is mixed with calculation, E like wine with water,
so that it shrinks away in the face of dangers and is found wanting when it
is needed. Some of you deny that this high-spiritedness should have a place
at all in combat, and maintain that warriors should put it aside and employ
calculation instead. This is correctly reasoned in the case of self-preserva-
tion, but it is a base assertion as regards valor and self-defense. How can you
not consider it absurd that you fault nature because she did not supply your
bodies with stings and teeth for self-defense,51 when you remove or curtail
the spiritual armor with which you were born?
5. ODYSSEUS: Gracious, you must have been a formidable Sophist, Gryl-

lus!52 Even now, F speaking from your swinish state, you attack your topic
powerfully! But why haven’t you taken up temperance next in succession?53
GRYLLUS: Because I thought you would first attack what I had said.54 You are
eager to hear about temperance because you are the husband of the most chaste
among women and you suppose that you provide the model of restraint since you
scorned the advances of Circe.55 In this respect, you are no different in self-control
from any other animal, for they do not seek to consort with their betters, 989 but
enjoy the pleasures of love with their own species. Thus it is no surprise if, just as
the Mendesian goat in Egypt, when penned up with many beautiful women, was
not eager to have intercourse with them56 but was instead excited by the nannies,
so you are happy with the sort of relations familiar to you and do not wish to sleep
with a goddess when you are a mortal. Countless cawing crows will make a joke of
Penelope’s chastity, for every crow, when her mate dies, remains a widow, not for
just a short while but for nine generations of men.57 Thus B it is that your Penelope
is surpassed in chastity by any crow you please.
6. Well then, since you did not fail to notice that I am a Sophist, let us put
some semblance of order to my argument by defining temperance and distin-
guishing the desires by kind.58 Temperance, then, is a kind of containment
and ordering of the desires that removes those that are alien and superfluous
while regulating those that are necessary in a timely and modest manner.59
You perhaps notice countless differences in the desires …60 Those that per-
tain to eating and drinking are natural and necessary. Sexual desires, which
find their origin in nature, are termed natural but not necessary, C for one
may forego them and readily dismiss them. The sorts of desires that are nei-
ther necessary nor natural, that pour in from outside because of your emp-
tyheaded notions and ignorance of the good, are like a crowd of aliens in a
population that overpowers the native citizens. But beasts, which have souls
110
that are closed to and free from alien passions, live lives that are untouched
by false opinion, as if far from the sea,61 and are free from elegance and
refinement. But they closely mind their self-control and carefully regulate
their desires, D for those that reside in them are neither numerous nor alien,
In truth, at one time gold bewitched me no less than it does you as a posses-
sion like no other, and silver and ivory seduced me as well. I thought that the
man who possessed the greatest quantities of those things was blessed and
godlike, whether he be a Phrygian or a Carian more lowborn than Dolon
and more ill-fated than Priam.62 At that time, when I was always hung up
on those desires, I derived no satisfaction or joy from the countless other
joys of life that I had on hand in boundless quantity, but rather complained
of my life as a person E wanting in life’s finest things and having no share
in good fortune. Thus I recall that, when I saw you in Crete ostentatiously
decked out in fine attire,63 I envied neither your wisdom nor your virtue, but
I adored and wondered at the fineness of your subtly-worked garments and
the woolly softness of your purple cloak (its buckle was gold and had, I be-
lieve, some trifle carved on it in relief). I followed you about, bewitched, like
a woman, but now that I have given up those empty notions and am cleansed
of them, I pass by gold and silver with scorn, F like so many stones, and
when I am full and settle down to rest, I would less happily lie on your woo-
len cloaks and carpets than on deep, soft mud. None of those alien desires
dwells in our souls.64 For the most part, our life is governed by necessary
desires and pleasures, and we engage with those that are not necessary but
natural in a manner that is neither undisciplined nor incontinent.65
990 7. Let’s first go through those pleasures. Our pleasure in fragrant things
that naturally arouse our sense of smell,66 besides possessing a utility that is
free and simple, provides us in addition a certain service in distinguishing
what is edible, for the tongue is said to be and is the interpreter of what is
sweet and bitter and sour when flavors come into contact with the sense of
taste and mix together.67 Our sense of smell, before we taste things, is a guide
to the nature of each item that we ingest, distinguishing things with greater
discernment than do royal tasters,68 admitting that which is appropriate to
us but driving away that which is foreign,69 and it does not allow the latter
to touch or distress our sense of taste. B Instead, it discredits and accuses
the bad before damage is done. Otherwise our sense of smell causes us no
trouble, as it does to you humans, forcing you to mix incense and cinnamon
and nard70 and aromatic leaves and Arabic reeds71 with a kind of bewitching
art to which the name “unguent making” is given, so that you at great cost
buy an effeminate luxury that has no use at all. Although its nature is such,
still it has corrupted not only all women but even most men, so that they
do not wish to lie with their wives unless they smell of myrrh and fragrant
powders.72 C But sows lure boars and nanny goats lure he-goats and other
beasts lure their mates with their own distinct smells, fragrant with fresh
111
dew and meadow grass, and induce them to mate out of mutual affection.
The females do not put on airs and adopt trickery and witchery and deceits
to fulfill their desires, nor do the males, stung by lust, purchase the act of
procreation with money or exertion or bondage.73 They share a love that is
free of deceit, at the proper season and without payment. This love awakens
at the appropriate time of year, like the sprouting of plants, and then it is
quickly cooled.74 D The female does not accept the male after conception,
not does the male attempt to approach her. So it is that pleasure is held in lit-
tle honor by us, whereas nature is everything to us.75 The desires of animals
have not to this day accepted the intercourse of males with males or females
with females.76 But there is much of that sort of thing among your grand and
noble classes. I don’t even mention the lower classes. Agamemnon came to
Boeotia hunting Argynnus who was eluding him,77 and falsely accusing the
sea and the winds,78 he E bathed his noble body in Lake Copais,79 hoping
there to quench his passion and free himself of his desire. Similarly, Hera-
cles abandoned his companions80 and betrayed the expedition, seeking after
a beardless youth. On the rotunda of Ptoian Apollo,81 one of your people
inscribed “Achilles is Fair,”82 although Achilles had already at that time had
a son.83 I understand that the inscription is still there.84 Yet if a cock mounts
another cock because there is no female available,85 it is burned alive be-
cause some prophet or soothsayer declares it to be a great and terrible omen.
So it is that men themselves are agreed that F animals possess greater tem-
perance and do not go against nature in their pleasures. In the case of you
humans, not even nature aided by law holds your intemperance in check, but
as if swept along by a torrent, your desires produce in many cases a dreadful
outrage and turmoil and confusion of nature: men have attempted to have sex
with goats and sows and mares, and women have been wild with lust for male
animals.86 991 From such unions spring up your Minotaurs and Aegipans87
and, I suppose, your Sphinxes and Centaurs. On occasion, a dog has eaten a
man from hunger and a bird has tasted human flesh out of necessity, but they
have never approached a human being for sex.88 But these animals and many
others besides are compelled to endure the outrageous lusts of humans.
8. Thus while humans are so base and incontinent in the desires that I have
catalogued, they stand convicted of being even more so in the case of nec-
essary desires, being surpassed by animals in temperance. These are the
ones that have to do with eating and drinking.89 B We animals always com-
bine some degree of usefulness with our pleasure in these activities, whereas
you, in your pursuit of pleasure more than of nourishment, are chastised by
many serious illnesses that bubble up from one source, the repletion of your
bodies, and fill you with all manner of flatulence that is difficult to purge. To
begin with, each animal has one food that is appropriate to it: for some, that
is grass, for some others, roots or some sort of fruit. Those that eat meat do
not turn to any other sort of food and do not deprive weaker animals of their
112
food: the lion allows the deer and the wolf the sheep to feed on that which
is natural to it. C But man, who is driven in his pursuit of pleasures to all
varieties of food by his gluttony, tasting and sampling everything as if he has
not come to know what food is suitable and proper to him, is the one true
omnivore. To begin with, he devours flesh not from any want or hardship
(he has at his disposal, at every season, one variety of plant and grain after
another to harvest and gather and enjoy without growing weary from the
very abundance).90 Instead, because of his love of luxury and his boredom
with only essential foods, he goes in pursuit of those which are not necessary
and which are befouled by the slaughter of animals, a practice much more
savage than the behavior of the wildest beasts, for blood and gore and flesh
D are food appropriate to the kite and the wolf and the snake, but they are
a delicacy for humans.91 Secondly man makes use of every sort of food and
does not abstain from most of them, as do beasts, or make war on just a
few of them out of his need to eat: practically nothing that flies or swims or
dwells on land has escaped your so-called civilized and hospitable tables.
9. Enough of that, then. You use animals as delicacies to sweeten your meal.
Why, then …92 But the intelligence of beasts provides no room for useless
and empty skills. Nor, in the case of those that are essential, E do animals
import them or buy them, or attach any one individual tightly to a single
branch of knowledge. Our intelligence, from its own self, produces skills
that are natural and appropriate to it.93 We are told that all Egyptians are
physicians.94 With animals, not only is each a self-taught physician,95 but,
in the case of food, warfare, hunting, self-defense and music, each animal
by nature has a talent for it. From whom have we pigs learned to go to rivers
when we are sick to catch crabs? Who taught tortoises to eat marjoram after
they have devoured a snake? Who taught goats in Crete to go after dittany F
when they have fallen victim to arrows, since the arrowheads fall out when
they have eaten it? If you say, as is indeed the truth, that nature is their
teacher,96 you raise the intelligence of beasts to the wisest and most power-
ful of first principles. But if you do not reckon that this should be labeled
either reason or intelligence, then you must scout out a nobler and worthier
term for it since in its actions it without doubt represents a finer and more
marvelous power.97 992 It is no untaught or uneducated capacity, but rather
one that is self-taught98 and self-sufficient not due to any lack of strength.
Because of the strength and perfection of its native virtue, it pays no heed to
additions to its intelligence that arise from outside sources. Those animals
that men train and instruct in support of their luxurious lifestyle and their
amusement possess intelligence that enables them to accept training that
is in conflict with the nature of their bodies.99 I pass over puppies that are
trained to hunt and colts that are trained to prance to a beat, and crows that
learn to talk and dogs that are taught to jump through revolving hoops. In
the theaters, horses and oxen perform precise routines involving lying down
113
and B dancing and maintaining tricky poses and movements that are not at
all easily performed by human beings, actions that they have learned and
remembered and memorized as a display of their quickness to learn but that
have no other utility at all. And if you do not believe that we are capable of
learning skills, hear how we are even able to teach them. When partridges
are making an escape, they accustom their nestlings to hide by falling on
their backs and holding a lump of earth in front of themselves with their
claws.100 One can also see on the tops of roofs how adult storks instruct the
young storks in their first attempts at flight. And too nightingales instruct
their nestlings in song. Nestlings that are caught while C young and are
brought up by humans sing poorly, as if they left off their instruction too
early …101 but since I have assumed this new bodily form, I wonder at those
arguments that the Sophists102 employed to convince me that all animals
except human beings are irrational and devoid of understanding.
10. ODYSSEUS: So, then, Gryllus, you are transformed and now argue that
even sheep and asses are rational?
GRYLLUS: Even from these creatures, noble Odysseus, one can conclude
that beasts are not by nature devoid of reason and understanding.103 Just as one
tree is not D more or less inanimate than another, but all exhibit that quality in
equal degree (since no one of them has a share of soul), so one beast would not
seem weaker in intellect or slower to learn if all beasts did not possess reason
and understanding, some more and some less than others.104 Keep in mind that
the quickness of wit and shrewdness of some animals attests to the stupidity105
and sloth of others, as when you compare an ass and a sheep with a fox or
wolf or bee …106 as if [someone were to compare] Polyphemus107 to you or the
Corinthian Homer108 to your grandfather Autolycus.109 E I do not believe that
there is as big a distance from one beast to another as there is from one human
to another in their understanding and reasoning and memory.
ODYSSEUS: But consider, Gryllus, whether it is not an awful act of violence
to allow reason to those who have no innate understanding of the divine.110
GRYLLUS: Will we not then say, Odysseus, that you who are so wise and
extraordinary were born of Sisyphus …?111
Commentary
1 On the title of the treatise, see Introduction, pp. 95–96 and note 5.
2 The opening words of Odysseus have occasioned much scholarly com-
ment since it is not clear what the hero is promising to remember. On
the wording, Helmbold 493 note a, notes the similarity of Odysseus’
first words to Horace, Satires II. 5. 1, a dialogue between Odysseus and
the seer Tiresias, at which point the hero asks the seer to answer an-
other question in addition to what he had already told him (Hoc quoque,
Tiresia, praeter narrata petenti/ responde). The reader is presumed to be
114
dropping in on a conversation already under way. On the use of a simi-

lar attention-grabbing device at the beginning of On Eating Meat Trea-
tise I, see Commentary note 2.
Angelo Casanova, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta animalia
ratione uti,” in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and
Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor
Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society (Málaga: Uni-
versity of Málaga Press and Logan: Utah State University Press, 2005)
122–123, noting that no one has satisfactorily explained what Odysseus
promises to remember, suggests that Plutarch may be alluding here
not to the episode in Odyssey X which provides the setting for Whether
Beasts Are Rational, in which Odysseus’ men are turned into pigs and
subsequently returned to human form, but rather to Odyssey XII. 37–38,
where Circe gives parting instructions to Odysseus and commands him
to pay attention to her words. Casanova maintains (124) that the open-
ing sentence of Whether Beasts Are Rational “takes up, in a direct and
punctual fashion, these two Homeric lines.”
3 Odysseus’ companion Eurylochus expresses hesitation to enter Circe’s
dwelling lest he and the other Greeks be turned into swine, wolves and
lions (Odyssey X. 431–433).
4 Plutarch portrays Odysseus’ motivation for petitioning Circe to return
his men to human form to be a desire for glory, an ignoble preoccupa-
tion that the witch immediately characterizes as an instance of the he-
ro’s recklessness and stupidity (985E). Later in this same section (985E),
Circe mocks Odysseus’ lust for glory as a pursuit after a phantom.
Homer’s Odysseus, on the other hand, is driven by more philanthropic
considerations. He laments to Circe (Odyssey X. 383–387) that he, as
a righteous man, cannot enjoy the food and drink that she serves him
before he sees his men returned to human form.
5 Circe administered a “potion” called κυκϵών (kukeōn) to Odysseus’ men to
effect their transformation into swine (Odyssey X. 235–236). It is mentioned
by name at Odyssey X. 290 and 316. kukeōn, from Greek κυκάω (kukaō,
“stir,” “mix”), refers, outside the Homeric context, to a drink made of bar-
ley, water, cheese and wine. A variety of kukeōn was used in the ceremonies
of the Eleusinian Mysteries that seems to have had drug-like properties
6 In Homer, Circe does not offer Odysseus immortality, even stating (Od-
yssey X. 489) that he should not stay with her against his will. Circe’s
words in Plutarch are more reminiscent of Calypso’ offer (Odyssey X.
135–136 and 206–213) to make Odysseus immortal.
7 See note 4.
8 In some accounts, Circe was the daughter of Hecate, the goddess of
magic and witchcraft (see Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheke IV. 45. 2–3).
9 In Homer’s account, Odysseus does not speak to his companions who
have been converted into pigs.
10 The indignant tone that Odysseus adopts here in his accusation that
Circe is mocking him is triggered by the witch’s suggestion that he per-
suade the pig by a process of “debate.” The term that Circe chooses
to characterize the discussion that Odysseus should have with the pig,
115
διαλϵ´γϵσθαι (dialegesthai, “to converse with,” “to reason with”) strikes

him as absurd and insulting since irrational beasts like pigs must be
viewed as incapable of reasoned debate. On Greek views of the lin-
guistic capacities of non-human animals, see Introduction, p. 100 and
note 20.
11 Circe says of her pig converts that she will “render them συνιϵ´ντας”
(sunientas, 986B), that is, possessing σύνϵσις (sunesis). Aristotle, Nico-
machean Ethics 1143a1–18, provides a detailed definition of this mental
faculty. According to Aristotle, sunesis is a kind of understanding that
renders an individual capable of comprehending what another person
says and of making judgments. Aristotle is speaking solely of the men-
tal faculties of human beings. If the term is seriously intended here in
Plutarch’s scene, Circe may be suggesting that the pig endowed with
speech can be trusted to know the truth of what he says, so that his in-
dictment of the failings of Odysseus and of other human beings can be
regarded as accurate. Likewise, the pig may be assumed to understand
the arguments that Odysseus makes. This interpretation may, however,
be an over-reading of the text, given its lighthearted nature.
12 Odysseus’ question is a variation of the Homeric formula of greeting
addressed to a stranger, which typically asked the country of origin of
the stranger, his background and the reason for his travels. Circe herself
(Odyssey X. 325–328) employs such a formula to inquire who Odysseus
can be that he is immune to the effects of her potion that transformed
his companions.
13 LiCausi and Pomelli (see Introduction note 21) suggest (465n8) that
Circe’s somewhat exasperated tone here is another expression of her
contempt for Odysseus’ preoccupation with insignificant and mundane
details like reputation and name. See note 4.
14 On the meaning of the name Gryllus, see Introduction, pp. 96–97.
The name Gryllus is in fact encountered in Greek texts in the case of
h istorical personages. The father and one of the sons of the historian
Xenophon bore the name Gryllus.
15 Gryllus’ image recalls the famous passage in Lucretius, On the Nature of
Things I. 936–942, repeated at IV. 11–17, in which Lucretius states that,
just as doctors who seek to give children a dose of bitter medicine place
honey around the cup to trick them into drinking and thereby regaining
health, so does he disguise the seemingly bitter taste of Epicurean phi-
losophy with the honey of his poetry.
16 The adjectives that Gryllus employs to characterize the unfortunate
status of human beings in the scheme of animal creation have been var-
iously emended by scholars. If the reading followed here, that found in
Hubert, is correct, Gryllus’ argument may be viewed as an instance of
theriophilic thought, in which non-human animals are viewed as by na-
ture happier than are human beings, even if their intellectual capacities
are inferior to those of humans. Shortly after this assertion, Gryllus
argues that non-human animals are morally superior to human beings,
another tenet of theriophilic thought. See Introduction note 4 for in-
stances of theriophily in Greek literature.
116
17 Odysseus seems to forget that he is conversing with a pig whose ability

to speak might suggest some level of intelligence. See Introduction note
20 on animal speech.
18 Helmbold 499 note a, suggests that Odysseus may intend to imply that
the human being converted into a pig called Gryllus was of a swinish
disposition even when human, and that only his outward appearance
has been altered.
19 Cephallenia is an island off the western coast of Greece that constituted
part of the realm of the family of Odysseus. In his Catalogue of Ships,
Homer states (Iliad II. 631) that Odysseus led the Cephallenian fleet to
Troy. Laertes, the father of Odysseus, is called the leader of Cephallenia
at Iliad XXIV. 378. Some scholars have detected a pun, in Gryllus’ de-
scription of Odysseus as “King of the Cephallenians,” on the Greek word
κϵϕαλή (kephalē), “head,” since Odysseus regards himself as “brainy.”
20 Gryllus employs the same verb here (διαλϵ´γϵσθαι, dialegesthai) to char-
acterize the nature of his verbal interactions with Odysseus that Circe
had employed (986B) to particularize the sort of intellectual qualities
with which she will endow her pig convert to enable him to debate
with Odysseus (see note 11). Gryllus hereby makes clear that he be-
lieves that his forthcoming arguments will have the weight of truth and
persuasiveness.
21 Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur
Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977)
189, views the motif of comparison of two lifestyles by an individual
who has experienced both to be characteristic of Cynic Menippean
satire, “Ein solcher Vergleich zweier Lebensformen durch eine Person,
die aufgrund einer Verwandlung beide selbst kennengelernt hat, scheint
ebenfalls bereits in der älteren menippeischen Satire vorgenommen zu
sein.” See Introduction note 18.
22 On Gryllus’ exploration of the Greek “cardinal virtues” of justice,
wisdom, temperance and courage, see Introduction note 10, with
bibliography.
23 Indelli, Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali 119 note 36, observes
here, charmingly and certainly correctly, “No manca, secondo me, un
velo di ironia.”
24 Gryllus’ memory fails him here. In Homer (Odyssey IX. 105–115), Od-
ysseus describes the encounter that he and his shipmates had with the
Cyclopes to King Alcinous of Phaeacia, not to Circe. The details of the
fertility of the land of the Cyclopes that Gryllus includes here are those
found at Odyssey IX. 109–111.
25 The poor quality of the soil of Ithaca is commented upon repeatedly in
the Odyssey. Odysseus’ son Telemachus tells King Menelaus of Sparta
(Odyssey IV. 605–608) that Ithaca is grazed by goats, being devoid of
grassy stretches and of pastureland, while Odysseus tells Alcinous that
Ithaca is harsh and rugged, although he does not expect to see a sweeter
place on earth (Odyssey IX. 27–28).
26 Gryllus is preparing the way for the argument that he will make in
the course of his debate with Odysseus, that non-human animals are
117
naturally disposed toward virtuous behavior. Subsequently, Gryllus

will argue (991F) that this natural disposition toward virtue arises from
the circumstance that non-human animals are taught by nature (ϕύσις,
phusis), which functions in them like reason or intellect. If human be-
ings choose to deny that this is an instance of reason, Gryllus demands
(991F) that they suggest a better term for it. He even goes so far as to
claim that this faculty in non-human animals is superior to the intellect
of human beings. Gryllus seems to confuse reason with what modern
animal behavioral scientists would classify as “instinct.” An instance
of this is his assertion (992A) that the practice of self-medication in an-
imals is “self-taught” (αὐτομαθής, automathēs) rather than “untaught”
(ἀμαθής, amathēs). Gryllus’ simple psychology of virtues is rejected in
the account of the origin of virtues found in Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics 1113b3–6, according to which virtues are matters of deliberate
choice and of voluntary action, rather than matters of nature.
27 Odysseus is called “bold” (θρασύς, thrasus) at Odyssey X. 436.
28 In the Homeric epics, Odysseus is repeatedly termed “destroyer of cit-
ies” (πτολίπορθος, ptoliporthos): Odyssey VIII. 3; XIV. 447; XVI. 442;
XVIII. 356; XXII. 283; Iliad II. 278; X. 363.
29 Odysseus’ predilection for trickery and lies is often illustrated in the
Homeric poems. The part that he played in the planning and deploy-
ment of the Trojan Horse is referenced at Odyssey VIII. 492–495 and XI.
523–525. In the first of these mentions, the poet remarks that Odysseus
led the horse into Troy as a “trick” (δόλον, dolon, 494). In the latter,
Odysseus himself says that he was charged with opening the compact
“ambuscade” (λόχον, lochon, 525) to release the Greeks from inside the
horse when it was within the city of Troy.
30 Helmbold 503 note b, suggests that Plutarch has in mind here the case of
eels or snakes whose tails continue to twitch even after the animals are
dead.
31 Gryllus offers a punning and false etymology. He suggests that the word
“slavery” (δουλϵία, douleia) is derived from the word for “cowardice”
(δϵιλία, deilia).
32 The word translated here as “beguilements” (ὑποπϵττϵύματα, hupopet-
teumata) seems not to appear elsewhere in Greek literature and editors
suspect a problem with the text at this point.
33 Gryllus maintains that non-human animals, if uncorrupted by con-
tact with human beings, live “in accord with nature” (κατὰ ϕύσιν, kata
phusin). Contact with humans compels them to act “contrary to nature”
(παρὰ ϕύσιν, para phusin). The ideal of Stoic moral philosophy was “liv-
ing in accord with nature,” which, in the case of human beings, entailed
living in accord with the dictates of reason. This, in the view of the Sto-
ics, was impossible for non-human species because they are irrational, a
position which Gryllus implicitly opposes here. Without mentioning the
name of the sect whose views he opposes, he turns on its head one of the
central tenets of Stoic philosophy. On “living in accord with nature” in
Stoic ethics, see Introduction note 17.
118
34 I follow here the reading of Hubert, who chooses καρτϵ´ρησις (karterē-

sis), “endurance,” over the reading παρρησία (parrhēsia), “openness of
speech, frankness,” followed in some editions, since the subject under
discussion in the present passage is that of courage rather than of man-
ner of expression.
35 According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VI. 12, the
philosopher Antisthenes (ca. 446–366 bce) held that virtue (ἀρϵτή, aretē)
is the same for men and for women.
36 Early in his heroic career, the young Theseus is said to have slain a wild
sow that terrorized the inhabitants of the town of Crommyon which lay
between Corinth and Megara. Some said the animal was named Phaea al-
though this was at times given as the name of the old woman who owned
the sow. Plutarch, Theseus 9, recounts that some held that the old woman
was herself nicknamed “the sow” because of her savage behavior, and that
it was this woman whom Theseus slew. In Plato’s Laches, Socrates remarks
(196e–197c) that the interlocutor Nicias would judge that even the sow of
Crommyon could not be adjudged to be courageous, and Nicias replies that
he considers the sow to have been fearless and rash but not courageous.
37 The famous Sphinx whose riddle Oedipus solved sat on Mount Phicium,
near Thebes.
38 The Teumesian vixen, known as uncatchable, ravaged the countryside
around Thebes. According to Apollodorus, Bibliotheke II. 4. 6–7, the
Thebans each month offered up the son of a citizen to keep the animal
from worse predation. To defeat the beast, the locals set against it a
dog capable of catching anything that it pursued. Zeus in time turned
both animals into stone to resolve the paradox posed by their unique
capabilities.
39 Many editors judge the words in quotation marks to be a citation from
some unidentifiable source.
40 In the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the monster that Apollo defeated at
Delphi to assert his control over the site is called δράκαινα (drakaina,
300), “she-dragon.” Elsewhere, Greek Questions 293C, Plutarch calls the
monster male.
41 King Agamemnon accepted the mare Aethe from Echepolus, son of
Anchises of Sicyon, in return for which he was not compelled to accom-
pany the king to Troy (Iliad XXIII. 295–298).
42 A contrary view is expressed by Aristotle, History of Animals 608a33–
34, who states that female members of all species excepting bears and
panthers are “less spirited” (ἀθυμότϵρα, athumotera) than are their male
counterparts, a sentiment repeated, with the same exceptions, by Pliny
the Elder, Natural History XI. 110.
43 Odysseus’ wife Penelope was the daughter of the Spartan prince Icar-
ius. Gryllus suggests that her placid demeanor at home during Odys-
seus’ absence of many years belies the reputation for courage enjoyed by
Spartan women, who were known for spurring on their sons to valorous
behavior and for downplaying the loss of sons in battle. See Sarah B.
Pomeroy, Spartan Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 57,
119
“Spartan women were renowned for enthusiastically sacrificing their

