The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Pakistan

Author(s): Bruce J. Esposito

Source: Asian Survey , May, 1974, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1974), pp. 429-438
Published by: University of California Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642848

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THE POLITICS OF AGRARIAN

REFORM IN PAKISTAN

/ Bruce J. Esposito*

mid increasing governmental chaos, deepening economic problems, a

crescendo of student protests, and war disillusionment, President Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party came to power in December
1971. Three months later he enacted land reform legislation. The focus 'of
this article is the nature and impact of the March '1972 land reform program
of the Bhutto Government.
The problems of political integration reached crisis proportions under the
rules of Ayub Khan (1958 -April 1969) tand Yahy'a Khan (1969-1971).
Political institutions introduced in the eastern sector under Ayub failed to
give the Bengal elite a feeling of participation in the political system, while
at the same time economic policies helped increase their numbers. Hence,
more and more people were politically frustrated. According to one author-
ity:

The regime's [Ayub Khan] emphasis on economic growth, without the

simultaneous development of political institutions, created a crisis in
political management. The regime depended on the civil administration
to manage these increasingly articulate socio-economic groups, but in
the absence of an ideology and effective political institutions, the civil
bureaucracy proved of limited value as an integrative force.'

By the end of the 1960s the Central Government, largely located in West
Pakistan, had lost the support of the eastern sector's urban intelligentsia,
industrial labor, urban salaried employees, and government workers. The
rural poor were at least politically neutralized by their amorphous nature
and limited public works projects. In addition, almost all the socioeconomic
strata were attracted by the banner of regional autonomy or independence.

*The research for and preparation of this article were supported by a generous grant
from the John C. Lincoln Institute of the University of Hartford.
'Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), p. 180. See also New York Times, December 4, 1970, p. 10.

429

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430 AGRARIAN REFORM IN PAKISTAN

President Yahya Khan was unable to

political chaos in the west nor reduce the hostility in the eastern sector.
Yahya, by proposing to return the country to party rule, hoped calm might
be restored. In December 1970, elections were called for a National Assembly
to elect delegates to write a new constitution. The results of the new elections
-victory of the People's Political Party (PPP) in the west and the Awami
League in the east-soon indicated that it would be difficult to "constitution"'
over the differing goals of the parties. By March 1971 political negotiations
failed and the battle was joined between Pakistan land what was later pro.
claimed as the nation 'of Bangladesh.
After -the brief, disastrous 'civil war and renewed conflict with India, Bhut-
to was catapulted to power. He became Pakistan's first civilian chief of state
in over a decade. Immediately, he began to consolidate his position and de-
velop .a firm economic base for the remaining half of the country.2

BHUTTO'S LAND REFORM

One of the victorious PPP's electoral gambits was the catchy slogan:3

Islam is our faith

Democracy is our Policy
Socialism is our economy
All power to the People.

Since "the People" included the large peasant population of Pakistan, a ver
significant portion of the PPP Program dealt with agrarian reform.
Program blamed "a feudal system of land tenure" for the poverty of th
peasants, mo~re than half of whom were underemployed or unemployed.
cording to the Program:

West Pakistani owners of large estates, the feudal lords, constitute a

formidable obstacle to progress. Not only by virtue of their wealth,
but on account of their hold over their tenants and the neighbouring
peasantry, they wield considerable power and are, even at present, a
major political force.... The breaking up of the large estates to destroy
the power of the feudal landowners is a national necessity that will
have to be carried through by practical measures.4

The Party Program also envisaged the need for cooperative farms. It argued
that for efficient utilization 'of the land, capital investment was required, and
improvements must be made over several holdings. The Program envisioned
that "social cooperative farms" would be created on a voluntary basis. For
example, the cooperative would allocate labor, provide agricultural machin-

'Robert La Porte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1972: Picking up the Pieces," Asian Survey
XIII:2 (February, 1973), pp. 187-198.
3Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party, (1970 Third Edition) (n.p., n.p
1970), p.3.
'Ibid., p. 28.

