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Oligopoly
Oligopoly
Unit
6.4
Oligopoly
Pricing and Output Determination
Arjun Madan Ph D
Oligopoly
Characteristics
Few dominant firms each large enough to influence market price
Interdependence of decision making
High barriers to entry (Technical Economies of scale, hard for new firms to
harness EoS early on)
Artificial barriers (non price competition, collusion/merger)
Price making power
Non-price competition / High selling cost (advertisement)
Products may be homogeneous or differentiated (by label, quality, branding)
Imperfect knowledge – sellers and buyers have incompelete knowledge
about production method and pricing
Types of Oligopolies
Perfect (Pure) / Imperfect
Perfect: Homogenous goods
Imperfect: Differentiated goods
Open vs Close Oligopoly
Open: no entry barriers
Close: entry barriers
Collusive Oligopoly / Non-collusive Oligopoly
Implicit agreement (price, quota, etc.), cartelization
Partial vs Full
Partial : market dominated by a price leader
Full: no price leadership
Syndicate vs Organized
Syndicate: high degree/level of coordination
Business Economics (Micro) – Market Analysis – Oligopoly Arjun Madan Ph D 3
18-09-2022
Oligopoly Models
Four behavioural models of oligopoly
Competitive Model (Price rigidity)
Cooperative model (Collusive oligopoly)
Formal collusion Model (Cartels)
Informal Collusion Model: Price Leadership
Price competition may break out at times - known as price war / predatory
pricing
An oligopoly firm may set price deliberately low
Undercut prices of other rival firms so as to drive competitors out and gain
larger market share
Though firm may suffer losses in the short-run
Due to mutual interdependence
Other rival firms also drop price to retain customers
Price war breaks out and erodes any supernormal profits being made
Competitive model
This model explains price rigidity (firms may drop price to match rival
firm’s prices but do not match price increases.)
For ex: When firm A increases its price – rivals will not follow. Consumers will
switch from firm A to its rivals – Demand will fall more than proportionately
for firm A.
If firm A lowers its price, rivals will follow – Demand for A will increase less
than proportionately as rivals will try to match price decrease by A (leading to
price war and erosion of economic profits)
Hence oligopoly firms seldom vary prices unless costs changes significantly.
The kinked demand model is used to explain this behaviour
In the same year Paul Sweezy’s Paper – “Demand under the conditions of
Oligopoly” – tried to explain why oligopolist face kinked demand curve.
Assumptions
Price reductions are readily matched
Price rise are not matched or matched only partially
Prices will remain rigid
Quantity demanded
drops by 20%
P1
If I increase my price say by
10%, no one follows and I
lose sales P0
D0
Q1 Q0
If I decrease my price by
Quantity demanded
10%, everyone follows and I P0 increases 5%
gain little or nothing at all!
P1
D0
Q0 Q1
D0
D1
Q0
MR0
MR1
Business Economics (Micro) – Market Analysis – Oligopoly Arjun Madan Ph D 14
1
The Kinked Demand Model
P
1000 Jio’s Demand for Two dominant firm, Jio and Airtel, price range
Cellular Plan from ₹1000 to ₹100.
900
800
At an equilibrium price of ₹600 Jio sells about
5 lakh plans /month
700
What will happen to the demand for Jio’s plan
600
if it lowers its price ?
500
We need to predict what will Jio’s rival Airtel
400 do in response to change in price by Jio
300 If Jio lowers its price, Airtel will also lower its
200 tariffs. (Due to oligopoly behaviour)
100 Airtel would not want to lose market share in
1 2 9
case Jio decreases its price. Therefore, price
3 4 5 6 7 8 10 Q
decrease will be matched.
2
The Kinked Demand Model
P The implication is that the demand for Jio will
1000 Jio’s Demand for be highly inelastic below ₹600.
Cellular Plan
900 Because Airtel will also reduce its price and Jio
800 will not gain any significant market share.
700 What will happen if Jio raises its prices?
600
How would Airtel respond to the price
increase?
500
If Jio raises its price, Airtel will keep its price
400
at ₹600.
300
Why would Airtel ignore price increase by Jio?
200
If Jio's price increases, we can assume that
100 Airtel will capture much of the market share
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q since Airtel's price remains low.
Demand for Jio will be highly elastic at price
above ₹600.
Business Economics (Micro) – Market Analysis – Oligopoly Arjun Madan Ph D 17
18-09-2022
3
The Kinked Demand Model
P Let’s derive the demand cure for Jio and see
1000 Jio’s Demand for
Cellular Plan how it will change if Jio lowers its price and if
900 it raises its price.
800 If Jio lowers its price to ₹400, the increase in
700 demand will be very small because Airtel will
lower its price too.
600
The D increase to only 6 lakh. This means the
500
demand is highly inelastic below ₹600.
400
If Jio increases its price to say ₹700, the D will
300 fall from 5 lakh to 1 lakh. this means the
200 demand is highly elastic above ₹600.
100 If we draw the D curve based on these
D
1 2 9
assumptions we end up with what is called a
3 4 5 6 7 8 10 Q
kinked demand curve.
4
The Kinked Demand Model
P At any price other than ₹600, demand curve
1000 Jio’s Demand for
Cellular Plan will slope steeply below ₹600. Demand will
900 be inelastic, however, demand will be
800 relatively elastic above ₹600.
5
The Kinked Demand Model
P The yellow shaded area represents the total
1000 Jio’s Demand for
Cellular Plan revenue at ₹600 price.
900
Jio must decide whether or not lowering its
800 price will improve its total revenue.
700
If Jio were to lower its price to ₹400 the D
600 grows only by 1 lakh units.
500 This means Jio’s TR will be actually smaller,
400
represented by the green rectangle.
6
The Kinked Demand Model
P Jio’s Demand for What about price increase ? Will Jio benefit by
1000
Cellular Plan rising its price?
900
Clearly, that will not be the case. Increasing
800 the P from ₹600 to ₹700, will once again cause
700 TR to fall.
600 The blue rectangle represents Jio’s TR at a
price of ₹700.
500
400
Jio’s TR will decrease whether it lowers its
price or increases its price.
300
Thus, we can see that there is a tendency of
200
price in the oligopolistic market to remain
100 sticky, at the eq’m levels.
D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q Oligopolist have no incentive to raise or lower
their prices.
8
The Kinked Demand Model
P Jio’s Demand for Now to complete our graph, we need to add
1000
Cellular Plan MR curve.
900
The MR curve will have two different
800 segments – one that accompanies the elastic
700 range of the demand curve and the other
corresponding to the inelastic range of D
600
curve.
500
This results in a vertical gap in the MR curve
400 since there is no MR curve corresponding to
300 the inelastic portion of the MR curve at the
kink.
200
This is generally called as the MR gap,
100
D represented by the vertical red curve in the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q MR curve.
MR
7
The Kinked Demand Model
P The implication of the vertical range of MR is
1000 Jio’s Demand for that even if the firm’s cost were to increase
Cellular Plan significantly in the short-run, the profit
900
maximization quantity will not change.
800
MC2 Even if there is an increase in MC to MC2 the
700
eq’m (MC=MR) Q and P does not vary from
600 MC1 5 lakh units and ₹600 price.
500
400
300
200
100
D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q
MR