sons for the welfare of the state. Instead of lamenting at the death of
their sons, they took pride in the bravery that had led to that fate.”
44 The inhabitants of Caria, in southern Asia Minor, and of Maeonia,
later called Lydia, also in Asia Minor, were reputed to be soft and weak.
45 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers X. 120, notes that the
Epicureans held that courage is not “natural” (ϕύσϵι, phusei) but arises
from a “calculation of advantage” (λογισμῳ̑ του̑ συμϕϵ´ροντος, logismōi
tou sumpherontos).
46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1116a17–20, in the course of his definition
of “courage” (ἀνδρϵία, andreiā), states that the courage of ordinary citi-
zens, as opposed to that of philosophers, is inspired by thoughts of the
penalties and censure that follow upon cowardice.
47 These are Homeric epithets. “Wolf-minded” (λυκόϕρων, lukophrōn)
appears as a proper name at Iliad XV. 430; “lion-hearted” (θυμολϵ´ων,
thūmoleōn) appears at Iliad V. 639 and VII. 228; “boar-like in courage”
(συῒ ϵἴκϵλος ἀλκήν, suï eikelos alkēn) appears at Iliad IV. 253.
48 The Homeric epithet “wind-footed” (ποδήνϵμος, podēnemos) is used of
the messenger-goddess Iris at Iliad II. 286 and elsewhere.
49 In Homer, “god-like” (θϵοϵιδής, theoeidēs) is often applied to Paris (e.g.,
Iliad III. 16).
50 Gryllus suggests that “courage” (ἀνδρϵία, andreiā) and “high-spirit-
edness” (θυμός, thūmos) are identical. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
1116b23–25, states, in contrast, that courage arises from considerations
of nobility, whereas high-spiritedness can occur even in non-human
species that are prompted to action by pain or hunger, although no ele-
ments of nobility accompany their actions.
51 Although Greek and Roman naturalists and philosophers regularly em-
phasized the intellectual superiority of human beings over other species,
they were in most cases willing to concede the physiological superiority
of other species over humans. In the famous “myth” on the topic of
the teachability of virtue that Plato places in the mouth of the Sophist
Protagoras, in the dialogue named for him, Protagoras explains that
the foolish Epimetheus bestowed every advantage of self-defense and
bodily strength upon non-human animals, in consequence of which his
clever brother Prometheus stole “practical wisdom” (ἔντϵχνον σοϕίαν,
entechnon sophiān, 321c) and fire from Athena and Hephaestus so that
humans would not be at a disadvantage against other species. An es-
pecially bleak assessment of the physiological inferiority of humans to
other species is found in Pliny the Elder, Natural History VII. 2, where
the Roman encyclopedist states that Nature is a cruel stepmother to
human beings, having fashioned them to be creatures totally dependent
upon assets derived from outside themselves, while she outfitted other
species with claws, fangs, feathers and fur for protection and defense.
There is a remarkable exception to this general concession of physio-
logical superiority to non-human species in Xenophon, Memorabilia I.
4, where he argues that the forethought of the gods has caused human
120
beings to be more thoughtfully and purposefully designed anatomically

than are other species. For a detailed analysis of the passages in Plato,
Xenophon and Pliny, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Hu-
man in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Con-
cept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 23–43.
52 Gryllus admits below (992C) that he had at one time allowed the Soph-
ists to convince him that only human beings are rational.
53 At this point, the conversation turns from the “cardinal virtue” of
“courage” to that of “temperance” (σωϕροσύνη, sōphrosunē). On the
part played by the so-called “cardinal virtues” in Gryllus’ presentation,
see Introduction, pp. 97–99.
54 Gryllus may be alluding to Odysseus’ reputation for quickness of speech
and rhetorical brilliance.
55 In Homer, Odyssey X. 337–344, Odysseus refuses to enter the bed of
Circe for fear that she will deprive him of his manhood, until she swears
a solemn oath not to harm him.
56 According to Herodotus, Histories II. 46, the citizens of Mendes in the
Nile Delta venerated goats. The historian appears to contradict Gryl-
lus, for he notes in that passage that, in his own time, a goat was seen to
have had intercourse in public with a woman, an action that Herodotus
calls astonishing.
57 Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 9, records that crows are remarkably
faithful to their mates and love them intensely. When one of a pair dies,
the other remains mateless. The longevity of crows was proverbial in
ancient sources. Hesiod, fr. 304 Merkelbach-West (= Plutarch, The De-
cline of Oracles 415C), likewise states that crows live nine generations of
the lifetime of human beings. Aristophanes, Birds 609, varies the claim
somewhat, stating that crows live five generations of the lifetime of hu-
mans, still a remarkable lifespan for a bird!
58 On the classification of desires, see Introduction note 11.
59 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1117b25–1118a1, offers an extended defi-
nition of temperance and its operation in the lives of humans and of
other animals. He defines it as a mean with regard to the pleasures, spe-
cifically certain pleasures of the body, including those pleasures that
arise from the senses.
60 There appears to be a break in the text at this point.
61 Helmbold 513 note e, on Gryllus’ comment, “the sea is the symbol of
mischievous foreign influence.” Aristotle, Politics 1327a11–40, speaks at
length on the question of whether proximity to the sea is detrimental to
states because it can encourage the influx of foreigners and of foreign
goods.
62 Phrygia and Caria, as well as other parts of Asia Minor, were known for
supplying Greece with slaves. See David Lewis, “Near Eastern Slaves in
Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with Persian Territories,” Classical
Quarterly 61 (2011) 91–113. King Priam of Troy was proverbial for his ill
fortune, having lost his sons and his city in the course of the Trojan War.
When Priam comes to the tent of Achilles to ransom the body of his son
121
Hector, he movingly contrasts Achilles’ father Peleus, who can rejoice

that his son still lives, with himself who has lost his sons (Iliad XXIV.
490–501). Dolon, a Trojan who offered to spy on the Greeks and was
slain by Odysseus and Diomedes in the course of his expedition (Iliad
X. 314–464), is described as ugly though swift-footed, his natural re-
pulsiveness enhanced by the wolf pelt that he wears while on his spying
mission. Gryllus considered the man who possessed riches, no matter
how lowly or unfortunate he might be, to be nevertheless godlike.
63 Gryllus alludes to the fictitious autobiography that Odysseus recites
to his wife Penelope, while still in disguise (Odyssey XIX. 165–189), in
which he says that he, a Cretan himself, had seen Odysseus at the court
of King Minos on Crete.
64 Pliny, Natural History VII. 5, in the course of a lengthy exposition on the
manifold ways in which human beings are from birth beset with short-
comings and natural failings, notes that only humans care about luxu-
ries and therefore fall victim to greed and ambition. For an analysis of
this passage in Pliny, see Newmyer, The Animal and the Human 36–39.
65 Gryllus seems to refer to the practice of nonhuman animals to mate
only in season, a natural continence which he elaborates approvingly
below (990C–D).
66 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1117b17–18, denies that non-human ani-
mals take pleasure from the senses, except accidentally.
67 Greek natural philosophers took great interest in the operation of the
organs of sensation. Aristotle, On the Soul 422a16–19, maintains that
tastes are triggered on the tongue by the presence of liquid in the
mouth but not before liquid is present. Theophrastus, On the Senses
25, reports that the physician Alcmaeon (fifth century bce) taught
that tastes are produced by the action of the tongue which dissolves
substances by the action of its heat and transmits information on
the tastes to the brain. For a translation and analysis of the trea-
tise of Theophrastus, see George Malcolm Stratton, Theophrastus
and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London: Al-
len & Unwin, 1917). Gryllus’ account seems to follow Alcmaeon’s
explanation.
68 Xenophon, Cyropaedia I. 3. 9, speaks of the duties of such royal tasters
at the court of the king of Persia who protected the king from poison-
ing. Tacitus, Annals XII. 66, recounts that poison was administered to
the Roman emperor Claudius by his own taster Halotus. He notes also,
Annals XIII. 16, that what prince Britannicus ate and drank was always
tasted first by such an attendant.
69 In his life of Epicurus, Diogenes Laertius reports, Lives of the Philoso-
phers X. 34, that Epicurus taught that every living creature experiences
two sensations, pleasure and pain, the former of which is “appropriate”
(οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion) to the creature, while the latter is “foreign” (ἀλλότριον,
allotrion) to it. Gryllus employs these two technical terms here in his
exposition that Epicurus had used.
70 This is spikenard, an aromatic plant from India.
122
71 Helmbold 517 note f, remarks of this plant, “Probably here sweet flag,
Acorus calamus L.”
72 Dierauer 192 detects Cynic inspiration in Gryllus’ attack on the sex-
ual behavior of human beings which is part of his critique of natural
but unnecessary desires, “Kynische Einschlag scheint auch die fol-
gende Erörterung über das Liebesleben (990B–D) zu verraten, die sich
im Abschnitt über die natürlichen, aber nicht notwendigen Begierden
(989F–991A) findet.”
73 Gryllus overlooks the possibility that the mating practices of non-hu-
man species may involve instinctual actions, and he anthropomorphi-
cally attributes modesty and openness to such mating, in contrast to the
self-interestedness of human sexual encounters.
74 Pliny, Natural History X. 171, notes that, whereas other species mate at
specific times of year, human beings mate at all hours of the day and
night, an indication, he remarks, that other species grow satisfied while
humans never do.
75 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 493C, argues that in non-human an-
imals, nature (ϕύσις, phusis) exists in an unmixed and simple form that
keeps them from coveting the unnatural pleasures that humans, with
their superior powers of reason, devise and then covet. On “living in
accord with nature” as a Stoic ideal, see note 33 and Introduction note
17.
76 Gryllus is mistaken. On homosexual unions in non-human species, see
Introduction note 12 with bibliography.
77 King Agamemnon built a tomb for his lover Argynnus when the young
man drowned in the Cephissus River in Boeotia. See Athenaeus, Deip-
nosophistae (Learned Banqueters) XIII. 80D.
78 Helmbold 520 note b, suggests that a short lacuna may be suspected
here.
79 Lake Copais was in central Boeotia.
80 This incident occurred in the course of the Argonautic expedition and was
treated repeatedly in classical literature. For treatments in epic poetry, see
Apollonius, Argonautica I. 1207–1357 and Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica
III. 521–666. See also Theocritus, Idyll XIII and Propertius I. 20.
81 The shrine of Ptoian Apollo was in Boeotia on Mount Ptoon.
82 The inscription of the sort to which Gryllus refers was commonly found
on Greek vases, especially in Attica but elsewhere as well. Such inscrip-
tions typically included the name of a male, usually young, and the ad-
jective καλός, kalos, “fair.”
83 To avoid his having to take part in the expedition to Troy, Achilles’
mother Thetis hid her young son on the island of Scyros in the court of
King Lycomedes. Achilles had an affair with the king’s daughter Deida-
mia. The son born of this affair, Neoptolemus, also known as Pyrrhus,
to whom Gryllus refers, subsequently became notorious in mythology
for slaying the Trojan king Priam. See Aeneid II. 506–558.
84 A number of scholars have reasonably concluded that this statement
must be a parenthetical observation rather than a remark by Gryllus
123
since, inasmuch as Gryllus must be viewed as contemporary with Odys-

seus and Achilles, the inscription might be expected to be still visible so
that Gryllus’ comment would be superfluous.
85 Aristotle, History of Animals 631b17–19, states that some male birds are
by nature so effeminate that they allow male birds to mount them.
86 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 972D–F, speaks at some length
of unions of human beings with animals of various species, and an in-
terlocutor in that dialogue, on introducing the topic of the sexual ac-
tivity of non-human species, states (972D) that their love making is in
some cases wild and in other cases as delicate and refined as in human
beings. In that passage, the speaker does not express the contempt for
interspecies unions that Gryllus does here. Such interspecies unions are
discussed also in Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38 and VII. 43, in both
cases the love of an elephant for a woman.
87 All of the creatures that Gryllus catalogues here are half-human. Ae-
gipan (“Goat-Pan”) is sometimes regarded as identical with Pan, the
half-man-half-goat divinity, and sometimes viewed as distinct. His par-
entage is variously given. Hyginus, Fables 155, says that he was the son
of Zeus and one Boetis, although his mother is elsewhere given as Aega.
Gryllus uses the name in the plural, meaning “creatures like Aegipan.”
It is worth noting that here, as elsewhere in his writings on animals,
Plutarch draws his examples indifferently from the real world and from
the world of mythology, and is satisfied to do so if they prove the point
that he is presently arguing.
88 Gryllus’ assertion is contradicted elsewhere in Plutarch. In the examples
of interspecies unions that Plutarch catalogues at On the Cleverness of An-
imals 972D–F, the elephant, the serpent, the goose, and the ram that loved
human beings are all described as approaching the human being after
whom they lusted, and in no case does the human approach the non-hu-
man animal. Aelian, Nature of Animals XV. 14, states that red apes in
India lust after women and are therefore kept out of cities. On interspecies
unions, see Judith Hindermann, “Zoophilie in Zoologie und Roman: Sex
und Liebe zwischen Mensch und Tier bei Plutarch, Plinius dem Älteren,
Aelian und Apuleius,” Dictynna 8 (2011) (http://dictynna.revues.org/717).
89 Gryllus’ attack on the culinary “intemperance” of human beings (991A–
D) recalls a number of elements in Plutarch’s critique of human dietary
excesses in On Eating Meat I and II, especially the arguments that hu-
man beings, who insist upon an enormous variety of exotic foods, end
up bloated and sickened (995A and C); that animal foods are a mere
relish to humans in their quest for luxury (996F and 997B); and that
the omnivorous diet of humans forced them to acts of cruelty (994A–B,
994E, 997A–B).
90 At On Eating Meat 993C–994B, Plutarch argues at length that, whereas
some non-human species by nature subsist solely on the flesh of other
animals, human beings, for whom nature provides an enormous bounty
of plant foods, cannot make the argument that necessity forces him to
devour other animals.
124
91 Similarly, at On Eating Meat 994–B, Plutarch charges that, for human

beings, meat is a mere “appetizer” (ὄψον, opson) whereas it is for some
other species their sole source of sustenance. Plutarch employs the same
Greek word for “appetizer” in the present passage.
92 There is obviously a lacuna at this point since the topic turns abruptly
to the third of the so-called “cardinal virtues,” namely “wisdom”
(ϕρόνησις, phronēsis, 991D), leaving Gryllus’ consideration of animal
“temperance” in matters of diet unfinished. Helmbold 525 note f, judges
that the lacuna here may have been of considerable length. Gryllus’ final
observation on the dietary practices of humans is a further charge that
they use animals merely as an “appetizer.” See note 90 above.
93 At On the Cleverness of Animals 973E, Plutarch argues that the capacity
for self-instruction (αὐτομάθϵια, automatheia) that non-human animals
demonstrate is evidence of their innate reason. Earlier in that treatise
(966B), he had isolated such capacities in non-human animals as mem-
ory, preparedness and care for offspring as examples of reason that does
not rely on instruction. Many of the capacities that Plutarch isolates in
the examples that Gryllus offers would now be classified as the opera-
tion of instinct, although he regards them as examples of reason and
nature working in tandem. Of such instinctual behavior, Seneca, Moral
Letters CXXI. 23, remarks that it is “inborn, not taught” (nascitur ars
ista, non discitur). On frequently-cited examples of innate and untaught
skills in non-human species that were regarded in classical authors as
instances of animal intelligence, see the classic study of Sherwood Owen
Dickerman, “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek
Psychology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42
(1911) 123–130.
94 This may be a misunderstanding of the statement of Herodotus, Histo-
ries II. 84, that Egypt is full of doctors, and that they are all specialists
in just one malady. At the same time, Homer, Odyssey IV. 231, states
that every Egyptian is a physician, and given the Homeric context of the
dialogue, perhaps Gryllus has the epic text in mind.
95 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 974A–B, states that non-human
animals practice the three divisions of medicine, namely, pharmaceu-
tics, dietetics and surgery, and he offers (974B–D) numerous examples of
the healing practices of dogs, snakes, tortoises, elephants, bears, wolves,
lions and tigers. The examples of tortoises devouring marjoram after
eating snakes that Gryllus cites is mentioned at 974B, while that of Cre-
tan goats consuming dittany to induce arrows to fall from their bodies
when they have been wounded occurs at 974D. Some of these examples
of self-medication in non-human examples are recounted in Philo of
Alexandria, On Animals 38–39, suggesting that Philo and Plutarch may
both have consulted some of the same literary sources. See Dickerman
on the stereotypic nature of claims of animal sagacity in Greek sources.
96 See 990D and note 75 above.
97 On the Cleverness of Animals is the only animal-centered treatise of
Plutarch in which it is stated that the intellectual faculties of non-human
125
animals might in fact excel those of human beings. Plutarch’s position

elsewhere on the relative intellectual capacities of non-human species
vis-à-vis those of human beings is that non-humans have a “share” of
reason. Gryllus’ assertion here is an instance of theriophilic admiration
for the excellences of non-human species. See note 16.
98 On the self-taught nature of the life-sustaining actions of non-hu-
man animals, see note 93. Gryllus uses the same term, αὐτομαθής, au-
tomathēs, “self-taught,” here in adjectival form, to characterize this
faculty in non-humans that Plutarch had employed at On the Cleverness
of Animals 973E.
99 Plutarch speaks, On the Cleverness of Animals 968B–C, of elephants
trained at Rome to perform maneuvers in the theater that were so
complicated that human beings had difficulty performing them. It is
noteworthy that the tone of the passage in On the Cleverness of Ani-
mals is rather different from that traceable in Gryllus’ account, since the
speaker in On the Cleverness of Animals speaks admiringly of the clever-
ness of animals in mastering such complex gyrations, whereas Gryllus
is contemptuous of attempts by human beings to teach non-humans an-
imals to perform actions that are contrary to their physiological endow-
ments. Similar elephant maneuvers are detailed in Philo of Alexandria,
On Animals 27.
100 This stratagem of partridges is recounted as well at On the Cleverness of
Animals 971C and by Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 35.
101 The instruction that nightingales provide their young in song is detailed
also at On the Cleverness of Animals 973B. Scholars reasonably suspect
a lacuna at this juncture because of the abrupt change of topic.
102 Helmbold 529 note g, notes, “Probably the Stoics are meant (by anach-
ronism).” It was the Stoics who taught that non-human animals are
devoid of reason. Plutarch’s case against the Stoic position that non-hu-
man animals are irrational is developed in detail at On the Cleverness of
Animals 960A–961F. See Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–36
on Plutarch’s arguments in that passage.
103 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 960A, states that all animals
“share in” (μϵτϵ´χϵιν, metechein) thought and reasoning capacity. On
Plutarch’s case for rationality in non-human animals, see Introduction
to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 3–9, and Commentary on the first
seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965D), passim.
See also Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 30–47.
104 Plutarch employs this same argument on the degrees of reason exhibited
by various animal species as evidence that all species possess at least
some reason at On the Cleverness of Animals 962F–963A.
105 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 962D, is willing to admit that
some animal species exhibit such faults as cowardliness and stupidity.
106 Hubert, whose text I follow in this translation, notes that some editors
suspect a lacuna at this place, although this is not universally accepted
by editors.
126
107 The Cyclops Polyphemus captured and devoured Odysseus’ compan-

ions but was duped by Odysseus into believing the hero’s name was
“Nobody,” so that when he had been blinded by Odysseus and his com-
panions, he shouted to his fellow-Cyclopses that he had been blinded by
“Nobody,” and they advised him simply to pray. This tale is recounted
at length at Odyssey IX. 105–566.
108 The reference is not to the epic poet but apparently to someone notori-
ous for his stupidity.
109 Autolycus was the son of Hermes and the father of Anticlea, wife of
Laertes and mother of Odysseus. Homer, Odyssey XIX. 396–397, states
that Hermes granted him skill at thievery and deception.
110 Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 100, ends his treatise with a very sim-
ilar observation that it is an act of sacrilege to elevate non-human an-
imals to the level of human beings and to regard other species as their
equal. Plutarch takes up the topic of the sense of the divine in non-hu-
man animals as well in On the Cleverness of Animals 972 B in the case
of elephants and at 975A in the case of birds. The question of whether
non-human animals have an understanding of the divine was an issue of
some interest to ancient writers. See Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Re-
flect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,”
Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129.
111 In some post-Homeric accounts, Sisyphus was said to have been the
father of Odysseus. Plutarch, Greek Questions 301D, relates that Sisy-
phus raped Anticlea when she was still a virgin and fathered Odysseus.
Gryllus alludes here to Sisyphus’ reputation as an atheist.
Many editors believe that the dialogue is incomplete in its present
state, and some feel that the portion that is lost would have been of con-
siderable length. One would have expected, at the very least, that Od-
ysseus would reply to the question of Gryllus with which the dialogue
ends. Moreover, if Gryllus had carried to its conclusion his analysis of
the Cardinal Virtues in non-human animals, he would have next taken
up “justice” (δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosunē), which remains untreated in the
dialogue as it is preserved.
127
3
ON EATING MEAT
(DE ESU CAR NIUM )
Introduction
And yet somehow the most matter-of-fact person could not
help thinking of the hogs; they were so innocent, they came
so trustingly; and they were so very human in their protests—
and so perfectly within their rights!
Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (1906), Chapter 3
The philosopher Xenocrates of Chalcedon (ca. 396–314 bce), who headed