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 BRUCE J. ESPOSITO 431

ery, and regulate the sup

would obtain seed and ma
In addition, the Program
tionally with rural areas.
their inhabitants the max
It was envisaged that:

... each agroville will have a main square in which civic life will focus.
There will be around this centre the town hall, the offices of the co-
operative, the town library, the civic centre with rooms for meetings,
festivities, clubs, and exhibitions. The agrovilles will function as a
market place for the surrounding rural areas and contain establish-
ments for storage and processing of agricultural produce. Small manu-
facture can thus be scattered all over the country utilizing local labour
and reducing transport costs. During peak periods, the manpower avail-
able in these agrovilles can be sent into the countryside to work. Repair
workshops for agricultural machinery in the agroville will be machinery
maintenance economical for the farms.5

The agrovilles would also contain hospitals and schools. The program also
envisioned the development of large cattle farms so that more protein could
be introduced into the diet. In addition, affoTestation was seen as a major
need to maintain the ecological balance.
The actual land reform law was Martial Law Regulation No. 115.6 This
law applied to all of West Pakistan (the province of Baluchistan, the North
West Frontier, Punjab, Sind, and the Islamabad Capital Territory), but did
not apply to the centrally administered tribal areas. Land Commissions, com-
posed 'of the governor and three other men appointed by him, were estab-
lished in each province, and 'a Land Commissioner was chosen from within
the Commission or brought in from outside. Landholding was tied to the in-
dividual rather thaan the family 'and the reform was based on the amount of
land a person owned as of December 20, 1971.7 If a landlord owned more

"Ibid., pp. 30-31.

"Land Relorms Regulation 1972 (Martial Law Regulation #115) (Karachi: Printwell
Publications, 1972), pp. 1-17. The press reaction was generally favorable and tended to
exaggerate the importance, as one will see later, of the reforms. One Lahore paper carried
a headline "Land Reforms will Remove Inbalance in Society," (Lahore Times, May 21,
1972). Dawn called the reform "a step forward," (March 3, 1972). The Morning News
spoke of how "far-reaching will be the impact of the reforms. They meet the ends of
social justice as well as the imperative need for increasing production." (Morning News,
March 3, 1972). Other laudatory comments were carried by the Business Recorder,
March 3, 1972; Jang, March 4, 1972; Hurriyet, March 4, 1972; and Mashriq, March 4,
1972.
'By December, 1971 it was obvious that Bhutto would be elected and the Party Pro-
gram implemented. According to some landlords I interviewed in July 1972 they reported
they had dispersed their lands among their heirs when Bhutto's political fortunes began
to rise. The bequeathed land lessened the amount that would have been resumed. If
Bhutto had retroactively made the resumption date early in 1971, then more land would
have been available for distribution to the peasantry.

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 432 AGRARIAN REFORM IN PAKISTAN

than 150 acres of irrigated land, or 300 acres of unirrigated land, or an area
equivalent to 15,000 units calculated on the basis of soil classification as
entered on the 1969 revenue records, this land would be resumed.8 An indi-
vidual landlord with excess land could select which land he wished to retain
or have resumed. If a'dispute arose as to what was legal or illegal under the
Regulation, the Land Commissioner would decide.9
In addition to the ceilings on landholdings, the 'Martial Law Regulations
dictated change in the traditional tenure relationship between landlords and
tenants. After the issuance of the Regulations the landlord rather than the
tenant is generally responsible for payment of the land taxes, seed costs and
water costs. However, one would expect the landlords to attempt to secure 'a
higher share of the produce to compensate for these additional expenses. The
Regulations 'do not place any limit on what percentage 'of the total crop may
be charged as rent.10
By 'and large the announcement of land reform was received quietly by the
peasants, despite the fact many had !received promissory notes from PPP
cadres indicating that when Bhutto came into 'office they would acquire
free-a certain 'amount of land. It appeared that -the peasants, perhaps 'show-
ing their traditional cynicism, were waiting to see what actual improvements
would be produced by the reforms. However, there were scattered incidents
'between peasants (Haris) and landlords. Minor clashes were 'reported in the
vicinity of Hyderabad, Sukkur, various towns in the Punjab, 'and the Thar-
parkar District of -Sind.'"
These minor clashes were confrontations between the peasants, who seized
land, and the landowners and police, who sought to restore order. One of 'the
most serious incidents took place near Tan'do Jam in the Hyderabad District,
in which gunfire was exchanged between Haris and the police who came to
theaid 'of some Zamindars (large landowners). The Sind governor, Mum-
taz Ali Bhutto, promised to institute an investigation of the incident.'3
Peasant conferences were another method by which peasants made known
their grievances. One conference peasants held in Hyderabad demanded :14
1. One-hundred acres maximum per family
2. Cessation of ejectments of Haris
3. That no outsiders be allowed to settle in the Sind.
Such conferences indicated that the peasants considered the amount of re-
sumed land to 'be distributed inadequate.
Political opposition leaders generally denounced the land Reform Program

