PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

L A C OUR I NTERNATIONALE DE J USTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY ATTACKS BY STATE OF LUSSIA AND REPUBLIC OF

PARKAIN

THE STATE OF LUSSIA

(Applicant)

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF PARKAIN

(Respondent)

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. Whether PARKAIN's bombings on the territory of Lussia are in violation of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Lussia and amounted to the violation of the provisions of the United
Nations Charter on the use of force
II. Whether the subsequent attack by Lussia constitutes as valid countermeasure and is legal as per
international law.
 ARGUMENT ADVANCED.

I. Whether PARKAIN's bombings on the territory of Lussia are in violation

of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lussia and amounted to the
violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter on the use of force

The International Court of Justice has elaborated on situation when a state violates sovereignty and
territorial integrity of another state; that is when one state uses any sort of coercion in order to intervene
directly or indirectly in internal matters of another state where it has a right to determine for itself.

The Respondent at no given moment made an interference in internal matters of Lussia. The rounds of
bombings only targeted the villages where Association of United Bakuland resided. The AUB conducted
six bomb explosions. In all these explosions, suicide bombers specifically targeted security forces,
resulting in the killing of 123 security personnel of Parkain.

The ICJ has previously observed that if the projected use of weapons was intended as a means of
defense and there would be a consequential and necessary breach of the principles of necessity and
proportionality, this would suggest that a threat contrary to article 2(4) existed.1 The proportionality of
the attack on Parkain was grave enough for the respondent to attack in self-defense. States have a duty
and a right to protect their citizens and residents from attack. When the persons planning and executing
attacks are operating from outside its borders, if neither the state from which those non-state actors
operate nor the international community takes effective measures to stop the attacks the victim state
must have the right to use force in self-defence. Hence the round of bombings were an act of purely self-
defence to secure its territory and citizens from any further imminent threat posed towards them. As
even after informing the concerned authorities in Lussia no action was taken against the AUB militants.

Parkain also complied with the international laws under article 51 of Charter of United Nation as the
permanent representative of Parkain to the United Nations had already submitted a letter to the president
of the United Nations Security Council informing their attacks on the AUB Militants along the border of
Lussia as a furtherance of Self Defense.
1
ICJ reports, 1996, pp. 226, 246-7; 110 ILR, P. 163
It is apparent that when force is employed in retaliation for an armed attack that has already occurred,
the use of force is legal. Obviously, any ambiguity is eliminated by the possibility of an armed attack.
According to this, there is also a reasonable argument that limits the use of legitimate self-defense to
instances of armed attack.2 The Catham House Principles on International Law on the use of force in
Self-defence, provides that the right to self defence may apply to attacks by non-state actors where the
attack is large-scale; if the right to self-defense is exercised in the territory of another state, and that state
is unable or unwilling to deal with the non-state actors itself, and further that it is necessary to use force
from outside to deal with the threat in circumstances where the conset of territorial state cannot be
obtained; and the force used in self-defense may only be directed against the government of the state
where the attacker is found so far as is necessary to avert or end the attack. 3 The acts of international
terrorism are posed as a threat to international peace and security in response to which the right of self-
defense is effective as they fall under the purview of large-scale attacks by non-state actors amounting to
‘armed-attacks’ within Article 51 of UN Charter and are declared as binding resolutions under the
Security Council.4

The Respondent submits that following the principles of international law the act of the state are
completely in compliance with the UN Charter and have not violated sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Lussia as it was done in self-defense.

II. Whether the subsequent attack by Lussia constitutes as valid

countermeasure and is legal as per international law.

Proportionality is concerned with the relationship between the internationally wrongful act and the
countermeasure.188 Both case law189 and customary law190 emphasize that countermeasures must be
equal to the injury suffered, be assessed not only in quantitive terms, but considering also the gravity of
the internationally wrongful act and the importance of the rights in question.

The bridge between internationally wrongful act and countermeasure is built with proportionality.
Countermeasures must be equivalent to the injury suffered, and should be assessed just not only in

2
(Bruno Simma, 2012)
3
55 ICLQ, 2006, pp. 963, 969
4
Congo v. Uganda, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp.168, 314,337.
quantitive terms but the gravity of internationally wrongful act and the importance of the rights in
question should equally be considered as emphasized by both the customary5 and case law6.

A countermeasure to be valid under international law, absolutely should be taken with the intention of
bringing a state back into compliance with its legal obligations 7, it should not involve the use of force. 8
Furthermore, countermeasures should be temporary in character and reversible in effect. Lussia
launched an armed attack against the respondent which is in violation of the international law9

Furthermore countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question. 10 The tribunal opined in the Air
Services Arbitration, “Judging the ‘proportionality’ of countermeasures is not an easy task and can at
best be accomplished by approximation.” 11 Countermeasures are more likely to satisfy the
proportionality requirement if taken in relation to the same obligation.12

In consonance with the above, Lussia’s countermeasures are invalid in the need and in action and thus,
Lussia is in contravention of the International law.

5
ARISWA, Art. 51.
6
United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WTO Appellate Body,
WT/DS192/AB/R, ¶120 (2001).
7
ASR art. 49(1). See ICSID, Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. the United
Mexican States, Case No. ARB (AF)/04/05, Award, 21 November 2007, ¶121 (taking articles 22 and 49 of the ASR as an
authoritative statement of customary international law on countermeasures).
8
ASR Art. 52.
9
ASR Art. 49(2), (3).
10
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, ¶85.
11
Air Services Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, ¶91, ¶¶94-6
12
Id. At p. 40
 PRAYER

PARKAIN requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

a) PARKAIN's bombings on the territory of Lussia on 21st July 2017 were undertaken as a measure of
right of self-defense and, therefore, were not in violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lussia
and did not amount to the violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter on the use of force
and any other relevant international law.

b) In consonance with the above, Lussia’s countermeasures are invalid in the need and in action and
thus, Lussia is in contravention of the International law.