the Academy following Plato’s immediate successor Speusippus (ca.
407–339 bce), is believed to have written the first treatise in Greek de-
voted entirely to a defense of a meat-f ree lifestyle.1 Because this treatise
is lost, we cannot determine with certainty on what grounds Xenocrates
advocated abstention from meat. In his own defense of vegetarianism,
De abstinentia (On Abstinence) IV. 2, the Neoplatonist philosopher Por-
phyry (234–ca. 305 ce) cites the biographer Hermippus (third century
bce) as stating that Xenocrates enjoined humans “not to harm animals.”
Hermippus speculated that Xenocrates may have so instructed because
he believed all animals to be in some manner akin. The loss of Xeno-
crates’ text is regrettable since it would be fascinating to know whether
he originated arguments that appear later in Plutarch and Porphyry, or
perhaps advanced arguments that do not appear at all in subsequent
classical defenses of vegetarianism.
In light of the loss of Xenocrates’ treatise, the survival of Plutarch’s trea-
tise Πϵρὶ σαρκοϕαγίας (On Eating Meat), commonly known by its Latin title
De esu carnium (On Eating Meat), is fortunate since it constitutes the earli-
est relatively complete work devoted to the vegetarian lifestyle that survives
from the classical world.2 Unfortunately, the text of the work is less well pre-
served than that of Plutarch’s other treatises on animals, De sollertia anima-
lium (On the Cleverness of Animals) and Bruta animalia ratione uti (Whether
Beasts Are Rational). At times, lacunae render the argument of the work
difficult to follow, and occasional passages are virtually incoherent. At least
128
ON E AT I NG M E AT
one relatively lengthy passage (994B–D) appears to have been derived from
some other work of Plutarch, and to have been placed in its present location
either by him or by a later editor, which interrupts the flow of thought in
the surrounding text. The mutilated state of the text may contribute to the
fact that De esu carnium remains the least-studied of Plutarch’s essays on
human–non-human animal relations.3 A good deal of earlier scholarship
devoted to On Eating Meat focused on the question of whether the extant
work constitutes one treatise or two, and the issue remains unresolved.4
Moreover, some scholars have interpreted a passing comment by Plutarch
to mean that he had composed still other works, now lost, in defense of
vegetarianism.5
A second question, equally puzzling and likewise ultimately unanswera-
ble, that occupied earlier scholars is that of the date of composition of On
Eating Meat relative to Plutarch’s other two animal-related treatises. While
the text itself offers no clues as to its date of composition, the sometimes
overheated rhetoric of the work has led some scholars to conclude that De
esu carnium antedates Plutarch’s other works on animals because of a cer-
tain stylistic and philosophical “immaturity” that they detect in it.6 The
rhetorical cast and the heavily moralizing character of the work, taken
together, have led to the conclusion that Plutarch was under the influence
of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe in the composition of the treatise.7 Indeed, the
very philosophical position adopted in the work has led some to argue that
it must be early on the grounds that Plutarch, as a mature thinker, could
not have and therefore did not champion vegetarianism after a relatively
early stage in his literary career. Frederick E. Brenk, for example, sees in
the work the “exaggerated rhetoric and naïveté associated with Plutarch’s
youthful works,” in this case betraying its author’s “youthful sincerity and
idealism and the appeal of the heart over the head.”8 Some scholars have
taken Plutarch’s enthusiastic advocacy of abstention in On Eating Meat to
be evidence of an early allegiance to Pythagorean teachings. Typical of this
position is the observation of Helmbold that the two parts of On Eating
Meat “probably depict faithfully a foible of Plutarch’s early manhood, the
Pythagorean or Orphic abstention from animal food. There is little trace
of this in his later life …”9 Already Haussleiter, in his history of vegetarian
thought in antiquity, had declared Pythagoras to be the figure who princi-
pally inspired Plutarch’ advocacy of the meat-free lifestyle.10
More recent scholars have adopted a more nuanced stance on the influ-
ence of Pythagorean doctrine in On Eating Meat. Damianos Tsekourakis,
for example, has correctly noted that, while Plutarch several times refers
to Pythagorean arguments, in none of these instances does he display the
enthusiasm for the doctrine of transmigration that figured heavily in the
earlier philosopher’s case for abstention.11 Indeed, in the opening sentence
of On Eating Meat, Plutarch expresses astonishment that anyone can ask
what led Pythagoras to abstain, when the more cogent question is what led
129
ON E AT I NG M E AT
the first man to touch bloody flesh to his lips (993A–B). Scarcely more en-
thusiastic for Pythagoras’ stance is Plutarch’s statement that, although the
doctrine of metempsychosis is not proven to the point that one can accept
it totally, the uncertainty inherent in the question should at least give one
pause (998D).
Evidence that Plutarch’s mentions of Pythagoras constitute less than a
ringing endorsement of the earlier philosopher’s doctrine of transmigration
calls attention to other, closely related issues that complicate our appreci-
ation of Plutarch’s own position on abstinence, including the question of
Plutarch’s own level of commitment to the vegetarian way of life, and the
problem, arising directly from the former question, of apparent contradic-
tions between Plutarch’s ardent support of abstention in On Eating Meat
and what appear to be less doctrinaire pronouncements in other of his works
on the need for abstinence, if not actual endorsements of a carnivorous diet.
An apology for the vegetarian lifestyle, even when clothed in language so
fervent if not indeed frenzied as that of Plutarch, does not in itself guarantee
that its author followed his own advice to the letter. Some scholars who have
offered accounts of the development of vegetarian philosophy since classical
antiquity have taken isolated passages in a number of ancient authors as
proof that the individuals who penned them were devoted and consistent
vegetarians. In his historical survey of attitudes toward non-human animals,
psychologist Richard D. Ryder declared categorically, “The philosophers
Porphyry and Plotinus, and the statesman Seneca, all followed a vegetarian
diet, but the most outstanding exponent of this habit was Plutarch …”12 A
much more judicious assessment of the question is that of Daniel A. Dom-
browski, “Many important thinkers from antiquity were greatly impressed
with vegetarian thought: Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Theophrastus,
Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others.”13 Dombrowski wisely stops
short of concluding that any of the individuals whom he catalogues can with
absolute certainty be declared to have been a practicing vegetarian, however
enthusiastically each may have spoken of the meat-free lifestyle.
Plutarch had occasion to discuss food choices in a number of the more
than 70 treatises that constitute the corpus of his philosophical and ethical
treatises that are known together as the Moralia, and his enthusiasm for
abstention appears to vary according to the nature of the works in which
references to food occur. In his lengthy and diffuse assemblage of dinner
table conversations, the Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk), Plutarch
and some friends discuss matters of diet in a relaxed and jovial setting. Even
in the context of that work itself, some degree of inconsistency may be de-
tected. In one conversation, the question of whether seafood is superior
to meat from land-dwelling animals is discussed (667C–669E), a question
that suggests that both choices are acceptable to the discussants, but in the
course of that same conversation, one interlocutor remarks that people feel
greater shame when slaughtering land-dwelling animals than sea-dwellers
130
ON E AT I NG M E AT
because of the pitiful cries that land animals emit at slaughter (669D), an
admission of some scruples on the part of some individuals. At one point,
Plutarch himself, one of the interlocutors in the work, observes that human
beings at an earlier point in history may have been compelled to eat meat,
and he acknowledges that they even now cannot readily abandon the prac-
tice because they find meat eating to be pleasurable (730A). His observation
here is not angry or critical of the practice but constitutes merely a matter-
of-fact statement of his perception of the situation.14
A similar, partially receptive attitude toward meat eating is traceable in
Plutarch’s dialogue De sanitate tuenda praecepta (Advice about Health). Here
Plutarch acknowledges that meat eating has become for humans a kind of
perverse “second nature,” and he enjoins humans to consume meat only as
a supplement to a diet made up of foods that are “more in accord with na-
ture” (132A). Meat, after all, promotes indigestion (131F). In this case, we
should perhaps view Plutarch’s observations not as an endorsement of meat
eating but rather as a concession to what he realizes are the realities of hu-
man life, so that the best that one can expect of human beings is restraint
rather than abstinence. In another symposiac work, the Convivium septem
sapientium (Banquet of the Seven Sages), the interlocutor Solon laments that
human beings are forced to commit injustice because of their need to eat, for
to take the life of any living entity allows one being to thrive at the expense of
another (159C–D). Hence a human being should strive to eat as little as possi-
ble. Although Solon’s position bears some similarity to Plutarch’s connection
of meat eating with injustice in On Eating Meat (994E, 997E–998A, 999A–
B), Solon does not clearly differentiate meat from other food sources, and
he seems more concerned with the health of the human soul when weighed
down by food than he is with the plight of animals slaughtered for meat.15
Our brief survey of passages from a number of Plutarch’s treatises in
which food choice is at least touched upon incidentally suggests that we can-
not find total consistency in our author. Plutarch does seem to acknowledge
that most human beings will not likely lose their taste for animal food, how-
ever preferable and praiseworthy the adoption of a meat-free lifestyle might
be. In this acknowledgment, Plutarch displays the pragmatism that marks
his approach to philosophical questions in general, although it stands in
stark contrast to the uncompromising position adopted in On Eating Meat.
One might argue that the seemingly accepting attitude toward meat eating
that appears in Table Talk is a reflection of the symposiac nature of that
work overall, in which all manner of culinary topics may be expected to be
aired and treated in a light-hearted manner, given the relaxed nature of the
treatise. We may conclude, from the passages discussed above, both that
Plutarch demonstrates less consistency than practicality in his pronounce-
ments on meat eating, even if the majority of his statements on the practice
are unenthusiastic if not critical, and that it is probably unwarranted to label
him categorically as a lifelong vegetarian.
131
ON E AT I NG M E AT
We have seen that Plutarch’s case for the meat-free lifestyle does not seem
to rest to any significant degree on the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsy-
chosis or reincarnation, a type of argument that may be considered primar-
ily religious in nature. At the same time, Plutarch advances virtually every
other type of argument encountered in ancient discussions of abstention,
and at times he offers arguments rarely seen elsewhere in ancient vegetarian
polemic but encountered regularly in modern vegetarian literature. Sum-
marizing ancient argumentation on abstention, Urs Dierauer has noted that
religious arguments figure much more prominently in classical sources than
in modern vegetarian literature, while concern for the suffering of animals
is less frequently detectable in ancient texts than in modern. He notes as well
that almost all arguments that occur in modern polemic have counterparts
in classical literature.16 Plutarch’s own choice of arguments for abstention
makes him a particularly intriguing case study. While we may isolate exam-
ples in Plutarch of virtually every type of argument advanced in ancient veg-
etarian polemic, we find comparatively few appeals to what may be termed
religious/spiritual considerations, while those that may be viewed as ethical/
philosophical and scientific/hygienic predominate. In this respect, Plutarch
emerges as a distinctly “modern” advocate for the vegetarian lifestyle in the
terms that Dierauer sets forth.
The issue of animal suffering is surprisingly prominent in Plutarch’s case
for abstention from meat, while it appears comparatively infrequently in
writers prior to Plutarch who treat the topic, a fact that lends support to
an assertion of “modernity” in his manner of argument. In his study of
Plutarch’s philosophy of vegetarianism, Michael Beer observes justly, “It
is his concern with the suffering of animals that not only makes him al-
most unique in the ancient world … but renders him eerily prescient of the
sorts of arguments offered by modern philosophers espousing the cause of
animal rights,”17 and his assessment of Plutarch’s approach is likewise cor-
rect when he asserts that he “attempts, through shock tactics, to destroy
any justification for meat eating.”18 The validity of Beer’s observation on
Plutarch’s use of “shock tactics” is demonstrated with particular clarity in
Plutarch’s gut-wrenching scene (On Eating Meat 994E–F) of animals about
to be slaughtered crying out to their slayer to spare them if their death arises
not from necessity but merely from the desire for a tasty meal.19 The brief
passage is strikingly “modern” in its appeal to several arguments raised in
vegetarian polemic today. Unstated but undeniably present in the scene
is the assumption that animals that are about to be slaughtered sense the
imminent danger that encompasses them.20 This awareness of impending
death is triggered, in Plutarch’s view, from the presence in animals of a share
of reason, which had prompted his lament (994E) that human beings are not
deterred from the act of slaughter by any recognition of the “extraordinary
132
ON E AT I NG M E AT
degree of intelligence” (peritton en sunesei) in the animals whose lives they

are taking. This obliviousness leads humans to conclude erroneously that
the utterances of the animals seeking justice from their slayers are merely
“inarticulate sounds” (phōnas anarthrous, 994E) rather than the “calls for
justice” (dikaiologias, 994E) that they in fact are. It is interesting to note
that Plutarch comments in this same passage on the injustice entailed in de-
priving food animals not only of their lives but even of sunlight during their
confinement, a scene that anticipates the so-called Harm as Deprivation
Argument that philosopher Tom Regan would make a cornerstone of his
case for animal rights.21 It is wrong, as Plutarch and Regan argue, for hu-
man beings to deprive animals of the joys that they might take in the simple
pleasures of their own lives.
Similarly “modern” in tone is Plutarch’s insistence that meat eating is
detrimental to human health. Beer considers this line of argument to be
central to Plutarch’s case against the eating of meat, observing, “The main
impetus of Plutarch’s argument lies in his assertion that the human body
is not designed to consume flesh.”22 While one might object that Plutarch
seems even more concerned with combatting the cruelty involved in the
meat-based diet, the scientific/hygienic argument which Beer stresses cer-
tainly does figure prominently in Plutarch’s case for abstention. He asserts
(994F–995A) that the bodily anatomy of human beings suggests that they
are not naturally carnivorous, since they do not possess the talons or claws
that assist those species that are naturally carnivorous, while the human
stomach does not produce the chemicals necessary for the digestion of flesh.
Because animal flesh is thus unnatural to humans, they must resort to cook-
ing and otherwise altering it before they can tolerate a meal that it by its
nature improper to them (995B–C). Precisely these arguments are made by
Matthew Scully in his study of the suffering inflicted upon non-human ani-
mals by human beings:
Our bodies, too, do not appear to have been designed for eating
flesh, a point easily established by examining the statistics on heart
and vascular disease … or by going to the mirror, opening your
mouth, and asking yourself why it is that you do not see fangs. In-
deed, what is all this genetic tampering with animals, to make their
flesh paler and leaner and softer, but an admission that normal
meats are not, after all, particularly healthy?23
Another type of argument that Plutarch brings to bear that has a strikingly
“modern” feel is his contention that the mistreatment and slaughter of an-
imals, whether in the service of food procurement or merely in an act of
wanton cruelty, inevitably leads to the mistreatment of one’s fellow human
133
ON E AT I NG M E AT
beings, as we are drawn ever deeper into depravity through acts of escalat-
ing viciousness (998B). From the slaughter of oxen and sheep and cocks,
humans are drawn to acts of war and slaughter. Plutarch offers here an early
formulation of the principle, frequently commented upon in discussions of
the psychology of serial killers, that cruelty toward animals in childhood
often presages a propensity toward murder in adulthood.24
As a final example of Plutarch’s forward-looking approach to vegetarian
polemic, we may note his insights into what might be called the “psychology
of meat eating.” He betrays some awareness of the possibility that the con-
sumption of meat may arouse a level of shame or even disgust in human car-
nivores. In his study of the symbolic aspects of meat, anthropologist Nick
Fiddes calls attention to what he views as a desire on the part of meat eaters
to “eschew confronting certain aspects of meat’s identity.”25 This squeam-
ishness is most readily observable in the attempt to disguise the origin of an-
imal foods by substituting designations like “beef,” “pork,” “venison” and
“veal” for the names of the animal from which each is derived.26 In a similar
fashion, cooking serves, in Fiddes’ view, to distance meat eaters from the
reality of their action. He argues, “Cooking ameliorates the stark animality
of the flesh, by altering its colour, imposing a human hallmark since we are
the only species to possess this skill, and confirming, beyond doubt, the
death of the beast.”27 Plutarch has taken note of the squeamishness that
the consumption of animal flesh may arouse in human beings, remarking
that the wealthy employ cooks and chefs as “corpse dressers” (nekrokomois,
994F) because they cannot bear to eat the flesh of dead animals without
first altering it by cooking and pickling it so as to render acceptable to the
human body “what is foreign to it” (995B). Plutarch’s point is precisely that
of Fiddes: humans do not wish to be reminded of the savagery that their diet
entails.
In his analysis of ancient defenses of the vegetarian lifestyle, Dierauer di-
vides the arguments marshaled by its advocates into three categories: those
that focus on the welfare of animals; those that focus on the welfare of both
humans and animals; and those that focus primarily on the welfare of hu-
mans. Plutarch advances ten of the 12 arguments that Dierauer includes in
his three categories, failing to mention only the assertions that the meat-
free lifestyle brings a human being closer to the divine, and that it renders
the human more godlike, two arguments which Dierauer includes among
those that he characterizes as focusing on human concerns and interests.28
The omission of these two arguments supports a conclusion that Plutarch
relies less on appeals to religious/spiritual considerations than is otherwise
observable in ancient defenses of abstinence. We cannot expect to find, in
Plutarch or in any extant ancient text on abstention from meat, some com-
pelling arguments encountered in modern polemic, for example, the ecolog-
ical consideration that the production of meat is not cost-effective because
of the enormous amounts of grain products required to feed animals that
134
ON E AT I NG M E AT
yield relatively small amounts of meat, or that food animals are fed chemi-
cals that are potentially hazardous to humans in order to improve the qual-
ity, taste and appearance of the meat that they yield. Such considerations
lay outside the experience of classical culture. At the same time, we cannot
fail to be impressed by the range and variety of arguments marshaled by
Plutarch within the brief compass of On Eating Meat, so many of which still
find a place in vegetarian literature.
Notes
1 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis VII. 32. 9, states that Xenocrates, in his
treatise Πϵρὶ τη̑ς ἀπὸ τω̑ν ζῴων τροϕη̑ς (On Nourishment Derived from Animals),
maintained that consumption of meat is unprofitable for human beings because
it renders the human soul like that of irrational beasts. It would seem that Xeno-
crates’ objection here arose rather from a concern for human spiritual welfare
than from any concern for the sufferings of food animals. Johannes Haussleiter,
Der Vegetarismus in der Antike (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1935) 198–201, offers a use-
ful analysis of Xenocrates’ views on animals in which he concludes that human
spiritual purity was the philosopher’s principal concern.
2 For a detailed analysis of De esu carnium and of references to vegetarianism
in other works of Plutarch, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Rea-
son in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006)
85–102. For general studies of Plutarch’s defense of vegetarianism, see Dan-
iel A. Dombrowski, The Philosophy of Vegetarianism (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1984) 86–102 and his “Philosophical Vegetarianism and
Animal Entitlements,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Hand-
book of Animals in Classical Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014) 546–550; Damianos Tsekourakis, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism
in Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s ‘Moralia’,”
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 1 (1987) 366–393; Stephen
T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for Vegetarianism,” Classical
Outlook 72, 2 (1995) 41–43; and Urs Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung
in der griechisch-römischen Antike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament
und frühe Christentum,” in Manuela Linnemann and Claudia Schorcht, eds.,
Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft einer Lebensweise (Erlangen: Harald
Fischer Verlag, 2001) 35–45.
3 See Preface note 3.
4 See Santese, Introduction to Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, Plutarco:
Il Cibarsi di Carne (Naples: D’Auria, 1999) 13 notes 16–17. She cites much the
same bibliography on the question that is found in Cherniss and Helmbold,
Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) 537.
5 At De esu carnium 996A, Plutarch states that, two days previously, he had noted
in a discussion that the Athenians had punished a man who had flayed a ram
while it was alive. That text does not in itself seem to support the contention that
Plutarch is alluding to other works on the topic. Cherniss and Helmbold 537 and
Tsekourakis 366, cite this reference in Plutarch in support of their belief that he
composed more works on vegetarianism than the extant On Eating Flesh.
6 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 36, concludes that the work, which
he finds loose in structure and argument, is probably a product of Plutarch’s
twenties or thirties because of its manner of presentation which he brands as
135
ON E AT I NG M E AT
“drastisch” and its overwrought rhetoric which he views as filled with “radikalen
Überspannungen.”
7 For an early formulation of this position, see F. Krauss, Die rhetorischen Schrif-
ten Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im plutarchischen Schriftenkorpus (Dissertation,
Munich, 1912) 77 ff.
8 Frederick E. Brenk, In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia
and Lives (Leiden: Brill, 1977) 57 and 70. Aldo Tirelli, “Etica e Dietetica nei De
Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta,” in Italo Gallo, ed., Plutarco e le Scienze (Genoa:
Sagep Editrice, 1992) 392, observes that Plutarch in time realized that human
beings cannot reasonably be expected to live a meat-free life, prompting Tirelli’s
comment, “ecco il bon sens del Plutarco maturo.”
9 Cherniss and Helmbold 537. As a sobering antidote against claims that evidence
of early support for a lifestyle that Plutarch may subsequently have abandoned
provides some certainty on the chronology of his works, we should keep in mind
the observation of D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 3, “There
are no works that can be shown to have been written in youth … Hardly any-
thing is datable.”
10 Haussleiter 228, “Fragen wir endlich, wer von allem Plutarch die Anregung zu
seiner Überzeugung gab, so ist in erster Linie natürlich Pythagoras und seine
Schule zu nennen.”
11 Tsekourakis 380. Plutarch mentions Pythagoras by name at On Eating Meat
993A, the opening sentence of the treatise; at 997E; and at 998A. Tirelli, in con-
trast, agrees with Haussleiter, judging Plutarch to be “faithful to Pythagorean-
ism” (“ligio al vegetarismo pitagorico,” 391), and he views Plutarch’s devotion
to Pythagorean doctrine as a demonstration of “almost absolute intransigence”
(“pressochè assoluta intransigenza,” 391).
12 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 23.
13 Dombrowski, “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements” 535.
14 For further discussion of diet in Plutarch’s Table Talk, see Newmyer, Animals,
Rights and Reason 88–89.
15 Topics related to non-human animals in Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Sages
are discussed in Stephen T. Newmyer, “Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium
Septem Sapientium,” in José Ribiero Perreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and
Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra:
Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009)
497–504.
16 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 55.
17 Michael Beer, “The Question Is Not, Can They Reason?, Nor, Can They Talk?,
But, Can They Suffer?: The Ethics of Vegetarianism in the Writings of Plutarch,”
in David Grumett and Rachel Muers, eds., Eating and Believing: Interdiscipli-
nary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2008)
96.
18 Beer 103.
19 On this passage, see Commentary, pp. 147–150.
20 Dombrowski, “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements” 548,

calls attention to the “fearful reactions to the smell of other animals’ blood at
the slaughterhouse” that animals at the point of slaughter experience.
21 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983) 96–99. For further discussion of this passage in Plutarch, with spe-
cial reference to its anticipation of arguments employed in animal rights litera-
ture, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 92–95. On conditions in modern
136
ON E AT I NG M E AT
meat-producing farms, see the classic work of Jim Mason and Peter Singer,
Animal Factories (New York: Harmony Books, 1990) and, more recently, Peter
Singer and Jim Mason, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Mat-
ter (Emmaus: Rodale Press, 2006), and Erik Marcus, Meat Market: Animals,
Ethics, & Money (Boston: Brio Press, 2005).
22 Beer 104. Beer 105 faults Plutarch for not taking into account the possibility that
meat eating may not after all be unnatural or lacking in nutrition for humans.
23 Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the
Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002) 320.
24 Beer 105 regards as specious Plutarch’s contention that cruelty to animals may
lead to homicide. He seems here to ignore evidence from criminology. Jeremy
Wright and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: Ap-
plying the Graduation Hypothesis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy
and Comparative Criminology 47, 1 (2003) 71–88, offer a fascinating overview
of evidence in support of what they term the “graduation hypothesis,” which
argues that the presence of cruelty to animals in the developmental stages of
an individual’s life may predict interpersonal violence in that individual at a
later stage of life. They note (75), “Cruelty to animals allows children either to
become desensitized to heartless violence or to learn to enjoy the feelings of ad-
ministering pain and suffering. This may ultimately fuel their desire to graduate
to human violence.” This last sentence strikingly echoes Plutarch’s formulation
of the idea.
25 Nick Fiddes, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London and New York: Routledge, 1991) 44.
26 Fiddes 97 makes the intriguing observation that speakers of English have cho-
sen to employ French-derived names for meat products so as to distance them-
selves from “the full conceptual impression of stating the name of the devoured
animal.”
27 Fiddes 114.
28 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 56. Dierauer includes the Or-

phics, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Ovid’s depiction
of Pythagoras’ position, Apollonius of Tyana, Musonius and Porphyry in his
tabulation.
137
Treatise I: Translation 1
On Eating Meat
(De esu carnium)
993 1. Well then, you ask2 on what grounds Pythagoras3 abstained from
meat eating, but I wonder B in what emotional state or frame of mind or
thought the first human being touched slaughter to his mouth and brought
to his lips the flesh of a dead animal, setting out tables of stale corpses, and
still labeled as “food” parts that a little while before had voice and move-
ment and sight.4 How did his eyes endure the carnage when the creatures
were slain and skinned and dismembered? How did his nose tolerate the
stench? How did the defilement not repel his sense of taste when it encoun-
tered the wounds of other beings and drank off the juices and fluids of lethal
sores?5
C “The skins began to move, the flesh to moan,

Both cooked and raw, as if the voice of cattle.”6
This is fiction and storytelling, but the meal is truly monstrous, to hunger
after a creature that is still bellowing and to give guidelines on what crea-
tures are to serve as nourishment when they are still living and chattering,
and to make provisions for seasoning and roasting and serving. We ought
to inquire into the man who first introduced this behavior, not the one who
ended it at length.7
2. One might say that the origin of the practice among those who first un-
dertook to eat meat was their lack of resources.8 D For it was not while
they spent their time in lawless desires and in abundance of necessities that,
swept away into unsuitable and unnatural pleasures, they arrived at this
practice. If they were to gain sensation and the power to speak at this very
moment, they might say, “O fortunate and beloved of the gods, you who
live now, what a life has fallen to your lot, you who enjoy a boundless har-
vest of good things! How many crops sprout for you! What a bountiful vin-
tage! What riches from the plains, what delights from fruit trees are yours to
pluck!9 You have the capacity to live in luxury without defiling yourselves!
138
ON E AT I NG M E AT
The most melancholy and fearsome age of the world welcomed us, who fell
into great and helpless poverty from the moment of our birth. E Air mixed
with thick and unstable moisture and fire and the raging of winds hid away
heaven and the stars.10
‘Not yet did sun sit firm and fixed in place,

heeding its course,
Dividing dawn from dusk, and led them back,
To crown the seasons rich with fruit and buds,
And earth endured the shame’11
of lawless overflowing rivers, and many areas were ‘disfigured by the

marsh,’12 and rendered wasteland by the deep mud and wild thickets and
underbrush. Nor did we yet know of cultivation of fruits, and we had no
tools for handicrafts nor for any art supplied by skill.13 Our hunger never let
up, nor did any seed then available await the annual time of planting. What
wonder is it if, contrary to nature,14 we made use of the flesh of animals,
when even mud was devoured, and F ‘the bark of trees was gnawed,’ and it
was a lucky find ‘to come upon a blade of sprouting grass or rush.’15 When
we had sampled and eaten acorns,16 we danced for joy around some oak
tree, calling it ‘life-g iver’ and ‘mother’ and ‘nourisher.’
994 In those days, that was considered a feast, but all else was full of
turmoil and gloom. What madness, what passion drives you nowadays to
bloodlust, you who have so many of life’s necessities? Why do you claim
falsely that the earth cannot sustain you?17 Why do you profane Demeter
the law-g iver and dishonor Dionysus the gentle god of the vine, as if you do
not receive enough from them? Don’t you feel ashamed when you mingle
the fruits of the field with blood and gore? You call serpents and leopards
‘savage,’ you who don’t take second place to them when it comes to cruelty
and bloodthirstiness. B For them, slaughter is a source of nourishment, but
for you it is a delicacy!”18
3. For we do not eat lions or wolves in self-defense: we leave them alone, but
we slay harmless, tame animals without stings or teeth to bite us, animals
which, by Zeus, nature seems to have produced for the sake of their beauty
and gracefulness …19
It is as if someone, seeing the Nile in flood and filling the land with its
fertilizing and productive waters, would not express admiration at what
this signifies, at how it richly nourishes the crops most productive of hu-
man health, but seeing a crocodile swimming about somewhere or an asp or
mice, savage and loathsome creatures, C would call them the cause for his
censure and his need to act as he does. Or, by Zeus, [it is as if]20 someone,
after taking note of this farmland filled with cultivated crops and weighed
139
ON E AT I NG M E AT
down with stalks of grain, and then looking under the crops and detecting
somewhere a stalk of darnel or dodder, would cease to harvest and gather
the crops, but would complain [about the underbrush]. And what about this?
What if someone, observing the speech of an orator who was in the full
flood of his eloquence in some legal case and was carried away in his defense
of some person in peril, or, indeed, in the condemnation of reckless deeds
and [assertions],21 D borne along in his eloquence in a manner neither sim-
ple not unadorned but with a great range of emotions intended to impress
the many varied dispositions of his listeners and of the litigants which he
must win to his side and convert, or, indeed, calm and tame and quiet down,
what if that someone, then, overlooking this aspect of the issue and taking
the measure of the overall [performance], were to pick out mistakes in ex-
pression in the speech, as it progressed, carried along with it in its onrush,
mistakes that slipped out with the remainder of the speech? And seeing …
of some popular orator …22
4.23 But nothing shames us, not the fresh bloom of their skin, E not the per-
suasiveness of their harmonious voices, not their cleverness of spirit, nor the
cleanliness of their manner of living and the extraordinary degree of intel-
ligence in the poor creatures,24 but for the sake of a bit of flesh we deprive25
their lives of the light of the sun,26 of the span of life to which they were
born and begotten. Then we imagine that their vocalizations and squeaks
are inarticulate27 and not the supplications and entreaties and pleas for jus-
tice28 of each creature saying, “I do not beg you to let me off if you act from
necessity but only if you act from wanton cruelty. Kill me in order to eat, but
not to enjoy a more enticing meal!”29 Oh what savagery! It is horrifying to
see the carefully-set dinner table of wealthy people who hire cooks and chefs
to dress the corpses.30 F It is even more horrifying to see the table when it is
cleared since more is left over than was eaten. So these creatures die in vain!
Still other persons, who abstain from the dishes set before them, do not al-
low them to be cut or chopped up, but, while interceding for the dead, they
do not avoid the living.31
5. Well then, we’ve heard that those men say that nature is the origin [of meat
eating] …32 That meat eating is not natural for a human being33 is proven
in the first place by the physiology of the body, for the body of the human
is not like that of any animals born for a carnivorous diet: a human being
does not have a hooked beak or sharp talons 995 or strong teeth,34 nor does
a human have the elasticity of the stomach or the warmth of air sufficient
to convert and digest a heavy and fleshy diet. On the basis of these facts, the
smoothness of our teeth, the small size of our mouth, the softness of our
tongue, and the sluggishness of our digestion, nature rejects the eating of
meat [in human beings]. If you say that you were born for such a diet, then
slay yourself what you want to eat, but do it with your own strength, not
140
ON E AT I NG M E AT
using a cleaver or a club or any sort of axe. Just as wolves and bears and
lions B kill what they eat, kill an ox with your own hands or a pig with your
own mouth, or rip apart and swallow down a lamb or a rabbit, just as those
animals do.35 But if you wait for what you eat to become a corpse and if the
presence of life in an animal makes you ashamed to enjoy it as a meal, why
do you, contrary to nature, devour a creature once it has lost its life? Still,
no one would eat a creature deprived of its life just as is, but people boil
and roast and alter the carcass with fire and drugs, changing and convert-
ing and overpowering it with innumerable seasonings so that their sense of
taste, thus deceived, may accept what is foreign to it. There is a charming
anecdote about a Spartan fellow who bought a little fish at an inn and gave
it to the innkeeper to prepare. C When the innkeeper asked for cheese and
vinegar and oil, the Spartan replied, “Well, if I had those things, I would not
have bought the fish!”36 But we are so fastidious in our bloodthirstiness that
we need condiments for meat, mixing together olive oil, wine, fish sauce and
vinegar with Syrian and Arabian seasonings, as if we were actually prepar-
ing a corpse for burial!37 When the flesh is softened and broken down and in
a sense dissolved, it is a task for the digestive system to get the better of it,
and even if the digestive process does win out, there follow a terrible feeling
of fullness and bouts of indigestion.
6. Diogenes was so bold as to eat octopus raw, D in order to do away with