'Land Reforms Regulation 1972, pp. 3-5.

Ibid., pp. 5-8.
"0Douglas M. Jones, Some Comments on the Recent Land Reform Proposal for Pakid
stan, (Pakistan, U.S. AID, 1972), p. 5.
:f brat, February 28, 1972; March 3, 1972; March 10, 1972; March 11, 1972; March
12, 1972; Mashriq, March 12, 1972; and Jasarat (Karachi) March 6, 1972.
1lbrat, March 11, 1972. See also Sun News Service, March 3, 1972.
"Sun News Service, March 3, 1972.
WIbrat, April 3, 1972; see also Sun News Service, February 25, 1972.

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 BRUCE J. ESPOSITO 433

for being too limited.

of the National Awami
the expectation of the
Pakistan NAP, stated t
fit from the new land
their praise. Khan Abd
League, described Bhut
tion" for millions of Haris. Mohammad Hanif, Minister of Labor Works
and Local Bodies in the Bhutto Cabinet, said tihe reforms would revolutionize
the entire economic structure of the country. Syed Hasan Mahmood, a politi-
cal independent, described the land reform program as "drastic" land "far.
reaching and fundamental."'5

ECONOMIC IMPACT

The Pakistan Government has not released the total area of land resumed
under the Bhutto land reform program, but all indications point to a limited
redistribution.l6
One way to gauge the approximate amount of resumed land indirectly is
by reference to the 1960 Agricultural Census. This Census indicates that
there were less than 14,000 farms 'larger than (150 acres.17 A portion of these
over ia decade were probably divided as a result of Islamic inheritance pro-
cedures and the feeling of landlords that after the 1958 reforms there would

"Land for the Landless (n.p., n.p., 1972), p. 19.

"6Earlier land reform measures will add some perspective to Bhutto's. In West Paki-
stan, a few ineffective land reform measures were attempted in the various provinces be-
fore West Pakistan was merged into one unit in 1955. These reforms generally had
extremely limited economic inpact. See Twenty-years of Pakistan, 1947-1967, Karachi,
1967; Economic Adviser to the Government of Pakistan; Ministry of Finance, Economy
of Pakistan, 1948-1968 (Islamabad, 1968). The first significant land reform in Pakistan
was taken under Ayub Khan. On February 7, 1959, West Pakistan Land Reforms Regu-
lations (Martial Law Regulation No. 64) was promulgated and immediately came into
effect. A West Pakistan Land Commission was created; the governor of West Pakistan,
who was its ex-officio Chairman, appointed five members to this body. The Commission
was a statutory body and was invested with all the powers necessary for the implemen-
tation of land reform. The Commission elected one of its members as the Chief Land
Commissioner, who then was the highest appellate authority under the law.
A ceiling of 500 acres for irrigated land and 1,000 acres for unirrigated land, with
certain exemptions, was laid down under the new law. In the sale of the resumed land,
the tenants were given the first choice. The land owner was offered compensation by
way of interest-bearing bonds redeemable in 25 years. Jagirdari was completely abolished
without compensation. Security of tenure was guaranteed to the tenants. Splintering
of lands into uneconomic units was prohibited. (Economy of Pakistan 1948-1968, pp. 38-
41.)
An area of 2,352,716 acres was resumed under the Land Reform Program. By 1968,
1,600,000 acres were disposed of by sale. The remaining -land in part was available for
sale as well as use by the provincial governments. It is estimated that the number of
people who benefited from these reforms was about 200,000. Approximately 150,000
were tenants in cultivating possession of the resumed land which was sold to them.
(Ibid., p. 44.)
"7Agricultural Census Organization, Ministry of Agriculture and Work, 1960 Pakistan
Census of Agriculture Vol II (Karachi: Manager of Publication, 1963), p. 217.