the need to prepare it with fire. Having covered his head with his threadbare
cloak and brought the flesh to his mouth, he proclaimed, “I am endangering
myself and running a risk for your sake!” Some risk!38 Did the philosopher
not risk his life in the same way that Pelopidas did for the sake of Theban
freedom, and Harmodius and Aristogeiton did for the Athenians, when he
did battle with the raw octopus, in order to make our lives more beastly?39
In addition to that, eating meat is not only contrary to the nature of our
bodies, E but it also weighs down our souls from fullness and satiety.40 “For
wine and overindulgence in meat render the body strong and powerful, but
the soul weak.”41 And so that I may not incur the hatred of athletes,42 let me
cite as an example my own countrymen. The Athenians used to call us Boe-
otians dull-w itted and foolish, especially because of our gluttony.43 “These
people are pigs …,”44 and Menander [says], “… who have jaws …,”45 and
Pindar [says], “and … to learn …,”46 “dry brightness [is] the wisest soul,”
according to Heraclitus.47 Empty jars make a sound when struck, but when
they are full they do not respond to blows.48 Thin bronze vessels pass along
sounds in a circle, F until someone blocks and deadens the sound by laying
hold of the vessels as the sound progresses around.49 When the eye is overly
full of moisture it feels dazed and lacks the strength for its natural tasks.
When we look at the sun through an overabundance of dense air that brings
along with it a host of unfiltered vapors, we do not see it as pure and bright
but rather as indistinct and robbed of the strength of its rays. Similarly, it is
141
ON E AT I NG M E AT
absolutely certain that, when the body is agitated and bloated and weighed
down by foods not natural to it, 996 the brilliance of the soul and its splen-
dor takes on a dullness and an indistinct quality, not possessing the bright
light and sharpness necessary to proceed to the subtle and obscure goals of
human affairs.
7. Apart from that, does a disposition toward love of humanity not seem
to be a marvelous thing?50 What person, so kindly and humanely disposed
toward creatures that are not akin, would harm a human being? A couple of
days ago I mentioned in a lecture51 a remark of Xenocrates that the Atheni-
ans punished a man who had skinned a ram alive.52 It seems to me that the
man who tortures a creature while it is alive is no worse than the man who
takes away a living creature’s life by slaying it. B Yet it seems we take more
note of acts that are contrary to custom than of those contrary to nature.
I spoke on that occasion in a somewhat popular fashion. I hesitate even to
broach that topic which is the basis for my opinion, great and mysterious
as it is and “difficult to believe for men who are clever,” as Plato says,53 and
who think mortal thoughts, just as a skipper of a ship [hesitates to shift di-
rection] in a storm or a playwright hesitates to raise the theatrical machine
when his play is in progress.54 Perhaps it is well to make a start by citing the
verses of Empedocles …55 for he states metaphorically that souls are bound
up in mortal bodies because they are atoning for the slaughter and eating of
flesh and for consuming one another.56 C And yet this line of thought seems
to be older, for the story of the sufferings of the dismembered Dionysus and
of the outrageous acts of the Titans who tasted his blood and were punished
for it with thunderbolts, is a myth that speaks symbolically of rebirth.57 The
ancients termed “Titans” that part of us which is irrational and disordered
and violent and derived not from the divine but from the demonic, that is,
“those being punished and paying a penalty.”58
Commentary
1 On the question of whether Treatise I and Treatise II of On Eating Meat
are in fact two parts of the same work or constitute separate works, see
Introduction, pp. 128–129 and note 6.
2 The particle ἀλλά (alla), the first word in the Greek text, can be used in
Greek to denote opposition to something said previously, indicating that
an earlier discussion of the current topic had occurred, or it can be used
to suggest an objection to another point of view. Here Plutarch seeks
to make clear that he considers the question of Pythagoras’ objection
to meat eating, which some individual is imagined to have raised, to be
of less importance than the broader issue of what could have induced
any person to devour a dead animal. The bluntness and suddenness with
which the sentence begins, with its second-p erson direct address to some
142
ON E AT I NG M E AT
imaginary individual who had raised the question of Pythagoras’ absten-

tion, is evidence of the rhetorical cast upon which scholars have often
commented. See Introduction, pp. 129–130.
3 Pythagoras (sixth century bce) is cited here as the classic Greek expo-
nent of the meat-free lifestyle. Scholars have disagreed on the degree of
influence which Pythagoras exercised on Plutarch’s own advocacy of
abstention, but Plutarch does not exhibit particular enthusiasm for the
argument, sometimes viewed as the central pillar of the earlier philoso-
pher’s case, that the possibility of reincarnation renders a carnivorous
diet precarious for human beings. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philos-
ophers VIII. 12–13, discusses theories on Pythagoras’ abstention, and he
maintains that while some held that he advocated abstention to prevent
humans from consuming other besouled creatures, the real reason was
to inspire a simple lifestyle in humans and to render them satisfied to
live on easily procurable foods that promote health of mind and body.
A helpful overview of ancient views on the origins of Pythagoras’ advo-
cacy of abstention is found in Damianos Tsekourakis, “Pythagoreanism
or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in
Plutarch’s Moralia,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36,
1, 370–379. On Plutarch’s relation to Pythagoras, see Tsekourakis, pas-
sim, and Introduction, pp. 129–130.
4 Plutarch’s expression of revulsion at the mere contemplation of man’s
first experience of tasting animal flesh recalls Empedocles’ lament
(DK31 B139 = Inwood 124) that he did not die before first committing
evil by touching flesh to his lips. Plutarch (On the Cleverness of Animals
959E) outlines man’s gradual progression from slaying dangerous preda-
tors, a praiseworthy endeavor, to the slaughter of harmless species which
men then begin to taste, a process that gradually dulled man’s sense of
pity while feeding man’s lust to kill. Meat eating thus emerges as an evil
that, once first introduced, becomes uncontrollable and, quite literally,
“all-consuming.”
5 In the composition of his treatise “A Vindication of Natural Diet” (1813),
the poet Shelley (1792–1822) was much influenced by Plutarch’s descrip-
tion of the repulsive actions that the preparation of meat necessitates,
observing, “It is only by softening and disguising flesh by culinary prepa-
ration, that it is rendered susceptible of mastication or digestion; and
that the sight of its bloody juices and raw horror, does not excite intol-
erable loathing and disgust,” “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” in E. B.
Murray, ed., The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Volume I (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993) 80. Immediately after this outburst, Shelley men-
tions Plutarch by name for his similar description of the horrors of meat
preparation and consumption. On Shelley’s debt to Plutarch in his veg-
etarian polemic, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch and Shelley’s Vege-
tarianism,” Classical Outlook 77, 4 (2000) 145–148.
6 Odyssey XII. 395–396. The citation is particularly apt here because the
sacrificial animals that Homer depicts seem by their actions to remind
their slayers that they had just been alive, possessing the movement and
143
ON E AT I NG M E AT
sight of which the animals described by Plutarch as turned into food for
human beings had themselves been deprived. Such miraculous behavior
on the part of animals is rare in Homeric scenes of sacrifice.
7 According to Pliny, Natural History VII. 209, one “Hyperbius son of
Mars” was the first human being to slay an animal, and Prometheus was
the first to slay an ox. Pliny’s comment appears in a catalogue of “firsts”
in human technological advancement. The individual who ended the
practice is Pythagoras. Nothing is known of Hyperbius. Plutarch’s in-
terest in this opening chapter of On Eating Meat I in the identity of the
first human being who prepared animal flesh for human consumption is
a reflection of the fascination among classical authors with the question
of the “first inventor” (πρω̑ τος ϵὑρϵτής, prōtos heuretēs, Latin primus in-
ventor) of various objects and activities. At times, authors sought by such
investigation to establish who bears the blame for the institution of an
activity, in this case the consumption of animal flesh, that deserves to
be censured. See Adolf Kleingünter, Protos Euretes: Untersuchungen zur
Geschichte einer Fragestellung (Leipzig: Akademie Verlag, 1933).
8 “Necessity” is often cited, in ancient accounts of the earliest stages of
human life on earth, as the origin of meat eating. In such accounts, hu-
mans are viewed as having not yet learned successful farming techniques
or as having been hindered by crop failures or a lack of productive farm
land. Even ardent defenders of abstention in antiquity were willing to
excuse certain groups from an obligation to pursue a meat-free diet if
they were compelled by their environment to live almost exclusively on
flesh. Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 964A, mentions among such
groups the Nomads and the Troglodytes. In a similar passage, Porphyry,
On Abstinence IV. 21, adds the Ichthyophagi (“Fish-Eaters”) to the No-
mads and Troglodytes as peoples whose carnivorous diet may be excused
because of the infertility of their home territory which yields no plant
crops.
9 A number of ideas common in Greek anthropological speculation on the
early stages of human life are touched on in the outburst of Plutarch’s
primitive man. The notion that earth at one time supplied abundant
plant food without the need for human effort appears in Greek accounts
of the so-called Golden Age, and it appears already in the Works and
Days of Hesiod (ca. 700 bce), wherein he outlines living conditions dur-
ing the five ages of man that he distinguishes (Works and Days 109–201).
In the Golden Age, “bountiful earth on her own bore abundant and
boundless fruits” (Works and Days 117–118). Advocates of abstention
took this concept of earth’s natural bounty as proof both that early man
was vegetarian and that the adoption of a carnivorous regimen signaled
a decline in human virtue, an idea that is hinted at throughout the first
chapter of Plutarch’s On Eating Meat I. In his dialogue Whether Beasts
Are Rational, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus argues (991C) that human
beings were drawn away from the abundance of plant foods that earth
offered up and first sampled animal flesh because of their taste for luxury
and their innate cruelty. Plato, Republic 372a–c, seems to recommend a
144
ON E AT I NG M E AT
vegetarian diet in his ideal state, a regimen that Socrates in that passage
associates with good health and peacefulness.
An excellent analysis of Greek views on the earliest stages of life on
earth is provided in W. K. C. Guthrie, In the Beginning: Some Greek
Views on the Origins of Life and the Early State of Man (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1957). See also Gordon Lindsay Campbell, “Origins of
Life and Origins of Species,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Ox-
ford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) 233–247, with additional bibliography.
10 Plutarch’s description of atmospheric conditions on earth in its earliest
stages mentions the four element or “roots” (stoicheia) identified by the
Presocratic Empedocles (ca. 492–432 bce) as the constituents of matter
(DK31 B71 = Inwood 74). The depiction of conditions as windy, turbid
and dark, due to the fact that the sun had not yet come into existence, is
similar to Ovid’s poetic description (Metamorphoses I. 15–20) of primal
chaos in which the elements of nature were not yet illuminated by sun-
light. A particularly elaborate account of earth’s earliest state in which
the operation of the primal elements is described is found in the historian
Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheke I. 7.
11 These verses have been attributed to Empedocles (DK31 B154). Many
scholars view the attribution as dubious (see Santese in Lionello Inglese
and Giuseppina Santese, eds., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne [Naples:
D’Auria, 1999] 184 note 10 for discussion and bibliography). Brad In-
wood, The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with a Commen-
tary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), omits the verses from
his edition.
12 The phrase appears to be the end of a verse of uncertain authorship,
perhaps a continuation of the verses dubiously attributed to Empedocles
cited just above (DK31 B154).
13 Plutarch’s speaker imagines a period so early in the development of hu-
man life that no advances had yet been made through the use of “tech-
nological skill” (τϵ´χνη, technē). Such skill was regarded by the Greeks
as a possession unique to human beings that enabled their remarkable
rise in culture and civilization, including their conquest of the land and
the invention of agriculture. Aristotle, History of Animals 588a29–30, ar-
gued that humans possess “technological skill, wisdom and intelligence”
(technē kai sophia kai sunesis) while other animals have only “some other
similar capacity” (tis hetera toiautē phusikē, 588a30–31). In the Meta-
physics, Aristotle stated that humans live by “technological skill and rea-
sonings” (980b27–28). Other ancient writers, including Plutarch, Pliny
the Elder and Aelian (ca. 170–235 ce), cite examples of apparent tool use
in non-human animals as proof that other species are endowed with a
degree of “technological skill.” Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals
967A, Pliny, Natural History VII. 125, and Aelian, Nature of Animals II.
48, all relate that crows and ravens drop pebbles into jars of water to raise
the water to a level at which they can drink. Anecdotal evidence of this
sort is still cited by cognitive ethologists and animal rights philosophers
145
ON E AT I NG M E AT
to argue for conscious mental activity in non-human species. On tool use

in non-human animals, see Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals
Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt, 2015) 193–199 and Stephen T.
Newmyer, The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought:
The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge,
2017) 112–117.
14 The notion that consumption of animal flesh by human beings is “con-
trary to nature” (para phusin, 993E) figures prominently in ancient and
modern vegetarian polemic, most especially in the anatomical argu-
ment that the dentition and digestive apparatus of human beings are not
designed to tear flesh or to digest it. Plutarch raises these points below
(994F–995A). For a modern articulation of this idea, see Introduction,
p. 133.
15 The two brief phrases enclosed in quotation marks have been taken to
be poetic fragments since they appear to be iambics. Their source is
unknown. On Plutarch’s citations from Greek poetry, see Ewen Bowie,
“Poetry and Education,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 177–190. Bowie observes that Plutarch
never comments on the poetic value of the verses that he cites, and he
suggests that he may not even have cared for poetry. Citations from poets
in Plutarch’s works are, in Bowie’s judgment, a reflection of his philo-
sophical background and of his elite education.
16 Classical literature is full of claims that acorns were a staple of the diet
of primitive mankind. Vergil, Georgics I. 147–149, states that Ceres first
taught humans the principles of agriculture when acorns were in short
supply. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V. 937–940, relates that primi-
tive man, when earth supplied her gifts without cultivation, rested among
the acorn-bearing oaks. Juvenal, Satires VI. 1–10, with a typically gro-
tesque twist on the motif, describes how women, in the Golden Age, were
still virtuous, unsophisticated and hairier than their “acorn-belching
husbands” (glandem ructante marito, VI. 10).
17 The adoption of a meat diet is viewed as an insult to Mother Earth
who is capable of supplying all necessities of human life in abundance.
Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 32, in a passage derived from the now-lost
treatise On Piety by Theophrastus (ca. 372–287 bce), contends that men
should make offerings to the gods and to the earth in thanks for abun-
dant crops. Earth is labeled in the passage in Porphyry as the “hearth of
gods and men,” and as “our nurse and mother.”
18 Human beings are seen as being in a position to make a real choice to
abstain from meat eating, whereas true carnivores cannot. Below (994E),
Plutarch depicts an animal at the point of slaughter pleading with its
slayers to spare its life if the human acts not from hunger but merely from
a desire to secure a tastier meal. Here, as often in his vegetarian polemic,
Plutarch views meat eating as a sign of human fondness for luxury. Sim-
ilarly, Plutarch argues (996F) that, if humans must eat meat, they should
do so with a feeling of shame and only out of necessity rather than from
a desire for luxury.
146
ON E AT I NG M E AT
19 Plutarch maintains (On the Cleverness of Animals 964F) that there is

no injustice involved in slaying animals that are dangerous to humans
and seek to harm them, nor in taming more human-friendly species
to aid in human labors. Plutarch’s point that humans slay for food
use only tame species has been raised in modern discussions of meat
production and consumption. Nick Fiddes, Meat: A Natural Symbol
(London: Routledge, 1991) 138, observes, “Carnivores are also, appar-
ently, not to our taste.” Various reasons for this fact may be cited,
in Fiddes’ view (139–142): the flesh of carnivores is too strong-t asting
for human enjoyment; only animals perceived by humans as victims
rather than as predators are chosen for human consumption, since hu-
mans, as predators themselves, feel a sort of bond with other preda-
tory species; the diet of carnivores may spread disease to humans who
eat them.
Scholars posit a lacuna at the beginning of Chapter 3. The subject
broached at the beginning of Chapter 3, the human practice of eating
only tame animals, seems to be introduced suddenly and does not follow
smoothly from the previous discussion. Similarly, an entirely new and
likewise unrelated topic is taken up after the initial comment on harm-
less vs. dangerous animals as potential human food sources. A lengthy
series of examples and analogies follows (994B–D), the precise context of
which never becomes entirely clear. The source of 994B–D has been de-
bated. Helmbold 547 note C suggests that the passage comes from an en-
tirely separate work of Plutarch and that it has been inserted here where
it seems inappropriate. He notes that the opening sentence of Chapter 4
follows smoothly upon the opening sentence of Chapter 3, which lends
support to the suspicion that 994B–D has been interpolated from some
other work.
20 I insert the words in brackets, which are not found in the Greek text, to
allow the apparent set of hypothetical situations that are imagined in this
obscure passage to flow more smoothly.
21 The text is again troubled here. Some editors have suggested that the
correct reading for the word “assertions” should be a verb rather than a
noun.
22 The sentence ends without a main verb, and the participle “seeing” has
no direct object, so that the point of the hypothetical situation posed in
994D remains unclear.
23 At the beginning of Chapter 4, Plutarch once again takes up the topic
introduced in the first sentence of Chapter 3 and interrupted by the inter-
polated section that constitutes the remainder of Chapter 3, namely the
idea that human beings limit their consumption of animal flesh to tame
and domestic species. Plutarch’s development of the topic in Chapter 4 is
striking for several reasons. The argument presented in Chapter 4 is set
forth by an animal at the point of slaughter that, like the pig in Plutarch’s
treatise Whether Beasts Are Rational, is imagined as endowed with speech
to bring charges against human beings for their moral shortcomings in
their treatment of other species, in this case their injustice toward them.
147
ON E AT I NG M E AT
Although one may detect in the paragraph hints of Plutarch’s condem-

nation of the human desire for luxury, in their craving for expensive and
exotic foods (see notes 9 and 18 above), the main thrust of his argument
in Chapter 4 is the idea that the human consumption of animal flesh vi-
olates a covenant of justice that should be observed between species that
are all endowed with intelligence and a capacity to enjoy life.
It may be this emphasis upon the ethical implications of meat eating
for human beings set forth by Plutarch’s talking animal in Chapter 4 that
prompts the observation of Inglese and Santese (193), “L’Autore fonda
qui il divieto di cibarsi di carne su considerazioni incentrale sull’animale,
piutosto che su osservazioni di tipo antropocentrico.” If the passage is
viewed in the light of arguments advanced in modern animal rights
polemic, however, Plutarch’s arguments and examples emerge as more
animal-c entered than Inglese and Santese allow, and adopt the point of
view of the animals in question more so than that of the humans who
misuse them. For more detailed analysis of Chapter 4, see Newmyer, An-
imals, Rights and Reason 94–96 and “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for
Vegetarianism,” passim.
24 Plutarch explores the nature and dimensions of animal intellect at length
in the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B),
wherein he develops the thesis that all animals have a share of reason and
understanding (960A), so that rationality in animals must be viewed as a
continuum. In the present passage, his emphasis is less on the specific de-
gree of rationality detectable in animal species than on the consequences
for human morality that arise from acknowledgement that all animals are
endowed with some intellectual faculties. Hence Plutarch satisfies himself
here with the general observation that animals are endowed with an “ex-
traordinary degree of intelligence” (peritton en sunesei, 994E).
The term that Plutarch employs here (sunesis) to characterize the in-
tellectual faculty discernible in non-human animals that comes into
play in the scenario that he develops denotes a capacity to “comprehend
quickly” or to “understand” (see the extended discussion of the term in
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1143a1–19). The term is thus well chosen
here in light of the fact that Plutarch’s animal is imagined as being moved
to speak because it understands the mortal danger in which it finds itself.
No subtler distinctions of animal intellect are needed in the context.
25 Plutarch’s use of the verb “deprive” (ἀϕαιρούμϵθα, aphairoumetha, 994E)
is striking and will resonate with readers familiar with arguments in fa-
vor of abstention developed by philosophers of the animal rights move-
ment. The verb aphairein has connotations of depriving, excluding and
hindering, all of which would seem to enter into Plutarch’s picture of an
animal deliberately kept from those aspects of life that might be expected
to enable it to enjoy its own life. Plutarch anticipates here the so-called
Harm as Deprivation Argument developed by animal rights philos-
opher Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1983) 96–99 (see Introduction, p. 133 and note 21).
Regan argues that animals may be harmed by human beings not merely
148
ON E AT I NG M E AT
by having pain visited upon them but also by being deprived of the op-
portunity to exercise preferences in their lives. Death is the ultimate dep-
rivation that humans visit upon animals because it precludes all future
exercise of preferences that an animal might employ in an effort to render
its life more satisfactory to it. Plutarch and Regan both see abstention as
incumbent upon human beings who seek to avoid injustice toward other
living creatures. Plutarch is highly unusual among ancient thinkers is
maintaining that non-human animals have interests that humans need
to take into account, and in concluding therefrom that taking those in-
terests into account is a matter of justice for humans.
26 Critics of the techniques of modern intensive farming regularly decry
the unnatural conditions in which food animals are confined prior to
slaughter, including the deprivation of natural light which they often ex-
perience. Aysha Akhtar, Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Ani-
mals Better Is Critical to Human Welfare (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012) 90, observes, “To sum up the realities of animals raised for food,
the overwhelming majority are housed in extremely filthy, overcrowded
conditions without access to fresh air, sunlight or room to move about
normally.”
27 The question of whether the vocalizations of non-human species are
meaningful was of paramount importance in Greek philosophical
thought, not least because the ability to use meaningful, articulate lan-
guage was viewed as the single most important factor that distinguished
human beings from other animals. Language was viewed in classical
thought as the outward manifestation of the faculty of reason (λόγος,
logos), and only human beings were judged to be rational. The same
term (logos) was used in Greek to indicate both reason and speech, and
the two cannot be easily separated in Greek thought. John Heath, The
Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and
Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 6, argues that the
term logos was first applied to speech and only subsequently to reason,
“The primacy of reason as a distinguishing criterion derived over time
from the far more obvious fact of experience that beasts do not speak.
‘Dumb’ animals do not possess any language.”
Rather clear distinctions between the intellectual capacities of hu-
man beings and of other animals are traceable in Aristotle. At Politics
1332b3–6, he declares that other species live “primarily by nature” while
“man lives by reason as well, for he alone has reason.” Non-human an-
imals were similarly declared to be irrational by the Stoics, whose posi-
tion Plutarch is primarily opposing here in his characterization of animal
utterances. In the teaching of the Stoics, the capacity to produce mean-
ingful language arises in the animal soul, in a division of the soul that
they termed the ἡγϵμονικόν (hēgemonikon), a sort of guiding or governing
mechanism which, in the case of human beings, attains to rationality
over time but which remains irrational in non-human animals. Reason,
conceived linguistically, is bipartite in Stoic doctrine: an “inner reason”
(λόγος ἐνδιάθϵτος, logos endiathetos), equivalent to “thought,” gives rise
149
ON E AT I NG M E AT
to an external manifestation of reason called λόγος προϕορικός (logos pro-

phorikos), a kind of “uttered reason” or “speech.” Because the utterances
of non-human animals do not arise from a rational hēgemonikon, they
are devoid of meaning. Plutarch rejects this notion in his assertion that
humans are mistaken in labeling animal vocalizations as inarticulate. He
discusses the topic of animal language more extensively at On the Clev-
erness of Animals 973A. On animal language see also Porphyry, On Ab-
stinence III. 2–3, where the two Stoic logoi are discussed. Plutarch’s views
on the language of non-human species are analyzed in detail in Stephen
T. Newmyer, “Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal
Language and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di
Cultura Classica 63, 3 (1999) 99–110.
28 On Plutarch’s views on justice toward non-human animals, see note 25
and his extended discussion at On the Cleverness of Animals 963F–965B,
with the Commentary on these sections and notes 67–85. The words of
the animal about to be slaughtered suggest that Plutarch believed that
some non-human animals have a concept of justice. The notion becomes
more piquant here since Plutarch portrays an animal lecturing a human
being on the true meaning of justice. The idea that some non-human
species practice a form of justice in their interactions with conspecifics
and with other species is currently the subject of investigation by cogni-
tive ethologists. Frans deWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and
Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1996) 218, argues that, since morality is grounded in neurobi-
ology and the nervous systems of mammalian species are similar, with
the weighing of ethical concepts traceable to specific areas of the brain,
“It should not surprise us … to find animal parallels.”
29 Plutarch again associates the practice of eating meat with man’s pursuit
of a luxurious lifestyle, and he again contrasts necessity, in which case a
carnivorous diet is at least excusable, with luxury, which always merits
censure. On “necessity” and luxury in human food choices, see notes 8
and 9.
30 Plutarch likens the preparation of meat dishes to the process of embalm-
ing a corpse. At 995C, he elaborates this image, noting that the process of
marinating meat in spices and oils is tantamount to “embalming a corpse
for burial” (nekron entaphiazontes).
31 It is possible that Plutarch has the Cynics in mind here. Below (995C–D),
Plutarch relates that the famous Cynic Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 413–324
bce) ate octopus raw as a sign of rejection of the practice of cooking flesh.
Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Diogenes the Cynic, notes that some
thought the philosopher died of colic after eating raw octopus, Lives
of the Philosophers VI. 76. Plutarch’s talking animal does not consider
the practice of the Cynics to be any more praiseworthy than that of hu-
mans who employ chefs to prepare elaborate dishes with cooked meats.
While the Cynics “intercede for the dead” in avoiding cooked meats,
they nevertheless eat raw flesh and thereby do not “avoid the living.”
Since antiquity, the cooking of meat has been associated with culture
150
ON E AT I NG M E AT
and civilization, while the consumption of raw flesh denotes crudeness