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 434 AGRARIAN REFORM IN PAKISTAN

be continued limits placed on the amount of land they could own.

Moreover,, among the over-150 acre farms, almost half were listed as "j oint
farms," which means that each -of the owners would be entitled to the maxi-
mum acreage. On ithe 'other hand, there is no indication that smaller-sized
farms were enlarged to over 150 acres in the period since 1960. According
to the 1960 Census, the 114,000 farms total about 4.9 million acres. However,
only 1.6 million acres 'of this is listed by the Census as "cultivated area."
The rest is either grazingland or other non-arable land.18
An examination of the spatial distribution 'of the 14,000 farms over 150
acres shows that 'over 25% are in the Kalat Division alone, 40% are found
in D. I. Khan, Sargodha, Quetta, and Rawalpindi Division's. One would infer
from this that most of these farms were non-irrigated and, hence, a landlord
could have a farm in excess 'of 300 acres, but under the 15,000 produce index
units.
One!observer suggested that the landowners from whom land will be re-
sumed will probably be less than six hundred.'9 It is also likely that some
resumed land will be retained by the provincial governments since that is
what happened when Ayub Khan initiated his 1958 land reform program. A
portion of the cost of provincial government is paid by renting land to ten-
ants, a practice that gives rise to part of the unwillingness to distribute all
the land.20
One area where statistics are available is in the Dadu District of the Sind,
where 'over 100,000 peasants are landless. In this District, 288 declarations
were filed by landowners under the Land Reform Regulation. Of these 288
declarations, 187 pertain to land already alienated by December 20, 1971,
and 44 declarations were filed by present or former government employees.
In addition, 20 declarations have claimed extra land because a tubewell has
been installed or 'a tractor used. Only 66 declarations have been filed by
landlords who have to surrender land.
In view of these 'declarations, the Government would probably resume only
6,000 acres from private landowners and 1,800 acres from government ser-
vants-in 'all 7,800 acres for distribution to landless in this district. Much
resumed land is listed as cultivable waste land is 'not irrigated. Nonetheless,
if the 7,800 acres are distributed at the rate of 16 'acres each, subsistencee
acreage), approximately 488 landless peasants (2.5%) in the District will
receive land. Reportedly, over 120,000 acres were available for distribution
throughout the Sind 'and an estimated 50,000 peasants were to benefit.2'
In the 'other provinces of Pakistan, according to 'a February 1973 report,

181960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, p. 217. See also Douglas M. Jones, Some Com-
ments on the Recent Land Reform Proposals for Pakistan.
9Jones, Some Comments on the Recent Land Reform Proposals for Pakistan, p. 4.
"'Interview with Secretary of the Punjab Land Commissioner, July 1972. The Secre-
tary speculated that at one point all this land would probably have to be given to the
peasants.
"Pakistan Times, November 1, 1972; Pakistan Times, December 9, 1972; Dawn, De-
cember 10, 1972.