and lack of cultural advancement in human beings. Fiddes 89 observes,
“Raw meat, dripping blood, is what is eaten by wild, carnivorous ani-
mals, not by civilised humans. We position ourselves above animals in
general by eating meat, and above other carnivores by cooking it. Raw
meat is bestial and cooking sets us apart.”
Already from the time of Hesiod (ca. 700 bce), the theft of fire from
the gods carried out by the rebellious Prometheus, and his gift of it to
human beings, which enabled the cooking of meat, was viewed by the
Greeks with some ambivalence. While Prometheus was seen as a culture
hero who bestowed upon mankind a gift that afforded mankind a more
refined lifestyle, the theft represented a source of hostility on the part of
the gods toward human beings. As punishment for the theft of fire, Zeus
created Pandora who released misery into the world of human beings
and forced them to live a life full of troubles and hard work. Prior to this,
according to Hesiod, Works and Days 90–91, “bountiful earth supplied
all of man’s needs,” an apparent suggestion that humans had previously
been vegetarian.
32 Hubert proposes a lacuna at this point, which seems correct since the ob-
ject of “origin” is not stated in the text. “Flesh eating” must be supplied
in light of the subsequent discussion in Chapter 5.
33 Plutarch had briefly touched on the idea that meat eating is “contrary
to nature” (παρὰ ϕύσιν, para phusin, 993E) in Chapter 2 (see note 14),
and here it is declared to be not “natural” for human beings (οὐκ ... κατα`
ϕύσιν, ouk kata phusin,“not according to nature”). In Chapter 5, Plutarch
introduces a number of arguments from human physiology to prove this
thesis.
34 On the unsuitability of human anatomy for a carnivorous diet, see note
14. Percy Shelley, “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” in E. B. Murray, ed.,
The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993) 79–80, seem to have been directly influenced by this passage
in Plutarch when he asserts, “Comparative anatomy teaches us that man
resembles frugivorous animals in every thing, and carnivorous in noth-
ing; he has neither claws to seize his prey, nor distinct and pointed teeth
to tear the living fibre.” On Shelley, see note 5.
35 Shelley, “A Vindication of Natural Diet” (Murray, 1993) 80, charges,
“Let the advocate of animal food, force himself to a decisive experiment
on its fitness, and as Plutarch recommends, tear a living lamb with his
teeth …” On Plutarch’s arguments for abstention based on the unsuita-
bility of human anatomy for a meat diet, see Introduction, pp. 132–133.
36 The anecdote alludes to the proverbial simplicity of Spartan life. The
innkeeper offers the other foods because plain fish would have been un-
appealing to many persons, but the Spartan counters that he would have
been satisfied with the other items without needing the fish as well.
37 See note 30 on Plutarch’s imagery here.
38 See note 31 on Diogenes’ diet of octopus. The anecdote was repeated
many times in classical sources, with various interpretations of the
151
ON E AT I NG M E AT
meaning of the philosopher’s behavior. Some regarded it as an example

of the Cynic desire to reduce human life to the barest necessities by ban-
ishing luxuries, while others viewed it as an attempt to draw attention
to himself. Plutarch suggests that Diogenes in fact ran no risk by eating
raw octopus, and that, moreover, the consumption of any animal food is
deleterious to human health and spiritual welfare.
Plutarch had related the anecdote of Diogenes eating raw octopus in
his treatise Aquane an ignis utilior (Is Water or Fire More Useful?), in the
course of a discussion of populations that live without the use of fire. In
that passage (956B), he also quotes the claim of Diogenes that he risks his
life for his fellow citizens by consuming the octopus raw. Plutarch does
not in that context mock Diogenes since he is illustrating the point that,
whereas some peoples can live without fire, no one has ever claimed that
a human being can live without the use of water.
39 Plutarch sarcastically equates Diogenes’ culinary stunt with instances
of individuals who genuinely risked their lives for their compatriots. The
fourth-c entury general Pelopidas, who was the subject of a biography by
Plutarch, died in the course of his military campaign to increase the in-
fluence of Thebes while reducing that of Sparta, the enemy of Thebes. In
514 bce, the Athenian tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton assassi-
nated Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus (608–528 bce),
but failed to assassinate his brother Hippias, and the two were executed.
They were subsequently venerated as champions of Athenian freedom
against tyranny.
40 Arguments for abstention that might be viewed as “spiritual” in that they
deal with effects of meat eating on the welfare of the human soul are not
prominent in Plutarch, although the idea that a meat diet weighs down
the soul is often viewed as having been central to Pythagoras’ case for
abstention. Plutarch does not seem to have been strongly drawn to Py-
thagorean arguments in his formulation of his own case for a meatless
regimen (see Introduction, pp. 129–130 and note 12). In the opening sen-
tence of On Eating Meat I (993A), he brushes aside the question of what
led Pythagoras to abstain and asks rather what led the first human being
to touch animal flesh to his lips.
Spiritual arguments for abstention are more prominent in Porphyry’s
treatise On Abstinence, where the Neoplatonist stresses the idea that bod-
ily desires, including the desire for animal food, hinder the philosopher’s
search for unity with the divine (On Abstinence III. 26). On the arguments
for abstention advanced by Pythagoras, Plutarch and Porphyry, and on
their use of spiritual arguments in developing their cases, see Newmyer,
41 This quotation is cited, in identical language, by the Christian theologian
Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215 ce) in his Stromateis (Miscellanies)
VII. 6, where the theologian attributes it to a physician named Androcy-
des (fourth century bce) who, according to Pliny the Elder, Natural History
XIV. 58, advised Alexander the Great to moderate his drinking of wine.
Plutarch cites this quotation from Androcydes repeatedly elsewhere.
152
ON E AT I NG M E AT
42 Porphyry, On Abstinence I. 26, says that Pythagoras made an exception

to his ban on meat eating in the case of athletes because it improved their
strength. In his life of Pythagoras, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philos-
ophers VIII. 13, says that an athletic trainer named Pythagoras, and not
the philosopher by that name, recommended a meat diet to athletes.
43 Plutarch’s hometown, Chaeronea, was in Boeotia, a region of Greece
often mocked in Greek authors for producing dull-w itted citizens. W.
Rhys Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians: Their Character and Culture, and
Their Reputation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895) 1–9,
offers an intriguing discussion of what he terms (1) “the stigma resting
upon the Boeotians, both in antiquity and in later times.” He catalogues
and discusses passages in Greek authors that accuse the Boeotians of
swinishness, drunkenness, gluttony and overall stupidity, and he cites
On Eating Meat 995E as evidence that the Athenians were instrumental
in attaching this reputation to the Boeotians.
44 The origin of this short quotation is uncertain, but it may derive from a
lost comedy.
45 This fragment comes from a lost comedy of Menander (ca. 342–ca. 291
bce).
46 Plutarch apparently intended to include a longer citation from Pindar’s
Olympian VI but a lacuna intervenes at this point. The phrase of Pindar
that Plutarch cites here, Olympian VI. 89–90, is followed by a reference
by the poet to the “old reproach ‘Boeotian swine.’”
47 DK22 B118. The exact wording of the fragment from Heraclitus is in
doubt so that its interpretation is uncertain.
48 Plutarch likens an overfed human being to a full jar that gives off no
sound, while the individual who avoids such satiety retains his “purity
of tone,” and exhibits no dullness of spirit. He employs a metaphor to
illustrate his point that overindulgence drags down the soul.
49 In his dialogue Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 721B–D,

Plutarch offers a rather elaborate discussion of the capacity of vessels
to conduct sound. He portrays an Epicurean philosopher named Boe-
thus lecturing the other interlocutors on the ease or difficulty with which
sound is conducted through various materials. Because gold and stone
have a more compact atomic structure, the philosopher remarks, sound
is muffled and short-lived when passing through them, whereas vessels
composed of bronze produce more melodious sounds because their
atomic structure is more rarified, affording an easy passage for sound.
50 Kindness toward animals, here manifested in abstention from killing
them for food, is said to foster ϕιλανθρωπία (philanthrōpia), a “love of
humanity.” Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 959A, had stated that
the Pythagoreans practiced “kindness toward animals” (tēn eis ta thēria
praotēta) in an effort to instill “love of humanity and love of compassion”
(to philanthrōpon kai philoiktirmon) in human beings. The operation of
love for one’s fellow human beings is a subject that interested Plutarch in-
tensely, and it plays a prominent role in his symposaic works, wherein the
topic of interpersonal relations is discussed in an atmosphere of revelry
153
ON E AT I NG M E AT
and camaraderie. See the essays in José Ribeiro Ferreira, Delfim Leão,
Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthro-
pia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da
Universidade de Coimbra, 2009). On the interest that issues of interper-
sonal kindness held for the Greks, Inglese and Santese remark (207 note
2), “Non c’è autore Greco che, a partire da Omero, non abbia trattato il
tema della riconoscenza, della mutual affezione, della benevolenza, sia
umana sia divino.”
51 This statement has been taken as evidence that Plutarch had composed
other essays on the topic of vegetarianism. See Introduction, p. 129 and
note 5.
52 Xenocrates fr. 99 Heinze. On Xenocrates’ contribution to vegetarian
thought in antiquity, see Introduction, p. 128 and note 1. Richard Sorabji,
Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 209, in commenting on this frag-
ment, states that Xenocrates’ pronouncement is an instance of what may
be judged to be “purer examples of concern for animals as animals.”
Concern for animals as suffering creatures does not figure prominently
in ancient discussions of human–non-human animal relations, and its
appearance here makes the loss of the text of Xenocrates lamentable.
Further evidence of Xenocrates’ concern for the sufferings of animals is
reported in Diogenes Laertius’ life of the philosopher, where he relates,
Lives of the Philosophers IV. 10, that Xenocrates once welcomed to his
bosom a sparrow that flew to him when pursued by a hawk. Xenocrates
stroked the bird and remarked that a suppliant must not be betrayed.
Sorabji notes that such anecdotes seem to suggest a concern for the pain
and fear that animals may experience, although he acknowledges that
the fragments do not specifically comment on this.
53 Plato, Phaedrus 245c. At this point in Plato’s dialogue, Socrates is about
to take up the topic of the immortality of the soul, and he predicts that
his argument will be believable only to the wise though not to the merely
clever.
54 The text of the passage in which the metaphors derived from sailing and
theatrical practice occur is troubled so that the exact meaning is some-
what uncertain.
55 The text of Empedocles is not cited since a short lacuna occurs at this
point. Helmbold 559 and Inglese and Santese 211 both speculate that the
verses may have been those cited also at 998C, where the subject is like-
wise metempsychosis.
56 Empedocles’ notion of metempsychosis as atonement for consumption of
flesh is treated in DK31 B115 (= Inwood 11).
57 According to the theogony of the Orphics, a religious sect associated
with the legendary singer Orpheus that dates to the sixth century bce,
Zeus mated with his daughter Persephone and fathered Dionysus, iden-
tified with the god Zagreus in Orphic teaching. Zeus intended Dionysus
to succeed him as king of heaven but his wife Hera, jealous that her hus-
band had fathered the child with another woman, inspired the Titans to
154
ON E AT I NG M E AT
attack Dionysus. They murdered him and ate all of him except the heart,
in consequence of which Zeus incinerated the Titans with his thunder-
bolts. Mankind was subsequently born from the ashes of the Titans and
of the consumed Dionysus, which accounts for the elements of the sinful-
ness that is encountered in mankind. For a reconstruction of texts asso-
ciated with Orphic religion, see M. L. West, The Orphic Poems (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983), especially Chapter 5, “The Death and Rebirth of
Dionysus,” pp. 140–175.
58 Plutarch alludes here to Hesiod, Theogony 209–210, in which the poet
offers a dual etymology for the term “Titan,” according to which the Ti-
tans “stretched out” (titainein) to castrate Ouranos, although in fact only
Kronos was involved in this action, and because of this deed, “venge-
ance” (tisis) would eventually follow. Plutarch references only the sec-
ond of these etymologies in his mention of punishment and penalty. See
M. L. West, Hesiod: Theogony, edited with Prolegomena and Commen-
tary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) on verses 209–210 for a discussion
of the Hesiodic etymologies.
The text of the first treatise ends here rather abruptly and inconclu-
sively, suggesting that some part has gone missing. Helmbold 561 states
that the text “breaks off at this point,” and he concludes his text with a
series of dots.
155
Treatise I I: Translation 1
On Eating Meat
(De esu carnium)
[996] D 1. Reason prompts us to come up with fresh arguments and enthusi-

asm following yesterday’s lecture on meat eating.2 It is difficult, as Cato re-
marks, to talk to stomachs that have no ears,3 and the potion of familiarity
has been drunk,4 like the drink of Circe,
E “a drink [that quells] distress, pain, guile and grief.”5
Nor is it a simple thing to pull out the fishhook of meat eating since it is
caught up and stuck in our love of pleasure.6 It would be a good idea for us,
like the Egyptians who remove the stomach of a dead person7 and, cutting
it up under the sun, cast it away as being the cause of all our wrongdoings,
to cut out our own gluttony and bloodthirstiness and to keep ourselves un-
tainted for the rest of our lives. The stomach is not in itself bloodthirsty,
but it is made so by a lack of self-control. If, indeed, it is impossible for us
to be without blemish because of our familiarity with misconduct, we shall
at least F feel shame at our behavior and approach it rationally: we shall eat
meat from necessity, not from gluttony.8 We shall take a life, but only in sad-
ness, not in arrogance or wanton cruelty, as they do in many cases today,9
shoving red-hot spits down the throats of pigs, so that 997 the blood may be
quenched by dipping the iron into it and so it may break up and soften the
flesh. Others leap on the udders of sows and kick them so that, when they
have mixed together the blood and milk and gore of the unborn creatures
that they have destroyed (O purifying Zeus!), they may devour the most in-
flamed part of the animal. Yet others sew up the eyes of cranes and swans
and, locking them in darkness, they fatten them, seasoning their flesh with
exotic compounds and sauces.10
2. It is clear from these examples that they have made a pleasure out of
lawlessness, not because of the need for food or because of any necessity
or constraint, B but because of gluttony and arrogance and insolence.
And just as in the case of women who have no bounds to their lust, which
156
ON E AT I NG M E AT
experiments with everything and is led into misdeeds through its inconti-
nence and falls into unutterable behavior, so too do acts of incontinence
in eating pass beyond the necessary bounds set by nature, and provide the
appetite with a variety of savage and indecent choices.11 The organs of sen-
sation fall ill, one with the other, and are drawn together and behave in a
dissolute manner when they do not hold to natural standards. Hence the ear,
when sickened, destroys one’s appreciation for music.12 From this our cor-
rupted and dissolute sensibilities crave debauched groping and effeminate
tickling. C These things taught the sight to take no delight in war dances13
or gesticulations or polished dance steps or statues or paintings, but rather
to view the slaughter and death of men and their injuries and wars as the
most valuable sort of spectacle. So too does incontinent intercourse follow
lawless feasting, and cacophonous tones follow debauched lovemaking, un-
natural sights follow shameless songs and strains, and a lack of feeling and
callousness toward other human beings follow savage spectacles. For this
reason, the divinely excellent Lycurgus,14 in his three Rhetrae,15 [prescribed]
that the doors and roofs of houses be constructed with saw and axe and
that D no other tools be applied to the structure, not because he had any
objection to gimlets and adzes and the sort of tools that are used for fine
work, but because he knew that one would not bring a gilded couch into
such an abode, nor venture to introduce into an unadorned dwelling silver
tables and purple rugs and expensive gemstones.16 A simple dinner and a
democratic lunch are the natural companions of such a house and couch
and table and cup, but all sorts of luxuries and expenditures follow upon a
base lifestyle,
“Just as the new-weaned foal runs with its mother.”17
3. Now, what sort of meal is not extravagant if some creature is put to death
for it? Do we consider a life to be a trifling expenditure? E I do not mean [by
“life”] the [reincarnated] spirit of one’s mother or father or friend or child, as
Empedocles said, but rather that life that has a share of sensation, of sight,
of hearing, or mental representation, of intelligence which is acquired from
nature to enable it to pursue what is appropriate to it and flee from what is
alien to it.18 Consider which philosophers humanize us better—those who
urge us to consume our children and friends and fathers and wives when
they have died,19 or Pythagoras and Empedocles who accustom us to be
just toward other species.20 You laugh at the man who does not eat cattle,
but when we see you cutting off and eating pieces of your dead father or
mother, sending a portion to some of your friends who are not present or
F summoning those who are close by and giving them a share of the meat,
are we not to laugh? But perhaps we err here too when we touch their books
without washing our hands and faces and feet and ears unless, by Zeus, it
157
ON E AT I NG M E AT
is a purification of these things to speak of those topics “while washing out

the salt from our ears with fresh discourse,” as Plato says.21 998 If one were
to place these books and their teachings side by side,22 the former [would
be worthy doctrine]23 for the Scythians and the Sogdians and Black Cloaks,
about whom Herodotus’ account inspires distrust.24 But the teachings of
Pythagoras and Empedocles were law to the Greeks of old … and their die-
tary regimens …25 [since we owe no debt of justice to irrational animals].26
4. Who then were those who later decreed this?
“Who first forged robbers’ evil-working knives,

First tasted flesh of oxen at the plow.”27
In this manner, indeed, do tyrants begin their slaughter. B So in Athens

they first put to death the worst of the sycophants, a man who was judged
to have deserved it, and likewise then the second and third.28 Thus, having
grown accustomed to the practice, they allowed Niceratus the son of Nicias
to be put to death 29 and Theramenes the general30 and Polemarchus the
philosopher.31 Similarly, at first some dangerous wild animal was eaten,
and then some bird or fish was torn apart. The urge to kill, having gained
practice on those creatures, turned to the ox of the field and the sheep that
provide clothing and the domestic cock. Honing our insatiable desires, we
little by little advanced to the C slaughter of human beings and to wars and
bloodshed. But if someone proves that souls use common bodies in their
reincarnations and that that which is now rational becomes irrational and
that that which is now tame becomes wild again, and if nature changes
everything and leads all life into a new abode,32 “enfolding unfamiliar garb
of flesh about them,”33 this will not turn aside the savage and unbridled
[element in some persons]34 and the inclination in some to put in their bod-
ies sickness and heaviness and to destroy a soul that has been twisted into
lawless conflict, when we are unaccustomed to entertaining a guest or cel-
ebrating a marriage or spending time with friends without bloodshed and
slaughter.
D 5. And yet if the explanation given concerning the transmigration of souls

back into bodies is not deserving of belief, nevertheless the doubt involved
commands great caution and wariness.35 It is as if a person in the course of
a nighttime military encounter who has drawn his sword against a man who
has fallen and whose body is covered in armor, were to hear someone say
that he did not know for sure but thought and believed that the person lying
on the ground was that fellow’s brother or father or tent-mate. Which is bet-
ter, to accept a false conjecture and to treat an enemy as a friend, or to scorn
a report that is not certain and to do away with a comrade as an enemy? E
158
ON E AT I NG M E AT
Observe Merope in the tragedy raising her axe against her son in the belief
that he is her son’s killer and saying,
“This blow I deal you is more costly.”36
Such an uproar she creates in the theater,37 arousing the audience with fear
and dread that she might act before the old man can lay hold of her and she
slays the young man. If some other old man should stand beside her and
say, “Strike! He is your enemy!” and yet another were to say, “Do not strike!
He is your son!” which would constitute the greater injustice, to forego the
punishment of one’s enemy because of one’s son, or to be caught up in the
murder of one’s son because of anger toward an enemy? When there is no
hatred, then, or anger impelling us to murder, or any thought of self-defense
or fear for ourselves,38 F but a creature stands as an offering for our pleas-
ure, with neck bent back, and some philosopher says, “Kill it! It is an irra-
tional beast,”39 while another says, “Stop! What if the soul of some relative
or friend has made its way in there?” The danger, by the gods, is the same if
I refuse to eat the flesh or if, in disbelief, I kill my child or some other kin.40
999 6. This argument concerning the eating of meat is not the equal of that
of the Stoics.41 What is the great “tension” with regard to the stomach and
the kitchen? Why, when they regard pleasure as effeminate and criticize it as
neither good nor “advanced” nor “appropriate,” are they so serious about
these pleasures? It would be logical, if they banish perfume and cakes from
their banquets, for them to feel disgust at blood and flesh.42 As it is, just as
they, one might say, philosophize in accord with their accounting books, and
curtail their expenditures at their banquets in the case of useless and superflu-
ous things,43 so do they not banish the savage and bloody sort of expenditure.
“Yes,” they say, “we have nothing in common with irrational beasts.”44 B
Nor, one might reply, does one with perfume or exotic spices. Turn away from
such things and drive off that which is useless and unnecessary in pleasure.
7. Well then, let us look at this claim that we have no covenant of justice with
animals, arguing not in a cunning or sophistical fashion but keeping in view
our emotions and speaking like human beings and examining …45
Commentary
1 On the relation of Treatise II to Treatise I, see Introduction, p. 129 and
note 5.
2 See note 1, and Introduction, p. 128. Plutarch’s assertion here that he
will adduce fresh arguments and speak with renewed enthusiasm about
the topic of abstention had led some scholars to conclude that On
159
ON E AT I NG M E AT
Eating Meat should be viewed as two distinct treatises rather than as two
parts of the same work.
3 Plutarch relates this anecdote, in almost identical language, in his bi-
ography of the Roman statesman Cato the Elder (234–149 bce), where
he is portrayed as attempting, in the course of a oration, to dissuade
the common people of Rome from ill-timed demands for distributions of
grain (Cato 8). In that passage, Plutarch is illustrating Cato’s fondness for
peppering his speech with pithy sayings.
4 Plutarch likens the force of habit, in this case the long-accepted practice
of eating meat, to a powerful potion like that of the witch Circe, called
κυκϵών (kukeōn) by Homer (Odyssey X. 290) and by Plutarch in this pas-
sage, the effect of which is hard to resist. On kukeōn, see also Whether
Beasts Are Rational, Commentary note 5.
5 The verse has been attributed to Empedocles (DK31 B154a) but the attri-
bution is in doubt.
6 Plutarch frequently contrasts necessity with a desire for pleasure as the
origin of a meat-c entered diet (see, in Treatise I, 993C–D and 994E, and
below, 996F and 998E, as well as On the Cleverness of Animals 991C–D).
In his Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 730A, Plutarch observes
that necessity may have compelled early man to adopt a carnivorous diet,
but it is now difficult to break the habit because meat eating is perceived
as pleasurable. Modern animal rights advocates still find themselves
compelled to combat the notion that the consumption of meat is justified
because of the pleasure that it brings to human beings. Philosopher Tom
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983) 334 asserts, “First, and most obviously, no one has a right
to eat something just because they happen to find it tasty or just because
they happen to derive satisfaction from cooking it well.” This is so, in
Regan’s view, because the pleasure of a few human beings does not over-
ride the suffering of many animals slaughtered for food.
7 In Herodotus’ account of the Egyptian process of mummification (His-
tories II. 86), he details the process by which the entire contents of the
abdominal cavity were removed, after which some organs were placed
in so-called canopic jars for preservation. Porphyry, On Abstinence IV.
10, adds the detail, not found in Herodotus, that the embalmers held the
box containing the canopic jars up to the sun and prayed for the de-
ceased. This practice may be the origin of Plutarch’s mention of cutting
up organs in the sunlight. Plutarch’s statement that the stomach was dis-
carded as the source of wrongdoing is incorrect since it was enclosed in
one of the canopic jars. In Plutarch’s dialogue Septem sapientium con-
vivium (Banquet of the Seven Sages) 159B, the interlocutor Solon makes
this same claim that the Egyptians exposed the entrails to the sun, and he
there adds the detail that they then cast the organs into the river.
8 On Plutarch’s contrast between necessity and luxury as the origin of meat
eating, see note 6, with references there to other appearances of the topic
in On Eating Meat. In Banquet of the Seven Sages, Solon adopts an even
more extreme view on the topic of human diet, lamenting (159B–C) that a
human being is compelled to sustain his own life through the destruction
160
ON E AT I NG M E AT
of another organism’s life, whether that be the life of an animal or of a