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 BRUCE J. ESPOSITO 435

211,000 acres of land w

tural section of the cou
slow, and as of early 1
tributed.22 The pace of distribution can only in part be explained by bureau
cratic inertia and provincial corruption; mainly it is the apparent lack of
Central Government drive to implement the Land Reform Regulation.
In the North West Frontier Province, 298,890 acres were resumed, and in
Baluchistan over 768,800 acres. The resumed land in these areas is generally
poor with desert-like conditions prevailing. In available sources there is little
indication of the number of landless peasants who will benefit.
The Central Government, in trying to make these new owners economi-
cally viable, has in some instances provided limited loans for seed, fertilizer
and agricultural implements. But in general, the consensus of informed
agrarian opinion is that less than 5 % of the peasants will in some way benefit
from the Bhutto's land reform.23

FUTURE OF LAND REFORM

Political problems and economic-technological factors were the major

constraints on Bhutto's land reform program and any further improvement
in the condition of the peasantry. One of Bhutto's first objectives was to
consolidate his own power and to restore political stability while he still
had a massive popular following. A constitution was drafted and deftly ma-
neuvered through the Assembly. The knotty problems of the form of govern-
ment and the division iof power between the center and the provinces was
settled by the end of October 1972. He further consolidated his rule by dis-
missing several military officers who possibly could have developed into po-
litical rivals. Political control of the North West Frontier Province and
Baluchistan was wrested from opposition party control, thereby further
strengthening Bhutto.
The organization 'of the'PPP also inhibits reform. The Party, during its
rise, was indiscriminate in accepting various adherents, i.e., large landown-
ers as well as the tenant farmers. Hence, there is little consensus in the Party
on what is a proper agrarian policy. Moreover, the lack of centralism and
discipline in the Party was deliberately encouraged by the PPP because of
continual harassment under the -Ayub and Yahya regimes. These policies
allowed maximum independence and flexibility at all levels and were con-
sidered the best defense against persecution.24
Perhaps the major limiting factor is the apparent low priority that land
reform and agrarian development has within the Bhutto Government.
Bhutto's land reform program essentially completes the land redistribution
process.
With the limited rural development funds available and only half-hearted

22Pakistan Times, January 5,1974.

2"Discussion with Pakistani officials and U.S. AID officials in July 1972.
2'Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 1972, p. 18.

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436 AGRARIAN REFORM IN PAKISTAN

Central Government support, the major rural problems remain. For exam-
pie, of the 680 million dollar budget in 1972-73, over half was allocated to
defense. Twenty million was allocated for "low cost housing and environ-
mental improvement" and twenty-three million allocated for starting a na-
tionwide public works program. The latter two figures are placed in per-
spective when one compares the 3.2 million spent on a new house for the
President in the capital.25
Rural credit, once dominated by the Hindu moneylender and now their
Muslim replacements, is inadequate. Modern banking facilities are few in
number 'and limited by the funds they can invest in the countryside. Rural
unemployment and severe underemployment is variously estimated by ob-
servers 'as between 25-60% of the total working male (10 years or 'over)
rural population.20 This enormously unproductive group tends to reduce the
general standard of living in the provinces.
Agricultural productivity doubled during the decade of the sixties but
will begin to level loff in the 1970s. Since 1972, 65-70% of the irrigated whea
acreage is now planted with high-yielding varieties and much of the surplus
created by the new technology has been absorbed by increased per capita
consumption and higher birth rates.27
The longstanding problem 'of tenancy 'appears in the late 1960s 'and in the
1970s to have taken la new form-with many tenants completely expelled
from the land land becoming casual day laborers or unemployed. A compari-
*son of the 1960 Agricultural Census28 and a Pretest for Second Census of
Agriculture in Pakistan (1970)29 indicates that for selected districts in the
Sind, Punjab, North West Frontier, .and Baluchistan there is a general reduc-
tion in the number of tenant farms (a tenant is defined as "a farmer who
operated land belonging to others and pays fixed rent in cash or kind or a
share of the produce"), an increase in the number of owner cum tenant
farms (an owner cum tenant is 'a "farmer who owns part of his farm and has
the rest of it as a tenant"), and also an increase in the number of owner
farmers (ian owner farmer is a "farmer who owns his farm"). The exact
meaning of these statistics are open to interpretation. It is this writer's view
that the 1970 Pretest results failed to account for completely landless peas-
ants-that is, agricultural day workers. Hence, what one actually has is a
reduction in tenancy but with many tenants being forced off the land com-
pletely to become casual day laborers or unemployed. The Pretest results
could'also be interpreted to mean that some tenants did benefit from the
Ayub Khan land reform program of 1959, 'and this accounts for the increase
in part owner/tenants. It is also known that many absentee land owners and