plant. Thus, Solon argues, even the meat-free regimen of Orpheus is rather
a quibble (sophisma, 159C) than a genuine instance of the avoidance of
injustice, since an injustice is committed instead against a plant.
9 Expressions of sympathy for animals as victims of deliberate acts of
wanton cruelty at the hands of human beings are rare in classical litera-
ture. Plutarch had mentioned, in Treatise I (996A) (see ad locum note 52),
the account of Xenocrates detailing the punishment of an Athenian for
flaying a living ram. The most famous instance of such an expression of
sympathy for animals experiencing deliberate abuse is the reaction of the
spectators at the Theater of Pompey upon the occasion of its opening in
55 bce, when a herd of elephants in the arena was tormented with spears.
In desperation, the elephants, after attempting to defend themselves,
raised their trunks and appeared to beg the spectators for help. This
so moved the spectators that they rose up against Pompey and cursed
him. See the accounts of the incident, with slight variations in details, in
Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares (Letters to His Friends) VII. 1. 3; Seneca,
De brevitate vitae (On the Shortness of Life) 13. 6–7; and Pliny, Natural
History VIII. 20–21. For further discussion of this incident, see Stephen
T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics
(New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 114 note 51.
10 Plutarch, Table Talk 692C, expresses similar disgust at the practice of
castrating pigs and cocks to soften their flesh to satisfy the market for
luxurious foods. His more extensive account in the present passage of
cruelties perpetrated against animals by food producers eager to cater to
the tastes of jaded human beings offers a remarkable foreshadowing, in
certain of its details, of the practices common in modern intensive farm-
ing, the cruelties of which form a regular target of vegetarian polemic
and animal rights literature alike. The art of producing liver pâté is fre-
quently singled out for its cruelty. Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power
of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2002) 120, notes of the practice of force-feeding ducks for
this delicacy, “all of it obtained by forcing a metal pipe down the ducks’
throats and pumping pounds of food until their livers are grotesquely
enlarged …” Pliny, Natural History X. 60, reports that the practice of
fattening thrushes, storks and cranes for human consumption began
around the time of Augustus, and that cranes are in his own time the
most coveted species for that purpose. He also notes, Natural History XI.
210–211, without the horror expressed by Plutarch at such practices, that
the udders of sows that have miscarried are tastier than those of sows
that have given birth, while the udders of sows that have been slaugh-
tered the day after they have given birth are next tastiest, provided that
the sows have not been allowed to suckle their babies.
11 Plutarch introduces a variation of his often-employed contrast between
necessity and luxury in dietetic choices. “Necessity” is now contrasted
with “arrogance” (hubris) and “insolence” (koros). At Table Talk 705B–C,
Plutarch deals at length with the dangers of incontinence in various are-
nas of human life. In that passage, incontinence is viewed as a disordered
161
ON E AT I NG M E AT
operation of the reason which blinds human beings to the inevitable con-
sequences of overindulgence in food, drink, sex, and even theatrical and
musical entertainments. Although the virtues of continence were praised
by all ancient philosophical schools, the idea that excess of any sort
constitutes folly is perhaps most closely associated with the Epicureans.
Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 130, states that that person takes most
pleasure in luxury who views it as unnecessary, for all natural pleasures
are easily obtained while luxuries are difficult to obtain. For a poetic
elaboration of this Epicurean doctrine, see Lucretius, On the Nature of
Things II. 20–36. Similarly Epicurean in inspiration is Plutarch’s implied
contrast between pleasures that are natural and necessary with those
that are unnatural and unnecessary, such as the desire for exotic foods
and gluttonous portions. Plutarch appears to allude here to the Epicu-
rean classification of desires set forth, for example, in Epicurus’ Letter
to Menoeceus 127–128. At Whether Beasts Are Rational 989C, Plutarch’s
talking pig Gryllus offers an elaborate discussion of the Epicurean clas-
sification of desires in the course of his attempt to prove that non-human
animals restrict their desires to those that are natural and necessary, in
contrast to human beings who indulge in those that are neither natural
nor necessary.
12 Plutarch, Table Talk 705D–706C, develops at some length the topic of
the dangers involved when human beings fall victim to luxuries that en-
ter through the ears and eyes, not to mention those that attend over-
indulgence in food, drink and sexual activity. Similarly, Porphyry, On
Abstinence I. 34, details the negative effects on spiritual welfare that
stimulation of the sense organs causes. When aroused by stimulation
entering through the ears, he observes, some humans are liable to lose
their reason and to act as if stung by a gadfly, while others writhe in an
effeminate manner.
13 In his account of the origin of dance in human society, and of the va-
rieties of dance that are to be reckoned decorous and worthwhile for
humans to perform, Plato (Laws 816b–c) singles out the “war dances”
(πυρρίχαι, purrhichai) that Plutarch mentions here, which, Plato
laments, are no longer appreciated by senses that have been corrupted
by luxury and can no longer take pleasure in the sound or sight of mod-
est dance.
14 The semi-legendary Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus (eighth century bce?)
was the subject of a biography by Plutarch, at the beginning of which
he admits that nothing can be said of him with any certainty. Despite
this, Plutarch attributes to him a number of measures that were designed
to combat luxurious living including the practice of requiring Spartan
men to eat in common mess halls so as to discourage luxurious dining
at home (Lycurgus 10). Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 3, adds the detail
that Lycurgus’ culinary reforms were undertaken in part because the
lawgiver felt that the consumption of meat was a sign of luxury, and he
suggests that Lycurgus’ reforms encouraged a vegetarian regimen. In
Treatise I (995B–C), Plutarch had referred approvingly to the sparing
162
ON E AT I NG M E AT
diet of the Spartans in his anecdote of a Spartan who chose to eat a fish
without condiments.
15 Plutarch, Lycurgus 13, notes that the lawgiver insisted that his laws not
be written down, so that his laws were termed ρ῾η̑τραι, rhētrai, “verbal
agreements, covenants,” ” hence, “unwritten laws.”
16 Plutarch, Lycurgus 13, repeats and elaborates his comments given here
on the lawgiver’s prescriptions for the building of houses, mentioning
again Lycurgus’ insistence that only the saw and axe be used in their
construction.
17 This fragment is attributed to Semonides of Amorgos (seventh century
bce) (fragment 5 West). The text as Plutarch cites it is all that survives of
the original poem.
18 Plutarch indicates that his opposition to the consumption of meat is not
grounded in an adherence to the Empedoclean doctrine of metempsy-
chosis, but rather in a consideration of the intellectual capacities of the
animals whose lives are sacrificed to feed human beings. His vocabulary
here recalls his account of the dimensions of animal intellect set forth
in the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B).
In the present passage, he maintains that non-human animals have a
“share” (metechousan, 997E) of sensation, perception and intelligence.
He employs the same verb metechein, “to share,” at On the Cleverness of
Animals 960A, where he introduces the idea that will be argued at length
in the first seven chapters of that treatise, namely, that non-human ani-
mals have a “share of thought and reasoning capacity” (see Commentary
on 960A). It is noteworthy that here, as often in his defense of vegetari-
anism, Plutarch distances himself from the Pythagorean-Empedoclean
doctrine of reincarnation. On Plutarch’s attitude toward metempsycho-
sis as an argument in favor of abstention, see Introduction, pp. 129–130.
Plutarch’s use of the terms “appropriate” (oikeion) and “alien” (al-
lotrion) indicates that he is alluding to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis,
“kinship, bonding, attachment,” according to which every creature,
from birth, naturally tends to pursue that which it recognizes as akin to
itself, and to flee that which it recognizes as alien to itself. See Introduc-
tion to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 5–9.
19 According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 121, the
Stoic Zeno countenanced cannibalism under circumstances of extreme
duress, and he records as well, in his life of the Stoic Chrysippus, Lives
of the Philosophers VIII. 188, that Chrysippus, in the third book of his
treatise On Justice, allowed for the consumption of human corpses.
20 Although Plutarch suggests that for both Pythagoras and Empedocles,
abstention from animal food was primarily a question of justice toward
other species, the motivations of both thinkers remain the subject of
scholarly debate, with some scholars concluding that a concern for hu-
man spiritual purity was paramount in the thought of both philosophers.
In that case, it might be argued that, for both Pythagoras and Empedo-
cles, human self-interest outweighed considerations of animal welfare.
At the same time, a desire to act in accord with the dictates of justice
163
ON E AT I NG M E AT
might in itself suggest an element of self-interest on the part of human

beings who do not wish to damage themselves by acting counter to the
dictates of good ethical practice. On the question of the motivations of
Pythagoras and Empedocles, see Commentary to Treatise I note 3, with
bibliography, and Urs Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung in der
griechisch-römischen Antike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament
und frühe Christentum,” in Manuela Linnemann and Claudia Schorcht,
eds., Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft einer Lebensweise (Er-
langen: Harald Fischer Verlag, 2001) 13–18.
21 Plato, Phaedrus 243c. Plutarch cites this text also at Table Talk 706D and
711D, with slight variations.
22 The Stoics are contrasted with Pythagoras and Empedocles, the former
viewed as harsh in their views toward non-human animals while Pythag-
oras and Empedocles enjoined kindness toward other species.
23 The text is uncertain at this point although the gist is clear: the views of
the Stoics are well-suited to wild and savage peoples like those whom
Plutarch goes on to mention.
24 The Scythians, Sogdians and Black Cloaks (Melanchlainoi) are cited as
examples of uncivilized Asian peoples to whom the severe philosophical
doctrines of the Stoics might be expected to appeal. The Scythians were
a semi-nomadic people who occupied territory in central Asia east of the
Vistula and who were proverbial among classical authors for their savage
and uncivilized ways. They are treated at great length in Herodotus, His-
tories IV. 1–144, an account of great value for its insights into their char-
acter and lifestyle. Herodotus states, Histories IV. 26, that the Issedones,
a people who dwelled near the Scythians and whom Herodotus describes
as similar to the Scythians, ate the flesh of their dead fathers mixed with
the flesh of animals, a custom commented on as well by Porphyry, On
Abstinence III. 17. Plutarch may have had this custom in mind in his men-
tion (997E) of Stoic views on cannibalism.
The Sogdians were a people who dwelled in what is now Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with their capital at Samarkand. Their culture
reached its high point in the sixth century bce. Herodotus, Histories IV.
20, says that the Black Coats were a non-Scythian people who dwelled
north of the Scythians. At Histories IV. 107, he states that they all wear
black coats, although in other respects they resemble the Scythians. Some
scholars believe that Plutarch confuses the Black Coats with the Issedones
since the latter had been named by Herodotus as devouring their dead.
25 The text is corrupt at this point. Plutarch seems to connect the idea that,
in ancient times, it was considered unlawful and sacrilegious to eat or
even kill a harmless animal, a prohibition again referred to by Plutarch
at Table Talk 729E, with the teachings of early advocates of abstention
including Pythagoras and Empedocles, on the assumption that the an-
cients were inspired by the injunctions of these thinkers to practice jus-
tice toward other animals.
26 This clause is clearly an interpolation here. It is only marginally con-
nected to the context and it seems to be grammatically unconnected to
164
ON E AT I NG M E AT
the surrounding text. It appears to be lifted from On Eating Meat 999B,

where it is given in slightly different wording and where its appearance
is logical since Plutarch is at that point about to take up the topic of
human justice toward non-human species, a topic left untreated because
the Greek text breaks off at that point. The sentence is found also, in
wording similar to its two appearances in On Eating Meat, at On the
Cleverness of Animals 970B.
27 In his astronomical poem Phaenomena, the didactic poet Aratus (ca.
315–240 bce) describes here (131–132) the coming of the Bronze Age. The
initiation of the practice of slaying plow oxen is said to coincide with the
inauguration of a carnivorous diet among human beings.
28 At On the Cleverness of Animals 959D, Plutarch cites this same example
of the behavior of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens (404–403 bce) to make
the point that he makes here: just as human cruelty advances in the case
of interpersonal relations, so do humans graduate in their cruelty toward
other animals. After initially slaying animals potentially harmful to hu-
man beings, they advance to the slaughter of tame animals and those
that are helpmates to humans in their labors and that pose no danger to
them.
29 Nicias (ca. 470–413 bce) was the ill-fated Athenian general whose hesita-
tion and superstition contributed to the spectacular defeat of the Athe-
nian forces at Syracuse in the Sicilian Expedition (415–413 bce) during
the course of the Peloponnesian War. The sufferings of the Athenians
in the stone quarries at Syracuse, and the death of Nicias, are movingly
recounted in Thucydides, Histories VII. 86–87, and in Plutarch’s biogra-
phy of Nicias, Nicias 27–30. Xenophon, Hellenica II. 39, suggests that the
death of Nicias’ son Niceratus at the hands of the Tyrants may have been
prompted by the great wealth of his family.
30 The politician Theramenes helped to set up the Thirty Tyrants and was
numbered among them, but after a falling out with the tyrant Critias, he
was executed. His death is recounted in Xenophon, Hellenica II. 56.
31 In his speech Against Eratosthenes, delivered in 403 bce, after the fall of
the Thirty Tyrants, the orator Lysias (459–ca. 380 bce) accused Eratos-
thenes, one of the Thirty, of capturing and contributing to the execution
of his brother Polemarchus (Against Eratosthenes 5–25). Plutarch calls
Polemarchus a “philosopher” here because he figures in the first book of
Plato’s Republic, inviting Socrates to the home of his father Cephalus for
a philosophical discussion (Republic 327b). Also, at Phaedrus 257b, Plato
mentions that Polemarchus had philosophical interests.
32 Plutarch again expresses some hesitation to accept the doctrine of me-
tempsychosis as fact, and he seems to underline that skepticism by offer-
ing a catalogue of the various claims that were made by proponents of
one or another version of the doctrine.
33 Empedocles (DK31 B126 = Inwood 113).
34 The text is uncertain in a number of places in the final paragraph of
Chapter 4. I have added the words in brackets to supply the sense that
seems to be required by the context. On the textual challenges presented
165
ON E AT I NG M E AT
in the final paragraph of Chapter 4, see Lionello Inglese and Giusep-

pina Santese, eds., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne (Naples: D’Auria, 1999)
224–227 notes 4–5.
35 This statement constitutes at the same time both a clear statement of
Plutarch’s skepticism on the validity of the doctrine of metempsychosis
and an expression of hesitation to reject it outright, along with a some-
what grudging admission that the doctrine may have something to rec-
ommend it after all. At the very least, it furnishes Plutarch with another
defense of abstention, and it is his most positive pronouncement on me-
tempsychosis, however weak his endorsement may be.
36 The verse is a fragment (456 Nauck) from the lost tragedy Cresphontes
by Euripides. Cresphontes, king of Messenia and son of Merope, was
murdered by his rival Polyphontes. Merope, thinking she was about to
assassinate Polyphontes, almost slew her surviving son Aepytus, but was
told just in time that the person she was about to strike was her son. Ar-
istotle, Poetics 1454a4–6, praises this scene in Euripides as a particularly
effective piece of theater and he notes that Merope recognized her son in
time.
37 D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics, Introduction, Commentary and Appen-
dices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) 154, remarks on this passage, “If
Plutarch saw the play himself, this must be one of the last recorded per-
formances of Euripides in the ancient world.”
38 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 995E, is willing to concede that
human beings have the right to protect themselves against animals that
intend to do them harm, but he laments that humans moved on from
there to the slaughter of harmless animals, a sentiment repeated in Trea-
tise I of On Eating Meat (994B). The reference in On the Cleverness of
Animals to the justifiable killing of noxious animals that eventually leads
to the slaughter of harmless species occurs in the context of a discus-
sion of the morality of the practice of hunting, a topic on which Plutarch
seems to have been conflicted. See Commentary to On the Cleverness of
Animals, pp. 54–56.
39 The “philosopher” in question is a Stoic, as is made clear from the ob-
jection of the speaker that the creature about to be slain is merely an
irrational beast and therefore merits no consideration. The subject of
the rational properties of non-human species takes up the greater part of
the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B), and
Plutarch’s polemic in those chapters is directed principally against the
Stoic doctrine that non-human animals are irrational. See Commentary
on those chapters in On the Cleverness of Animals, and, for a detailed
discussion of Plutarch’s case for rationality in non-human species, see
Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 10–47.
40 The text of the final sentence of Chapter 5 is corrupt and has been sub-
jected to much rewording by textual critics.
41 Having spent some time discussing the Pythagorean doctrine of me-
tempsychosis and having suggested that it is in itself not sufficiently
well proven to serve as an argument for abstention, Plutarch turns his
166
ON E AT I NG M E AT
attention now to the Stoics, whom he mentions here by name for the first
time in the treatise.
42 Plutarch mocks Stoic technical philosophical terms (“tension,” “ad-

vanced,” “appropriate”) and accuses the Stoics of hypocrisy in scorn-
ing pleasures while not at the same time banishing meat from their diet.
They thus emerge, in Plutarch’s estimation, as pleasure-seekers since he
viewed the consumption of meat as a sign of luxury (see note 6). In his life
of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 117–118, dis-
cusses the austere lifestyle of the Stoics who rejected pleasures, drinking
a little wine but not allowing themselves to become drunk. He does not
comment on their taste for meat.
43 “Useless and superfluous things” is an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of
“indifferents” (ἀδια´ϕορα, adiaphora), which Diogenes Laertius, Lives
of the Philosophers VII. 104, explains as referring, in Stoic parlance, to
those things that contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness. These
“indifferents” include health, wealth, reputation and strength, none of
which, Diogenes notes, was considered by the Stoics to be necessary for
human happiness.
44 Plutarch alludes again to the Stoic doctrine of “affinity” or “kinship”
(οἰκϵίωσις, oikeiōsis) citing the objection advanced by some unnamed
Stoics that human beings have nothing “in common” (οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion)
with irrational beasts. See Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals,
pp. 5–9, and note 18.
45 Since the text of Treatise II breaks off at this point, it is impossible to
know how Plutarch would have developed the topic of justice toward
animals. The topic is introduced somewhat suddenly at this point, but
it may have been suggested by the discussion of the Stoics at the end of
Chapter 6. Plutarch elsewhere attacks the Stoics for denying a juridical
relationship between human beings and other species on the supposed
lack of kinship with non-human animals that are devoid of reason. See,
for example, On the Cleverness of Animals 963F–964A, Banquet of the
Seven Sages 159B–C and Table Talk 730A for discussion of justice toward
animals. See also notes 25 and 28. For a detailed discussion of Plutarch’s
concept of justice as it operates in human–non-human animal relations,
see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient
Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54 and Animals,
Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just Beasts,” 48–65.
167
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts, translations and commentaries

DK = Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, ed. and transl., Die Fragmente der Vor-
sokratiker, 6th edn. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951–1952).
SVF = Johannes von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Stuttgart: Teubner,
1964; reprint of the edition of 1905).
Aelian:
A. F. Scholfield, transl., Aelian: On the Characteristics of Animals (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1959).
Aristotle:
D. M. Balme and Allan Gotthelf, eds., Aristotle: Historia Animalium. Volume I:
Books I–X: Text (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
I. Bywater, ed., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
Cicero:
W. Ax, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia, Vol. 45: De Natura
Deorum (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1968).
Walter Miller, transl., Cicero: De Officiis (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 1913).
Claudio Moreschini, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia Fasc.
43: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Munich and Leipzig: Saur, 2005).
Diogenes Laertius:
H. S. Long, ed., Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
Empedocles:
Brad Inwood, ed. and transl., The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with
Introduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
169
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Homer:
Thomas Allen, ed., Homeri Opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
Lucretius:
Marcus Deufert, ed., Titus Lucretius Carus De Rerum Natura Libri Sex (Berlin and
Boston: deGruyter, 2019).
Philo of Alexandria:
Abraham Terian, ed. and transl., Philonis Alexandrini de Animalibus: The Armenian
Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).
Pliny the Elder:

H. Rackham, transl., Pliny: Natural History (Cambridge, MA and London: Har-
vard University Press, 1949).
Plutarch:
Jean Bouffartigue, ed. and transl., Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales, Tome XIV, 1re Par-
tie, Traité 63, l’Intelligence des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012).
Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, ed. and transl., Plutarch: Moralia XII
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984; reprint of edition of 1957).
Myrto Gondicas, transl., L’Intelligence des Animaux, suivi de Gryllos (Paris: Arléa, 1991).
C. Hubert, ed., Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI. Fasc. 1, recensuit et emendavit C. Hubert
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1959).
Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali: intro-
duzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995).
Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di
Carne: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1999).
Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, transl., L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele,
Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2015).
Donatella Magini, transl., Plutarco: Del Mangiar Carne. Trattati sugli Animali
(Milan: Adelphi, 2001).
Joaquim Pinheiro, transl., Plutarco: Sobre Comer Carne (Coimbra: Imprensa da
Universidade de Coimbra, 2019).
Rex Warner, transl., Plutarch: Moral Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
Robin Waterfield., transl., Plutarch: Essays (London: Penguin, 1992).
Porphyry:
Gillian Clark, transl., Porphyry: On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 2006).
Seneca:
L. D. Reynolds, ed., L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1969).
170
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Secondary literature
d’Agostino, Vittorio, “Sulla Zoopsicologia di Plutarco,” Archivo Italiano di
Psicologia 11 (1933) 21–42.
Akhtar, Aysha, Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Animals Better Is Critical
to Human Welfare (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
Angell, Tony, Ravens, Crows, Magpies, and Jays (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1978).
Babut, Daniel, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1969).
Bagemihl, Bruce, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diver-
sity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
Barrow, R. H., Plutarch (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967).
Beagon, Mary, Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992).
Beagon, Mary, “Wondrous Animals in Classical Antiquity,” in Gordon Lindsay
Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 414–440.
Becchi, Francesco, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità degli Animali,” Prometheus 26
(2000) 205–225.
Becchi, Francesco, “Istinto e Intelligenza negli Scritti Zoopsicologici di Plutarco,”
in Michele Bandini and Federico G. Pericoli, eds., Scritti in Memoria di Dino
Pieraccioni (Florence: Istituto Papirologico G. Vitelli, 1993) 59–83.
Becchi, Francesco, “Lignes Directrices de la Doctrine Zoopsychologique de Plu-
tarque,” Myrtia 17 (2002) 159–174.
Beer, Michael, “The Question Is Not, Can They Reason?, Nor, Can They Talk?,
But, Can They Suffer?: The Ethics of Vegetarianism in the Writings of Plutarch,”
in David Grumett and Rachel Muers, eds., Eating and Believing: Interdiscipli-
nary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2008)
96–109.
Bekoff, Marc, The Emotional Lives of Animals (Novato: New World Library, 2007).
Bekoff, Marc, The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal Emotions
(New York: Discovery Books, 2000).
Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.
H. Burns and H. L. A. Hurt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
Bergua Cavero, Jorge, “Cinismo, Ironía y Retorica en el Bruta ratione animalia uti
de Plutarco,” in Estudios Sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y Naturaleza (Madrid: Ediciones
Clásicas, 1991) 13–19.
Boas, George, “Theriophily,” in Philip P. Wiener, ed., Dictionary of the History of
Ideas (New York: Scribners, 1973) IV, 384–389.
Bowie, Ewen, “Poetry and Education,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 177–190.
Bréchet, Christophe, “La Philosophie de Gryllos,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les
Grecs et les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: Collection UL3,
2005) 43–61.
Brenk, Frederick E., In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia and
Lives (Leiden: Brill, 1977).
Brennan, Tad, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2005).
171
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brink, C. O., “Οἰϰείωσις and Οἰϰειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral
Theory,” Phronesis 1 (1955–1956) 123–145.
Campbell, Gordon Lindsay, “Origins of Life and Origins of Species,” in Gordon
Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought
and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 233–247.
Cartmill, Matt, A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through His-
tory (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1993).
Casanova, Angelo, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e Omero,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les
Grecs de l’Antiquité et les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: Col-
lection UL3, 2005) 97–109.
Casanova, Angelo, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e la Tradizione della Figura di Ulisse,”
Plutarchos N. S. 4 (2006/2007) 19–28.
Casanova, Angelo, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti,”
in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and Biographical Values of
Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the Interna-
tional Plutarch Society (Málaga: University of Málaga Press and Logan: Utah
State University Press, 2005) 121–131.
Desmond, William, Cynics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2008).
Dickerman, Sherwood Owen, De Argumentis Quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Pla-
tonem, Aristotelem Obviis e Structura Hominis et Animalium Petitis (Dissertation,
Halle, 1909).
Dickerman, Sherwood Owen, “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence
in Greek Psychology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42
(1911) 123–130.
Dierauer, Urs, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie,
Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977).
Dierauer, Urs, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung in der griechisch-römischen An-
tike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament und frühe Chrstentum,” in Manuela
Linneman and Claudia Schorcht, eds., Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft
einer Lebensweise (Erlangen: Harald Fischer Verlag, 2001) 9–72.
Dombrowski, Daniel A., “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements,”
in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical
Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 535–555.
Dombrowski, Daniel A., The Philosophy of Vegetarianism (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1984).
Dyroff, Adolf, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia (Würzburg:
Bonitas-Bauer, 1897).
Fiddes, Nick, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
Fögen, Thorsten, “Animal Communication,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed.,
The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) 216–232.
Fusco, Maria, “Il Linguaggio degli Animali nel Pensiero Antico: Una Sintesi Stor-
ica,” Studi Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44.
Gill, James E., “Theriophily in Antiquity: A Supplementary Account,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 30 (1969) 401–412.
Graver, Margaret R., Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
172
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guthrie, W. K. C., In the Beginning: Some Greek Views on the Origins of Life and the
Early State of Man (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957).
Hatzantonis, Emmanuel, “I Geniali Rimaneggiamenti dell’ Episodio Omerico di
Circe in Apollonio Rodio e Plutarco,” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 54
(1976) 5–24.
Hauser, Marc D., Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Henry Holt,
2000).
Haussleiter, Johannes, Der Vegetarismus in der Antike (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1935).
Hawkins, Tom, “Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature,”
Humanities 6, 3 (2017) doi: 10, 3390.
Heath, John, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the Other in Homer, Aeschy-
lus and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Herchenroeder, Lucas, “Τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον; Plutarch’s Gryllus and the So-
Called Grylloi,” American Journal of Philology 129 (2008) 347–379.
Hindermann, Judith, “Zoophilie in Zoologie und Roman: Sex und Liebe zwischen
Mensch und Tier bei Plutarch, Plinius dem Älteren, Aelian und Apuleius,” Dic-
tynna 8 (dictynna.revues.org/717) (2011).
Horty, Phillip Sidney, “The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in Plutarch,” Apeiron
50, 1 (2017) 103–133.
Jazdzewska, Katarzyna, “Not an ‘Innocent Spectacle’: Hunting and Venationes in
Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium,” Ploutarchos N. S. 7 (2009–2010) 35–46.
Kechagia-Ovseiko, Eleni, “Plutarch and Epicureanism,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Com-
panion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 104–120.
Kindt, Julia, “Review Article: Capturing the Ancient Animal: Human/Animal
Studies and the Classics,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 137 (2017) 213–225.
Kitchell, Kenneth F., Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z (London and New
York: Routledge, 2014).
Kitchell, Kenneth F., “A Defense of the ‘Monstrous’ Animals of Pliny, Aelian, and
Others,” Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies in the Preternatural 4 (2015)
125–151.
Kleingünter, Adolf, Protos Euretes: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestel-
lung (Leipzig: Akademie Verlag, 1933).
Konstan, David, “A Pig Convicts Itself of Unreason: The Implicit Argument of
Plutarch’s Gryllus,” Hyperboreus 16–17 (2010–2011) 371–385.
Krauss, F., Die rhetorischen Shriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im plutarchischen
Schriftenkorpus (Dissertation, Munich, 1912).
Labarrière, Jean-Louis, “De la Phronesis Animale,” in Daniel Devereux and Pierre
Pellegrin, eds., Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: Éditions du
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990) 405–428.
Lamberton, Robert, Plutarch (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2001).
Larmour, David, “The Synkrisis,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 405–416.
Lewis, David, “Near Eastern Slaves in Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with
Persian Territories,” Classical Quarterly 61 (2011) 91–113.
Lucas, D. W., Aristotle: Poetics, Introduction, Commentary and Appendices
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
Marcus, Erik, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics, & Money (Boston: Brio Press, 2005).
173
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Martin, Hubert, “Plutarch’s De Sollertia Animalium 959B–C: The Discussion of the

Encomium on Hunting,” American Journal of Philology 100 (1979) 99–106.
Mason, Jim and Peter Singer, Animal Factories (New York: Harmony Books, 1990).
Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emo-
tional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995).
Mühl, Max, “Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und πϱοφοϱιϰός von der älteren Stoa bis zur
Synode von Sirmium 351,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962) 7–56.
Murray, E. B., ed., The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. I (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1993).
Newmyer, Stephen T., The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought:
The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium,”
in José Ribiero Ferreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias,
eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clás-
sicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009) 497–507.
Newmyer, Stephen T., Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics
(New York and London: Routledge, 2006).
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Calculating Creatures: Ancients and Moderns on Under-
standing of Numbers in Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 89, 2
(2008) 117–124.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Human-A nimal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary
on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., In-
teractions between Animals and Humans in Graeco- Roman Antiquity (Berlin and
Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Of Pigs and People: Plutarch and the French Beast Fable,”
Ploutarchos 13, 1 (1996) 15–22.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious
Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 75, 3 (2003)
111–129.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch and Shelley’s Vegetarianism,” Classical Outlook 77,
4 (2000) 145–148.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a
Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for Vegetarianism,” Classi-
cal Outlook 72, 2 (1995) 41–43.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal
Reason and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura
Classica N. S. 63, 3 (1999) 99–110.
Newmyer, Stephen T., “Tool Use in Animals: Ancient and Modern Insights and
Moral Consequences,” Scholia N. S. 14 (2005) 3–17.
North, Helen, “Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin
Literature,” in Luitpold Wallach, ed., The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical
Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) 165–183.
Opsomer, Jan, “Plutarch ad the Stoics,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch
(Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 2014) 88–103.
Paetz, Bernhard, Kirke und Odysseus: Überlieferung und Deutung von Homer bis
Calderón (Berlin: deGruyter, 1970).
174
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pembroke, S. J., “Oikeiôsis,” in A. A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London:

Athlone, 1971) 114–149.
Pomeroy, Sarah, Spartan Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Puech, Bernadette, “Prosopographie des Amis de Plutarque,” Aufstieg und Nieder-
gang der Römischen Welt II, 33, 6 (1992) 4831–4893.
Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
Roberts, W. Rhys, The Ancient Boeotians: Their Character and Culture, and Their
Reputation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895).
Russell, D. A., Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972).
Ryder, Richard D., Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1989).
Safina, Carl, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt,
2015).
Santese, Giuseppina, “Animali e Razionalità in Plutarco,” in Silvana Castignone
amd Giuliana Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo Antico (Pisa: Edizioni
ETS, 1994) 141–170.
Schuster, Max, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De sollertia animalium, mit be-
sonderer Berüchsichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit Plutarchs (Augsburg: Himmer, 1917).
Scully, Matthew, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the
Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002).
Singer, Peter and Jim Mason, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices
Matter (Emmaus: Rodale Press, 2006).
Smith, Steven D., Man and Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of
Claudius Aelianus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Sorabji, Richard, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western
Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
Steiner, Gary, Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and
Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
Stratton, Malcolm, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Ar-
istotle (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917).
Tabarroni, Andrea, “On Articulation and Animal Language in Ancient Linguistic
Theory,” Versus 50–51 (1988) 103–121.
Tirelli, Aldo, “Etica e Dietetica nei De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta,” in Italo Gallo,
ed., Plutarco e le Scienze (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1992) 385–403.
Tsekourakis, Damianos, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine?
The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s Moralia,” Aufstieg und Niedergang
der Römischen Welt II, 36, 1 (1987) 366–393.
deWaal, Frans, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New
York: Harmony Books, 2009).
deWaal, Frans, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other
Animals (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996).
West, M. L., The Orphic Poems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
Williams, Craig A., “When a Dolphin Loves a Boy: Some Greco-Roman and Native
American Love Stories,” Classical Antiquity 32 (2013) 200–242.
Wright, Jeremy and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder:
Applying the Graduation Hypothesis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy
and Comparative Criminology 47, 1 (2003) 71–88.
175
INDEX
Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to endnotes.
abstention xii, 69, 129–30, 132–4, 143–4, 82–7, 92–4, 151–2, 160, 163; about
148–9, 151–3, 159, 163, 166; advocates dogs 52; and anthropomorphization
of 129, 143–4, 164; arguments for 152, 11–13, 58, 61; of behaviors by
166; Plutarch’s case for 130, 132–3, dolphins 92n352; at De primo frigido
143, 151; spiritual arguments for 152 (The Principle of Cold) 76n139;
abuse 9–10, 17, 70 manner of presentation by Aelian
Achilles 112, 121n62 16n9; of “sociability” in non-human
Aelian 15–16, 62, 64, 72–91, 93, 121, animals 65n56
124, 145, 169, 173; discussion on the Angell, Tony 73n114
musical tastes of horned owls 62n40; animal behaviors 13, 72, 74, 98–9, 103
manner of presentation of anecdotes animal emotions 61, 171
16n9; and the Nature of Animals 15, animal flesh 133, 139, 143–4, 148, 164
62n38, 62n39, 62n42, 64n51, 64n51, animal intellect 1, 12, 15–16, 16n10,
64n52, 64n54, 72–3, 73–4, 74–8, 17n21, 57–8, 148n24
79–80, 82–4, 85–91, 93; reproduces animal language xiii, 150n27
the phraseology of Plutarch without animal rights xiii–xiv, xvi, 14, 16–19,
mentioning his name 15, 16n9 56–7, 59, 62, 126, 128, 132–3, 135–6,
Agamemnon, King 112, 119n41 148, 160–1, 166–7, 174–5; movement
Alcinous, King 117n24, 117n25 xii, 148; philosophers 59, 145, 148
Alcmaeon 15 animal species 3–6, 8, 10–13, 15, 18n25,
Alexander the Great 34, 35n15, 77n154, 57n17, 63n45, 65n57, 65, 98, 100,
77n156, 77, 152n41 126, 148
allotrion (“alien”) 9, 58n22, 122n69, animal speech 117n17
163n18 animals 25, 134, 138, 142; aiding 92;
American animal rights organization carnivorous 151; cruelty to 137n24,
see PETA 137; depriving 27, 133; frugivorous
anatomy 133, 151n14 151n14; homosexuality in 103n12;
ancient literature 15, 102; see also irrational 5–6, 67, 70, 116, 135, 158–9,
literature 166–7; land-dwelling 14, 21, 24, 34, 41,
ancient philosophy 11, 71, 103; see also 84, 130; noxious 166
philosophy anthropomorphization 11–13, 19, 38, 58,
ancient texts 132, 134; see also texts 59n24, 61n35, 73n112
ancient thinkers 7, 149; see also thinkers ants 15, 18n25, 31n11, 31, 32n12, 39n20,
ancient world 9, 132 48n31, 74n120, 74–5
anecdotes 11–13, 58–9, 61, 73, 73n109, arguments xii–xiii, 8, 10–11, 18, 20,
74n117, 74n120, 74, 76n141, 76–80, 59, 74, 76, 97–8, 114, 116–17, 124,
177
INDEX
132–6, 147–8, 151–2; advanced 128; 83–5, 90n330, 121n57, 121, 154n52,
anatomical 146; fresh 156, 159; 158n4
scientific/hygienic 133; spiritual 152 birth 5, 7, 27–8, 36, 41, 48–50, 52, 58,
Aristotimus 28, 72n95, 72n96, 75n131, 60, 90n327, 91, 91n332, 161, 161n10,
76n140, 77, 79–80, 81n195, 82n203, 163n18
82n209, 84 Black Sea 46, 48n32, 48, 89n309, 89
Aristotle 6, 46–7, 53, 68n72, 68–9, 71–3, blood 20n2, 34n14, 35n15, 55, 67n69,
78–9, 81, 85–6, 87–91, 116, 120–2, 88n298, 113n8, 136n20, 139n994,
145, 148–9, 169; History of Animals 6, 142n7, 156, 159
64n52, 66n62, 71n93, 72n97, 73n113, Boas, George 102n4
77n149, 81, 81n198, 81, 85–8, 88n298, Boeotia 2, 54, 84, 112, 123, 153
89, 90n320, 90–1; Nicomachean Ethics Boeotian swine 153n46
53n1, 68n72, 116, 118, 120n46n46, Boeotians 141, 153
120n49n50, 122, 148n24; Politics 6, Bouffartigue, Jean 12, 14n3, 14, 14n4,
58n21, 59n24, 121n61, 149n27 15n8, 15n9, 16, 58n18, 66n64, 72n95,
Artemis 29, 51, 71–2 74n122, 75n128, 75n134, 84n231,
Asia Minor 77, 120–1 88n296
Athenaeus 88, 123 Boulogne, Jacques 102n8, 103n10
Athenians 34, 70, 77, 135, 141–2, 153, Bréchet, Christophe 103n10
161, 165 Brenk, Frederick E. 129, 136n8
Athens 20, 33–4, 56, 77, 158, 165 Brennan, Tad 9, 16n17, 104n17
athletes 34, 47, 141, 153 bulls 29n10, 72n108
Autobulus 9, 20–1, 23–5, 27–8, 54–7, Byzantium 45n28, 52, 79n178
59n22, 59, 63n43, 63, 63n44, 63n45,
64n48, 64, 69–70, 70–2 “Canons and Hierarchies of the
Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin
Babut, Daniel 16n12 Literature” 103n10
Bagemihl, Bruce 103n12 cardinal virtues 65, 74n122, 74, 98–9,
battles 13, 29–30, 34, 53n37, 54n3, 103, 117n22, 121n53, 125n92,
77n156, 109–10, 119n43, 141n6 127n111
Beagon, Mary 15 Caria 120n44, 121n62
beasts xi–xiii, xv, 7, 18, 56–7, 62–7, Carian women 109, 111
74–5, 77–9, 81–2, 91–2, 95–7, carnivores 36, 133–4, 146n18, 147n20,
99–106, 108–10, 113–15, 149–50; 151n14, 151n31
large 89; luring their mates with carnivorous animals 36, 133, 151n14,
their own distinct smells 111n6; 151n21
wild 52, 106 carnivorous diet 151n34
Becchi, Francesco xi, 17, 17n22, 17–18, Cartmill, Matt 70n84, 71n84, 72n100
63n43, 63 Casanova, Angelo 102n8, 115n2
Beer, Michael 132–3 Castignone, Silvana 17n22
bees 15, 23, 30, 42, 47–8, 50, 73–4, 90, 114 cats 21, 82n211
behavior 4, 12–13, 16, 26, 41, 44, 58, cephalopods 86n265, 87n270
85, 113, 138, 156; aiding 93; devoted Chaeronea 2, 54, 56, 153
64; instinctual 125; miraculous 144; chemicals 133, 135
philosopher’s 152; restrained 82; Cherniss, Harold 14n2, 135n5
savage 90, 119; valorous 119 Christianity 101
beings see human beings Chrysippus and his treatise on opposites
Bekoff, Marc 19n40, 61n35 (Peri enantiōn) 58n19
Bentham, Jeremy 10 Cicero 17n20, 62n41, 63n46, 65n56, 66–7,
Bergua Cavero, Jorge 104n18 68n70, 69n73, 74n119, 74, 102n9,
besouled nature 22 161n9, 169; and the connection of
birds 30, 40n22n22, 40–1, 47n31, reason and language 67n68; De finibus
47–8, 73n114, 78n168, 80n194, 80–1, bonorum et malorum (On the Ends of
178
INDEX
Good and Evil) 7; exposition of the crops 56n12, 97, 108, 139n3, 140, 146n17
Stoic position on human treatment of crows 30, 37, 73n114, 73, 80n193, 81,
non-human animals 71n85 110, 113n9, 121, 145, 171
Circe 106–8, 110, 115n2, 115n4, 115n5, cruelty 20, 71, 97, 124, 133–4, 137n24,
115, 115n10, 115, 116n11, 116, 137, 139, 161, 165; to animals 137n24,
116n12, 116n13, 117n20, 117, 121n55; 137; innate 144n9; wanton 70n83, 133,
conversion of Odysseus’ men into 156, 161n9
animals 101; and the hesitation of culture 145, 150, 153, 164, 175
Eurylochus to enter the dwelling of cunning 35, 55, 62, 159
115n3; mocks Odysseus for his “love curiosity 15, 73
of honor” (philotimiān) 97, 115n4; cuttlefish 44, 86–7
petitioned by Odysseus to reconvert Cyclopes 108, 117n24
his men 97; words in Plutarch Cynics 70n83, 95, 99–100, 104n18,
reminiscent of Calypso’ offer to make 150n31, 150n31, 150n31, 150, 152n38,
Odysseus immortal 115 172; and Epicurean depictions of ideal
Cirrha 51n984, 51, 92n347 human conduct 99; and Stoic diatribe
citizens 34, 54, 77n155n155, 77, 119, 121 129; understanding of the concept of
Civil Rights Movement xii “living in accord with nature” 104n18
civil war 33
Clark, Gillian xii Darwin, Charles 1
Cleanthes 31n11, 74n120 De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the
Cleomenes, King 22 Ends of Good and Evil) 7
cognitive capacities 18n33, 71n85 death 20–1, 41–2, 52, 55, 71, 77, 84, 91,
cognitive ethological thought 59n24 93, 132, 134, 149, 155, 157–8, 165; of
cognitive ethologists 11, 92, 145, 150 Crassus 41; embracing 109; king’s 83
consumption 21, 143, 147, 151–2, 154, deer 21, 23, 25, 29, 42, 85n245, 113n8
160, 163; of animal flesh 134, 144, Democritus 39n20, 70n79, 82n82, 82n207
146–7; human 144, 147–8, 161; of desires 23–4, 67, 91n342, 92, 97–100,
meat 134–5, 162–3, 167 110n6, 111–12, 112n8, 132, 134,
cooked meats 150; see also meats 146c18, 148c23, 158, 162n11, 163n20
cooking 32, 133–4, 151, 160 Desmond, William 104n18
courage 18n24, 18, 20n1, 24, 29, 29n10, Devereux, Daniel 53n1
31n11, 35n15, 65n56, 66, 98, 103, deWaal, Frans 68n72, 86n258, 150n28
108–10, 117, 119–21; of animals 29n9; Dickerman, Sherwood Owen 15, 125
boar-like in 109, 120n47; intelligent Dierauer 134, 135n6
20; manly 43; of women 109 diet 10, 26, 56n14, 67n69, 91n342,
courageous 25, 109, 119n36, 119 125n92, 130–1, 134, 136, 140, 146–7,
courts 28, 28n9, 93, 122n63, 122n68, 163, 167; carnivorous 67, 130, 140,
123n83 143–4, 150–1, 160, 165; fleshy 140;
crabs 16n14, 23, 29n9, 88n297, 88, human 160; meat-based 133, 160;
88n298, 113n9 meat-free 144
cranes 31, 35n16, 45n28, 45, 73, 78, 87, dietetics 82, 125
156, 161 digestion 133, 140, 143
creatures 7, 9–10, 21–5, 28, 42, 44, 46–7, dikaiosunē (obligation of justice) 9,
51–2, 56–7, 86–8, 90, 107–8, 138, 98–9, 127
140–2, 157–9; besouled 22, 143; dead Diogenes the Cynic 152n38, 152n39
86; irrational 58; little 46; living 57–8, Laertius, Diogenes 5, 14n3, 16n10,
69, 122, 149; loathsome 139; ordinary 59n24, 68n70, 70n79n79, 76n141,
106; rational 58; suffering 154; unborn 104n17, 122n69, 143n3, 150n31,
156; wild 48 152, 153n42, 154n52, 167; Lives of
Crete 71, 111, 113, 122 Philosophers VI 119n35, 150n31; Lives
crocodiles 30, 41, 47n31, 47, 49n34, of the Philosophers VII 5, 61n37,
84n238, 84, 139 76n141, 163n19, 167n42, 167n43
179
INDEX
disease 89, 147 evil 7, 59–60, 69, 143

doctrine 16, 58, 68, 100, 104, 129–30, external reason, (logos prophorikos)
158, 165–6; ethical 58, 103; of 81, 150
metempsychosis 130, 132, 154n55,
154n56, 163n18, 163, 165n32, 166n35, factory farming 149n26
166, 166n41 fear 7, 22–3, 31, 41, 45, 48, 52, 59–61, 87,
dogfish 49n33, 90n321 98, 107–9, 121, 154, 159
dogs 21, 23, 26–7, 35, 39n20, 41, 61nh36, Ferreira, José Ribeiro 93n353, 154n50
66, 66n63, 66, 113n9, 125n95 Fiddes, Nick 134, 137n25, 147, 151
dolphins 43n26, 45n29, 48n32, 51–3, 80, fishermen 42–4, 47–8
86n263, 88, 89n309, 92, 92n352, 92, fishes 26–8, 41–4, 44n27, 44, 45n28,
92n353, 93–4, 171, 175 45–8, 72, 81, 88n295, 88, 151n36, 158,
Dombrowski, Daniel A. 130, 135n2 163; angel 90; displaying sociability
dragnets 43 43; little 46–7, 141; sacred 48, 89;
drinking 21, 110, 112, 116, 152, 167 savage 89; spawning 48
dwellings 3, 40–1, 50, 75; see also houses flesh 17, 21, 39, 46n30, 124n90, 133–4,
Dyroff, Adolf 12, 15, 17n21, 19n38 138, 140–4, 146n14, 147, 154, 156,
158–9, 161n10, 164; cooking 150;
eagles 24, 34, 40, 47, 77 eating xiii, 133, 135, 151; human 112;
eating habits 98, 150, 152 raw 150–1
eels 41, 84, 118 Fögen, Thorsten 14, 66n62, 93, 103n10,
eggs 24–5, 31, 48–9, 64, 74, 90 104n20
Egyptians 39n20, 40n22, 82n210, 82, food 33–5, 39, 47n31, 47, 68n70, 68,
91n342, 91, 113n9, 156, 160n7 69n78, 79, 87–8, 98, 112–13, 130–1,
elephants 32n12, 36, 37t17, 37n17, 160–2, 161n10, 162n12; choices 57, 70,
37n18, 43n25, 75n130, 75t136, 130–1, 150, 175; distributing 47; exotic
79–80, 124–5 124, 148, 162; luxurious 161; plant
emotions 12, 16, 19, 21, 23, 29, 38, 49, 124, 144; procurable 143; procurement
59–62, 93–4, 104, 140, 159, 171–2; 133; sources 131, 147
animal 61, 171; experiencing 59; moral frogs 28, 49–50, 90n328
61; normative 60 frugivorous animals 151n14
Empedocles 27, 69n78, 70, 130, 137n28, fruits 36, 37n18, 79n177, 112n8, 139
142n7, 143n4, 145, 154, 157–8, 160, Fusco, Maria 104n20
163n20, 163–4, 164n25; notion of
metempsychosis 154; stance on Gill, James E. 102
abstention at On Eating Animals 69, gluttony 27, 113, 141, 153, 156
69n78 goats 27, 39, 108, 112–13, 117, 121
endorsements 130–1, 166 Golden Age 144n9, 146n16
Epicureans 17n19, 69, 95, 120n45, 162; “governing principle”, hēgemonikon 4,
depictions of ideal human conduct 99; 81n195, 81, 149
doctrines 69, 162; philosopher 153 grain 31–2, 77, 113, 140, 160
Epicurus 27, 69n74, 69, 103n11, 122n69, grapes 36
122, 162 Graver, Margaret R. 60n34
Eratosthenes 48n32, 165n31 Greece 97–8, 117n19, 153n43
ethical philosophy 11, 58 Greek xi–1, 3, 14–15, 53, 66, 68, 76,
ethics 1, 16, 46, 137, 173, 175 96–102, 102–7, 115–20, 122–3, 125,
Euripides 20, 28, 40, 56n7, 56n10, 69, 142–7, 149, 172–5; comedy 102n7;
72n94, 166n37 literature 97, 116, 118; literature
evidence 2, 4, 7, 11–13, 33, 38, 42, (ancient) 116n16, 118n32; mythology
75n127, 76n142, 125n93, 129–30, xiii, 96; philosophical thinking 98,
136n9, 137, 153–4, 154n52; anecdotal 149; poetry 146; texts xii–xiii, xv–xvi,
12–13, 145; clear 4 68, 72, 88, 116, 125, 142, 147, 165
180
INDEX
Gryllus see Whether Beasts are Rational Homeric 72, 115, 125; epics 118; poems
Guthrie, W.K.C. 145 80, 118; scenes 101, 144
gyrations 32n12, 75n131, 126n99 homosexual unions 98, 123
homosexuality in animals 103n12
“Harm as Deprivation Argument” 133, horned owls 23, 62
148n25 horses 21, 23, 26–7, 34, 41–2, 48, 52, 66,
harmless species 143n4, 166n38 77, 82, 89, 108–9, 113, 118
Hatzantonis, Emmanuel 105n23 Hortensius (Roman orator) 84
Hauser, Marc D. 60n35 Horty, Philip Sidney 17n21, 17n21
Haussleiter, Johannes 129, 135n1 houses 5, 32, 52, 157, 163
Hawkins, Tom 100 Hubert, C. 116n16, 119n34, 126n106,
hawks 25 151n32
health 131, 143, 145, 167; human 133, human beings 3–11, 13–18, 51–2,
139, 152; regaining 116 55–70, 75–6, 79–85, 90–3, 96–104,
Heath, John 149n27 107–14, 116, 118, 120–7, 131–7,
hēgemonikon (“governing principle”) 4, 143–51, 157–67; accorded a moral
81n195, 81, 149 standing denied to the remainder
Helmbold, William C. 14n5, 54n2, of animal creation 7; acting with
56n8, 62n41, 70n83, 79n177, bravery 98; caring about luxuries 98,
95–6, 99, 114n2, 125n39, 126n102, 122n64; considered by the Stoics as
129, 147 having no obligations toward non-
Hensley, Christopher 137n24 human animals 71n85; graduate in
Heraclitus 27n7, 69n78, 141n6, their cruelty toward other animals
153n44 165n28; jaded 161; loved 124; mating
Herchenroeder, Lucas 102n7 at all hours 123; rational 5, 9–10,
Hermippus 128 67; sensing their kinship with other
Herodotus 84, 86, 93, 121, 125, 158, humans 58
160, 164 human form 97, 106, 115
Hesiod 26t6, 33, 52, 68n71, 72n98, human happiness 167n43
76n146, 121n57, 144n9, 151n31, human incontinence 98
155n58 human labors 147
hibernation 36, 39 human life 5, 9, 27, 69, 99–100, 104,
Hindermann, Judith 124n88 131, 144n8, 144n9, 145n13, 146n17,
hippopotamus 24, 64 152n38, 161n11
History of Animals 6, 64n52, 66n62, human morality 5, 17, 148
71n93, 72n97, 73n113, 77n149, 81, human-non-human animal relations xii,
81n198, 81, 85–8, 88n298, 89, 1, 10–11, 129, 154, 167
90n320, 90–1 human society 162
Homer 28n8, 34n14, 43n26, 44n26, humanity 142, 153
48n32, 85n249, 86, 101, 102n8, 102, hunger 21, 112, 120, 138–9, 146
104n20, 115n6, 117n24, 170, 173–4; hunters 28–30, 56, 70–3, 78
and Odysseus 53, 97–102, 105–10, hunting 2, 10, 20, 28–9, 37, 54, 55n55,
114–18, 121–2, 124, 127, 174; Odyssey 55, 55n55, 55–6, 67, 70–2, 83,
IV 117n25, 125n94; Odyssey IX 113n9, 172–3; Plutarch’s attitudes
117n24, 117n25, 127n107; Odyssey V on 56n6; practice of 2, 55, 166;
71n88; Odyssey VI 91n338; Odyssey Soclarus’ designation of 56n6;
VIII 71n86, 118n28; Odyssey X 97, tactics 73t113
102n8, 115n2, 115n3, 115n4, 115n5,
115n6, 116n12, 118n27, 121n55, Iliad 71, 74, 77, 85–6, 89, 117,
160n4; Odyssey XII 102n8, 115n2, 119–20, 122
143n6; Odyssey XIV 78n160; Odyssey immortality 101, 154
XIX 122n63, 127n109 impulse 4–6, 22–3, 102n41, 104n17
181
INDEX
incontinence 98, 157, 161 163, 167, 175; innate 18; natural 84;
Indelli, Giovanni xi, xvn1, xvin13 theory 58
injustice 6–7, 18, 24, 26–8, 67, 69, 131, Kitchell, Kenneth 15n8, 80n189
133, 147, 149, 159, 161 knowledge xiv, 22, 46, 64, 82, 99, 101,
intellect 3, 6, 8, 17, 21, 23, 32–3, 55, 60, 113; innate 64; mathematical 46;
99, 114, 118; endowments 1, 6, 63, 65; medical 82
superior 11, 13, 17–18 Konstan, David 100
intelligence xv, 1, 14, 16, 18, 20, 29, 43,
53–4, 73–4, 82–3, 87–8, 113, 148, 170 Labarrière, Jean-Louis 53
intemperance 24, 112, 124 Laches 119n36
intercourse, sexual 98, 110, 112, 121 Lamberton, Robert 54n2
interests xii–xiv, 1, 3, 5, 10–11, 15, 78, land animals 28, 41, 43, 52, 72, 84, 131
127, 134, 149, 154; common 48; land-dwelling animals 14, 21, 24, 34, 41,
inordinate 103; potential 9; scientific 17 84, 130
interlocutors 9, 55, 57, 96, 130; language xi, xiv, 34, 67, 75–6, 88–9,
Alexander 103; Heracleon 54; Nicias 92, 104, 130, 149–50; articulate
119; Solon 18, 69, 131, 160 149; human 81; identical 152, 160;
internal reason, (logos endiathetos) meaningful 67, 92, 104, 149; see also
37n19, 81, 149 animal language
interspecies unions 80n186, 124n86 Larmour, David H. 14n3
Inwood, Brad 143n4, 145 Latin titles 1, 14, 96, 102, 128
irrational animals 5–6, 67, 70, 116, 135, lawlessness 70n79, 156n2, 157
158–9, 166–7 laws 26, 29, 71–2, 103, 109, 112, 158, 162–3
leafcutter ants 74, 75n129
jays 12, 38, 73, 80–2, 171 letters 22, 103, 130, 161–2
Jewish philosophers 103 Lewis, David 121n62
Juba, King 43n25, 79n179, 79n180, LiCausi, Pietro xvn5, 55, 74n120
86n259 life 5, 8–9, 14–15, 26, 64–70, 97, 99–100,
judgment 4, 7, 49, 59–60, 116; moral 61; 111, 129–31, 140–1, 145–6, 148–53,
and opinions 23; perverse 60 156–8, 160–1, 171–3; ageless 106;
justice 4–6, 8–10, 17n18, 17n19, 17, civilized 67; community 24; meat-free
18n25, 25–7, 31–2, 63–8, 68n71, 68, 136; organism’s 161; social 64
69n76, 74n122, 98–9, 103; birth of 63, lifestyles 5, 23, 117, 136, 143, 164;
77; calls for 133; covenant of 5, 9, 16, austere 167; contrasting 104; luxurious
67, 148, 159; debt of 8–9, 17–18, 104, 113, 150; meat-free xiii, 128–32, 134,
158; discussions of 9, 57, 167; human 143; refined 151
65, 68, 104, 165; obligation of 9, 18; linen cloths 41, 84n238
reciprocal 68, 74–5, 92; relationship of linguistic capacities 116n10
8, 34, 59, 65, 67, 69–70; sense of 18, lions 23, 25, 29n10, 35n15, 35, 37n17,
24, 63, 68, 104; share of 24, 70; topic 108–9, 113, 115hn3, 125n95, 139, 141
of 65, 77, 103, 167 logos (reason) 4, 149
logos endiathetos (internal reason) 81,
Kechagia-Ovseiko, Eleni 69n74 149, 162
killings 70–1, 153, 166 logos prophorikos (external reason)
kindness 34, 153, 164; interpersonal 154; 81, 150
toward animals 153 Lucretius 69n74, 116n15, 116n15,
Kindt, Julia xvn6, 173 146n16, 162n11
King Agamemnon 112, 119n41 luxury 98–9, 111, 113, 122n64, 124n89,
King Alcinous 117n24, 117n25 144, 146, 146n18, 148, 150, 160n8,
King Cleomenes 22 161n11, 162, 162n13n13, 162
kinship 5, 17n17, 17n20, 18, 57n17, Lycomedes, King 123n83
58n22, 58–9, 65n57, 67n68, 71n85, 85, Lycurgus 157n2, 162n14, 163n16
182
INDEX
“madness” 4, 26, 139 mothers 24, 36, 38, 49, 55, 90, 124, 127,
Maeonian women 109 139, 157
manhood 121, 129 motion 23, 32–3, 46, 59, 88; constant 46;
Martin, Hubert 55 perpetual 88; rolling 46
Mason, Jim 137n21 mullet 28, 42–3, 72
Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff 61 murder 33, 76, 134, 159
maternal care 90 murderers 33, 52
mathematics 40, 89n314 mythographers 32
mating 49, 90n328, 123n73 mythological creatures 12
McCarthy, Susan 61 mythology 123–4
meals 67, 98–9, 113, 132–3, 138, 141,
157; easily-attainable 98; enticing 140; Natural History (Naturalis Historia)
tastier 146 64n54, 64n54, 73n113, 73n114,
meat 26n6, 67, 78, 112n8, 125n91, 128, 73, 74n117, 74–6, 75n130, 77n157,
130–5, 137–8, 140–1, 143, 146–7, 78n161, 80n192, 80n194, 91–2,
156, 157n3, 159, 167n42; cooking of 161n9, 161
150–1; diet 146n17, 151n35, 152n40, nature xii, 3, 5–8, 22, 63, 87, 98; changes
153n42; dishes 150; marinating 150; of 158; living in accord with 8,
raw 151 123n75; as teacher 82n209
meat eating xii, 131–4, 137n22, 138, Nature of Animals 15, 62n38, 62n39,
140n5, 142n2, 143n4, 146n18, 146, 62n42, 64n51, 64n51, 64n52, 64n54,
151n33, 152n40, 153n42, 156, 159; 73n112, 73n113, 73, 74n119, 79–80,
origin of 144n8, 160n8; psychology 82–4, 85–9
of 134 necessity, and dietary choices 161n11
medicine 82n209, 107, 125n95 Nemean Zeus (Temple) 52
memory 7, 22–3, 26, 29n10, 41, 48, 53, nervous systems 13, 150
84n232, 114, 125n93 nestlings 25, 28, 35–6, 38, 78, 81,
Menelaus, King 117n25 109, 114
mental xiii–xiv, 4, 7–8, 10, 12, 15, 18, Niceratus 158
22–3, 26, 92, 94–5, 97, 101, 116, Nicias 119, 158, 165
133; activities 146; capacities 92; Nicomachean Ethics 53n1, 68n72, 116,
disarrangement 66; disorders 26; 118, 120n46n46, 120n49n50, 121,
processes 23 122, 148n24
metempsychosis, doctrine of 130, 132, Nile River 49, 84, 121, 139
154n55, 154n56, 163n18, 163, 165n32, non-human animals xi–xiii, 1–13, 15–18,
166n35, 166, 166n41 53–5, 57–72, 74–7, 81–4, 91–2, 94,
military campaigns 152n39 96–100, 102–4, 116–18, 122–7, 148–50,
milk 27, 67, 156 162–4; displaying 98; indulging 98;
Minos, King 122n63 practicing the three divisions of
modern animal rights 9, 160 medicine 125; teaching 126
moral xv–1, 3–7, 9–11, 13–18, 60–1, non-human species xi, xiii, xv, 3–4, 6–7,
64–5, 67–8, 71, 76, 92–3, 101–4, 135–6, 9, 11, 15, 17–19, 57–61, 63–4, 120,
147–8, 170–2, 174–5; distinctions 123–6, 149–50, 165–6
6; emotions 61; inferiority 57; normative emotions 60
philosophy 96, 118; standing 4, 7, 13, North, Helen 103
71; status 18, 71, 175; values 7, 9–11 noxious animals 166
morality 67, 150, 166 noxious strategies 13
“moralization” 6 nutrition 87, 137
moralizing character 129
Mother Earth 146n17 observation xi, 6–7, 9, 15, 55, 57n17,
mother seals 90 70n84, 71n84, 79n184, 82n211,
mother turtles 90 127n110, 129, 131, 148, 148n24;
183
INDEX
biological 61; direct 12; eyewitness 78, Paetz, Bernhard 105n23