"5New York Times, June 23,1972, p. 7.

26Twenty Years of Pakistan 1947-1967, pp. 175-176.
27U.S. AID Pakistan, Economic Data Sheets (1972), p. 3; Office of Agricultural Policy,
U.S. AID Pakistan, Pakistan Agricultural Sector Analysis (Pakistan, 1972), pp. 10-11.
`81960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture Vol. 11.
"9M.Z.A. Temur, Pretest for Second Census of Agriculture in Pakistan (Lahore:
n.p., 1971).

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 BRUCE J. ESPOSITO 437

owner/tenants found
profitable iand tended
tenants casual day laborers.
Partial documentary evidence corroborates the above thesis. Rochin, who
did an off-farm migration study of the Hazara District in the North West
Frontier Province, suggests an increasing rate of off-farm migration in the
period from 1961 to 1971. This could be partially explained by increasing
numbers of people attempting to earn a living by agricultural means and
simply not being;able to support their families. At the time of their departure,
60%o of the migrants left families who were farming less than 5 acres of
barani rainede) land. Another 30% of :the migrants left families who were
farming between 5 and 10 acres 'of barani. In either case, these men would in
effect be severely underemployed (recall that 16 acres represents subsistence
agriculture for barani land) or else on casual day labor.30
According to one report, waterlogging and the associated problem of salin-
ity account for the loss of over 40,000 acres ia year.3' Plakistan's share of
the Induis water, according to the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, is the total
annual flow of the three western rivers (i.e., the Indus, Jhelum, and the
Chenab). India has been allocated the exclusive rights to the water of the
eastern rivers, (i.e., the Ravi, Beas, and Sutley) with !a total annual mean
flow of 142 million acre feet (MAF). Pakistan must now use this water to
irrigate areas which have traditionally been irrigated by eastern rivers as
well as the watersheds of the western rivers. Itappears, according to a USAID
study that, by 1985:

Pakistan will likely approach the practical upper limits of its irrigation
potential; that is, most of the water sources available for irrigation that
can be economically exploited will have been tapped.32

All available evidence suggests the economic import of the Bhutto land re-
form will be limited land that agrarian development has a 'low priority in
Central Government perspective. The PPP pledge that it stands for "elimi-

80Refugio I. Rochin, Some Aspects of Off-farm Migration from Hazara District, West
Pakistan (Ford Foundation Study, 1971).
"1Said Hasan, Pakistan: The Story Behind Its Economic Development (New York:
Vantage Press, 1971), p. 175. See also Indus Times, June 23, 1963 and June 24, 1963.
L. Dudley Stump, Asia: A Regional and Economic Geography (London: Methnen & Co.,
Ltd., 1952, revised edition), pp. 170-340. The problem stems from the generally porous
nature of Pakistan soils and wide-spread leakage of the extensive irrigation system.
This lost water tends to raise the water level bringing with it salt compounds which
lay at lower soil levels.
82Office of Agricultural Policy, U.S. AID Pakistan, Pakistan Agricultural Sector
Analysis, p. 17.

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438 AGRARIAN REFORM IN PAKISTAN

nation of feudalism and will take con

lished principles of socialism to prot
peasantry,"33 may well turn outito

"Article 6 of the Programmatic Princip

BRUCE J. ESPOSITO is Assistant Professor

Connecticut.

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