81; parenthetical 123; pig’s 99 pain 23, 27–8, 43–4, 59, 61, 71, 82,
octopus 28, 44–5, 72, 87, 151; devouring 90–1, 120, 122, 137, 149, 154, 156;
itself 72, 87; raw 141, 150, 152 experience of 22
Odysseus 53, 97–102, 105–10, 114–18, “paradoxography” 15
121–2, 124, 127, 174; described parrots 37, 80–1
by Gryllus as “King of the Parthenon 34
Cephallenians” 117n19; father of partridges 24, 35, 64, 114, 126
117n19, 127; and his companion passions 80, 99, 112, 139; external 8;
Eurylochus hesitating to enter unjust 27
Circe’s dwelling 115n3n3; and his paternity tests 90n326
father Laertes 117n19; and his wife Pellegrin, Pierre 53n1
Penelope 119n43; immortality of Pelopidas 141, 152
115; leads the Cephallenian fleet to Peloponnese 23, 51, 84
Troy 117n19; predilection for trickery Peloponnesian War 165nh29
118n29; reputation for quickness People for the Ethical Treatment of
of speech and rhetorical brilliance Animals 10, 18, 70
121n54 Peripatetic school of philosophy 60n25
Odyssey IV 117n25, 125n94 Peripatetics 6, 9, 26, 68, 95
Odyssey IX 117n24, 117, 117n25, Persephone 51
127n107 Persia 83, 122
Odyssey V 71n88 Persians 43, 54, 86
Odyssey VI 91n338 PETA see People for the Ethical
Odyssey VIII 71n86, 118n28 Treatment of Animals
Odyssey X 97, 102n8, 115n2, 115n3, Phaedimus 21, 28, 40, 77, 82–6, 88
115n4, 115n5, 115n6, 116n12, 118n27, pharmaceuticals 39n20
121n55, 160n4 pharmaceutics 125n95
Odyssey XII 102n8, 115n2, 143n6 philanthropy 92n352
Odyssey XIV 78n160 Philo of Alexandria 73, 73n112,
Odyssey XIX 122n63, 127n109 73n113, 73n113, 76n141, 81n194,
oikeion 5, 9, 58n22, 122n69, 163n18, 81, 81n195, 87, 103, 125–6, 126n99,
167n44 126–7, 170
oikeiōsis 5, 7, 10, 16n17, 18n33, philosophers 4, 11–12, 14n3, 14,
58n22, 60n28, 64n48, 67, 163n18, 16n10, 16n17, 59–60, 60n35, 61, 92,
167n44 120, 153n42, 154n52, 158n4, 159;
oils 30, 141, 150; see also olive oils Antisthenes 119n35; Aristotimus
olive oils 141 72n103; Jewish 103; natural 60, 122;
omnivorous sea creatures 72n98 Xenocrates of Chalcedon 128
Oppian 86n263, 89n304, 90n322 philosophical 7, 11, 13, 129–30, 132;
orators 140, 165 adversaries 4; agenda 97; allegiance
organs 24, 160; see also sensory 96, 99; antecedents xiii; debates 94;
organs doctrines 164; interests 165; questions
“Origins of Life and Origins of Species” 131; schools 95–6; topics 2; traditions 95
145n9 philosophy xiv, 54, 60, 89, 102; current
ornithologists 73 animal rights 100; ethical 11, 58;
Orpheus 154n57, 161 modern animal rights 71; moral 96, 118
Orphic 129, 154n57, 155n57, 175; phronēsis 17, 53, 98, 125
poems 155n57; religion 155n57; physicians 113n9, 113, 122n67, 125n94,
teachings 154 152n41
owls 23, 62 physiological capacities 64n47
oxen 42, 113, 134, 158, 165 physiological inferiority 120n51
oysters 31, 88, 101 physiology 140n5, 151n33
184
INDEX
pigs 18, 21, 89n319, 95–103, 105–7, treatises on animals xi–xii, 8, 10, 14,
113, 115n2, 115n9, 115, 115n10, 54, 98, 103, 131, 147; works of xii,
116, 116n11, 116–17, 117n20, 141n5; xiv–xv, 14, 54, 96, 102, 129, 135, 147;
castrating 161; eloquent 97; responses zoological lore 12, 18
99; talking 96–7, 100–1 poetry 78, 89, 116, 123, 146, 171
Plato 24, 27, 29, 82–3, 103–4, 120–1, poison 38, 122
128, 130, 142, 144, 149, 154, 158, Polemarchus 158, 165n31, 165n31
162, 164–5; dialogue 154; and Laches polemics 59, 148
119n36; and the Republic 103n10, 103, Politics 6, 58n21, 59n24, 121n61,
144n9, 165n31; tripartite division of 149n27
the soul 103n10 Pomelli, Roberto xvn5, 55, 74n120,
Platonism 135n2, 143n3 104n21
playwrights 142n7 Porphyry xii, xv, 56n12, 60n26,
pleasures 21, 23–4, 61n114, 61–2, 80–1, 91, 128, 130, 144, 146, 150,
109–12, 112n8, 113, 121n59, 121, 152–3, 160, 162, 164; assertions
156, 159–60, 160n6, 162n11, 162, on the vocalizations of the jay 82;
162n13; sexual 98; unnatural 123n75, Neoplatonic philosopher xi, 16, 128;
138n2 records sacrifices had been restricted
Pliny the Elder 15, 64–5, 73–5, 90, to crops 56
119n34, 120n51, 122–3, 144–5, Porus, King 34, 77n156, 82n212
145n13, 145, 152, 160n3, 161, 170–1, Poseidon 50–1, 91
173; explains that there is a small Presocratic philosophers 15
worm on dogs 66n63; gives an Priam, King 111, 121n62
affecting account of how man is cast priests 34, 39, 41, 51, 91
forth into the world by nature 65; Prometheus 17n22, 27, 63n43, 70n80,
and Natural History 73n113, 73n114, 120n51, 144n7, 151n31, 171
73, 74n117, 74–5, 77–8, 80n192, Protagoras 120n51
80n194, 84n236, 85, 88, 90, 90n326, Ptolemy, King 41, 83n223
91–2, 161; provides evidence of the Puech, Bernadette 14n5
industriousness and hard work of ants punishment 23, 27, 44, 61, 75, 98, 151,
75n127 155, 159, 161
Plutarch xi–xiv, xv–4, 6–8, 10–15, Pyrrhus, King 33, 34n14, 40n22, 76n143,
16–18, 54–60, 61–2, 63–72, 92–3, 76n144
95–6, 100–1, 102–4, 129–36, 143–54, Pythagoras 27, 57, 70, 84, 129–30,
161–5; animal treatises of xi–xiii, xv, 136–8, 143–4, 152–3; advocacy
12, 64; argues case for abstention in of abstention 143, 152; doctrine
On Eating Meat 130, 132–3, 143, 151; of metempsychosis 132, 166; and
arguments 10, 126, 133, 148; case Empedocles 157–8, 163–4; objection
for an ethical relationship between to meat eating 142
humans and other animal species 10; Pythagoreanism 21, 57, 129, 135–6, 143,
case for rationality in non-human 153, 175
animals 126; challenges the Stoic
contention that non-human animals Quaestiones naturales 82n209
are devoid of reason 4, 6; estimation Quaestionum convivalium libri 72,
of the intellect of non-human 130, 160
species 17n22; expresses revulsion qualities 3, 29, 95, 97, 108, 114, 117,
at tasting animal flesh 143; and the 135; abortifacient 39; intellectual 117;
rational faculty in animal species 3, manly 29; moral 14
8, 65, 99, 126; reliance on anecdote
and anthropomorphization 11–12; rabies 4, 26, 66
skepticism on the validity of the rational animals 101–2
doctrine of metempsychosis 166; rational capacities 57
185
INDEX
rationality xiii, 2–8, 11–14, 17, 22, 57–8, sea snails 89

62, 126, 148–9, 166; animal 2, 7–8, 17, sea turtles 90
57, 63, 173; degree of 14, 148; share seafood 130
in 3 seals 90
reason xiii–xiv, 3–11, 16–19, 22–31, 33, Seneca the Younger 64n48, 125n93, 130
37–8, 53–7, 62–8, 80–1, 99, 104, 113– sensation 6–7, 22–3, 40, 46, 57, 88, 122,
14, 125–6, 135–6, 148–50; imperfect 138, 157, 163
63; innate 63, 125; inner 149; internal sense organs 162
37n19, 81; shared 99 senses 4, 13, 20–1, 31–2, 37, 41–5, 47, 50,
reciprocity, and justice 68n72 58, 111, 138, 141, 143, 162
red mullet 51 sensory organs 59
Regan, Tom 10, 18n31, 133, 136n21, sentences 53, 74, 91, 115, 129, 136–7,
148n25, 149n25, 149, 160n6, 160, 175 142, 147, 152, 165; final 166; first 147;
relationships 13, 101; all or nothing longer 80
57; ethical 1, 8, 10; juridical 167; sentience 18n33, 71n85
uncertain 96 serial killers 134
religions 101 sex 98, 109, 112, 123–4, 162, 173
Republic 103n10, 103, 144n9, 165n31 sexual indulgences 100
rhetoric xiv, 3, 20t1, 59c24, 69c78, 129, sexual intercourse 98, 110, 112, 121
136n8 Shelley, Percy Bysshe 143c5, 151c14
rights see animal rights Sisyphus 114, 127n111
River Nile 49, 84, 121, 139 Sisyphus’ reputation 127
rivers 32, 35, 47–9, 76, 113, 139, 160 skills 20, 44, 58, 73, 75, 113, 127, 134,
Roberts, Rhys 153n43 139, 145; astronomical 87; empty 113;
Ryder, Richard xiii, xvn11, 130, 136n12 human 55; imitative 38; impressive
problem-solving 73; mathematical 75,
sacred offerings 21 83, 88; nest building 73; technological
sacrifice of animals 37, 56, 143–4 60, 145; untaught 125
Safina, Carl 146 slaughter 20, 51, 56, 131–2, 134, 139,
salt 35, 103, 158 142, 147, 149, 157–8, 165–6; of
salt water 39; see also water animals 113, 133; experience of 136;
Samarkand 164 of harmless species 143, 166
Santese, Giuseppina xi, xvn3, xvi, 17n22, slaughterhouses 136
18, 101n4, 145n11, 145, 148, 154, slavery 109, 118
154n55, 166n34, 170, 175 slaves 24, 27, 63, 108, 121
scholars xii–xiii, 2, 5, 7–8, 14, 16, 54, smells 111, 136
63n43, 63, 95–7, 99, 116–17, 129–30, Smith, Steven D. 15n8
143, 163–4 sociability 24–5, 29, 34, 36–7, 41, 43,
schools 4, 46, 56, 64, 69, 93, 99–101, 104; 46–7, 65, 72, 84–5
ancient philosophical 162; exercises social union 65
56, 66; lessons 107 society 7, 65, 70, 162; civilized 65
Schorcht, Claudia 135, 164, 172 Soclarus 2, 9, 20–1, 23–8, 53–4, 58, 65,
Schuster, Max 2, 14n4, 56n8 67–9; assertion that the rational is
scientists xiii, 11–12, 61, 92, 118 counterbalanced by the irrational
Scully, Matthew 133, 161n10 58n20; believes that non-human
sea-creatures 1–2, 8, 11, 28, 34, 40–2, 44, animals have a greater natural
50–1, 54, 56, 66, 72 propensity toward the production
sea-dwellers 2, 8, 11, 14, 24, 29, 41, 43, and perfection of virtue than do
53, 74, 82, 84–5, 130 human beings 62, 161; interlocutor
sea-hares 51, 91 6, 9, 55, 57; interlocutor of Plutarch
sea-hedgehogs 45 6; and non-human animals 64; and
sea scolopendra 85n252 the undesirability of regarding other
186
INDEX
species as “possessed of reason and of animal bonding 5; doctrine of

akin to us” 68 oikeiōsis 10, 18, 64–5, 85; position
Socrates 24, 40, 95, 119, 145, 154, 165 on human treatment of non-human
soldiers 86, 109 animals 71; punishing their dogs to
solemn oaths 121 instill pain in them 61n36; theoretician
Solon 28, 69n78, 71n92, 71, 131, and logician Chrysippus 4–5, 7, 16–17,
160n8, 161 46, 58, 67, 76, 88, 102n9, 163; theory
solstice 45, 50, 90 of opposites 58–9; Zeno 59, 68, 163
Sophists 110, 114, 121 sunesis (practical intelligence) 6, 116n11,
Sophocles 21, 53, 72 145c13, 148c24
sōphrosunē (temperance/moderation) 98 surgery 39, 82, 125
Sorabji, Richard 17n19, 68n72, swallows 23, 25, 30–1, 39n20, 39, 42,
154n52 50n35, 50, 52, 73n112, 73, 74n120, 74,
Soteles 51n984, 92n348 82n207, 82n208
soul 4, 20–2, 40, 58–9, 81, 103, 108, swans 38–40, 156
110–11, 114, 122, 141–2, 149, 152–4, swine 115, 153n46
158–9; of animals 4–5, 16, 97, 99, synkrisis (judgment) 14n3
103, 149; human 131, 135, 152; non-
human 103 Tabarroni, Andrea 66n62
sounds 22–4, 32–3, 38, 61–2, 81–2, taste 15, 56, 80, 109, 111, 122, 131, 135,
84, 93, 97, 141, 153, 162; articulate 143–4, 147, 161, 167
81; inarticulate 133; melodious 153; temperance 18n24, 31n11, 79n186, 98–9,
squeaking 81 110, 112, 112n8, 117n22, 121n53,
source 9, 20, 51, 71, 79, 82, 87, 93, 121n59, 125n92
95–6, 100, 112–13, 139, 146–7, 151, Terian, Abraham 103n10
160; classical 132, 151; common 88, texts 54n5, 55, 95, 98–9, 116, 118, 121,
103; potential 95; secondary xiv; 128–9, 145n11, 147n21, 151, 154–5,
unidentifiable 119 163–4, 164n25, 167n45
sows 109, 111–12, 119, 156, 161 Thales 35, 78
Spartans 54, 60, 117, 151–2; poets 54; theater 27, 39, 113, 126, 159, 166
warriors 54; women 119–20, 175 Theater of Pompey 161
species xiii, 1, 3–13, 15–16, 18, 55–7, Thebes 119, 152
65–8, 98, 103–4, 120–1, 123–7, theft 151
133–4, 145, 147–50, 163–4; coveted Theophrastus 16n10, 16, 16n17, 16–17,
161; domestic 147; land-dwelling 18n29, 45, 60, 70, 87, 122, 130,
2; mammalian 150; predatory 147; 137n28, 146n17
sociable 27; tame 147 “theriophily” (love of beasts) 102n4,
speech 18, 20, 62, 67, 96–7, 100, 104, 102, 116n16, 171
107, 116, 121, 140, 147, 149–50, 160, thinkers 130, 163–4
165; human 80–1; intelligible 81; Thomas, Edmund 93n353, 103n10
meaningful 81; openness of 119 Titans 83, 142, 154–5
sperm 28, 72 topics xii–xv, 2–3, 5, 14, 16–17, 21, 82,
spider webs 73n113 124–7, 135–6, 142, 147, 153–4, 158–60,
spiders 15n9, 30, 39n20, 46, 73n113, 162, 165–7
82n207, 82n208 tortoises 24, 39, 49, 90, 113, 125
Stadter, Philip A. 102n5, 115n2 translations xi–xvi, 5, 16, 20, 95–6, 103,
Stoicism 5, 60n34 106, 122, 126, 138, 145, 156, 169–70
Stoics 2–7, 9, 16n17, 17n18, 17n19, 17, treatises xi–4, 6, 8, 13–17, 53–7, 60–1,
55, 58–64, 66–8, 81, 118, 126, 149–50, 69–70, 73–4, 94–5, 102, 125, 127–31,
164, 166–7; accused of hypocrisy in 142–3, 159–64, 166–7; animal-centered
scorning pleasures 167; argue that 125; on animals xii, 128; ethical 130;
reason confers value 10; conception lost 16, 18, 55, 146; zoological 71
187
INDEX
Troglodytes 26, 67, 144 31; frozen 32; productive 139; salt 39;
Trojan Horse 118 tainted 82
Troy 117–19, 121, 123 wealth 38, 134, 165, 167
turtles 90 welfare 48n33, 50n35, 53n1, 71n92, 134,
152
unions 80, 124; homosexual 98, 123; whales 47, 88–9
same-sex 103 wheat 31
urine 25, 42, 64 Wiener, Philip P. 102n4
Uzbekistan 164 wine 110, 115, 141, 152, 167
winter solstice 45n29
vegetarianism 10, 16, 128–30, 132, wisdom 17, 24, 31, 53, 63, 65, 74–5,
135–6, 148, 154, 163, 171–2, 174 98–9, 103, 108–9, 111, 117, 125, 145;
vegetarians 56, 84, 128–32, 134–5, 144, animal 99; practical 120
151, 154 women 27, 39, 109–12, 119, 121, 124,
vices 8, 12, 63–4 146, 156
victims 43–4, 76, 89, 113, 122, 147, Women’s Liberation Movement xii
161–2 Works and Days of Hesiod 144n9
violence 6, 20, 56, 98, 114; heartless wounds 20, 43, 99, 138
137; human 6, 137; increasing 56; Wright, Jeremy 137n24
interpersonal 137; unreasoning 55
virtues 5, 8, 12, 15, 18, 24, 29, 31, 62–4, Xenocrates 70, 128, 135, 137, 142,
74–5, 77, 97–100, 103, 107–8, 118–20; 154, 161; contribution to vegetarian
human 144; imperfect 63; life of 101, thought in antiquity 121, 154n52
104; native 113; production of 97, 108 Xenophon 116n14, 120n51, 121,
voices 25, 38, 40–1, 81, 138; harmonious 122n68, 165
140; human 80, 82; parrot’s 38;
untrained 38 Zeno 5, 16n17, 61n34, 76n141, 104n17,
167n42
war 9, 27, 54, 70, 109, 113, 134, 157–8 Zenobius 78n173, 78n175
war dances 157, 162 Zeus 80, 83, 91, 106–7, 119, 124, 139,
warfare 18, 20, 108, 113 151, 154–7
water 30, 32, 35, 39, 44–6, 48–9, 53, 84, zoological lore 3, 12, 71
86–7, 90, 92, 110, 115, 145, 152; clear zoology 11
188

(Routledge Classical Translations) Plutarch - Stephen Thomas Newmyer - Plutarch - Plutarch's Three Treatises On Animals - A Translation With Introductions and Commentary (2021)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Routledge Classical Translations) Plutarch - Stephen Thomas Newmyer - Plutarch - Plutarch's Three Treatises On Animals - A Translation With Introductions and Commentary (2021)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES

This volume offers a new translation of Plutarch’s three treatises on animals—

Stephen T. Newmyer is Professor Emeritus of Classics at Duquesne Univer-

Routledge Classical Translations provides scholars and students with

THE LOST HISTORY OF PETER THE PATRICIAN

THE SORROWS OF MATTIDIA

MUSAEUS’ HERO AND LEANDER

PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES ON ANIMALS

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

ISBN: 978-1-138-57084-9 (hbk)

1 Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence,

2 Whether Beasts Are Rational, or Gryllus

3 On Eating Meat (De esu carnium) 128

Treatise I: Translation 138

Treatise II: Translation 156

It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Amy Davis-Poynter and

In the Introduction to his 1995 edition of Plutarch’s dialogue Bruta ­animalia

nature of human–non-­human animal relations and obligations. R ­ eaders who

Plutarch’s longest and most detailed examination of the intellectual

work (965D–985C), in which one of the interlocutors in the dialogue offers

of “madness” in an animal when its behavior is erratic or when it suffers

irrational animals is to obey the urgings of impulse (hormē) that guaran-

The interlocutor Soclarus inaugurates this discussion of interspecies jus-

of Vittorio d’Agostino, writing almost a century ago, that Plutarch’s zoology

rationality is a continuum, other animal investigators still adopt what

Professional animal behaviorists inserted a hard divider between

6 On the difficulty involved in attempting to date the philosophical works of

mentioning his name, and at times discussed anecdotes pertaining to particular

“The strength of man is small, but

without a soul, since it is irrational and devoid of understanding, is at once

4. SOCLARUS: Well then, Autobulus, include me among those who believe

only a great deficiency of attainment among animals and no clear aiming

by its nature does not understand or reason or think is not to be termed

“That fish and fowl and winged birds should eat

7. AUTOBULUS: My friend, you have articulated what is “dear to the

“Offspring of horse and ass and spawn of bulls,”

which Prometheus in Aeschylus says he “gave” to us,

965 “Like slaves, to take our work upon them.”80

“The lot, the child of Chance, presiding here,”94

“In fireless home and joyless haunts,”98

10. On the whole, the endowments by which philosophers103 demonstrate

“His mighty right arm placed upon it, sleeps,

11. It would be impossible to discuss exhaustively the domestic arrange-

“Or ants that brought up all their eggs in haste,

“the blue-­g ray sea begot you,”153

“The howling dogs rushed forth. Odysseus

“The fox knows many things, the hedgehog one–

When the fox approaches, as Ion174 says,

“It curls its spiny body in a knot,

23. HERACLEON: Get ready, my dear Phaedimus, and rouse yourself to

D “To make excuses when combat comes your way

“She hurled into the depths of sea like lead

27. We may observe ingenious examples in many of sea creatures of their

“In all the cities where you come to dwell,

And similarly Theognis:

“Take on a mind that, like the octopus,

“May neither stop nor halt its forward course.”287

By nature it is in constant motion,288 and the cessation of its motion is also

“Left-­glancing, like the tunny fish.”292

a distinct sort of movement, inward on itself and outward, which needs a

“Swift sacred fish with gold upon its brow.”316

“Once such a thing there by Apollo’s shrine”338

C “Like a dolphin on the sea,

In the Introduction to his 1995 edition of Plutarch’s dialogue Bruta animalia

nature of human–non-human animal relations and obligations. R eaders who

“the blue-g ray sea begot you,”153

“Left-glancing, like the tunny fish.”292

intellectual capacities of non-human animals, at times using the term

restraint and modesty of non-human species in their lovemaking, rather

2 13 On the mathematical skills of non-human animals, see note 135.

non-human animals are morally superior to humans and at least as rational as

to argue for conscious mental activity in non-human species. On tool use

“Just as the new-weaned foal runs with its mother.”17

“Who first forged robbers’ evil-working knives,

might in itself suggest an element of self-interest on the part of human